Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 2 · Chapter 6 (1 of 3)
CHAP. VI.
Of Eternity, or of the branch of absolute infinities, whereof Successive Duration of the imaginary infinity of time is the modell.
I See no reason to subscribe unto the proposition wherewith you begin your discourse on this Argument, as touching the exact proportion betweene immensity and eternity. For Gods immēsity is that whereby he is ubi que or every where, like as by his eternity he is semper or alwayes: But to be every where supposeth the creations, but to be semper alwayes, doth not: For God was alwayes ever before the world: Againe God in proper speech hath true being, and consequently true Duration of Being, which having neyther beginning nor ending is properly eternall. But God in proper speech hath no quantity, and consequently neyther extension, and so in proper speech cannot be coumpted immense, which signifieth extension without beginning and end; and having no extension at all, being merely spirituall and not materiall. And ere you turne over a new leafe, your self make doubt, whether Time hath the same proportion to eternity, as magnitude created hath to Divine Immensity. In a word, I doe not beleive you are like to find so many nothings to resemble God by in this argument of eternity as you did devise in the other of Immensitie. That saying of Tertulliā you mention, is no more appliable to Gods eternity as tis sayd he was to himselfe Time, then to his immensity, as 'tis therein sayd he was unto himselfe a World; And for ought I see, God is so still, and not onelyonly was so before all things; in as much as he hath no more need of them, then before all things he had. You say we cannot properly say God was in time before the world was made; I say such a speech in my judgement seemes to be neyther proper nor improper; but directly false, even as false, as to say God was in place before he made the world: For before the world was made there was neyther time nor place: Nowe he is in neyther as conteyned in them, but only as conteyning both time and place, which before the World, absolutely were not at all, & consequently could not be conteyned by him. I doe not think that Austin himselfe was conscious of any acutenes in inferring that God could not have bene before all times, if he had alwayes bene in time; for common sense doth justifie, that that legge which was ever in the stockes, was never out of the stockes. But whereas you say, that we believe God to be as truly before all times future, as before all times past, & seeme to affect it as a subtlety of opinion herein.
I willingly professe, that if it be a subtlety, it is of so subtle a sense, as quite passeth mine intelligence: I had thought it might be avouched of every thing that is past, that it is before all times to come: And that all future things are behind the things that are past.
Neyther had I thought any reason needfull to be given of this: because common sense, I think doth justifie it.
Yet you seeme to make this a peculiar propertie of God, that like as he is before all times past, so allso he is before all times to come.
Yet I gesse at your meaning: For we now existent, allbeit we are before the things that are to come, yet it is not necessary, that we should be after them. But God as he is before all, so, if it please him, he may be after all; For God is that which was, & is, & is to come; that is, which shall be, and that for ever of himselfe.
Now this phrase; to be after all, in a sublimate streyne of conceyt attributed unto God, is more truly and perfectly to be accoumpted his being before all, then after all, in your opinion, as it seemes; like as the Heavens invironning the Earth, though they seeme to sense to be under the Earth, and under our Antipodes, yet indeed they are above them; So God in being after all things future, is more properly and truly to be accoumpted before them.
This mystery I seeme to find by your subsequentd iscourse and I wonder what you meane to carry your selfe so in the cloudes, when you might have exprest your selfe playnly.
And surely it is no glory to affect a lofty understanding of your owne phrase, above the apprehension of your Reader, when your termes are not sufficient to expresse your meaning. This is to equivocate like the Iesuites. Of that conceyt of yours I will prepāre my selfe to consider against the time, I shall arrive to your more full discourse thereof, in the pa…s subsequent of this Chapter.
In the next place you propose a conclusion which is this. His eternity then is the inexhaustible founteyne or Ocean, from which time or Duration successive doth perpetually flow.
But I can neither justifie this inference, nor the truth of the proposition inferred: For I know not from what premises of yours, it can be inferred.
That, which went immediately before, was this: God is before all times future, as well as all times past; Now to inferre that God was before all time, therfore all time flowes from his eternity, is no good consequence. You might as well argue thus. God was before all place, therfore all places flowes from Gods eternity. We our selfes are before all times that are to come; but herehence it followes not, that all times to come flow from our eternity, or from us.
Suppose Angells had bene made before the World, yet would it not thence followe that the World did flow from them.
Now for the proposition it selfe inferred, it is subject to exceptions divers wayes. The phrase, to flow, savoureth of a natural & necessary emanation, & so much the more when it is resembled by the flowing of water from a founteyne. But nothing created doth in such sort flow from God.
Naturall emanations from God are not to be found but in God, and that in respect of the Persons; the Sonne being naturall and necessarily begotten of the Father, & the H. Ghost naturally and necessarily proceeding both from the Father & the Sonne.
Againe, the water that floweth from the founteyne on from the Ocean, is of the same nature with the founteyne, on with the water of the Ocean, so is not time of the same nature, with eternity from whence, you say, it flowes.
Agayne it is untrue that eternity produceth time or duration of things created: for the duration of them is nothing els, but the continuance of their existence.
Therefore looke what produceth the things themselves, & maynteynes them, being produced, from thence they are to be accoumpted to have their beginning. Now it is the power and will of God, wherby things are created and preserved, & not the eternity of God. By the Word of the Lord were the Heavens made, & all the hoast of them by the breath of his mouth. We no where read, that by the eternitie of God all things were made, Angells and Men, Heaven and Earth.
And so likewise as by his word he made all things, so by the power of his mighty word he supports all things. Heb. 1. And Ioh. 1.therefore all things both touching theyr being and duration, depend upon the mighty word of God: this we have ground for: But that they depend upon his eternity, we have no ground to affirme; though it is true that both God, and his Word, and Spirit are eternall, otherwise he could not be the Creator of the World. VponUpon the back of this, you come in with a new Paradox, namely that From all eternity, there was a possibility for us to be; as if it were possible for a creature to be from all eternity.
Yet I know some Scholemen have maynteyned it (as what will not wild witts dare to undertake): but doth it therefore become a Divine, to suppose it without all proofe? I hold it to be impossible, and Durands reasons to the contrary are more pregnant, in my judgement, then any that are brought for it: to witt, that then, yeares and months, dayes and hours should be equall; for each of them, even yeares, should be infinite, and dayes, and houres, yea and minutes past, should be but infinite; whence he inferres, that to every minute should be equall to an yeare; and albeit he invadeth only eternity of things in motion; yet I see no reason to the contrary, but the argument is appliable as well to all created things, though not subject to motion, though the evidence of deduction is not so manifest as in case of motion.
I know well that Aquinas enterteyned the opinion of this possibility, out of zenle to uphold the creditt of Aristotle in some measure. But then taking upon him to reconcile seeming contradictions in his opuscula, and one of them being this; If the World were eternall, then the soules of men pa… were infinite, supposing the immortality of them; according to the opinion of Aristotle: And both Aristor. as well as Aquinas himselfe hold it impossible that there should be infinitum actu eyther in number or in magnitude: Mark how he reconciles this, and what course he takes to prevent an infinite number of soules; Though the World, and Man (sayth he) had bene everlasting, yet the first man might have bene preserved without generation for an infinite space of time, & not begin to generate till about six thousand yeares agoe.
By this let every sober man judg to what shifts this great Schoolman was put to salve this opinion of a possibilitie, of the worlds being eternall from contradiction. To this you adde that in like sort our actuall being or existence whiles it l… steth, is composed of a capacity to be what we are, and of the actuation or filling of this capacity; you might well say so or in like sort, for there seemes as like truth in this as in the former. Man as he is unum perse is sayd to consist ex potentia et actis, which is as much as to say ex materia et forma rationali; which Maxim had a capacity of receaving this forme, upon whose conjunctiō doth arise that compositum, which we call a man, and us it had a power, so an appetite thereunto, all which was conteyned under that principium generationis which is called Privatio, According to that saying Materia appetit formam sicut femina virum. But the particular appetite being satisfied with the forme, it no longer remayneth, nor the capacity to receave it, that time being now past. But rather an appetite there is in the matter to a new forme, by corruption of the present compound, which is the naturall ground of mans mortality. And the generall appetite of matter is never satisfied.
Much lesse is this capacity a part, whereof man doth consist. For every Philosopher knowes that the capacity of the matter belongs to that principium generationis which is called privatio. Now Privatio, though it be principium generationis as well as Materia & forma; yet is it not principium compositi. Ex tribus principiis Homo generatur? ex duobus tertiu companitur? But perhaps you speake not of the capacity of the matter to receave a forme, which is proper only to compound substances; But of the possibility of Being, before they are, which is extended euen to Angells. But then I say much lesse is the nature of man to be sayd, composed of such a capacity; for this capacity is not so much as potentia physica, but a onelyonly potentia logica, to witt, negatio repugnantia, as when we say 'twas possible the world should be, before it was, for it implyes no contradiction: For Gods almighty power was able to make it out of nothing. So it was possible that Angells should be before they were. In like sort it was possible, that man should be, before he was. But neyther man nor Angells can be sayd to be composed of such a possibility; or of such a capacity, for that were to say that a reall & positive thing is composed of that which is neyther reall nor positive. And it is impossible that a thing not reall or positive should be a part of that which is reall & positive. But yet, you may say; All created things consist ex potentia & actu, be they never so simple and uncompound, as the very Angells themselves, God alone is Actus purus voyd of all passive power. But as touching this power by your leave, I take it not to be spoken inrespect of the potentiallity going before the Act, which you saye is actuated, but rather in respect of a potentiallity consequent to the Act, or concomitant with it, as we conceave it of such a nature as may cease to be, or be destroyed.
Or last of all, it may proceed in respect of the distinction between essence and existence, which is found in all things beside God himselfe: In which respect they are sayd to consist ex potentia et Actu, which kind of composition, as I remember, is called Metaphysica; and it extends to all created things in distinction from all other compositions whatsoever, which are peculiar to some more then to others. But in what congruity this capacity may be sayd to be filled, when essence is actuated by existence, I comprehend not. For to be filled, presupposeth the existence of that which is to be filled. And existence seemes rather to conteyne essence, then essence, existence. But most paradoxicall of all is it, that existence should be composed of capacity, and the actuatiō or filling of it: Whereas existence, in my judgement, is rather the actuation formall of essence, then is composed thereof.
In the next place you tell us, that life (especially sensitive) is but the motion or progresse of this capacity towards that which fills it; or as it were, a continuall sucking in of present existence, or continuation of actuall being, from somewhat preexistent. I think there is a liberall errour in this, and insteed of life sensitive, as I take it, there should be life vegetative. Now this doctrine of yours is wonderous strange. There is a motion & progresse in life vegetative by waye of augmentation, but not by waye of generation.
Neyther hath the existence of any vegetable, much lesse man, any degrees: Neyther is it of the nature of any substantiall forme, much lesse of a soule, least of all of the reasonable foule, to be brought in, much lesse to be sucked in, by degrees.
And if our existence be present, as you call it, how can it be suckt in? For we suck in that which we have not; not that which we allready have. Neyther could we have power to suck in ought, much lesse the actuall sucking in of ought, unles allready we had existence: For without existence presupposed there can be no motion. And of degrees of existence, especially of substantiall formes, or of the things compounded of them, I never heard till now: Degrees, or rather a graduall extension of quantity is gotten by that act of vegetation which is called growth or augmentation. So then, not existence, simply, but of quantity rather; nor the existence of quantity neyther, but a greater extension thereof is sucked-in by things that growe: Neyther is this extension sucked in; but rather matter of nourishment is suckt in, which by the peculier operation of the soule is first fitted for nourishment divers & sundry wayes, and after that converted into nourishment, & appropriated to each part; and after that by another peculiar property of the soule, there flowes from it augmentation of quantity; which is not suckt in from without, but only the materialls of it: This wild phrase and manner of speech of yours, if it proceed, is sufficient to corrupt all Philosophy, & not Divinity only.
The next point, I confesse, is no Paradox, when you saye, Except the vegetables by which our life is continued, had existence before they become our nutriment, they could not possibly nourish us. This, I say, is most true: for if they had not being before, they were just nothing; and it is impossible that that which is nothing, should nourish any thing.
Naye, if they had not theyr being before, they should have no being at all: for Milk or Bread if it had no being before it nourish us; surely it hath no being of milk or bread when it doth nourish us, by being converted into flesh and bone; for then surely, it is neyther milke nor bread. The next assertion is very obscure, if at all it hath any truth in it, as when you say, These vegetables themselves cannot exist, unles they did draw theyr existence or continance of their being, from that which did exist before them, and unto which they doe by motion or continuance oft theyr being approach: For you propose this of life vegetative, which is found in plants as well as men; and the matter of theyr nourishment is only the moysture or fatues of the earth; which fatnes of the earth, how it drawes existence or continuance of its being so much as in your sense, I cannot conceave; sc. Matter of mans nourishment, Honey, and potted butter, and poudred beefe, and bacon, and bisket, how they draw it from that whereunto by motion or continuance of theyr being they approch: Wherein you seeme to have a sublimate conceyte, resolving the continuance of all things into the operation of God: But, by your leave, they doe not draw theyr continuance from God; God gives it rather, and that by naturall meanes, whereby things are preserved from putrefaction, which is the destruction of theyr being: Which preservation against putrefactiō, is either in the nature of the things themselves, which God by an ordinary naturall course hath wrought in them, onby the Art of Men: Which you resolving without more adoe into the operation of God carry your selfe not like unto a Philosopher, but like unto that Grammarian who being demanded by a gardenar what should be the reason, why weeds thrived so fast notwithstanding all his care to weed them out, and pluck them up by the rootes; when good herbes prospered so slowly notwithstanding all his care, not only to plant them, but being planted to water them, and to manu…e the ground that bare them; Derived the reason of all this from the providence of God; Whereat a Philosophes standing by laughed, not that he despised the Providence of God, but because he conceaved there was a more immediate reason thereof, though it also were subordinate to the providence of God, and that was this. As for the weeds that grow of themselfes, the earth is a naturall mother unto them; but as for the herbes that were planted in her bosome, she was but a step-mother unto them; & ergo: no merveyle if she mainteyned her owne children, her owne fruits brought forth by her better, then strange children brought unto her to be fostered by her. But be it as you intimate, that all things draw theyr existence and continuation of their being from God; but how will you unfold that mystery of yours that followes, namely, that by motion or continuation of their being they approach unto God? For I have read, that the Crow liveth out nine mens lives (measuring every age to be an 100. yeares) and that the Hart liveth thrice as many yeares as the Crow; and that the Raven trebleth the Harts endurance; whence came that Theophrastus his complaint of natures inequality, that to Harts and Crowes had given so long time of continuance, which was denied unto man: what shall we say therfor that these have approached neerer unto God then Man? Perhaps you will say, yes, in respect of Gods eternity: Why but herein, your selfe shalbe brought to plead against your selfe; For in the eight sect: of your former chap. discoursing how the center of Gods immensity might be sayed to be every where; you gave this reason or exemplification of it; that be supposing a spere infinite, every point is equally removed from the circumference, as put the case, S. Michaells mount should be as neere to the circumference Eastward as Dover, and consequently Dover as far of as S. Michaells mount, though the whole bredth of England lye between them.
And by the same reason the life of a Raven shall be as far of from eternity, as the life of a Hart, and the durance of an Hart as farre from eternity as the Durance of a Crow, though three times as much; & the durance of a Crow as far of from eternity, as the durance of a Man, though nine tunes as much.
In the next place, as by waye of inference, you adde: So that future times and all things conteyned in time it selfe, presuppose a fountaine of life. I will not trouble my selfe with your inference: What such move you to make choyce of future times to instance in, rather of times in generall, whether future, present, or past?
I doubt preexistence to future times is in your imagination a very mysterious point; & such as you are loath your Reader should be acquainted with: For as Aristotle sayeth of Fallacies, foreign, to discover them, is to solve them; so you may feare, the bare discovery of your conceyt may be enough to discredit it. And yet, to shew how well you please your selfe in it, you say that this fountayne of life, presupposed to future times, and all things conteyned in them, is as truly preexistent to their future terminations, as it was to their beginnings.
How will you construe this sentence, and accommodate it to future times, whereupon notwithstanding it proceeds, as well as of things conteyned in time, both touching the terminations of them, which are future, and touching the beginnings of them which are past? Surely you cannot; ergo: the latter part of the sentence must be accommodated not to future times wherewith you began this sentence, but to all things conteyned in time it selfe. And these indeed have had beginnings which are past, and we doe expect future terminations or, motions of them, according to the parts of future time, so long as time it selfe shall last.
But what is this strang assertion you are impregnated withall, when you deliver it as a rare and curious conceyt, that things conteyned in time doe suppose a fountaine of life not only to the beginnings of them, but allso to their future terminations and motions. Whereas to my poore conceyt, if a founteyne of life be presupposed to things past, it must be presupposed allso to things to come: And there is no curiosity in this; the inference rather is most vulgar; For seing future things are behind things past, quod est prius priori must needs be prius posteriori; yet, that which is before a former thinge, must needs be before a latter thinge.
Hence you proceede (whether by following on, or falling of, lett the Reader judge) to censure that common saying, Tempus edax rerum, as relishing more of poeticall witt, then of Metaphysicall truth. For which kind of censure delivered by you, I find no just reason; For what? can no truth satisfie you, but that which is Metaphysicall? And why you should make such an opposition I know not; as if what I ever relished not of Metaphysicall truth, were no truth, but rather of Poeticall witt: and whatsoever relished of poeticall witt, did not relish of truth. You maye as well censure Aristotles Physicks, and Ethicks, and Politiques, and Rhetoricks, for surely they doe not relish of Metaphysicall truths; no nor Euclides Mathematicks; no nor of Poeticall witt neyther; belike they are liable to a double censure.
Yet what think you? cannot Poeticall witt have course in conjunction with truth, as well as in separation from it. Nec fingunt omnia Cretes. No nor Poets neyther. And as for this saying, Tempus edax rerum: I never knew any sober man or other except against the truth of it before: But if you will put a construction upon it at your pleasure, to shew your witt in refuting it; you shall therein play the part of a Poet rather then the Philosopher; for some of them have taken a course to shape stories, according to the use they had to make of them, and not to followe the direct truth: and this hath bene sayd to be the difference betweene Sophocles and Euripides: And herein they were like to Mathematicians of whom it is sayd Mathematici abstrahunt nec mentiuntur: And abstracting a line from the matter of it, they may adde to it, or take from it what they list: So you construe this saying, Tempus edax rerum, as if it were delivered in proper speech, and not by a figure; whereas the meaning is Synecdochicall; that in course of time things doe consume and wast, not that time it selfe doth wast them; For time being the duration of things; how can the duration of a thing consume it selfe?
Yet is your reason whereby you oppose this common saying very loose, as when you say, If time did devoure things, what could possibly nourish them or continue them from their beginning to theyr end, And that in two respects; for neyther the saying signifies that time should devoure thē, before the time appoynted for the consumption of them: And though time did consume them, yet some thing els might contnue them; For theyr owne natures wherein God hath made them, are for a time apt to resist that which laboureth to corrupt them. And other meanes also there are for the preservation of thē: As man by using meanes for his preservation may hold out longer then he which useth none; neither did the Authors or approvers of that saying, Tempus edax rerum, ever conceit that any thing should desire the destruction of it selfe, as you are pleased to rove in impugning it: And look in what sense time doth not destroy, but things are destroyed in time; in the same sense, things temporall have not the continuation of their being from time, but from somewhat els in time; For when things are preserved, by the witt and industry of man from putrefaction, they doe not receave this preservation of theyrs from time, but from the wit and industry of man: And ergo: as time doth not wast, so neither doth time preserve from wasting.
It is a paradox if not a manifest untruth, rather to say that the motions of things themsselfes, and theyr endeavours, to enjoy or enterteyne time approching is that which doth wast and consume them; For albeit in man sometimes you find such causes of consumption, yet in all other creatures inferior unto man, as beasts of all sorts, how can you make it good that they out of a desire and endeavour to enterteyne time doe wast themselfes, who know not so much as what time is? How much lesse will you be able to make it good in vegetables of all sorts, as plants and trees, and in all sorts of mixt bodies? Nay, how will you make it good in man? Some die by course of nature, and that eyther through age or sicknes; when a man of 100. yeares old dieth, what motion or endeavour is there in him to enterteyne that wasted him? and how will you prove, that had not this motion or endeavour of his bene (as all endeavours are voluntary and free) he might have lived longer.
When God sent apestilence among the Israelites, that in the space of 3. dayes swept awaye 70. thousand; was it a motion of theirs, or an endeavour to enterteyne time, that consumed them? Nay, when any disease proves mortall, how can it appeare that when one man died of an Ague, another of the Dropsie, another of the squinancy, another of the plurisie, another of the consumption, that all of them died of a certeyn disease, called theyr motions and endeavours to enjoy and enterteyne time approching: A disease, that I think was never knowne to Hipocrates or Galin, or any Physician before or since. I should think the desease of Pastime should wast us more then the desease of enjoying Time. Others come to theyr ends by violent deathes, some in warre, some by course of justice, others by private malice: In all these I find my selfe in the bryers, and cannot possiblie conceive, how mens owne motions and endeavours to enjoy time should wast or consume them: or in case a man makes a waye with himselfe by hanging drowning or poysoning. Not altogeather so wild is that conceyt of yours which followeth, in saying we naturally seeke to catch time. Yet wild enough; for it is untrue that men catch. Time; they catch opportunity, which is foreign, and not a litle differing from foreign. Now opportunity is only an advantage of doing something conveniently offered to us in the course of Time. As it is good to make hay while the sun shineth, ergo; I will roundly sett my selfe to the making of Hay, while this opportunity is offered, wherein I catch not time but opportunity; for the Time were the same in case it rayned, but the opportunity for making of Hay were not the same, because the wether in that case were not the same; And Hay-making requires fayr wether.
Who they are, who acknowledge no difference between Time and Motion, I know not; I should think no man so blockish as to confound them, seing motion it selfe may be of more or lesse continuance in respect of Time, as well as any thing els, And in the same Time somethings more or lesse slowly, something more swiftly, some in one kind of motion, some in another: But of divers kinds of time, that should belong to things moved, with divers kinds of motions, I never heard that any Philosopher hath discoursed.
Aristotle I confesse, defines time to be numerus motus secund. prius & posterius; but this is not to confound time with motion, but rather to distinguish the one from the other: For he g…ves a far other definition of motion it selfe: And albeit the time of every temporall thing be the duration of it, whether it resteth or moveth, yet if the questions be made how long such a thing hath continued, or when such a thing beganne to be, or ceased to be; We have no better meanes to answere it, then by numbring the revolution of the Sun, if we will shew how many yeares; or of the Moone, to shew how many moneths; or of the Diurnall motion of the Heavens, to shew how many dayes agoe such a thing was done, or began, or ceased to be; or to shew how many dayes, or moneths, or yeares any thing hath continued: & ergo: Aristotle in his Physicks considering time as the measure, in such sort as hath bene expressed, gives a definition suitable, in saying it was numerus motus per prius & posterius. Which definition when your true Philosophie shall mēd, we shalbe so ingenuous as to give congruous respect unto it.
As you beganne, so you proceed to acquaint us with your subtleties in Philosophie concerning time, Motion (you say) in true observation goes one waye, and drives time another way, as the streame which runnes Eastward, turnes the wheele West-ward.
This curiositie is worth the examining, it may minister some merry matter of refreshment unto us, which in my judgement, your reader hath no litle need of to take him of from too sad and serious attention in tracking your obscure phrase, and treading out therhence some morsell of good meaning.
I thinck you speak of motion circular, and that of the heavens, because nothing so fitt to notifie unto us Time, as that, and of such motion you speak as immediately before you have signified: Well then; The circular motion of the Heavens goeth one waye, and drives Time another waye: Before you told us that Motion notifies Time, here you say, It drives Time; but how? Not the same waye, but another waye as the streames which runnes Eastward, drives the wheele West-ward: And which waye. I pray doth Time passe: Eastward of Westward? As there is a motion of the heavens, that makes the daye, which is from East to west; so there is a motion of the Sun which makes the yeare, and that motion is from West to East; doth each motion drive time a different waye or the same waye? Againe each motion is not onelyonly from East to West, as the first, and from West to East as the second; but the first is againe from West to East, and the second is againe from East to West; You have not told us, which waye Time is driven by motion; and ergo: being to seeke, you drive our inquisitions divers wayes, and perhaps all different from your owne; And all because you will not acquaint is with the waye you conceave to your selfe, ergo; you drive us other wayes, as the motion drives time: Let us see whether we can have any help from your comparison.
The streame, you saye, running Eastward drives the wheele West-ward; Now this seemes to us untrue, & so farre forth as it may be tolerated for true, surely it drivs the wheel no more West-ward then East-ward: First I saye it is not true: For the wheele by the streame is turned neyther East-ward nor West-ward but round; Now to move Eastward or Westward is to move motu recto a streight motion, but to move round is not to move motu recto, but orbiculari, not by a streight motion, but circular: Yet because circular motions may be sayd to be towards the East or towards the West, & so the motion of the wheele may be (as you say it is) Westward; yet then I say it is no more Westward then Eastward, as it is manifest in all circular motions: And indeed the river moving according to his naturall course drives the wheele before it, but the wheele being round, moves round, not onelyonly Eastward as the river goes, but Westward also; For to move circularly towards the East in respect of some parts, is to move circularly towards the West also in respect of other parts, not Westward only or principally so as to give the denomination of a motion Westward, rather them of a motion Eastward.
But all this while we have not found which waye Time is driven in your opinion: For sure your meaning is not that time is driven circularly (though I have observed you to discourse of circular duration.) And my reason is this: if the motion from East to West should drive Time another waye of motion circular; then seing that motion which makes the daye is contrary to that motion which constitutes the yeare, it would follow, that the time of the daye should goe a waye quite contrary to the Time of the yeare: And as litle reason to drive time another waye, in respect of direct motion.
For there is no reason whie the waye of Time should be towards the East, rather then towards the West, or contrariwise; and why rather eyther of these wayes, then towards the North or towards the South.
And no mervayle, seing the way of place is one thing, & the way of time another: For though the streame run directly Eastward, and turne a wheele round; 'tis nothing strang, sith both are bodies apt to moove, and the streame apt to run downward, and a wheele apt to be turned round. But time is not a bodie that it can move ane waie.
And this reflects my thoughes upon the consideration of another incongruity, as when you say, motion goes one way; you might as well have sayd, motion moves one way; whereas it is the bodie that moves, & motion is the act of it, but it selfe moves not.
Yet there is a proper way for a body moving, & so for motion. And it may be there is a proper way for time as when that which is to come becomes present time, and present time, becomes past time; as this yeare the last yeare was to come, now it is present, and after a while it will be past: So all the way of time is this, & shalbe, it is, it was: one after another.
And (by your leaves) motion drives it no more then rest: If the Heavens should stand still, yet might things continue still the same time that God hath appointed them, as well as in the case of theyr motion.
Neyther is it true, that our actuall existence slides from us with time; our being still continueth the same, by you leave, and not our capacity of being onelyonly; For Socrates senex non differt a Socrate puero according to our Vniversity learning, which whether it be true Philosophie or no, let the Reader judge; I say, he differs not in substance, I doe not say, he differs not in accidents: I doubt not but Socrates was auncienter in his old age, then in his child-hood, and different both in quantity of bodie, and quality of mind; But I see no reason but his existence was still the same: And as for capacity of being, I see no reason why that should have any place where being allready is: As for substantiall actuation of capacity of Being (which you make to be continuall) after a man hath his being I know none; Neyther am I conscious of any such desire; and it is strang to me, that you should be more privy to my desires then my selfe. I desire to encrease in knowledge, and to grow in grace and goodnes, and in favour with God and man.
But of any desire of actuation or replenishment (as you speak) of the capacity of being, I am nothing conscious to my selfe: Neyther can I acknowledge any new coexistence (with time approaching in respect of any mutation of my existence, but in regard that times doe change and succeed one another, I may be sayd to coexist anew with them, because they coexist anew with me.
Neyther doe I know any such office of time as you devise to be assigned to it by eternity, as to repayr that ruines which tions present or past, have wrought in our corruptible substance.
No mervayle that you could not brook that time should be accounted edax rerum: For now I perceave you maynteyne time to be reparatrix rerum, yea the curer of diseases; For to repayre the ruines which motion hath made in our corruptible substances, what is it but to cure deseases? So that time is a simple of more sovereigne virtue, then I was ware of; but I know not whether it were ever knowne to Hippocrates or Galen; I doubt it was not; And that tempus is edax rerum, hath better authority to confirme it I think, then that it is reparatrix rerum: And consider in reason, time is the duration of things temporall, whence it commeth to passe, that the very ruines themselfes which are wrought in our corruptible substances have theyr time, that is, theyr duration; so have all deseases: Now lett any sober man judge, whether the duration of such a ruine, such a desease, be fitt to repayre it, fitt to cure it; What time then shall cure or repayre it? Take the most sovereigne remedies to repayr such ruines, to cure such deseases, and the duration or time thereof hath no power to repayr or cure it, but the nature of that remedie applied may; which nature and the application therof, is not time, but the remedie hath a duration, which is the time therof, whether it be applied or no.
As for the motions of the heavens numbred according to preority and posteriority, which in a Physicall consideration is the time of every thing, as the fittest measure to measure out the continuance of all things, as litle power hath that to repayre ruines or cure deseases, more then to make them.
In the next place you draw us to the consideration of Plotinus his excellent observations. I had rather you would acquaint us with some accurate conclusions and demonstrations of his. Yet these observations which you so magnifie in a Platonick, such as they are wee will consider them. The first is that the best of our life, the very being of things generable is but as a continuall draught or receite of being, from the inexhaustible founteyne of life. This is one of his (so much by you magnified) observations, and a very proper one. As if a man should say, the very water, be it the best of waters, is but a streame flowing from the fountayne of waters. Is not this an excellent observation, thinck you? Yet you add some thing of your owne, which partly swerves from truth, and partly marres Plotinus his musick; For you make the very being of things generable, and the best of our life to be all one; wheras the wickedest men that are, are the miserablest things that are, are things generable, and have a being as well as the best; And in the state of our corrupt nature we had a being, & so had Paule when he persecuted the Church of God, and Peter when he denied his Mr. and David when he committed adultery with Bathsheba and caused Vriah to be slayne with the sword of the children of Ammon; but did this being of theirs, or theyr very being, deserve to be accounted the best of theyr life? Now whereas you say, Our being is a continuall draught of being from the inexhaustible founteyne of life: I find no mention at all of any fountayne of life in Plotinus, His words as you cite them are, Videtur in rebus generabilibus id potissimum essentia esse, scilicet tractus quidam ab ipso esse, (this is all he hath concerning the inexhaustible founteyne of life as you paraphrase it) ex generationis initio, quousque ad temporis extrema perveniat.
And to my understanding his meaning is no other, then that the essence of things generable is as it were esse fluens, like as we say, linea est fluxus puncti in longitudinem. And therupon his first sentence is this, that take away erit from things generable, and forthwith they cease to be: And to things that are not such, if you add erit to them, it shall befall them a sede ipfiue esse labe, to slide from the seate of being; All which are but odd streynes of expressions of that which to know is worth just nothing, if at all there be any sound truth in theyr subtleties: But hence he concludes indeed that the being of a thing generable is not naturall unto it; and therefore (you will say) he must have it from something, and what can that be, but from the founteyne of life; as it is well knowne Plato first, and accordingly Platonickes maynteyned, that the world was made by God.
To this I answere, that albeit they attributed the making of the world to God not out of nothing, but out of matter actually preexistent; yet here Plotinus discourseth, not of the creation whereby the world was made, but of generation, whereby the parts of it were continually meynteyned; Neyther doth he discourse of the efficiency of the being of things generable, but only of the formality thereof: But if over and above a question were moved as touching the efficiency of being, who can doubt but his answere would be either ascribing this to the individuall generating, and virtus seminalis as his instrument, working to the extracting of forms ex potentia materiae; or otherwise to the Dator formarum; in neyther of which should he as an heathen man ascend unto the inexhaustible founteyne of life, whither you would draw him, to make the magnifying of his excellent observations the more specious: But what should Christians expect from the Schollar of Ammonius and Mr. of Dorphity? Now, whereas he confines this to things generable, doe you magnifie that also! What think you of Augul…s? Is not theyr being also a continuall draught or receit of being from the inexhaustible fountayne of life, as well as the being of things generable?
But proceed we to take notice of the rest of his so excellent observation: Nature (sayth he) hastens unto that being which is to come, nor can it rest, seing it drawes or sucks in that being which it hath, by doing now this and now that, being moved as it were in a circle, with the desire of essence, or of being what it is. By this I perceive where you dipt your pen that dropt forth such wild conceits as before in this very section I have encountred with; to witt, in Plotinus his Philosophy, fitt lettice for such lips as like them. And for the obscurity of conceit, your writings, to my thinking are very like unto his; and the rather may men be moved to suspect, there are some rare notions in them which they understand not; Yet by the waye you sometimes insperse such glosses as make Plotinus meaning worse then it is; as when Plotinus sayth of a thing generable, that movetur in orbem quodam essentiae desiderio, that it is moved round with a certeyne desire of essence; you render it this with desire of essence or being what is: Now Plotinus sayth, not of any thing that it hath a desire to be what it is, which is very absurd; for nothing desires what it hath already, but rather what it hath not: So when Plotinus sayth, that esse sibi haurit, it drawes unto it selfe being; you render it thus, It sucks in what it hath; whereas indeed it is a thing impossible for any man to suck in that which he hath, but rather he sucks in that which he hath not.
Nor can I approve this saying of Plotinus, that A thing generable hactens to that being which is to come; which Plotinus seemes to understane only of Time; Now we rather on the contrary many times complayne that time passeth awaye too fast; yet againe some there are, I confesse, that think time never passeth awaye fast enough: Both are conscious of times hasting more or lesse; but neyther are conscious of theyr hastning to Times: And the truth is, the swiftest motion and the slowest motion is in respect of the same time, which indeed in neyther swift nor slow, though motions in time may be swift or slow; yet the swiftest mover no more hastens to time to come, then the slowest mover, how excellent soever Plotinus observation be in your conceit, yet I grant we may be sayd to hasten to a being which is to come, but this being is alwaye accidental never essentiall: A man may make hast to be rich, and such a one sayth Salomon can not be innocent: A man Pro. 28. 20.may grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord Iesu Christ, and to make hast therein is commendable: and so for 2. Pet. …. 18everyone to be diligent and quick in the works of his calling: But our essentiall being we hast not unto, it is the same still; for Socrates being old differs not essentially from himselfe being a child: Indeed we labour for the preservation of our being; but all our actions tend not hereunto, they tend to the service of God as well as to the service of our selves.
And how in these motions whatsoever we move in orbem, or as it were in a circle I know not; That quaint conceit I leave to Plotinus till your commentary may unfold the meaning of it.
Now you tell us (belike in a suitable proportion unto the conceits of Plotinus, or rather in some degree beyond them) that Nor we men, nor any creatures (specially generable) are permitted to draw or suck so much of our proper being from the founteyne of eternity at once, or in any one point of time as we list, and that We have our portions of life or self-fruition distributed peecemeale and sparingly unto us, least too much put into our hands at once might make us prodigall of the whole stock.
It is great pitty the pages of your booke be not stored with the word Mystery; for they are nothing almost but mysterie; This is delivered not only of men, but of all creatures generable: Why then, all creatures generable have a list to drawe or sucke more of their proper being from the fountayne of eternity, then they doe or can suck: Surely you charge them with that they are nothing guilty of; For, not to speake of stones and mettalls nor of vegetables; How doth it appeare there is any such desire in brute creatures, whether beasts or birds or fishes… that neyther know eternity, nor their owne proper being, nor what it is to suck more of it at once then is fitt.
And as for my selfe amongst reasonables, one though a poore one, having some knowledge both of eternity in the waye of Christian Divinity, and of my proper being in the waye of naturall Philosophy; yet what it is to suck more of my portion of being at once then God think fitt, I am utterly ignorant, and therefore cannot be conscious to my selfe of any such transgression: Suppose the durance of my being in the appoyntement of God be betwene 50. and 60. yeares, doe I desire or can I desire to enjoy these 60. yeares in the space of 20. or is it possible by the almighty power of God that I should? I grant the knowledge and goodnes I have arrived unto by Gods grace in the space of 50. yeares, I might have arrived unto in the space of 40. Yet am I not conscious of any desire I had of this: But this is only my accidentall being, and therefore deserveth not simplie to be accompted my proper being.
The like may be as touching the Qualities or Quantitie of my bodie: But my substantiall being, that only deserveth to be accompted simply my Being; And this I had all at once, as I had my organicall bodie, and soule all at once; though the continuance of it I had not all at once; For that was impossible I should have, it being a continuance by way of succession of dayes after dayes &c. And …f I had had all at once, there had bene no succession; and therfore, in my judgement, it is absurd to say our portions of life are pece-meale & sparingly distributed unto us, lest too much being put into our hands at once might make us prodigall of the whole stocke. And which implies, that God could, if it had pleased him, have made us enjoy the whole space of our life at once; For that were to make time past, present and to come, to exist alltogeather, which, I think, every wise man will judge to be impossible: Yet this case being put; how were it possible to the contrary, but that we must needs spend it all at once? For like as the space of life of 60. yeares must necessarily be spent in 60. yeares: So if we had all this space togeather in one day, or one yeare, we wust needes spend it togeather in the space of a day, or a yeare: In a word, sith this cannot be true of our essentiall being, which we have all at once undoubtedly; nor of our accidentall being; for that cannot be properly accoumpted our being; it remaynes to be understood onelyonly of the continuance of our being: And to desire to have all this at once, is to desire to have at 7. yeares, as much age as others at 60: But no man desires this, though lately we heare, that after the surrendring of Rochel, maydens, by reason of the famine there during the Seige, of 16. yeares old were found to looke like women of an 100 yeares old. We rather desire in old-age to be young, like unto Moses who being an 100. and 20. his eye was not dimne, nor his naturall strength abated. Yet your conceit is manifestly impossible; for it proceeds not of having the qualities of age in youth, but the very continuance, which is as much as to say, at seven yeares of age to be as old as a man of 60. which no man desires, neither is it possible for God to effect.
This piercing of time, or reduction of many yeares into a small space being as utterly impossible as the penetration of dimension in magnitude, if not much more.
Mens stocks may be spent in one yeare upon as much pleasure as another may be taking in seven yeares: but the continuance of space or time to come, can neyther be taken before the time, nor spent.
2. In the next Section you are more popular; I doe not say more true: For you give me no cause to say so.
For first, in my Judgement, it is a manifest untruth to say, that time is a participation of eternity: For as immensity is to place or magnitude, so is eternity unto time: But place or magnitude is no participation of immensity, therfore allso time is no participation of eternity.
And like as Gods immensity is without extension, & therfore quite of a different nature from magnitudine corporall; So his eternity is without succession; and therfore of a quite different nature from duration corporall.
And whereas you say, that He should desine the severall branches of time most exactly, that could number or decipher that severall actuations, draughts, or replenishments, which are derived from the infinite founteyne of life and being, to fill the capacities or satiate the internall desires of things temporall; Here agayne you slip back to the transcendentall notions, farre above, not only common sense, but all sobriety of conceit.
You tell us of actuations, draughts, and replenishments derived from the founteyne of life to fill capacities, and internall desires; all which togeather with the severall branches of time you speake of, and theyr references to the actuations after mentioned, are so many hobgoblins unto me: what are the parts of time, I seeme to understand, time past, time present, and time to come, but what the Severall branches are, I know not.
The founteyne of life is it, that which brings natures possible into act of being? But how hereby he can be sayd to satiate theyr internall desirs, I comprehend not: For while a thing is only possible, …t neyther hath, nor can enterteyne any desire of being. Perhaps you may say, that when things are, they may desire continuance: And it is the founteyne of life, that as he made all things, so he doth perpetuate them so long as he thinks good. But what mysterie, the deciphering of this actuation or perpetuation doth conteyne, so avaylable to the definition of the severall of time, I therefore know not, because you have not vouchsafed the enucliation hereof unto your Reader.
I find no sense in that which followeth, as when you say the motion of the Heavens is more uniforme then time (which you call the duration of things temporall): For every part of time is still uniforme, and that in such sort as it impossible to be otherwise; be the motion never so deficient in uniformity. As an houre is still the same, whether motions herein be swift or slow, or both swift and flow (as such different motions may be in the same time without all question) and that according to all variety; yea though one and the same motion, I meane of one and the same subject be partly swifter, partly slower, and that in all variety of degrees.
So is the monethmonth, so is the yeare most uniforme, taking it to consist of how many dayes and howres soever you will: I grant things in time may dure more or lesse; but time it selfe admitts no contraction or dilatation; as for example, a daye cannot be contracted into the space of an houre; nor an houre cannot be dilated into the space of a day; but the motion of a day may be contracted and reduced within the space of an houre; that is, a thing may move as fast in an houre as it doth in a day, I have heard of a Pope, that when his countrey men presuming of his omnipotency, entreated they might have two sommers in a yeare, made answere as Elias did to Elisha, that he had asked a very hard thing; yet it might be obteyned by them upon a condition: And when they being eager to obteyne what they desired, shewed theyr willingnes to accept of any condition; Hereupon the Pope told them, that upon condition to accompt 24. monthes to theyr yeare, they should have two sommers every yeare: This was a cunning trick to fill his countrey mens mouthes with empty spoones: He was no more able to gratifie his countrey-men in this, then Mark Anthony was the Athenians, who having imposed a double tribute in one yeare; was told by an Oratour, that if he could give them two Sommers, and two Springs within the compasse of one yeare, he might exact two revenewes, not otherwise.
I know no such double duration or course of time indented, as you speake of, what if a man be sometimes in health, and sometimes in sicknes? the condition of his life, and the qualitie thereof it diversified, his duration is not; as appeates by this: In the same time wherein one it sick, another is not; one in pleasure, another in payne; it is manifest, the time may be the same, though the condition much different.
These conceits of yours are so popular, that they crosse withall: In grife or payne to thrust time from us, is but to wish it were shorter then it is; as it is signified Deut. 28. 67. In the morning, thou shalt say, would God it were evening. and at evening thou shalt say, would God it were morning: And yet the meaning hereof in effect, is but this, to wish that our payne were shorter, then would we not care though the time were longer. And so our joy to be continued, we desire not the moments of our time to be fixed.
Still you confound a mans condition with the time, as if time it selfe were sweet or sowre. Let every sober man judg, whether it be not an absurd conceyt to affirme, that men desire to prolong theyr dayes by living the same time over and over againe. As if we could not have the sam…oy, without living the same time over and over againe: Whereas it is manifest, that in one and the same time, one man may be in case and joy, another in payne and sorrow.
And yet in serrow the fr…ction of our existence is never the lesse perfect, then in times of joy, for joy and sorrow are no parts of existence, for existence is found never a whitt the lesse where joy and sorrow have no place: This you confesse in the next place, where you say; that the pleasure of borrowed …ife is to the identity of being but at water to the pipe through which it runnes. yet both serve alike to fill up the matter of your discourse, both the confusson of things different, and the correction of such confusion.
And if the gluts and gushes of pleasure (as you phrasifie it) may be at one time much greater then at another, surely they may continue at one time as well as at another, and therefore for the continuance of pleasure, it is not necessary to desire the stay of time, which is a thing impossible: Yet you pleased your selfe not a litle in your former popular discourse of this nature.
The fruition of pleasure may be as intire as our selfes; and it is no more true, that they are begotten and die in every moment, then it is true of us, that we are begotten & die in every moment: For this scrupulous hicetie ariseth from no other ground, then the being measured with time, theyr duration is partly past, partly future, and but a moment present: And judge whether this conceit of but a moment present, be not a vayne conceit: For I pray, what is that which followes this present moment immediately? Is it a moment only, or no? if not a moment onelyonly, what is become of your conceit? If a moment only, will it not followe, that time consisteth of nothing but moments? And you may as well say, that magnitude consists of nothing but points, which were indeed, to consist of nothing.
We truly say, this daye is present; this month is present; this yeare is present, like as time is sayd to be present, to witt, by way of succession of parts, which parts are not moments succeeding one another, but times Homogeneall, though according to reason divisible in infinitum, as all things continuall are.
3. How the Angells doe accoumpt the continuation of theyr duration, I know not; but surely we have no better meanes to accoumpt theyr duration past, then by the making of the World, and the number of yearely revolutions of the Heavens, that have bene since. But because we believe, that God could have made Angells, & no visible World; yea and made the Heavens without moving of them; in which case yet I doubt not but their duration, & continuance thereof should be knowne to themselfes, but by what meanes I know hor.
The Learned doe distinguish of the duration of Angells, from the duration of things materiall; & so accordingly their measures; making time to be the measure of the duration of the one; and even of the other: Yet I have no cause to think that theyr duration is a participation of eternity more then time: And like as theyr magnitude spirituall is no participation of immensity; so neyther is theyr duration any participation of eternity.
They are creatures as well as we, though no mortall creatures, and have theyr beginning as well as we; and the time shall come, when we shall be foreign even as the Angells themselfes, and continue as long as they, yet never atteyne to Luk. 20.any eternity of being, though our being shall never have end: But seing both theyrs, and ours had a beginning; therefore it is impossible that it should ever grow to be eternall.
I see no reason why Angells should not be sayd to watch for opportunities of time as well as we.
The Divell I am sure is still compassing the earth. Iob. 1. & goes about like a roaring Lyon seeking whome he may devoure, and doe they not wayt all opportunities to doe mischiefe? And why may not Angells as well wayt all opportunities to doe us good, according to the will of theyr and our Heavenly father? Especially considering they are all ministring Spirits sent forth for the good of them that shall be heires of salvation.Hebr. 1.
But I confesse, how this wayting or expectance of opportunity should be sayd to feed them, I am as much to seek, as to define how it is sayd to feed us; unles in respect of Hope; & so I see no reason, but that it may be as well sayd to feed them allso; for surely theyr owne glorie is not at full, & they wayte for the enjoying of that; neyther our glorie nor grace is yet at full; & as they rejoyce at the conversion of a sinner; how much more will they rejoyce at our salvation; and why may they not be sayd to wait & hope for that allso, & rejoyce in the hope, as we doe?
If a desire to continue what they are doth argue, they have not all that in present possession which is allotted to their compleat duration; then surely they never shall, nor we neyther, no not in the state of glorie, have all in present possession which is allotted to our duration: And what, I pray, is wanting? You will say the future duration; but what, I pray, doe we gett by that, when as fast as duration future becomes present, so fast duration present becomes past? Yet surely by continuing what we are, we loose nothing; & if by this, that our duration passeth in respect of time, we cannot be sayd to loose any thing; then surely by this, that duration commeth on as fast, we cannot be sayd to gayne any thing. If indeed we should grow weaker and weaker, and our strength and prosperity should passe with time, then we should be loosers by it, not otherwise; So if we should grow stronger and stronger, & our strength or prosperity should encrease with time, then we should be gayners by it, and not otherwise.
Now I hope it is without question; that the glory of Heaven shall not encrease, but be at full, at the very first, and so continue without end. And, in my judgement, it is a very poore conceit, to denie that a man hath his whole life togeather, because the duration of it, is not all at once.
If we had our life by degrees, one part at one time, and another part at another time, this were a manifest imperfection; but having all of it togeather, to conceave that the duration & continuance hereof longer & longer is an imperfection, is a very wild conceit in my judgement: This were to cast us upon the deniall of Gods continuance; For like as our time being upon supposition of 60. yeares, if we should have all of it, within an houre, it should end at an houres end; so likewise, if God should have his continuance all at once, it should end all at once.
But we say, that the Divine essence as it is without beginning, so it is without end: and nothing past with him, nor nothing to come to him, as it is with all creatures, which are subject to motion in some kind or other: if not of corruption, yet of perfection, at least capable of it: if no such thing were, yet as they come from nothing, so they might returne to nothing: But that God, as he gave them theyr being, so he continueth it. As for God he receaveth not his being from anything, no not from himselfe: But is most necessary to exist, and most necessary to continue, without loosing of ought that is in himselfe, no not so much as a thought; nor receaving any thing into himselfe, no not so much as a new thought, or a new affection: All which, and changes in respect thereof are incident unto Angells, though not so much as unto us; who allso have materiall motions, as locall, and alteration, & that tending to corruption.
In a word, as mans existence is as it were an accident to his essence; because the nature of a man is only of it selfe passively possible to exist, and God can give existence to such a nature, or make the humane nature to exist, as he hath done; so likewise to Angelicall natures, existence is but an accident.
And as existence is an accident to such essences according to our conceit of them; so is continuance an accident to such existences. In which respect every day and houre, both man and Angell may be sayd to receave a new accident, which before they had not.
But it is quite otherwise with God; For as his existence is all one with his essence; (because it is absolutely impossible his essence should not exist:) so his continuance is no accident to his existence: because it is necessary that God should be, & so be, as to be without beginning and without end: And therfore though our continuance be new to us, as being an accident unto us, and wrought by motions; yet Gods continuance is no accident unto him; For it is impossible, he should not continue, who is of necessary being: But of this, and of the indivisible nature of Gods continuance more hereafter.
I willingly confesse, that because Angells were made of nothing, therefore theyr continuance is meerly at the pleasure of God, and have parts divisible, in regard that God can set an end to them, whensoever it pleaseth him.
But I know no cause to denie, that they enjoy an entire self-fruition; For though they have not all theyr continuance at once, yet seing theyr continuance is no part of their essence, which is a thing indivisible, I see no reason why they should be denied, entirely to enjoy themselfes.
Man growes to perfection in parts integrall, though not in parts essentiall, which perfection of parts integrall, as it daily groweth, so it makes him daily more fitt to performe the offices of nature, and duties of his calling; and so may be sayd, not to enjoy himselfe intirely (according to that perfection) which belongeth unto him but by degrees: But it is not so with Angells; yet may they acquire something unto themselfes accidentally, which before they had not.
God can acquire nothing: His duration ('tis true) is indivisible; For there is no prius nor posterius therein; For he is subject to no kind or manner of motion.
I doe not like the manner of your justifying this indivisibility of Duration in God: as when you say, he cannot gayne ought to day, which yesterday he had not; or loose to daye, what yesterday he had: For this, in my judgement, is incident to glorified creatures: For shall not the glorious condition of men and Angells be at full without gayning any new or loosing any old? Yet no doubt, theyr duration notwithstanding shalbe divisible; God is not.
Perhaps you will say, they loose the former dayes existence, and gayne the following dayes existence: And so we doe much more properly in this world, but without impediment to the same-nes of our existence: For to loose the former dayes existence, and gayne the following dayes existence, is but to loose our coexistence with the former day, and gayne a coexistence with the day following: Now this is no impediment to the same-nes of existence in duration; which I prove thus: It is incident to God, yet is he still the same in duration: And that 'tis incident to God, I prove thus; God himselfe was yesterday coexistent to yesterday, and now he is not; for if he were, then yesterday should now exist, which is not only untrue, but impossible to be true, for then time past should be present: And the reason why this is no impeachment to the most perfect same…nes in duration is manifest; for to coexist with some thing yesterday, and not to day, may arise from no variablenes from within, but only from variablenes in something from without: As, namely, therefore God doth not coexist to day, with many things to day, with which he did coexist yesterday, is not because of any change in God, but by reason of change in these outward things, which had a being yesterday, but to day have not.
In that which followes you manifestly betray your cause: For that God hath such fulnes of joy and sweetnes of life, that nothing can be added thereto in joy or sweetnes; doth no way inferre, that therefore, the duration hereof cannot be added unto him, and the continuance thereof: Your comparison utterly overthrowes you: For as in a bodie infinite, though there cannot be a middle nor extreame; yet there are parts without parts by waye of extension; So in infinite life, though it hath, no extremes, as being without beginning and without end, yet this hinders not but that it may have parts going before, and parts comming after by way of succession.