Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul, Chapter 38
CHAP. XXXVIII. Of Errours: the Causes thereof: the Abuses of Principles, Palsifying them: or Transferring the Truth of them out of their owne bounds. Affections of Singularity, and Novell courses. Credulity and Thraldome of Iudgement unto others. How Antiquity is to be honoured. Affection to particular Objects, corrupteth Iudgement. Curiosity in searching things Secret.
THe other maine Corruption of Knowledge was Errour, whereby I understand a peremptory and habituall assent, firmly and without wavering fixed upon some falshood under the shew of truth. It is Aristotles assertion in his Ethicks, that one man may conceive himselfe as certaine of his Errour, as another man of his Knowledge: and this indeed is so much the more dangerous Aberration from Knowledge, by how much it seemes most …erly to resemble it.
If wee enquire after the prime Fundamentall Cause, the Gate by which Errour came first into the World. Syracides will tell us in a word, that Errour and Darknesse had their beginning together with Sinners: And the reason is, because sinne being a partition-wall, and a separation of man from God, who is P…ter Luminum, the Father and Fountaine of all Knowledge; and whose perfections man did at first one principall way by Knowledge resemble, cannot chuse but bring with it darknesse and confusion into the Soule. But I shall enquire rather after the more Immediate and Secondary Causes; some whereof, amongst sundry others, I take to be these:
1 A first and most speciall one is the Abuse of Principles: For the Vnderstanding must have ever somthing to rest it selfe upon: and from the conformity of other things, thereunto to gather the certainty and evidence of its Assents. For it is the nature of mans minde, since it had at first it selfe a beginning to abhorre all manner of Infinity, á Parte-Ante (I meane in Ascending and Resolution) as well of Sciences and Conclusions, as of Entities and Natures, as I before noted. And therefore as the Vnderstanding is not quieted in Philosophicall inquiries about created things, till it have according to their severall differences ranged them severally within the compasse of some Finite Line, and subordinated the Inferiors of every kinde, Sub an… Summ… Genere, under oneArist. phys. l. 7. chiefe; and rests not in the Resolution of Effects into their Causes, till it come to Aliquid primum, in Time, in Motion, in Place, in Causality, and Essentiall Dependance: so likewise it is in Knowledge & Truth, notwithstanding a Parte Post, downward, our pursuits of them seeme Infinite and Vnlimited, by reason of our owne Infinities, and Aeviternity that way; yet upward in the resolving of Truth into its Causes and Originals, the Vnderstanding is altogether Impatient of proceeding in Infinitum, and never rests till it finds a Non …ltra, an utmost linke in the chaine of any Science, and such a Prime, Vniversall, Vnquestionable, Vnprovable Truth, from whence all Inferiour Collections are fundamentally raised, and this is the Truth of Principles: which if it be traduced and made crooked by the wrestings of any private conceipt, mishapes all Conclusions that are derived from it: for if the foundation be weak, the whole edifice totters; if the root and fountain bee bitter, all the branches and streames have their proportionable corruptions.
Now the Abuses of Principles, is either by Falsifying and casting absurd Glosses upon them within their owne limits; as when Philosophicall Errours are falsly grounded upon Philosophicall Axiomes, which is Error Consequentia, or Illationis, an Errour in the Consequence of one from the other: or else by transferring the Truth of them beyond their owne bounds, into the Territories (as I may so speake) of another Science, making them to encroach and to uphold Conclusions contrary to the nature of their Subject; which is Error Dependentia, or Subordinationis, an Errour in the Dependance of one on the other. For the former, it hath been alwaies either the subtilty or modesty of errour to shrowd it self under truth; & that it might make its fancies the more plausible, to fasten them upon undenyable grounds, & by a strange kinde of Chimistry, to extract darknesse out of light. †Liv. l. 28.Fraus sibi ex parvis, (said Fabius Maximus in Livy upon another occasion.) I will alter it thus, Error sibi ex principlijs fidem prastruit, ut cum magnâ mercede fallat. *Ex bis ea… impugnat, ex quibus constat. Tertull. de Baptis. c. …. Uid … pras…r. c. 36. 39. Sententias per primas com … Argumentis … ▪ de …. c. …. Inde sumentes prasidia, quò pugnant. c. 50. Omnia advers… …, de ipsà Veritate construct… sunt. Apolog. c. 47.Vnreasonable and groundlesse fancies alwaies shelter themselves under a plausible pretence of truth and ostentation of Reason. †…. Alex. in ….As Praxitiles the Painter drew the Picture of Venus by the face of his Minion Cratina, that so by an honourable pretext he might procure Adoration to a Harlot. *Cic. Orat. l. 1. I… Ir…idendu Oratoribus O … Summu….Thus as Plat… is said, when he inveighed chiefly against Orators, most of all to have played the Oratou… (making a Sword of …loquence to wound it selfe:) So they on the contrary, never more wrong Knowledge, than when they promise to promote it most. It was the custome of that Scipio, honoured afterward by the name of his Punicke Conquest, alwaies before he set upon any businesse, as Livy reports of him) to enter the Capitoll alone, pretending thereby a consultation with the gods about the justnesse, issue, and successe of his intended designes; and then, Apud multitudinem, plerum que Liv. l. 26. N… aliter N… ma Simul…ns sibi cum dea … no…nes congressus esse, apud …. …. l. 1. Vid. V…. Max. l. 1. c. 2. Plut. in Num….velut mente divinitus monitâ agebat: Hee bore the multitude in hand, that whatsoever exploits hee persuaded them to attempt, had all the Approbation and Vnerring Iudgement of their Deities. What were the ends of this man, whither an Ambitious hope of fastning an Opinion of his owne Divinenesse in the midst of the people, or an happy and politicke imposture, the better to presse those people (alwaies more inclinable to the perswasions of Superstitions than Reason) to a free Execution of his designes, it is not here necessary to enquire. Sure I am▪ even in matters of greatest consequence, there have never been wanting the like Impostors, who boldly pretend unto Truth, when they cunningly oppose it: as Iacob in Esa…'s Cloathes, robbed Esau of the Blessing: or as the Ivy, which when it embraceth the Oake, doth withall weaken and consume it. And this is a very preposterous and perverse method, first to entertaine Corrupt Conceits, and then to *Scriptura…li esse volumus quae nostra …. Aug. vid. qua advers… …nc Curioscitatis … p…ssim occ…rrunt apud Tertull Apol. c. 46▪ 47. co…tr. Hermog. c. 1. ac praescr. c. 17. 38, 39, 40 De R…surrect c. 40. De sug. in per…t. c. 6. De …dic. c. 16. Simplicitatem s… … Ec …, …d v…lunt significare, quod ipsi senti… ▪ Epiph. ad Ioan. Hier…sol. … Martyr. … …. …. Alex. Stro…. l. 7. p. 54…. D. …. g. c. …. … …oe lest. l. 1. c. 42. De Grate Christi.wrest and hale Principles to the countenancing and protecting of them. It being in the errors of the mind, as in the distempers of the palate usuall with men to find their owne rellish in every thing they read.
Concerning the other Abuse, it is an often observation of Aristotle, that Principles and Con clusions must be within the Sphaere of the same Science; and that a man of Learning ought al waies to be faithfull unto his owne Subject, and make no Excursions from it into another Science. And therefore he saith that it is an equall absurdity for a Mathematician (whose conclusions ought to be peremptory, and grounded on principles of infallible evidence) only to ground them on Rhetoricall probabilities, as it were for a Rhe…oritian, whose Arguments should bee more plausible and insinuative, to leave all unsaid that might reasonably be spoken, except it may bee proved by demonstrative principles. This leaping a Genere ad Genus, and confounding the dependancies of Truth, by transferring Principles untoforeign ▪ Clem. Alex. …erom. 6. Sciences, which they belong not unto, hath been ever prejudiciall to Knowledge; and Errour hath easily thereby crept upon the weakest apprehensions, while men have examined the conclusions of one Science by the Principles of another. As when Religion which should subdue and captivate, is made to stoop & bow to Reason▪ and when those Assents which should be grounded upon Faith, and not on meer humane disquisition, shall be admitted according to the conformity which they have with †Viderint qui Si…lcum, & Plato…icum, & dial…cticum … …. …. de pr… script. c. 7.Nature, and no farther. And hence it is that so many of the Philosophers denyed those two maine Doctrines, of the Creation and Resurrection (*Cit. lib. de Univers…. Plat. in Tim…o …seb. de …. …van. l. 11. c. …9. Theod. ser. 4. C…m. Alex▪ Str…m. l. 5. Q… & Re… … Philosophis … … (… …e▪ … doctrin…) affirmat. E…b lib. 11. c. 33. 36. Tertull. de Resu…rect. …. c. 1. Niscio an bu… etiam per… illa. S…n. …. q…. l. 3. c. 30 although in some of them the very sight of Nature reacheth to the acknowledgement of the former of those) because they repugned those maine Principles of Nature (which are indeed naturally true, and no farther) that ex nihilo nihil fit; Nothing can be made of nothing. And a privatione ad habitum non datur regressus; That there is no regresse from a Totall Privation to the Habit l…st. And this reason was evidently implyed in that answer, which was given by him, who knew the Root of all Errour, unto the obstinate Opposers of the Resurrection: Erratis nescientes Scripturas, ne que Potentiam Dei. Where are intimated two maine Principles of that Mystery of the Resurrection; the Word, and the Power of God. This later commanding our Assent that it May be: that other, our Assurance, that it Will be. So that wherever there is an Ignorance of these two, and we goe about to examine this or any other Mystery, rather by a disputing, than an Obeying Reason, the immediate consequent of such peremptory and preposterous course, is Errour and Depravation of the Vnderstanding. Pythagoras and his Schollers, out of aPlut. de pl…cit. Philos. l. 1. c. 3. Laert. in …. …. …stic. l. 10. c. 10. strong conceipt that they had of the Efficacy of Musicke, or Numbers, examining all the passages of Nature by the Principles thereof, fell into that monstrous Errour, that Number was the first and most Essentiall Element in the Constitution of all Creatures. Thus as men which see through a coloured Glasse, have all Objects, how different soever represented in the same colour: So they examining all Conclusions by Principles forestalled for that purpose, thinking every thing of what nature soever to be dyed in the colour of their owne conceipts, and to carry some proportion unto those Principles: Like Antiph…ron▪ Orites and others in Aristotle, who did confidently affirmeforeign ▪ Lib de … & Reminis. c. 1 every thing for Reall, which their Imagination faneied to it selfe. But Tully hath prettily reprehended this abuse in that satyricall reprehension which he gives to Aristoxenus the Musitian, who needs out of the Principles of his Art, would conceipt the Soule of man to consist of Harmony▪ H…c magistr… concedat Aristoteli; canere ipse doceat. Let him leave these things to Aristotle, and content himselfe with teaching men how to sing: intimating thereby the absurdity of drawing any Science beyond its owne bounds.
2 Another Cause of Errour may be Affectation of Singularity, and a Disdaine of being but an accession unto other mens Inventions▪ or of Tracing their steps: when men shall rather desire to walke in wayes of their owne making, than in the beaten paths which have been troden before them; to be guilty of their owne invented Errors, than content with a derived and imputed Learning; and had rather be accounted the Purchasers of Heresie, than the Heires of Truth, Quase nihil fuisse… rectum, quod primum est; melius existiman… quicquid est aliud, as Quintilian spake elegantly on another occasion: As if nothing had been right, which had been said before; they esteeme every thing therefore better, because new.
3 Another Cause may be the other ExtremeNon tam A… thoritas in disputando, quā rationis momenta quarē da s…t, &c. Ci…. de Nat. Deor. l. 1. (for a man may lose his way, as well by enclining too much to the right hand, as to the left) I mean a too credulous prejudice and opinion of Authority; when wee bow our judgements not so much to the nature of things, as to the learning of men. Et credere, quàm scire, videtur …, we rather beleeve, than know what we assent unto. Tis indeed a wrong to the labours of Learned men to read them alwaies with a Cavilling and Sceptical mind; and to doubt of every thing, is to get resolution in nothing. But yet withall, our Credulity must not be peremptory, but with reservation. Wee may not captivate and resigne our judgements into another mans. hand. Beleefe, without evidence of Reason, must bee onelyonly there absolute, where the Authority is Vnquestion… ble, and where it is impossible to …, there onelyonly it is Impious to Distrust. As for mens Assertions, Quibus possibile est subesse falsum, what he said of Friendship, Sic ama tanquam Os…s, Love with that Wisedome as to remember you may be provoked to the contrary, is more warrantable and advantagious in Knowledge: Sic▪ crede tanquam dissensurus, so to beleeve, as to be ready, when cause requires, to dissent. It is a too muchVid. Aug. ep. 6. Lib. de Vn…tat. Eccli…. cap. 19. C…tra Crescon. Gramat. l. 2. c. 32. & …. 111. Cypr. l. 2. ep. 3. ad Cacilium. streightning of a mans owne Vnderstanding, to inthrall it unto any: or to esteeme the dissent from some particular Authorities, Presumption and Selfe-conceit. Nor indeed is there any thing which hath bred more Distempers in the Body of Learning, than Factions and Sidings. When as Seneca said of Cato, that hee would rather esteeme Drunkennesse a Vertue, than Cato Vitious: So Peripateticks and Platonists, Scotists, & Thomists, and the rest (if I may adventure so to call them, of those learned Idolaters, in deifying the Notions of Mortall men) shall rather count Errour, Truth, than their great Masters Erroneous. But yet I would not be so understood, as if I left every man to the unbridled reines of his owne fancy: or to a presumptuous dependance onelyonly on his owne judgement with contempt or neglect of others. But I consider a double Estate of the Learned; Inchoation and Progresse. And though in this latter there be requisite a Discerning Iudgment, and Liberty of Dissent; yet for the other, Aristotl's speech is true, Oportet discentem credere, BeginnersVid. Theodor. serm. 1. d… …ide & Plat…n. apud …seb. l. 12. c. 1. must beleeve. For as in the Generation of man, hee receiveth his first life and nourishment from one Wombe, and after takes onelyonly those things, which are by the Nurse or Mother given to him; but when he is growne unto strength and yeares, hee then receiveth nourishment not from Milke onelyonly, but from all variety of meats, and with the freedome of his own choise or dislike: so in the generation of Knowledge, the first knitting of the Ioynts and Members of it into one Body is best effected by the Authority and Learning of some able Teacher (though even of his Tutors, Gate being a childe, was wont to require a reason)Plut. lib. de Audiend. Po…tit. Vid. Sen. p. 64. but being growne thereby to some stature and maturity, not to give it the Liberty of its owne Iudgement, were to confine it still to its Nurse or Cradle. I speake not this therefore to the dishonour of Aristotle, or any other, stom whose Learning, much of ours, as from Fountaines, hath bin derived. Antiquity is ever venerable, and justly challengeth Honour, Reverence, and Admiration. And I shall ever acknowledge the worthy commendationHooke… lib. 1 …. 6. which hath been given Aristotle by a learned man, that he hath almost discovered more of Natures Mysteries in the whole Body of Philosophy, than the whole Series of Ages fince hath in any particular member thereof. And therefore he, and all the rest of those worthy Founders of Learning do well deserve some credit, as well to their authority, as to their matter. But yetnotwithstandingforeign. …. Orat. 1. d… R…. there is difference betweene Reverence and Superstition; we may Assent unto them as Antients, but not as Oracles: they may have our minds easie and inclinable; they may not have them captivated and fettered to their Opinions As I will not distrust all, which without manifest proof they deliver, where I cannot convince them of Errour: So likewise will I suspend my beleefe upon probability of their mistakes: and where I finde expresse Reason of Dissenting, I will …ather speake Truth with my Mistresse Nature, thanforeign Arist. Bible. l. 1. c. 4. Tacit. U…ritas nec mt… est, … illi …. …ut illi …. Aug. Confess. l. 12. c. 25. maintaine an Errour with my Master Aristotle. As there may be Friendship, so there may be Honour with diversity of Opinions: nor are wee bound therfore to defie men, because we reverence them. Plura s…pe peccantur dum demeremur, quam dum off endimus; Wee wrong our Auncestors more by admiring than opposing them in their Errours; and our Opinion of them is foule and without Honour, if we thinke they had rather have us followers of them then of Truth. And we may in this case justly answer them as the young man in Plutarch did his Father when he commanded him to do an unjust thing. I wil do that which you would have me, though not that which you bid mee. For good men are ever willing to have Truth preferred above them. Aristotle his CommendationR…. l. 2. of his middle Aged men, should be a rule of our Assent to him, and all the rest of those first Planters of Knowledge. Wee ought neither to overprize all their Writings by an absolute Credulity; because they being Men, and subject to Errour; may make us thereby liable to Delusion; neither ought we rudely to undervalue them, because being Great men, and so well deserving of all Posterity, they may challenge from us an Easines of Assent unto their Authority alone (if it bee only without and not against Reason) as T…lly professed in a matter so agreeable to the Nature of Mans Soule, as Immortality: Vt ration…m nullam Plato afferret, ipsa Authoritate me frangeret: Though Plato had given no reason for it; yet his Authority should have swayed Assent: I say, not slavish, but with reservation, and with a purpose a l…vaies to be swayed by Truth, more than by the thousand yeares of Plato and Aristotle.
4 Another Cause of Errour, may be a Fastningforeign. …. too great an Affection on some particular Objects, which maketh the Minde conceive in them some Excellencies, which Nature never bestowed on them: As if Truth w…re the hand-maid to Passion: or Camelion like could alter it selfe to the temper of our defires. Every thing must be Vnquestionable and Authenticall, when wee have once affected it. And from this Root, it is probable did spring those various Opinions about the utmost Good of mans Nature (which amountedVid. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 19. c. 1. to the number of two hundred eighty eight, …s …as long ago observed by Varro) which could not …ut be out of every particular Philosophers con …ipt, carrying him to the Approbation of some particular Object, most pleasing and satisfactory to the Corruption of his owne crooked Nature: so that every man sought Happinesse, not where it was to be found, but in himselfe, measuring it by the Rule of his owne distempered and intangled Iudgement; whence could not possibly but issue many monstrous Errours, according as the Minds of men were any way transported with the false Delight, either of Pleasure, Profit, Pompe, Promotion, Fame, Liberty, or any other worldly and sensuall Objects. In which particular of theirs, I observe a preposterous and unnaturall course; like that of the Atheist in his Opinion of the Soule and Deity: For whereas in Nature and right Method, the Determinations of the Vnderstanding concerning Happines should precede the pursuit of the Will: they on the contrary side, first love their Errour, and then they prove it; as the Affection of an Atheist leads him first to a Desire, and wish that there were no God (because …e conceiveth it would goe farre better with him in the end, than otherwise it is like to doe) and then this Desire allures the Vnderstanding to dictate Reasons and Inducements, that may persuade to the Beleefe thereof; and so what was at first but a wish, is at last become an Opinion: Qu…d nimis volumus facile credimu…, we easily beleeve what we will willingly desire. And the reason is, because every man (though by Nature he love Sinne) yet he is altogether impatient of any checke or conviction thereof; either from others, or himselfe; and therefore be his Errours never so palpable, his Affections never so distempered, his Minde never so depraved and averse from the Rules of Reason, he will notwithstanding easily persuade himselfe to thinke he is in the right course, and make his Iudgement as absurd in defending, as his Will and Affections are in embracing vitious Suggestions, Viti a nostra, quia amamus, defendimus. When once our Minds are by the violence and insinuation of Affection transported into any crooked course, Reason will freely resigne it selfe to bee perverted, and the discourse of the Vnderstanding will quickely bee drawne to the maintaining of either; So easie it is for men to dispute, when they have once made themselves obey.
And another reason hereof is, because as a Body distempered and affected in any part, especially those vitall ones, which diffuse their vertue into the whole, the Weaknesse spreads, and overrunnes all the other, though remotest from it▪ So likewise the violent motion of partiall and unruly Appetites ▪which do any waies miscarry by the delusion of Objects, which they fasten upon, immediately derive themselves upon the higher pa…s of mans Soule▪ out of the naturall Harmony & consent which they desire to have amongst themselves; but especially doe they labour to winne over the Iudgement unto their side, and there hence to get unto themselves Warrant and Approbation. For as where the Vnderstanding is regular, the chiefe Dominion thereof, is over-Affection. And therefore we see alwaies, that men of the most stayed and even Iudgements, have the most unresisted power in the government of Passions: So on the other side; when the Affections are strongly enclined to any, either enormous motion in Morality; or Object in Nature, the first Faculty whereon they strive to transferre their prejudice in the Reason▪ since without the Assent and Approbation thereof, they cannot enjoy it with such freedome from distractions and feare, as if they were warranted thereto by the Sophistry and Disputes of that Power. Thus as it is usuall with men of deceitfull palates (as before I touched) to conceive in every thing they taste the same disagreeing rellish, wherewith their mouth is at that time distempered: So it is with mens Minds prepossessed with any particular fancy: Intus Existens prohibet alienum. They cannot see it in its own proper colours, but according as their Conceipts are any way distempered and transported by the violence of their Affection. And hence in Naturall Philosophy sprang that Opinion of Aristoxenus the Musitian (which I spake of before) that the Soule of Man consisted in Harmony, and in an apt Concord, Velut in Cantu & Fidibiu, between the parts; and Tully intimates the reason I speake of very prettily: Hic ab artificio suo non recessit: this man knew not how to leave his owne Art; & more expresly of the same in another place: Ita delactatur suis Cantibus, ut etiam ad animum transferre con…tur. Hee was so affected with Musicke, that he transferred it upon the Soule.
5 Another reason, which I conceive of Corruption of the Vnderstanding by Errour, is Curiosity and Pushing it forward to the Search of things clasped up and reserved from its Inquiry. Tis the naturall disease of Mankinde to desire the Knowledge of nothing more than what is lest attainable. It a Naturâ comparatum est (saith Pliny) ut proximorum incuriosi Longinqua sectemur; adeo ani … rerum Cupid… Languescit, cum f…ili occasio est. It is the vanity of man, as well in Knowledge, as in other things▪ …o esteeme that which is far fetched (as we say) and deare bought most pretious; as if Danger and R…rity were the only Argument of worth. The enquiry after the Estates of Spiri…, and separated Soules, the Hierarchies of Angels; and (which is more) the secret Counsels of God, with other the like hidden Mysteries, doe so wholly possesse the Minds of some men, that they disappoint themselves of more profitable Inquiries, and so become not onelyonly hurtfull, in regard of their owne vanity and fruitlesnesse; but also in that they hinder more wholsome and usefull Learnings. And yet Ignorance is of so opposite a nature unto mans Soule, that though it be Holy, it pleaseth not; if there be but Evill (the worst of all Objects) unknowne. The Devill persuades Adam rather to make it by sinning, than not to know it.
But wee are to remember that in many things, our searchings and bold speculations must be content with those Silencing, more than Satisfying Reasons. Sic Natura jubet, sic opus est mund…: Thus God will have it, thus Nature requires. We owe unto Natures workes, a… well our wonder, as our inquiry; and in many things it be…ooves us more to magnifie than to search. There are as in the countries of the World, so in the Travels of mens wits; as well Praecipitia▪ as Via; as well Gulfes and Quicksands, as common Seas. Hee that will be climing too high, or sayling to farre, is likely in the end to gaine no other Knowledge, but only what it is to have a shipwrack, and to suffer ruine. Man is of a mixed Nature; partly Heavenly; partly Morall and Earthly▪ and therefore as to be of a creeping and wormy▪ disposition, to crawle on the ground, to raise the Scule unto no higher Contemplations, than Base and Worldly is an Argument of a degenerous Nature: So to spurne and disdaine these Lower Inquiries as unworthy our thoughts. To soare after Inscrutable Secrets; to unlocke and breake open the closet of Nature, and to measure by our shallow apprehensions the deep and impenetrable Counsels of Heaven,Aug. de Gen. ad li… ▪ l. 11. c. 14. …t lib. de ve…. Relig. c. 13. De C…v. Dei. l. 12. c. 6. Hier. Ep. 44. ad Anton. de Modestia, & i… c. 14. Isai… ▪ Greg. Moral. l. 14. c. 17. Damas. de Orth…d. sid l. 2. c. 4. which we should with a holy, fearfull, and astonished Ignorance onelyonly adore, is too bold and arrogant sacriledge, and hath much of that Pride in it, by which the Angels fell▪ For Ero similis Altissimo, I will be like the most high, was (as i… beleeved) the Devils first sinne: and Eriti tanquam Dij, ye shall be like unto God, was I am sure his first Temptation, justly punished both in the Author and Obey or with Darknesse; in the one, with the Darknesse of Tophet; in the other, with the Darknesse of Errour.