Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 1 · Chapter 4
CHAP. IV.
There is no pluralitie of perfections in the Infinite essence; albeit the perfection of all thinges be in him. Of the Absolute Identitie of the Divine essence and attributes.
AS for the argument, which you propose, We must eyther allowe the Gods to have bodies, or deny them sense, because sense is never founde without a body. I see no great cause to mislike it; especially if it be rightly proposed, as it may be, thus, because sense (to witt in proper speeche) cannot be founde without a body. For is not sense an organicall facultie, that is such a facultie as cannot exercise its function without materiall instruments? How you dispute in justifyinge your censure upon this argument, let the Reader judge. God the supreame Artificer can make Virtus formatrix, (you say) doe more then Epicurus can by all his sense and reason; and hence you conclude, that therfore God hath both sense and reason. Wheras you may as well proove that God hathe bodily substance in him, both because he setts virtus formatrix, on woorke in producing bodies, and can doe more then we can withall our bodies and soules. Therfore if you please, you may in confidence of such illations, proceede to say that God consists of a body, and soule too. The Psalmists Philosophy is a poore ground for you to builde on. For you may as well conclude out of the Psalmist, that God hathe eyes, and eares, and handes allso, as when he say the, The eyes of the Lord are over the righteous, & his eares are open unto their prayers. The Psal. 34. 15. Psal. 118. …6.right hand of the Lord is exalted, the right hand of the Lord hath done valiantly. And if you are pleased to attribute sense unto God, why doe you not attribute unto him feeling, and smelling, and tastinge allso? Whatsoever we come to understand by our five senses, why may not God understand the same without sense, as well as Angells. That God only is, and all thinges numerable are but mere shadowes of his beinge, are your owne principles and phrases; & to drawe conclusions from such groundes, is to builde Castles in the Ayre. You thinke to helpe it by sayinge, that Hearing sight and reason are in God according to their ideall patternes or perfections, you might have taken in three senses more as well, and have sayde that smelling, …astinge and feelinge are in God according to Ideall patternes and perfections; and justify Epicurus too, in maynteyninge that the Gods have bodies. For thoughe our Saviour sayde, a Spirite hath not fleshe and bone, yet you knowe howe to justifie that bodies and soules, and fleshe and bone, and Luc. 24. …9braynes and senses, yea and the basest thinge that is, are in God, to witt, according to their ideall patternes and perfections. For we make no question, but that all these thinges are knowne to God, and he is able to produce them, (& no more doe you require in the next Section unto this, that all thinges are in God;) yea materia pr…a and all. And this conceyte of yours you prosecute▪ with a great deale more Rhetoricke then Philosophy or Logicke. Certeinly not to be, and not to have operation, are farre more different betweene themselves, then nihil agere, and otium esse. For these are formally the same, the other are not. For like …, to be, and to worke, are in themselves manifestly distinct, so must be their negations allso; so are not nihil agere, & otium esse.
2. Your affectation of phrasifyinge, more like a Rhetorician, then a Philosopher, makes you overlashe and cast your selfe upon resemblances without all proportion. As when you say, all thinges are in Gods power, as strengthe to moove our limmes is in our sinewes, or motive faculty. Now in this, I say, is no proportion. For seinge all thinges are in God because he can produce them, so strengthe (by just proportion) should be in our sinewes, because our sinewes coulde produce it, which is palpably untrue. You shoulde rather say, as the motion of our limbes is in our sinewes, or in our motive facultie rather, because our motive facultie can produce such motion. Yet this were a very strange resemblance taken at the best. For it is nothinge strange that our motive facultie shoulde moove our limbes; but that God, shoulde produce all thinges out of nothing, is so wonderfull strange a thing, that the most learned Philosophers could never digest it, and the H. Ghost imputes it unto faithe that we believe it. Here Hebr. 11. 3.you confesse that sense cannot be without a corporall organ, whence it followe the manifestly, that if sense be in God, then allso corporall organs must be found in God. And agayne you confesse, that what we feele by sense, he knowes much better without sense: how litle then did it, become you to professe, that he argued like himselfe (that is sottishly belike) who sayde, we must eyther allowe the Gods to have bodies, or deny them sense? I make no question, but that the Divine essence represents the natures of all thinges: For by knowing himselfe, Divines say, he knowes all thinges. But is this representation only of natures extant as you speake? If so; how did he knowe all thinges before the World was? howe shall he knowe all thinges, after that the World shall cease to be, some natures only reserved. How varietie sets foorthe unitie, as you speake, I am to seeke; yet the variety of Gods creatures, by your leave, is not infinite.
3. Of the questions proposed by you, let the Reader judge, as they deserve; as allso of your solution of them, & of your more accurate and exquisite distinction of universalitie, and totalitie, then the Platonicks ever atteyned too, you distinguishinge it, not only from that totality, which arisethe from aggregation of parts, but from that allso, whose extent is not more then equall to all the parts: which last member, I confesse, is very curious, to witt, that there shoulde be a totalitie more then equall to all his parts; and I litle woonder that the Platonickes, were not acquainted with this subtile curiositie. Gods nature we acknowledge to have no parts, but yet conteynes all entities, not formally, but vertually, or eminently and examplarily; which eminent comprehension is equivalent to a formall comprehension of all (if possible) thoughe the number of them were infinite; but not greater, because a number cannot be imagined greater then infinite. Exhaustinge by particulars derived from them, belongs to natures that conteyne the particulars formally; as a bushell of wheate by substraction of graynes may be exhausted, it belongs not to natures, that conteyne particulars eminently. To say that God is being it selfe, or perfection, dothe not exclude pluralitie in my judgement, and that for this reason. Humanitie is humanitie it selfe, yet this hinderethe not, but that many thousands may be partakers of humanitie. In like sort, thoughe divine perfection be perfection it selfe, yet this hinderethe not, but that many may be partakers of Divine perfection. But you speake, I confesse, of pluralitie in the nature of God, and that in respect of attributes reall, not of denominations personall. For pluralitie her of undoubtedly you doe not deny. Now to say that God is all perfections eminently, dothe no way hinder his formall unitie; as likewise his formall unitie dothe nothing prejudice his perfectious eminent pluralitie.
4. I see no cause for this distinction of yours, concerning Ideall perfections, & internall perfections. For if you understand ideall perfections of perfections externall and possible to be created by God, but from everlasting represented unto God by his essence; there is no cause why you should exclude the pluralitie of these from the essence of God. For what Divine can doubt, but that as the perfections of created thinges are many, so they are all knowne by God, and from everlasting were represented unto God; and pluralitie of finite perfections represented unto God, and knowne by him, dothe no way hinder the unitie of Gods infinite essence, no more then it hinders the unitie of our soules essence, such as it is. But if you meane it not of Idea representata, but representans; so I grant, there is but one in God, as there is but one essence, which essence of God represents all entities, and quiddities possible. But the argument which you use to proove this unitie in God, is neyther congruous, nor sound. Not congruous, because it tends only to this, namely to proove that God is illimited and infinite; as much as to say, that all kinde of entities are comprehended in the nature of God; but whether they are so comprehended, as with distinction of pluralitie, or without, that is another question, to the cleering wherof, you conferre nothinge for ought I yet perceave. You demaund, if Gods beinge be absolutely illimited, what could limit or restrayne it from being power, from being wisedome, from being goodnes, from being infinitely whatsoever any thing that hath being is? I leave the congruity of your last phrase to be justified by your selfe. I dare not say, that God is whatsoever man or beast is. But touching your interrogation, I say, it is nothing to the purpose. For the question in present is not, whether Gods being be bothe life and power, and wisedome, and goodnes, and whatsoever any thinge is, which is your phrase, not mine: But the question is, whether all these are one in God, or more, that is, whether his life be his power, and both, his wisedome, and all these his goodnes, and every thinge els, that any creature is, whose beinge allso (as you say) is infinitely in God. Not whether all these thinges are in God, but whether all these are drawne to an unitie in God, without all pluralitie? If you frame your argument in another fashion to helpe this, as thus; What hindereth Gods life from being his power, and wisedome &c. I answere that the formall notions of these is sufficient to hinder it, except you can give some better reason to the contrary, then hitherto you have done. A second incongruitie I finde in your discourse and that is this. That question, the decision wherof you meditate in this chapter, arose from that which formerly you maynteyned; that all thinges were in God, in a kinde of Ideall, and transcendentall manner, nowe your selfe have confessed that Ideaes were of substances, if not only of them. For your wordes are these, If Plato meant that there were as many severall Ideaes eternally extant, whether in the first cause of thinges, or without him, as there were substances specifically distinct, &c. But here you give instance only in such thinges as are of accidentall notion and denomination with us, such as are life, and power, and wisedome, and goodnes. Lastly, I have allready shewed that this argument of yours is not sounde, wherby you proove Gods being to be illimited, because forsoothe it is independant: As if this consequence were evident of it selfe, wheras on the contrary, all Philosophy is against it. For Aristotle maynteyned the World to be independent; all others maynteyned the matter wherof the world was made to be independent: Yet none conceaved, that herehence it woulde followe, that eyther of them was therfore illimited, or at all illimited. That Gods attributes are not really distinguished, we all confesse, you neede not have brought in Austins authoritie to justify this. But you take upon you to confront Atheists by evidence of demonstration wherin you fayle very much. For it will not followe, that if these attributes be distinct among themselves, or from the essence of God, then the Divine essence is limited. Like as on the contrary, it will not followe, that if the essence of something be limited, the attributes therof must needes be distinct from the essence. For the soule of man is limited, yet some have maynteyned that the faculties of the soule are not really distinct from the essence of the soule, as Scotus, & that by shrewde arguments. And Zabarell professethe, that Intellectus practicus is all one with Voluntas. And all beit the power of God be distinct from the wisedome of God, yet if bothe be acknowledged to be infinite, each in his kinde, what prejudice is this to the infinitenes of Gods essence? Neyther will it followe, that one attribute shall want so much of infinite beinge in his kinde, as another hathe of proper being distinct from it; consideringe that these notions are of different kindes. As for example, if a body, as put the case, the outward heaven, were infinite, there shoulde be bothe infinite lengthe, and infinite breadthe, and infinite thicknes, neythers infinitenes being any whit prejudiciall to the infinitenes of the other, because they are of different kindes. And what colour of reason have you, why infinitenes of power should prejudice the infinitenes of wisedome, thoughe they were distinct really, which yet we believe they are not. And what thinke you, if some attributes be founde answerable to personall distinctions in the Trinity? Is it not commonly sayde that the second person in Trinity is the wisedome of the Father, and commethe from the Father per modum intellectus; and that the H. Ghost proceedeth from bothe per modum voluntatis? But I have no edge to looke into the Arke, or suffer my disputation to trenche upon these mysteries. Yet I confesse, thoughe the Father be not the Sonne, nor the H Ghost, &c. Yet they are not really distinct one from the other. In the Trinity there is alius & alius, not aliud & aliud. But you maynteyne that Gods power is his wisedome, &c. which yet notwithstanding I misl…ke not, but only doe question the argument, wherby you endeavour to proove it, and to my judgement it seemes very superficiall. But my comfort is this, if you weakely maynteyne the nature of God, you will as weakely oppose the grace of God. Agayne I say, it will not followe, that if the severall beings of wisedome and power were distinct, and not identically the same with the essence of God, then the essence should not be infinite. For it may be sayde that the essence is infinite in a beinge substantiall; the power and wisedome of God are infinite in a being accidentall, thoughe such as necessarily flowes from the nature of God. Indeede if it were prooved, that there is no accident in God, then the case were cleere, that these attributes were not distinct from the essence of God, as indeede they are not; but this is more then hitherto you have prooved. And till you have prooved it, they may be conceaved as distinct from the essence (as before hathe bene sayde) without any prejudice to the infinity of Gods essence, or danger of exposing it unto nakednes, for ought your discourse, hathe as yet alleaged to the contrary.
5. As for that definition of a thing absolutely infinite; Infinitum est, extra quod nihil est, which you make so much reckonninge of; I take it to be a vayne conceyte; considering that the Philosophers who urged it, never made any such construction of it, as you doe; but applyinge it only to materiall bodies of quantitie and extension, maynteyned that in this sense the World was infinite. But Aristotle dothe not approove of such a notion of infinite, as nothinge agreable with the denomination; the world being finite rather then infinite in his opinion; and yet as they all thought, without the world nothing was. Yet some in my knowledge have avouched the world to be infinite, thoughe I nothing commend eyther their learninge, or their honestie herein. And in those former dayes finitum & infinitum, were taken only for materiall differences of bodies nothing at all belonging to immateriall natures, abstract from bodily or materiall extension of parts. And Zabarell (as I remember) observes as much (as touching the opinion of Aristotle) upon the last chapters of the eighthe booke of Physicks. And howe farre foorthe infinitum is to be acknowledged in nature, Aristotle in his Physicks hath discoursed. Now in the sense before spoken of, it is very absurd, to attribute such a definition of infinity unto God, who is not only a Spirite but the Father of Spirits, and incapable of parts, much more of extension in any materiall manner. But let the wordes be shaped after such a construction as you devise to make the definition suitable to the nature of God; to witt, as if he were such an entitie, as comprehendes all entitie. I say it is manifestly untrue. For is not the World & all the parts therof, from Angells unto the basest woorme that creepethe, and drop of mire, or sparkle of fire, or the least cinder; are not all these something, and that extra Deum? For thoughe eminently they may be sayde to be in God, yet undoubtedly they are extra Deum formally; and to my understanding it is absurde to say, they are identically conteyned in Gods essence. It is true that Gods essence dothe represent them. For God knowes them not, but by knowing of himselfe and his essence, and beinge of infinite power, can produce any thing that implyes not contradiction. I cannot represent a fitt comparison: but such as the creature can affoard if you give me leave to make use of, I say that every thing which a glasse represents, is not identically conteyned in the glasse, neyther is it true, that whatsoever is knowne by the understanding of man or Angell, is identically conteyned in the understanding or spirite of man or Angell. As I have sayde, so I say agayne; I see no evidence of that consequence you make thus; God is illimited, therfore all thinges are in God; and therfore allso, all thinges that are in God, or are attributed unto him are all one. That which you adde, when you say, whatsoever is uncapable of limit, is uncapable of division or numericall difference, is very ambiguous; and the ambiguitie being cleered, will proove partly to be without all question, and nothinge to the purpose, partly as questionable as ever, where it is to the purpose. For that, that which is infinite in essence, must be one and not many, I thinke is without question even amongst Atheists nowadayes, that have any learning in them; allthough a man may fayle in the demonstration of it, as here you doe. For to be infinite in essence, is to comprehend all specificall entities not numericall. For such, as such, differ not in essence. And for it to be multiplied according to numericall differences only, seemes nothing prejudiciall to the infinitie of the essence, save only as infinity of essence is corruptly conceaved to imply quantitie. Infinity of power dothe more evidently include opposition to numericall pluralitie, then infinity of essence in my judgement. But be it, not only without question, but allso supposed to have bene made evident by some demonstration of yours, yet is it nothing to the present question. For the question in present is not, whether there may be two Gods: but only, whether in the one nature of God, there be not thinges different; to witt whether Gods wisdome be not different from his power, and both these different from his goodnes; that is in a word, whether there be not any accident in God. And yet, unto this question you are arrived, but in a very indecent, and incongruous manner. For wheras before you had undertaken to proove, that all thinges were in God accordinge to ideall perfections, by all thinges understandinge substances cheifly, as of Angells, and men, and beasts of all sorts. And in this chapter doe undertake to shewe, that all things thus being in God, are not in him by way of pluralitie, but drawne to unitie: and accordingly should herby proove, that the essence of an Angell, and the essence of a man, yea and the essence of a beast, and of every base thing is so in God, as one with him, and one with every thinge: You shift of from this, and in the place therof, only mention, how Gods life, and wisedome, and power, and goodnes are all one in God. And this you proove only from this, that God is illimited; which is as sory a consequence as that, wherby you prooved his illimited condition, to witt from this, that he is independent, and receaved not his being from any thinge. Which consequence of yours, is so farre from naturall evidence, that it is repugnant to all Philosophers of olde, who maynteyned eyther the World, or the first matter (not to speake of Intelligences) to be independent of any efficient cause, and without all makinge, yet did never conceave that herehence it must followe, that eyther of them should be infinite. No lesse inconsequent is that, which followeth allso, as when you say, Whersoever it can be truly sayde, this is one and that another, or this is, and is not that, each hath distinct limits. I say this is untrue. For suppose a body were infinite; In this case bothe lengthe, and bredthe, and thicknes were infinite; yet lengthe were only lengthe, and not bredthe, yet never a whit the lesse infinite. Neyther is infinity in thicknes any hinderance to infinity in breadthe, though breadthe be not thicknes; nor infinity in breadthe, any hinderance to infinity in lengthe, thoughe lengthe be not breadthe. In like sort the infinity of Gods power shoulde be no prejudice to the infinity of his wisedome, though his wisedome be not his power; Nor the infinitie of his goodnes, any prejudice to the infinitie of his power, and wisedome, thoughe his power, and wisedome, and goodnes were different in themselves. But to come nearer; what thinke you of the Persons in the Trinitie? The Father is the Father, and neyther is he the Sonne, nor the Holy Ghost; will you herehence conclude that he is not infinite? The Sonne is the Sonne, but he is neyther the Father nor the Holy Ghost; will you therfore say, he is not infinite? The Holy Ghost, is the Holy Ghost, but neyther the Father nor the Sonne, will you hence inferre that he hathe limits, and is not infinite? And is it not confessed not only by great Schoolemen, but even by our divines allso, that the Sonne is produced of the Father per modum intellectus? Is he not the wisedome of the Father, and what difference betweene the wisedome of God, and the understanding of himselfe? And doe they not allso confesse, that the H. Ghost proceedes from bothe per modum voluntatis? And as we say, Gods understanding is not his will, though it be no different thing from his will; and Gods will is not his understandinge, thoughe it be no different thinge from his understandinge, so we may adore the indivisible unitie of the Godhead, notwithstanding the Trinity of the Persons, thoughe we are not able to comprehended the mystery herof. It is true, our understanding is such, as that, oportet intelligentem phantasmata speculari; & imaginatio non transcendit continuum. Yet notwithstandinge we atteyne by discourse to the acknowledgment of thinges immateriall, as of our soules, yea and of Angells; yea and of the God both of men & Angells; yet not by materiall thinges as by the pictures of them, as you phrasify it, but rather as in the effects; wherein as it were in glasses doe shine the causes of them. Thus Aristotle from the motions of the heavens hathe inferred the existence of immateriall and abstract substances as the moovers of them. And we commonly say, that the World is as a glasse wherein the glory of God is represented. His eternall power and Godhead being made manifest by his workes, as the Apostle speakethe Rom. 1. 20. Of Gods illimited beinge we make no question; but well we may question the soundnes of your arguments, wherby you proove it, as allso the soundnes of those consequences, which you make from it. And farre better it is to content our selves with the simplicitie of our Christian faithe, in believinge of God, what Gods word teachethe us, then to depend upon weake reason for the confirmation therof. For weake reasons doe rather betray a cause, then justify it. We believe that God is one, and that there is no pluralitie of natures in him, but only of Persons. And we must take heede that the Metaphysicall extract of vis unita fortior (which you speake of) doe not so farre possesse us with the contemplation of Gods unity, as to deny the Trinity. And touchinge the attributes of God, as neyther distinct from the essence of God, nor from themselves, we doe not much affect curiosity of demonstration; but if any man voluntarily undertake such a taske, we looke for substance of sound proofes, and are not content to have our mouthes filled with emty spoones. You seeme to gratify God with your hyperboles; but surely he dothe not put us to tell any untruthes for him, as man dothe for man, to gratify him. You enterteyne a conceyte of Gods power, above all conceyte of infinite power; of Gods wisedome above all conceyte of infinite wisedome; of Gods goodnes above all conceyte of infinite goodnes. To be essentiall to the nature of God, is more noble, I grant, then to be accidentall: but howe any power can be greater then power infinite, or any wisedome greater then wisedome infinite, or any goodnes greater then goodnes infinite, I cannot comprehend yet I verily believe, that whersoever infinite power, & infinite wisedome, & infinite goodnes is founde, that nature is not accidentally but essentially both powerfull, and wise, & good, as namely the nature of God: thoughe of the evident demonstration therof, for ought you have brought to helpe us herein, we may be still to seeke. As for succession, and extension, we holde that each is impossible to be infinite. And neyther of them any attribute of God, as power, and wisedome, and goodnes is. And therfore, the comparison you make of the nature of God in this kinde, must needes be wonderous wilde.
Yet I envy no man the delight that he takes in these and such like contemplations, but rather wonder that succession, and extension shoulde be reckoned up by you as excellencyes and perfections conteyned in God, and that all these mentioned attributes layde out in severall, should have infinities added unto them. Much more should we have wondered, if the issue of your discourse had bene answearable to the originall, which is to shewe, not how power, and wisedome, & goodnes are all one in God, which are with us of accidentall denomination; but to shewe how every substance is in God, of Angell, of man, of beasts, of birds, of fishes, of woormes and every creeping thinge; and that all these are to be accoumpted excellencyes and perfections. And surely they had neede to be in God, in a more excellent manner, then they are in themselves; otherwise their advancing so highe, woulde be too great a degrading of the nature of God.
But to adde my mite of discourse, touching the being of all thinges in God, and the precise unitie of all thinges in God, which under a forme of pluralitie according to our conceytes, are attributed unto him. As touching the first, that all perfections are in God, is to be acknowledged without all controversy, because we understand by God such a nature, as nothing can be imagined better; and I approove of Aquinas his reason. Like as heate if it did exist of it selfe, it should comprehende all degrees of heate: so the essence of God being all one with his existence, that is he beinge essentially foreign, all perfections of being must necessarily be comprehended in him. But as for the perfections of beinge which are founde without God, according to their severall rankes and kindes therein; …s namely of being, without life, of being and life without sense, or reason; of beinge, life, & sense without reason, of bothe beinge, life, and sense, and reason: as they are not like unto God according to any univocall notion of Species, o…kind, but only analogicall, which as Aquinas shewethe, is this, that God is entitie by essence; every other thinge is an entity only by participation. So likewise their perfections cannot be sayde to be in God univocally, but only analogically, as the effect is sayde to be in the Agent, in as much as he hathe power to produce it. It is true, some thinges are attributed unto creatures, which cannot be attributed unto God; and some thinges are attributed bothe to God, and to the creatures. As for example; God is not a body, man is a body; God is a spirite, an Angell is a spirite; God hath beinge, so have all thinges; God hath life, so have many thinges. God is wise, good, powerfull; these attributes are likewise conveniently given to men and Angells. Yet these denominations, in admitting wherof bothe God and creatures doe agree, are as different in respect of God and the creatures, as those denominations in the communion wherof they doe not agree. As for example the Spirituall nature of God is as farre different from the spirituall nature of an Angell, as from the bodily nature of ma… or beast, as being infinitely different from eache. And therfore it is that some make the measure of perfections in the creatures not their approximation in nature unto God, but rather their remotion a non esse. One creature having more perfections of beinge then another, & consequently so much the more remooved from not beinge. But the creatures of greatest perfection being but finite are still infinitely remooved from God who is infinite. So that like as the bodily nature of man dothe not agree in any kinde with the spirituall nature of God; so neyther dothe the spirituall nature of an Angell agree in any kinde with the spirituall nature of God. But God is equally an equivocall Agent in respect of bothe. And no merveyle; for the denominations wherein God and the creature agree, are commonly such as are of accidentall denomination unto the creatures; as when we say God is wise, and holy, and powerfull; a man or Angell is wise, and holy, and powerfull &c. But is there any colour why, the nature of God shoulde come nearer unto those thinges that are of accidentall denomination in us, then unto those that are substantiall; wheras every meane scholer knowes, that substances are more noble then accidents, and as for substantiall denominations wherein God, and the creature doe agree, if they be examined, it will be founde that in the resolution of the truthe, the agreement will appeare to be only in negation. As when we say, God is a spirite, the negation of extension corporall and materiall, is the only thinge, wherein the nature of God agreeth with an Angell. Like as our Saviour intimates the description of a spirite in distinction from a man, to consist in this, that a spirite hathe not fleshe and bones. And Luc. 24.as for the generall not on of entitie common to all, marke what a vast difference there is herein betweene God and the creature, and such as excludes all univocation. God is an entity independant, and wherof all other entities depend bothe for their production, and for their preservation, and that out of nothinge, as touching the last resolution of them into their first principles. Let it suffize then, that all perfections are in God, and that they all are his one most pure and most simple essence. But as for created perfections, the word created is a terme diminishing perfection; but such as they are, they are in God only, as effects are in their causes, and they not univocall, but equivocall only, or at the best but analogicall. Let us come to the consideration of the unitie of Gods attributes, especially with Gods essence, whence it will followe, that an unitie of them is to be acknowledged amongst themselves. And the question wil come to this, whether there be any accident in God? Not that I have any edge to these Metaphysicall speculations; or that I thinke our language to be fitt for them, for want of termes of Art in common use to expresse such notions, as here must necessarily occurre: But only being provoked herunto by your discourse, who here and there inculcate foule errors in Divinitie, & that depending sometimes upon these, or such like Metaphysicall contemplations.
Some therfore argue thus. If there were any accident in God, then there shoulde be some essence common unto God with complete substances create, to witt an essence supporting accidents. And if there were any common essence to God with other substances, then there were to be acknowledged something in nature before God; as the Genus is commonly accoumpted in nature before the Species therof. And further, it seemes, that if any genericall nature were common to God and us, then some part of Gods essence should be found in us, and some part of our essence shoulde be found in God. Like as the essence of Animalitie being common unto man & beast, is found both in man and beast. And consequently. God creatinge substances, should create in part a certeyne common essence, which is founde in himselfe, and so the selfe same essence shoulde be bothe the Creator, and the creature. If to avoyde these dangerous consequences, it be replyed that to support accidents is not af any essentiall denomination, but accidentall; as great absurdities seeme to followe on that part allso. For if to support accidents be an accident, this makes way to a progresse in insinitum without ende. For even this supportation of accidents, if it be an accident, must be supported by a substance and so without ende. Agayne if to support accidents be an accident; it must eyther flowe from substance, in case it be an accident proper; or be brought from without by some agent, if it be an accident common. This latter cannot be admitted in respect of God. If the former be, then there must be acknowledged some common essence bothe to God and other substances, whence this accident flowes, and then we are, where we were.
Another argument may be conceaved thus. It is commonly receaved, that every substance is more noble, and of greater dignitie then any accident. And therfore if accidents were to be found in God, some thinge shoulde be founde in God, more ignoble then his creatures.
If accidents were to be found in God, then eyther they shall denote entities of perfection or imperfection. Impossible it is that any entitie of perfection shoulde be founde in God. For Deus est quo nihil melius excogitari potest. If of perfection, then it is the very essence of God and no accident, for as much as Gods essence is foreign, which comprehendes all perfection of entitie. Like as heate comprehendes all degrees of heate.
Agayne an accident is compared to the subject, as an act to the power of receavinge it. But there can be no power passive in God: For as much as passive power is allwayes perfited by the act. And so the nature of God should admitt perfection from an accident.
Lastly, God is a Spirite, and therfore no bodily or materiall accident can be found in God; if any be found in him, it must be spirituall. Nowe as Aristotle saythe, there are but three sorts of thinges in the minde of man, and they are eyther faculties, or passions, or habits. Of these, passions are too base to be attributed unto God, and they are not severed from change. And as for habits, they suppose an imperfect nature, which is perfited by them, which cannot be verified of the nature of God. Nowe the faculties of God are eyther of understandinge, or of willing, which are operations immanent or of working without by operations transient. If it may appeare, that Gods facultie of understandinge is all one with the act of his understandinge, then it will therby appeare that the facultie of the understanding is not distinct from the nature it selfe of God: considering, that albeit it is without question that the facultie of mans understanding is distinct from the act of his understandinge; yet some have questioned, whether the faculties of a mans soule be really distinct from the substance of the soule, and maynteyned that they are not, as namely the Sco…ists. But what neede we proceede further. Aristotle him selfe, that great naturalist hathe acknowledged the first moover to be his life, and his intelligence.
Yet consider in reason; If Gods essence and existence be all one; how much more his understanding facultie; and his actuall intelligence. For an understandinge facultie can easily produce the act of understanding; but essence cannot give it selfe existence. But essence and existence in God are all one. For if they were not, then eyther his existence should flowe from his essence, which is a thing utterly impossible. (For act cannot flowe from possibilitie; neyther can any thing be conceaved to be productive, unles it suppose existence.) Or existence must proceede from some exter…or Agent that causethe it; Now this were to maynteyne some superior cause unto God himselfe, which hathe power to create him. In which case he should have something better then himselfe, which is flat contradiction to the nature of God, whome we conceave to be such, as nothing better then he can be imagined. But I willingly professe, I nothing like these curiosities, neyther did I ever give my selfe to this kinde of study before. There is no reason but may be shaken by wrangling opposition. Faith cannot.
SECT. II.
Of the Severall branches of absolute infinity; or of the infinity of the Divine attributes as they are severally apprehended by us.