Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 2 · Chapter 6 (2 of 3)

Discovery of Jacksons Vanity · Section 2 · Chapter 6 (2 of 3)

p. 168And whereas you say, that Natures capable of these differences have alwayes the one accomplished by the other, is either without sense; as if you meane it of the parts of time, as if one were accomplished by the other; For how I pray you, is time past or present accomplished by that which is to come, or that which is present or to come accomplished by that which is past: Or if in respect of natures subject to time, which are perfected by time, or rather in the course of time; thus, as it is sometimes true, so sometimes it is notoriously false: For as there is a time of growth in perfection, so it is wel knowne that there is a time of diminution, & corruption also; And, I pray you, how doth a mans dotage accomplish him either in soule or bodie? And in the Kingdome of Heaven, what accomplishment by time, when our glorious condition shalbe as full and perfect at the first, as in the progresse, for what space imaginable soever.

As for this state, 'tis well knowne, that as there is a time of repayring and encreasing, so there is a time of impayring and decaying: And though perfection cannot be perfected, yet it may be continued; so it is in man, so it is in God; but by necessity of nature continued in God; by the pleasure of his gracious will continued in the creature: And therefore though p. 169his essence being infinite excludes such a continuance as is wrought by reiterated acts; yet it excludes not such a continuance as is by necessity of nature, but rather includes it, it being of the nature of life infinite to be as with beginning, so also without end: Even created Angells and Saints shall have no want of continuance in the Kingdome of Heaven; much lesse God the Author of theyr continuance, more then of his owne; Yet shall he continue and that by necessity of nature, both to the worlds end, and after that without end. Yet nothing in him is to come to him; nor nothing from without can come to him; For who should give it him? But the duration both of men and Angells is maynteyned unto them by the will and pleasure of God: And herein consists the true difference betweene the duration of creatures and the Duration of God; For as for prius & posterius, past, and to come, this hath his foundation onelyonly in respect of motion, And therefore time is commonly not reputed a fitt measure for the essences of things, but only for individuall substances: and these only generables, not of substances merely spirituall, as you may remember Plotinus hath taught you. What doe you meane by the degrees or acts of life, an infinitie whereof you place in God? We commonly accoumpt three sorts of life, and no more, to witt, vegetative, sencitive, and rationall; Of an infinitie I never hard before in this kind: And as for the degrees of these, I doubt not but there may be degrees in any; as in each kind some may be more quick and vivacious then other. But none of these kinds, much lesse the degrees of thē ar found in God formally, but iminently: And as for the plurality in respect of such as are decreed by him, the case is cleare, that they are infinitely farre of from infinitie; for undoubtedly the things decreed by God are but finite. I doe not agree with you to conceave God to be everlasting in referēce to perpetuity of succession; for that kind of everlastingnes is a parte past: But eternity cheifely consists in being everlasting a parte ante, and before there was any succession at all.

But here, by the waye, you give me an hint of what you p. 170make your foundation of many wild discourses; and for which I have looked all along; And not till now you have bolted it out, as where you say, Gods interminate existence is present to the whole and every part of succession: which long agoe hath bene discovered to be a very vayne conceit, though embraced by as great a Schoolman as Aquinas himselfe; who hereupon builds his opinion of the presence of all things in Gods eternity: And his opinion herein is built upon a very plausible comparison, and devised correspondencie between Gods immensity and eternitie, for like as God by virtue of his immensity doth fill all places, and should coexist with every part of magnitude, although, upon supposition, it were infinite: In like sort God by reason of his eternity should fill all times, and coexist with all times, and all things that hereafter shall exist in time.

But the fallacie of this comparison, and the error of this assertion hath now long agoe bene discovered by Ioannes Scotus: It is true indeed, God must needs coexist with all 1. Sect: dist: 79. q. 1.places. and all things in place; but not untill the place it selfe▪ and the things therein doe exist: As if the world were twice at bigge as it is, God should coexist in every part of it; But yet God doth not coexist with any such, because, as yet there is not any such to coexist with him: In like sort God shall coexist with all times, and all things existing in all Times; but when? Not till these times and the things therein shalbe found to exist: and as they shalbe found to exist, so shall God coexist with them: Now all Times, and all things conteyned in all times doe not exist but by waye of succession, (magnitudes exist otherwise, even all togeather) and in like sort God shall coexist with them, to witt, by waye of succession: Nor that Gods existence is or shalbe by way of succession; (for nothing in God is found that succeeds any thing in God) But because both times, and creatures in times doe exist by way of succession, in respect of whose succession and not of any succession in God, God is denominated, and that properly enough, to coexist with them by way of succession, in as much as they exist, and consequently coexist with him by way of succession: p. 171Like as a pole fixed in a river doth coexist with divers parts of the streame by way of succession; not that any motion or succession is found in the pole, but only in the parts of the streame, that succeed in theyr course one after another: velut unda supervenit und…: And albeit Alvarez hath taken great paynes and shewed great witt in justifying the opinion of Aquinas in this (yet no otherwise then upon the supposition of the predetermination of Gods will) and in dissolving the arguments which Scotus brought against it; and that in such so…t, that in so spinous of matter I have sometimes thought it a matter very difficult to find out a cleare solution of his reasons; yet (I thanck God) as it was the first worke I undertook after I left the university, before ever I thought of dealing with Arminius, so I seeme to have fully satisfied my selfe therein; and am reasonably persuaded of abilitie to give satisfaction, on that point, to others also.

But to proceed along with you; In the next place you tell us, that God considered in himself, He is every way indivisibly infinite and interminable; not only, because he had no beginning, nor shall have ending: Here your attentive reader would expect what is answerable to this not only, and when you come in with but also; but here he must hold his breath till you have dispatched your parenthesis; and if he hold his breath till you come to make up this your imperfect sentence, he is likely never to draw it againe: Againe when you say, God is indivisibly infinite and interminable, considered in himselfe; you leave your Reader to suspect that your opinion is, that God considered not in himselfe, is not indivisibly infinite and interminable, and the meaning thereof I am yet to seeke.

But consider we what you insert in your parenthesis; For so might time or motion be held interminable, could the heavens have bene created from everlasting: So they might, as much as to say, as well as that of whome but e…st you spake, and that was of none but God: But God, you sayd was indivisibly infinite, and interminable, not terminable: Wherein in making so incongruous a comparison, whether you had forgott your selfe, or streyned to be delivered of some involved conceyt, the p. 172congruity whereof must be farre fett, and deare bought, before a man can meet with it, I know not he obvious meaning which your text aymes at, seemes to be this; God is infinite and interminable, not only, because he is without beginning and without end; for so the heavens should be infinite and interminable, put case they were created from everlasting, but in an other respect also; which respect or cause you forgett to expresse, to perfect the sentence of yours, which is otherwise very imperfect; Yet in this waye of interpretation of your text, there are faults enough; for to make the heavens like unto God in this, you should putt the case, not only of being created from everlasting; but also of being to be continued without end, otherwise they cannot be like unto God both as he is without beginning, and also as he is without end: Secondly though the case were thus put, yet is it incongruous enough; for albeit herein they should be like unto God in being without beginning, and without end: Yet herein they should be nothing like unto God in being indivisibly infinite, and interminable; whereof notwithstanding proceeds your comparison: we acknowledge a difference in this, & that a mighty one, though the heavens had bene created from everlasting, &c. not because all Gods continuance to come is present, as you devise; but because Gods duration and continuance is impossible to be devided, the continuance of a creature is not: For God can make the continuance of any creature to cease this daye and houre; but it is impossible Gods continuance should cease; for he is of necessary being: As for the conceyt of prius & posterius in Gods duration; that is a sory conceyt, for that is to be found no where, but where there is some motion or other, spirituall or corporall, eyther in place, or alteration in quality, or augmentation or dimination in quantity, or generation and corruption: And you may remember that your excellent M^r. Plotinus, whome you so much magnifie, confines his discourse of time to things generable, as if he meant the Angells were free from such a division of duration as is made by prius and posterius; How much more God? But of such a division as I speake; the Angells cannot be free from it being p. 173creatures; but only God, who is ens necessarium, of necessary being; And therefore his continuance or duration is impossible to be divided from his continuance to morrow, because it is absolutely impossible, that it should ever cease: and therfore whensoever time and place, and things conteyned in them shall exist, & as long soever as they shall exist, God must necessarily coexist with them, and it is impossible it should be otherwise: But before time and place had course, though God did exist, yet did he not coexist with them; So likewise before time to come doth exist, and the things that are to exist therein, it is impossible that God should coexist with them.

But whereas you say in your parenthesis, that had the Heavens bene everlasting, theyr revolutions neverthelesse should have bene truly numerable, and therefore terminable; It is true, I confesse, of some of them, as 10. 40. 60. 100. 1000. &c. but impossible that all should; For had the Heavens bene everlasting, their motions undoubtedly had bene innumerable, neyther could we ever come to the first number while we could.

Secondly you say all things conteyned in their circuit should have gotten somewhat which before they had not, and this something, you say is eyther addition of duration, or (which is all one) continuance of theyr first existence, or new acts of life, or sence, or reason.

All very odd, and litle or nothing congruous to things gotten by motion, without which nothing at all is gotten: Now every poore Schollar knowes what is gotten by motion; For if it be motion locall, a new site is gotten; If alteration, a new quality, if augmentation or diminution, a new quantity; If generation & corruption, the matter getts a new substantiall forme; Now where none of these are gotten, there is no addition of any new thing: And it is well knowne, that the Divine Essence is capable of none of these, neyther of new place; nor new quality, not new quantity, nor new forme substantiall; Allbeit he continueth for ever, and consequently there can be nether prius nor posterius to be divided in God: But yet because you enterteyne a wild conceit of Gods eternity indivisible; you would have his duration so, p. 174ind visible; as if both the time past, and the time to come were drawne togeather within an instant: And therefore, you say, that all other things have eyther addition of duration, or continuance of existence, or some new acts of life, or sense, or reason; the last whereof is only congruous & agreing with the nature of that motion which is called alteration; as the two last and the first, may have reference allso to generation, or augmentation; from all which the case is cleere that God is free, notwithstanding that his continuance which is to come be not sayd, to be present, at which wild conceit and the justification thereof you seeme to ayme: But as for the two first, which yet you make to be all one, they have no place of consideration amonge the termes that are acquired by motion: And dare you denie, that God hath continuance of existence or duration? But you will say no new duration is added unto God: Who sayth it is! And what new duration is added unto man by his continuance? God may add something unto him if it please him; but if he continue him in statu quo, what addition, I pray? You will say duration: I demand; whether naturally or supernaturally? if supernaturally, then God doth a new create it; But God hath long agoe ceased from creation: againe then not only every day, and houre, but every minute allso, and every part of a minute God should creare a new duration: If naturally, then by motion corporall, or spirituall; Now I pray devise, if you can, what motion that is whereby duration is procured; Yet I confesse, thus farre God may be sayd to add duration; in as much as he will not sett an end to it, though he can.

But as for the duration of God, it is impossible, that should have any end.

But some may say, If Gods future existence be not present, when it is present, something is added to Gods former duration; As for example, when tomorrow comes God is a daye older, then he was: I answer, nothing growes older by accesse of time, but that which tooke it being eyther with time, or in processe of time; So did not God.

Secondly, I answer, Gods future existence is nothing els, p. 175but his coexistence with time to come, or with things which shallbe in time to come; which is an externall denomination, arising from the futurition of things to come: In any other sense it is false to say that God hath any future existence, or past existence.

But his coexistence with time or things in time may be sayd to be past, or to come, as well as present; and in this sense is the Scripture phrase to be understood, when it is sayd that God is he which is, which was, and which is to come: That is, when this World, and Angels were fifst made, then he was, that is, he did coexist with them, and so all along unto this day present; And so shall exist all along with all creatures & times that are to come: Now this existence of God, more properly to be called his coexistence is partly past, partly present, partly to come; not in respect of Gods existence, (who hath neyther motion nor shadow of change, & consequently nothing in him is found to be past or to come) but in respect of the existence of creatures which is partly past, partly present, and partly to come.

Henceforth you acquaint us with certeyne definitions of Eternity; The first is out of Boetius, which you commend above that which followes out of Aquinas, belike it fitts your turne better in your conceits, then that other of Aquinas; and therefore deserving well at your hands you bestow upon it that preferment which you think good; Well let us consider it: Aeternity (then in Boetius accoumpt) is the entire or totall possession of interminable life, all at once, or togeather.

The scope you ayme at, is to prove that in Gods eternall being there is no succession; Et quis Herculem vituperat? who ever sayd there was? In man the very life vegetable, sensitive and rationall growes more and more perfect by degrees: No such motion, no not to perfection, is to be found in God; In Angells there may be a succession of thoughts & of affections: no such succession is to be found in God.

Yet doth he and you allso maynteyne Gods life to be interminable, that is, of such a continuance as is without end, as well as without succession.

p. 176But you shall never be able to prove herehence, that Gods existence is present to every part of succession of other things, as namely, both to that which is past, and allso to that which is to come.

Aquinas definition though very artificiall you grant, yet doth not, you say, imprint so lively a character and notion of the everliving God his infinite happines, as the definition givon by Boetius doth: Aeternitas est duratio manens, uniformis, sine principio & fine, mensurâ carens.

This lettice fitts not your lips like to the former; because, belike you cannot find by this, that time past & future should be present unto God; as you conceave to find by the former; but you will never be able to make it good.

4. Yet Plotin is your Oracle in Philosophy beyond all, who gives, as you say, a more deepe apprehension of it in fewer termes, saying Aeternitas est vita infinita, which you render thus, Eternity is infinitie of life: Like as if when man is defined to be a reasonable creature, you should render it thus, A man is the reasonablenes of a creature.

We all grant, nothing in God is past, of that which belongs to God by denomination from within, nothing is to come. Only things without God are such as they may be both past, present, and to come, successively. I doe not mislike that sayinge of Plotius, to witt that when we say God is allwayes, we breede in our mindes a wandring imagination of pluralitie or divisibility of duration. But yet so long as we understand Gods duration though indivisible yet equivalent to divisible succession in things without, there is no errour, in which respect we may justly say with scripture God was, and is, and is to come, in as much as he was coexistent with things past, when they were existent, is coexistent to things present shall be coexistent to thinges to come.

And not to say, as you would have us, that God is now coexistent to things past, and to things to come as well as to things present. There is nothing hitherto alleaged out of Boetius or Plotin, that can justifie this; no more then in the definition of eternitie made by Aquinas; yet Aquinas had a p. 177conceyte of the existence of all thinges both past and to come in Gods eternitie, not only as they are knowne: For that is to exist rather in Gods knowledge then in his eternitie, and that is esse secundum quid, and in esse cognito only, it is not to exist simplicitur, absolutely. I doe not dislike your notification of eternitie, to be that which allwayes is and cannot cease to be, save that I finde no vertue in the word to be extended to this latter clause; allthoughe I conceave, that whatsoever allwayes is the same, dothe necessarily imply such a nature, as cannot cease to be.

And therfore the Apostle takes eternall power and Godhead to be termes equivalent. You say that in true Philosophicall contemplation it is not onething truly to be & allwayes to be. There is a typographicall errour in this, if I be not deceaved; and the sentence should runne thus, It is but one thing truly to be and allwayes to be. This I take to be your meaninge, but I acknowledge no truthe in it. For if this were true, then all creatures should have no true beinge; for certenly they are not allwayes.

And if they have no true beinge, then they have no being at all, as afterwards yourselfe acknowledge this manner of consequence to be good. And albeit to have a being and to have a true being be all one, yet hence it followes not, that truly to be and allwayes to be is all one. I grant that to be allwayes, without beginninge and without ende, dothe inferre an independent beinge. But even true beings may be dependent; otherwise the beings of Angells and men made after the image of God were no true beings. For undoubtedly theyr beings are dependent beings.

Another use of the woord allwayes is to note (as you say,) the interminable, indistiuguishable, and indivisible power, which needs nothing besides that which it actually & for the present hath. But I see no congruity in the woord alwayes to signify all this. And first I wonder what you meane to leape from Gods life and power; seing you propose the infinity of each, as severall branches of Gods infinity to be discoursed on a part, Say then it denotes his interminable and indivisible being or duration: p. 178yet I cannot like this neyther.

For thoughe the terme allwayes, dothe congruously denote his interminable beinge, to witt, without beginning and without ende: Yet I see not howe it can note his indivisible beinge. I grant this latter may be inferred out of the former, for as much as that which is allwayes, cannot be produced, but must be of necessary beinge and consequently indivisible in such sort, as that the duration of it to day, cannot be divided from the duration therof to morrowe: for then it shoulde cease to be, which is impossible, seinge it is presupposed to be of necessary beinge. We deny not, but God hathe all that belongs to his divine nature; thoughe not for the reason you give to witt, because he truly is. For that were to inferre, that nothing besides God h…he any true beinge, which were to deny the being of all creatures.

The divine nature conteynes a totalitie of increated entitie (if a totalitie may be imagined of that which hathe no parts.) As for created entitie, that is not to be found in God at all but only from God. All creatures may have neede of some thing els then continuance, as namely theyr natures being capable of greater perfection; then yet they have atteyned unto. As for continuance, they have only thus farre neede therof, because otherwise they shall cease to be; and so likewise God himself, if he should not continue, he should cease to be. Only here is the difference. The creature may be sayde properly to neede continuance, because he depends upon the free will and pleasure of another, for the obteyning of it, to witt, upon the will of God.

But God depends upon no other for the obteyninge of his continuance; no nor upon his owne will neyther.

And therfore he cannot be sayde to neede continuance, but rather that he must needes be, because he is not ens contingens, but ens necessarium, of no contingent, but of necessary beinge. By your leave, Eternity conteynes more, then to signify the having of whatsoever is expedient to be had.

For undoubtedly, it signifies allso the continuance of all that without beginninge, and without ende.

p. 179But you after your manner, seeme under these …rmes whatsoever is expedient to be had, to include and comprehend duration future, as if duration future were allready present unto God; which is a groundles conceyte, arising merely from a superficiall interpretation of the nature of eternitie, which is commonly called an instant of duration.

… It is true, the duration of God is not to come; For it is present, and incapable of succession as being subject to no manner of mutation.

But there is a duration of time, and of things measured by time to come; which future duration is no way present to God, in respect of his coexistence with it.

It is most true, and proper enough to say with Scripture phrase, that God is he which was, & is, & is to come: which phrase of specche implyes neyther change, nor succession in God, but only in things without God.

Agayne, wisedome, power, and goodnes are expedient to concurre in the supreame essence: But this eternitie comprehends not, but only the continuance of all these without beginninge, without ende.

That a thing looseth so much of perfection, as it wants of duration, is a wilde assertion; unles under perfection, you comprehend duration; and then your proposition is identicall, and no more then to say, that a thing looseth so much of duration, as it wants of duration.

Otherwise I say it is manifestly untrue, not only because Aristotle was bold to say that, Bonum non ideo melius quia diuturnius; good is not therfore better because the more lasting, or everlasting, but allso, because by the same reason of yours it would followe that a Crowe, an Hart, and a Raven were much more perfect then a Man; if it be true as some write, that a Crowe lives three times as long as a Man, an Hart three times as long as a Crowe, and a Raven three times as long as an Hart.

Sure we are the least starre hathe continued from the beginninge of the World.

…. I muse not a litle to see Platonicall and Plotinicall Philosophy, p. 180so much advanced by an Oxonian: as if Aristotles learning left Logicians perplext in a point of sophistry, and only Plotinicall Philosophy would expedite them. And lookinge backe to what you have discoursed of, out of Plotinus, if so be I might light on that parcell of subtiltie suitable to this ende you speake of, I professe, that as I finde no thing in that which you have alleaged out of Plotinus, that is not vulgar, nothing woorthy of that commendation which you besto we upon him, (therby reflectinge no small commendation upon your owne peculiar studies in Plotinus:) so withall, I cannot imagine what piece of witt that is, the ignorance wherof dothe perplexe eyther any other better Logician, or my selfe eyther, in the resolution of that question, which you propose.

Neyther doe you accommodate any sentence of Plotinus herunto, that might serve as a key to open that locke, which as you say, is so hard to be opened, but leave your Reader at randon, to pore after it. But whether it be Plotinus his resolution or your owne, let us consider it.

And first the question proposed is, Whether Socrates in the instant of his dissolution or corruption, be a man or corps, or bothe. To be both (you say) implyes contradiction, and yet you say, there is as much reason, that in this instant he should be both as eyther. Thus have we the question and that argued in part. Now followeth your resolution, as it were our of Plotinus, though you alleage no crumme of any sentence of his for it. Now I observe that your solution, thoughe you woulde have it seeme to be but one, yet indeede it is diverse; the one nothing to the purpose, the other something to the purpose, but utterly overthrowing your former assertion, as whē you sayde, There is as much reason he should be both as eyther. The third overthrowinge the very foundation of the question it selfe, in effect professing that it proceedes from a false ground or supposition.

A manifest evidence that you are still to seeke howe to satisfie your selfe herin, or others in this unproffitable speculation.

p. 181And if this be to be endoctrinated by Plotinus, make you as much as you will with your knowledge of Plotinus his Philosophy, I shall have no great cause to complayne of my ignorance therin.

Your first resolution is, that he was a man and shallbe a corps. This I say, is nothing to the question. For the question proposed is, not what he was, or what he shallbe, but what he is in the instant of his dissolution.

In the next place you seeme to speake more to the purpose, when you say that in the instant of his dissolution, he ceaseth to be a man, and beginnes to be a corpse. But even this allso, is not fully to the purpose. For the question is not, what he beginnes to be, or what he ceaseth to be, in that instant, but what he is.

Yet because substantiall formes have no degrees as accidentall formes have, and therfore cease to be, or beginne to be all at once; therfore I take your answere at the best to be this; that in the instant of his dissolution, he is a corps, and not a man, which is directly contrary unto that which formerly you affirmed sayinge, There was as much reason why he should in this instant be both, as eyther.

Your third resolution different from both the former is this: that the space of dissolution is not in an instant, as the question supposed, but a space of time consisting of parts, which is not to answeare the question, but utterly to overthrowe it; and withall it openeth a way to a newe difficulty; for in this case it may well be demanded, what portion of this divisible time shall be allowed to the being of a man, and what to the being of a corps; and take heede least you ascribe one instant to the last of the first forme, and another instant to the beginninge of the succeeding of the second forme.

For seing two instants cannot be immediate, it will followe herhence that materia prima, shall some space of time actually exist without any forme.

As for my selfe, I never …ept upon Plotinus his Parnassus, nor was ever acquainted with his muses. Nay, I have bene so long time departed out of the universitie, and while I was p. 182there so long remooved from these kinde of studies, that I may well be sayde to have forgotten Aristole. Nun… mihi sunt oblita sophis…ata. Yet will I adventure to compare the remnants of my old Peripateticke store with your atchievements out of Plotinus.

I say then, the resolution of this question depends upon the resolution of a more generall question.

And that is concerninge the beginninge and ceasing of forme, now the rules therof most receaved as I remember, are these. The formes we speake of are, eyther permanent, or successive. Formes permanent beginne per primum sui esse, by the first instant of theyr beinge; desi…unt per primum sui non esse, they cease to be, by the first instant of theyr not beinge.

In such sort as to say, that immediately before such an instant they were not, but at such an instant, and in the time following they were. Agayne, touching theyr endinge, you may say, Immediately before such an instant they were; in and after such an instant, they were not.

As for formes successive, such as are time and motion, they are sayde to beginne per ultimum sui non esse; by the last instant of theyr not beinge; and to ende per primum sui non esse, by the first instant of theyr not beinge.

That is, at such an instant motion (speaking of motion properly as it includes succession) was not: for it cannot be in an instant but immediately after it was.

Agayne touching the ending of motion we may say, at such an instant motion was not, but immediately before, it was. And accordingly, to the question proposed, I answeare; Corruption or dissolution is taken eyther in a complicate signification, comprehending the whole alteration that went before the ceasing of the forme, and then all that while, undoubtedly Socrates was a man, and not a carcase.

But if only for the desinency or ceasing of the forme humane. I say, in that instant, wherin he is sayde to desinere or cease (it being the first instant of his not being, as before hathe bene shewed, to be the manner of desinence or ceasinge of all p. 183forms permanent) he is a corps; but immediately before he was a man.

In the next place you tell us of Plotins conclusion, namely, That while we seeke to sit that which truly is with any portion of quantity, the life of it being thus divided by us, looseth its indivisible nature.

First, I like not that assertion, whether it be yours alone or derived from Plotin, in sayinge, that God alone truly is.

I well knowe our beinge is of a quite different nature from Gods being: but to deny that we creatures have a true beinge, is as good as to deny that we have any being at all.

Secondly, I knowe no man; that goethe about to fitt Gods nature, with any proportion of quantitie.

Yet we maynteyne, he was coexistent with all thinges past, is coexistent with all thinges present, shall be coexistent with all thinges that are to come in their order, & that without all, divisibility, or succession in himselfe: his coexistence after the manner forementioned, implying only divisibilitie and succession in the creatures.

Of time, you say, no part truly is but the present.

So then the present time, at least truly is. Yet but a litle before and often hertofore you have professed, that nothing but God truly is.

Now give me leave to maynteyne some paradoxes, as well as you.

I say, all time truly is, and is present, as well as that which you accoumpt to be only present.

For how dothe this present houre exist but by succession of parts.

If you accoumpt nothing present but an instant; it is well knowne, that an instant deserves no more to be accoumpted time, then a point deserves to be accoumpted magnitude.

But if you speake of time properly, it must have parts, which cannot exist together, but only by succession. As for example, this minute of an houre is present but how? only as having a part past, and a part to come.

For this only to exist is to exist by way of succession. In p. 184like sort this present houre dothe truly exist; but how … as havinge a part past, and a part to come.

So this present yeare dothe truly exist, as having a part past, and a part to come.

In like sort the time of the Gospell, accoumpting from the day of Pent…cost, when the H. Ghost came downe upon the Apostles, unto the ende of the World, may as well be sayde truly to exist, namely thus, as having a part past, and a part to come.

So dividing the World into two parts; The old world, from the beginninge of time by creation unto Noahs flood; and the newe World, computed from Noahs flood to the ende of the World: I say the time of this World dothe only exist, as havinge a part past and a part to come.

So the time of the whole World from the beginning to the ende, may be sayde truly to exist, to witt, by way of succession of parts, havinge one part past and another to come. For not the least part of time dothe exist otherwise, to witt, by coexistence of parts, but only by succession of parts.

They who made doubt, whether navigators were to be accoumpted amongst the living or amongst the dead, affected more witt then truthe. For if Navigators, undoubtedly, they are livinge and not dead; Indeede after they have sett foorthe, we are uncerteyne what is become of them: and equally as uncerteyne may we be, what is become of our freindes that are travayled unto China by the way of the Continent. But to make doubt whether time consists rather of being then of not being, is a conceyte litle becomming a Philosopher in my judgement, thoughe it may become such a one as enterteynes a vulgar contemplation of thinges successive, and in motion, whether by Sea or land.

I should thinke that sory imagination, is grounded upon conceavinge that nothing in time is but an instant, which if it were true, woulde inferre that time were nothing but a succession of instants.

But were it so; yet surely the shortnes of continuance of any thinge, nothinge hinders the true beinge therof, when p. 185it is. A childe of a day olde, hath as true being, as Methusalch had, who lived till he was, allmost a thousand.

It seemes the sent of Plotinus his subtilties, hathe perfumed all those that have dwelt under his shadowe; and therfore no merveyle if Ficinus commenting upon him, savoureth herof allso. He compares, you say liternitie to a center, and time to the points or extreamities of the line in the circumference allwaye moovinge about the Center, so that if it were an eye it might viewe them all at once.

I doubt not, but ere we depart from this chapter, we shall meete with the Circumference of eternitie as well as with the center of it; but not from Plotinus his text, or Ficinus his Commentaries, but from one that will be bolde to adde a Gemora to theyr Talmud.

For it is fitt the World should profite in subtilties as well as in solid points, and not allwayes to stand at a stay. But a woord of this by the way: Though future times, and future things are all knowne to God, yet not by reason of any existence of theyrs in eternitie, or Gods coexistence with them for the present. For how dothe God at this time coexist with them, which at this time have no existence at all?

Agayne, God lookes not out of himselfe for the knowledge of any thinge now, more then he did before the World was made.

For surely the making of the World wrought no change in him as touching the manner of his knowledge, with whom there is no variablenes nor shadowe of change. When you take upon you to tell us how Eternitie is indivisible, to witt, by conteyning all the parts or perfections possible of succession in a more eminent manner then can be conteyned in time it selfe. I pray remember, that in like manner you professed, that God did conteyne all entities even the entities of brute beasts; and you expo…nded it in this sense, because forsoothe he was able to produce them.

And thus we easily grant God conteynes all perfections of successions, in as much as he can produce them. If so be succession may be coumpted a perfection, wherof but erst you p. 186made doubt, whether it had any being at all. Yet we doubt not, but God can produce them; yea so farre forthe as to exceede all that is conteyned in time.

For as much, as he could have made the duration of the World, tenne times more then it is like to be.

I doe not affect to quarrell with Plato his witt; much good doe you with it, and if you please your selfe with such fancies, as namely that time is a moovable image of that which is unmooveable; a divisible image of that which is indivisible; a successive representation of that which is without all succession; a modell finite, with beginning and ende of that whic… is infinite, without beginning and ende, you shall not displease me.

You have another sophisme or seeming contradiction to unloose or salve by these rarities of curiositie; and that is, how it may be verified, that Petrus in aeternitate aegrotat, & Petrus in aeternitate non aegrotat. If this were spoken of the same time, you say it were contradiction; but being spoken of eternitie, you say it is not, and yet you confesse Eternitie is more indivisible, then any time.

Let who will thinke, that you have salved this knott of seeming contradiction, to my understanding you leave it as you finde it. The propositions conteyning a seeming contradiction are bothe absurd.

For Peter cannot be sayde to be sicke in eternitie, as in that which is the measure of duration eythe▪ of himselfe, or of his siknes, but only in time, with which time, eternitie, I confesse, is coexistent, but when? not till the time that Peters sicknes dothe exist, nor after it hathe ceased to exist. For coexistence supposethe existence on both sides. And as the existence of the creature is past, present, or to come; so is Gods coexistence with it, eyther past, present, or to come; which hathe bothe Scripture & reason to warrant it; whereas your wilde conceytes are warrantable by neither.

6. Materia prima, is ingenerable and incorruptible not because it is no body, but because it is no compound body. But God is ingenerable and incorruptible, because he is no p. 187body at all: Therefore better it is to liken him unto the Angells who are ingenerable and incorruptible, because they are Spirits.

All thinges generable come from matter only as touching their materiall parts, not as touching their formes; neyther can they be sayde so properly to spring from it, as to be compounded of it. But from God all things spring in the way of an efficient cause, yea the matter it selfe allso, and that out of nothing.

If matter be most unlike him, in wanting the true unitie of entitie, other things belike have this; And if they have unitie of entitie, it is to be hoped they have true entitie allso, veritie being the propertie of entitie, as well as unitie, and consequently they may be sayde to have a true beinge, which you hertofore, & that very often have made proper and peculiar unto God.

I wonder why you make the Creator and essence it selfe to be termes of equall signification; wheras God is not the creator of all things by his essence, but by his freewill rather.

Those things which necessarily belong to God, are usually ascribed unto him, by way of essence, but not such things, as contingently denominate him, arisinge from the libertie and freedome of his will.

God, you say, is the incomprehensible perfection of all things; doe you meane of things create only, or only of things increate, or of bothe? You cannot meane it of things create: For no create perfection is found in God: Nor of increate; For no imperfection at all is founde in essence increate.

The Earthe is not unmooveable: some have conceaved it to moove naturally: Vndoubtedly, it may be mooved, otherwise it were not Corpus naturale; And Earthquakes doe manifest as much.

If it cannot be mooved by the force of Man (yet by prayer of faith, Mounteynes may be remooved, and cast into the Sea), yet it may be mooved questionles by the force of Angells, at least by the power of God.

Neyther is infinite vigour of vitalitie required to an immoveable p. 188condition in the opinion of greater Clerkes then our selves, as who thinke all Angells to be no way capable of locall motion.

Yet you talke of a mobilitie of the Deitie (a prodigious phrase) thoughe you thinke to charme it, by calling it more then infinite, and calling the motion therof a supermotion; and this his mobilitie, as well as his immobility formerly spoken of, you make to proceede from the infinite vigour of his vitalitie.

Nor dothe eternitie (say you) receave addition from succession infinite; Belike it receaves succession (in your opinion) though no addition therby. For if it receaves no succession at all, what sober man coulde expect, that it should receave addition by it.

At lengthe you come towards that, which I have a long time looked for: Eternitie, you say, is like to a fixed center, because indivisibly immutable, but it is allso as you say, like unto a circle, but you tell us not wherein, nor why.

And as Trismegist did define Gods immensitie, by the similitude of a Spheare, whose Center was every where, but his Circumference no where.

So you will take upon you to define Gods Eternitie, neyther out of Trismeg st, nor out of Plotinus, nor out of Ficinus, but out of your owne invention to be a Circular duration, whose instants are allwayes, whose terminations or extreamities never were, never shall be.

We willingly grant, that Gods eternitie is a duration without beginninge, and without ende; This is nothing strange, nothing remote from vulgar capacitie.

But to say it is a Circular duration, is such an attempt, and so audacious, as I thinke, it never entered into any sober mans brayne eyther sleeping or wakinge, before it was fancyed by your selfe.

Lets bid farewell to Aristotles Philosophy, and let Platoes Divinitie come in the place of it. Distill Plotinus his Philosophy, and Ficinus Commentaries upon Plotins Enneades throughout, and see whether any such Extract can be made, p. 189as this Circular duration you dreame of, and commend to the World as some rare notion.

Of Circular motion I have heard and read; But of Circular duration never.

Nay thinges that have circular motion, were never affirmed to have Circular duration. For motion may be from space to space in a round figure, returning thither, where it begunne, but duration is neyther round, nor goethe round.

For thoughe the Heavens runne round, yet the time of the Heavens and of the World runnes not round, nor returnes to the period of time from whence it beganne.

Yet is duration successive more fitt to be accoumpted duration Circular, then duration constant, which hathe no parts succeedinge.

I holde it to be a notorious untruthe, to say that eternitie coexists to every parcell of time. For to say it coexists with time to come, is to say, that eternitie existethe, and time to come existethe allso, which latter clause is most false. For if it were present, it were not to come.

No time defines eternitie, we say, but rather eternitie sets … ende to time.

But we dare not enterteyne so absurd a conceyte as to say, eternitie circumscribs time; as if time were some lower spheare, and eternitie an upper spheare, and so time should be a circular duration as well as eternitie.

Your next sentence beginnes to open the mystery, as whe… you say, Thoughe the motions of the Heavens should continue without ende, yet every period of time shall fall within eternitie, now totally existent.

I marke your phrase well, as when you say, It shall fall within eternitie, implyinge that eternitie is beyond it, in respect of time to come; like as it is sayde to be before all time, in respect of time past.

Now to discusse this phrase of yours of falling within eternitie: This phrase (I say) here used, is utterly out of his place. For in proper speeche it hathe place only in respect of quantitie continuall, outreaching all other thinges we speake of.

p. 190Thus all things in the World besids the uttermost Spheare, fall within the uttermost spheare; so that the uttermost spheare doth not only extende so farre as they doe, but beyond them.

Now to say that every period of time falls within eternitie, is to suppose, that eternitie extends beyond it so as to exist beyond it; which is true of all time past. For God did both coexist with it, and dothe continue after it.

And as touching time present, it may be justified in this sense, to fall within eternitie, in respect that Gods continuance is not at an ende with this present, but continueth without ende.

But to imagine that at this present Gods continuance doth actually extende farther then this present, is a most absurde conceyte; As if forsooth God had not onelyonly an existence present, but allso an existence to come, and that this existence of God to come is present. Whereas neyther of these is true, but each false, and that most absurdly false.

For first God hath no existence to come, for if he had, then he should have also an existence past, and consequently he should be measured with time, and subject unto motion. And whereas the Scriptures doe confesse that God is he which was, and is, and is to come; this is to be understood of his coexistence and not of his existence; as much as to say God doth not onelyonly coexist with all things present, but also did coexist, with all things past; that is to say with every one of them in the time of theyr existence, and also shall coexist, with all things to come, that is to say, with every one of them in the time of theyre actuall existence.

Now this coexistence of God with things past, and things to come is not present, onelyonly his coexistence with things present, is present, his coexistence with things past, is past, and in that respect tis sayd he was; so likewise his coexistence with things to come is to come, and in that respect onelyonly it is sayd that God is to come.

By this we may judge of the proposition following which is this.

God hath bene, is, and ever will be, unto every minute or Scruple p. 191of time that hath beene, is, or shallbe, alike everlastingly coexistent. If one word had beene left out (to witt the word everlastingly) it might have admitted an handsome interpretation, and a sober meaning taken respectively thus, God hath beene coexistent to things that have beene, is coexistent to things that are, shall be coexistent to things that shall be.

But to apply all these differences of time past, present, and to come, to each of the things mentioned, (as namely to say, that God hath beene, and is, and shall be coexistent to all things that have beene, and is, and shall be, coexistent to all things that shall be) is most absurde.

For the coexistence of God doth as well implye the exisstence of the things themselfes with which God is sayd to exist, as the existence of God.

And therefore though it be true to say, that God was coexistent with all things past, because there was a time when these things did exist and at the same time undoubtedly God did coexist with them; yet it is false to say that God doth or shall coexist with things past; for that saying doth implye, that things past doe now exist; and also are to come. In like sort though it be true: that God doth now coexist with all things that now are, for as much as both these things doe indeed at this time exist, and God must needs coexist with them as the author and preserver of theyr existence; yet it is untrue to say that God doth now coexist with time past or to come, and with the things which were or shall be therein, for if this were true; it would follow that not onelyonly God is now present, but also that time past and time to come, are also present withall things conteyned in them, which every man knows to be most untrue.

Last of all though it be true that God shall coexist with the time to come, and the things therein, because both they shall exist, and consequently God must needs coexist with them, as the author and preserver of them; yet it is most untrue to say that God shall coexist with time past and present and the things therein, for if this were true it would herence follow that both time past, and present with all things conteyned in them p. 192were both to come, which how absurde a speech it is, let every sober man judge.

And yet that this is the meaning appeares by the adding of the word everlastingly, which addition makes the proposition untrue in every member of it, though taken respectively, which otherwise as I have shewed might admitt a tolerable interpretation. For though it be true that God was coexistent with Noahs floud, yet is is un…ue that he was everlastingly coexistent with it.

At the time of Noahs floud God was coexistent with it by vertue of his eternirye, which makes him necessarily to coexist wiih all things when they are, like as by vertue of his immensitie he necessarily filleth all places, as soone as there are any places to fill. But God was not everlastingly coexistent with Noahs floud, for as much as neyther before the time of Noahs floud, was God coexistent with it nor after: For to coexist with Noahs floud doth implye the existence of Noahs floud: But Noahs floud did neyther exist before the time of it nor after.

In like sort to say that God doth now coexist with all things present is true; but to say he doth everlastingly coexist with this time present, and the things therein is most untrue: For if this were true, then it were as true that he did coexist yesterday, with this day and shall coexist to morrow with this present, which is utterly untrue; for if it were true, then yesterday and to morrow should be this present day, Nay it would follow that this present day were everlasting (and not time onelyonly in generall) if so be God did everlastingly coexist, with it.

Last of all it is true that God shall coexist with the fall of Babylon; but it is untrue to say that God shall everlastingly coexist with it, for if that were true, then he should coexist with it both before it were, and after it were past, whith is impossible. For it would imply that Babylon should fall, before it shall fall, and after it hath fallen. And all this confusion ariseth from a precipitate and superficiary apprehension of the nature of eternity being commonly accoumpted but an instant, p. 193which indeed is a truth, because in the nature of God there is no succession, and that not onelyonly in respect of such motions whereunto bodyes are subject, but in respect of such motions which are incident unto Angells. In regard of which motions the differences of time past, present and to come are attributed unto God, in respect of his coexistence with them, without bringing in such monstrous conceites as are hat…hed in the fancyes of some, though I professe I know not many such, nor never read or heard of the like till now,

So then the reason why God was coexistent with time past and the things therein; is coexistent with time present and the things therein, shall be coexistent with time to come and the things therein, is not onelyonly by reason of his owne indivisible, and in erminable unitye; or rather is not at all by reason of this, for this consideration is rather opposite to the determinations of was, is, and is to come, which you attribute unto God, then any way suitable with it, but rather in regard of his eternitie, in which respect he must necessarily coexist with all times according to theyre severall differences; provided that they have an existence; for otherwise: how shall God be sayd to coexist with them.

But then agayne I say not onelyonly in respect of eternitie are these denominations given unto God, but also in respect of the acquisition of new successive parts, not in himselfe but in time and things contayned therein. For because God cannot be sayd to coexist with such things that have no existence at all, And all things without God have not theyre existence at once but some at one time some at another, hence is coexistence with them attributed unto God, according to differences of time past, present, and to come, not by reason of any succession of parts in God, but onelyonly in respect of succession of parts in time, and motions, in all things without God.

But we shall have a mad World quickly, when men shall take upon them doctórally to dictate conclusions unto others from certayne principles (as about the eternitie of God, and the indivisible nature therof) superficiarily apprehended, and never rightly, much lesse sufficiently understood.

p. 194What time you have bestowed in the study of these attributes of God I know not; but as for my selfe I professe I never bestowed any hereabouts as I can remember, but ever contented my selfe with common notions generally received. And whereas I mett sometimes with strange suppositions grounded upon these common notions, I have rather contented my selfe with ignorance how to justifie them, then to thinke it worth the whyle to enter upon the discussion, only in the question about the presence of all things in eternitie maynteyned by Aquinas, I found in Scotus a discovery of that errourous conceite.

And though Alvarez hath laboured to repayre the credit… of Aquinas in that particular and to answer Scot, yet the vanitie of that discourse of his, I have laboured to discover, and therein have reasonably well satisfied my selfe.

Now being cast upon these Meditations, by reason of this your discourse, which in the very Epistle dedicatory manifest your affection towards Arminianisme, which I professe I hate as much, as I love the grace of God, and desire to be zealous in the mayntayning of it to my last gaspe; I am driven herewithall to take into consideration your Philosophical discourse concerning the essence of God. and his attributes, and finding therein some prodigious assertions by way of deduction from the receaved notions of Gods indivisible and yet eternall being; out of the Logicall facultie which I brought with me long agoe, out of the Vniversitie, I make bold to observe well the soundnes of such illations, and finding no ground for them, but rather utter disproportion betweene them, and the principles wherehence they are inferred, in the course hereof I become better acquainted with the nature of Gods eternitie then before; and hope to be better inabled to encounter any unsound assertions, derived therehence and grounded thereupon, then heretofore.

And we are like to be acquainted with your mysteries to the full in the next Section.

7. You suppose duration successively infinite.

In this case 'tis true that God cannot be sayd to be after all p. 195duration successive. For to be after it, is to be when duration hath an end, but you suppose that such duration shall never have end.

And in this case it can neyther properly nor improperly be sayd, that God is after it. For it is manifest contradiction to say, that hath an end which is supposed to have no end.

You seeme to groane in the delivery of some quaint subtiltie when you write thus: Yet that eternitie now is and ever was a… infinitely preexistent to all ages in succession comming towards us one way; it is, and was to the Worlds nativitie the other way.

Here you make a full point, whereby it comes to passe, that wanting a principall verbe, the sentence contaynes a manifest non-sense; & it is the observation of others as well as mine, if divers such non-sensed propositions have dropped from your penne in this discourse, yet your meaning we see plainly in the sentence following, as when you say, This is a point which we must beleive, if we beleive God to be eternall, and know what eternitie is.

So the former speech of yours though imperfect, & indifferently capable of being, pronounced to be a fable as a truth, we perceave to be received by you as a truth, and not so onelyonly but affected allso by you as a truth, whose consideration hath not beene so well taken to heart, by those who have had Gods eternall decrees and the awardes of it most frequently in theyre mouthes and pennes; as it hath beene by your selfe.

Thus you accommodate your selfe to the venting, & your Readers to the expecting of some sublimate and so quintessentiall a conceite, that poore Calvin & Beza, and such like unproficients in Academicall studies, never attayned to the depth of any such speculation.

Once before I observed a certayne gradation tending to this purpose, and that with some wonderment, as when you affirmed in the beginning of this section, that God was as truly before all times future, as before all times past.

As if to be before all times future, were a greater matter then to be before all times past; whereas I had thought that such poore snakes as my selfe might truly be accoumpted to p. 196be before all times future. So in this place it might well make a man wonder what you meane to affirme in solemne manner that God is and ever was as infinitely preexistent to all ages comming towards us, as to the Worlds nativitie.

As if to be preexistent to the times to come, were as greate a matter as to be preexistent to times past, which might seeme to carry no sobriety in the forehead. For ever the meanest worme that creepes upon the Earth, is preexistent to all ages to come, but none is preexistent to all ages past but God himselfe. But there is, no doubt a mysterie in this.

Heretofore I had a sent of it: But now it beginnes to breake forth in greate measure.

For when we say God is preexistent to all ages past, & consequently must needs be preexistent to all ages that are to come, we understand all this but one way according to the course of time from future to the present, from being present to become past, and so that which is first actually existent, is before all that which arrives to actuall existence afterwards. But you tell us of two wayes & that God is preexistent before all ages past one way, & before all ages to come another way, by which other way your meaning seemes to be this, that as God is afore all ages past, so also he is after or behinde all ages to come; which phrase of speech in saying God is after or behind any thing, because you thinke it too ignoble to be attributed unto God, and perhaps in part to astonish your Readers with some strange language being never acquainted with the like; This being after all ages you are pleased to instile & call his being before them, but another way or a different way from his beinge, before all ages past.

As if a man should say that the Horse goes before the Cart one way, and the Cart may be sayd to goe before the Horse another way, which later is indeede and in substance of sense no other, then to go after the Horse.

In like sort we may say the calling of the Gentiles is before the calling of the Iewes one way, and the calling of Iewes goes before the calling of the Gontiles another way, to witt as it comes after it.

p. 197So the rising & florishing of Antichrist goes before the fall of Antichrist one way, and the fall of Antichrist goeth before the rising and flourishing of Antichrist another way, to wit it followeth after it.

Now if this manner of language doth not goe beyond all Canting, I know not what doth. But take wee your phrase according to this sense, yet there is no truth in this assertion. God indeed was before all ages past, because he was when they had no beginning; but he shall not be after all ages to come, because he shall not be when all ages have an end.

For according to your owne opinion all ages shall never have end. And for this reason in the very beginning of this section your selfe affirmed, that God could not properly be sayd to be after all times and durations to come. For what (sayd you) can be after that which hath no end? To this I added, this could not be affirmed eyther properly or improperly, because there was no truth in it, as that which implyed a manifest contradiction.

Much lesse properly or truly can it be sayd that God is preexistent to all ages to come after a different way from that whereby he is sayd to be preexistent to all ages past.

But let us see whether any greater measure of sobriety, can be found in that which followeth.

In the next place you tell us, that As he is no Christian Philosopher, much lesse a true Christian divine, that would deny that whatsoever is by God decreed, was so decreed before all worlds: So he is no Christian Philosopher, much lesse a true Christian divine, that shall referre or retract the tenor of this speech, (before all worlds) to that onelyonly which is past before the world beganne, whatsoever can be more properly sayd or conceaved to be past, then to be yet to come, or to be in every moment of time designable can have no propertye of eternitye. So then whosoever shall dare say that it is a more proper speech to affirme, that God did chuse us in Christ before the foundation of the world, then to say that God shall chuse us in Christ after the end of the World, you will be bold to deny him the title both of a Christian Philosopher and of a true Christian divine also.

p. 198By the way let me aske you, what that is which you call past before the World was; for before the World was, nothing at all was but God. Agayne, though we say the decrees of God, were before the world was, yet no divine that I know sayth they were past before the World was; for the decrees of God are nothing but the Counsayle and will of God, which undoubtedly we say continue the same and ever shall. In the last sentence you teach us that it may stand well enough with eternitie, to be sayd to be past, present, and to come; so we doe not affirme it to be more properly past, then present or to come. Yet I promise you, I nothing like to say that God is past, I had rather say he was and is, and is to come. As much as to say, God is of necessary being, and still continueth, and it is impossible he should be otherwise, in which respect we may truly and properly say he was coexistent with every thing that is past, (to witt in the time of its existence,) is coexistent to every thing present, shall be coexistent to every thing that is to come (to witt in the time of the existence of each thing) and all this not by any succession of parts in himselfe, (as who is subject to no motion) but by succession of parts in outward things, with which or whom, he is sayd to coexist, his owne existence being perpetuall and invariable.

These your propositions I can finde reason to make them good in some tolerable construction. Yet you adde a reason of it, which should be more evident then the Conclusion, but indeed is farre more obscure, and when the meaning of it is perceived, is found to have most need of reason to proove it, as being in shew contrary to all reason; yet you content your selfe with dictating it, & thence proceed to a wild goose race of illustration by the heavens that environ both us and the Antipodes; so to make way for the circular duration which formerly you attributed unto God, by comparing it with the heavens turning round (upon supposition) in a moment.

The rationall proposition without reason delivered is this: For that onelyonly is eternall which allwayes is, and so allwayes is, that it hath precedence or preexistence infinite to all successions, which way soever we look upon them or take theyre beginninge, whether p. 199backwards or forwards: Now this saying of yours is full of incongruities if not rather of foule absurdi its.

For first you suppose the beginning of succession may be taken backwards or forwards; but how is this possible? is succession indifferent to beginne backwards or forwards? Is time indifferent to beginne backwards or forwards? The first time is the beginning of it, but as for the last of time will any sober man call that the beginning of it, unlesse you make time like to a pudding, where a man may beginne at which end he will. And surely I see no reason but a pudding may be in better sense, acknowledged to have two ends, then time two beginnings, Especially two such beginnings as you ascribe unto it, the one backwards and the other forwards; for beginne at which end of a pudding, you will, you may be well sayd to goe forwards and not backwards. Agayne suppose your owne phrases be allowed you, and that the end of time may be taken for the beginning, yet where there is no end to be found how will you devise a beginning? As for example, Time we all know had a beginning but you suppose that time to come shall have no end, for though this world shall have an end, yet men and Angells shall have no end, but live with God for ever.

For the same reason, though God be infinitely prexistent before times past, yet he cannot be sayd no not in your phrase and your meaning, that he is infinitely preexistent to all times to come, the meaning whereof is to continue infinitely longer then all ages to come; for that were to suppose that God shall be when all ages have runne theyre course and are come to an end, which you suppose shall never be. Thus from your Antipodes which you devise in the course of time, I come to the consideration of the Antipodes in respect of place and situation. And hereupon I remember what you delivered in the entrance upon this discourse of eternitie, and it is this; whatsoever hath, beene or rightly may be conceaved of divine immensitie, will in proportion as well suite unto eternitie, and in like manner whatsoever is incident to space of place, the same in porportion may be verified of space of time. And p. 200therefore like as Antipodes are found in place, so in some proportion Antipodes may be found in time. For when you beginne at the ends of time you seeme to turne the heeles of it upwards.