Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul, Chapter 39
CHAP. XXXIX. The Actions of the Vnderstanding, Invention, Wit, Iudgement; of Invention, Distrust, Prejudice, Immaturity: of Tradition, by Speech, Writing: of the Dignities and Corruption of Speech.
HItherto of the more Passive Operation of the Vnderstanding, which I called Reception or Knowledge of Objects. Now follow the more active; which consist more in the Action of Reason, than in its Apprehension▪ And they are the Actions of Invention, of Wit, and of Iudgment. The former of these hath two principall parts; the Discovering of Truth; and the Communicating of it. The former only is properly Invention; the other a Consequent thereof, Tradition: but both much making to the honour of the Faculty. For the former, I shall forbeare any large discourse touching the particular Dignities thereof, as being a thing so manifestly seen in Contemplations, Practises, dispatches in the maintaining of Societies, erecting of Lawes, government of Life; and generally, whatsoever enterprize a man fastens upon, this one Faculty it is, that hath been the Mother of so many Arts; so great Beauty and Ornament amongst men, which out of one world of things have raised another of Learning.
The Corruptions then which I conceive of this part of Invention, are,
First, a Despaire and Distrust of a mans owne Abilities: For as Corruption and Selfe Opinion is a maine Cause of Errour: so Dissidence and Feare is on the other side a wrong to Nature, in abusing those Faculties which she gave for enquiry, with Sloath and Dulnes. Multis rebus inest Magnitudo (saith Seneca) non ex naturâ suâ, sed ex debilitate nostrâ: and so likewise, Multie rebus inest difficultas; non ex natura sua, sed ex opinione nostrâ▪ Many things seem hard & involved, not because they are so, but because our suspition so misconceives them. Thus as in an affected and ill disposed Body, …very light Weaknes is more felt than a more violent distemper, where the Constitution is stronger. So with fearfull and despairing wits, every Inquiry is estimated, not according to the nature of the Object, but according to the Disopinion & slender Conceipt which they have of their own Abilities. Non calcant spina…, sed habent. It were but ridiculous for a Blind man to complaine of dark weather, when the fault is not in the Aire, but in the Eye.
Another prejudice to this Faculty, is that which I observed before on another Occasion, an Over-Reverend Opinion of those who have gone before us. For when men shall so magnifie the Gifts of others, that they sleight and neglect their owne; when out of a prejudicate Conceipt that the Antients have sufficiently perfected the Body of more serious Learnings, they shall exercise their Wits (capable of greater imploiments) in degenerate and unusefull Studies; Knowledge must needs be hindred from attaining that Maturity, to which by their owne Inventions it might be raysed. Thus as it fals out amongst men of thirstlesse Minds in their Fortunes: Divitiarum abundantia inter Causa… paupertat is est. Their profusenesse out of their present store, with a negligence to recover and new make their Estates, drawes them quickly beyond their Fortunes▪ or as it was in the like case amongst the Romanes in those times of Publique Luxury, and Effeminatenesse, the valour of their Auncestors procuring unto them large wealth, and securing them from forreigne hostility, did also by the means of that Wealth and Ease soften and melt their valour, so that their Weaknesse was principally occasioned by the invincible spirit of their Predecessors: So it is in the matter of Learning, when we spend our time onelyonly in the Legacies that our Fathers have left us, and never seeke to improve it by our owne Inventions, the Large measures of Knowledge which we receive from them, is by our preposterous use made an occasion of a Large measure of Ignorance in other inquiries, where in their Labours offer greater Assistance, than discouragement. There was not I perswade my selfe amongst the Ancients themselves, a greater means of disclosing so large a measure of Truth, than the Freedome of their owne Opinions. For notwithstanding this Liberty was often the occasion of many prodigious Births; yet this disadvantage was coun…vailed with many fruitfull and good ly iss…; all which might haply have been undi scovered, had men laboured only in Traditions, and contented themselves with Learning upon Trust. And those more Errours being still examined, were lesse pernicious than fewer beleeved. And even of them I make no question but there hath been good use made by those that have enquired into Truth. For first, there are very few Errours that have not some way or other Truth annexed unto them, which haply might not otherwise have been observed. It is an Errour in that man which shall presume of Gold hid in his Land, to dig and turne it up for no other end, but to find his Imaginary treasure; yet that stirring and softning of the Ground is a means to make it the more fertile. Lastly, this use may bee made even of Errours, when discovered in the In quiry after Truth, that they let us know what it is not: and it is speedier to come to a Positive Conclusion by a Negative Knowledge, than a naked Ignorance: as hee is sooner likely to finde out a place, who knowes which is not the way, than hee that only knows not the way.
The last Cause of Disability in the Invention may be Immaturity and Vnfurniture for want of acquainting a mans selfe with the Body of Learning: For Learning is a Tree or Body, which in one continued Frame, brancheth it selfe into sundry members: So that there is not onelyonly in the Object of the Will: which is the Good of things; but in the Object of the Vnderstanding also, which is their Truth, a certain mutuall Concatenation, whereby every part hath some reference unto the other.▪ insomuch that in the handling of particular Sciences, there are often such occurrences, as doc necessarily require an insight into other Learnings: So that of Tully is generally true, Difficile est pauca esse e… nota, Cui non sint, Tus… ▪ q. l. 2▪aut plera que aut omnia. All that addresse themselves either to the Invention of Arts not known, or to the polishing of such as are already found out, must ground their endeavours on the Experiments and Knowledge of sundry kinds of Learning.
For the other part of Invention, which I call Tradition, Communication, or Diffusion, I comprehend it within that perfection peculiar to man from all other Creatures, Oration, or Speech. Wherin I consider a double ministerial reference; the one to the eye; the other to the eare: that is Vox scripta, a Visible Voice; this Vox viva, an Audible Voice. To which purpose Scaliger acutely: Est quidem Recitator Liber Loquens, Liber recitator Mutus. The Dignities which this particular … on man, and wherein it gives him a preheminence aboue other Creatures, are taken from the Ends or Offices thereof; for the worth of every service able or Ministeriall Instrument is to bee gathered from the Regularity of its function, whereunto it is naturally instituted.
The end whereunto Living and Organicall Speech was principally ordained, is to maintaineArist. Polit. l. 1. c. 2. mutuall Society amongst men incorporated into one Body. And therefore Tully well cals it, Humana Societatis Vinculum, the Ligament and Sinnew, whereby the Body of Humane Conversation is compacted and knit into One.
It would be a long and large labour to speake of the Honour which God hath bestowed upon our Nature in this noble Gift of Speech, making our Tongue foreign, as the Poet calleth it, The…. Messenger of Reason, and as it were the Pen of the Minde which cloatheth our Conceits with Characters, and makes them obvious unto others. I shall not engage my selfe on so great an Argument, which hath already filled the Volumes of so many learned men, who have written some Rhetoricall, others morall Institutions and Precepts touching Speech. I shall therefore content my selfe with but naming some few particulars, by Consideration whereof we may acknowledge the Bounty of God, and Excellency of our Nature, which is attended on by so noble a servant.
… For the Dignity hereof it appeares in this, That whereas in other lesse Considerable Perfections, other Creatures have an Exquisitenesse above man, yet in this man excelleth all other Inferior Creatures, in that he is able to communicate the Notions of Reason cloathed in sensible Characters unto others of his owne kinde. For though some melancholy men have beleeved that…. Aug. lib. Qu… …. …x Ve…. …. …. 3. Elephants and Birds, and other Creatures have a Language whereby they discourse with one another; yet wee know that those narrow and poore Voices which Nature hath bestowed on them proceed onelyonly from the Impression of Fancy, and sensitive Appetite to serve themselves, but not to improve one another. And therefore Speech is called foreign, by the Name of Reason, because it attendeth onelyonly upon Reason. And as by this the Soule of man differeth in Excellency from all other Creatures: so in two things amongst many others (both subservient unto Reason) doth hisforeign. Arist. de part▪ … l. 4 c. 10. Vi… …. Anatom. …. 1. c. 2, 4. … in G … 2. 7. disp. de …. …. Corp▪ q. 1. Body excell them too. First, in the Vprightnesse of his Stature, whereby he is made to looke up to Heaven, and from his Countenance to let shine forth, the Impression of that Light which dwell…th within him. For the Face is the Window of the Soule▪
Proná que cum spectent Animalia caetera terram,
Os homini sublime dedi…, Caelum que tueri
Iussit▪ & erectos, ad Sydera tollere Vultus.
Whil'st other creatures downward fix their sight,
Bending to Earth an Earthly Appetite:
To man he gave a lofty Face; might looke
Vp to the Heavens; and in that spatious Booke,
So full of shining Characters, descryQuint. Instit. l. 2. c. 16. …. …hodig. l. 2. c. 30. l. 16 …. 1…. foreign Arist. de Interpre…. c. 1. Greg. N…ss. de Hom opisicio. c. 9.
Why he was made, and whether he should fly.
Next in the Faculty of Speech, which is the Gare of the Soule, through which she passeth, and the Interpreter of the Conceits, and Cogitations of the mind, as the Philosopher speaks. The uses whereof are to convey and communicate the Conceptions of the Mind (and by that means to preserve humane Society) to derive Knowledg to maintaine mutuall love and supplies; to multiply our Delights, to mitigate and unload our sorrows; but above all to Honour God, and to edifie one another, in which respect our Tongue is called our Glory. Psal. 16. 2. Act. 2. 26.foreign Eu. …pid. Hec. Sutton▪ …n C…s. cap. 70. L…c. l …. … foreign S…phocl. Elec. …. foreign Vid. …. de Eloq. l. 1. …. 4. V…l. …. l. 8. c. 9. Pluta…. l…b. de Praecept. gerend. Reip.
The force & power of Speech upon the minds of men, is almost beyond its power to expresse, How suddenly it can inflame, excite, allay, comfort, mollify, transport, and carry captive the Affections of men. Caesar with one word quiets the Commotion of an Army. Menenius Agrippa with one Apologue, the sedition of a people. Flavianus the Bishop of Antioch with one Oration; the fury of an Emperour. Anaximenes with one Artifice, the indignation of Alexander; Abigail with one Supplication, the Revenge of David; Pericles and Pisistratus even then when they spake against the peoples liberty, over ruled them by their Eloquence, to beleeve and imbrace what they spake, and by their Tongue effected that willingly, which their Sword could hardly have extorted. Pericles and Nicias are said to have still pursued the same Ends, and yet with cleane different successe. The one in advancing the same busines pleased; the other exasperated the people; and that upon no other Reason but this, the one had the Art of Perswasion which the other wanted.
foreign
One spake the Right with a slow Tongue,
Another fluently spake wrong.
He lost, this stole the Cause, and got
To make you thinke, what you thinke not.
And this power of Speech over the Minds of men is by the Poet, in that knowne passage of his thus elegantly described:
—Magn… in popule cum sapè Coorta estVirg. ….
Seditio, savit que Animus Ignobile vulgus
Ian… que faces & Saxa volant, furor arma ministrat.
Tum pietate gravem, ac merit is si fortè virūquem
Conspêxere, silent, arrectis que auribus astant:
Ille regit dictis Anim…s & pectora …ulcet.
When in a Multitude Seditions grow,
And Vicerated Minds do overflow
With swelling Ire▪ when stones & firebrands fly,
(As Rage doth every where weapons supply)
Then if some Aged man, in Honor held
For Piety, and Prudence, stand to wield,
And moderate this Tumult: strait wayes all
Rise up with silent Reverence, and let fall
Their Angry Clamors; His grave words do sway
Their Minds, and all their Discontents allay.
The Vertues of Speech (whereby it worketh with such force upon the Minde) are many, which therefore I will but name, some Grammaticall, as Property, and Fitnesse, and Congruity, withoutVid … Orat. … l. 4. … … Eliq. …. 2. Quint. l. 1. c. 5. & possim alibi. foreign. Laer…. … Zen. …. 7. Solaecismes and Barbarousnesse, some Rhetoricall, as choice, Purity, Brevity, Perspecuity, Gravity, Pleasantnesse, Vigo…, Moderate Acrimony and Vehemency; some Logicall, as Method, Order, Distribution, Demonstration, Invention, Definition, Argumentation, Refutation. A right digesting of all the Aydes of Speech; as Wit, Learning, Poverbs, Apologues, Emblemes, Histories, Lawes, Causes, and Effects, and all the Heads or Places which assist us in Invention. Some Morall, as Gravity, Truth, Seriousnesse, Integrity, Authority; When words receive weight from manners, and a mans Speech is better beleeved for his Life than for his Learning. When it appeares, That they arise esulce pectoris, and have their foundationv d. A. Gell. l. 1. c. …. 5. in Vertue, and not in Fancy. For as a man receiveth the selfe same Wine with pleasure in a pure and cleane Vessell, which he lo…ths to put unto his mouth, from one that is soule and soiled: so the selfe same Speech adorned with the Piety of one man, and disgraced with the Pravity of another, will be very apt accordingly to be received, either with delight or loathing.
—foreign.
Eurip. Hecub.A Speech from Base men, and men of Respect,
Though't be the same, works not the same Effect.
And therefore the Spartan Princes when theyPlut. lib. de Audit. A. Gell. l. 18. c. 13. heard from a man of a disallowed and suspected Life, an Opinion which they approved, They required another man of reputation to propose it: That the prejudice of the person might not procure a rejection of his Iudgement. For wee are apt to nauseate at very good meat, when we know that an ill Cooke did dresse it. And therefore it is a very true Character which Tully and Quintilian Quint. l. 12. c. 1.give of a right Oratour. That he must be Vir bonus dicendi Peritus, as well a Good man as a Good speaker. Otherwise though he may speake with admirable wit, to the fancy of his hearers, he will have but little power over their Affections. Like a fire made of greene wood, which is fed with it as it is fewell, but quencheed as it is greene.
Lastly, some are Civill in Causes Deliberative, or Iuridicall, as Wisedome, pertinency and fitnes to the Nature and Exigence of the End or—foreign Sophot. Aj…x. Matter whereupon we speake. For in that case we are to ponder and measure what we say, by the end whereunto we say it, and to fit it to all the Circumstances incident thereunto. Paul amongst the Philosophers disputed with them from the Inscription of their Altar, from the Authority of their Poets, and from confessed Maximes of Reason, by these degrees convincing them of Idolatry, and lending them to Repentance. But amongst the Iewes hee disputed out of Scripture. With Felix that looked for money, he disputed of Righteousnesse and Iudgement to come, but amongst the Pharisees and Sadduces, of the Resurrection, that a Dissention amongst themselves mightforeign S…phocl. Aj…x. procure a party for him. It is not wisedome for a man in misery to speake with a high stile: or a man in Dignity with a Creeping. The same speech may be excellent in an umbratile Exercitation, which would be too pedanticall, and smelling of the Lampe in a matter of serious and weighty debate; and that may be dainty meat i… one place for the fancy, which in another would be too thinne for the Conscience. Nature hath guarded and compassed in the Tongue with the lips, like a folding Gate, and with the Teeth likePetulanti… verborum co… … esse opposit … …, &c. A. Gell. l. 1. c. 15. a double Hedge, that wee might be admonished to weigh and ponder our words before we produce them.
These are the principall Vertues. And in Opposition unto these, wee may easily collect the principall Corruptions of this Faculty, which I will content my selfe with but the naming.
The Vices in Grammer, are Solaecismes, Barbarismes, Obsoletenesse, Impropriety, Incongruity of Speech. In Rhetoricke, Sordidnesse, Tediousnesse, Obscurity, Flatnesse of Conceit, Argutenesse, and Minutiae, Gawdinesse, Wordinesse, and Empty Ostentation. In Morals, the VicesVid. Plut. de …. & …. Cl…m. Alex. Padag. l. 2 c. 7 S…uck. Con…iv. l. 4. c. 17. & 19. Coel. Rhodig. l. 7. c. 26. may be comprised under these two Generals, Multiloquium and Turpiloquium, Garrulous and Rotten Communication. Lastly in Civill Respects, Levity and Impertinency, like the advices of Thersites, foreign Many and to little purpose.
But besides all these, there is one thing whichDe …. Cle…. Al…x Padag. l. 2. c. 9. … spec…es qu… plurima extra Iustitu … nostrum, … … perjuria, … dicta, …, Dicteria, Ob…, &c seemeth to be the most proper Corrupter of this Ornament of Speech, and that is a Lye. For a… every thing is then most Regular when it retains the purity of its first office and institution: So on the other side it is most depraved, when it deviates from that service, whereunto it was principally ordained. Thus a Picture, though it be never so much in the frame abused, crackt, spotted, or made any other way unvaluable; yet if the resemblance which it beares, be expresse and lively, we still call it a true Picture: whereas if that be a false and deceitfull resemblance (be all other adventitious Ornaments never so exquisite) wee still accompt it False and Corrupt: So it is with the Speech of man, which though of never so great Weaknesse and Insufficiency in other respects; yet if it retain that one property of shaping it selfe to the Conceipts of the Mind, and make levell and proportionable the words with the thoughts, it may still be said to be (though not a good) yet in some respect a Regular Speech, in that it is conformable to the first institution: But be all other Excellencies never so great; yet if it be a false Image of our Intentions, Nature is diverted from her prime End, and the Faculty quite depraved, as for saking its originall office: and indeed, other Morall Duties of the Tongue do necessarily presuppose this adequation and conformity to the thoughts, which I speake of, without which they are but Hipocrisie, and come within the compasse of the noted Corruption, a Lye: for every Hipocrite is a Lyer. I confesse there are Sinnes of Speech greater than a Lye, in the intention and degrees of their owne Guilt: But herein is the difference: the Tongue may in it (whether Morally religiously considered) beare a double Irregularity (wherein it differs from other powers.)
First it may be Vnconformable to the Law of right Reason, as in all manner of vitious and unsavory Speeches. And the Corruption which hereby it incurres, is common to it with other Faculties, as the disproportion betweene Evill Thoughts and Reason dictating the contrary, worketh Corruption in the thoughts.
And then secondly it may be disproportioned to the Conceipts of the Mind in proposing them otherwise than they are inwardly …, and this is properly a Lye. Which I therefore call the principall Corruption of Speech, not (as I said) because I conceive in it a greater measure of heinousnesse and Guilt, than in any other Speeches (because all Guilt followes the Incomformity and Remotion from the Law of God and Reason; and therein other Speeches, as Blasphemy, and Sedition, may have a greater measure of wickednes) but because in a Lye I finde both the forenamed Irregularities, it being a Speech not only uneven to the Conceipts of the Mind; but repugnant also to the Will of God, and the Law of Na ture.
The next kind of Active Operations were those of Wit. The use whereof is so much the more Excellent, by how much the Wrestings and Abuse of it is the more dangerous▪ I shall sufficiently declare the worth of it, by shewing what it is: For I take not Wit in that common Acceptation, whereby men understand some sudden flashes of Conceipt, whether in Stile or Conference, which like …otten wood in the darke, have more Shine than Substance; whose Vse and Ornament are like themselves Swift and Vanishing; at once both Admired and Forgotten: but I understand a setled, constant, habituall sufficiency of the Vnderstanding, whereby it is inabled in any kinde of Learning, Theory, or Practise, both to sharpnes in Search, subtilty in Expression, and dispatch in Execution. As for that other kinde seen in Panegyricks, Declamatory Discourses, Epigrams, and other the like sudden issues of the braine, they are feats only and sleights, not Duties and Ministeries of the Wit, which serve rather for Ostentation than Vse: and are onelyonly the Remission of the Mind and Vnbending of the thoughts from more severe Knowledge: as walking for recreation is rather Exercise than Travell, although by the violence of the motion, or length of the way there may ensue Sweat and Wearinesse.
Now for the Corrupters of the Wit, though there be diverse; yet none so immediate and certaine as it selfe, if alone: For Wit, though it bee Swift, yet is often Blind. And therefore the faster it hastens in Errour, the more dangerous it is to it selfe. And hence it is, that as Learning was never more bound to any, than those men, who have been emment in this Faculty, if they swayed it by Moderation and Prudence: So none have been more pernicious and violent Oppugners of Truth, than men best furnished with Acutenesse, when they turned the use of it to the strengthning of their owne Fancies, and not submitted it to Iudgement and Examination. As the fattest Soiles in Greece caused the greatest troubles; and the Beauty of Helena, the ruine of Troy. Wit like Wine is a good remedy against the poison of the Minde; but being it selfe poisoned, it doth kill the sooner. There ought to be… for the right disposing of our Inventions, a mutuall reference and service between Wit and Iudgement. It is a vexation of Mind to discerne what is right and profitable, and have no inablement to attaine it: and that is Iudgement without Wit. And to have a facility of compassing an End, and a working and restlesse fancy, without direction to fasten it on a fit Object, is the onelyonly course to multiply Errour, and to be still in Motion, not as in a path, but as in a Maze or Circle, where is continuall toyle, without any proficience or gaine of Way; and this is Wit without Iudgement. They ought therefore, I say, to be mutuall Coadjutors each to other. Wit is the Spurre to stirre up and quicken the Vnderstanding: and Iudgement is the Bridle to sway and moderate Wit: Wit is the Hand and Foot▪ for Execution and Motion; but Iudgement is the Eye for Examination and Direction. Lastly, Wit is the Sayle and Oare to further the progresse in any Inquiry; but Iudgement is the Ballace to Poise, and the Steere to guide the course to its intended End.
Now the manner of the Iudgements Operation in directing either our Practise or Contemplation is by a discourse of the Mind, whereby it …educeth them to certaine Grounds and Principles, whereunto they ought chiefly to be conformable. And from hence is that Reason which Quintilian observes, why shallow and floating Wits seeme oftentimes more fluent than men of greater sufficiencies: For, saith he, those other admit of every sudden flash or Conceipt, without any Examination; but apud Sapientes est …lectio & Modus: They first weigh things before they utter th…m.
The maine Corruption of Iudgement in this Office, is Prejudice and Prepossession. The Duty of Iudgement is to discerne between Obliquities and right Actions, and to reduce all to the Law of Reason. And therefore tis true in this, as in the course of publique Iudgements: That respect of persons, or things, blind the Eyes, and maketh the Vnderstanding to determine according to Affection, and not according to Truth Though indeed some Passions there are, which rather hood-winke then distemper or hurt the Iudgement▪ so that the false determination thereof cannot bee well called a Mistake, but a Lye: Of which kind flattery is the principall, when the Affections of Hope and Feare debase a man, and cause him to dissemble his owne opinion.