Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 2 · Chapter 11
CHAP. XI.
Of transcendentall goodnesse, and of the infinitie of it in the divine nature.
I Professe I have no desire to oppose ought in this, or in the Chapter following; yet having begunne this worke of examination it is fit to consider these also, if it be but to take notice of what you deliver, and rightly to understand the meaning thereof.
They which fetch light beyond the Sunne, must bee content with Starre-light; and they which cannot satisfie themselves with day light, but seeke for starre-light, they are well enough served if they goe to bed darkling. Wee commonly say, Life is sweet, and it is a truth, not because it is a principall stemme of being, in my judgment, (for reason is a more principall stemme of being then it) and yet is life as sweet to creatures unreasonable, as to creatures reasonable. And you confesse that the appetite of preservation, of it selfe is naturall unto all; yet it cannot be denyed but that life is subject to soure things as well as sweet: whereupon some have said, Non est vivere sed valere vita. And foreign. Better eye out then alwais akeing; and better once dead then alwaies dying. Nay the hope of a better state, without all others consideration, may make this life of ours distastefull unto us, I desire to be dissolved, sayth S. Paule, and to be with Christ, I am not of your opinion, in your construction Phil. 1. 23.of the Maxime, Omne ens qua ens est bonum, as if the meaning were, that it is good it selfe, for that which is good, and that whereunto a thing is good, should be rather different then the same, for the termes of relation, must be distinct. Your instances, are very incongruous, you should say, that poyson is good to it selfe, not to the aspe, for the aspe is a different thing from his owne poyson, and so is the Adders stinge, from the Adder. And as sure I am that even of poyson, good use may be made for the service of man; And the Scorpion cures the wound, that is made by his owne sting: And even of the Adders sting, God the Creator of it, hath a good use evē in stinging, and the heathen Man in this kind observes the providence of God when he sayth:
foreign,
foreign.
If naturall qualities of contrary nature, doe fight for the maintenance of their owne being, it seemes being to them, Dionys. peri ego sive discriptio orbis.is as sweete, as life is to us, though life be a principall stemme of being. How transcendentall goodnes, should be equally communicated by God to all, and not equally participated, by all, I understand not: the contrary seemes true to my opinion, for as much as like as there can be no communication, where there is no participation, so there can be no equall communication, where there is no equall participation; And though a lesse vessell, may be as full as a greater, yet there is no equall communication of water unto them both, and the comparison is no way congruous, for as much as it is an easy thing, to distinguish betweene the water and the vessell, filled with it, but not so easy to distinguish betweene the thing, and the being of it. Rather thus. God doth sitt every thing with qualities, or parts according to the being thereof, or as it shall require, like as every vessell small and great are filled with water. The being of a fly, of a man, of every thing is good in it selfe, and as it may be, and is referred to the glory of God, for God made all things for himselfe.Prov. 16. 4
But in the things that God hath created, there are degrees of perfection, some creatures have onelyonly being, some being and life also, some adde sense unto them both, some have reason over and above them all. The degree of entitative goodnesse, cannot arise from the specificall nature of it, for so it should arise from it selfe, for the degree of entitative goodnesse in any thing and the specificall nature thereof is all one; Your other derivation of the degree of entitative goodnesse is as bad or worse, as when you derive it from the degree of their specificall nature: As if the specificall nature of a thing had degrees, which is untrue, as I remember; Aristotle compares specificall natures or formes of substances to numbers, that admit no intention or remission; three flyes are as truly three, as three Elephants.
The difference of individualls under the same species, is merely accidentall not essentiall; Thus, that one is not so happy as another, is an accidentall difference, not entitative or essentiall; It is true, sensitive appetites cannot be satisfied all at once, yet I have heard of a Ruffian Englishman, that in one night at Venico bestowed five hundred pounds, upon his five senses. It is not the fruition of goodnesse incident to one sense that defeates another for the time, of that it most desires, but rather want fruition thereof by your instances. For if the belly be satisfied, it is free to delight in musick also, if pinshed with hunger not so, yet too much feeding I confesse may bring a man asleepe, and make him unfit for taking any pleasure in the exercise, either of body or minde. On the other side deepe contemplation, as you say pines the body, and is occasion of farre worse accidents also sometimes; as in Archimedes whole plodding upon his Mathematicall operations, made him neglect the Souldiour that came upon him, and by neglect provoked him to set an immature and bloody end to all his studies, to the great greife of Marcellus the Generall, who had given chardge to the contrary. The gainving of Archimedes safe into his hāds, though by his art a most mischievous enemy to him, had been more worth, to an ingenuous Conquerour, then the taking of Syracusa. I have great cause to be sensible, of that of Solomons, of making many books there is no end, for I think if I should live Methusalehs yeares, yet I should not make an end. Much study is a wearinesse unto the fleshe, but by the goodnesse of God I find this wearinesse, with a litle refreshing quickly to vanish, and I returne unto it with as great vivacity of minde and Spirit, as ever I did before. I desire to doe the taske, which God hath appointed for me. And if death prevent me, yet it is good to dy doeing something. I should put it out of doubt that the more knowledge we get, the more is our reasonable desire of knowledge satisfied, yet it is true I confesse the more we encrease in knowledge, the greater is our immediate capacity of knowledge. For the more we know the better is our understanding and judgement, enabled to proceed in knowledge. And this capacity of ours will never be throughly satisfied, till the enjoying of God himselfe, yet I see not how the nature hereof hitherunto can be sayd to hinder the entire possession of our selves, whether contemplation be vaine or not vaine, whether it be used as a pledge of a better life to come or no, I see no reason why it hindreth or furthereth the possession of our selves, though it hinder or further our possessing of God.
Certainly that life to come is no part of our selves, like as eternall death is no part of the damned selves. But eternall life is a condition that God bestowes upon us, and everlasting death is a juste recompence, which God inflicts upon others. Yet in what sense contemplation may be used (as you say) as a pledge of a better life to come, I am to seeke. The Spirit of God and the fruits of sanctification, are the pledges and earnest penyes hereof, but contemplations are not; How Angells are sayd entirely to possesse their angelicall natures, and men not to possesse their natures entirely hath neede of explication. Angells have no bodies, and consequently are not capable of augmentation as we are. In this sense I conceave how we by degrees attaine to a fulnes of age, Angells doc not. There is a growth of our soules in knowledge also, Eph. 4. 13. in grace, 2 Pet. 3. last. This fulnesse of age is not all at once in us; you suppose it is so in Angels, but without distinction; for there are Angels of darknesse, as well as Angels of light. What thinke you of Angels of darknesse, doe they entirely possesse their Angelicall nature, or no? I should think they differ not in nature Angelicall, though their accidentall condition bee much different. As for the elect Angels, doe you thinke they doe already possesse all that may belong unto them, either in respect of knowledge or glory? It appeares Eph. 3. 10. that the verie Angels themselves doe encrease in knowledge, and that by the Church. It seemes also, that though they are void of sinne, and so void of sorrow, in respect of themselves, yet that all teares are not wiped from their eyes in respect of us; for if there bee joy in heaven for one sinner that repenteth, what is there in respect of the falls of Gods children? No question but the nature of man at best is inferiour to the nature of an Angell. And on the other side, as little question is to be made (I should thinke) whether man shall not be as happie in his kinde as the elect Angels in their kinde: in the 20. of Luke, our Saviour professeth, that the time shall come when we shall be foreign, like unto the Angells.
Gods infinity is nothing pertinent to the comparison of men and Angels, from whom Angels as well as men are infinitely distant, as the creature from the Creator; yet this infinity of Gods joy is vainly amplified, by saying, he wanteth no moment of time to enlarge or perfect it by continuance, whereas time is no measure suitable with the being of God, no nor with the being of Angels. Yet God hath continuance, it cannot be denied, both without beginning, and in respect of being, without end, which is an essentiall perfection of God, as much as any, as being but the interpretation of his necessary being, whereas all the being of a creature is meerly by the free will of God, and yet continuance to the creature addes no perfection. For will you say that the Angells and Saints of God in heaven doe grow more and more perfect by continuance. In this world for a while we grow more and more perfect by continuance. But then againe it is as true, that by continuance we decay more and more both in body and minde.
Aristotle hath said, that Bonum non ideo melius quia diuturnius. But of the transcendentall goodnesse of God (you say) you now intreat not, but of the transcendentall goodnesse of the creature, which you make to consist in doing good to others: and withall you deliver another maxime, namely, that amongst visible creatures, the better every one is in its kinde, or according to its entitative perfection, the more good it doth to others. And I confesse this latter stands in much congruity with the former. But I have already shewed my dislike of the former, and given reason for it, and I see no reason to embrace the latter. A Lyon is the king of beasts, but of more good hee doth to others, then the inferiour beasts whereon he preyeth, I am nothing conscious. An Eagle is the king of birds, yet we commonly say, that a Larke is better then a Kite. What creature more profitable then the Sunne, yet I pray consider, doth not a Mouse, or an Emmet, or a Fly, in entitative perfection go beyond it? for these are animate, the Sun is not, though God sends him forth as his most conspicuous and goodly messenger every morning like a bridegroom bedeckt with light & comelines, as you are pleased to expatiate or take the aire, & breath your self in a rhetoricall flourish. God himselfe to the contemplation of whom the Sunne you say doth invite us, though from the boundlesse Ocean of his internall joy and happinesse (as you say) sweet streames of perpetuall joy and comfort more uncessantly issue, then light from the Sunne, to refresh this vale of misery. Yet I hope you will not say, his entitative goodnes consists in doing good to others.
For before he made the world, he was no lesse good, then since the creation; and though he had never made it, yet had he continued every way as good as now he is. And in that dispensation of this his goodnesse, which proceeds not from his joy and happinesse, though you say so, but from the counsell and freedome of his will; though as touching the comforts of this life, God maketh his raine to fall, and Sun to shine as well upon the wicked as upon the righteous; yet as touching the dispensation of his grace, though he be most good, that way also, yet it is but towards whom he will; for that Oracle of God, I will have mercy on whom I will; and againe, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth, must sway more with us, then any vaine conceit or imagination of man to the contrary. And why doe you call this world a vale of misery? is it not in respect of Gods jugements, as well as in respect of sinne? which judgements of God have their course as well as mercies, how then doth perpetuall joy and comfort more uncessantly issue from him, then light from the Sunne, to refresh this vale of misery? Surely as the Prophet said, his song should bee of mercy and of judgement: so doth God also sometimes mourne unto us, that we may weepe, as well as at other times draw us to dance after his pipe.
You conclude with telling us the causes why men are not so happy as they might be. The one is, you say, That they doe not beleeve the eternall happinesse of their Creator to bee absolutely infinite, as his other attributes are. The other, That they doe not consider that the absolute infinitie of this his eternall happinesse, is an essentiall cause of goodnesse unto all others, so farre as they are capable of it. As for the first of these, what Heathen Philosopher, that acknowledged the making of the world, that acknowledged a God, did ever doubt of his eternall happinesse, and that as infinite as any other of his attributes. As touching the other, doth not Callimachus acknowledge as much, when he saith, foreign? Doth not Aristotle acknowledge felicity to be from God; and did this make them as happy as they might be? It is true indeed, their goodnesse they conceived to be from themselves.
Det vitam det opes, animum mihi ipse parabo.
And doe not you I pray concurre with them in this, even in this place? For although you carry it in generall termes, when you say, he is the cause of all goodnesse, yet by that which followeth it is manifest that you limit this unto the happy condition that followeth man upon his goodnesse; as when you say, God is a cause of goodnesse to all that are capable of it, and capable of it all reasonable creatures by creation are, none but themselves can make them uncapable of happinesse. And where is any mention of Christ Iesus in all this? where any mention of the grace of God for the performing of this, which you make sufficient to bring them unto happinesse? It is true, God cannot be the author of evil of sin, but God forbid that we should so maintaine God to be no Author of evill, as withall to deny him to be the author of good.
Speake plainly, doe you beleeve that God is the author of faith, that God it is who gives repentance, that workes in us both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure? if you beleeve this, then you must beleeve that God did decree to give men faith and repentance. But this is contrary to the articles of your Creed, who professe that God doth decree contingency, but not things contingent. And who doubts but the faith of Peter, and his repentance, the faith of Paul and his repentance, were contingents? and if God did never decree them, surely he was not the author of them; for God doth nothing in time, but what he decreed to doe before all time.
And in case you did truly acknowledge God to bee the cause of all goodnesse, we would not quarrell with you about the terme essentiall, which with what learning you deliver, I professe I know not; but I observe you are very liberall of your words and phrases; we were never acquainted with any more then foure causes, can you tell us which of them is called by any essentiall, unlesse matter and forme be called essentiall, because they constitute the essence of that, whose matter and forme they are. But I hope you will not say that God, in this sense, is the essentiall cause of all our goodnesse.