Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 2 · Chapter 12
CHAP. XII.
Of the infinity and immutability of divine goodnesse, or as it is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the creature.
I doe not like this Title, the disjunctive argueth, that Gods goodnesse communicative as communicative, is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the creature, I know no patterne of morall goodnesse, which we must imitate, but that which is commended unto us in Gods Law, Gods communicative goodnesse was exercised in making of the World, and us; Is this a fitt patterne for us to imitate? As touching his providence, whereby he governs the World, we are called by our Saviour, to imitate him in some particulars, as when he suffereth his rayne to fall, and Sunne to shine on the bad, as well as on the good.
But in most particulars we can not, in many we may not imitate him; He caused two shee beares to come out of the wood, and teare 42. children that mocked Elisha, we must not 2. King. …. Matth. 5.imitate God in the like, we must still blesse them that curse us, and pray for them, that persecute us.
The sense of imbecillity and indigence in our selves, even in this corrupt state of man, doth only provoke us the more, to shewe pitty unto others, in the time of their calamity according to that of Q. D…do, Non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco: But it doth not breede it, for it is manifest that men litle exercised with the Crosse, or not at all, may shewe more mercy, then such as have beene in great misery themselves. Yet these mercifull natures having tasted of misery themselvs, will be the more provoked to shew compassion unto men in misery.
2. And this is true, not onelyonly in the corrupt state of man, but even in the state of integrity, for is it not sayd of our Saviour, Heb. 2. 18.that being tempted himselfe, he knew how to succour them, that are tempted? It is now a dayes without question, among divines, that mercy and pitty as they signify passions are not in God, but attributed unto him, per foreign as are the members of our body also. But the will of Psal. 107. 9. Math. 10. 20.succouring creatures in their necessity, may with propriety enough be attributed unto God, for he heareth the cry of Ravens when they call upon him, and not a sparrowe falleth to the ground, without the providence of our heavenly Father, how much more, is his love enlarged towards man, who when they were sinners, sent his Sonne to dy for them, and when they lay weltring in their blood, sayd unto them, live, And washed them with water, yea washed away their blood from Ezek. 16. 6. 9.them, and anoynted them with oyle: Thus God hath a will to succour man in misery, and this will, and grace, and favour of God is in Scripture phrase, called mercy. But he sheweth this mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, I wonder Rom. 9.you should applaud that saying; Nemo sponte malus, which hath no colour of truth; Save in respect of originall sinne, traduced to Adams posterity of which originall sinne, the Author of that saying was utterly ignorant; And you in another sense treading the authors stepps, seeme to mainteyne it, not in respect of any naturall corruption that hath sowred our natures, but in respect, rather of the perfection of our soules, and their native inclination unto good, for externall things, you say, doe so captivate the humane soule, that she cannot doe, as she would, but these strings, being cut, she followeth her native sway: And hereupon you come in with the approbation of this, Nemo sponte malus, manifesting thereby, that you acknowledge the native sway of the soule to be unto good.
But by the way you cast your selfe upon an erroneous assertion, convictable of untruth, by the very light of nature; as when you say, that externall things doe captivate the soule; as if the object had power to the will, which is a conceipte contrary to all Philosophy and Divinity. And nothing indeed, but a mans owne corruption is it that captivates him unto evill. For let Ioseph be tempted with a wanton Mistris, yet if lust be mortified within him, her wanton invitation, shall never captivate Ioseph. No nor the ladyes admitted to his presence, could inflame Scipio Adricanus, though a man of warre, with a lustfull appetit. Shewe a Lyon grasse he is nothing affected with it sayth Decumenius, because it is not Decum. upon the parable of the sower that went forth to sow. I am. 1. 14. 2 Tim. 2. last.the dyet of a Lyon, but of an Oxe; Shew an Oxe flesh, he hath no appetite unto it, for fleshe is no diet for an Oxe, but for a Lyon rather; every man is tempted, (sayth S. Iames) when he is drawne away by his owne concupiscence and entised. And by working upon this concupiscence, it is that the Divell leades men captive, to doe his will, no such matter could he finde in our Saviour.
And so much some conceaved to be signified, when he sayth: The Prince of the World commeth and sindes nought in me: Ioh. 14. 30Yet cannot the Divell certainly prevaile to every particular, nor to any particular, so as to justifie, that man doth not that evill which he doth sponte; for even beasts doe sponte whatsoever they doe, and man even the worst of men doth not onelyonly of his owne accord, that which he doth but voluntarily also, yea and freely too; And yet the Divell is none of those externall things you speake of, with farre more colour of reason did they proceed, who mainteyned, that looke what mē did of passion, they did not voluntarily, fetching the restraynt of doeing voluntarily, not from things externall, but internall rather even from the passion themselves, but even this also is learnedly confuted by Aristotle long agoe.Eth. 3.
3. We must with patience expect and wait, till you come to your text, and intreat of the theame proposed, to wit of the infinity and immutability, of divine goodnesse communicative. The first sentence is not well stated; for Sarah was old stricken in age, and it ceased to be with her after the manner of Women, when hearing from the Lord, something concerning the conceaving of a child by her, she sayd; After I am waxed old, and my Gen. 18. …2Lord also, shall I have lust? Lust, certeynly may be in old age and not a sinne, lust is one thing, inordinate lust is another thing, and where lust is, why should it seeme a Monster, in corrupte nature, for that lust to be inordinate? And if a proud man be brought to a beggars condition, why should it seeme monstrous, if his morall condition be not altered, but he continue as proud as ever? As Plato discerned a proud heart, thorough Antisthenes patcht coate; And Diogenes might be as proud of his tubbe, as Alexander of his Crowne; And a man may be as proud of carying a cloake bagge beh…nde him, as Cardinall Camprins, was of his sumpter horse, that followed after him; for pride though it be more hatefull in one then in another, as the wiseman speaks, yet it disdeyns no condition, but accepteth entertainment in every breast; how much more in the breasts of Kings, and such may be found even amongst the wandring planets on earth, otherwise called Roagues, and beggars. Certeynly men of a shifting disposition, if they have gotten wealth thereby, it is nothing strange if they continue their trade still, considering that Crescit amor nummi quantum ipsa pecunia crescit: especially if they have prospered well by it. And yet I confesse, men sometimes give over their former trades, as horse leaches leave sucking, when their bodyes are full; but I doe not think, they can so easely, leave off their manners, neither doe temptations, begett any sinnes, but rather provoke our corruptions, to actuate themselvs; as a mans corrupted will and affection, to actuate it selfe, and bring forth actuall sinne.
And as the Apostle sayth, Sinne not only provoked by temptation, Rom. 7. 9▪but even taking occasion by the Commandement, doth bring forth in us all manner of concupiscences. It seemes you are a very morall man your selfe, that are so well perswaded of others▪ but in the meane time, you are little thankfull unto Gods grace; For this your morality, when you ascribe it to a generall inclination of nature, belike you are loath to be beholding to Gods grace; for the morality of your nature, I wonder the lesse at the prodigious blindnesse of your minde, mainteyning that he, who hates his brother, desires, to deserve well of him, whereas S. Iohn sayth, that he, who hateth his brother, is a manslayer, that the avaritious person, desires to be liberall, and the … Iohn. 3.Hypocrite, desires to be upright, and the unmercifull to be compassionate, the Extortioner or robber to be just, and the Niggard to be bountifull, which is as much as to say, that the hotte fire, desires to be cold as earth, and the cold earth desires to be as hote as fire.
Why doe you not proceed in expressing the good opinion you have of a naturall man, even of the worst of men, and say that they have a desire to repent, to please God, to be holy, to be religious? Continuance in sinne was wont to bee called altera natura, and secunda natura; and the Prophet justifieth it, where hee saith, Can a blacke Moore change his skinne, or a Ier. 13. 23.Leopard his spots? then may ye also doe good, that are accustomed unto evill. The sight of Gods judgements causing feare, may restrain from evill, like as an hedge of thornes, crossing a mans Hos. 2. 6.way, may hinder him from finding his paths: But as for impulsions unto goodnesse, in a man abandoned unto his lusts, and who, as the Apostle speakes, commits sinne with greedinesse, Eph. 4▪ …8.and is growne to foreign, I know none. And Seneca seemes to be your onelyonly Oracle for this; a proper master for a Christian Divine to rely upon. And yet upon the scanning, Seneca alledged by you in this place, I finde pleades against you, rather then for you, as who plainly professeth, that They who erre in matters of life and manners, are delighted with their errours; every criminall person is delighted with his crime, one sola…th himselfe in adultery, another delights in over-reaching others, and in theft. He saith, that naughtinesse is afraid of darknesse it selfe, which may restraine from evill, I confesse, but this gives no evidence of any impulsion unto goodnesse, no more then his last conclusion, that naughtinesse may be safe, but never secure. Which conclusion seves you for a passage to the next Section.
4. It is very true, an evill conscience will not suffer a man to be secure; for if a good conscience be a continuall feast, surely Prov. 15. 15▪an evill conscience holds a man continually upon the racke. Occultum quatiente animo tortore slagellum. The wicked slye when no man pursueth him, saith Solomon; and, There is no peace, saith Esa. 48▪ 22▪the Lord, to the wicked. It was one of the Iudgements God threatned to his owne people, when they persisted in their obstinate courses against him; namely, that the sound of a leafe Levit. 26. 36.should chase them, and they should flie, no man pursuing them: but this is no evidence of any impulsion unto goodnesse. And when Seneca saith, Even in mindes drencht in the dregs of filthinesse, there remaines still a sense of goodnesse: this is no more then that which the Apostle informeth us of, when he saith, they have a conscience accusing them, by vertue of that law that is Rom. 2.written in their hearts: yet the Apostle doth not extend this to them that are drencht in the dregs of filthinesse. Hee acknowledgeth elsewhere, that some through the course of sinne become past all feeling, and have their conscience seared with an hot iron. And it is a proverbiall speech in the world, Nemo senex metuit Iovem. Yet it is one thing to have a sense of goodnesse by the conviction of their conscience, & a farre Eph. 4. 18. 1 Tim. 4.different thing to have an impulsion unto goodnesse.
Be it that the minde of man in that it is indued with reason, hath the rules of equity imprinted in it, is it not as true, that the rules of iniquitie are imprinted in it also? doth he not know evill as wel as good? Nay, hath he not more knowledg of evil then of good, at least as touching the compassing of it? doth not the Lord complaine of this, where he saith, They are wise to doe evill, but as touching good they have no understanding. If Yer. 4. 22.this were so amongst men brought up in the Church of God, what was the condition of those that were aliens from the common Eph. 2. 12.wealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise? especially considering what d…fference the Apostle puts betweene these, when he saith, We Iewes by nature, not sinners of Gal. 2. 15.the Gentiles.
And therefore if it belongs to the mind to seek to instamp her rules upon inferiour faculties, she shall be as forward to stamp rules of iniquity, as rules of equity. And with what congruity I pray you may rules of equity be said to bee stamped upon faculties, that are not intellectuall? appetites are guided by rules, in their motions, not instamped with them. Rules of knowledge are circumstant to appetites of doing, not inherent in them. And why should not these rules of equity be stamped on the will, as well as on sensuall appetites? or if it be so, why should you reckon the will an inferiour facultie in comparison to the minde? whereas indeed the will rules in man as king, the minde is but his privie Councellor.
To quash an exception that might arise against your tenet touching the integrity of nature, as thus, If the minde have such good rules, and withall seekes to instamp them upon inferiour faculties, how comes it to passe that there is so little love of vertue in many? your answer is, that this proceeds from their disposition, being over-growne with sensuall desires. But by your leave this is a weake reason, for it onelyonly transfers the difficultie, but answers not the doubt; for still I may demand, how it came to passe that these rules of equity did not prevent the growth of these sensuall desires, and without grace what place is left for any goodnesse in the nature of man? Philosophers had a love of vertue, but can you shew they had any love of God? their most vertuous actions in the state of nature, was not Austin bold to call them splendida peccata, Aug. contra Iul. P… lag lib. 4. c. 3.glorious sinnes? For the discerning of true vertue aright he gives us this rule, Noveris non officiis, sed finibus discernendas esse virtutes. I am sure they were not ordered by Gods word, nor referred to his glory, nor proceeded from acknowledgement that all power of doing good was from God, yet they looked for justification by them: and as for repentance and confession of sinnes, they make that no part of their integritie. So that whether their knowledge were in a mist, or out of a mist, it brought them never a whit the nearer unto God: as the Sunne, whether in a mist or out of a mist, was never knowne to set moist stuffe on fire, but …st dries it, then fires it. And our Saviour was bold to professe, that Publicanes and Mat. 21. 31Harlots…ntred into the kingdome of heaven before Scribes and Pharises.
If the notions of the minde be ideall characters, you may, if it please you, bestow the phrase as well on notions of evill, as notions of good; and if the good have so slippery an impression upon the unse…led affection of youth, it seemes the bad are more permanent; yet these naturall notions of good are farre distant from true notions of God, or of true goodnesse; A heart hardned with vast desires, you say, … hardly cured; but I pray tell me, when one man transgresser… for an handfull of barly, or a morsell of bread, another saith, Si violandum Ezek. 13. 19.est jus impij causa violandum est, which of these is the greater hardnesse? yet as a stone by losing somewhat of his substance may take another shape, so you signifie the hardest heart may be wrought into a new frame. I confesse, to make a Camell Marke 10. 25. Gal. 1. 11.goe through the eye of a needle, is not impossible unto God: and what naturall man hath not a body of sinnes to be cut off by spirituall circumcision? but that this you make to bee a worke of grace, you give not the least intimation: nay you rather imply the contrary, when you say, that if hopes of supplies from internals bee intercepted, a worke that may bee done by course of nature, then you say, the soule thus freed, becomes more fashionable to reason; a saying that would become Seneca well, that knew no reason but naturall; but full ill becomming a Christian Divine: let desire be never so vast, as you speake, let seven devils possesse a man, yet the strong man Christ, by the power of his grace is able to cast them out, and make even Ekron become as the Iebusite.
Without grace, will any mans morality commend him in the sight of God? As Lebanon is turned into Carmell, so Zach. 9. 7.Carmell becomes as the high places of the forest. And most morall men have beene as great enemies to Christianity, as any other; like as the Scribes and Pharises were greatest enemies unto Christ. Why you should call that a superficiall draught of reason, that endeavoureth to stampe the heart with reall and solid kindnesse. I know no reason; this in my judgement deserves to be accompted a substantiall operation. And when you tell me that Affability consists in this, you goe about to teach me more then ever I learned out of Aristotle. I had thought affability might have place in all men, as a morall vertue, whether they were enabled to stampe the heart with reall and solid kindnesse yea or no. This affability you grant to Epicures, but not temperance; yet Epicurus, if my reading deceive me not, was knowne to bee as temperate a man in moderating his appetite, as most that then lived. And that because he made mans happinesse to consist in pleasure, the sense whereof was quickned by temperance, and dulled by intemperance. And therefore little cause there is to charge him with uncharitablenesse to his neighbours or brethren, either in time of plenty, or time of scarcitie. You doe him the greater wrong, to charge him, with sucking in cruelty as wine, and feeding upon the needy as upon delicates: neither will your good phrases make him amends in words for the wrong you doe him in deeds; as for cutting morsels out of other mens throats; this is a phrase incongruous for an intemperate mans diet: is fitter for a superstitious Papist, that in case the Priest should vomit the hoast, thinkes the people bound to lick… it up.
The close of this ninth Section complies with the beginning of the first; betweene which, what suitable matter hath occurred, let the Reader judge. Though indigence be the mother of cruelty, yet herehence it followeth not, that it is not the mother of pitty, for, Rara est concordia fratrum: Cleocles and Polynicas both had one mother, yet there is a great difference in indigence, as the cause of these. Indigence heretofore suffered, is made the cause of pitty; but indigence in present alone, is the cause of cruelty, and that onelyonly in case it cannot be relieved but by cruelty.
5 Philosopher-like, or rather meere naturalist-like, you make errour of judgement the root of all evill: as the cause of covetousnesse you make to be the opinion of want, either that is for the present, or may be for the time to come. How farre are you different from Aquinas, who maintaines, that our wills are more corrupt, quoad appetitum boni, then our mindes, quoad intellectum veri: yet the Poet seems to have had another conscience in that of his, Video moliora proboque deteriorasequor. Saint Paul, I thinke, was a man regenerate when he made that profession, I see a law in my members rebelling against Rom. 7.the law of my minde, and leading me captive to the law of sinne. It is true, there are bosome sinnes (as wee call them) like familiar spirits to particular men, and so they may be dispensed withall in these, they will shew themselves very morrall in other points, and thinke it reason God should be mercifull unto them in breaking one commandment, so they keepe the other nine. Herod heard Iohn Baptist gladly, untill hee toucht upon the keeping of his brother Phillips wife. Iudas was content to follow Christ, so he might b…are the bagge, and so long as hee could make best wages by his service; but thirty pieces of silver mooved him to give his master the bagge, and to betray him. A man for judgement able to arbitrate and voide of exorbitant affections, which might expose him to partialitie or prejudice, no doubt is the fittest arbitratour. But if you aske me whereto this running discourse tends, I cannot answer you yet, it may bee you may answer your selfe hereafter. Internall moderation mixt with outward competency, is the onelyonly supporter of true constancy. I had thought, integritie had made a man fit for arbitrament, not constancy, for constancy may be in courses unjust as well as just; I presume, it proceeds from constant integrity, That content is little commendable that depends upon sufficiencie of estate, not onelyonly competent, but more then competent. And to my thinking, even in the course of naturall morality, a vertuous condition should not depend upon outward things; the exercise of vertue doth, I confesse, but not vertue it selfe. Bias his saying was, Omnia meo mecum porto: but wee are taught of a better Master, that, Godlinesse is great gaine with contentment, 1. Tim. 6. 6.and that the righteous cateth to the contentation of his minde, which is delivered without distinction of poore or rich, like as that which followeth, The belly of the wicked shall want: And that, a dinner of greene herbs, and love with it, is better Prov. 13. 25 Prov. 15. 17then a stalled oxe with hatred and strife. The meanest Christian hath the love of God with him, who answereth to the joy of his heart; and the most glorious King that ever was, professeth that, A good conscience is a continuall feast; and David the father. Pro. 15. 15a great conquerour, found no blessednesse in any temporall state, but in that which was incident to the meanest of his subjects, saying, Blessed is the man whose iniquitie is forgiven, and whose sinne is covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Psal. 32. 1.Lord imputeth no sinne, and in whose spirit there is no guile. The truth is, if our pretences depend upon outward things, they shall bee as fraile as those are mutable; and who can give strength to resist the temptations of Satan but God? As there is no being but from God, so no permanence of being but from God: & till the time of temptation a man is not known; let the raine fall, and the flouds rise, and the winde beat upon the house, then it will appeare whether it were built upon the rock, or upon the sand. Wee know the Angells fell, wee know Adam fell; and how vaine a thing is it to discourse of any naturall permanency in vertuous courses amongst naturall men that knew not God. By the way, your phrase of satisfying capacities is incongruous; of satisfying desires wee usually heare, but of satisfying capacities I never read of but in your discourse. You proceed to discourse unto us of another roote of unconstancy, which you call contingency, which is a terme of art with you and your peculiar dialect: this roote you will have to be, the infinite capacitie of reasonable creatures, conceites or desires, within whose compasse their finite motions may become eccentricke and irregular, as it were a starre fixed in too wide a sphere. And this applyed to the fall of Angels, in whom wee finde a double change or alteration; the one morall, to wit, a change from the state of integrity wherein they were created, into the state of sinne; the second naturall, to wit, a change from a blessed state, into a wretched and damned condition; the first change was their owne worke, as wherein they sinned; the second, the worke of God whereby they were punished. Their inconstancie in not standing upright, but falling into sinne, is onelyonly pertinent to the present purpose, and to enquire after the root of this, is to enquire after the cause of their fall. Now the cause hereof, as it is plaine, so if we please, we may as plainly expresse it; for, as for their possibility to fall, that rose from the condition of their natures, being made by God free agents, and so accordingly, a law being given them by God, they might freely obey it, freely disobey it: what need wee straine our wits for obscure expression of so plaine a truth, as by referring it to the infinite capacitie of their conceits or desires, within whose compasse, their finite motions may become eccentricke and irregular? What need we affect such perturbation of speech, in confounding conceits with desires, and placing finite motions within the compasse of desires, infinitely capacious; which motions undoubtedly were their desires (for they sinned questionlesse in desiring somewhat) and comparing desires to spheres, and againe, desires to starres fixed in spheres, that so the sinne of Angels may be sinely phrasified, and called an excentrical motion; thus in catching after a phrase, you obscure the sense of a sentence, which when all is well scanned, is but this, the root of the Angels fall was this, that he might commit an irregular motion, which might have beene done, although the capacity of his desire had not beene infinite, that is, though he had not affected the greatnesse of the divine Majesty; for this I take to be the meaning, and yet this meaning is little congruous. For this infinite capacity you compare to a sphere too wide, and the finite motion you compare to a starre fixed in this sphere, and to it you ascribe the irregular motion, not to the sphere, and that very incongruously too; for the finite motion of Angels you speake of, was their very sinne; but the starre sixed in his sphere, is not his irregular motion. If ever Divinity and Philosophy have beene frayed out of their wits, by any mans discourse, it is your discourse that hath done this deed. You suppose the sinne of Angels consisted in affecting Majestie infinite, whereof, you say, he was more uncapable, then a whirrie of an Arposies saile. But how I pray you could such a thing be affected, without errour of judgement? And was it possible that errour, and so Foule an errour of judgement could be in an Angell before his fall? Should not so poena be prior culpa? Hereupon it is that Scotus maintaines, there could be no affecting of any such thing, but onelyonly complacentia simplex therein, not that he did affect it, well knowing it to bee a thing impossible. For my part, I doe as little like that simplex complacentia he speakes of.
No wise man (in this state of our corruption) will please himselfe, in conceiting himselfe to be a King, much lesse to be a God, but reckons of such fancies as most vaine and frivolous: let us leave unto Clownes such conceits, O if I were a King I would live like a Lord, I would eate fat beese, and glorry porridge, and have a whip should cry slash. Dic mihi si sieres tu Leo qualis eris. And what devise you should move all the rest of the mutineers to concurre with him in so unreasonable an affectation? Doe you thinke the chiefe called in Scripture the Devill, did sinne in one thing, to wit, in affecting majestie insinite, and the rest, called his Angels, in another thing, to wit, in standing with him, and standing for him? I should rather thinke their sin was one and the same: And I make no doubt but their sinne was pride. Sure I am, they were not subject to concupiscence of the flesh, or concupiscence of the eye, but to pride, spirits may bee subject as well as men. But wherein this pride manifested it selfe, that is a great mystery; but if they did affect divine Majestie, I should thinke it was in a way whereby they were capable of it: and this is now revealed to be by hypostatizing. And there is no question but that God could hypostatize an Angell, and as many as he would, as well as man. But I doe not say that they did affect it; I have no ground to conceive that any such thing entred into their thoughts. But as God tooke a course to put Adam and Eve to the triall of their obedience, so it is very likely God had a course to put the Angels to the trial of their obedience, which became a scandall to many of them, through pride and disdaine to be in subjection, not that they disdained to be in subjection unto God, but more likely to some inferiour nature, which was to be advanced to the throne of God. For as God made this visible world for the service of man, so God might withal reveale unto them what his purpose was, namely, to advance the nature of man unto his owne throne, so that all the Angels of God must worship him: Th…s I say might bee the rocke of offence to them, of any more fit then this, I cannot conceive.
As touching the roofe of mans unconstancy, you are nothing so curious, as about the Angels. But that curiosity of yours tended not to the discovering of any depth of truth, but meerly to the involving of a plaine truth, by most wilde expressions. The bitter fruit of Adams prevarication we all feele in a generall impotency unto that which is truly good, or to resist temptation unto sinne in a gracious manner. But yet I see no reason but a man may resist many a temptation, without grace, but not in a gracious manner. For what thinke you? is it necessary that as often as the Devill tempts a man to incontinency, to murther, to theft, he should as often yeeld to the committing of any of these? It is apparent that many naturall considerations may restraine us: but in a gracious manner, that is, in such a manner as is acceptable unto God, no man can resist any temptation unto sinne, without grace.
That maxime, Mora facilius moventur, hath no proportion in the case whereto you apply it, for it proceeds of the same individuals, such as Adam and his children are not; yet by Adams yeelding unto sinne, through Satans temptation, all his posterity are made more prone to sinne, then any man in particular is made by the committing of any sinfull act. For a sinfull or vicious act, in ordinary course, hath no more power to habituate a mans inclination unto evill, then a vertuous action hath unto good: but farre greater is mans pronenesse unto sinne, since and through the fall of Adam, then by any vertuous action is our pronenesse unto good.
Touching your close, I say, to seeke our owne welfare with anothers harme, is not to seeke that which is good and right; yet in some cases another mans harme may be sought, without any transgression. For undoubtedly the Iudge sinneth not in pronouncing the just sentence of condemnation upon a malefactor: no nor the Israelites neither, in robbing the Aegyptians; nor Abraham, in going about to cut the throat of his owne innocent childe Isaac.
6. In the next place you discourse of the improvement of the force of temptations, which you say is wrought by inequality, partly of our naturall propensions, partly of the meanes which minister their severall contentments or annoyances. Herein you propose a distinction, but I doe not finde you very carefull to follow it, and make it appeare how you accommodate your selfe thereto. Great meanes of annoyances are apt to breed great feares, and feare is a strong passion hindering the course of reason, and of morall duty, according unto reason.
Peters confession of Christ at the very time when, and in the place where Christ was in his enemies hands that sought his death, might have hazarded his life; and the consideration hereof, being suddenly put unto it, either to confesse him or deny him, surprized him with feare; this feare exposed him to deny his master. Sir Gervas Elvas moved to give way to the poysoning of Sir Thomas Overbury, saw manifestly, that his refusall would have beene an occasion to bereave him of his Lieutenancy of the Tower, which he had bought with a great summe of money. This temptation prevailed with him: wee commonly say, The greater is the temptation, the lesse is the sin. So where small meanes of contentments are, the greater is the temptation to discontent, and to tast of the bitter fruits thereof. But I doe not finde that the particular instances following, doe any way savour of this member of your distinction. You seeme to keepe your selfe wholly to the prosecuting of inequality of naturall propensions; yet not that neither with such congruity as might justly be expected. For first you prosecute the inequality of wealth and wit: Wit is a naturall faculty, I confesse, I never heard it called a naturall propension till now. But as for wealth, it is neither propension, nor faculty naturall, nor at all naturall. It is true, I confesse, that some mens wealth gets the start of wit, as he observed, that in a great audience sometimes said unto his auditors, When I behold your wealth, I wonder at your wit; againe, when I behold your wit, I wonder at your wealth. I confesse willingly, that to abound in wealth, is to abound in temptations unto sinne; that fulnesse of bread is reckoned among the sins of Sodome, Ezek. 16. Deut. 32.that when Jeshurun waxed fat, he spurned with the heele. But the temptations herehence arising, prevaile onelyonly on them that want wit, is an observation I have not beene acquainted with before, neither am prone to beleeve it. I never read this laid to the charge of Sardanapalus of the Assyrians, or of Xerxes, who (as I remember) it was that proposed a reward to him that could invent a new pleasure; nor to Heliogabalus; among the Romane Emperours Nero was luxurious enough, I never heard it proceeded from want of wit, for the first quinquennium of his reigne hee manifested himselfe to bee no foole: Hercules servivit Omphale, was it for want of wit? That the Merchants sonne of whom it is reported, that in one night at Venice he spent sive hundred pounds upon his five senses, had his honesty beene answerable to his wit, he had kept his reputation with the best. And the Gentleman of the house of the Vaineys, that in most luxurious manner wasted his estate and afterwards turned Turke, I never heard defamed for want of wit. Yet we commonly say, many men have good wits, but they are in fooles keeping. And indeed a foole in Solomons computation doth usually stand for a knave. And it is most true, that such are most unwise, as appeares by the issue; for by such courses they shorten their dayes, and send themselves with precipitation unto their graves, there to grow greene before their heads bee gray; and after they are gone, their remembrance rots, and they leave a very ill savour behinde them.
But I should thinke, that dull fellowes are neither so inventious of mad courses, nor of so active spirits to prosecute them, as those whom God hath endued with better parts of understanding. I grant men of great wits have not alwaies revenues answerable: But I should thinke it is their pride, rather then their wit, that instigates them to injurious courses. For when men cannot subject their minds unto their fortunes but labour to carve unto themselves fortunes answerable to their mindes, this must needs expose them to lewd courses. Yet a good wit, I confesse, to maintaine a bad cause, may animate some more to molest and vexe, and it is not the greatnes of revenues will free them from such exorbitant courses. Though mens bodies overgrow their soules, yet if they have not a spirit answerable, they will prove but lubbers, though great lubbers, as great as Gog-Magog, whom Corineus met withall at Dover, when that great lubber like a timber log came tumbling topsie turvie, over and over. And it is a common saying, that a short man needs not a stoole to give a great lubber a box in the eare: though he that is weake had neede to be witty, yet it is not alwaies true, or for the most part, that weake persons are wily: and where wilinesse is found, it is a temptation strong enough without weaknesse, to move men to practise unlawfull policy, where grace is wanting. But to say that wilinesse shelters it selfe with craft, is as much as to say, it shelters it selfe with it selfe; and if the distinction be put betweene the disposition of wilinesse that is within, and wily crafty courses without, well, something else, to wit, mens private reaches and ends may be said to be sheltred hereby, yet wilines cannot. For like as wisdome is not sheltered, but rather discovered & laid open by wise courses, & folly by foolish courses, so also wilines & craftines, by wily and crafty courses. I see no reason to justifie that saying, men love their wits more strongly, when they perceive them set upon that which in it selfe is good. And I give a reason for my negation, though you give none for your affirmation; for the more convenient the object is unto the appetite, the more strongly doth the appetite affect it; and the more convenient things are unto us, the more wee love our selves for affecting them. Now it is manifest that luxurious objects are more convenient to a luxurious appetite, then objects temperate; and avaritious courses more convenient to the appetite of an avaricious person, then courses of liberality; and generally to all men in the state of corruption, the pleasures of sinne are more gratefull then the pleasure of righteous courses. Nay, a man regenerate may for good reason seeme not to be so strongly caried in his affections unto good, as the wicked are in their affections unto evill; my reason is, because in the regenerate there dwels a flesh lusting against the Gal. 5. 23.spirit, which remits and qualifies the fervour of his affection unto good: whereas on the contrary, in the wicked there is found no spirit lusting against the flesh, to remit or qualifie the fervour or fury, rather of their affection unto evill; especially when they are fitted with most convenient objects to allure them.
Againe, to doe good to the poore, is not good in it selfe (as you suppose,) we were wont to say in the Vniversity, that Omnis actio est bona aut mala propter circumstantias; and as I remember, it was a saying of Bernard, that vaine-glory clotheth the poore as well as charity. And how can that bee a good will to the poore, that practiseth to coosen others for the gratifying of the poore? …o may hee be said to beare a good will to Paul, that robbeth Peter to pay Paul; yet that which hee will leth is good to Paul, I confesse, but it is no good will to him that is such a pay master; neither is it necessary it should proceed from any intention to satisfie Paul; it may well proceed from other intentions. No man is bound in conscience to hinder any mans welfare, or his owne either, no nor the glory of God by ungodly courses; no nor doth the obligation rest in generall, but it concludes in speciall, all good courses that lie in his power: so to tender it, a man is bound and not otherwise. You have discoursed of divers enormities, in the close you open the cause of them unto us, and of many other like and that you say is the infinite capacity of finite existence: this you say is the cause, not why such enormities are, but of the possibility of them. Now the possibility of such enormities is all one with the possibility of sin and transgression. Therefore the infinite capacitie of finite existence is the cause why sinne is possible. I thought it had beene satisfaction enough in this point, to conceive, that because wee are in subjection to a Lord, who can give us a law, and are free agents, therefore we may either obey a law given unto us, or transgresse it. And because, looke what is the cause why disobedience is possible, the same is the cause why obedience also is possible. It followeth, that the cause why obedience is possible, must be the infinite capacity of finite existence. And because by finite existence you meane a reasonable creature, your meaning a little more plaine is this, The reason why a man may sinne, or abstaine from sinne, is his infinite capacity. Wee say, it is the libertie of his will, being in subjection to a law which you cannot deny, nor any sober man: herehence it followeth, that this infinite capacitie you cant of, is but the libertie of mans will in subjection to the law of a superiour Lord. For man being free, may overcope, as you speake, that is, to expresse in a small and still voice, without thundring, or fire, or mightie winde, to doe that which he should not. And thus having attained to your plaine meaning, wee bid farewell to your mysticall expressions of so plaine a truth, by comparing this infinite capacity you speake of, to too wide a sphere, and finite motions, to a slarro fixed in that sphere, and thereby exposed to excentricall and irregular motions, which I think neither Copernicus, nor Ticho Brahe, were they alive, could well tell how to expound unto us, or to their selves either. We have enough in finding out the cause why sin is possible, as for the life and improvement of this possibility (for so you are pleased to bestow the being, and life, and improvement upon it) by the inequality of internall propensions, never fitly matching outward occurrences, that we reasonably well understand, and have discoursed thereof what wee thought fit, enough, if not more then enough.
7 At length you are come to the house it selfe of your present discourse, according to the title of this Chapter; hitherto we have beene complementally entertained in the porch. But, in God, you say, there is no place for exorbitancy, hee being an incomprehensible sphere, which hath omnipotency for his axis, ubiquity for its center: if you had added, & nusquam for his circumference, the illustration, according to your former subtleties, had beene more compleat. We say, that God in doing what he will cannot sinne, because hee hath no superiour Lord to give him lawes, to binde him; his owne wisdome alone can and doth direct him, and it becomes his wisedome to manifest his owne glorious nature; and therefore whatsoever hee can doe, in case hee doth it, it shall be wisely done, for as much as his power therein is manifested. You had rather fetch the cause hereof from this, that his capacities cannot overcope, though the Angels did. One branch of being in him you say, cannot missway or overtop another: what your meaning is I know not, but looke unto it that you doe not contradict your selfe, in maintaining, that God can doe some things by his omnipotency, which yet cannot be wisely or justly done by him, which is as much as to say, that he can do that which is unjust. And if this bee not to acknowledge in God a possibility to overcope, I doe not know what is. To say that God possesseth all things that possibly he can desire to have, is to say, that hee possesseth nothing; for it is impossible that God should desire to have any thing, for this implies a want of something belonging to the deitie. It is directly false and foule to say, that God is whatsoever possible can be; for if it be true, then it ever was true, seeing this proposition depends not upon the revolution of time, and consequently, before the world was, it was true; wherehence it will follow, that God is an Angell, a man, and every vile thing, as wee account them amongst the creatures: for all these were possible to be before the world was; neither will it salve this foule sore, to say, that God is a man, or an oxe, infinitely, for he is no bodily substance at all, neither can any bodily substance be infinitely. We say, that God is all things eminently, whereby we meane no more then this, God is the cause of all things; and better thus in plaine tearmes to expresse our meaning, then by affecting curious straines, and formes of expression to expose religion and the glory of our God to scorn & derision amongst atheists. God is of necessary being, and therefore of himselfe eternall, without beginning, and without end. To perfect himselfe, or to be greater or better then he is, is to suppose that he is imperfect, and not Optimus maximus, which is a thing impossible, and therefore not subject to, nor the object of Almighty power; nay, it destroyes it, as one part of contradiction destroyes the other: for Almighty power were formally destroyed, if it were imperfect, or lesse then Almighty. Therfore all outward imployments are for the good of his creature, but how? not as tending to the good of the creature as Gods end, but both his imployments for the creatures good, and the creatures themselves are for God and his glory. Hath not the Apostle expressed thus much, that both from him and for him are all things: and the Prophet also, God hath made all things for himselfe, even the wicked for the day of evill: and Rom. 11. last. Prov. 16. 4 August. de praedest. & gratia.that for good reason, as many hundred yeares ago hath beene acknowledged in these termes, Qui dedit esse, quo sine essent, habui potestatem. If Gods will to have creatures when they were not, was but the influence or working of his essentiall goodnesse, I pray what is his will to destroy them when they are? The scripture tells us, that God worketh all things according to Eph. 1. 11.the counsel of his owne will; so he did when he made the world, so he doth when he sets an end to any part of it, so he should if hee should set an end to all, and returne them to the gulfe of nothing from whence they came. It is false to say, that the continuance of being is desired by all, as the stampe of Gods goodnesse: for continuance of being was as much desired by those atheists that denied the creation, as by those Christians that doe believe it. And as for the making of the world, it is in holy Scripture (the language of God) attributed to the word of God, to the breath of God, to the wisedome of God, to the power of God, to the counsell of God; but never, that I know, ascribed to the goodnesse of God. And it had need of explication, to shew how Gods goodnesse is communicated unto all, much more how it is communicated unto a stone; yet the earth is filled with his goodnesse, in as much as God provides for every thing that which is good for it; so that whatsoever we partake of for our comfort, wee call it Gods goodnesse, for as much as things which are good to us, are derived to us from God, and therein we have a taste of his goodnesse towards us, in that he doth good unto us. Your last position I have heretofore spoken of, and shewed the incongruity of it. That which is good, and that whereunto it is good, must be different; but the entitie of any thing is not different from it selfe, and therefore it cannot be good unto it selfe, as you affirme.
8. God is foreign serus irarum, slow to wrath, even against sinners that dishonour him to his face. But to say hee is never swayed to sudden revenge, is a more bold assertion then sound. Did not Zimri and Cosbi perish in their incestuous act, and give up both lust and ghost together, without leisure to enjoy their sinne, much lesse respite for repentance? Perhaps you will say their persons were formerly forborne, notwithstanding former sinnes, though the vengeance of God cannot be denied to be most sudden. So perished Herod in his pride, and Balthasar in his revellings, and the Israelites in the wildernesse; while the meat was in their mouthes, and the delicate flesh of Quailes lay betweene their teeth, the heavy wrath of God came upon them, and before they could swallow their sweet morsels, sent them to the graves of lust to bee swallowed by them.
Againe, Sodome and Gomorrah were consumed with fire from heaven; were not some children in their mothers wombs, some hanging at their mothers breasts, some newly come to the use of reason, all consumed to ashes, and made an example of Gods wrath, and suffered the vengeance of eternall fire, as Inde speaketh? Here is no forbearance of divers particular persons: so it was in the daies of Noah, so shall it bee at the comming of the Sonne of man; for while they shall say, peace and safetie, sudden destruction shall come upon them, as sorrow upon … Thes. 5. 2a woman in travaile, and they shall not escape.
The difference you make betweene man and God, I like well; man by forbearance may bereave himselfe of power to execute vengeance, God cannot: and this is a good reason of his forbearance towards the verie reprobates; but towards his elect, a power exercised in another kind, yet a power too, namely, to sanctifie the consideration of his forbearance, to bring them unto repentance; as also a power to provide for satisfaction to be made for their sinnes, by the blood of his Sonne. A sentence related out of the booke of Wisedome. ch. 12. 15, 16, you say is canonicall, although the Author bee not; a distinction that I never read nor heard of before. And if the truth of a sentence be sufficient to make it canonical, the canonicall Scriptures shal be multiplied unreasonably, not out of the book of Wisdome only, but out of the rest of the works of Philo the Iew, and Iosephus too, yea and out of Senecaes workes, and Plutarchs morals; not to speake of Plato, and Aristotle, or your Plotinus. But let us consider this canonicall sentence you speake of and weigh the truth of it in the ballance of the Sanctuarie. I pray, wherein had our Saviour Christ and the Sonne of God deserved to be punished? And did not God (thinke you) thinke it agreeable to his power to condemne him, notwithstanding his innocencie, and his fervent prayers to be delivered from that cup, but with submission to the will of his Father? I pray consider the martyrdome of Gods Saints, were their punishmēts according to their deserts? Nay, what thinke you? is it not agreeable to Gods power to annihilate the holiest man that ever was? yet wee doe not say that God condemnes any man, that hath not deserved to be punished, the Sonne of God and our Saviour onelyonly excepted. But the desert of eternall death is not onelyonly in sinne actuall, but in sinne originall also, which Pelagius did not say, Arminius doth not, whether you doe or no, I know not; the latter clause, which is this, Because thou art the Prince of all, it maketh thee to be gracious to all, makes a shew to plead for universall grace, I cannot tell whether you licke your lips at this; yet the author of the booke could not be ignorant what a difference, as touching the participation of his grace, God had put betweene the Iewes and the Gentiles, for, He had shewed his word unto Iacob, his statutes and ordinances unto Israel: But hee Psal. 147. 19.had not dealt so with every nation, neither had the Heathen knowledge of his lawes. And the Apostle, who undoubtedly was canonicall, to speake in your owne phrase, hath plainly professed, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth.
And as for the reason here used, drawne from this, that he is Lord of all, the Apostle himselfe taketh notice of it, but in a different manner, Rom. 10. 12. There is no difference between the Jew and the Grecian, for he that is Lord over all, is rich unto all that call upon him: and who are they that call upon him, but they that beleeve in him? for it followeth, How can they call upon him in whom they have not beleeved? Yet like as it is the part of parents, not onelyonly to bring children forth, but after to provide for their bringing up: so God doth not onelyonly make things, but also preserveth them: and for their preservation causeth the Sunne to shine, and his raine to fall, as well on the wicked as on the just; alwaies provided that even this providence of God is to be dispensed of no other right, but meerly according to the good pleasure of his owne will. For what grace was shewed to infants, either unborne, or hanging at their mothers breasts, which perished in the flood, and in the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah by fire from heaven? and therefore though there were sixscore thousand persons in Ninivie that could not discerne betweene the right hand and the left, and also much cattell, yet God was not bound to spare them. And can you doubt, but as many as these, if not in Sodome and Gomorra, yet at least, or rather many more, perished in Noahs flood. Yet by the way, this sparing of the Ninivites was but as touching salvation temporall, not spirituall.
You have but trifled a long time, now you beginne to bee serious, yet in little or no congruity to the theame; you were more then halfe way over this chapter, before you came to intreat of Gods goodnesse, and now you come to inculcate it, not in the infinity or immutability of it, but in the generality of it unto all, as whereby he wils and desires indifferently the salvation of all. This is the voluntas antecedens that so many are enamoured with now adaies, and you as much as any, wherewith we are like to bee acquainted much more in your following chapters. And a chapter you have hereof expresly in your booke of Providence. But first you beat another bush where the bird is not; onelyonly it seemes to have a reach a farre off to something that is of kinne to it; you demand, What lord would spoile his proper inheritance? what Architect would disgrace his owne worke? implying, that surely, God will not. Now if you had withall told us whom you do oppose in this, and in what particular point, wee might be the bolder to reply in knowing what to answer; which now wee do not because of your concealements. All creatures are the works of God, which as by generation they are wrought, so by corruption they are defaced: What a beautifull piece of work was Absolom? What a wise piece of worke was Salomon? What a strong piece of worke was Samson? yet these workes of God are all defaced. And the defacing of them is the worke of God undoubtedly, as well as the making of them. And no marvell, for when that worke, for which God hath appointed them, is at an end, to what end should hee continue them, considering that hee made them but for himselfe? Nay, Kingdomes and Nations God hath raised, and made them glorious; then againe, those glorious Kingdomes he hath defaced. Perhaps you will say, but the defacing of these is for sinne. Bee it so, yet God could set an end, both to kingdomes and to the whole world, though there were no sinne: for Gods well-being depends not upon his work, the world, as mans well-being depends upon his inheritance, yea, and upon the worke of his owne hands: for the master of it could have no comfortable habitation without an house, and every trades-man lives by his trade, and therefore it stands him upon not to deface his worke when he hath made it. Againe, onelyonly reasonable creatures are capable of sinne, yet all other creatures are the workmanship of God, which he maketh and defaceth at his pleasure, without any prejudice to his wisedome or to his goodnesse. Yet there is another manner of defacing, and that is by damnation; and herein I know no coulor of inveighing against any man, unlesse it be in the behalfe of infants, as many as perish in originall sinne; wherein if it please you, or any man else, to shew your teeth, or hornes, wee will be nothing dismaid, by Gods assistance, but ready to encounter you. Yet there is another defacing, and that is by sinne; so wee say the Devill and his Angels defaced themselves by their free and voluntary rebellion against God: so Adam defaced himselfe, by a voluntary and free action, hearkening to the voice of his wife; and Eve to the voice of the Serpent; each voluntarily and freely neglecting to hearken to the voice of God, and to maintaine the consideration thereof alwaies before their eyes. Thus every man, even the unregenerate, yea, and Devils themselves, doe still continue voluntarily and freely to sinne against God: so that this defacing is not the worke of God, but of the creature, it being a thing impossible that God should be the author of sinne, because it is impossible that he should doe any thing that hee ought not, of any thing in other manner then he ought. Againe, it is impossible that hee should omit any thing, or in anyother manner then he ought. And no other meanes can be devised to make any one become the author of sinne. But it is enough for you to propose your interrogatories at pleasure. And in the third place you bring in another interrogatory, different from all the rest, which is more sutable with your tenet; for the delivery whereof in good time, you seem already to travaile in childebirth, and that is this, Who would leave a good foundation bare or naked, unlesse he be not able to reare it up without injustice. I professe I wondred a long time, to what purpose the last clause of this exception was pulled in by the eares; for if a man want means to finish an house which he hath begun, though hee would be unjust, yet hath hee no certaintie to enable himselfe for the finishing of that worke hee hath begun. But by comparing it well with the sentence following, I seeme to spring your meaning. The foundation which God hath laid, is the creation of our reasonable natures, the finishing of this worke, is the adding of salvation, or an happy being to this naturall being. Thus to finish the worke in every one, it is the will and pleasure of God, by your profession. This in another Tract of yours, that yet hath not seene the light of the presse, you amplifie, and call it, A most earnest desire in God of the salvation of all, and every one, though he much desire it, is, as here you say, because he cannot do it without injustice. And why so? Is it because they are sinners? why, what then shall become of us all, seeing we are all sinners? There be but two things that might be replyed, the one is, that though all have sinned, yet Christ hath satisfied for the sinnes of his elect, Rom. 8. 33. Who shall lay any thing to the charge of Gods elect, it is God that justifieth, who shall condemne us? It is Christ which is dead, or rather risen againe, who is also at the right hand of God, and maketh request also for us. But I presume, this kinde of answer is no lettice for your lips, for that were to maintain, that God willeth the salvation of none but of his elect. 2. The other answer is, that though all are sinners, yet all doe not die in impenitencie. To this I reply. 1. That if Christ hath made satisfaction for all their sins, I see no reason why they should not be saved, notwithstanding their impenitencie: for, what justice can require, that damnation should bee suffered for those sinnes for which ful satisfaction is already made. 2. God could give them repentance, if it pleased him, as he gave to Israel, Act. 5. 31. Him hath God lift up with his right hand, to be a Prince and a Saviour, to give repentance unto Israel, and forgivenesse of sinnes. So then, Christ gives not onelyonly forgivenesse of sinnes to them that repent, but hee it is that gives repentance it selfe also: These be no Cabalismes, but the plain testimonie of Gods word. And as to the Iewes, so to the Gentiles also, Act. 11. 19. When they heard this they held their peace, and glorified God, saying, Then hath God also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life. And accordingly Saint Paul warnes Timothy, to cary himself gently towards them that are without, waiting the time, when God will give them repentance, that they may acknowledge the truth, and come to amendment out of the snare of the Devill, by whom they were led captive to doe his will. By this let every one judge what strength there is in your illation, when you say, Wheresoever God hath laid the one (to wit naturall being, it is to all that rightly consider his wisedome, truth, and goodnesse, and assured pledge of his will and pleasure, to finish it with the other. Why the truth of God is directly against it, professing, that he hath mercy on whom he will, and heardeneth whom he will: and that the same word of God is, a savour of life unto life, to them that are saved; hee doth not say, to them that are carefull to prepare themselves, and a savour of death unto death, unto them that perish, and a good savour unto God in both; he doth not say, to them that do not prepare themselves. And by comparing that place with Act. 13. 48. it appeareth who the saved are, even those whom God hath ordained unto salvation; for they believed, as there the Apostle professeth, as much as to say, the word preached was a savour of life unto life unto them, and wot you the reason hereof? Why surely because they were ordained to salvation, like as Act. 2. 47. It is said that, God added to the Church day by day, such as should be saved. You might with as much modesty professe, that in as much as God hath made every man, It is an assured pledge of his will and pleasure, to give every man repentance, before he drops out of the world. Gods gifts are without repentance; it is true of the gifts of sanctification, but it is as true, that God repented that he made man. That the current of Gods joyfull benificence can admit no intermission, is most untrue, for he dispenseth it freely, so he continueth it as freely; For he worketh all things according to the counsell of his owne will, that is, nullo necessitatis obsequio, as Ambrose expoundeth it. Nay it doth admit intermission in this world. In the world to come, indeed, it shall admit no intermission, in this it doth, both in respect of blessings temporall, and in respect of motions spirituall. For as touching blessings temporall, God sheweth the back sometimes, and not the face, Ier. 18. 17. And as touching spirituall motions and consolations, what moved the Lord to cry out upon the crosse, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me, but the intermission of these? It is true, sorrow to us hath no other originall then our own sinne, yet no sinne in Christ could be found to bee the originall of his sorrow. And though the woman, by reason of sinne, hath ever since conceived in sorrow, yet bruit beasts conceive in sorrow, notwithstanding that they are incapable of sinne. And albeit God be an ocean of joy yet the dispensation of joy unto creatures, is meerly according to the good pleasure of his will. And though all sorrow proceeds from sinne in the way of a meritorious cause; yet all sorrow proceeds from God, in the way of an efficient cause. Hee is the great Iudge that inflicteth sorrow on some, as well as hee causeth joy to others.
9. The comparison is most absurd. For illumination proceeds from the Sunne, as from a naturall cause, working by necessity of nature; but to say that God in such sort doth communicate ought, or send forth any influence; is more Atheisticall then Christian. The devils belike have seeds of joy and happinesse, wherewith they were sowne in their first creation; for undoubtedly they were capable of them before their fall, as well as the Angels of light. And all the influence that God sends forth, you say, is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse; whence it followeth, that God at this day doth by his influence cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in the verie Devils. And seeing Gods concurrence to the actions of men and Angels, is a part of that influence that proceeds from God, and one action of the Devils is their assurance that they are damned spirits, without hope of recovery; in concurring to this assurance, God doth cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in them. Besides this, with Devils and Men God affordeth his concourse to all their most sinfull actions, this your selfe have often acknowledged, and this concourse of his is a part of his influence, and no influence (you say) can proceed from him, but such as is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse, wherewith their natures were sowne in their creation. Therefore this concourse of God also to their sinfull actions, doth cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in reprobate men and Angels also.
Now proceed we along with you: God, you say, doth inspire all that are conformable to his will, with desire of doing to others that which he hath done to them. This is a bone very well worth the picking. I am perswaded many a sweet morsell will be found about it. You doe not tell us that God doth inspire any man with a conformity to his will, but as many as are conformable to his will, hee inspires with other good desires; whence I pray then comes conformity to his will, if not from the inspiration of God? doe you make conformity to Gods will to bee the inspiration of the flesh? For I presume you make it not an inspiration of the world, or of the devill. Yet S. Paul saith, that it is God that worketh in us both the will and Phil. 2. 13.the deed, not by any necessary emanation, as light issueth from the Sunne, but according to his owne good pleasure. Againe, this very desire of doing others good, is it not a part of our conformity to the will of God? Now if God inspire us with one part of conformity to Gods will, why not also with another? And so why may we not runne over all parts of conformity to the will of God, and finde as good cause to ascribe them all to the inspiration of God, as the cause of them? The mystery of your meaning in this, the next sentence serves as a key to open, when you say, that such as wilfully strive against the stream of his over-flowing goodnesse, or boisterously counterblast the sweet and placid spirations of celestiall influence, become creators of their owne woe, and raise unto themselves those stormes wherein they perish. So then Gods influence is to all, like as the light of the Sunne; onelyonly the difference ariseth herehence, that some resist it, others yeeld unto it. As good Arminianisme and Pelagianisme as ever dropt from the mouth or pen of Arminius or Pelagius himselfe. So then it is not God, that ex nolentibus volentes facit, but mans free will. And in spight of St. Paul it shall be volentis & currentis, and not miserentis Dei. For these spirations you speake of, can be no other then exhortations, Rom. 9.whereunto some yeeld, and some resist. And I pray, who deserves to be accounted the author of my faith, the author of my repentance? he that exhorteth me hereunto, or rather I my selfe, that doe beleeve, and doe repent, though upon anothers exhortations? For exhortation may thus farre bee performed by a reprobate: for such plead at the day of judgement, Have we not prophesied in thy name? and S. Paul observed, that some preached Christ not chastly, but upon pretence, Phil. 1.and that with foule intentions, even to adde affliction to Pauls bonds; yet howsoever he rejoyced in this, that Christ was preached, which hee would never have done, if by their preaching none were likely to be brought over to Christ by faith and repentance.
Againe, to inspire them with good desires, and with conformity to Gods will, this is no other in your language, then to exhort them hereunto. And thus it is that God workes in us both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure. Now this speech bewrayeth you as much as ever Peters speech bewrayed him; but with this difference, Peters speech bewrayed him to be a follower of Christ, but your speech bewrayeth you to be a follower of Pelagius, and as like him as if you were spit out of his mouth; for thus did Pelagius discourse, Operatur Deus in nobis velle quod bonum est, velle quod sanctum est, dum nos terrenis cupiditatibus deditos futurae gloriae Aug. lib. 1. de gratia Dei, contr. Pelag. cap. 10.magnitudine & premiorum pollicitatione succendit, dum revelatione sapientiae, in desiderium Dei stupentem suscitat voluntatem, dum nobis suadet omnem quod bonum est. Now see to what acknowledgement of grace Austin putteth him, if so be he will be a true Christian. Nos eam gratiam volumus, isti aliquando Ibid. cap. 11.fateantur qua futurae gloriae magnitudo non solum promittitur, verumetiam creditur & speratnr, nec solum reveletur sapientia, verumetiam & amatur, nec suadetur solum omne quod bonum est, verumetiam persuadetur. Hanc debet Pelagius gratiam consiteri si vult non mod… videri, sed esse Christianus. Now what followeth upon this your doctrine touching the nature of election, namely, that it must bee upon the foresight of mens obedience to Gods exhortations and perswasions, which here you call placid inspirations. Now because God exhorts us to faith, repentance, and all manner of good workes, the foresight of our obedience hereunto must bee it whereupon our election must depend, and so you are ready to shake hands with the Apostle, not of fellowship, but to bid him adieu, as who plainly professeth, that Election is not of workes, but of God that Rom. 9.calleth us; and he proves it by this, that before they had done either good or evill, Iacob was elected, and Esau reprobated, which must exclude not only the pre-existence of works, but the pre-consideration of them; otherwise hee could not therehence conclude that election is not of workes; and the circumstance of not being as yet borne doth evidently exclude as well faith, as good workes. For a man unborne is as unable to beleeve, as to performe any other worke. And notwithstanding this foule injury, you offer unto God in robbing him so shamefully of the glory of his grace, and absolute prerogative to dispose of his creatures as he thinkes good, in making whom he will vessels of mercy, and whom hee will vessels of wrath, yet you thinke to pacifie him with an hungry, base, and meere verball amplification of the streames of his goodnesse, the issue whereof is to injurie him afresh in like manner, by robbing him, and adorning man with the spoiles of his glory. For increase of joy and happinesse shall be, you say, unto a man from the streames of life, proceeding from God as a fountaine of life, provided that man gives free passage to their current. And what is this current, but Gods spirations formerly mentioned, whereby he exhorts us to profit by the examples of his judgements on others, and also to patience when we are injuried by others. Now if we doe ye…ld to this, and doe profit by the consideration of Gods judgements upon others, and doe patiently beare the wrongs that are done us by others, then increase of joy and happinesse shall be unto us from the fountaine of goodnesse, who as he hath some streames of life, whereby hee exhorts us unto that which is good; so he hath other streames of life and happinesse, wherewith he rewards us for our obedience: so that whatsoever shew you make of honouring God, the issue is to bestow all the honour upon the obedience of man. So that the amends you make herein for former injuries, is as if a man having given his neighbour a box in the eare, should make shew of making him amends by kinde stroaking of him, and in stead of stroaking him, give him another box in the eare, Thus Ioab tooke Amaza by the beard as though hee would have kissed him, but, indeed, stabd him to the heart. You are willing to make God the author of glory, but by no means can you be brought to acknowledge him the author, but onelyonly the orator of grace: like to the Panims, who were wont to say,
Det vitam, det opes, animum mihi ipse parabo.
You are given so much to painting, that it is a hard matter to discerne the native countenance of your discourse, the proper face of your meaning. What meane you by the current of life? Is it a gracious current, or a glorious current? if gracious, that is the same with spirations before spoken of, and these are exhortations and perswasions. But how I pray do… these when they are refused by some, the more overflow to others? They that heare the same Sermon, have never a whit the more for others resisting it; they that heare it not, have no part of it, though all resist it. As for the currrent of glory, how hath any man the more, for that others are wholly deprived of it? yet it is true, that even the reprobation and damnation of some, tends to the increase of glory to the elect, in contemplation of the mercy of God towards them in comparison of others, and of the sorrowes from which God hath freed them, as both the Apostle signifies, Rom. 9. 22. And is maintained both by Didacus Alvares, and Alphonsus Mendosa. But I doe not finde you have any such meaning. But when you have taken up a metaphor by the end, you play upon it, and make as good musicke with it as pigges doe, in playing upon Organs.
What are the miseries which wicked spirits suffer, are unknowne to us; we reade that they beleeve and tremble, Iam. 2. that they are kept in chaines to the judgement of the great Iude 6. Mat. 8. 29.day. They aske our Saviour whether he be come to torment them before their time; they pray him not to send them into the deepe. And therefore a man may very well be ignorant of Luc. 8. 31.any good which their miseries work upon us, seeing that their miseries are so unknowne unto us.
Yet as conceiving your selfe to have beene somewhat free in…venting somewhat, which alas is but a vaine ostentation of some momentous matter, which hath no moment at all in it; you demand whether God may yet inspire these castawayes with mischievous thoughts, seeing their mischievous thoughts worke for our good. A very vaine objection; as if the devill and his Angels had need of any prompting unto villany, or as if prompting unto villany were fit to bee called inspiration, which is never used, but either in the way of prophecy, or in the way of some gracious suggestion. Yet as touching any thought or action of Satan, your selfe dare not deny Gods concourse to the substance of the action; and as for the manner of concourse, we are willing to undergoe with you, or any man else that breathes, any scholasticall discourse or inquisition hereupon: as whether the will of the creature determines the will of his Creator, or whether the will of the Creator determines the will of the creature rather.
As touching the evill it selfe, whether from our opinion can be inferred any more then this, that Gods will is it shall come to passe by his permission; and whether we cannot shew better reason for this our tenet, then you or any man else for the contrary. As for the intending of the creatures woe and miserie, as occasions or meanes of Gods glory, what sober man can doubt but that God is the efficient cause of their woe and miserie, as it signifies the misery of punishment, and in inflicting punishment on transgressors, undoubtedly hee doth advance the glory of his justice, yea and the glory of his Saints also, who may see in others sufferings, what might have beene their portion, if God had shewed no more grace unto them then unto others, and hereupon have cause to be so much the more ravished with the contemplation of Gods goodnesse toward them. As for the miserie of sinne, be the sinne as great as the crucifying of Christ, God determined it should be done, Act. 4. be it as great as the Kings giving their kingdome to the beast, little lesse then the giving of their kingdomes to the devill, yet God it is that hath put into their hearts to doe his will even in this also: and even this undoubtedly shall redound to the glory of God, and the good of his elect. For Rev. 17. 17 2 Cor. 11. 19.both heresies must be, that they which are approved may bee manifested, and God raiseth tyrants up, to exercise the patience of his children, yea their own sinnes redound to the profit of Gods elect. Utile est superbis in aliquod apertum manifestamque cadere peccatum. But hereupon to make use of that August. de civ. Dei, l. 14. cap. 13.maxime, Gods will is the rule of goodnesse, is most absurd; for the rule of goodnesse is Gods will of commandement; but the will of God, that signifieth his determination to have this or that come to passe, is farre different: neither I hope will you make question, in case God willeth any thing to come to passe, whether God doth well in willing it; though that which hee willeth or determineth bee the crucifying of Christ Iesus.
As for the will of commandement, that is onelyonly the will of God touching what is our duty to doe, or to leave undone, and accordingly called voluntas approbans, for certainly he approves obedience unto his will, in whatsoever he injoyneth us: yet this wide leape hath cast your meditations upon this point, to enquire forsooth whether Gods will bee the rule of goodnesse. But as you have entred upon it without distinction of will and will, so you carrie your selfe therein with miserable confusion.