Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 2 · Chapter 5

Discovery of Jacksons Vanity · Section 2 · Chapter 5

p. 87CHAP. V.

Of Divine immensity, or of that branch of absolute infinity wherof infinitie in magnitude or space imaginary is the shadowe.

HENCE you drawe us to the speculation of the severall branches of absolute infinity; and first of Gods immensitie, which you premise unto Gods eternitie; wherof I muse not a litle: considering that immensitie is an attribute denominating God in respect of creatures; and is not any otherwise considered by Schole Divines nor by your selfe neyther, but in this respect that he fillethe all places. And therfore before the World was, and before there was any place to fill, he could not be sayde to fill all places. As for eternitie in being without beginninge, that is an absolute attribute, and was ever verified of God. Perhaps you consider immensitie not as it signifieth his filling of all places, but as it signifieth his abilitie to fill all places. Yet this is in reference unto place, and we commonly confound Gods immensitie with his ubiquitie. Much lesse can I approove your Rhetoricke, as when you make infinity of space to be the shadowe of Gods immensitie. First because infinity of space is neyther existent nor possible to be existent, and to my judgemēt, such a thing seemes not fitt to be a shadow of that which is existent, such as you suppose the immensitie of God to be. p. 88Secondly immensitie of space is in respect of that quantity which is called quantitas motis quantitie of extension, and capable of division, but the immensitie of God denominates him, in respect of that quantitie, which is called quantitas virtutis, quantitie of vertue, incapable of extension or division. And therfore the one seemes no way sitt to be the modell of the other. Thirdly shadowes doe many times exactly represent the proportion of the thing shadowed; and if at some times they are farre lesse, at other times agayne, they are farre greater then the bodies which they represent, as when the day declineth and the shadowes of the evening are stretched foorth, as the Prophet speakethe. And indeede you may well say that Ier. 6 4.Jer 6:4immensitie of space is even in this respect a shadowe of Gods immensitie. For immensitie of space is absolutely infinite; but Gods immensitie as it signisies his existence in all places, (neyther doe I finde it otherwise considered, eyther by Schoolemen or your selfe) is absolutely finite: For as much as all places put together are but finite, nor can possibly be any more then finite. But let us consider the particulars of your discourse. You tell us, that our imaginations will hardly suffer infinitie to be severed from time and place. This is a paradoxe to me. I had thought rather, it had bene farre … for us to imagine time finite, and place finite, then eyther of them infinite. For it is a ruled case, that infinitum qua infinitum non potest cognosci; Yet you will have it so easy to be imagined, Arist. phys. 1. cont. …6.as that you make it a very difficult matter for imagination to apprehend eyther time or place otherwise then infinite. If you had avouched it of time and place indefinite, it had bene lesse distant from the truthe; yet that allso distant from the truthe. For undoubtedly my imagination may conceave a time definite, as well as indefinite; As for example, it may as well conceave three yeares space of time, as well as more yeares space of time then three, without de…ing how much: the like may be sayde of place allso. As for infinite time and place, as it is impossible that any such thing should be, so I promise you, I cannot conceave that it should be so easily (as you suppose) if possibly imagined. Yet you take p. 89upon you to give a reason of so uncouth an assertion. But that proofe is as inconsequent, as your former assertion was insolent. For thoughe sensible thinges cannot easily be separated in our understanding from place and time, yet when herehence you inferre, that place it selfe cannot be separated by the understanding from the immensitie therof, nor time it selfe from the eternitie therof, I finde neyther art in this consequence, nor any tolerable colour or shewe of reason to make it probable. And to the contrary (as I sayde) It is a ruled case that infinitum qua infinitum non potest cognosci. And therfore it is so easie a thing to separate infinity from time & place; as it is impossible, that in the understanding of man it should be con…oyned with them. Yet this is not all the errour of this your discourse. For the Antecedent is utterly untrue: as when you say, that sensible thinges when they are winnowed from the rest into the closet of the understanding, they still reteyne their circumstances of time and place. Wheras to the contrary it is undoubtedly true, that Intelloctus abstrahit ab hic & nunc; the understanding considereth thinges abstract from time and place; and so dothe the imagination allso: Only this is the condition of the imagination, in distinction from the understanding, that imaginatio non transcendit continuum: It cannot consider thinges abstract from continuitie, that is from extension of parts: but from time and place it can abstract, how much more from the infinity of each And surely each facultie were a sory winnower, if it could not separate the graynes of naturall thinges, from such grosse hu…kes that in wrappe them. It is true we are apt to imagine a locall distance, beyond the utmost surface of heaven, but it dothe not herehence followe, that we imagine an infinite distance beyond it, but rather indefinite. And therfore we are apt to imagine a distance without the globe of Heaven, because we can imagine the globe of Heaven in as small a proportion as we list, even no bigger then one of the globes in our College Libraries. In like sort we may imagine time before the World; for who doubtethe, but that it was possible that time should have bene sooner then it wa… & wh…s p. 90it is nowe about sixe thousand yeares since the World beganne; so if it had pleased God, it might have b…ne 1…. thousand. But doe not you inferre herehence, that we doe imagine infinite time preceding the World; for that is not helde to be possible as finite time is. But it is an easy leape, I confesse, in the …rrour of a mans imagination to passe from time indefinite, to time infinite, …nd to take one for the other. To imagine a successive dur…tion of time much longer before the creation of the world, th…n hathe bene the continuance of it since, is one thinge▪ but to imagine an infinite duration of time before the World, is another thing, and much different, …ea infinitely different. Looking backe upon this discourse of yours to proove▪ whether it might admitt any other toler…ble construction; I conc…ved your meaning might perhap… be this; not that place and time coulde not be conceaved without the immensitie of the one, and the eternitie of the other▪ but …ather that immensitie could not be conceaved without place, nor eternitie without time. But upon serious consideration I do… not finde this latter interpre…tion to be any way congruous unto your text. For you playnly professe, that albeit both reason and faith drives us to confesse both time and place to be finite, yet our imaginations will hardly suffer infinity to be severed from them, which can admitt no other interpr…tation then that whi…h I have impug…ed. That whi…h you talke, of certeyne Schoole braynes pu…ed in passing this unsoundable gulfe, and that so farre as to suspect, that God, who now is in every place of the world created by him, was as truly in these imaginary distances of place and time before the creation was att…mpted; is nothing but a bundell of mysteries unto me. For I never kn…we any that offered to p…sse that unsoundable gulfe, you sp…ake of, otherwise, then by imagining…; …nd how their braynes were p…zled in giving way to this imagination I k…owe not; much le… doe I understand▪ how being pu…ed in this imagination, they should herehence grow to suspect, that God was as truly in …hat imaginary distance of place as in things truly exist…t, and …ruly distant …ach from other. And most of all doe I woonder, p. 91what you meane to clap the imaginary distance of time▪ with the imaginary distance of plac…. For thoughe I hav… read of some that discourse of vacuum lo…i, an imaginary distance of place, and maynteyne that God was and is therin▪ yet I never heard nor read of any man discoursing in like sort of Vacuum temporis, and maynteyninge that God was and is therein. And as touching the question, whether God be i… Vacu… or in that imaginary distance you spe…ke of; I have read the question proposed by Vasquius, and th… opinion of some Vasq. …n …. p. disp. 29.mentioned, who maynteyned that God was in Uac…; but very fewe; yet he reckonnethe Cajetan for one; but whe…ce dothe he fetche this …pinion of Cajetan? no… out of his Commentaries upon Aquinas hi… Summes, where is the proper place for a Schooleman to manifest his opinion herabouts; but out of his Commentaries upon Io…n. 1. v. 12. which makes me suspect the fidelitie of his relation or interpretation of Cajetan. The other which he mentionethe is Major upon the 1. of the sentences and 37. distinction. And sinc… we are fallen upon it▪ I am willingly to conferre discourse with you herabouts. And first, I say, that Scripture and reason seeme to favour it. For King Solomon professeth 1. Kings ….that the Heavens of Heavens doe not conteyne the Lord: & likewise Iob saythe of him▪ that He is higher then the Heaven, Iob. 11.Job 11and deeper then Hell; & certeinly God is able to produce a body without the Heavens, and consequently in Vacuo; & herupon it seemes to some, that in good reason God should first have a being there, before he produce the any body there. And this is one reason of many, which Brad wardine usethe to proove, that God is in Vacuo: (for tha… is his opinion) though Vasquius was not acquainted with him. Now by your leave, I will consider your reasons to the contrary. First you demaund whether this locall distance be created or no… ▪ whether it be something or nothing? I answeare, that …rteinly it is not created, as being just nothing yet so as that it is possible a body shoulde be, where before was no body. As for example where now the World is, before the World was, … no body, yet was it then possible there should be a body, p. 92So without the Heavens is no body, yet is it possible that a body shoulde be without the heavens. You proceede sayinge, If it be nothing, then they had an imagination of an infinite space which really was nothing; and we grant they had. For they helde it only an imaginarie space or distance. Further you inferre; If really nothing, then it coulde not be truly termed an imaginary space, before the World was created. A manifest inconsequence. For as men may imagine thinges that are not, so such things may be truly termed imaginary things which are not reall. And there is no such difference, as you avouche, betweene these two, To imagine an infinite space, and to say, that There is an imaginary infinite space. For whersoever there is the imagination of an infinite space, there must needes be an infinite space imagined. And therfore as often as there is in man the imagination of an infinite space without the heavens, this is as much as to say, there is an infinite space imagined by man to be without the heavens. But I observe your subtiltie following. Before the heavens, you say, there coulde be no imagination of any such space; therfore there was no such space imagined. I answeare; thoughe before the heavens there was no man at all to imagine it, yet neverthelesse was it imaginable, and now you confesse it is so imagined. And not only doe we imagine a Uacuum to have bene before the World was, but even since the World is, to witt, without the Heavens. And taking it aright, is not only nowe so imagined by us, but a truthe that a Uacuum is without the heavens, and was before the world was, where now the world is. For the errour of the imagination is to mistake in the right meaninge of Vacuum. For commonly it is imagined under the notion of a space existent, wheras indeede it is rather the negation of a body existent, joyned with the possibilitie of a body to exist. So without the heavens is no space or body, yet possible is it, that a bodly space shoulde be. Neyther is it required herunto, that it should be created by God; for only reall things are created by God, but the negation of bodies existent requires no creation, but rather the suspension of creation. You thinke the reality of this imagination to be p. 93God, whome the Hebrewes call foreign place; I rather thinke the realitie of it is a voydenes of a body or bodies with the possibility of existence of a body or bodies. Touching which possibilitie, if it be demaunded in what subject it is; I remember what answeare Ioannes Grammaticus made to the like question, reported by Averroes on the 12. booke of Aristotles Metaphysicks, namely that it was in God, to witt fundamentally not formally. For I nothing doubt but his meaning was this. In God allone is found an almighty power to make the world out of nothing, whence it followeth, that before the world was, there was a possibilitie that the world should be, and the mere active power of God is sufficient to denominate this possibilitie. A possibilitie physicall or naturall requires a subject to support it, but a possibilitie logicall not so, as being only negatio repugnantie, a want of repugnancy. And if God was able to make a world out of nothing, then surely it was no contradiction, that the world should be, and consequently the world was possible before it was. And yet to drawe a litle nearer unto you in this; I professe, I finde it more hard to maynteyne, that God i any where as in a place, then to maynteyne that God is in Uacuo. For marke howe Durand distinguishethe; Place, saythe he, Durand. in 1. dist. 37. p. 1. q. 2.is considered two wayes, eyther as a naturall thing, or as conteyning the thing placed therein. As it is a naturall thinge, God is in every place, but as it conteynethe the thing that is sayde to be therin; so God is in no place secundum se, in respect of himselfe. For nothing without him is able to conteyne him; but in respect of his effects, he is in all places; because he is conteyned of nothing, but rather conteyneth all things, and preservethe them. But in respect of his effects he is every where. For he fillethe every place with his effects; & in this sense, it is proper to God to be every where. Herupon some may conceave that God may be called foreign place, because he conteynethe all thinges, rather then is conteyned. Yet we knowe that the continency of place is corporall, and ordinarily the place is more base then the things conteyned therein. But Gods continency is merely vertuall and spirituall, and in p. 94dignitie infinitely beyoud the most noble creatures. And we have no great cause to doate upon the Rabbines, whose Philosophy was never a whit better then their divinitie. Yet one thing more: The question was whether God might be sayde to be in Uacuo, and your discourse is only to deny, that there is any such infinite space as is imagined, eyther now to be without the heavens, or hertofore to have bene before the world was, but you take no notice of the Arguments made to the contrary, much lesse doe you take any care to answeare any one of them. And yet to my thinking some are shrewde ones, and different courses are taken in answearing them; which argues that one mans answeare gave litle satisfaction to another. I will therfore take this paynes in part for you, & represent the arguments of Bradwardine, who takes upon Bradward. Summa de causa Dei contra Pelag. lib. 1. cap 5. coroll. 2.him to proove, that God is essentially and presentially every where, not only in the World, and all the parts therof; but allso without the World, in that Uacuum or site imaginary; & withall I will make bold to shewe you my judgement of them. His first argument is large; in effect this: God can moove the World by a direct motion further Eastward, or further Westward. VponUpon this supposition he proceedeth thus. Eyther God was here before, whether the World is now mooved or no; Agayne, eyther God continuethe there from whence the World was mooved, or no. If God was there before his motion thither, and continuethe still where he was before the motion from thence, then it is manifest he was and is in Vacuo. But if from the time that the World mooved from hence, he ceaseth to be here, and upon the Worlds mooving more Eastward, he beginneth to be there, then God changethe his place with the world, ceasinge to be where formerly he was, and beginning to be where formerly he was not; and consequently God shall be mooved at the motion of the world, as the soule of man is sayde to be mooved, upon the motion of the body. But this seemes very uncouthe to be attributed unto God, thoughe some are content to swallowe it, not satisfyinge themselves in finding out a convenient answeare. Others deny the supposition, to witt, of a direct p. 95motion competent to the world. But saith Bradwardine, to deny that God is able thus to moove the world, is to curtll the Allmighty power of God; and therfore that opinion saythe he, is amongst the Articles which were condemned by Steven Bishop of Paris. Yet of those Articles it was woont to be sayde, non transcendunt Alpes, they doe not climbe over the Alpes; and we may as well say, they doe not goe a ship board to sayle over our narrowe Seas. In my judgement the supposition is unsound and the contrary rather true, namely that the world cannot be mooved Eastward or Westward; not thoroughe any impotency in God, who can doe all thinges that imply not contradiction; but by reason that this is such a thing as implyethe contradiction, if it be well considered, and therfore is impossible. For it supposeth that without the world there is a space, consisting of parts, thorough some parts wherof more or lesse: the world may be mooved. But this is utterly untrue; for they themselves confesse, that the space they speake of is only imaginary. Nowe herehence it followethe that the motion thorough an imaginary space, must be only an imaginary motion, and no reall motion. Secondly we answeare, supposing the motion true and reall and such a thing possible; that God is sayde to be in the world not secundum se, but secundum effectus, as before we had out of Durand, because with his effects he filles all thinges, all places. Now though these bodies doe thus moove, & therwithall the effects wherwith he filleth them, yet he himselfe is not mooved; because himselfe, as himselfe cannot be sayde to be any where, but as in himselfe he was before the world was, so in himselfe he continuethe to be still. His second argument is this: Suppose God create another world without the heaven; then eyther God is there, where he was not before, and so shall be changed in place; or if he were there before, then he was in Uacuo. I answeare, that God may be in thinges, wherein he was not before, not because himselfe becommethe otherwise then he was before, but because thinges which before were not, nowe are; and God with his effects dothe fill all things and all places, as they have their p. 96beinge, and ceasethe to fill all thinges, as they cease to have any beinge. In a word God is sayde to coexist, or not coexist with thinges anewe, not that he dothe eyther beginne or cease to coexist with them; but in respect that they doe eyther beginne or cease to coexist with him. His third argument is, that as many as deny God to exist in Uacuo, must be driven to deny that God could make the world bigger or lesse then it is. But we see no cause, why we should be cast upon any so absurd assertion. We grant that God could and can make a reall and spacious distance beyond the Heavens: but till God doth create such a distance, we deny that there is any such, thoughe we deny not, but man may imagine such. Agayne he say the we must be driven to maynteyne, that God necessarily made the world n the site. A. where now it is, and that before the world was made, there was no other site, but the site A. where now it is. But we say that before the World was, there was no site at all, not only no site different from the site A. but allso not so much as the site A. neyther. And that to imagine any different sites before the world was, is to imagine distance of parts, where neyther any parts were, nor distance; thoughe such distance of parts be imagied by us, like as Chimeraes are, and such like fictions. Agayne he disputes thus: Except Uacuum be granted to have bene sometimes, the world was everlasting; I answeare; Uacuum sometimes was; but the question betweene us is not about the existence of it (as such negations and possibilities may be sayde to exist) but only about the nature of it, to witt wherher it conteyned any distance of parts as it is imagined after the forme of a positive thinge. This we deny, and doe maynteyne that Uacuum is only a voydnes of bodies with possibilitie of existence of bodies, not of existence of bodies therein, as in a space capable of bodies as it is imagined, but simply of their existence. His cheifest argument is this … when God created the world eyther he was there before he created it or no. If he were there before he created it, then he was in Uacuo. For before the creation was, nothing was without God, but Uacuum. If you say, God was not there before he p. 97created the world; this he saythe is contrary to reason. But to my judgement it is contrary to all reason, to say that the differences of site, as here … there were extant, before any thing was created. Well he prooves it thus; for say… he, God must first be there, before he workes there. I answere; Gods workes are of diverse sorts; there is a worke of creation, a worke of preservation, and a worke of moovinge his creatures agreeably to their natures diverse and sundry wayes, as he thinkes good. Now all other operations of God about his creatures, suppose his being in them, they being allready created, but his creation dothe not, much lesse dothe it suppose his being there as in Uacuo. For to be in Uacuo, is as much as to say to be in nothinge. Which I confesse is true of God taking it as a negative thus, God was not in any thing. The truthe is, all differences of place and site as here, & there, and els where, are not, but by creation. For to say that God is in some site or place, is to say, that some site or place or thing is coexistent with God, which cannot be without creation. That which he addethe herunto is of the same nature, and admitts the same solution, now I proceede along with you.

2. To the Atheists demaund, where God was before the world was; your answeare is, God was in himselfe. I doe not Mal. 3. 6.Mal 3:6mislike it: and so I say, God is in himselfe still. For he is not changed. Only in the creation and preservation of all thinges, virtue did and still dothe flowe out of him allwayes, so that with his sweete influence he fillethe all thinges. To be conteyned in place, is too base a condition for the nature of God, he rather conteynes all thinges. So that even now, God is no where conteyned; before the world he was no where conteyninge, because there was nothing without to be conteyned and nourished by him. Neyther is it any thing harshe to say, that God was in no place, where there was no place for him, wherein to be. But betweene the question which you propose, and the answere therunto, you doe insperse some strange assertions, affecting curiositie of discourse, more then sobrietie of sense, as when you say; In respect of p. 98eternitie and immensitie, no creature, no positive essence, no numerable part of this Vniverse, is so like unto him, as this negation of all thinges, which we describe by the name of nothing. A string may be strayned so high, as by breakinge to marre all the musicke; and some witts have affected so highe a streyne of subtiltie of sentence, as that they have degenerated into non-sense. Such is this assertion of yours, wherein you affirme, that no numerable part of this Vniverse (as much as to say, neyther man nor Angell; yet was man made after Gods image & likenes) is so like unto God as nothing. Ou… upon such abominable speeches; wherby God himselfe who is the breath of, our nosthrills is made, if not just nothinge, yet to come nearest unto nothing. What sport are Atheists like to make with this? why like Davids foole, say in their hearts, there is no God: when a Christian, and a Divine, and a great writer, whose workes are current, when others are not, is founde to professe, that no creature is so like unto God as nothing. Yet this is not all; for you say allso, that no positive essence is so like unto God as nothing, as if God himselfe were not so like unto himselfe as nothing is. And indeede we commonly say nullum simile est idem. Yet by your leave the Sonne of God is the image of his Father, and dare you say that he is not so like his Father, as nothing is! No merveyle if the Spirite of confusion overspreades your discourse like a garment. For what sense, I pray, is there in this speeche of yours as when you say, that this name, nothinge, is the description of the negation of all thinges; wheras indeede the negation of all thinges, is much fitter to be the description of this name, nothing; then the name, nothing to be the description of the negation of all thinges. For the description is usually larger then the terme described. The reason you bring to justifie so uncouth a speeche, is as absurd and odious, and false as your former assertion, as when you say, Nothing hathe neyther beginning nor ende of dayes. Fye, fye upon such shamefull assertions, as much remooved from witt as from honestie. Hathe nothing neyther beginning nor end of dayes, which is as much as to say, that the dayes of it are everlastinge? why I say, It hathe no dayes at all, no being at all, no not so much beinge as propositions attribute unto negations p. 99and privations. I say it never had, nor hathe, nor ever shall have any dayes, at all, neyther is i… possible it should have dayes, for as much as it is utterly impossible, that God should not be, or cease to be, who is the sovereigne beinge, and i… whome but erst, you professed that all thinges are, and that in a better manner then they are in themselfes. And shall this name nothing be now so farre advanced, as to be above all positive essences, or parts of this World, in likenes unto God, and that in respect of eternitie, and immensitie? But what eternitie or immensitie of being is to be found in that which hath no being at all, nor ever had, nor ever shall have, nor can have, no not so much as negations have? Yet the Heavens have had continuance so long, as not very well knowne to man; and so have the Angels had, and shall have for ever. The smallest part of this Vniverse, hathe some magnitude; some parts have quantitatem motis, quantitie of extension, and that all most incredibly great, certeinly incomprehensible by the witt of man, as the Heavens; other parts have quantitatem virtutis, quantitie of spirituall perfection, as the Angells, and that allso inscrutable by the witt of man. But as for the name nothing, that hathe no magnitude at all, neyther of corporall extension, nor of spirituall perfection, unles you will returne to the imaginary distance of space without the Heavens, which but erst you disputed against. For no immensitie otherwise can be found in this your nothing, which you advance so high as in eternitie and immensitie, to be so like to God, as no creature, no positive essence, no numerable part of this Vniverse more, or so much. If in consideration of the most monstruous incongruitie of your assertion, and that as God hath his beinge necessarily, so it is a thing utterly impossible, that nothing should have any being; to shift your selfe out of this absurditie, you shall say, that by nothing you understand not the negation or privation of any thinge whatsoever (which yet was delivered by you without all limitation) but only the negation and privation of things created: yet herein you shall fall into a newe non-sense. For then your proposition shall runne thus in effect, No creature is so like unto God p. 100as no creature, which yet is as untrue as absurd. For surely every creature is more like unto God, then no creature, in as much as it hathe a true beinge, which the negation or privation of a creature hathe not. And yet you consider not that in this sense, nothing, hathe an ende of dayes. For as soone as the World beganne to be, forthwith ceased the being of nothing which went before it. But you proceede to take the word nothing in a more large signification, as when you foorthwith say, The negation of all thinges is more like unto God then any one thinge; You were as good say, that it is more like unto God, then God himselfe, yea then the Sonne is like unto the Father. What blasphemous conceytes are these, & how fitt for Atheists to make merry withall. And that you may not seeme to runne madde without all reason, you adde a reason unto it, and the reason is this, Because no distinct or proper place of residence can be assigned to nothing, or to the negation of all thinges. A most absurde reason, and only plausible unto them, that have lost their witts, in the wildernes of their confused imaginations as you have done. For in such a sense no place can be assigned to the negation of all thinges, as makes it more base, then the vilest thinge that is, so farre of is it from advancing it to any likenes unto God above such thinges as have being at all. For therfore no proper place can be assigned to God, because he filleth all places, and if there were a thousand Worlds he should fill them all, nor by beinge conteyned in them, but by conteyninge them, yet not locally conteyninge them, but vertually. But therfore no place can be assigned unto the negation of all thinges, because it is uncapable bothe of place and beinge, whether, circumscriptive as bodies are capable of place; or desinitive, as Angells are sayde to be in place; or repletive, as God is sayde to be in all places. Nay it is not so much capable of place, as accidents are, which are in places not per se of themselfes, but per accidens, as they affect bodies, which are in place of themselfes. For in very truthe, the negation of all thinges never had, nor hath, nor ever shall or can have, any such existence, as propositions attribute to negations or privations. For it was ever false, & p. 101is, and shall be to say, Nihil est; For as God all wayes is, and that necessarily: so it is impossible, that this proposition shoulde be true Nihil est. Yet that it may in some sort appeare, that this your wilde discourse proceedes from the zeale of the glory of God, that so you may advance him, above that which is most like him, to witt above nothing or above the negation of all thinges, you tell us, that this nothing is most unlike him. Yet this allso is a newe non-sense, namely that, that which is most like unto God, and that for eternitie and immensitie, prime branches of Gods infinity, should be most unlike him; and herein you manifestly contradict your selfe. For if it be most unlike him, then every thing is more like unto God then it, which before you denyed; and to the contrary affirmed, that no positive essence, no numerable part of this Vniverse was so like unto God as it, to witt, as nothing. Yet nowe you say even this nothing, is most unlike him: and as it were to endoctrinate our plumbeous cerebrosities, and to supply our insufficiency of proovinge so quaint a point of Metaphysicall untruthe, namely that this name nothing is most unlike unto God, you helpe us in a freindly manner with a reason herof, and that is this, because for soothe nothing is truly, and absolutely no where. But why did you not adde, that as it is no where, in respect of place, so it never was, nor is nor shall be in respect of time; nor is it possible that it shoulde be, like as it is impossible that God shoulde not be. For nihil esse, est Deum non-esse: to say that nothing is, is to say that God is not, or to deny that God is. But you proceede to exercise your witt in disparaging nothing; and wheras before you sayde, that it was no where; next you say, that It is not in it selfe; as if to be in it selfe, were some kinde of being some where. And you adde as it were a reason herof, when you say, non entis non est actio, non est qualitas, non conditio. But this reason is as good as the rest. For that nothing should be in it selfe, it is not requisite, that it shoulde have eyther action, qualitie, or reall condition. Or if it had eyther of these, it should not be in nothing. And why shoulde you accoumpt it a condition of being, to be in nothing? You adde that nothing cannot have any right or title p. 102to be accoumpted it selfe; a wonderous strange assertion. For if it be not it selfe, then it is not the same with it selfe; if it be not the same with it selfe, then it is different from it selfe, & that in somethinge. For if in nothing it be diferent from it selfe, then every way it is all one and the same with it selfe. But if in somethinge you conceave it to be different from it selfe, it behooves you to shewe what that something is, wherein nothing is sayde to be different from it selfe. But if nothing can be alleaged, wherein it differethe from it selfe, then surely it is the same with it selfe, and consequently it hathe good right and title to be it selfe. You proceede in your unprofitable subtilties, and tell us, that we may truly say some objective conceytes are nothing. Yet surely every conceyte is somethinge, but the objects of some conceytes, perhaps your meaning is, are nothing. Now the objects of conceytes are the things conceaved. You might then as well have sayde, that somethinges conceaved are nothinge. And it is a truthe; for Chimeraes may be conceaved, and Tragolaphoi, and Centaures, and after a sort privations and negations allso, which yet are no reall thinge. But we cannot rightly conceave (you say) that nothing shoulde have any degree or kinde of beinge. And I say, that neyther is any such conceyte requisite to maynteyne, that nothing may have just right and title to be termed it selse. And yet by your leave, if it were possible that God should have no beinge, then this proposition Nihilest, were possible to be true, and not otherwise. Now in maynteyninge this proposition you have proceeded so farre, as to affirme that nothing hathe neyther beginninge nor ende of dayes, and that therein it is most unlike unto God in respect of his eternitie. Want of being, you say, is the worst kinde of barrennes. But is it not more sober to affirme, that want of being is no kinde of barrennes at all. For barrennes implyes beinge. And why shoulde you put your selfe to such paynes of phrasifyinge, in proovinge that nothing cannot bring foorth any ranke of being? since no such thing is needefull to this, to witt, that nothing may have right or title to be termed it selfe; taking it as an affirmative p. 103proposition, wherein nothing is the subject, not as a negative, wherein the word nothing is only a signe of an Vniversall negative. For in this latter acception, it is utterly untrue, seinge every thing may be termed it selfe, as in sayinge a man is a man, and so is a mouse a mouse; and so the negation of all thinges (which is your owne description of the word nothing) is allso, it selfe, to witt, the negation of all thinges. And so it is true to affirme that nihil est nihil.

Thus farre you have discoursed of nothing; now you come to discourse of something, or rather of God.

And God, you say, cannot be sayde to have being no where, before the World was made, but with this limitation, save in himselfe. But I judge this to be a very improper speeche, as that which supposethe Gods being in himselfe to be a kinde of being somewhere, which in my opinion is untrue.

The truthe is, God is in himselfe, but not as in place. And to be in place, here, or there, or every where, is a denomination too base to be attributed unto God: who as Durand saythe is no where that is in no place secundum se, in respect of his essence, but every where by his effects, as filling all places, all bodies, all Spirits, whether of men or Angells with his effects. You say, he is so in himselfe as that he is more then all thinges. But consider I pray, how is pluralitie a fitt attribute for indivisible unitie? Yet tis …ue, he can produce more then all thinges of this world of creatures put together, are. You say he is longer then time; I had rather say, He is more ancient then dayes; because he is eternall, & being eternall and all mightie could have made time more ancient then it is. You say, he is greater then place; It had bene more fitt to say, he is greater then space; because the greatest place, is but the hollowe superficies of the uppermost heaven, the spacious body wherof is farre greater; and God greater then it.

Yet is this a very improper speache, because comparisons ought to be of thinges in the same kinde. But Gods greatnes & the worlds greatnes are farre different in kinde; the greatnes p. 104of the world, being quantitas motis, quantitie of extension; & the greatnes of Gods beinge quantitas virtutis, quantitie of spirituall perfection. Yet in this sense it may passe. He is vertually greater then the space of this world, because he could & can produce a greater space then this. You say he is more infinite then capacity it selfe; Belike you suppose capacitie to be infinite, in sayinge God is more infinite. But created capacitie cannot be infinite; thoughe greater, and greater it may be in infinitum, yet still finite; and this is all the infinity, that we doe or can conceave by succession or addition; & so Gods power to produce greater neyther doth nor can receave any boundes or limits. And as God is able to enlarge time and place, so is he able to limit it, but by your leave with distinction. It is not possible that time past shoulde be made lesse, then it is. But if I mistake not you overlashe, when you say, that God by his essentiall presence or coexistence is able to limit time and place. For as the limitation of thinges proceedes from Gods will, not from his essentiall presence; so likewise, it is Gods power that denominates him able to limit all thinges according to the pleasure of his will, and not his essence, or essentiall presence or coexistence. It is true, that nothing could have beginning or continuance of being but by him: and it is true allso, that all other thinges have had beginninge, and still have continuance, and that from him. Though this was no Article of the Peripateticks faithe, yet it is an Article of our Christian faithe. And herehence, to witt, from Gods preserving all thinges, and workinge in all thinges, dothe Aquinas inferre, that God by his essence (not only by his power) is in all thinges, because, and that according unto Aristotles doctrine, Movens & motum must be simul. But then agayne you knowe, or may knowe how this inference is impugned by Scotus and his followers. As if this were the Scot. 1. sect. dist. …7. qu. 1.propertie of a finite Agent, to worke only on thinges indistant from it. But God beinge an infinite Agent, they conceave it to be his propertie, to be of power to woorke upon that which is distant from him; if by supposition, it were possible, that God were distant from any thinge, or any thinge from it. p. 105And therfore thoughe if he be in all thinges, at the center of their supportance as you phrasifie; yet this is to be in them only by his power, and operation; and great Schoolemen have peremptorily denyed, that herehence it can be soundly inferred, that he is in all thinges by his essence. It is untrue that thinges in succession, may be in number infinite. They may by succession be more and more without ende; but never shall they come to be infinite. Likewise it is impossible that God shoulde be in more thinges then those that are, or may be; because it is impossible that there shoulde be more thinges, then those that are or may be. And withall I wonder, how you can maynteyne that God is in those thinges that yet have no being, but only may be.

3. You have discoursed so long of infinitie, that your discourse seemes to be transfigured into it. For the sentence, wherwith you beginne this Section, hathe no ende, no way out of it. Had the evaporation of proud phantasticke melancholy, eclipsed the lustre of his glorious presence, in that late prodigious questionists brayne, which would bring us out of the sunshine of the Gospell, into olde Aegyptian darkenes. Here your Reader becomes erect, to understande, what then: But you falling upon givinge a reason of the last clause, by way of parenthesis, utterly forget to make up the sense of your former sentence. This Questionist you speake of, seemes by that which followeth, to be Vorstius. For his opinion is, that of enclosing God in the Heavens, and excluding his essentiall presence from this inferior World, which was (as you report) first brought foorthe in Aegypt. So that it seemes, the Aegyptians were long agoe troubled with this disease, arising from the evaporations of proud phantasticke melancholy, as well as Vorstius; yea and some Nations too. You say indeede it was not propagated to many Nations, therby implyinge, it was propagated unto some. Only fewe Philosophers of the better sort enterteyned it (as you say) except Aristotle or the Author of the booke De Mundo. You woulde say, I take it, that no Philosophers of the better sort enterteyned it, except Aristotle &c. as it lyethe, your sentence is incongruous. But p. 106herein, you say, Vorstius did dissent from them, in that he helde that God was and is every where by his power and immediate Providence. This errour of his, you censure as exceeding grosse and unsufferable in that he makes Gods infinite power, wisedome, and goodnes in whole sweete harmony, Divine Providence especially consistethe, but as Agents or Ambassadors to his infinite Majestie: as if his infinite Majestie only were full compeere to his essence; unsitting to be imployed abroade, or to keepe residence any where save in the Court of Heaven. Concerning Vorstius, I professe, I never founde any such sufficiency in him, especially for Metaphysicall discourse, as should make any man zealous of salving his reputation. And that the essence of God should be confined to one place, more then to another, yea to the Court of Heaven, rather then to the basest corner of the earthe, is so absurd to my judgement, that I professe ingenuously, all the reason and witt that I have, is not sufficient to make it good of Angells, as being Spirits abstract from materiall extension. And I will remember how Aquinas So Scotus understands him. 2. dist. 2. q. 6. Durand. in 1. dist. 37. quest. 1.makes Angells to be in place, only in respect of their operation. And places are for the natures of bodies, and not of Spirits: and Durand discoursethe strange things of the nature of Angells, and such things, as I am willingly content they should continue as they doe without the reach of my comprehension. How much more absurd were it to confine the essence of God more to one place, then to another. And indeede, to my judgement, to be in place, is too base a denomination to be attributed unto God. And Durand as allready I have shewed, professethe that God secundum se is in no place, but only secundum effectus, and so every where, for as much as he fillethe all places with his effects. And as God is sayde to have bene in seipso in himselfe, before the World was made, is he not so to be accoumpted still? according to those verses of course in this argument.

Dic ubi tunc esset, cum praeter eum nihil esses:

Tunc ubi nunc inse, quoniam sibi sufficit ipse.

p. 107And is there not reason for it: For Gods essence hathe no respect to outward thinges, as his power hathe, and his operation hathe. And see, whether by ascribing place to him, you shall not be driven to acknowledge that God is in Uacuo, which opinion but erst you impugned. For suppose many Angells existent in the ayre, (as some are called Princes of the ayre,) and so within the hollowe of the moone, and suppose God should annihilate all that body of Element or Elements within the hollowe of the moone, the bodies and spheares of the Heavens only remayninge. It will not followe herehence that the Angells supposed to be within the hollowe of the moone, shall be annihilated, because they being abstract substances, and undependant on any matter, shall exist still, and consequently shall be in Uacuo. For Uacuum is only a voydenes of bodies, not of Spirits. And who doubts, but that God could have created spirituall substances only, and not bodily; in which case they must be sayde to be in Uacuo, or no where without them. Then agayne suppose these Spirits themselfes within the hollowe of the moone shoulde be annihilated; yet God shall not cease to be existent there, upon the annihilation of Angells, like as Angells did not cease to exist there, upon the annihilation of bodies: and consequently God himselfe shall exist in Vacuo; and all this commeth to passe by placing his essence there in distinction from his presence, and from his power. Doe not all confesse that God is no where without himselfe as conteyned, but only as conteyninge? now to conteyne is the worke of his power, and of his will, & not of his essence, save as his essence, and power, and will are all one realitie in God. And so God may be sayde to be every where, not only three manner of wayes, to witt, by his essence, by his presence, & by his power: but more manner of wayes, to witt, by his knowledge, by his wisedome, by his will, by his goodnes. Yet all these shall be but one way, as all these are but one in God. But yet in proper speeche as Gods essence is no where, but it may content us to say, that God ever was and is in himselfe only: so his goodnes is no where, but in himselfe, his knowledge, wisedome, and understanding no p. 108where but in himselfe; his will & mercy and justice no where but in himselfe; his power to make, to preserve, to worke no where but in himselfe: but the operations of all these united in himselfe, are every where, and so sayth Durand; God fillethe all thinges with his sweete influence and effects of his power, wisedome, and goodnes, all which are as it were the Trinitie of his one essence. Thus we may say, his power, and wisedome, and goodnes reachethe unto the earthe, and to every thinge within this canopy, eyther by way of influence naturall, or by way of influence gracious; like as in the Pallace of the third Heaven, by way of influence glorious. All which are not properly his wisedome, and power, and goodnes, but rather the effects of them; of them I say, which yet are all one thinge with his essence. But Gods essence is such as implyethe no respect unto outward thinges, as his wisedome, power, and goodnes doe bothe, in the way of mercy, and in the way of judgement.

It implyes contradiction to affirme his power, or wisedome to be more infinite then his essence, if so be we conceave his power, and wisedome to be his essence. And yet to be in many places more then another thing is, is not to make it infinite, because all places put together, are but finite, much lesse to make it more infinite.

Not only some great Schoolemen, as you speake, but all of them for ought I knowe to the contrary, distinguishe of Gods being in all thinges by his essence, by his power, by his prosence; and so the vulgar verse runnes,

Enter, praesenter. Deus est, & ubique potenter;

Allthoughe they take severall courses in the explication of them, as we may reade in Vasquez. Three of which explications, Vasq. in 4. qu …. art. 3. disp. 30.he takes upon him to confute, to witt, that of Alexander Halensis, as allso the way of Bonaventure, and lastly the way of Durand: & resteth himselfe upon the explication of Aquinas, followed as he saythe by Cajetan, Albertus, Aegidius, Ricardus, Capreolus, & Gabriel, & the exposition there set p. 109downe is this. 1. God is in all thinges by his essence, because his substance is not distant from things, but joyned with them, whether in respect of himselfe, or in respect of his operation. 2. By his presence, because he knowes all thinges. 3. By his power, because his power reachethe unto every thinge. Nowe I freely professe, I cannot satisfy my selfe in this distinction. And to my judgement, presence is only in respect of essence, or of that individuall substance whatsoever it be, which is sayde to be present, whether it hathe knowledge or no, what power soever it hath much or litle, & whether it worke or no. Nowe the essence of God is never parted from his knowledge and power. And God indeede cannot be sayde, in proper speeche, to be more distant from one place or thinge, then from any other. But he may be sayde, I confesse, to be in one place more then in another, in as much as he dothe manifest himselfe more in one place, then in another. He is in all places as the Author of nature, & communicating the gifts of nature; in speciall sort he is sayde to be in his Church as the Author of grace, & communicating the gifts of grace, but in most speciall manner in the third Heaven as the Author of glory, & communicating himselfe in glorious manner unto his Angells and Saints; all which diversities of being are rather in respect of his power, then of his essence. For how is God sayde to be in any thinge? as conteyned? by no meanes, but rather as conteyninge; which conteyning is a transient operation of God, proceeding from his power, & his will. Thus saythe the Apostle God is not farre from every one of us; for as much as in him we Act. 17. 27. 28.Acts 17:27Acts 17:28live, & moove, & have our beinge. And marke but the particulars of explication proposed by Vasquius, according to the best opinion, in his judgment, to witt, according to that of Aquinas. God is in all things by his essence, because his substance is not distant (& this is most true, I confesse; for certeinly he is no more distant in place from a mouse, then from an Angell) but he is joyned with the things themselfes, whether in respect of himselfe, or of his operation.

So then if Gods operation be joyned with the thinges themselves, it suffizeth, (by this opinion) to maynteyne, p. 110that God is present with them by his essence; yet if you consider it well, you shall finde, that this is all one with his presence in respect of his power; for that was expounded thus; God is in the whole Vniverse, by his power, because his operation reacheth unto every thing. Next, consider, how God is in every thing by his presence. First, to say that God is in every thing by his presence, seemes a very absurde manner of speeche: for it is as much as to say, that God is present in every thing by his presence. Then consider the explication of it. He knowethe all thinges, therfore he is present with all things: Now this seemes very absurd. For we read that God revealed to Elishah, what was done in the King of Arams 2. King. 6. 1….2 Kgs 6:1privy Chamber; might therfore Elishah justly be sayde to have bene present in the Kings privy Chamber? We knowe the number of the Starres, what therfore, are we present with them? God foreknowes things to come, is he therfore present with them allso, which yet are not? Vasquius himselfe professed before, in confuting the opinion of Durand, that Nothing is sayde to be present with another, unles that other thing were conscious therof, and he prooved it out of the digests, and out of the lawe Coram; Coram Titio aliquid fecisse jussus non videtur praesente eo fecisse, nisi is intelligat; & allso out of the 112. epistle of Austin, plane sorsitan satis est, si praesentia hoc loco intelligamus, quae praesto sunt sensibus, sive animi, sive corporis, unde etjam ducto vocabulo. praesentia nominantur. As if praesens were as much as prae sensibus. To this I may adde that of Aeneas in Virgill, when the cloud wherwith his mother Venus had covered him, vanished away, then he breakes out into these wordes Coram, quem quaeritis adsum Troius Aeneas. But now consider, according to this interpretation of the word praesent God shall be sayde to be present with none, but with intelligent creatures: for such alone can knowe him and take notice of him; and because but fewe of them take notice of him; therfore he can be sayde to be present, but with a fewe of them allso. Yet Aquinas his explication of Gods beinge in Aquin in …. qu. …. …. 3.all thinges by his presence, is quite of a contrary nature, to witt, because God knowes them, and not because they knowe p. 111or take notice of him. Last of all, to be every where by his power, is sayde to be in this respect, that his operation reacheth to every thinge. Now who seethe not that this presence is rather in respect of his operation, and actuall workinge, then of his power to worke. And if we ascend to the ca…se of his operation, we must ascend not only to the power of God, but even to his wisedome, and goodnes, as which is the cause of his operation, as well as his power. And if we looke for some thing more proper, to admitt this denomination then other, we must take notice of his will, rather then of his power, as which is the most immediate cause of his operation. For infinite power to be able to reache every possible effect, is no more, then to be able to produce it, or being produced to preserve it, or to worke in it, or by it, whatsoever it pleasethe, which is nothing pertinent to the being of it, therein as in a place, which belongs to essence rather then unto power: For when I am sayde to be here and there, the meaning is not, my power is here or there, but my person, which is properly sayde of me, because I am a body, to which kinde or natures, place properly belongethe. But as touchinge the essence of God, that being spirituall & infinite, it is not capable of any place to conteyne it, but rather it conteynes every thinge: in which respect your selfe have allready observed, that by the Hebrewes he is called foreign place it selfe. Nowe Iudge, whether God may be sayde in any congruitie to conteyne bodies by his essence, or Spirits eyther created; and whether that were not to signify, that bodies and Spirits created, were of the essence of God. Neyther is it proper to say, that God by his essence dothe worke eyther the creation or the conservation of outward things, but rather by his understanding, power, and will. For to worke by essence, is to worke in the way of naturall Agents necessarily, but to worke by wisedome & will, is to worke after the way of free Agents, freely. If God were every where, (according to the sayinge reported and avouched by you) before there was any distinction of times; then surely God allso was every where before there was any distinction of place. For certeinly distinction of time, p. 112and distinction of place beganne together.) And must you not herby be driven to the acknowledgement of a Vacuum before the World was, and that conteyning distinction of parts, in such sort, as to make way for the denominations of here and there, and every where, and that God was therein, and every where therein, before the World was? which opinion your selfe in this very section have impugned. To discourse of the effects of Gods infinite power, in case his knowledge were not infinite; or of the effects of his infinite knowledge in case his power were not infinite, I judge to be a very vayne thinge; because it is impossible that the one shoulde be infinite without the other. For seing many things cannot be brought to passe without knowledge; like as without knowledge none of such thinges can be brought to passe at all: so likewise, without sufficiency of knowledge, such things coulde not be brought to passe, as require such a proportion of sufficient knowledge to performe them. And if God had but a finite power, he coulde foreknowe no more thinges, then coulde be brought to passe by that finite power. It is true, God is, where any thing is, but howe? as conteyning it, not as conteyned by it; but it is untrue, that God is, where any thing may be. For without the Heavens something may be; but God is not without the Heavens. For without the Heavens is Uacuum; but God is not in Uacuo, as before your selfe have disputed. And indeede how should he be there seing he coulde neyther be there as conteyninge, nor as conteyned. For that which is nothing, is neyther fitt to conteyne, nor fitt to be conteyned. In fine, I observe, how Gods being in all things you reduce unto two heads; The one is his creation; the other, his preservation of them. And so I confesse, God is not distant from any of us; for as much as we live and moove, and have our beinge in him as the Apostle speakethe.

4. The two wayes as you make them of Gods being every where, as you construe the Prophet Ieremy, are by Piscator conceaved to be but one; the latter wordes, Can any hide himselfe in secret places, that I shoulde not see him? being but an p. 113explanation of the former, Am I a God at hande, and not a God a farre off. As much as to say, that God seethe as well thinges done in earthe, as thinges done in Heaven. So that in Scripture phrase, thinges done in earthe are called things done a farre of, God speaking herein according to vulgar apprehension. Wheras God is sayde to fill Heaven and Earthe, hence it is that God is sayd to be neyther circumscriptively in place as bodies are, nor definitively as Angells are, but repletively, that is filling all thinges; but howe? that is saythe Durand with his effects.

God dothe more then fill Heaven and Earthe. For he hathe made them, and dothe maynteyne them, not only fillethe them with all creatures fitt for them.

Water filles the bucket, and the bucket conteynes the water: But God forbid we should so conceave of the nature of God, as by filling the Heavens and the Earth, to be conteyned in them.

His infinite power and wisedome serves his turne first to make them, afterwards to preserve them, and unto proper & congruous endes to order them, and with his various effects to fill them, but not with his essence, least we should be driven to ascribe extension to his essence, and maynteyne that he was and is in Uacuo as before I have shewed. Vndoubtedly Gods essence is as present with us on earthe, as with the Angells and Saints in Heaven, and no more distant or absent from us, then from them.

But how is God present? Not as praesensibus Corporis according to Austins exposition of the word praesent; for God is no sensible thinge, for then he were corporall, and to be praesensibus animi is nothing to the purpose. God dothe coexist with every thing that is. For they doe exist, and God doth exist: But doth God coexist with them in time? they doe exist in time, that is their measure of duration, but God in eternitie that is the measure of his duration, to witt himselfe.

They doe exist in place, that is the measure of corporall extension; but doth God exist in place, who hathe no extension? dothe he not rather exist in his owne immensitie which p. 114is all one with himselfe, like as is his eternitie? In a word, the severall beings of one thing in another are usually comprehended in these verses.

Insunt pars, totum, Species, Genus, & calor igni.

Rex in Regno, res in sine locoque locatum.

Now see whether any of these are competible unto God. Your selfe have observed and approoved the Hebrewes conceyte in calling him foreign Place. Let this then passe for a peculiar being of God in all his creatures, whether visible or invisible, corporall or spirituall, namely that as he hath made them, so he conteynes them, praeserves them, ordereth them, fillethe them all with his effects, and workes the good pleasure of his owne will in them, and by them. And this his presence, it is impossible he should withdrawe from them, …ave as he shall be pleased …o destroy them, and take all beinge from them; and lastly that his very essence is as indistant from the meanest worme, as from the most glorious Angell. But to talke, of Gods piercing or penetrating all thinges not with his effects only, but with his essence, as the light pierc…th the ayre, I dare not enterteyne any such g…osse conceyte of the most simple and spirituall nature of God, for feare attributinge extension unto his essence, and such as should continue thoughe the World were destroyed, and make roome for the essence of God, to extende it selfe in Uacuo, and the parts therof (which are merely imaginary) as well as in the World, and in the parts therof, like as before I have argued. The power of God dothe exercise it selfe, according to the pleasure of his will: And therfore it seemes wonderous strange to me, that you should ascribe power to God, to dispose of his essence, as touching the placinge of it in space locall.

Neyther doe I see cause, why glorious Angells should be required to prepare a place of residence for God, more then bodies inglorious.

God I acknowledge to be as well in the basest worme, as in the most glorious Angell. And so farre foorthe as it beto p. 115Gods essence to be every where, I presume no sober Divine will maynteyne, that it is other then a naturall attribute unto God, & not in his power freely to dispose of his essence eyther otherwise, or so.

And therfore when you aske, whether upon the creatinge of a newe Heaven, it is not possible that God should be therin? I answere; looke in what sense God is sayde to be any where, in that sense it is impossible that God should not be here. And yet without all change in them, thoughe not without change in things without him, one creature beinge annihilated, and another created a newe. And thoughe Angells be subject to change, yet God is not. But when you shall proove that change is no fruite of impotency, I will reno…nce the Prophet that laythe, The Lord is not changed, and Mal. 3. 6.Mal 3:6take you for my Apostle. And surely if not to be changed, were to be impotent; how impotent must God needes be, Iam. 1. 17.Jas 1:17with whome is no variablenes nor shadowe of change?

5. Gods immensitie is no more subject to his will and power to be streitned, then his eternitie: But as God is not in time, that being a measure only fitt for creatures subject to mutation, but in his owne eternitie, which is all one with himselfe: So neyther is he in place a measure fitt for creatures only subject to extension, but in his owne immensitie, which is all one with himselfe. And as by his eternitie he doth transcendently and supereminently comprehend all times: so by his immensitie dothe he comprehend all places. So that neyther doe we say, that the first could not be, neyther doe we say, that this your second way can be. Only we dare not say, the essence of God dothe pierce all things; least we should give unto his simple and indivisible nature, some kinde of extension.

And how can you avoyde it, in making the essence or substance of God to pierce all thinges; how, I say, can you avoyde the maynteyninge of Gods essence to be changeable from place to place, (upon supposition that the World may moove eyther Eastward, or Westward, farther then it is) or that his essence is in Uacuo, and that after a manner of extension, as p. 116before hathe bene argued. Now you tell us, that mutabilitie is imcompetent with infinitie: yet in the very next section foregoinge, you reckoned it a point of impotency not to be able to change, as Angells doe their mansions, when they mislike them. Of which course of Angells, eyther as touchinge their mistake, or change of mansion I am nothing conscious, as neyther am I of any oracle tending that way.

By your leave; there is no proportion betweene Gods immensitie in respect of all places filled by him, and the infinity of his nature.

For seing place and created things can be but sinite, his immensitie this way, never extends farther then to the filling of a finite creature. Neyther doe you well to confound distinction with limitation, as if they were all one. For when we distinguishe Gods power, and wisedome, and goodnes, or the Persons in the Trinity, herby we doe neyther limit the nature of God, nor the Persons, nor his attributes.

It is true, that God is the supporter of all thinges, and in this respect, the Apostle acknowledgeth, that He is not farre Act. 17. 27. 28.Acts 17:27Acts 17:28from any of us, for as much as In him we live, and moove, and have our beinge.

6. You say that God was, when nothing was. A most improvident speeche, and as good as sacke and sugar unto Atheists. For it is as much as to say, that God was nothinge, or that sometimes God was not. But eftsoones you alter this dangerous forme of wordes, and tell us that God was, when nothing was besides himselfe. Without all peradventure, before the creation of the world, there was neyther distinction of time, nor of place. Thoughe you doe not cloathe God with an imaginary space as without him; yet may you doe as great wrong, to imagine such a space in the nature of God, as it seemes you doe, and that you call immensitie. For you say, such an imaginary space should be a checke to his immensitie, as being a parallel distance locall. So that you seeme manifestly to acknowledge a distance in Gods nature, but you woulde not have it checkt by any parallel distance as immense as himselfe. This imagination is wonderous grosse. p. 117Wheras on the contrary, I finde none to conceyte of any immensitie in God, otherwise then as he is sayde to fill all places; and therfore before places or bodies are existent, only a power and abilitie is in God to fill all places; & that filling, Durand professethe to be in respect of the effects wrought by him, & wherwith he filles all places, not with his essence piercinge all thinges as you discourse, as if it were as bigge as the World, or as an infinite World: & yet you thinke to charme this extravagant conceyte, with calling it indivisible.

And so the light of the Sunne which filles the world, with manifest extension, is yet indivisible.

Gods essence, you say, conteynes the Heavens. I would, you would consider this phrase well, & what it imports.

If you were askt what the essence of man conteynes, would you say, that it conteynes any thing more then that, which is of the essence of man, as Animal rationale? Yet without making any bones of scruple in the prosecution of your owne conceytes, you say that the essence of God conteynes the Heavens. May you not as well say, that the essence of God made the Heavens?

I had thought it had bene a more congruous speeche, to say, that God by his power & will made the Heavens, & so dothe preserve and conteyne them rather then by his essence. For in respect of essence, only such thinges are attributed unto God, as doe necessarily belong unto him; as for example that he is, eternall, unchangeable, omnipotent, most wise, most good. But no sober man woulde say (I thinke) that God is the creator, preserver, conteyner of all thinges by his essence. But these attributes belong unto him by the freedome of his will. I nothing doubt, but that if the World were a thousand times bigger then it is, God should be as intimately coexistent to every part of it, as he now is to any part of this Heaven & Earthe, which we now see. For all thinges that live or moove or have any beinge, doe & must live, & moove, & have their beinge in him. But yet, as it is by his will that he made them, and not by his essence: so it is by his will, and not by his essence, that he dothe preserve them.

p. 118You pursue the phrasifying of your owne conceytes according to your owne pleasure: But where doe you finde in Tertullian or Philo the penetration of Gods essence thorough all thinges? Yet I confesse Anselme saythe, that Natura Dei penetrando cuncta continet; and whether you tooke it hand over Ansesm. Monolog. cap. 23.head from him I knowe not: You seeme to make Gods essence a space of some spirituall extension; to which kinde of conceyte our imagination I confesse, is wonderous prone; as if it did penetrate all thinges as light dothe penetrate the ayre, and so fill all thinges with it selfe, and not only with his multifarious effects as Durand interpreteth it. Nowe this is a dangerous conceyte and obnoxious to a foule errour, and opposite to the simplicitie of Gods nature: which you perceave wel enoughe, and therfore you thinke to checke this errour of conceyte, by saying that he is indivisible, as if wordes would serve the turne to salve Gods pure simplicitie.

Durand I am sure professethe against this penetration which you are so enamoured with. Durand. 1. dist. 37. q. Quando dicimus Deum esse in rebus, non intelligimus eum esse in iis ut partem intrinsecam, vel intrinsecus penetrantem: sed intelligimus eum esse praesentem rei, non solum secundum durationem, quia & quando res sunt, nec secundum contactum corporalem cum non sit corpus nec, virtus in corpore, sed secundum ordinem qui in Spiritibus tenet locum situs in corporibus. In hoc tamen excellit ordo in Spiritibus situm in corporibus; quia per situm se habet unum corpus ad aliud immediate quoad sui extremum: sed per ordinem se habet Spiritus ad corpus immediate secundum quodlibet sui; For thus he writes, when we say, that God is in thinges, we doe not understand him to be an intrinsecate part, or that he doth intrinsecatlie penetrate them: but we understand him to be present to the thing, not only according to the duration therof, in being when the things are, not by corporall touch, seing he is not a body, nor any qualitie in a body, but according to order, which in Spirits, is answerable to situation in bodies. Which order in Spirits, excells situation in bodies in this respect; because by situation one body is with another only as touching the extreame parts therof immediately. But by order a p. 119Spirit is immediate to a body in respect of every part therof.

Our imagination, I confesse, is apt to imagine God to be as it were of most subtile quantitie penetrating all. But to conceave so of an Angell is too grosse, how much more of God.

Durand. 1. dist. 37. part. 2. qu. 1. num 17. Differentiae situs non extenduntur ad substantias incorporeas, cujusmodi sunt Angeli. Huic autem contradicit imaginatio, quae non transcendit quantum & continuum, secundum quod formamus nobis de Angelis aliquod Quantum Subtilissimum. Sed in hoc non est rectum credere imaginationi, quia Angeli abstrahunt secundum rem a quanto, sicut a quali: & ideo sicut non sunt albi aut nigri, frigidi, aut calidi, & sic de caeteris qualitaetibus corporalibus: sic non sunt magni vel parvi, quia non sunt quanti, & per consequens hic vel ibi ratione suae essentiae, quia hae sunt proprietates quanti.

The proper differences of corporall thinges saythe Durand are not to be extended to incorporall things, such as Angells are. Imagination contradicteth this, which dothe not transcend quantities, according wherunto we fashion to our selves Angells, as if they were of a most subtile quantitie. But we doe not well to followe imagination in this. For Angells are natures abstract as well from quantitie as from qualitie; & therfore like as they are not white and black, cold and hott, and so of the rest of corporall qualities: and so they are not great or small, because they have no quantity, & consequently, are not here, or there, in respect of their essence, seing these differences are proper unto quantitie.

But some may say, If Gods essence be not here, where is it then? I answeare that God is as much here as any where, and when I say God is here and every where, I doe not exclude his essence. For by God I understand his essence. But I deny that he is here or any where els secundum ess…ntiam. as if his essence had any situation here, which kind of being is proper only to bodies, and not to Spirits, and makes Gods nature subject to extension.

We may be bold to say, that Gods essence is indistant from every thing; For herein we goe along with the Apostle, who p. 120sayth, that God is not farre from every one of us. For in him we live & moove & have our beinge. But as for penetration of all things with Gods essence, I leave that phrase to them that like it. As for Gregories trimēbred sentence, one part therof alone is to your purpose, namely when he saythe, that God is intra omnia non …nclusus. And indeede we all say, that God is so in all thinges as that he rather conteynes them, then is conteyned by them. Now which I pray is the more sober speeche, to say that Gods essence conteynes all thinges, or to say that Gods power & will conteynes all thinges, let every learned and sober Reader judge.

7. Thoughe I deeme it not much woorthe the while to searche after this distinction in Anselme, the place wherof you conceale. Yet I have taken that paynes to the ende I might the better consider in what sense, and upon what grounde of reason he dothe deliver it. And in his Monologion I finde he discoursethe of Gods beinge in time and place. But no such distinction can I finde in him, nor any such assertions as you impute vntounto him. In his 19. chap. he disputethe that God is in no place and time. In the 21. How he is in all places, and in no place. In the 22. That It may be better vnderstood that God is sayde to be allwayes then in all time. In the 23. How it may be better vnderstood, that God is sayde to be every where then in all places. But that it is fitter to be sayde of God that he is with place, then in place, I finde no where nor in any place in Anselme. Yet you avouche it as the distinction of Anselme, and as well approoved of good writers, but who they are, you keepe to your selfe. Notwithstanding you tell us, that the resolution of doctrine according to the former distinction, is blameable in two respects. 1. For that it conceales much matter of admiration (which the description of immēsitie used by Barnard and others, dothe promptly suggest. 2. Because it dothe occasion an erroneous imagination of coextension in the divine essence. As touching the first; I see nothing to the contrary, but that Gods being with every place, dothe every way conteyne the very same matter of admiration, which his being in every place dothe. For the woonderful nature of his immensitie in playne termes is but this, (thoughe it may p. 121be phrasified diverse wayes as it pleasethe the writer) that he conteynes all thinges and is conteyned in none. Now this may as well be signified, by sayinge God is with every place, as by sayinge God is in every place. For being with a place is indifferent to admitt, such a manner of being with it, as namely by way of conteyning it. But being in a place, dothe rather incline to signify a beinge conteyned by it. Which is opposite to the active conteyning of it. Place say the Durand, may be Durand. …. dist. 37. q. 2.considered two wayes, eyther as a naturall thing, or as conteyning the thing placed. As it is naturall thinge, so God is in every place; but as it conteynes the thinge sayde to be in it, so he is in no place. For he conteynes all, and is conteyned of none. As for the imagination of coextension in the divine essence, to my judgement, your opinion in making the divine essence to penetrate all thinges, hathe bene very prone therunto. And howe to be with every thinge, dothe more include a coextension of nature, then to be in every thinge, I cannot possibly conceave. But I pray in what sense of truthe, or truthe of sense, can you averre that every body is with every place? You may as well avouche that every worme here on earthe is with the Sunne, or with the place of the Sunne. And can the mathematicall dimensions of a bodily substance, be accoumpted the place, of that bodily substāce, that you should say, Every bodily substance is with the mathematicall dimensions therof, and that even there where you speake of a substance his being with a place? And why you should terme them mathematicall dimensions rather then Physicall I knowe not.

You say that Gods being in every place and in every part of every body, so as not to be conteyned in them, dothe exclud all conceyte of coextension. But I see no reason for this assertion: it rather includes an extension of Gods being beyond all thinges, then hinders or excludes the conceyte of coextension with the things that are: especially wheras you maynteyne that God is in all thinges not only as conteyning them (with cannot be attributed unto God in respect of his essence, as I have shewed, but rather in respect of his power and wil) but by way of penetration thoroughe all, and that in p. 122respect of his essence, (and not in respect of his power only) like as light is diffused thoroughe our Hemi spheare; which similitude I am bolde to adde, because you fayle in affoording us any resemblance to succour our capacitie of apprehension this way. But I dare not adventure vponupon such an apprehension, because in my opinion it is too grosse to be attributed to the nature of God. I content my selfe with this, that as God before the world, was in himselfe, so he is in himselfe still according to that old verse,

Tunc ubi nunc in se quoniam sibi sufficit ipse.

But then nothing being made, he had nothing to conteyne, & governe, and worke by or in, as nowe he hathe. As touchinge all other manner of being in all thinges, I content my selfe with ignorance. You magnify Trism g…sts definition of Gods immensitie, and much good doe it you. It is suitable with your dicourse. But doe you remember what censure Aristotle passed vponupon Empedocles, for this figurative & obscure manner of expressions in Philosophicall discourse? And indeede when we take paynes in searching out the truthe, why shoulde we encumber our selves with resolving figures into playne speeches, that so we may have somethinge wheron to dispute. Hertofore you tolde us that God was the center of all thinges, and that of supportance: now out of Trismegist you tell us, that God hathe a Center and that every where, but not of supportance passive I thinke, as wherby he shoulde be supported, but of supportance active, wherby he supporteth all thinges. Now herof we can easily finde bothe a center and a circumference. For Gods supporting of the earth, may well be accoumpted the Center, and Gods supporting the heavens may well be accoumpted the Circumference of Gods supportinge the earthe. In as much as there is no divine supporting without it, at least of materiall creatures, but all with it. Thoughe it be true, that God coulde & can make the world much bigger then it is. But Gods will hathe herein circum…scibed himselfe, thus farre to proceede as he dothe, p. 123in supporting all thinges & no farther. I doe not like your phrase of inlarging the actuall coexistence of Gods essence. For dare any sober divine say, that Gods actuall existence hathe boundes, and that these boundes may be more or lesse enlarged? And yet the face I confesse of your discourse, lookes hitherwardes. How then doe you say, that the boundes of Gods coexistence with his creatures are or can be enlarged? The only way to helpe it, is to say, that Gods existence is never enlarged, but the existence of creatures, by the encreasing of newe, may be enlarged, and consequently Gods coexistence with them may be sayde to be enlarged, not that his existence is more then it was, but that the existence of created substances, is more then it was. And more creatures coexisting with God, then formerly there did, he doth coexist with more then he did. His existence is no greater then it was, nor hathe no larger boundes then it had; but creatures are supposed to exist by the power of God, more then formerly did exist. And yet the omnipotency of God hathe pitcht a circumference to Gods coexistence with his creatures, and that is the circumference of the world. For without it God seems to have no coexistence with his creatures but all within. And albeit God coulde make the world greater and greater, yet still it shoulde be but finite, & as there should be a circumference of all creatures existing, so likewise of Gods coexisting with them. To say, that God only truly is, is one of the paradoxes. That God alone is id quod est, that is, that whatsoever is attributed unto God, is essentiall to him, not accidentall, I have often read. But that God only, truly is, I never read but in your writings. In him we live, and moove, and have our being saythe Saint Paul: but this by your subtile commentary must be understood with a distinction: In him we live but not truly; in him we moove but not truly, in him we have our being but not truly. That God conteynes all things, and is not conteyned in any thing, we easily grant. Spheares doe conteyne by way of place; but I hope, you will not say, that God in such sort conteynes any thinge; thoughe therfore called by the Hebrewes foreign, because he conteynethe all p. 124thinges. And yet certeinly, there is no Spheare conteynes so much, but that a square figure may conteyne as much, thoughe not under the same limits. And can any man make doubt, but God coulde make a World of a square figure, that shoulde conteyne as much as this World dothe, thoughe in this case the Circumference of the World shoulde be greater then now it is? But because that all thinges cannot comprehend God, therfore you say, He is rightly resembled to a spheare, whose Circumference is no where.

A proper resemblance of the nature of God to a thing utterly impossible, and fitt matter for Atheists to make themselfes sport withall, I say impossible more then one way.

For first, it is a thing impossible, that a body should be infinite.

Secondly it is impossible, that a body infinite should be Sphericall. If you aske, of what figure then shoulde it be? my answeare is, it should be of no figure. For figures are the boundes of quantities; & it is contradiction to make a boundles quantitie consist of boundes; or a bounded and figured quantitie without boundes. And yet, if all this were receaved as fitt, and convenient, what shall we gayne therby, when all this while we imagine him to be merely corporall, who indeede is merely spirituall? For I doe not thinke you looke to finde spheares any other where then among bodies.

We reade and heare of the Spheares of Heaven; but I never read or heard of the Spheares of Angells or Spirits, as if they might be of a round or square figure as bodies are, much lesse is any such figure fitt to resemble God. Yet upon these conceytes as extraordinary atchievements of yours in the way of Metaphysicall discourse, you proceede in the next place to the solution of certeyne difficulties; that so Drismagist his definition of Gods immensitie, may finde the more easy admittance, into the Articles of our imagination, if not into the Articles of our Creede. Which yet truly I should not have excepted against, but rather have admitted, if to no other ende, yet to this, even to cutt of curious speculations about the immensitie of God; had you not so farre magnified it, as if it p. 125had bene some Oracle of natures light, and made use of it, not as a Rhetoricall flashe, and diaculation only, but as a serious maxime to rely upon in Philosophicall discourse; where the best decorum is, to make no use of tropes and figures, but of playne and proper termes, that we may not be to seeke of our owne meaninge.

8. Your former discourse about the Spheare, together with the Center and Circumference (spoken of) of Gods immensitie, you perceave is likely to rayse some Spirits; and therfore aforehand, you shewe a course how to lay them. The first is, How a Center should be conceaved to be every where? The second How the indivisibility of Gods praesence should be compared to a Center? To the former, you answeare, that As the Divine essence by reason of absolute insinity hath an absolute necessitie of coexistence, with space or magnitude infinite; so were it possible there should be (as some Divines holde it possible there may be) a magnitude or Spheare actually infinite, this magnitude could have no set point for its center, but of every point designable in it, we might avouche this is the Center: Every point shoulde have the negative properties of a sphericall center, there coulde be no inequalitie betweene the distances of severall parts from the Circumference of that, which is insinite, and hath no boundes of magnitude. So then God by absolute necessitie of nature must coexist with that, which neyther doth exist, nor can exist by the opinion of most. For that an infinite body should exist, is not only by Aristotle and Aquinas prooved, but most generally helde to be impossible. But if such a thing be impossible to exist, it is allso impossible that God should coexist with it; & consequently most false, is that which you say, namely that by reason of his infinity, it is absolutely necessary, that God should coexist with it.

Now will it not followe herehence, that it is absolutely necessary, that God should not exist at all, and that by reason of his infinity? For to coexist with that which is impossible to exist, what is it, but not to exist at all? O' what dangerous consequences doe your wilde assertions goe as it were with childe, withall; and howe fitt are such lettice for the lipps of p. 126Atheists? marke how Durand discoursethe against this conceyte of yours, as when you say, that by reason of his infinity God must be every where.

Per eandem rationem dicendum est quod non competit Deo esse Durand. 1. dist. 37. p. 1 quest. 1.ubique, ita quod infinitas suae substantiae sit ei, ratio ubique essendi, Si enim competeret Deo esse ubique ratione suae essentiae infinitae hinc competi ei esse necessario ubique, vel in loco infinito, & nullo modo finito, sicut a contrario dicitur de Angelo quod ratione suae essentiae finite convenit ei esse in loco finito, & nullo modo in infinito.

By the same reason we must say, it agreeth not to God to be every were, so as that the infinity of his substance, is unto him the reason of his being every where. For if it belonged to God to be every where in regard of his essence infinite, then necessarily he should be every where, or in an infinite place, and by no meanes in a finite place; like as on the contrary, it is sayde of an Angell, that in regard of his essence finite, it agreeth to him, to be in a finite place, by no meanes in a place infinite.

Secondly you tell us, that some Divines holde it possible, there may be a magnitude or materiall spheare actually infinite. But you doe not love to betray your Authors.

I have read in a late Spanish Iesuite a discourse to proove Petr. Hurtado de Mendosa. disp. in Vniversam Philosoph. Tract. de Infinito.that infinitum potest dare. But in this he is a meere mountebanke, and affectator of singularities, I have hertofore read allso in Hills Philosophia Lencippaea, Democritica, so bold an assertion as this, That the World is infinite; Otherwise, sayth he, the effect were not suitable to the cause. For God the Author of the World is infinite. But he was conscious of this his heterodoxy in the opinion of the World, & therfore would professe (as I have heard) that if in Oxford he should dispute thus, we in the Vniversitie would cry out for a Limitor, for this Infinitor.

And truly these and such like disputes, I reckon not woorthy to be named the same day, with the demonstrations that are brought to the contrary. And I may take libertie to professe thus much, how that observinge the Iesuite before spoken of, Hurtado di Mendosa by name, to affect subtilties and p. 127curiositie of demonstration, in zeale of maynteyning the truth, which as Austin sometimes saydo, A Deo dicitur verum quodcunque dicitur; I tooke leave of my better studies, destinated to the mayntenance of Gods grace against all Pelagian, Iesuiticall, and Arminian oppositions, and to examine the arguments of Hurtado in that point, and went a large way in the solution of them, & confutation of his insolent assertion, until I thought it highe time to returne to such aliene meditations; considering it might be a practise of Satan, to cast a ball of provocation in my way, and therby to cause a diversion, from more grave, more seasonable and more profitable contemplations. But yet I professe I never heard or read before of any that maynteyned the possibility of a Spheare to be infinite, as that which implyes a manifest contradiction. For figures beinge the boundes of quantities it shoulde imply a bounded quantitie without boundes. But in the fiction proposed, you say, every point should be the center as pertakinge of the negative properties of a Center: that is, there should be no inequalitie betweene the distances of severall points from the Circumference of that which is infinite as for example. Suppose the world were infinite Eastward, & infinite westward. Nowe consider a direct line passinge over S. Michaels mount to Dover and so forwards Eastward, & in like manner from Dover to Sainct Michaels mount, and so forward, westward. From dover Eastward is infinite, and from Saint Michaels Eastward is but infinite. So then these two are equall that is the part is equall to the whole. For the line from, Dover Eastward is but a part of the line from Saint Michaels Eastward in infinitum. This contradictious absurdity amongst many other, followeth upon supposition of any body or extension infinite. By the way observe a great incongrutie; thoughe you suppose a spheare infinite, yet you conceave it to have a Circumference. But to have a Circumference is not to be infinite. Touching the second difficultie, to witt, how the indivisibility of Gods presence in every place may be compared to a Center: You say, this comparison is right, in as much as God hath no diversitie of parts. And indeede p. 128I finde no small uniformitie, betweene the beginning of this your discourse of Gods immensitie, and the ende of it. For about the beginninge you professed; that No creature, no positive essence no numerably part of this Vniverse, was so like unto God as notting; And nowe you say, he is rightly resembled to a point, which every man knowes, is much about the same proportion, & quantitie of just nothing. For immensitie & eternitie no Angell so like unto God as nothing: & agayne for his indivisibilitie, you say he is rightly compared to a point, which is as much as nothing. Of the sobrietie of these your discourses, let the Reader judge. But you thinke to helpe the matter by saying, that His presence agayne is like to magnitude actually infinite, in that it can have no circumference. Now consider I pray, How will you make the Majestie of God amendes, for these your injurious comparisons, to witt, in comparing him, to magnitude actually infinite, which indeede is just nothing? For in the most generall opinion of Philosophers & Divines, magnitude actually infinite, is a thinge utterly impossible to have any beinge. And marke withall, how you contradict your selfe. For here you suppose, that magnitude infinite can have no circumference; & but a litle before, your discourse was of an infinite Spheare that had a circumference. At length notwitstanding your▪ former assertion of justifyinge the comparing of Gods indivisible essence vntounto a center, or point of magnitude; Nowe▪ you confesse that the indivisibilitie of the one, and indivisibilitie of the other are heterogeneall, and consequently asymetrall, the best Philosophicall truthe I have hitherunto founde in your discourse. But least all this while you should seeme utterly extravagant in your incongruous comparisons of the nature of God to vile thinges, or rather to Nothings; first you mince this Philosophicall maxime, as when you say, They are of times asymetrall; and then you corrupt it by interpretation as if asymetrall signified not absolutely incommensurable, but only not exactly commensurable. Wheras in truthe you shall as soone proove the Diameter of a square commensurable to his, side as to proove the indivisible nature of God commensurable to a point of quantitie. Est quoddam p. 129indivisibile, saith Durand, quod est aliquid quantitatis ut punctus: Durand. …. dist. …7. quest. 2.Aliud est indivisibile quod est totalitur extra naturam quantitatis, ut Deus. What an absurd thing were it to compare the soule of man to a point in a quantitie; the soule being so indivisible as to be all in all, & all in every part; how much more so to compare an Angell, most of all the divine Essence? And the soule of man is much fitter to represent God by (man being made after the image of God) and God is all in all, and all in every part of the world, but not as forma informans, as the soule is, and consequently neyther extended with the extension of the world, nor mooved at the motion of the world; nor any part therof. Hence you say it is that the most subtile Schoolemen or Metaphysicall Divines as well ancient as moderne, resolve it as a point irresoluble by humane witt; whether a mathematicall point or center, can be the complete, and definitive place of an Angell, albeit they holde the Angelicall natures to be as truly indivisible, as points or centers are.

I doubt there is litle truthe & sobrietie in all this. If there be, I must confess… I was never acquainted with any of these concealed Schoolemen or Divines eyther ancient, or moderne, at least in these particulars; For you tell me that, which I never heard or read of before; yet I have bene acquainted with fopperyes more then enoughe, amongst them, & might have bene with more, if I had any minde thereunto. But for the most part I have ever shunned those trifling subtilties. But consider we the particulars, which here you give us a part. For to make your assertion good, you are to shewe, not only that these Schoolemen you intimate, doe holde the point you speake of irresoluble, but allso that Hence they doe holde it so; that is, because the indivisibilitie of centers, or points, & of spirituall substances are heterogeneall and asymmetrall, that is, not exactly commensurable.

But let us consider the point it selfe, concerning a Mathematicall point. Now I pray consider this: As Mathematicall quantitie is herein distinct from quantity Physicall, because that is abstract from matter, this is not: so a Mathematicall point, must herein be distinct from a point Physicall, in as p. 130much as that is abstract from matter, this is not.

Now quantity, and poincts Mathematicall thus abstract from matter, are but only in imagination. And doe the Scholemen, you speake of, maynteyne it as a point irresoluble, whether an Angell may be defined within a point of imagination only? what were this, but to have no being at all but in mans imagination? Wherfore you may be advised, to let the question runne rather of a point physicall, then of a point Mathematicall, unles you looke for some succour, from that rule of course Mathematici abstrahunt, nec mentiuntur.

Yet that woulde proove but a broken toothe and sliding foote, to keepe you from errour in this. But I thinke the Nominalls are those most subtile Schoolemen you speake of; I envy not the glory which you give them, be it as great as that which Scaliger passethe upon Scot, Occam, and Sincet. The nominalls are much magnified by Hurtado di Mendosa. And I finde in Gabriel Biel such a question as this, Whether an Angell may determine unto himselfe a certeyne quantitie of place, …. 2. dist. 2. q. 1.in such sort as be cannot coassist unto, or be defined by eyther a greater or a lesser, and the answeare is sayde to be according to Occam in his Quodlibets 1. quest. 4. First that there may be given the greatest place of an Angell, so that he cannot extende himselfe to a greater. Secondly, there cannot be given the least place of an Angell, in such sort that he cannot define himselfe within a lesse. For my part I utterly dislike all these conceytes of an Angells power to extend or confine his owne essence: it seemes so opposite at first sight to a spirituall perfection, and so obnoxius to the imputation of corporall extension unto them. And I manifestly perceave how they puzle themselfes, in labouring to scatter such mists of scruples, as their owne fancyes rayse, and are driven to professe, Nihil in his materiis tam absconditis puto temere asserendum. But Gabriel. 1. dift. 2. q. 3.let every man make his owne bed, and lye as soft as he can, I will not hinder any. But we are not hitherunto come to the point; you point at; yet neyther Physicall nor Mathematicall, but that which I meane is your point Philosophicall. (Pardon me, if I picke up by the way some crumes of merryment p. 131to refreshe my Spirite in so unpleasing an argument.) The reason why the least place, for an Angell to define unto himselfe, cannot be given is, because saythe he, Posset coassistere loco punctuali pro eo quod ipse est indivisibilis.

Now you see we are upon the matter; and withall quite off from your assertion. For even these Nominalls doe not holde it to be a point irresoluble, as you speake, but resoluble, and they actually resolve it for the affirmative, to witt Gabriel Biel, after Occam. Nowe what will you say if they resolve it for the negative, and so bothe wayes, namely both negatively and affirmatively, (which you say, they holde for a point irresoluble). And indeede they resolve it bothe wayes: for I have not tolde you all; They interpose a caution, & the caution is this, Si possibilie esset locus indivisibilis: Whence you may easily guesse what their meaninge is; to witt, that indeede a punctuall and indivisible place cannot be existent, and consequently neyther can an Angell be defined therin, or coasist therto; there is the resolution negative. But in case such a punctuall place were possible then an Angell might coasist therto; there have you the resolution affirmative, in both opposite to this assertion of yours.

But who they be you speake of, that holde this point irresoluble, you conceale. And yet it may be, some such there are.

For as Cicero sometimes sayde; there was nothing so absurde, but had bene delivered by some or other of Philosophers: so the like may be verified of Schoolemen allso: For amongst all kindes of humane writers there may be some vanities more or lesse, and some thinke most amongst Schoolemen; according to the censure passed upon them, Ab hoc tempore Ioan. Trit. Abbas Sphanheimensis. P. Dialect.Philosophia sacularis sacram Theologiam sua curiositate muliti saedari caepit. From Angells, you proceede to God, and without scruple maynteyne, that he is as properly in every Center as in every place; and I confesse the reason here added why you may say so, is very sounde, seing we acknowledge him a like incomprehensibly and indivisibly in both. For surely a man may say, that which he dothe acknowledge; but take no more p. 132along with you herein, then are willing to accompany you, & upon good termes.

Now Occam and Biel propose certeyne termes, and they are these, si locus punctualis possibilis esset. But if such a thing be not possible, to say that God is therin, is to say that God is in nothing, and so you returne to your old course of amplifyinge the immensitie, or indivisibilitie of the glorious essence of God that made us. And wheras we are willing to acknowledge that God is in all thinges as conteyninge them; I doe not finde that a point is of any conteynable nature. As for example, there is punctus lineam terminant; now suppose God conteynes the line, and conteynes not the point, shall the line herupon be without an ende? I professe I cannot finde any other thinge in the notion of such a point, but negatio ulteriorie tendentiae, and what neede hathe this of the divine power to conteyne it? And surely the point which continueth a line, is nothing more then the center of the earthe, and of that you professe in the next chapter and second section, that it is a matter of nothing. The manner of Gods indivisibility we conceave (say you) by his coexistence to a Center: his incomprehensiblenes, by his coexistence to all spaces imaginable; as much as to say. The indivisibility and incomprehensiblenes of God, is best conceaved, when we conceave his coexistence to such thinges as are founde only in imagination, or to thinges that are, but have no realitie in them, Now if God be all in all, and all in every part, is he not better conceaved, by comparison with the soule of man, (which is made after the image of God) then by comparison to a base Center, or thinges in imagination only? especially seing Imaginatio non transcendit continuum. If God were more in a great place then in a lesse; then it would followe that an Asses head shoulde participate the essentiall presence of the deitie (I speake in your owne instance and phrase) in greater measure, then a mans heart dothe. And doe not you affect some popular applause in this discourse of yours, the vulgar sort being apt to conceave the contrary, namely that a mans heart participates the essentiall presence of the deitie in greater measure, then an Asses head: and by the p. 133same reason; they may conceave that a mans head participates the essentiall presence of the deitie in greater measure, then an asses heart, which yet is as contrary to your assertion, as to the truthe. But it is manifest herby, more then enoughe, that your care is not so much for the investigation of truthe, as to give satisfaction unto vulgar conceyte.

9. That Gods immensitie or magnitude, is not like magnitude corporall, as being without all extension of parts, as there is no doubt, so wee neede no great paynes to satisfie reason, how this may be; especially to every Scholar, that knowes but that receaved▪ Axiome even amongst naturalists concerning the soule, namely, that she is all in all and all in every part, not only in the least childe newe borne, but in the greatest Anakim that ever was, which in my opinion gives farre better satisfaction, then by multiplyinge bare woordes, as in sayinge God is unitie it selfe, infinity it selfe, immensitie it selfe, perfection it selfe power it selfe, which serve neyther for proofe nor for illustration. But if we goe about to satisfie imagination, we shall never come to an ende. For Imagination transcends not that which is continuall, and hathe extension of parts; and all your courses of illustration hitherunto have inclined this way. You speake in your owne phrase when you say that all these before mentioned, to witt, unitie, infinitie, immensity, perfection, power are branches of quantitie; wheras we have more just cause to professe that no quantitie is to be found in God, no more then materiall constitution is to be found in him. We make bolde to attribute unto God quantitatem virtutis, quantitie of vertue and perfection; but every scholar should knowe that Analogum per se positum stat pro famesiori significato. And yet to speake more properby, the quantity of God, which we call quantitatem virtutis, and the quantity of bodies, which we call quantitatem motis, quantitie of extension, have no proportion at all betweene them; but the terme of quantitie attributed to both, is merely equivocall. It is true, that if God were not, nothing could be, for as much as all other thinges have their being from him. But it is a very incongruous course, in my judgement, which you take, by multiplyinge of quantitie p. 134materiall, to guesse of Gods immensitie. And yet you should have observed a better decorum in your phrase, if insteede of multiplication, you had putin the woord amplification. For immensitie is rather magnitude infinite then multitude. I cannot away with that which you subjoine, that imaginary infinity of succession or extension shoulde be a beame of that stable infinitenes which God possessethe. Hertofore you called it a shadowe, nowe a beame. And is this a proper course, to runne out to the imagination of thinges impossible to represent God by? For wherto tendeth this, but to conceave him infinite, first by way of extension, which is quite contrary to spirituall perfection, and secondly after such a manner as is utterly impossible to be. Yet such courses, all they must needes take, that seeke out to satisfie imagination. For imaginatio as we commonly say in Schooles non transcendit continuum. You proceede to shewe how Gods immens…ie hathe no diversitie of parts; and your argument intends to drawe to an inconvenience as many as maynteyne the contrary. But the inconvenience which you inferre depends only upon peradventure thus. A concurrence of all parts in number infinite, would perhaps be impossible; why then perhaps it would not be impossible; and what then shall become of your argument. Besides this; the whole frame of your argument is unsound. For infinite natures, such as man is, there is no necessitie of the concurrence of all parts to the performing of all actions, no nor to the performing of any action. As for example if he gives himselfe to study and meditate, there is no necessary use of other then of the inward faculties of his minde. If he playeth upon the Lute, there is no use of his legges and feete. If he fighteth with his enemies, there is no use of his tongue or teethe, nor so much use of his legges as of his handes, thoughe sometimes one payre of leggs is better then two payre of handes, yet not to fight, but to runne away rather; thoughe foreign, as Demosthenes sometimes sayde, being put to his witts to save the credite of his courage. Indeede if God were not as he is, he coulde not be so omnipotent as he is, we neede no paynes at all to proove this.

p. 13510. We are never so safe in matter of divinitie, as when we goe along with scripture, & one place may easily prevent the mistaking of another, if we give our selves to the due consideration of it, and submitt unto those meanes which God hathe appoynted for our edification. And the Scriptures represent his being every where in respect of two thinges. 1. In respect of knowinge all thinges, as Why sayest thou o Iacob Es. 40. 27. 28.Isa 40:27Isa 40:28and speakest o Israel. My way is hid from the Lord, and my judgement is passed over my God. Knowest thou not, or hast thou not heard, that the everlasting God the Lord hath created the ends of the Earthe, &c. 2. In respect of his power conteyning Psa. 119. 7 8. 9. 10.Ps 119:7them, as whither shall I goe from thy Spirite, or whither shall I slee from thy presence? If I ascend into Heaven thou art there, &c. Let me take the winges of the Morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the Sea, yet thither shall thine hand lead me, and thy right hand hold me.

But to talke of Gods essence penetrating and diffufed, is to vent such phrases, as I dare not adventure on, I have allready tolde you, what I have read to the contrary, in some, naming my Author, as you take libertie to doe the like, without naming of them.

Quando dicimus (sayth Durand) Deum esse in rebus, non intelligimus Durand. 1. dist. 37. part. 1. q. 2eum esse in iis ut partem intrinsecam, vel intrinsecus rem penetrantem, ut magis infra patebit: sed intelligimus eum esse praesentem rei non solum secundum durationem, quia est, quando res sunt nec secundum contactum corporalem, quum non sit corpus nec virtus in corpore, sed secundum ordinem, qui in Spiritibus tenet locum situs in corporibus. In hoc tamen excellit ordo in Spiritibus fitum in corporibus, quia persitum se habet anum corpus ad aliud immendiate, quoad sui extremum: sed per ordinem se habet Spiritus ad corpus immediate secundum quod libet sui: saltem non est hoc dubium de Spiritu increato scilicet de Deo, quicquid sit de aliis: propter quod potest dici esse non solum juxtares, fed in rebus. And Ibid. p. 1. q. 1.agayne in a question following, Per eandem rationem dicendum est quod non competit Deo esse ubique, ita quod infinitas suae substantia sit ei ratio ubique essendi: sed est ubique solum ratione suorum effectuum (us dictum fuit in praecedente questione. Si enim p. 136competeret Deo esse ubique ratione suae essentiae infinitae, tunc competeret ei esse necessariò ubique vel in loco infinito, & nullo modo finito, sicut à contrariò dicitur de Angelo, quod ratione suae essentiae finitae convenit ci esse in loco sinito, & nullo modo infinito. Esse autem ubique non est esse in loco infinito. Ergo infinitas Divinae essentiae non est ipsi ratio essendi ubique, quod tamen assumebat ratio aliorum.

In a word, I have no edge to cast my selfe upon any curious inquisition hereabouts, because errours are dangerous about the nature of God, eyther in denyinge unto him, what is beseeming him, or ascribing such things unto him, as doe unbeseeme him; which in the Schooles are accoumpted certeyne kindes of blasphemies.

I content my selfe with the simplicitie of Scripture institution; which professethe, that God filleth Heaven and Earthe, and this undoubtedly is true, as Durand saythe in respect of Gods effects, wherewith he filleth all thinges; as allso that he knowethe all thinges, that he cannot be any where as conteyned, but is every where as conteyninge, governing, orderinge, working the good pleasure of his will, in and by all thinges.

Now whether God conteynethe all thinges by his penetrative and diffused essence, and not rather by his power and will, let every sober Reader judge.

Before the World was, God was in himselfe, and so he is still; how his power is extended to the making and conteyninge of his creatures, I easily conceave, but how his essence is extended, I conceave not. I conclude with those old verses.

Dic ubi tunc esset, cum praeter eum nihil esset,

Tune, ubi nunc, in se, quoniam sibisufficit ipse.