Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 2 · Chapter 6 (3 of 3)
And like as the roundnes of the heavens environing all, salves this and makes it appeare how the heads every where are uppermost howsoever it seemes otherwise to vulgar capacities: so heere you have a devise of a circular duration to salve the turning of times heeles upwards, for by this it appeares that in truth time hath no heeles to turne upwards, but rather wheeles to turne roundwards; like as eternitie hath a Circular duration, by way of supermotion or a vigorous rest as you phrasifie it.
Well let Lactantius passe with his errour in denying Antipodes, and the vulgar with theyr errour passe, that think the heavens if they be …ound be under us. Now wee come to the comparison and comparative demonstration, which is this: As the heavens are every way above the earth: so is eternitie every way before all worlds. Suppose there be truth in the parts of this assertion, yet I find no convenience in tho resemblance.
It is true that Tiburne is three square, and a Citizens capp is round, but there is no congruitie in saying that as Tiburne is three square: so a Citizens capp is round. Yet I find as litle accuratenes in the propositions considered by themselfes as in saying the Heavens are every way above the earth, for I know no other wayes of the Heavens being above the whole earth which is round, then by compassing it; In my judgement it is more proper to say the heavens are every where above the earth (then every way above it,) and on every side above the earth, or which way soever we goe, whether East, West, North, or South, we shall still find the Heavens to be above the earth.
So likewise I know but one way how eternitie can be sayd to be before all Worlds, and that is by being before they had beginning. As for that other way which you devise as it were an Antipodes in time as well as in place, namely to be when all Worlds are at end, that is to be after all Worlds rather then before them.
And yet you flatter your selfe in this erroneus conceite, as if it were some exquisite invention, by another fiction, & that is by conceyting eternitie to compasse and inviron time, as the heavens inviron the earth.
Now because the earth is immoveable, but time hath succession of parts; and the heavens wonderfull nimble in motion, and contrariwise eternitie a constant and permanent instant; therefore you may doe well to salve the foreign in the Spheare of your discourse to consult with Copernicus about blowing some quicksilver into the dull and sullen earth & set it going round, and on the other side persuade the Heavens to favour themselves and take theyr rest, the modell of eternitie, and time represented by you would be something the more accurate.
Some helpes for this you have, I confesse, of your owne divising, to witt, by supposing the Heavens to move in an instant, leaving it to the Readers judgment whether to accompt that motion a cessation from motion, or a vigorous rest, besides that of the topp & scourge, which we may have time to consider of in due place. But to proceede; of the beginning of this World past, and the end of it to come, there is no difference betweene us.
To this you adde, that the eye of eternall providence, lookes thorough the World, thorough all the severall ages, successions, or durations in the World, as well from theyr last end, to theyr first beginning, as from theyr first beginning, to theyr last end.
This World as it had a beginning, so it shall have an end. But successive duration even in your opinion, shall have no end.
And therfore you cannot say without contradiction, that God looks thorough the severall ages thereof from theyr last end to theyr beginning.
Yet this last end, you might have called a beginning according to your phrase and tenent, maynteyning God to be before all ages, not onelyonly before ages past one way, but allso before ages to come another way. Agayne, that all things are knowne to him, as well things to come, as things past, or present, is without all question.
This is to be present unto God, in esse cognito. But you have another wilde conceyt of the coexistence, both of things past and of things to come with God, & that for this present, which turne of yours this will nothing serve that God knows all things.
Last of all as touching this manner of knowledge which you attribute unto God, it is nothing decent.
We confusse, we may indifferently consider the course of the World past, eyther from the beginning unto this present day, or from this present day rising upwards unto the beginning of the World; because our understanding is of such a nature, as to consider things in succession one after another. But Gods understanding, as you well know, is of no such nature, as to consider things one after another; for so you should maynteyne succession in the nature of God, and consequently subject him unto time.
Agayne, God doth not looke out of himselfe in knowing the course of the World throughout; for he knew it as well what it might be, and what it should be before the World was made, as now he knowes what it is, yet certainly before the World was, he knew it not by looking without him, for then there was nothing without him to looke into.
And surely since the World was made, the manner of Gods knowledge is nothing altered, for with him is no variablenes nor shadow of change.
Neyther doe I see any reason why the knowledge of God, whereby he knowes all things, should be called the eye of his. Providence: seing Providence beganne with the world, but his knowledge was the same before the world beganne, and by his providence it is more properly sayd, that he governes all things, then that he knowes all thing…s.
Agayne you returne to the devised Circular forme of eternitie (yet that will not warrant a Circular duration thereof, which was your former sigment) and tell us that there is no period of time, which is not so environed with eternitie, as the earth or center is with the Heavens; save onelyonly that the Heavens are finite, and eternitie infinite.
Give me leave to professe the absurditie of this conceyte of yours amongst many others. For what doe you talke of environning that which hath no sides, but onelyonly hath a kind of extension of succession in lenght of parts one after another.
Every period of time hath eternitie before it, and eternitie after it, but this is not sufficient to maynteyne that eternitie environs time as the Heavens environ the earth.
My selfe was borne before many thousands, whom allso I have outlived, but yet I cannot be sayd to environ them as the Heavens environ the earth.
If a Crowe lives many ages of a Man, and an Hart more then the Crowe, and the Raven more then the Hart; how many thousands have begunne to breath & ceased to breath within the limits of theyr duration; yet what an absurde thing were it to say, that they environed them all, as the Heavens environ the earth, yet you proceed, sitting upon these addle eggs, to hatch congruous conclusions, you say that in this sense were it possible, the world might have bene created from everlasting, the Eternall, notwithstanding should have bene everlastingly before them. Which as it is most false, so it is most inconsequent. Most false, for like as God cannot be after that which hath no end (as your selfe before in a manner professed) and the reason is manifest. Because to be after a thing, as for instance to be after the world, is to be after the world is come to his end, which were untrue if the world had no end.
In like sort to be before the world, is to be while the world had yet no being, which is contrary to the supposition of being everlasting.
Neyther doth it follow, that because God is before every period of time which hath a beginning, therefore he should be before such a time which is supposed to have no beginning.
I grant he should be before it by prioritie of cause, and by prioritie of dignitie, but he should not be before it by priority of duration, which is the onelyonly prioritie whereof this discourse proceedeth.
Yet you will bring a reason to prove the former assertion, and that is this, For that period of motion which must terminate the next Million of yeares shall have coexistens with eternity now existent, whose insinity doth not growe with succession, nor extend it selfe with motion; but stands immoovable with times present, being eternally before times future, as well in respect of any set draught or point. Whence we imagine time future to come towards us, as in respect of the first revolution of the Heavens when time tooke beginninge.
This reason hath number enough of words; but let us consider what is the waight of sense it carryeth; And this is an hard matter to doe by reason of the obscurity that accompanieth it; one peuliar character of your discourse; For what doe you meane by the next Million of yeares? I know not how to accompt them, whether in respect of the time present; and so they proceede of the next Million that are to come; or rather of the Million of yeares next past; For I presume, you meane it not of the first Million of years of the world, in case it were eternall: For if eternall, then it had no beginninge, and consequently as it had no first yeare, so neyther had it any first Million of years. Therefore I understand it of the next Million of years to this present, whether it be the Million next past, or next to come, all is one, and it must be true of both, as well as of either, that they are coexistent with eternity now existent; and what I pray of all this? when comes the forme of Syllogisme, whereby to conclude that God is not only before, but everlastingly before that which is without beginninge. And that Gods continuance extends not only beyond, but everlastingly beyond that, which never shall have an end?
Give me leave to helpe you at a dead lift, thus; If the next Million of years cominge, are coexistent with God, now existent, then allso the Million of years cominge next to that, shall be coexistent with God now existent: And so all the Millions of years that are to come, are coexistent with God now existent; But Gods continuance of beinge, doth extend infinitely beyond his now existence: therefore it doth extende infinitely beyond all times to come, though they be without ende; So on the other side: If the Million of years next past doth coexist with God now existent, then also the Million of years next past to them, doth coexistent with God now existinge, and so by the same reason all the years past doe coexist with God now existent; But Gods continuance, hath bene infinitely before his now present existence; therefore allso it hath bene infinitely beyond all the Millions of yeares, though upon supposition they have bene infinite; This I thinke is the But of argument you shoote at, though you have not expressed so much; whether because your Logicke served you not, beinge used to a confused manner of dictatinge at pleasure what you thinke good, or because you envied so much your Readers facility in apprehendinge your meaninge.
Thus I have helped you in raisinge a Spirit: Now without your helpe I will assay to lay him agayne.
To the Major; I grant it in part, namely that there is as much reason why the two next Millions of years, whether you take them of the time past, or of the time to come, should coexist with God now existent, as well as one Million; but when you proceede and say; therfore by the same reason all that are to come, and all that are past, are coexistent with God now existent, you make an incredible stride or leape, infinitely greater then the stride, not only of Polyphemus, but of the Colossus at Rhodes too: For a Million and a Million, yea & a third Million, yea and though you make the progression in such sort while you will, still the number is but finite, but to leape herehence to all that are to come, is an infinite leape: For all are infinite both wayes, both as touchinge time past and time to come: in which respect, no progression, from Million to Million, shall ever reach to all, nay it shall never make the number of yeares remaininge, eyther for the time past, or for the time to come, lesse then infinite.
This is the fowle flawe we finde in the major: let us come to the minor which was this; But Gods existence extends infinitely further, and was infinitely before his now existence. I answeare thus; By Gods now existence, you understand his existence, eyther in the present instant of time, or in the present instant of eternity; if of the present instant of time, then the proposition was not true in any one part of it; For certeinly neyther the Million of yeares next past, nor the Million of yeares next to come, are coexistent with God, now existent in instant of time, both because neyther many years can possibly exist in an instant of time; nor God himselfe; but rather his existens is in the instant of eternity, though both he and his eternity be coexistent with every instant of time: Now if it be understood of the instant of eternity, I deny that God was before this instant, or shall continue one ace of duration after it; And no merveyle, seinge both everlastingnesse for the time past, and everlastingnesse for the time to come, are supposed, to coexist in this instant of eternity; Yet have I not all this while discovered the vanity of the conceyte, which is as a mist before your eyes: You say, the next Million of years doth coexist with eternity now existent; I say this is notoriously untrue, whether you take it of years past or of years to come, all is one; for that which is past, and that which is to come, hath no existence with God now existent: And I proove it thus; That which hath no existence at all at this present, that cannot be sayd to have any coexistence, but things past and things to come have no existence at all at this present, therefore they cannot be sayd to have any coexistence with God; Things future shall have coexistence with God, to witt, when the time of theyr actuall existence cometh; Likewise things past have had theyr coexistence with God, to witt, when the time of theyr actuall existence was.
But neyther things past, nor things to come have any coexistence with God now coexistent, for as much as they have no actuall existence at all, the actuall existence of the one beinge past, and that of the other beinge yet to come.
Neyther doth it follow that because Gods infinity doth not grow by succession, therefore things future are now coexistent with God, but because things present and things future are in succession one unto another, therfore they cannot be sayd eyther future things to be present, or things present to be future.
That reason of yours, (namely that Gods infinity doth not grow by Succession, carryeth rather some coulour of proofe, why Gods coexistence with his creatures or with time, cannot be sayd past or to come, then why things future shall be sayd, to be coexistent with God in this present; Yet your selfe use these formes, as to say, God was coexistent with his creatures that are past, shall be coexistent with such things as are to come; and indeed your reason is too weake to infringe these formes of speeches.
For this coexistence attributed unto God is not in respect of any succession in himselfe, but only in the things without him, which come and goe one after another by succession, & you are in the right, when thereupon you deny all succession in God, because his nature is not subject to any kinde of motion; God was before the World, and is coexistent with and in the World, and shall be after the World, which beinge after time, you in your language, enstile his beinge before the end of it; but after another manner, then whereby he is sayd to be before the beginninge of it; But we must give you leave to be as disertus as you will in Lingua tua; Nobis non licet esse tam disertis, qui musus colimus severiores; At partinge you give us another paradox; when you tell us It is impossible to conceive any duration to be without beginninge or endinge without conceavinge it Circular, or altogeather voyd of succession, on the contrary it is as wonderfull to me, how it should be possible for any man to conceive any duration to be Circular, whether finite or infinite; For the word Circular is a denomination only of forme, and of such a forme as belongs to magnitudes, that have coexistence of parts extended, and of motion in such a forme: But time is neyther any such magnitude, nor capable of motion; In a round figure, I confesse, there is no beginninge nor end of magnitude, But of duration, rounde figures have theyr beginninge, as well as squares; The latter part is as untrue. Some have bene of opinion that the World was everlastinge, and the motions of the Heavens everlastinge, as Aristotle and his followers.
And some greate Schoolemen have thought it possible; how much more could they immagine it. For surely we may immagine things altogether impossible; And in the very next lines you confesse, men may immagine so if they list, and over and above you doe them the favour, as to further them in this theyr imagination, to witt by conceitinge the uninterrupted sluxe of an instant; and why not as well I pray, the uninterrupted motion of the heavens; and what is this to the everlastingnesse thereof, seinge this hath place in the space of a fewe years? Neyther doe we finde the Peripateticks needed any such helpes to conceive the everlastingnesse of the world; In the last place you tell us, the stability of eternity may be best conceived, by the retraction of such a perpetuall fluxe into one instante; And yet before you told us such at everlastinge fluxe could not be imagined; sure I am the retraction of it into an instante is utterly impossible; And be not these proper things to represente Gods eternity by, and fitt for Atheists to make merry with? That God is everlastinge, I trust we can demonstrate it, and that he is without succession, why shold that seeme hard to conceive, when it is improbable he shold be subject to any motion?
And now I come to the topp and the scourge whence you derive observations of greate force, If not for composinge some greate controversies amongst learned men, yet for facilitatinge contemplation in one of the greatest difficulties, that Philosophy whether sacred or humane affords to the concerte of the most curious. At my first cominge to the university, it was a greate comforte and incouragemēt, to me in the studyinge of Predicables to heare a Preacher out of the pulpit deliver that peccata Iuvenum Predicantur in quale; peccata senum Predicantur in quid. Shortly after in the Divinity Schoole, I heard a divine in the question, whether the pope were Antichrist make use of that axiome … uni opponitur; and an other in the pointe of predestination to alleage, that Scibile was prius Scientia: To heare such notions which at that time were familiar unto me, so much dignified as to finde use in the pulpit and in the divinity Schoole, it brought me even in love with such learninge, which before seemed to me but course stuffe in comparison to one of Ciceroes Orations especialy, that conspicuae divina philippica famae volvitur à prima quae proxima, or Aiax Mastigophoros in Sophocles wherwith we were acquainted at winchester.
How much more might a man like topp and scourge the better while he lives, to observe what transcendent use good witts may make of it. And yet by your leave, I finde no such difficulty in conceaving how eternity though Permanent, shall have coexistence with succession or motion.
A Pole fixt in a River hath coexistence with infinite parts of the streame succeedinge one another, without any succession in it selfe.
While I stande still, an army of men may passe by my side, & thereby shall I have coexistence in the same time with every one successively; But if I be not deceived you would devise, how we may conceive eternity to have coexistens with all parts of motion at once; for such a madde coexistence you have devised to your selfe, out of a wilde apprehension of the nature of eternity, and you will not be beaten from it. And you may as well beate your brains to devise how all parts of time both past and to come, may coexist in one instant, and but erst you did cast us upon such an imagination, namely of the retraction of a perpetuall fluxe into one durable or permanent instant. I have alredy laboured, veteres avias a pulmone revellere, to scatter these vaine conceyts.
But proceed we alonge with you; the topp turnes so swiftly somtimes, that he seemes to sleepe; Indeed we were wont to say that in such a case the topp sleepes; And in turninge round every bright marke seemes to make a circle; what of all this? hence you say it will be no hard supposall to conceyte that a moover of strength and vigoure infinite, shold be able to moove a body in a momente. I doe not denye, but a man may conceite so, as they doe conceyte Chymeras; and greate divines somtimes are found to enterteyne such conceyts, as are found to be contradictions, such is this: never any question was made of this, rather it hath beene generally received, as a thinge impossible that locall motion should be in an instant; And the reason of it in this rounde motion whereof you speake, is evident for to be in this instant in the same place what it was immediately before, is rather to rest then moove; and so the parts of successive motion shold not be contracted into unity as you speake, but rather into nullity.
And you your selfe are in doubte whether it were fitt to call it a cessation from motion or a vigourous rest or supermotion: you may doe well to put it to Plotinus to resolve this, or Ficinus his Commentaries upon his Enneads. I perceave you have very vigourous conceites, which whether I shold so call them, or rather a cessation from all sober conceyte or a superconceyte, let the reader judge. In the meane while that must needs be a proper motion which may be called a cessation frō motion, and a rest and that a vigorous one. Yet wonderfull strange is it, that a rest or cessation from motion shold conteyn in it parts of motion successively infinite, and I confesse it were a very hard thinge to determine what to call it; for it is a certaine kinde of Chimera, that never I thinke was hatched in the conceyte of man or Angell before.
If this were granted you, then you presume the moover wold not moove it more slowly this day or yeare then he shold the former; But consider I pray, the pointe is not of moovinge it in a day or yeare, but in an instante; And because two instants cannot come together, therfore for the time betweene while, it must stand still, and because there be infinite instants in every day and houre, it followeth it shold be mooved about infinite times every day and hower; and infinite times stand still. Take what co…se you will, it must stand still as oft as it mooves, and because betweene every two instants of motion there must be a time of rest, and every one infinitely greater then the instant of motion.
For betweene that which is divisible and that which is indivisible, there is no proportion of greatnesse; Now this supposition being granted you, (which you professed to be no hard suppos…) we shall finde parts successively …nfinite in one revolution, or revolutions successively infinite in one or the same instante. So like wise E…ope would instruct his Master how to drinke up all the waters in the Sea, provided that first all the Rivers might be stopped, from runninge into the Sea, for it was most unreasonable that as fast as he dranke the water out, the Rivers shold bee suffered to poure water in againe, and that with a longer and a larger spoone then he had need to use that eates with the devill.
And I see no reason but a man might by ocular inspection discover the world which Galileus hath made report of, in the moone, provided that he might have a stayre case sure enough & high enough & all necessary provisions by the way, & at his journyes end also, & safe returne, to quitt Lazarus relations of the dead, with celestiall relations of …he terra incognita in the moone. And yet I confesse a truth, I doe not finde to what purpose you shold say there be parts successively infinite in one revolution. For in the motion of a snayle this is to be found as well as in the motions of the heavens; for every thing that is continuall is divisible without end, to w tt into parts proportionall; as for parts quotall, as namely fifts or thirds, or fowerths, or hundreds, these ever in the motion of the heavens are finite, the other are infinite. Whereupon it is that Aristotle denies there is principium motus, in the seventh of his phisicks, not speakinge of principium externum and effectivum, for so the nature of every thinge is the cause, both of his motion and of rest, but he speakes of principium internum, and of the integrall parts of motion whereof no part can be assigned to be the fist, but that it may be devided in o two parts, whereof the one is before the other; And in the same sense as there is no first of motion, so there is no last; for what part soever you take; it is divisible into two parts, whereof the one is latter then the other.
The like may be sayd of every thinge that is continuall, even of magnitude which is permanent, as well as of time and motion that consist in succession of parts: but then we must know too, that these parts proportionall, are not to be accoumpted actuall, but only potentiall; And so Aristotle dissolves that Achilles of Zenoes arguments, whereby he wold proove that motion being allowed to be continuall, the swiftest moover shold never overtake the slowest moover, if he were allowed never so litle ground before him because in the time wherin he is to overtake the first space, wherin his fellow moover was before him, that fellow moover will have got some ground more, and while that is in passinge over by the other, he will get some ground more, and so in infinitum… the answere whereunto I never yet found explicated by any.
Hurtado di Mendosa amongst other difficulties, the solution whereof he undertakes, falls upon this also, but most unhappily; for he gives no satisfaction; Aristotles answeare unto it, is but this; partes sunt in toto non actu sed potentia; it is spoken in reference to parts proportionall; which answeare of his seemes a mystery, the right explication and accommodation whereof I never could be so happy as to find in any; but if I be not dereived it conteins an admirable and cleare solution of the difficulty; but I doe not affect the ostentation of such subtilties.
I know not well how to give accounte for this very diversion from graver studies. To returne I say it is a poore course to lash out unto the supposall of such impossibilities to shew how in one revolution the parts are successively infinite; whereas this is found in every the meanest motion, which is a true motion and consists in succession; but in your feigned motion an instante, it is indeede not to be founde, because in an instant there can be no succession.
But further you say, that upon this supposall there shall be revolutions successively infinite in one and the same instant. But how this shall be you have not shewed, although I easyly conceave how it may be prooved upon this supposall, but in a certeyne kinde which I presume you dreame not of.
And it is this; if it be admitted that a revolution of the heavens may be in an instante, then it is as possible that two revolutions may be in an instant, and in the same instant as well as one, and three as well as two, and three hundred as well as three, yea and looke how many thousand dayes are past, since the World beganne, so many revolutions of the heavens there might have beene in one instant of time. And it is nothinge strange if uno absurdo dato, mille scquantur; but I doe not find that you once so much as dreame of this; and what your meaninge is, I find no where explained, much lesse the deduction thereof manifested. Yet as if you had prooved many revolutions, (upon this supposall) to bee possible in one and the same instante, you discourse what they are to bee called; and you will not have them properly to be termed motion, but rather the producte of motions infinitely swifte united or made up into a vigourous permanency; and herence to serve your turne in the explication of eternity, you adde how shold not duration of one or of all these revolutions be accompted as an instant of time, but a kinde of duration indivisibly permanent. Here is strange language, had not we need of an interpreter, or of some urinator delius to dive into the depth, and sound the bettome if it? I remember what a freind of mine pleasantly discourst in the university, by occasion of a certeine disputants strange manner of disputation; I have longed saith he to heare a scholer dispute eagerly, & distinguish and goe one boldly in schoole termes and phrases which himselfe understoode not. And now to my judgement I have lighted on such a one.
But whether you understand your selfe or noe I know not. I doubte I never shall; yet I will not give over, I will adventure to discusse it, and to shake this rotten stuffe in peices, that at least it may not abuse the readers with suspicion of som rare notions, whome they cannot endoctrinate. First you speake of revolutions plurall yea infinite, how you have come by them I know not, unlesse as capons come by chicken; you made supposall of a thinge impossible enough, namely of the revolutions of the heavens in one instante of time, but it was only one revolution, and hereupon you steale up many revolations, yea infinite, I know not how, neyther doe you once goe about to explicate how.
Secondly you will not have it called motion, but a product of motions. Had you sayd you wold not have these revolutions called one motion but many, there had bene some sense in the speech, though litle reason.
For you professe these revolutions to be successive, and no where have you in the least manner signified them to be interrupt or discont nuall.
And if you take them as continuall, why should they not be stiled one motion? But this I thinke is not it, you insist upon; For you dislike the name of motion it selfe; you will rather have it called the product of many motions.
Now here I am at fault, in hu…inge after the meaninge of your invention, But yet as Plutarke makes the hounde to discourse in huntinge after an hare, thus; he went not that way, nor that way, therefore he came this way; so will not I give over, but inquire which way the hare runs.
Now then this your product of motions is to be understood eyther of a product Physicall, or of a product Mathematicall; and I explicate my selfe (as you louelove to involve your selfe) thus.
The product of motion Physicall, is the forme that is acquired by motion; As for example, in alteration a quality is produced, in augmentation a certeyne measure of quantity; in locall motion a new place or a new site; Eyther in respect of the whole as it falls out in all direct motions, or only in respect of the parts, as in all motions Circular; which new site is sayd to be new in respect of that which immediately went before.
Now in this motion of the Heavens in an instant supposed by you, there is no such product Physicall, for looke what site every part of the Heavens hath immediately before this instant, the same it hath still; And therfore you call it very significantly (I confesse) a vigorous permanency; which is as much as to say, no motion at all; Neyther doe I thinke that by the product here spoken of, you meane a product Physicall; Let us come therefore to consider, whether it may be verified of a product Mathematicall, that is in the Arithmeticall operation of addition: for if two numbers be added togeather, it will produce a totall, and that totall shall be the product.
Now here you speake of revolutions infinite, which beinge added to greater, make a product which you call a vigourous permanency; which I professe, in my judgement seemes to be delivered with admirable significancy and congruitye.
For if in teachinge my Schollar Arithmaticque I shall exercise him in addition, and bid him write seven Cyphars in a rewe thus 0000000 and then bid him subscribe seven Cyphers under them thus, 0000000, and then bid him adde one unto the other, and tell me what in the product, & he will tell me that he finds seven Cyphers still, which is as much as just nothinge; In like sort suppose the Heavens standinge still immediately before this instant, and in this instant to be turned round to the place where it was immediately before, this deserves to be called a vigourous permanency: that is no motion rather then a motion: For to be where a body was immediately before, is the definition of rest, and not competible unto motion.
Nay take such an other revolution, and adde unto the former, this allso beinge rather a vigourous permanency, and so no motion rather then motion, adde no motion, unto no motion, and what will the product be, but a vigorous parmanency; and so in infinitum, it shall be a vigorous permanency: For no motion added to no motion while you will, the product shall still be no motion; but a vigourous permanency.
But I see no reason why you should call this vigorous permanency, infinitely swifte.
And yet I confesse by this supposition of yours the Heavens are made to stand still faster, then now they goe or run: allbeit they run so incredibly swift, in the judgement of some; that they had rather set the earth goinge, and make the Heavens stand still in a vigorous permanency, though in a sense much different from the vigorous permanency you discourse of: And this calleth to my remembrance one of Bastards Epigrams, which he made of himselfe ridinge on Sarisbury plaine: For beinge overtaken by a gentelman well mounted, who desired to have his company; Bastard Spurs his cutt, the Gentleman reines his geldinge, yet could Bastard keepe no way with him. Whereupon he complains thus, What shold I doe that was bestrided so. His Horse stood still faster then mine could goe.
So the Heavens by your supposall stand still faster then now they goe.
I am not a litle sensible of the construction that some may make of this discourse of mine, as namely a greate deale too light and vayne for a Divine; especially in a matter of so high a nature, as of the essence of God, and his eternity.
I professe I am often striken with feare of transgression in this kinde: and have often meditated the relinguishinge of it wholy, I take so litle pleasure in these Schole quircks.
Yet another consideration affrights me more then this, and that is lest comming to calculate the Divine attributes by discourse of reason, in following the course of my weake understanding this way (wherof in this case I am much suspicious) I shoulde be founde to shape the attributes of God in such a manner, as to attribute that unto God, which dothe not become his Majestie, or deny that unto him, which dothe well become him; and thus I may fall upon blasphemy before I am awave.
I had rather submitt unto the acknowledgement of attributes divine, by faithe, so farre foorthe as they are revealed unto us in Gods word; then curiously inquire into the nature of them, by reason, & quaint Scholasticall argumentation.
But agayne, I consider, that it may please God to make use of that illumination as well Philosophicall as Theologicall, which he hathe given me, to cleere some difficult points, concerning the nature of God, & therby to prevent blasphemies each way.
And as, by his grace, I feare to enterteyne any indecent conceyte of the Majestie of God; so I trust, he will not expose me, to have my feares brought upon me, but rather by exercise perfect those seedes of knowledge of his Divine nature, which have bene sowen in me, bothe by the light of nature, and by the light of grace, and assist me allso even in these discourses, and make them meanes to keepe others from being led away into erroneous opinions & enormous conceytes, concerning his nature, and divine attributes.
And as for the censure of lightnes, and want of gravitie, passable upon this discourse; let the Reader consider; we are now upon the By, and in consideration of a Monstrous supposition, and most ridiculous prosecutions therupon, and let him judge how such deserve to be enterteyned.
Agayne when we medle with an obscure, perplexe, and intricate manner of discourse, if matter of refreshing both of mine owne, and of my Readers Spirits be offered, especially in that way of an harshe & unpleasing discourse; shall I balke it, and in the affectation of a Stoicall gravitie decline the quickninge of mine owne, and of my Readers senses? It was wont to be sayde Omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci; & agayne Ridentem dicere verum, quis vetap. In a word; I am at thy judgement Reader, to passe what censure upon me thou pleasest, neyther am I unwilling thou shouldst knowe mine infirmities, as well as my poore sufficiencyes, that knowing me to be fleshe and blood, as well as others, thou mayst receave nothing herein for the Authors sake, but only for the evidence it carryethe with it. And that evidence is the worke of God, thoughe the manner of caryinge it be the worke of Man.
Now it is highe time to confider the other member of this sentence followinge, which is this, So should not the duration of one, or of all these revolutions be accoumpted as an instant or portion of time, but a kinde of duration indivisibly permanent.
Nowe I finde no proportion betweene this and the former member, thoughe they be coupled together with a particle of similitude, So. For if the revolution be as it is supposed by you; to be in an instant of time, why shoulde not the duration of it also be accoumpted in an instant of time? So likewise, if you conceave diverse revolutions, yea infinite revolutions, to be in the same instant of time; what reason is there why theyr duration should not be accoumpted allso, in the same instant of time? Fof if these infinite revolutions you speake of, have each of them a severall instant, why shoulde not the duration of each be accoumpted in each soverall instant, and the aggregate duration of them all, be reckoned to be, in an aggregation of all the severall instants, in each wherof, one of the former revolutions is founde?
Secondly, you doe not well to joyne an instant, and a portion of time together, as termes equipollent, because; no portion of time is an instant, nor is an instant any portion of time; more then a point is a part of magnitude. For every thinge consistethe of its parts; but neyther magnitude consists of points, nor points of instants.
Thirdly, much lesse reasen is there, why the duration of one or of all these revolutions, shoulde be coumpted a kinde of Eternitie. First, because there is no kinde of eternitie indivisibly permanent (such as you here speake of) but one, and that is the eternitie of God. Secondly, what an absurd thinge is it to say, that the duration of a thinge in an instant of time and no longer, is fitter to be called eternitie then an instant of time. For the revolution you speake of is but for one instant of time. For the justifying wherof I appeale to your owne supposall.
It were no hard supposall to conceyte that a moover of strengthe and vigour infinite, shoulde be able to moove a body in a moment: This cannot be meant of any other moment then of time. For to moove a body in an instant of eternitie, requires not a moover of infinite strengthe; the meanest motion of the meanest moover, is comprehended (as you acknowledge) within the instant of eternitie. Nay all the revolutions you speake of, thoughe successively infinite, are upon your supposition in one and the same instant, which cannot be understood otherwise, then of an instant in time. Now is it fitt, that the duration of such a motion or motions, the beginning and ende wherof are both in a instant of time, shoulde be stiled eternitie?
And how can that be called permanent, which bothe beginnes and endes in one and the same instant of time? Or how can that motion be coumpted indivisible, which hathe parts successively infinite as your selfe professe in the sentence immediately before? If these be sober conceytes, I never knewe, what sobrietie in this kinde meaneth. But let us proceede to the next; The motion of the eighthe spheare supposed to be such as hathe bene sayde, that is motion infinitely swift, or not divisible by succession; the Sunne moovinge successively as now it doth should have locall coexistence to every starre in the eighthe spheare, to every point of the eclipticke circle, wherin it mooves, at one and the selfe same instant, or in every least parcell of time. The substance of this hathe reasonable good consequence, from the former supposition of a thinge utterly impossible, and consequently it is not more impossible then the former. Yet by your leave, you erre in many a circumstance.
For first, as touching the mayne intention of this sentence, the Sunne shall not have locall coexistence with every starre or with any starre in the eighthe spheare; how can it? there beinge the huge distance of three vast bodies of the Spheares, of three planets betwixt the firmament, and the orbe of the Sunne.
But that upon your former supposition he shall coexist in the same line drawne from the North to the Southe I graunt in Astronomicall computation, and so by the same computation may be sayde to have locall coexistence with it, thoughe not in computation physicall.
Secondly, marke I pray you, what libertie of speeche you take unto your selfe. For that which even now you called a vigorous permanency, in this place you terme it a motion infinitely swift: as if you should say, the motion is so incredidibly swift, that the body indeede stands still and mooves not at all. As much as to say, such a one talkes so fast that he seemes, and that in a vigorous manner to holde his peace.
And indeede I confesse, that sometimes it falleth out, that the faster we ride, the later we come to our journeys ende; as in case by fast ridinge, our horse playeth the jade, and tyreth under us, and we can hardly make him goe. I had not thought such anomalies and irregularities could have bene devised in the heavens, as namely, that a motion swift, should become a vigorous rest. In my judgement if the motion of such like discourses of yours were converted into a vigorous rest, it would give farre better satisfaction.
Thirdly you will not have this supposed motion to be divisible by succession, yet you doe impute unto it succession. For but erst you affirmed that it had parts successively infinite. Now if it hathe succession, how is it possible, but that it should be divisible into parts succeeding one another? For like as magnitude havinge extension of parts, must needes be divisible in respect of its extension; so motion fluent as it hath succession of parts, so it must needes be divisible in respect of this succession.
Yet you suppose the contrary, like unto the Fryar in Chancer, who to shewe his contentednes with a litle, professed that he desired, but of bread a shiver, and of a goose the liver, and of a pigge the head, but that for him, nothing must be dead. So you will have the motion you speake of, to consist of parts succeeding, yet not divisible into parts succeeding. Lastly, your disi…nctive is not good, as when you say, in the false same instant, or in the least parcell of time. For your supposit on is of the revolution of the heavens, not in the least parcell of time at all, but in an instant, which you well knowe is no parcell of time.
Yet I thinke to charme the absurditie of your former supposition, which perhaps makes you weary of it, and something confounded in the prosecution therof, you would fayn turne it into some small parcell of time: but then, all that you builde herupon falls utterly to the ground.
One sentence remayneth to be considered, wherby in prosecuting your former supposition, you desire to lay a ground, for the commodious illustration of Gods eternitie, and that is this: Every starre in the eyghthe spheare should be converted into a permanent circle, and so in one circle there shoulde be circles for number infinite, as many circles as there be points or divisibilities in the eclipticke circle. All this I may be bolde to say is nothing to the purpose, but proceedeth merely from affectation of holdinge your Reader in admiration, at the wonderfull conclusions, which yet being not superficially but exactly considered, conteyne most superficiall conceytes; the thinges you here deliver, so farre foorthe as they have any truthe, are as well verified in respect of every days motion of the heavē; yea as well verified in a tennis ball, at every turning round therof.
For looke how many circles are made, upon the eighthe spheares turninge round in a moment; so many circles are made, by the turning of it rounde in 24. houres, For the body of the heavens is divisible alike, whether it turne round in a day, or in an houre, or in a moment; savinge that the turning of it round in a moment; deserves rather to be accoumpted a vigorous rest, and may be called a cessation from motion, as your selfe have professed, and consequently a cessation from making any circles at all.
But howsoever; I say the body of the heavens is alike divisible and that in infinitum, because it is corpus continuum; and for the same reason a tennis ball is so too & upon his turning rounde, you may as well imagine infinite circles made by him, according as the points therin are infinite.
Now we come to the application of this fiction (prosecuted with much varietie, partly of Chimericall, and partly of vulgar inventions) unto eternitie it selfe, as followeth: Thus in him that is eternall, or being infinite and in eternitie, are actually conteyned durations successively infinite. Thus in him, say you; and what I pray, may an Atheist reply out of that heart of his wherin he saythe There is no God. For may he not rejoyne in this manner? And if it be but Thus; like as the fiction here supposed by you, is of a thing utterly impossible, so you give us libertie to conceave alike of the Eternitie of your God: not to reiterate the varietie of vayne conceytes, which have bloomed from the severall branches of this your discourse in prosecutinge so vile a fiction to represent Gods eternitie therby. Agayne, how dothe God conteyne durations successively infinite? Not formally, you well knowe, but only eminently, for as much as he can produce them.
But no such thing appeares, nor any modell therof in this your fiction. For this revolution in an instant, conteynes only it selfe formally it conteynes the motion of no other body, neyther formally, nor eminently.
Yet thus, you say, Gods eternall being conteynes durations successively infinite, thoughe there be no more resemblance betweene them, then betweene harpe and harrowe; a foxe and a ferne bushe, no nor any thing like so much.
Yet you proceede in your accommodation thus: The former supposition admitted, we coulde not say, that the inferior orbes mooving as now they doe, did moove after the eighthe spheare, but that the times of their motions were continually conteyned in it. For the eighthe spheare being mooved in an instant, should loose the divisibilitie of time, and the nature of motion, with all the properties that accompany them, not by defect (as if it no way comprised them) but by swallowing up time or duration successively infinite, into an actuall permanency. To this I answeare, first; The Heavens moovinge as nowe they doe, I cannot subscribe unto you intimatinge that the inferior Orbes doe moove after the eighthe spheare: But rather as in respect of their proper motion they goe against it (supposing the eighthe spheare to be the uppermost Heaven) so in respect of Diurnall motion, they moove not after it, but motu raptus are drawne a long with it: this is on the By.
Nowe to the mayne: I deny that upon your supposition, it will followe, that the times of these inferior orbes motions, were eminently conteyned in the motion of the eighthe spheare.
Your contrary affirmation seemes to me wonderous absurde, neyther can I devise any reason for it, or in what sense you take this phrase, to conteyne eminently.
For the common acception of it is this: That conteynes another thinge eminently, which not conteyninge it formally, is able to produce it.
So the Sunne is commonly reputed to conteyne heate eminently, for as much as not being formally hot it selfe, yet is able to produce heate in bodies capable.
So your selfe before have acknowledged all thinges to be in God, not formally (for he is neyther man nor Angell, much lesse any inferior creature), but yet is able to produce all these.
But it is impossible that the motion of the eighthe spheare, supposed to be in an instant, should produce the times of the inferior Orbes motions.
It cannot produce their motions, they mooving as now they doe.
For how should an instantaneous or momentany motion in one body, produce a temporall motion in another body? Much lesse can it produce the times of their motions. For that is only in the power of God.
He alone that gives existence to any thinge, can give duration and time unto it.
Neyther dothe it conteyne their motions formally. For their motions are supposed to be temporall, that is in time, the motion of the eighthe spheare is supposed to be momentany, that is in an instant.
But a momentany or instantaneous motion cannot formally conteyne a motion that is made in time.
A swifter motion can conteyne a motion lesse swift, because it is bothe so swift, and swifter allso.
And here by accident, and ere I am aware, I have a glimse of your meaninge; and while I dispute against it, I may seeme to you, to make for it.
For this instantaneous motion is supposed by you, to be infinitely swift, and therfore it may well conteyne the motions of Inferior orbes, which are lesse swift, as mooving rounde no soever then in the space of 24. houres; wheras the eighthe spheare is supposed to moove round in a moment. I thinke I have sprunge the partridge, now let me see, whether I have not a springe to take him: First then I say, this is not to conteyne eminently, but formally rather.
Secondly I say, this swiftnes of motion which you have invented is too swift, too infinite to serve your turne, to conteyne the revolutions of inferior Orbes. For you have allready professed that it deserves to be called a vigorous rest, and that it may be called a cessation from motion,
Now let any sober man judge, whether a cessation from motion, whether rest, and permanency, and that a vigorous one be fitt, eminently to conteyne the true mōtions of inferior Orbes, which in the space of 24. houres are turned round. Yet if leave were given you to suppose this allso, namely that a vigorous rest is so infinitely swift, that it might well be sayde eminently to conteyne the motions of inferior Orbes; yet how woulde it herhence appeare, that it should conteyne the times of them allso?
Since this vigorous rest which you make to be infinitely swift, is but in an instant, and the motions of inferior Orbes of like quantitie are performed, in no lesse space then 24. houres.
Is an instant of time fitt to conteyne 24 houres? Yes you may say eminently. For as fluxus puncti in Longitudinem makes a line, so fluxus instantis for a certeyne space of time, makes 24. houres. Any man hathe reason to give me leave, to refreshe my selfe a litle while my witts are dulled about such stuffe as this. But you labour to shewe how the times of the inferior Orbes motions should be eminently conteyned in the eighthe spheare, if it mooved round in an instant. And that by this reason: For say you the eighthe spheare being mooved in an instant, should loose the divisibilititie of time and the nature of motion, not by defect (as no way comprising them) but by swallowing up time into an actuall permanency.
Tis true, I confesse, that motion, which is made in an instant; loosethe the divisibilitie of time, that is, is not made in time. For an instant is no part nor parcell of time; Agayne it is well that you doe so ingenuously confesse, that it looseth the nature of motion, allso, and all the properties that accompany it. For you have allready professed, that it may be called a cessation from motion, and is to be called a vigorous rest or permanency, rather then motion.
All this I doe not dislike. But yet to make way for the conteyninge both of times and motions, you tell us, that all this is not by way of defect, as if it no way comprised them, but by swallowing up time or division successively infinite into an actuall permanency; which assertion of yours if we should take for a truthe, we should swallowe many a goageon. For first you imply, that what a thing comprisethe not, that it hath not, by way of defect, which is untrue for my hand comprisethe not sixe fingers,; yet that it is without a fixt finger is not by way of defect. Secondly you give us to understand that a certeyne mutation may loose both the nature of time and motion, and all the properties of them, and yet some way comprise them which is contradictious.
For looke what way it compriseth time or motion, surely that way it hathe it, and dothe not loose it. Thirdly it is an absurde thing to say, that an instant of time swalloweth up time. For to swallowe it up is to conteyne it. But it is impossible that an instant should conteyne the space of any time, as the space of 24. houres. For if it be impossible that an houre should conteyne the space of 24. houres, much more impossible is it, that an instant shoulde.
The motion indeede, which you suppose to be in an instant, conteynes an whole revolution of the eighthe spheare, (for upon the fiction of this impossibilitie, you are pleased to descant much:) but surely this supposition of yours, thoughe it be of a thing impossible, yet dothe it not inferre, that this instant shall swallowe up the space of 24. houres, thoughe it swalloweth up the motion, (as you suppose) which usually is made in no lesse space then the space of 24. houres.
Last of all consider I pray the sobrietie of this speeche: It swalloweth up motion into an actuall permanency (as much as to say, into an actuall rest) and so it comprisethe it, that is, rest conteyneth motion, and that in an instant; how much more shall the space of 24. houres rest, be sufficient to conteyne a motion infinitely greater, then an instant dothe. As for division successively infinite (as it were to make your deductions the more admirable to vulgar capacities) it is a very sory conceyt. For the least time or motion that is, is divisible in infinitum, like as every continuall thing is, though never so small. By this, let the wise Reader judge, of the profitable nature of the improvements you speake of in improving motion infinitely swift into permanency or rest, which is as much as to say, into no motion; and let him well weighe and consider whether this be not to bring a noble unto nine pence, or rather unto no pence: and by such improovements, when you cast up your reckoninge at the yeares ende, you may put all your gaynes in your eyes, and never hurt your sight.
After this you come in with a newe way of conceavinge the first moovers eternitie, and that is as Mathematicians conceave the nature of a spheare, by imagining it to be produced by the motion of a semicircle upon the Axis. There is such a definition, I confesse, of a spheare, which is defined to be transitus circumferentiae as which transitus I conceave to be emanation rather then motion, like as a line is imagined to be fluxus puncti in longitudinem; and a superficies is imagined to be fluxus lineae in latitudinem. But all these are very vayne imaginations. For neyther is it possible, that such things should have any fluxe, or if they had, that by theyr fluxe they should make eyther lengthe, or breadthe, or thicknes in such a figure; but rather a length so made should consist of points, & a breadth so made shoulde consist of lines, and a spheare so made, shoulde consist of semicircles, which is utterly impossible.
And shall we never linne to compare the nature of God to the vayne imaginations of such vayne thinges? Yet seing you will take your course, we will take libertie to consider it. And thus you proceede, For let the eternall be but thus imagined, to be an intellectuall spheare, capable of momentany motion or revolution throughout this World, and the indivisible coexistence of his infinitie to every part of time and place, will be very conceavable. Very conceavable, you say; but first let us try, whether this conceyte of yours conteyne any conceavable truthe. For if it dothe not, are we not well advanced to the conceaving of Gods eternitie, by comparing it to such impossibilities? And first you were as good bid us imagine God to be an intellectuall body, as to be an intellectuall Spheare.
For a Spheare is a body, eyther physicall or mathematicall, that is, a body at least of quantitative dimensions. The world indeede is Sphericall, and God is in every part of it; but will you therfore conceave the nature of God to be Sphericall allso, and his forme altered, upon the making of the World, from that it was before?
Remember I pray, God is in the World and in every part of it but how? as conteyning it, not as being conteyned by it.
Secondly, you will have us imagine God to be capable of momentany motion, or revolution throughout the World? Now consider I pray, what a congerie of wilde conceytes are involved here. Is a revolution, a motion throughout the world? Every man knowes a revolution to be a turninge round. The orbes of the heavens have theyr revolutions, but doe they therby moove throughout the World? or rather keepe theyr places, & each mooveth only about the bodies that are within the compasse therof.
Agayne you knowe momentany motion is a thing imposible. And that which dothe so moove round as you would suppose it, dothe rather rest then moove. For to be in the same place where it was immediately before is the definition of locall rest. And your selfe have confessed it may be called a cessation from motion, and doe affect rather to call it a rest, a permanency, a stabilitie.
If it were a motion, is it fitt to attribute motion unto God? Is it fitt to maynteyne that God mooves from place to place? Agayne the motion of an intellectuall nature as intellectuall, is rather the motion of the understanding in knowing things, then motion locall from place to place. And it is true, that all thinges done in time and place are knowne unto God, but without all motion so much as in the understanding. For even in the understanding of God, there is no change, much lesse motion. Lastly by mooving through the World in an instant, he shallbe coexistent to every part of place & that in an instāt, but how shall we conceave herby, any coexistence of his to every part of time, as well to all parts of time past, and time to come, as to the time present?
The light of the Sunne is diffused thoroughe all, let us suppose, thoroughe all the world, therfore it shallbe coexistent to every place, but not to every part of time, but only to the present. But is it not your meaning that Gods eternitie should be diffused not so much thorough the world; for that belongs to his immensitie; but rather thoroughe the time of the world, from the beginning therof, to the ende of all durations successive without ende (for you doe maynteyne that successive duration shall have no ende?) Certeinly this seemes to be your meaninge, and then indeede, it is no hard thing to conceave Gods eternitie to coexist with all parts of time past, present & to come, if so be we conceave it diffused thoroughe them all, as God is coexistent to all parts of this World, if he be diffused thorough them all (which is your phrase, and not mine, and utterly disclaymed by Durandus.)
But then what Meant you to adde coxistence of place to coexistence of time, which are woonderous different, the one belonging to Gods immensitie, this alone to Gods eternitie.
Secondly, what meant you to call this a motion thoroughe the World, wheras it is rather thorough the duration of the World, or thorough the time of the world, and the parts therof, from the beginning of it to the ende, and infinitely further. For by the World we usually understand a World of place, and not a world of time.
Thirdly, what meant you to call, this motion throughout all times a revolution, doth time runne round, & by fetching a compasse about returne to the beginning of it from whence it first issued? For this is the nature of revolutions.
Fourthly, what meant you to call it a motion, seing it can neyther be alteration, nor augmentation, nor generation, nor locall motion, thoughe you seeme to devise a motiō throughout all time, like unto the locall motiō of the eighthe Spheare turning round in a moment. And so you devise as it were a locall motion thoroughe time but it shallbe in an instant, to make up a world of woonders, that in an instant a motion may be conceaved thoroughe all time, from the beginning of the World to the ende, and infinitely beyond it in duration. Yet this motion thorough so many thousand yeares while the world lastethe, and millions of yeares after that, shall be in an instant.
Fiftly when, I pray, did this motion beginne? was it before the world, or with the beginning of the world? Not before the world: For, as there was then no place for God to penetrate (as you speake) and to fill, so there was no time for him to moove thorough by his eternitie. If with the world, then seing this motion is supposed to be in an instant, in the first instant God mooved thorough all time to come.
But how was that possible, seing like as before the World it could not be, because then there was no time; so in the beginning of the World it could not be, because the time to come as yet was not. If you say, thoughe it were not present, yet it was to come, and therfore God coulde by vertue of his infinite eternitie moove thorough it in an instant, I answeare, that by the same reason, he might as well moove thorough all time before ever the World was. For even then, thoughe there was no time present, yet there was time enoughe to come.
But like as it is absurd to say, that God by his immensitie did fill all places before the world, when as yet there was no place to fill: so it is alike absurd to say, that God by his eternitie did fill all times before the world was, when as yet there was no time to fill. And now I pray, be pleased soberly to consider, what litle neede there is of all this paynes, in streyning our conceytes as it were upon tenter hookes, till they are quite out of joynt: what neede of so many absurd fictions, of so many impossibilities to proove that which is most untrue, and yet confidently supposed by you as a principle out of a superficiall consideration of the nature of Gods eternitie, Namely, that God by vertue of his eternity doth coexist with all times past, present, and to come.
For consider I pray, will you say that God did by vertue of his immensitie coexist with all places before the world was? No sober man I presume, will say this; why then should you affirme, that God by vertue of his eternitie did coexist with all times before the world was? And if the actuall existence of place, be required unto this, that God by vertue of his immensitie should exist with it; why should not the actuall existence of time as well be required unto this, that God by vertue of his eternitie should coexist therwith? And if before the world was, God did not coexist with times that were to come (like as then he did not coexist with place that was to come:) then surely by the same reason, he shall not at this time present coexist with time that is to come; and consequently, neyther shall he be sayde to coexist with times that are past, like as if the world were destroyed, he shoulde not be sayde to exist with those places, and bodily spaces, which sometimes were, but in this case now were not.
And therfore we have litle neede to trouble our selfes with any such wilde and monstrous fictions to maynteyne the coexistence of God with every part of time. For as the parts of time shall be found to exist in theyr order, so shall God be truly sayde to coexist with them, and no otherwise, that is, not to coexist with them all at once, but only in succession, not of Gods duration or of any thing in God, but in succession of time, and of the thinges conteyned therin.
Gods duration we acknowledge to be eternall without beginning and without ende, yet indivisible; for as much as it is no way subject unto motion, no way subject to any variablenes or shadowe of change. For he is of necessary being, and therfore impossible it is, he should not be. Besides, whatsoever he is the same he is essentially, and therfore not subject to any kinde of change, eyther in substance or qualitie, or quantitie or in place.
And as he is the Author of all thinges, so both the motions and rests of all thinges are produced and maynteyned by him, and so may be sayde after an eminent manner to be conteyned in him, and no otherwise. I mislike not Plotins interpretation of Gods totalitie of being, in as much as he is able to produce all kindes of beinge. As for eternitie, I had rather rest vponupon Aquinas his definition of it, then on yours. For it hathe no parts formally; and as for an eminent conteyning of all parts of duratiō, that is in respect of activitie to produce them. Now time, and the duration therof, together with the duration of thinges therin, is rather produced by the counsayle and will of God, then by his eternitie. And therfore all durations doe flowe rather from Gods will, then from his eternitia. To my understanding a body casteth but one shadowe, and not many; which casting of a shadowe is no other thing then the hindring of light from the earthe or water, according to the bodies proportion, which therupon are sayde to be shadowed by it. These diverse shadowes, as you call them, how they vanishe in every moment, as you speake, I professe, I know not, sure I am the fishes in the water doe not eate them, if they did, certenly they would be never a whit the fatter by them.