Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul, Chapter 40
CHAP. XL. Of the Actions of the Vnderstanding upon the Will, with respect to the End and Means. The Power of the Vnderstanding over the Will, not Commanding, but directing the Objects of the Will to bee good and convenient. Corrupt Will lookes only at Good present. Two Acts of the Vnderstanding, Knowledge and Consideration. It must also be possible, and with respect to happinesse Immortall. Ignorance and Weaknesse in the Understanding, in proposing the right means to the last End.
HItherto of the Actions of the Vnderstanding, Ad extra, in regard of an Object. Those Ad Intra, in regard of the Will: Wherein the Vnderstanding is a Minister o… Counsellor to it, are either to furnish it with an End, whereon to fasten its desires: or to direct it in the means conducible to that end. For the Will alone is a blind Faculty; and therefore as it cannot see the right Good it ought to affect without the Assistance of an Informing Power. So neither can it see the right way it ought to take for procuring that Good without the direction of a Conducting power. As it hath not Iudgment to discover an End: So neither hath it Discourse to judge of the right Means, whereby that may be attained. So that all the Acts of the Will necessarily presuppose some precedent guiding Acts in the Vnderstanding, whereby they are pro portioned to the Rules of right Reason. This Operation of the Vnderstanding is usually by the Schoole-men called Imperium, or Mandatum, a Mandate or Command; because it is a Precept, to which the will ought to be obedient. For the Rules of Living and Doing well, are the Statutes (as it were) and Dictates of right Reason. But yet it may not hence be concluded that the Vnderstanding hath any Superiority, in regard of Dominion over the Will; though it have Priority in regard of Operation. The Power of the Vnderstanding over the Will, is onelyonly a Regulating and Directing, it is no Constraining or Compulsive Power. For the Will alwaies is Domina s…orum actuum: The Mistresse of her owne Operation: For Intellectus non imperat, sed solumm…dò significat voluntatem imperantis. It doth only intimate unto the Will, the Pleasure and Law of God: some seeds whereof remaine in the Nature of man. The Precepts then of right Reason are not therefore Commands, because they are proposed by way of Man date; but therfore they are in that manner proposed, because they are by Reason apprehended to be the Commands of a Divine Superior Power. And therefore in the breach of any such Dictates we are not said properly to offend our Vnderstanding; but to sinne against our Law giver. As in Civill Policy, the offences of men are not against inferiour Officers; but against that soveraigne Power, which is the Fountaine of Law, and under whose Authority all subordinate Magistrates have their proportion of government. Besides, Ejus est imperare, Cujus est punire: For Law and Punishment being Relatives, and mutually connotating each the other, it must necessarily follow, that from that power only canbe an imposition of law, from which may be an Infliction of Punishment.
Now the Condition under which the Vnderstanding is both to apprehend and propose any either end, or means convenient to the Nature of the Will, and of Sufficiency to move it, are that they have in them Goodnesse, Possibility; and in the end (if we speak of an utmost one) Immortality too. Every true Object of any Power, is that which beareth such a perfect Relation of convenience & fitnes therunto, that it is able to accomplish all its desires. Now since Malum is Destruct…vum all Evill is Destructive. It is impossible that by it selfe, without a counterfeit and adulterate face, it should ever have any Attractive Power over the Desires of the Will. And on the other side, since Omne bonum, is Perfectivum; since Good is perfective, and apt to bring reall satisfaction along with it, most certainly would it be desired by the Will, were it not that our Vnderstandings are clouded and carried away with some crooked misapprehensions; and the Will it selfe corrupted in its owne Inelinations.
But yet though all mans Faculties are so depraved, that he is not able as he ought, to will any Divine and Perfect Good▪ yet so much he retains of his Perfection, as that he cannot possibly desire any thing, which he apprehends as absolutely disagreeable & destructive to his Nature; since all Naturall Agents ayme still at their owne Perfection. And therefore impossible it is, that either Good should be refused, without any apprehension of Disconvenience; or Evill pursued, without any appearance of Congruity or Satisfaction. That it may appeare therefore how the Vnderstanding doth alwaies propose those Objects, as Good to the Will, which are notwithstanding, not only in their owne Nature, but in the Apprehension of the Vnderstanding it selfe knowne to be evill. And on the contrary, why it doth propose good Objects, contrary to its owne Knowledge, as Evill. We may distinguish two opposite conditions in Good and Evill: For first, all Evill of Sin, (though it have Disconvenience to mans Nature, as it is Destructive; yet) on the other side, it hath agreement thereunto, as it is crooked and corrupt. As continuall drinking is most convenient to the distemper of an Hydropticke Body, though most disconvenient to its present welfare. Now then as no man possessed with that disease, desires drinke for this end, because he would dye, though he know that this is the next way to bring him to his Death; but only to give satisfaction to his present Appetite: So neither doth man follow exorbitant and crooked courses, onelyonly that hee may therby come to Destruction (though he is not ignorant of that issue) but onelyonly to give way to the propension of his depraved Nature. In the same manner likewise Goodnes, though it have the most absolute Convenience to man, as it is Perseclive, & in respect of his finall advancement thereby; yet … hath as great a disconvenience toward mens corrupt Faculties, as it is a strait rule to s…uare them by, & in respect of its R…ctitude. As light, thou…h it be in its own property, the perfection of the Eyes; yet to distempered Eyes, it works more trouble than delight,foreign. A…st …thic. l. 3. …. 7. because as in Philosophy▪ Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis so, Quicquid appetitur, appetitur ad modum appetenti…. So that if the … it selfe bee by inherent pollution depraved and evill, it cannot but desire every thing that beares proportion & conformity to its own distempers. And this I take to be the maine reason, why men of corrupt and irregular desires, oftentimes fasten Delight on those Objects which they know to be Evill, and are quite averse from those which yet they assent unto as Good.
To which I may adde another, namely, the Resolution of a Corrupt Will to yeeld unto it selfe all Present Satisfaction, and not to suffer it selfe to be swayed with the Preoccupation of a Future Estate: Insomuch that the small content which mans Nature receiveth from the Actuall fru…ion of some instant-conceited Good, prevailes more to draw on Appetite, then the fearfull Expectation of ensuing Misery, can to deterre from it. And the present irksomnesse of Pious Duties, have more power to divert the corrupt Minde from them; then the Fore-conceipt of Eternall blisse can have to allure the Mind unto a Delight in them. Hence then it appeares, what I understand by that first condition, wherewith Reason is to propose any End or Means to the Will, that it may be desired; namely, Sub Ratione Boni, under the Condition of Good, not alwayes True and Morall; but somtimes as it is so apprehended by a depraved Vnderstanding, Sub conceptu Convenientia: as it beares Conformity to the present Crooked Estate of mans Will: a Deprâved Vnderstanding I say, and not alwaies properly and precisely a Darkened Vnderstanding; Depraved by Neglect and Inconsiderablenesse; not darkned by Ignorance and Blindnesse. For there may bee an Irregular Will with a Iudgement rightly informed by Truth. Otherwise there could not be any offence of Presumption and Knowledge. We are therefore to consider that there is in a Well-stayed Reason, a double Act in the directing of the Will. The one respecteth the Nature and Quality of the Object: the other, more peculiarly the Circumstance of Time: the one is properly Knowledge; the other Circumspection, arising out of Meditation, and more close pressing of the Object, which is knowne as Good to the Will, against Insinuations of Sensitive Desires, which aime onelyonly a… the Fruition of pleasure present. First, the Vnderstanding proposeth to the Will Felicity, as an Absolute and Eternall Good, which cannot but be desired. Next, it proposeth means for the attaining of it; namely, the practise of these Precepts, which are revealed unto us as necessary for purchasing the End desired. The Will being, besides its own Corruption, transported by the Sensitive Appetite, finds great Irksomnesse in those means. A re…raint of al those present Ioyes, Delights, Satisfactions, which it instantly pursues: it perceiveth that great trouble is to be expected, many Prejudices and Difficulties to be grapled with; a severe hand to be held over Passions; a narrow Restraint to be observed towards Mutinous and Rebellious Eruptions of the Minde, fewer inablements for advancing our Fortunes, and infinite other the like bars of present contentment; which withdraw the Will, and make it renounce courses so severe and disagreeable to the Liberty it desires. Hereupon comes the second Act of the Vnderstanding, Efficacy and Weight of Consideration, whereby it compares the Circumstances of that Difficulty of Good to the Will in regard of the small time, they shall continue; with the consequent and unspeakable Good, that will in the end ensue there from, and also with the unsufferable Torments that follow the vilenesse of present Pleasures. Whence the Will is made more inclinable (by the Assistance of greater Power than its owne) to goe along rather through Thornes with Vertue, than with adulterate and painted pleasures to daunce towards ruine.
Now of these two, the defect of the former works properly a Blinded Vnderstanding; but the Defect of the Latter, namely, an Insufficiency and Inefficacy of pondering the Circumstances, and pressing the endlesse Consequence of Good or Evill, works properly a Depraved Vnderstanding, in regard of Practicall or Applicative Direction. As a man walking in some deep Contemplation by a Ditch; though his Eyes be open to see a present danger before him, yet may happly fall into it; not out of Blindnesse, but out of Inconsideratenesse, as not fixing his conceipt thereon; but being wholly possessed with other thoughts. In like manner, the Vnderstanding being taken up by the Imposture of the Affections, with the conceit of present Good, or present Ill in any Object, and thereby being diverted from a serious Inquiry, after the true Rectitude and Obliquity therof, suffers the Will fearfully to plunge it self in danger and misery.
Another Condition, under which and End or Means are to be proposed by the Will, is Sub rationo Eossibilis, as a good Possible. For if once the Vnderstanding discover Impossibility in any Object, the Will cannot fasten any desire upon it: Since all Appetite is only terminated by that which can replennish and satiate the Power. Now all Satisfaction is by Fruition; all Fruition necessarily presupposeth a Possibility of Acquiring: So that where this is taken away, the Will is left Hopelesse, and therefore Desirelesse; and therefore we see that the neerer any things comes to Impossibility, the more averse is the Will of most men from it: as is plaine in these things that are perplexed and difficult to ateaine. And if here the wish of him in the Poet be objected:
O mihi praeteritos refer at fi Iupiter ann…s?
O that Iove would me restore,
The yeares that I have liv'd before.
It may be answered that this was a Wish only, and not a Will. Since that which a man willeth, he doth really endeavour to obtaine.
The last Condition (which is restrained onelyonly to the utmost end of mans desire) is that it bee proposed, Sub ratione Immortalis, as an Immortall Good. The Endlesnesse of Happinesse is that only which maketh it a perfect End. For the Mind of man naturally is carried to an Immortality of Being; and therefore also consequently to an Immortality of Happinesss; it being a necessary Desire of all Naturall Agents, to attaine a Perfection proportionate to the measure of their Continuance. So then mans End must not be only Good, but for ever Good, Totally and Eternally: not onelyonly a Fulnesse of Ioy in the nature of it; but a Fulnesse of Perpetuity in the Continuance. Most perfect in proportion in the Spirituality; most infinite in proportion to the Immortality of mans Soule. The Frailty and Languishing of any Good, and a Foresight of the losse thereof, with the ablest Mi…ds doth much weaken the Desire of it. And the reason is, because Providence and Forecast is a certaine companion of the humane Nature; and he which is most a man, is most carefull to contrive the advancement of his Future Estate. It is beastiall to fasten only upon Present Good; this being a maine difference between the Vnderstanding, and the Sensuall Appetite, that this respecteth only the present Ioy that is at hand; but that being secretly conscious of its owne Immortality, fastens it selfe upon the remotest times, yea outrunnes all time, and suffers it selfe to bee ever swallowed up with the Meditation and Providence of an Endlesse Happinesse. And thereforeEthic. l. 1. the reason that Aristotle brings against his Masters Ideas, argues an Vnderstanding lesse Divine in this particular than Plato's was, when hee saith that Eternity doth no more perfect the Nature of Good, than Continuance doth the Nature of White. For though it be true, that it is not any Essentiall part of Goodnesse in it selfe; yet it is a necessary and principall condition to make Goodnesse, Happines; that is, an Adequate Obiect to mans Desires; there is not then the same proportion between Eternity and Good, as there is between Continuance and White: For Continuance is altogether Extrinsicall and Irrelative in respect of White; but the Happinesse of man hath an Intrinsicall Connection with Immortality, because mans Vtmost and Adequate Good must be proportioned to the Nature of his Minde (for that is no perfect Good that doth not every way replennish and leave nothing behind it that may be desired) So that man himselfe being Endlesse, can have none End able to limit his desires, but an Infinite and Immortall Good; which hee may enjoy without any anxiety for After-Provision. I dare say there is not an A theist in the world, who hath in his Life be-beasted himselfe by setting his Desires onelyonly on Transitory and Perishable goods, that would not on his death-bed count it the best bargain he ever made to change Souls, with one of those whose Diligence in providing for a Future Happinesse, hee hath often in his beastly Sensuality impiously derided.
Now of these two Directions of the Vnderstanding to the Will, in desiring the End or Means, the Corruption is for the most part more grosse and palpable in Assistance to the Means, than in the Discovery of the End; and farre oftner fayles the Will herein than in proposing an Object to fix its Desires upon. For we may continually observe, how a world of men agree all in opinions and wishes about the same Supreme and Immortall Happinesse, the Beatificall Vision; Every Balaam fastens on that; and yet their means unto it are so jarring and opposite, that a looker on would conceive it impossible that there should be any Agreement in an End, where is such notable Discord in the wayes to it. The reason which I conceive of this difference, is the severall Proportion, which the true End and the true Means thereunto beare unto the Will of man. For it is observable, that there is but one Generall Hinderance or Errour about the right End, namely the Ignorance thereof. For being once truly delivered to the Vnderstanding, it carries such a proportion to the nature of the Will (being a most perfect fulfilling of all its wishes) that it is impossible not to desire it; but the disproportion betweene man and the right means of a true End is farre Greater. For there is not only Errour in the Speculation of them, but reluctance in other practique Faculties, proceeding from their generall Corruption in this Estate, and nayling the Affection on the present Delight of Sensuall Objects. First, for the Vnderstanding, I observe therein a double Hinderance concerning these Means: Ignorance Ignorantia & Difficultas. Aug.and Weaknesse; the one respects the Examination of them; the other, their Presentation or Inforcement upon the Wil. For the former of these, there seemes to bee an equall difficulty between the End and the Means, as proceeding in both from the same Root. But in this very convenience there is a great difference; for the Ignorance of the End is farre more preventable (considering the Helps we have to know it) than of the Means. Not but that there are as powerfull Directions for the Knowledge of the Means, as of the End; but because they are in their Number many, and in their Nature repugnant to mans Corrupt Minds. There is therfore more Wearinesse, and by consequence▪ more Difficulty in the Inquiry after them, than after the End, because that is in it selfe but One; and besides, beares with it (under the generall Notion of Happinesse) such an absolute Conformity to mans Nature, as admits of no Refusall or Opposition: Insomuch that many that know Heaven to be the End of their Desires, know yet scarse one foot of the way thither.
Now besides this Ignorance, when the Knowledge of the means is gotten, there are many prejudices to be expected before a free Exercise of them. For (as Aristotle observes) amongst all the Conditions required to Morall Practise, Knowledge hath the least sway. It hath the lowest place in Vertue, though the highest in Learning.
There is secondly in the Vnderstanding Weaknesse, whereby it oftentimes connives at the Irregular Motion of the Will, & with drawes it from Examining with a piercing and fixed Eye, with an Impartiall and Bribelesse Iudgement, with Efficacy and weight of Meditation, the severall Passages of all our Actions, with all the present and consequent Inconveniences of crooked courses. It were a vaste labour to runne over all the Oppositions, which vertuous means, leading to an Happy End, doe alwayes finde in the severall Faculties of man: how the Will it selfe is stubborne and froward; the Passions Rebellious, and Impatient of Suppression; the Senses and Sensitive Appetite thwart and wayward, creeping alwayes like those under-Coelestiall Orbes into another motion, quite contrary to that which the Primum Mobile: Illightened Reason should conferre upon them. Sufficient it is, that there is a Disproportion between the means of Happinesse, and the generall Nature of Corrupt man. For all Goodnesse is necessarily adjoyned with Rectitude and Streightnesse (in that it is a Rule to direct our Life) and therefore a Good man, is called an Vpright man; one that is every where Even and Strait. To which Aristotle perhaps had one Eye, when hee called his Happyman, a Foure-square man, which is every where smooth, stable, and like himselfe. But now on the other side, mans Nature in this Estate of Corruption, is a Distorted and Crooked Nature; and therfore altogether unconformable to the Goodnesse which should as a Cannon, direct it to the true and principall End it aymeth at. And this is the reason, why so many men are Impatient of the close and narrow passage of Honesty. For crooked and reeling Movers necessarily require more Liberty of way, more broad courses to exerise themselves in: as wee see in naturall Bodies, a crooked thing will not bee held within so narrow bounds as that, which is strait.