Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 2 · Chapter 10
CHAP. X.
Of the eternall and Immutable decree.
VPonUpon this you enter with a fayre promise of betteringe or rectifying our apprehensions of Gods absolute and omnipotent decree. I hope we shall never be unwillinge to learne of any, much lesse of your selfe. For why should we not affect to have our apprehensions if they swerve from the the truthe to be rectifyed, and though in good propension thereunto, yet to have them bettered. For though good be good, yet better is better, especially in so preciou… a point of divinity as about the decree of God. Most of all if it be true (as you say) that in all ages it hath beene most difficult, and is so common in this, that no divine can adventure upon any other service profitable, but he must eyther enforce his passage thorough it, or come so high, as to doe homage to it. As for the difficulty you speake of, as you give me no edge to imbrace it, so I professe I have no edge to oppose it. But as touchinge the commons thereof in such sort as in all profitable services to the Church, we must be driven to take notice of it, and that with appropriation to this age above all ages that went before possesseth me with admiration. For what reason can be devised why divines and fathers in former ages could handle diverse worthy points of divinity without touching upon Gods decree, and our divines in this age can not? I doubt your care in this sentence was to vent more phrases then truthes. Three attributes you give us of Gods decree, namely, that it is immutable. 2. Irresistible. 3. Eternall. But the first of these you choake with strange cautions, a manifest signe that you have some stitch or spleene against this attribute. The first proviso is, if we take it in the abstract; and you give no instance to explaine your meaning. I had thought this word, the decree of God had beene an abstract, and of abstract signification alone, and not indifferent to signification abstract & concrete also. Decretum, I confesse in the Latine is indifferent to signifie either in the abstract Gods decree, or in the concrete a thing decreed. But Gods decree in the English admitteth of no such equivocation, but is of abstract signification onelyonly and not concrete.
Your other caution by way of exegeris and interpretation of the former is no lesse strange, as when you say, Or as it is in God, implying that Gods decree may be taken two wayes, either as it is in God, and so it is immutable, or as it is out of God, and so it is not immutable. Now I doe not find it possible that Gods decree can be any where but in God, it being an action immanent, or intramanent, not passing forth of God, but abyding within him, such as are all actions called elicite both in men and Angels, as the actions of their understanding, and the acts of their wills. Yet (you say) it is not agreed upon by all, either what a decree is or what to be eternall; at least the most part doe not perfectly beare in minde the true importances of an eternall decree. With these differences which you intimate, I never was acquainted, but am ready to be, as soone as you shall enforme me of them. I had thought no man had doubted what Gods decree is, as namely his purpose or resolution of will that something shall be brought foorth in time, either immediately by himselfe, or by second causes and the agency of his creatures.
And as for eternity, I had thought that all had agreed in this, that to be eternall is to be either without beginning or without end, or both; and as applyed to Gods decree, it signifieth the being of it without beginning. But it may be you travell in childbirth to be delivered of some subtilties, which you call here the importances of an eternall decree. We are ready to entertaine them as soone as they come to light, with such consideration as becomes our poore abilities, in Philosophicall or Theologicall speculations.
First you tell us that to this purpose your former speculations concerning eternity of Gods infinite wisedome, have beene premised; that is to prepare for the delivery of the child: you fore saw belike you were like to have an hard labour of it, an hard bargaine. Yet if a manchilde prove to bee borne, this hardnesse may well be endured, and will soone be forgotten. By the way it seemes the importances you speake of doe concerne as well the wisedome of Gods decree; as the eternity thereof; and therefore it is that you have premised the speculations of Gods infinite wisedome, as well as of his eternitie. And all to prevent a mischiefe, to wit, lest by the incogitant use of these and the like Scripture phrases (God fore-knowes, or hath decreed all things from eternity) that slumber might creepe upon the unvigilant and unattentive reader, with whose dreames many deceived have spoken of Gods decree or predetermination of things to come, as of acts already irrevocably finished and accomplished; and by a consequent errour, resolve that it is as impossible for any thing to be otherwise then it is, wil be, or hath been, as it is to recall that again which is already past. The child is born, but a monster, rather then a perfect child. For the doctrine you propose savoureth strongt ly of making Gods decrees to be of a revocable nature. Well, let us consider it peece meale. First, the proposition, then the consequent deduced therfrom. You are jealous over your reader, & that for his good as you pretend; & that is, lest Scripture phrases should cary him too far through incogitancy, and unvigilancy, and unattentivenes, wherupon a slumber may overtake him, & he may dream of Gods decree, as of an act already irrevocably finished & accomplished. Well then to conceive of Gods decree as of an act already finished or accomplished, is but a dreame as you censure it. And dreames have great liberty to erre from truth. Let us scanne this a little. First, doth it like you to affirme that Gods decrees are finished and accomplished, provided that they be of a revocable nature, and may bee altered? If this please you, what need you except against the conceiving of Gods decree as an act past or finished? For though it be past and finished, yet if it bee of a revocable nature it will serve your turne well enough. But if you deny it, positively and simply to be finished, what meant you to put in irrevocably, which manifestly implyes an acknowledgement of the finishing of Gods decree, though not irrevocably, but so as it may be revoked.
Againe, as touching the word accomplished, that is very ambiguous. For like as Gods promises which are not eternall but in time, and the significations of Gods decrees may justly be said not to be accomplished untill they be fulfilled; in like sort Gods decrees may be said in a good sense not to bee accomplished untill they be executed by performing that which God hath decreed. But you speake of the finishing of Gods decree actu interno, not actu externo. For you oppose them that maintaine that Gods decrees of things to come are already (that is, before the things decreed doe come to passe) finished. Now never any man was knowne to dreame waking any such dreame, as to thinke or affirme that Gods decrees were finished actu externo, that is in plaine termes executed before the things decreed were brought to passe.
Now lets examine your opinion cleared from ambiguities. I say the decrees of God were finished actu interno before the World was made; And I prove it thus. Every decree is finished actu interno when it is made and hath existence. But the decrees of God were made and had theire existence before the World was (otherwise they should not be eternall) therefore the decrees of God are not onelyonly already finished but were finished before the World was made. And the Major I farther prove thus. If before the World things were decreed by God, then also before the World, Gods decrees were made and had existence, but before the World many things were decreed by God, therefore before the World, Gods decrees were made and had existence.
Agayne I prove that Gods decrees are already finished actu interno. Every thing that hath intire and full existence is to be accompted finished, but Gods decrees already have their entire and full existence, even as God himselfe, and so had before the World was; therefore Gods decrees are already finished and so were before the World was.
Thirdly if Gods decrees be yet unfinished I demaund when they shall be finished or whether they shall for ever continue unfinished. If for ever they shall continue unfinished; then Gods executions of his decrees shall be finished before his decrees are; for they eternally shall be finished, these upon supposition never shall. If one day Gods decrees shall be finished then either before the execution of them, or with the execution of them, or after the execution. If before the execution of them, then either for a certaine space of time before the execution of them, or from eternity before them. If for a certaine space before, name that space, and give a reason why such a space of time, rather then a greater or a lesser.
Secondly shew what hath accrewed to Gods decrees whereby after a certeyne space of time they are sayd to be finished, for want whereof they could not be sayd to be finished before.
Thirdly it is manifest, this cannot holde, as touchinge the decree of creation. For as much as there was no space of time before the execution of that decree. And therfore if that decree were finished at all before the execution of it, it was finished from everlasting before it. And if that decree were finished before the World was made, then also all the decrees of God were finished before the World was made. For all Gods decrees are alike everlasting as your selfe (I thinke) will not denye. And here you propose not, this doctrine of any decree of God in speciall, but of his decrees in generall, implying thereby that it is as true of one as of another, and consequently if it holds not in any one, it fayles in all. If Gods decrees are finished from everlasting before the execution of them, this is flatly contradictory to your assertion: But if you thinke to say that Gods decrees are not finished actu interne untill they are executed actu externo; then they had not their full and entire existence till the execution of them; and consequently they are temporall, not eternall; and though man finisheth his decrees before hee executes them, yet God doth not.
Secondly, if nothing doth accrew to the constitution of Gods eternall decrees by the execution of them more then before; then Gods decrees cannot bee said to have their full and entire constitution more at the time of execution then before. But nothing doth accrew hereby to the constitution of Gods decree. For the execution is temporall, the decree eternall, but that which is temporall cannot belong to the constitution of that which is eternall.
If they bee not finished till after the execution, then God shall be said to execute things before hee hath fully decreed them. Adde unto this what Mr. Rogers writes in his Analysis of the Articles of the Church of England, printed by authority, and dedicated to D. Bamcroft Archiep. of Canterbury, upon the 17. Article, propos. 2. Those wrangling Sophisters then are deceived, who because God is not included within the compasse of any time, but hath all things to come, as present continually before his eyes; doe say that God he did not in the time or age past onelyonly, but still in the present time likewise, doth predestinate. Thus I have considered your uncouth assertion, now I come to the consequence you draw herehence; and that is this, It is as impossible for any thing to be otherwise then it is, will be, or hath beene, as it is to recall that againe which is already past. But I say this consequence is unsound, and I prove it thus: To recall that againe which is past, is absolutely impossible, as implying manifest contradiction; but the impossibility of a thing to be otherwise then God hath decreed it, is meerly secundum quid, & exsuppositione. And dare you deny that Gods decrees had existence at the very beginning of the world; and is not that time long since past, though Gods decrees continue like as God himselfe, for his will is unchangeable as well as his nature? And supposing things to be decreed by God to come to passe, dare you deny but it necessarily followeth herehence, that they shall come to passe? Yet I confesse that of this consequence of yours there is some colour, but that which followeth is as wilde as ever entred into a sicke mans braine to conceive: as when you say, to make Gods decrees already finished, is to involve, That God by his eternall and powerfull decree, did set the course of nature a going with an irresistible and irretractable swinge, and since onelyonly lookes upon it with an awfull eye, as masters sometimes watch their servants, whether they goe the way they are commanded. Thus it pleaseth you confidently to dictate, and positively without all reason, that which hath neither truth nor colour of truth, as it may bee made manifest in each member.
For as touching the first member; God doth not onelyonly set the course of nature going, but continueth it going, and that not onelyonly in working necessarily, but also contingently and freely, which manner of working is alwaies joyned with a possiblity of the contrary, and that not onelyonly by way of resistance, but even of naturall propension also, as appeares manifestly in all free agents, whether Angels or men.
In a word, both course of nature, and course of free will is not irresistible, as appeares by the issue. For the most determinate course of nature hath beene resisted, for the Sunne Ios. 10. 12. 13. 2 King. 20. 10. 11. Ioh. 3. 13. Exod. 14.and Moone hath sometimes stood still; nay sometimes the Sunne hath gone backeward, and that tenne degrees in the Diall of Ahaz; the river Iordan hath stood still, and the red Sea hath beene divided; and the fire it selfe hath beene restrained from burning the three noble children cast into the Dan. 3.fierie furnace. OnelyOnly upon supposition of the will of God, it necessarily followeth that the course of nature shall have its course, or be restrained from having his course without resistance. For who hath resisted the will of God?Rom. 9. 19
As touching the second member, how absurd is it to inferr that God onelyonly lookes upon the course of nature, if the will of God concerning it be already finished. Whereas Gods will is for the continuance of the course of nature, either with disturbance or without disturbance, not of it selfe, but by the assistance, influence, and operation of God. For in him all things live, and move, and have their being. Pater meus us que Act. 17. Ioh. 5. 17.hodie operatur, & ego operor, saith our Saviour. So farre are we from denying that there is as much use of power and wisdome infinite in the mannaging of it, as in the making of it. What odde conceits possessed you to shape so absurd a consequence from this assertion, that the decrees of God are already finished, that is, that already they have their existence? In the next line you discover the originall of this absurd fancy of yours, when you say, And as he ceaseth not to worke, so doth he never cease to decree. By this I perceive, you would faine have your reader confound Gods working with his deeteeing, as you doe.
Indeede if we had sayde that Gods works are already finished; it would followe that he should be a spectator only and not a worker for the time to come. But we say no such thing, we say that his decrees are finished and that from everlasting, we doe not say his workes are finished. Though you are pleased to confound these to make unto you matter of extravagant discourse, yet I pray give us leave to distinguish them: Yet here you seeme to give a reason why God doth never cease to decree, and that drawne out of the Ephes. 1. 11. He worketh all thinges accordinge to the counsayle of his will: when I consider that which went immediately before, I thought you had hereby gone about to prove, that God ceaseth not still to decree, which is as much as to make decrees; But when I looke upon the collection you make herhence, I finde you have no such meaning: For your inference is onelyonly this: So that albeit the counsayle of his will by which he worketh, be eternall; yet all things are not yet wrought by it. Now of this no man maketh any question.
But the question in present is not whether Gods works be already finished, but whether his decrees be already finished. We say they are and were from everlasting, because from everlasting they did exist. You say they are not, but as God doth not cease to work, so he doth not cease to decree. Which in my judgement is a strange assertion, and the comparison is without all proportion; For Gods works are temporall, and God brings forth new works one after another dayly. But Gods decrees are eternall and therefore cannot he be sayd to bring forth newe decrees dayly one after another.
And though all his workes he brings forth according to the counsayle of his will, yet both this counsayle and this will of his is eternall. Here you propose a question, shall we say then, he hath not decreed whatsoever doth or shall befall us? And you answere it affirmatively in a certaine sense which is this, He doth not now first beginne to decree them. Now I appeale to every judicious Reader to determine, whether this interpretation of yours be not plainly contradictious to the manifest meaninge of that assertion which you interprete. For if God doth not new beginne to decree those things that befall us, doth it not manifestly follow here hence that he hath already decreed them, rather then that he hath not decreed them already? We willingly grant that Gods decrees have no end but continue the same still, but you would have us thinke that they are still in making.
As God himselfe was from everlasting and still continueth unto everlastinge, in like sort Gods decree or will was from everlasting, and the same will of his continueth still without any alteration or shadowe of change. But albeit Gods will continueth the same without change and end, yet I finde no example to justify this phrase of yours, in saying God now decreeth the thinges that befall us; and you may as well say that God shall decree the things that doe befall us; and that by the same reason; for his decree hath no end. And is it a sober speech thinke you to affirme, that God doth now decree the creation of the World, or the fall of Angells, or the turning of Adam out of Paradise, or Noahs flood, or the burning of Sodome and Gomorrah with fire and brimstone? You say it is much safer to thinke on Gods decree as present to the whole course of our life, then as it was before the World: for so we shall thinke of them as of acts past and finished, more irrevocable then the lawes of the Medes and Persians. Well then you deny not that these decrees were before the World, if this be as much as to be now past and finished, then also it is true, that they are acts past and finished; which you denye; If to be before the world be not to be past and finished, then to thinke of them as they were before the World, is not to thinke of them as acts past & finished, which yet you say it is, but without al reason in this case. And I pray what think you? are Gods decrees, which you dare not to deny to have had their existēce before the world, of a revocable nature? Certainely they are no more alterable then that which is past irrevocable. But like as God cannot be sayd to be past, though he was before the World: Because he still continueth and shall continue for ever: So the decrees of God cannot be sayd to be past, though they were before the World; because the same will whereby he decreed all things, doth continue without all change and shall continue for ever, though the thinges decreed and willed by him doe change from thinges to come to things present, from thinges present to things past. But the lawes of men suppose liberty in the makers while they are in making, which they utterly take from them being enacted. Very well observed, and therefore let us think it fit to mainteyne that Gods decrees are still in making, and none of them made, no not the decree of creation, nor of redemption, nor of sanctification, of al the holy Patriarchs & Prophets that ever were; lest otherwise we should spoile God of his liberty. By the same reason let us maintain that God is a doing stil, but never doth any thing, lest after he hath done it he have no longer any libertie to doe it or leave it undone. These conceites have as much wisedome as sobriety in them, being equally removed from both. For what sober man would make doubt but that Methusaleh was as free and had as greate liberty of will the last yeare of his age as he was or had when he was but 10. yeares old, notwithstanding many thinges had beene done by him in the space of 900. yeares, which to doe or not to doe in the last yeare of his age was not a thinge indifferent unto him. And were it not a madde thing to affirme that the longer a man lives the more he loseth of his liberty? or that the more idlely a man liveth, the more liberty he keepes in store, and the more painfull hee is, the more his liberty perisheth?
2. Gods decrees are infinitely more unalterable then the lawes of the Medes and Persians. For God cannot change, man can change. Gods will cannot bee resisted, the will of man may be resisted, even the will of the greatest Princes, by God himselfe, by his Angels, by men, by forreine enemies, by their owne subjects. The evils which by decrees are made either evitable or inevitable, are either evils of sinne, or evills of punishment; you will not say evils of sinne. For you acknowledge no such evils to be objects of Gods decrees. If evils of punishment, it is false to say that Gods decrees doe not make them as inevitable as the decrees of men. For no decrees of men doe make evils of men inevitable, but upon supposition of transgression.
Now it is of an undoubted truth, that punishment designed by the decrees of God, is infinitely more inevitable by transgressors then punishment designed by the decree of men. For many malefactors escape the hands of men, but it is impossible they should escape the hands of God. Of the wicked in respect of the certainty of Gods judgements to overtake them, it is said, that sudden destruction shall come upon them as travaile upon a woman with childe, and they shall not escape. 1 Thess. 5. 3.You are besides the truth when you say that wisedome hath just warrant to make decrees for men; this belongs to power and authority, not to wisedome.
The subject many times may be wiser then the Prince; yet hath he not therefore any authority over his Prince, to make lawes to binde him, but rather the Prince though inferiour in wisedome, hath power over him. But the wiser men are, the fitter they are to governe, and the more willingly and joyfully should others submit unto them, supposing the wisedome of the governour to be bound to aime at the good of the subject. But no such obligation is found in God, who as he is the Creator of all, so he made all things for himselfe. And good reason that seeing all things are from him, therefore all things should be for him. Qui dedit esse, quo sine essent habuit potestatem. Aug. de praed. & gra.When you say that too strict obligement unto lawes positive or decrees unalterable, deprives both law-givers and others of their native libertie and opportunity of doing good, I finde nothing sound in all this. For you confound the libertie of nature, which is equally common to all, with liberty of condition, which is greater by farre in one then in another. Secondly, you range God the supreme Law-giver, with other law-givers which have onelyonly power deputed unto them; no obligement unto lawes doth deprive any man of liberty naturall. For whatsoever is forbidden any man, yet is hee never a whit the lesse naturally free to the doing of it then before, though in case he transgresse, he is subject to censure and punishment. And of this naturall libertie you speake of hitherunto, as being most proper for the nature of decrees, that is, liberty from coaction and naturall necessitation, though now you divert from this unto civill liberty, which is onelyonly liberty from subjection.
As touching the lawes of men, it is fit there should be a Court of Chancery for mitigation, because men cannot foresee all cases that may fall out, and by too strict observation of lawes, summum jus may prove summa injuria. But this cannot without great absurdity be applyed unto the decrees of God, who from everlasting was ignorant of nothing, but foresaw all things that were to come. And by the way, what doe you manifest hereby, but a strange fancy, that in some respects it were fit Gods decrees should be alterable, lest otherwise hee might be deprived of liberty, in taking opportunity of doing good: implying withall, that God in course of time takes notice of something, whereof from everlasting hee was not conscious. And though the Pope in reserving to himselfe power and liberty to send them forth or call them in againe, doth take upon him more authority then is fit, because hee hath neither wisedome nor integrity answerable to so great authority: yet seeing God wants neither wisedome nor integrity, it seemes fit in your judgement (as may appeare by the tenour of this sentence) that he should make decrees, and recall them at his pleasure. And so though at the first entrance upon this discourse, and since also you professed that Gods decrees were unalterable; yet here you plainly signifie that Gods wisedome and integrity may well beare him out in exercising such authority as the Pope usurpes, to wit in making grants at pleasure, and at pleasure to revoke them. Which I confesse the Pope doth with a great deale more ease, then he doth draw in the same breath, which once hee hath breathed out; which if he doth, yet certainly it is more then it is in his power to doe at his pleasure, unlesse hee hath some extraordinary device that I know not of. I doubt your mysteries are not yet full; you seeme to commend the condition of mutability, as a condition befitting the wisedome and integrity of God; it remaines that you doe as much disgrace immutability and count it an impotent condition, that so with the better grace you may reject it, as unbeseeming the nature of God. In the next sentence you utterly forsake your text, and whereas in congruity to the precedent discourse you should shew how alteration of decrees is no signe of a fickle disposition, you nothing to the purpose tell us that the alteration of awards is no signe of a fickle disposition. For by the same decree may different awards be executed, without any revocation or alteration of the decree. It was long agoe the saying of Gregory, that Deus mutat sententiam, consilium nunquam. But by the way you signifie that the former practice of Popes in making Greg. in Iob. l. 16. cap. 6.grants and recalling of them, is no signe of mutability. A manifest untruth. Nay your selfe laboured to justifie such a change, as to make grants and to revoke them as an apparant change: but you justified it by the opportunity to doe the greater good thereby, provided that wisedome and integrity bee answerable. So that though it be no vicious change as you would have it, yet: apparantly there is a change. But: the administration sometimes of rewards, sometimes of punishments doth argue I confesse no mutability in decrees. One and the selfe same lawes of men doe cause the different administration of rewards and punishments to divers persons, yea and to the selfe same persons at different times, without all colour of change in the lawes themselves.
Of the coherence of that which followeth with that which went before, I will not enquire, for what doe I know whether you purpose to write quodlibets. But in my judgement you doe not give a right reason why it is fitter to be grounded by lawes then by the wils of men. For the corruption of man disables him as well from the making of good lawes, as from governing well by will and pleasure. But if men are to chuse, the reason in my opinion why they will chuse to be governed by lawes, is because by lawes they may aforehand know what shall be the execution of justice, and accordingly judge thereof, and if they like and approve it, they may the better submit unto it. But if executions proceed according to the will of a Prince absolute, they cannot judge of executions before they come, because they know them not, they being left to the pleasure of men, and after they are brought forth it is too late to remedy them, if they prove evill. And the incorruptest and wisest man that ever was is fitter to give lawes and to execute just…ce thereby, then to bee trusted with execution of justice according unto pleasure; because such men come indifferent to the making of lawes, which may bee particularly interested in the manner of execution. For executions are only in particular cases, which particular cases may in speciall cencerne them that have the execution of justice. As for example, the malefactor may be a friend to the Magistrate himselfe, or a brother, or neare of k…nne, which is a shrewd tentation to provoke him (though otherwise vncorrupt and fit enough to mak: generall lawes) in this particular case to strain a good conscience, and by partialitie to corrupt the course of justice.
Secondly, in case government is by succession; lawes are most necessary, because the most wise and uncorrupt Prince is not sure to beget one like to himselfe, or if hee should yet is it not in his power to leave it unto him at such a time as by ripenes of age and experience he shall be fit for government: and by experience wee finde that many times good government in the father doth degenerate into tyrannie in the sonne. And it is true that good Princes as true fathers of their countrie and people, have sometimes remitted off their absolutenesse, the better to enjoy the heartes of their subjects (which is the best maintenance of perpetuity) then by force to compell them. Yet by your leave every Act, wherunto princes passe their consent doth not restraine them of their former liberty, or abate something of their present greatnes. For unto all acts of Parliament the King consents; yet in consenting to give him 5. Subsidies in a yeare, or restoring and confirming unto him the customes called runnage and poundage, I doe not find that hereby he either remitts of his former liberty, or abates any thing of his present greatnes.
It is true the lawes of men can have no greater perfection then men that make them; and therfore they are sayd non cavere de particularibus; for it is impossible that they should comprehend all occurrences, yet in this case there is an helpe in Christian states having a court of chancery established for the remedying of such inconveniences; without so much as taking any notice of the Pope, as the Chancelor of Christendome. For if S. Peter himselfe were alive and Bishop of Rome, yet what should he have to doe with governing of States? Our Saviour would not meddle with dividing of inheritances, and professed his Kingdom was not of this world, & Peter is commanded out of his love to his Master to feede his sheepe, not with any civill coerc…tive power and authority to governe them. Yet Popes have layd title I confesse to both swordes: but the unfittest that ever were to manage either, such abominable abuses and corruptions have beene found amongst them in the managing of both, as I think are without example.
But that rule of the Canonists, Papa …nquam sibi ligdt manus doth much inamour you, and greate zeale …oth inflame you to applye it unto God, to free him from impotent immutability, as hereafter you call it, and that his decrees may not oblige him, and indeed they doe not; for how can he be sayd to be tyed or restrayned that is confined to nothing against his will, but to every thing according to his will? But to free God from an impotent immutabilitie, you would have his decrees, not alterable, (for you dare not professe so much) but something els, I know not what, which you call reservation of liberty, and to be still as it were in making decrees, but not having decreed any thinge till the time of execution or afterward: mysterious inventions of your owne braine, which if perhaps you seeme to understand your selfe, I assure you I doe not: but hence it is that you discourse so much of the Pope in this.
3. In this Section, you beginne with telling us that God passeth no act to the prejudice of his absolute and eternall power of jurisdiction. This is a truth and will nothing serve the turne of your reaches. By the way you deliver unto us the object of Gods foreknowledge, and that you say is whatsoever will be; and the object of Gods decree, and that you say is whatsoever may be, which later is a most absurd position. Looke we upon the decrees of men the wisest of men, were they ever knowne to decree that a thing may be done? But rather supposing many things may be done they make choyse to decree the doing of such courses, as seeme most convenient. Things are possible without any reference to the decrees of God, but only in reference to his power. That is possible unto God which God can doe, or which he hath power to cause, that it be brought to passe. As for example, before the World was made it was possible that the World should be made, was this by vertue of Gods decree? Did God decree it to be possible? If he did, seeing his decrees are free it followeth that he might have chosen whether the World should have been p…ssible or no.
Againe, was not the creation of the World, is not the end of the World decreed by God, the rewarding of the godly & the punishing of the wicked, are they not decreed by God? What moves you then to make only things possible the object of Gods decree, and the things that will or shall be onelyonly the object of his foreknowledge? This witt of yours is able to make us a newe World of Divinity and Ph…losophy both, if it be let alone to runne a wilde goose race at pleasure. Well, God passeth no act to the prejudice of his absolute and eternall power of jurisdiction. What of this? In the next place, you tell us that, what grant or promise soever he makes cannot binde the exercise of his everlasting libertie for a moment of time: they last no longer then Durante bene placito: seeing gracious equitie, and only it, is his everlasting pleasure. Be it so that gracious equity is his everlasting pleasure; and will it not follow herehence that seeing all his promises doe proceed from his gracious equitie, and this you say is his everlasting pleasure, and his grants and promises must last you confesse during his good pleasure, is not this enough to assure us that whatsoever grants and promises God doth make, they doe so farre bind God to performance, that we may assure our selves they shall stand good for ever and never be reversed? OnelyOnly you discourse that they shall last no longer. And what sober man would expect or desire that they should last longer then for eternity? Or what wisedome is found in such discourse as laboureth to prove that Gods grant, shall last no longer then during pleasure, and withall confesseth that his pleasure is everlasting. But no promise you say, bindes the exercise of his everlasting libertie for a moment of time: It is fit to consider this. To my judgement Gods promises binde him as much, as our promises bind us; the force of which obligation is not to bind our liberty, but to keepe our honestie: For what promise soever he makes, he is still free naturally whether he will performe what he hath promised or no; but if he breaks his promise he shall be unt…ue. In like sort God if he should doe otherwise then he hath promised, he should be untrue, though never a whit the lesse free. And in doing what he hath promised he is both true and never a whit the lesse free.
For even men doe freely keep their promises though not alwayes willingly, because when they promised they might be of one judgement and disposition, and when they come to performance they may be of another. But all such change and alteration is not to be found in God. Every honest Magistrate is free to recompence every man according to his evill wayes; for it becomes him not to make any such promise that whatsoever he committs, he will not punish him. And looke what a good Magistrate resolves upon, when facts are committed eyther good or evill; the like may God decree from everlasting. For no Mag…strate knowes so well what man hath committed, as God from everlasting knows what he will commit. And more then that, God knowes how to keepe man from evill courses, or to expose him to evill courses, by having mercy on whom he will, and hardening whom he will; which power and wisedome is not incident to a creature. Besides all this, a Magistrate is bound by duty, to recompence every man according to his works. But God is not bound by any such duty, to any such course. He can pardon one and p…nish another; have mercy on one and deale severely with another. Of many men taken in the same transgression he can give repentance to some, deny repentance unto others. And if he hath made any such promise as this. If his children Psal. 49. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.forsake my lawe and walke not in my judgements, if they break my statutes and keep not my commandements; then will I visite their transgressions with the rodd and their iniquity with strokes, yet my loving kindnes will I not take frō him, neither will I falsify my truth; they to whome such promises are made, may be assured hereby that God is bound to perform as much, bound I say by morall obligation in such sort, as it is impossible he should doe otherwise, yet shall he perform it never a whit the lesse freely; First in respect that he doth it not by coaction and necessitation, and because he is as well pleased still to doe it as to promise it. For as much as looke of what judgement and disposition he was when he promised, of the same he is when he makes it good; and consequently performes it as willingly as he made it.
It is not alwayes so with man in the execution of his promises. If Gods one and indivisibly everlasting decree without any variety or shadow of change fitts all the changes, severall dispositions and contingent actions of men and Angells, as exactly as if he did conceive and shape a new Law for every one of them; what mooved you heretofore to professe that the reservation of libertie, and that to make grants and to revoke them, is a point of so high perfection, as that you would faine bestow it upon the nature of God? What meane you here to professe that God ceaseth not to decree, which to my understanding sounds as if the meaning were, that God is still in making of new decrees. Gods decrees continue I confesse as God himselfe continueth, and more unalterable then lawes of Medes and Persians. But neither could they bee said in this respect not to cease to make lawes, so neither can God bee said not to cease to make decrees. For like as while lawes are in making, they are not yet made; so to intimate that Gods decrees are in making (as you doe while you say God ceaseth not to decree) is to imply that Gods decrees are not yet made; which you doe more plainly signifie in the words following, when you say, They are conceived and brought forth as well befitting them as the skinne doth the body, which nature hath enwraped in it. Wherby you manifestly profess that Gods decrees are brought forth in time, not onelyonly the executions of them, and thus howsoever you flatter your readers eare with bestowing on Gods decrees the title of everlasting, yet you plainly declare your minde that they are brought forth in time, together with the execution of them.
And hereto properly tends that reservation of libertie which you magnified as an high perfection, and the power of the Popes to make grants and revoke them, as a power onelyonly fit for God. And to this purpose you seeme to discourse of eternall liberty, making use thereof to draw his decrees to a temporall condition, lest if they were eternall, they should deprive God of liberty. Let every indifferent reader judge whether this bee not the language of your heart, disclosed by the tenour of your discourses, howsoever you stile Gods decrees eternall; herein like unto boat-men, that looke one way and row another.
Besides, by this discourse of yours you seeme to acknowledge no other…d crees of God then in rewarding them according to their workes; for hitherto tends the congruity of Gods decrees, which after your manner you amplifie as no lesse congr…ous to the actions of men, then the skinne to the body. A very good resemblance by the way, that as the skin doth befit the body, so Gods recompences doe befit mens workes. Yet this you apply most incongruously to Gods decrees (for thereof runnes your discourse) and not to the executions of them, and withall as touching the actions of men, though never so gracious, though actions of faith, love, repentance, these I say are not objects of Gods decrees in your Divinity; but onelyonly the rewards of them. No not Cyrus his Es. 45. 13. 1 King. 13. 2. Gen. 15. 14 Ex. 3. 20.restoring of the Iewes, nor Iosiahs burning of the Prophets bones upon the Altar, nor the children of Israels comming out of Aegypt, nor Pharaohs dimission of them; and infinite the like, God decreed none of these by your doctrine. He decreed onelyonly the contingency of these actions, not the actions themselves.
Which doctrine of yours you are not willing to take notice of, when in the next words according to your course of argumentation, you tell us, No man living (as you take it) will avouch any absolute necessity from all eternity, that God should inevitably decree the deposition of Elies line from the priesthood, or his two sonnes destructions by the Philistims. For here you seeme to imply a grant that God decreed it, but not inevitably, and that upon his decree there followed a necessity of his deposition, but not absolute. Now it is well knowne that Solomon deposed Elies house in Abiathar freely, and the Philistims by free actions of theirs were the death of Elies sonnes. And therefore if God decreed them, the very free actions of men are the objects of Gods decrees; and consequently no action by the freedome thereof is any way hindred from being the object of Gods decrees. All which is directly contrary to your opinion, who maintaine contingency to bee the object of Gods decree, and not the thing contingent, as you have plainly exprest and professed in another Treatise; and but erst you made the decrees of God to be brought forth suitable to the actions of men, as if the actions of men were no objects at all of Gods decrees.
Againe, is it a sober distinction which here you imply, as if the decrees of God were some evitable, some inevitable; well it may be accommodated to the executions of Gods decrees, but most absurdly to Gods decrees, which being everlasting as you confesse, were before any thing could have existence to avoid them. Yet we plainly professe that God decreeth some things to come to passe necessarily as workes of natu…e, some things contingently as the actions of men. Againe, some things to come to passe inevitably, as the end of the world, some things to come to passe evitably, as the judgments of God, which may bee avoided by repentance. But you desiring to speake home, tell us that no man will avouch that it was necessary that God should decree the deposition of Elies house. Indeed decrees are free, or else they are no decrees. Neither the making of the world, nor the ending of the world was necessarily decreed by God, but freely. Yet you come very soberly to this asseveration, and adde very cautiously (I take it) implying this …o bee your opinion, not daring too confidently to avouch it to be the opinion of others. And as if you were fearfull lest you should deliver something unawares that might lie open to exception, you propose it of absolute necessity; and so you think That no man living (whether of them that be dead any have thought otherwise, that matters not) will avouch that from all eternity there was an absolute necessity that God should inevitably decree the deposition of Elies line. So that though a man should say that it was necessary that God should decree such a deposition, yet if hee doth not say that it was absolutely necessarie; or if hee doth say it was absolutely necessary that God should decree it; yet if hee doth not say that this was so from all eternitie, or though he should say this also, yet he shall not contradict you, provided he do not say that God did inevitably decree it.
And surely I cannot but commend your wary proceeding in this, and if you had used the like warinesse in everie sentence, he had need rise betime that would goe beyond you in this k…nde of warinesse and circumspection; yet to make all sure, you give a reason of it, saying, For this were to bereave him of his absolute and eternall liberty. And herein you say verie true, for if it were absolutelie necessarie for him to decree this, surelie it were not absolutelie free for him whether to decree it o… no.
Yet I finde some in opinon have transgressed in this later, but never any in the former. For Aristotle a great Philosopher hath denied God to be a free agent, and conceived him to be a necessary agent, yet never beleeved that it was necessarie for him to decree the deposition of Elies house, or ought else. And therefore you doe not well to prove a more plaine thing by that which is lesse manifest. We have as good stuffe in the next. To say that before Elies dayes God past any act that could constraine his eternall libertie of honouring Elies family, as well as any others, were impiety, because it chargeth the Almighty with impotent immutability. Herehence are certaine Aphorismes to be selected, worthy our consideration. 1. God is not to be charged with any thing that is impotent; but there is a kinde of immutability that is impotent; therefore God is not to be charged with such an immutability. Now to att…bute unto God …hat which doth not become him, is a kinde of blasphemy. The contrad…ctorie hereunto doth become God, and must be attributed unto him, to wit, immutability. For mutab…lity and immutability are termes contradictorie; and it is one of the most generall principles that are, that one of two contradictorie termes may be attributed to any thing, therefore if it be blasphemy to say God is immutable, it is no blasphemy to say that God in some cases at least is mutable. And in haec Amph…arae sub terram abd…tae? Old Prophet Ma…achy dost thou heare this, that hast instructed us this to be the voice of God, I the Lord am not changed? And thou Iames the Apostle, Mal. 3 6. …ac. 1. 17.how hast thou deceived us in ll…, that with God there is no variablenesse nor shadow of change? Yet now we are taught that it is no l…le then blasphemy to say that God is altogether immutable, yea it is to ascribe impotencie unto him. Hee must be mutable that he may be potent.
Well, let us consider wherein this impotent immutability doth consist, to wit, in not being able to reverse his owne act: so then potent mutability consists in being able to reverse his owne act. Here by the way it is acknowledged that Gods decrees are acts past, otherwise in doing contrary thereto there were no colour of mutability. Yet hitherunto it hath beene denyed, that Gods decrees were acts past. And by not passing of them there was conceited a reservation of liberty. For so you thought better to discourse, then at the first to professe any revocable nature of Gods decrees. But now that conceyte not fadging, and your selfe as it seemes not throughly satisfied, you plainely breake forth, and adventure to mainteyne that notwithstanding Gods decrees are acts past, yet he can change them, and thus farre he is mutable, and to say that God is immutable herein, is to charge him with impotency.
From the first I looked for this, and at length the partridge is sprunge. But you will say, otherwise his liberty is restrayned. I answere, this is a vayne fiction, proceeding from the vayne consideration of mans infirmities, and attributing them unto God. For man after he hath promised a thing, afterwards would fayne break his promise, either because he made it improvidently, or because he is of a fickle disposition; and therfore in performing his promise he doth it in a sort against his will. But no such improvidence is found in God, no such fickle disposition is incident to him. And therefore his will being the same still and that for good cause, his liberty is the same still. For liberty extends no farther then to doe what we can or will.
Now though God can doe otherwise absolutely, yet he will not doe otherwise; and supposing that he hath decreed to doe this it is impossible that he should doe otherwise. For God cannot change his will, for as much as all change of will in the creature, proceeds from such imperfections as are not incident to the nature of God, as namely, improvidence, or forgetfullnes, or sicklenes or the like, and yet doe not we say that the deposition of Elies race, or the death of his Sonnes were absolutely necessary.
But God had ordained them to come to passe contingently that is with a possibility to the contrary, and upon supposition not only of their miscarriage, but also of the will of God thus to punish their miscarriage. If you rest your selfe upon such a decree of God, They that dishonour me them will J…dishonour 1. Sam. 2. 30.what need you trouble the World with such distastfull speculations, as to affirme that to say God is immutable, is to charge him with impotency? But this is an indefinite proposition, and if this be all the decree you acknowledge in God, you must deny that the will of God to depose Elies line in particular from the Preisthood, was eternall, and affirme thus it had its beginning by way of reservation of liberty, but not to doe it untill Ely had dishonoured God. And such proposition as these undoubtedly are the best grounds for these your extravagant speculations; and these doe farre better suite with your first course, namely as touching reservation of liberty, and suspension of resolution, then with revocation of his decrees considered as acts past.
But the common and generall opinion of making Gods decrees eternall made you to shuffle in that a long time; and at length plainely to fall fowle upon the liberty to revoke them lest otherwise, Gods liberty should be restrayned. Of Cicero Austin sayth, that dum homines fecit liberos, fecit sacrilegos. And you to make God free make him immutable; and think to helpe it by giving us to understand that some kind of mutability is potent, like as there is an immutability which is impotent as you conceave.
4. In conclusion you tell us, that to think of Gods eternall decree without admiration voyd of danger; we must conceive it as the immediate axis or center, upon which every successive or contingent act revolves. And I professe I cannot think on this which you deliver without admiration. And the object of my admiration is, upon what axis or center your witt did revolve when you pleased your selfe with this resemblance. Yet I think there is no great danger in your meaning to make a man an hereticke. For it had neede be understood first. And he deserves to be one of your worthiest disciples that understands you in this. For like as he was a worthy Scholar that bid his Master give him positions and let him alone to prove them; so no l…sse worthy a Scholar is he also, that gives his Master leave to speake what gibrish he will, yet nothing doubts of understanding him; In this Section hereafter you say that Gods eternall decree is coexistent to each humane thought or action: But in what sense it is, your axis or center whereupon every contingent act doth revolve, you no where explane that I know. As how every act (many of them being instantaneall) hath a revolution, or how the whole body of contingent actions being drawne into one by aggregation may be sayd to turne round. As if time from the beginning of the World unto this day did turne, and the change of things to come into thinges present, & of things present into things to come, were a sphericall change; or lastly how Gods decree is the center hereof, and yet coexist with every part of the circumference; These are mysteries I confesse which we cannot think upon without admiration, yet no other danger herein doe I finde in hast, besides the wasting of precious time in the consideration of so wilde and extravagant speculations. Yet one word more of this before we part. Every contingent act revolves you say upon the axis of Gods decree.
Now I demaund whether these contingent acts are the objects of Gods decrees or no. If not, what hath Gods decree to doe with them? or they with the decree of God? let them rather be thought fitt (if you please) to revolve upon the axis of Gods knowledge, and that will be with farre lesse danger unto your tenet. For this revolution of contingent acts upon the axis of Gods decree, doth savour strongly of making them the object of Gods decrees. But this you may remember is directly opposite to your tenent, who mainteyne that God decreeth contingency but not the contingent things themselves.
The next member of the first sentence in this Section had beene very mysticall, had we not beene already reasonably well acquainted with this dialect of yours in the chapter of eternity. And upon my remembrance of that your discourse, I take that, wherein the whole frame of succession and contingency is fully comprehended, to be no other then that precious creature called time, wherein all contingent things come to passe, and so are comprehended therein as in the measure of their existence and duration. For of such a comprehension (as I take it) you doe discourse, not of substantiall or integrall comprohension; For I see no reason why the decree of God should not be the axis of the whole body of contingent things as well as of any particular of them, wheron to revolve. But you make a farre greater quiescent to be the axis of this, by which greater quiescent, I think you meane Gods eternity. For that alone is it, as heretofore you have expounded it, which drawes all the successive parts of motion into an indivisible unity of duration permanent. I am now almost growne as perfect in this canting language as your selfe.
But herein I had neede of your helpe for satisfaction, as touching certaine points. As namely, why time should be accounted by you, an unconstant and moveable sphare. Time I confesse cannot be conceaved without motion, but it is neither motion it selfe nor a thing moveable. Yet in the course of it to my understanding it is most constant; for things never so differēt in constancy or inconstancy are still measured with the same time; as whether motion be uniforme or difforme, swift or slow, the same or different, yet the time wherein motion is, is still the same.
But least of all doe I see any reason, why you should accoumpt time a Sphere. For a sphericall forme is proper unto bodyes, & such bodyes moving round are sayd to move spherically, but of sphericall time I see no congruity. Againe, why should you accoumpt eternity a farre greater quiescent, then the decree of God, you may as well say that eternity is a greater quiescent then God himselfe. Eternity as it is duratio manens, without beginning and without end, so it is of Gods decrees also.
Thirdly it is impossible that all the successive parts of motion should be drawen into an indivisible unity of duration permanent. For motion can neither be made indivisible nor permanent. Well it may cease, but it cannot be drawne into permanency, or indivisibility. Againe, duration permanent of indivisible unity (if I understand the language aright,) is eternity. But motion cannot be drawne into eternity, no more then eternity can be drawne into motion. To swallowe up motion into a vigorous rest… understand right well what it is, I am pr…ty well acquainted with this language.
It is for a Sphere of Heaven to turne round in a moment, that is to turne so swiftly, as to stand stocke still. For to be where it was immediately before this instant is to stand still. Yet if such a revolution should be in an instant, then every part of the larger Sphere should have coexistence locall with all and every part of the lower Sphere under it, provided you understand it aright, & so shall every part of the lower sphere have coexistence with all and every part of the Sphere above it, without any paynes more then ordinary. And that whether it move swiftly or slowly; to witt, in an instant. This is sober discourse, is it not? For if one body may move twise so fast as another in an instant; then in halfe an instant it may move as fast as the other in an whole instant.
In the next place you tell us, that Gods foreknowledge is included in the conceyte of his eternall decree. And you speake of the foreknowledge of things contingent. For of no other things but contingent have you spoken in reference to Gods decree; hence it followeth that contingent things are the object of Gods decree; and that therefore he foreknows them, because he hath decreed them; otherwise how could the foreknowledge of such things be included in the conceite of Gods decree? But that the foreknowledge of such things depends upon Gods decree, is a thing which you impugned in the 8. chap. and 5. Sect. pag. 96. 97. Gods ubiquitary presence you have heretofore compared sometimes to a center, sometimes to a Sphere. And there must be an analogy as here you signify, betweene his decree and his ubiquitary presence, and therefore we must beleive the decree of God to be as the axis or center upon which every contingent act revolves, but you doe not inferre that therefore it must be as a Sphere also; yet analogy requires this as well as that.
Neither did you tell us that Gods ubiquitary presence was as a center wherupon all things did revolve; though here you tell us thus much of Gods decree in respect of contingent acts. The profitable nature of this admirable conceyte is (you say) to free us from suspicion that his necessary foreknowledge should lay a necessity upon our actions, or take away all possibility of doing, otherwise. Now to prevent this suspition, we have no need of these quaint fictions of yours, as in conceiving Gods decree (or fore-knowledge rather) as an axis whereon every contingent act revolves. We say that by vertue and efficacy of Gods decree, not onelyonly some things come to passe necessarily, as the workes of naturall agents: but other things also come to passe contingently, that is, with all possibility of being otherwise, as the free actions of men, onelyonly upon supposition of Gods decree, we say it necessarily followeth that such things how contingent soever, shall come to passe: but how? not necessarily, but contingently.
In like sort supposing Gods foreknowledge of things to come, (which foreknowledge of God not onelyonly is to day, but was before the world was made, though it continueth in the notion of foreknowledge till the things are, and afterward also with the notion of knowledge) it necessarily followeth that all such things shall come to passe; but how? not necessarily but contingently: Here followes a list of what you will prove; when time serves: 1. That the Omnipotent doth eternally decree an absolute contingency in most humane acts. I pray tell me, had not this decree of God existence in the beginning of the world, and before that also? If it had, what meane you to say he doth decree it, as if this decree of God which yet you call eternall, had not existence till now? why doe you not or may you not as well say that God doth eternally decree the creating of the world, the turning of man out of Paradise, the drowning of the world in the dayes of Noah; the destruction of Sodome, and the like, for you have no colour of reason to justifie your phrasiologie herein, but onelyonly this, that though (Gods) decrees bee eternall, yet they still continue. Now this is as true of the decree of creation, and the rest above mentioned, as of any other decree. Secondly, what meane you to qualifie your assertion, by saying In most humane acts: as if you durst not avouch it of all? Are not all humane acts of a contingent nature, and consequently have a contingencie in them? and why should not their contingency be decreed as well as others? It may be that herein you have reference to the Iesuits distinction, of future contingents absolutely that shall be, and future contingents conditionall that should be, if and in case some condition were put in esse. But how then will you prove, that the acts of men that shall be, are of a greater number, then those that might or should be, in some case? For you suppose that this absolute contingency decreed, is in most humane acts. I have a manifest reason to the contrary. For the number of things that might be upon supposition, is farre greater then the number of things that are, have beene, and shall be; for in case the world had beene made twice bigger then it is, and twice as many men as there are, and should last twice as long, the number of humane acts would be farre greater then these are, wherein God hath decreed an absolute contingency.
Againe, the Iesuits maintaine that God hath not onelyonly decreed contingencie in humane acts, but the humane acts themselves, which you doe not: we maintaine that God decreeth the actions of men themselves, that they shall come to passe contingently and consequently; decreeth the contingency of them, but not that onelyonly, but the actions themselves. As Pharaohs dimission of the children of Israel, God decreed not onelyonly the contingency of it, but the act it selfe, that it should come to passe in a contingent manner. Iosiahs burning of the Prophets bones upon the Altar, God decreed not onelyonly the contingencie of this act, but the act it selfe, to wit, to come to passe in a contingent manner. So Cyrus his restoring of the Iewes out of captivitie, to their countrie, was an humane contingent act, and God decreed not onelyonly the contingencie hereof, but the act it selfe, to come to passe in a contingent manner.
2. The second Aphorisme is, that Gods eternall decree doth coexist to each humane action throughout the whole succession of time. This we doe not deny, no more then wee denie Gods coexistence with every action: but heretofore you have professed, that God doth at this present coexist with all things, not onelyonly with all things present, but with all things that are to come: and this we denie, because God cannot coexist with that which doth not coexist with him: and therefore seeing things past, and things to come, doe not at all exist at this present, and consequently doe not coexist with God, therefore we professe that God at this present doth not coexist with them.
In the next place you say, that Gods decree doth inspire them with contingency in their choice. It was wont to bee said, that praedestinatio nihil ponit in praedestinato; rather the execution of his decree doth bring things forth, then his decree; for his decree was from all eternitie, yet nothing was inspired into man, till the creation, nor into us men, untill we are brought forth, and grow capable of inspirations. When you talke of contingency in our choice, you might have spoken plainly and called it libertie in our choice. But doth God continually inspire this? It is too absurd: to inspire, is to bring forth something anew: as when God doth inspire good motions into us. You might as well say that God doth continually inspire a reasonable nature into us, as libertie of choice; more congruous it had beene to say, that God continually preserves it as he doth our natures. For as we are reasonable creatures we have essentially a libertie of choice in all that we doe: and he moves us so, as that we may move our selves more waies then one. But when doth he move us thus? in the very time of doing ought, or before? and so doth he move us by perswasion onelyonly, or by mediate operation on the will? For all this whereabouts alone there is question now adaies amongst Divines, we have nothing but blankes here: you are yet onelyonly upon the promise of performance, and not upon any performance it selfe.
Yet whilst it moves them, it withall inevitably effecteth the proportioned consequents, which were foreordained, to the choices which we make, whether they be good or evill. That is, God doth inevitably decree that they that die in faith and repentance shall be saved, they that die in impenitencie shall be damned. Wherin you nothing doubt to acknowledge an inevitable decree of God, to wit, of an indefinitive nature, thus, Whosoever beleeves shall be saved, whosoever beleeves not, shall be damned. But that these men in particular shall beleeve, and repent, and so be saved; others shall neither beleeve, nor repent, nor bee saved, you will be wise and wary enough to keepe your selfe from the acknowledgement of any such decree, unlesse it be provided that God be not charged with any such impotent immutabilitie, as not to be able to revoke his decrees. For though the Pope wants wisedome and integrity sufficient to manage such an authority and power as he challengeth to himselfe, as namely, of making grants, and againe revoking them; yet God doth not.