Truth Tried, Treatise 1 · Postscript
A Poſtſcript.
SIR,
I Sent you (a while ſince) certain Animadverſions upon my Lord Brook's Treatiſe concerning the Nature of Truth. Which (briefly) tend to this purpoſe.
By Truth, or Light, his Lordſhip underſtands, that Light whereby the Soule and Underſtanding is able to See or Underſtand: Which can be no other then the Light of Reaſon. Which he conſidereth firſt in It ſelfe, then in its Operations: that is Truth in the Fountain, this in the Streams; (that the Spring, this the Off-ſpring.)
Propoſitio 1. Arg. 1. Chap. 1.
Which Truth or Light (of Reaſon) he contends to be the ſame with the Underſtanding, Becauſe the Underſtanding in Man is that Ray of the Divine Nature, enlivening the Creature, or making it Rationall, whereby it is conformed to the Creator, who is the Primitive Light, or Fountain of Knowledge. Now that which doth thus enform Animal Rationale, enlivening it, or making it Rationall, is Reaſon; And therefore Reaſon (which he calls Truth) is the ſame with the Underſtanding.
But this (if I miſtake not) none will deny; for Reaſon and the Underſtanding-faculty are all one, Ratio and facuitas Ratiocinandi is the ſame. 'Tis true, they ſay ſometimes, that Reaſon is in the Underſtanding, or that the Underſtanding is indued with Reaſon: But then by Ʋnderſtanding, they doe not mean, the Underſtanding-Faculty, but the Soule it ſelfe quatenus intelligens. And ſo this propoſition, Intellectus est Subjectum Rationis, is the ſame with this Anima intelligens eſt Subjectum Intellectûs. Anima, Intellectus, and Ratio, are not Three.
Arg. 2. Chap. 2, 3 4.
His ſecond Argument to prove it is drawn from hence, That there is required to the conſtitution of every Being, an Eſſence received▪ a Fountain imparting, and a Channel receiving. The which Channel or Recipient muſt be the ſame with the Eſſence received; becauſe every thing is the Recipient of its own Eſſence; nothing can receive the Eſſence of a Stone, but by being a Stone, for to be Stone, and to have the Eſſence of a Stone, is all one. Therefore the Underſtanding being the Recipient of Truth, muſt needs be Truth, that is, Reaſon.
Propoſitio 2. Chap. 5.
Which Truth, or Reaſon, Whether it be in the Underſtanding, or be the Underſtanding; yet it cannot make the Soule to be Rationall, unleſſe it be alſo in the Soule: For how can Reaſon make the Soule Reaſonable, if it be not in …t, but in ſomewhat elſe. And if it be in the Soule, then muſt i… be the Soule: Becauſe to be in the Soule, and to be the Soule i… all one; every thing being its own Recipien…. Thus Truth, or Light (of Reaſon) will be the ſame with the Underſtanding; And both That and This the ſame with the Soule.
But I hope his Lordſhip will not deny, but that there is another kind of Receiving▪ beſide that Receiving that he ſpeaks of. (They tell us in Logick of …cto modi habendi; and there are as many manners of Receiving, as there are of Having.) To receive the Eſſence of a Man, and to be a Man, is all one; To have the Eſſence of Money, and to be Money, is all one; But yet, I hope, a Man may receive Money, without being coined, and made Money. To receive the Eſſence of Water, and to be made Water; to receive the Eſſence of a Veſſell, and to be a Veſſell, is all one; yet a Veſſell may contein Water, without being made Water. Thus a Subſtance may receive an Accident, a Subject may receive a Form, without being made that Accident, that Form. Thus datur Animae eſſe Animam datur Rationi eſſe Rationem, (each being its own Recipient:) But withall datur Animae Habere Rationem, though the Soule be not Reaſon, nor Reaſon (in this ſenſe) its own Recipient.
If there be any ſtrength in this Argument, it lies in this, That if Reaſon (or Truth) be only in the Soule as an Accident, and not the Soules Eſſence, then it cannot make an Eſſentiall Difference between the Rationall and Irrationall Soule.
And to this we muſt anſwer, (if we maintain Reaſon, and the reſt of the Faculties, to be diſtinct from …he Soul) That it is not the Faculties, it is not Reaſon, that makes the Eſſentiall Difference; but the Subſtance or Eſſence of the Soule from whence theſe Faculties proceed as Eſſentiall Conſequents. Like as it is not Heat, and Cold, and the reſt of the primae Qualitates, which make the Eſſentiall difference between one Element and another; but that Eſſence or Form, from whence theſe Qualities doe proceed.
Corollarium. 1. Chap. 6.
From hence he proceeds to a further Corollary, That not only the Soule, but All things elſe, are alſo the ſame with Truth. But why ſo? Becauſe every thing is its own Recipient? If it be; it doth not follow that every thing is the Recipient of Truth. If every thing be the Recipient of its own Eſſence, muſt therfore this Eſſence needs be Truth? If his Lordſhip had well conſidered, that Truth, as he hath formerly ſpoken of it, is but the ſame with that which others call Reaſon; he would ſcarce have made this Conſequence, unleſſe he could think to perſwade us, that all things whatſoever are Reaſonable Creatures▪ There is therefore too great an hiatus, to make this propoſition, a Corollary of the former.
But indeed his Lordſhip is by this time fallen off from his former acceptation of Truth. For having (as he ſuppoſeth) proved Reaſon to be the Soules Eſſence, the Soules Entity; he begins to take that word (which formerly ſignified Reaſon,) to ſignify Entity, or Being: So that Truth now, muſt be the ſame with Entitas. And the Emphaſis of this laſt aſſertion lies in this, not that the Eſſence of all things is Truth, or Entity, (for that were no great news,) but that the Eſſence of all things is this One Truth: meaning, that all Entity is Homogeneall and of the ſame nature.
He was proving before, that Truth or Reaſon was the ſame thing with the Soule: He hence infers, not that all things are the ſame thing; (for I cannot underſtand him to ſpeak ſo harſhly, as that one drop of water were the ſame drop with another drop of water, though Homogeneall; that the Soule of Peter is the Soule of Judas, though of the ſame Species;) but that they are alike things, or things of the ſame nature.
The Conſequence, (that all things muſt be of the ſame Species, becauſe the Soule and its Faculties are the ſame Thing) will not hold. The thing it ſelfe, hath only this ground (ſo farre as I can diſcover,) Becauſe all Being proceeding from God, who is in his actions Uniform, muſt therfore be Alike: For the ſame Agent, acting in the ſame Manner, cannot but produce like Effects. But this Uniformity in God' is Equivalent to an infinite Variety; and God can by one act in it ſelfe ſimple, produce effects variouſly diſtinct▪ And if his Lordſhip grant, that this Uniformity hinders not but that God may produce various Shapes, I ſee not why he may not produce various Species.
Corollarium. 2. Chap. 7.
But from hence he draws a further conſequent. He is not contented to ſay, that the nature of all things is One, but that it is Ʋnity. And heer is as great an hiatus as the former. The Eſſence of all Soules is One and the ſame; but that this One Eſſence is Unity, I have not formerly heard, nor doe yet beleeve. And I am ſo farre from thinking that Ʋnity is the Eſſence of All things, that I eſteeme it ſelfe to be Nothing. Unity, is but a Negative term, a Negation. Ʋnus indeed, as it is oppoſite to Nullus, is poſitive, and is the ſame with Nonnullus, or Aliquis: But Ʋnus, or Ʋnicus as it is oppoſed to Multitude, (and ſo we now take it) is Negative. Elſe, where is the fault in this Syllogiſme? Quod eſt in Angliâ, eſt in Europâ; Sed Rex Ʋnicus eſt in Angliâ; Ergo Rex Ʋnicus (veltantùm Ʋnus) eſt in Europâ.
Propoſitio. 3. Chap. 8. 9▪
He returns next, to his former diſcourſe; And what he had ſaid of the Light of Reaſon, he ſaith alſo of the Light of Knowledge, both Habituall and Actuall. Hee allows not that Habits, either Infuſed or Acquiſite, are any thing new brought into the Soule, but only former principles enlightened: And therefore rejecting Ariſtotle's raſatabula, he imbraceth Plato's Reminiſcentia, Which may be thus expreſſed; He ſuppoſeth the Soule to be as a Table, wherein be many rare lineaments, and lively colours deſcribed, but hanging in the dark they appeare not till ſuch time as they be illuſtrated by ſome advenient Light; which Light doth not bring with it any new colours, or more lineaments, but only illuſtrateth thoſe that were formerly there but appeared not: Whereas Ariſtotle rightly ſuppoſeth it as a Table prepared, void of any, yet capable of all; Or rather as a Glaſſe, which having of it ſelfe none of thoſe Colours, is yet fit to receive and reflect all thoſe Rays or viſible Species, which from the adjacent Objects fall upon it.
And indeed, as for Hiſtoricall Knowledge, I ſuppoſe, his Lordſhip himſelfe, if he well conſider of it, will not affirm that to have any Idea's originally in the Soule: It being utterly impoſſible by diſcourſe to find out a by-paſt Hiſtory, without Hiſtoricall Relation. And if there may be new Idea's of Hiſtoricall truths imprinted in the Soule which were not there before, why not alſo of Diſcu…ſive Knowledge.
But his Lordſhip ſtays not here, diſſenting from us in the Nature of Habits, whether they be new Idea's, or the illuſtration of former Idea's▪ but in effect, he takes away all Habits wholly. Telling us, that we Seem only by frequent acts to help the Soule, and create new Habits, but that indeed all actings are but new diſcoveries.
Now this is not to eſtabliſh Plato's Reminiſcentia; but to take away all Memory whatſoever. How can we be ſaid to remember? how is one ſaid to be learned, another ignorant? what is the benefit of ſtudy, and of experience? if former acts doe not at all help future acts, but only ſeem ſo to doe▪ How comes it to paſſe, that wee are able out of our own memories to furniſh our ſelves with Hiſtoricall truths formerly heard or read, without a ſecond relation, which at the firſt wee could not doe? if our former acts doe not at all help latter acts, but all things be new diſcoveries.
Propoſition. 4. Chap. 10.
And what hath been ſaid of Naturall and Habituall light of Reaſon and Habituall Knowledge, he now affirms of Actuall Knowledge. The ſeverall Operations of the Soule, in apprehenſions, affirmations, negations, &c. the ſeverall Actings of Truth, are alſo the Souls Eſſence. And why? but becauſe the Soule is Actus primus, and therefore its Eſſence muſt be Action; This Action likewiſe muſt Exiſt; which what elſe can it be but Rationall workings? and ſo the ſame with Actus Secundus.
But his Lordſhip is much miſtaken to think that actus primus is Latine for Action. Actus is of as large an extent as Potentia: Now there is potentia ad Eſſe, and potentia ad Formam, as well as potentia ad Operari. When Ens in potentiâ becoms Ens Actu, when that which was poſſible, is actually produced; its own Eſſence o… Being is that Actus, which makes it Ens Actu, which was before Ens in Potentiâ: and this we call actus Entitativus, and it is better tranſlated Actuality, then either Action, or Activity. Again the Matter is capable of this or that Form, which we call potentia ad Formam (ſubſtantialem;) whereby it is potentiâ tale (in genere ſubſtanti…;) as materia putris is in potentiâ ad formam vermis: Now when this Form whereof it is capable is actually introduced, that which was before potentià tale, becoms now actu tale (in genere ſubſtantiae;) and this Form is called actus Subſtantialis▪ (but not Actio Subſtantialis,) or actus primus; and (thus) the Soule is Actus. Again, a Subſtance of this or that Species, conſtituted by this or that form, is capable of this or that Accident, and is therefore potentiâ talis, accidentaliter; or in potentiâ ad hanc formam ac…identalem; as Water is potentiâ calida, when Heat is produced, it becoms Actu calida, and the Heat is this Actus whereby it is actu talis; and it is actus primus accidentalis, (though perhaps ſome would call it actus ſecundus: Yet none call it Actio) This actus acciden alis, or forma accidentalis, if it be Operative, ſtands in a double relation; to its Subject, and ſo it is actus informans; and to its Operation, and ſo it is actus operativus (but not Operatio) and belongs either to the firſt, or the ſecond ſpecies of Quality, it is either a Habit or a Faculty; this, if you pleaſe, you may call Activity, though not Action▪ Now a Subject indued with this actus operativus is in potentiâ ad operandum: When this power is reduced into act, it is actu operans; and this actus whereby it doth actu operari, is properly Actus ſecundus, Actio, or Operatio, and belongs to the Praedicament of Action. But ſuch an Actus the Soule is not, and therefore its Operations cannot be its Eſſence.
Objectio. 1. Chap. 11.
But now leaſt by making the Soules Operations to be the Soules Eſſence, he ſhould make ſo many Soules as there be Acts; (which is indeed a good Conſequence;) he is put upon another invention, to make all theſe operations to be but One; the ſecond action is but the ſame with the former: (So that with him, one ſinfull Act is all one with a continued Courſe of ſinning.) And therefore tells us, that actions performed in diſtinct Times and Places are not therefore diſtinct actions, becauſe Time and Place are Nothing, but meerly imaginary.
But this p…aiſter is not large enough to cover the ſore; For, it is true indeed, different actions may receive an externall denomination from difference in Time and Place, but they receive not their difference from hence, but from themſelves: Time and Place can neither make different things to be the ſame, nor the ſame to be different. A man is the ſame to day that he was yeſterday, the ſame at London that he was at York▪ yet both Time and Place be different: Againe, two Angels being at the ſame time coexiſtent in the ſame place are not therefore the ſame Angel. So that whether time and place be any thing or nothing, yet this Man is not the other Man, this Action is not the other Action.
But if difference of Time and Place be only imaginary; then why do we deny to the Papiſts, that Chriſts Body is corporeally preſent in the Sacrament? ſince if it be any where, it muſt be every where, all places being indeed the ſame, admitting onelyonly of an imaginary difference. Why doe we cry down the Lutheran Conſubſtantiation, as abſurd? for if ſeverall bodies may be in ſeverall places, then may they be in the ſame place, if difference of Place be only imaginary: If the ſame body may be at ſeverall times in ſeverall places, why not at the ſame time? ſince difference of Time is only imaginary.
Object. 2. Chap. 12.
There is another Objection as ſtrong as this former: If Acting Truth be the Soules Eſſence, then what becomes of the Soule when it doth either not Act, or act Falſely?
To the firſt he applyes his former remedy; Any one act is able to give the Soule a Being at all times; for ſucceſſion of moments being onelyonly imaginary, that which at all is, muſt be alwayes, and whatſoever hath at all a Being, is indeed coexiſtent to all Eternity; ſucceſſion, beginning, and ending being onelyonly imaginary: (So that a Childe that is new born, had lived as long as the moſt aged, if he could but think ſo.
And as for the other, he denyes that the Soul can at all act Falſhood, becauſe Falſhood is onelyonly Privative, it is Nothing▪ now to act nothing and not to act is all one.
Which he affirms likewiſe of Evill, and of Pain; And tells us, with Dr. Twiſſe, that it is better to be Miſerable, then not to be: Which is grounded upon this, that Evill is only a privation of Good, and therefore to have the goodneſſe Being without the goodneſſe of Happineſſe, is better then to want both the one and the other.
But withall I wiſh them to conſider, whether the ſame Argument do not prove, that it was better for David to commit adultery, then not to commit it; For the ſubſtance of the act, in its Phyſicall Eſſence, was poſitive, and therefore Good; the fault was only the want of a further good, to wit, the goodneſſe of conformity to Gods will; now to produce the goodneſſe of an Act, without the goodneſſe of Conformity, is better then to produce neither the one nor the other.
Corollaria. Chap. 13. &c.
This is his Lordſhips Opinion. Which he commends to us as uſefull to make our Chriſtian life more cheerefull both in the Theoreticall and Practick part. For if we knew, that All things are one, what need we feare either difficulty or danger? knowing, That Miſery is nothing and cannot hurt us, and hath no Being but only in the the Brain; That whatſoever is, is Good, and good to Me, Becauſe both I and It are Beings, and ſo Good; And theſe two Goods falling under no other difference but of degrees, Good and Good muſt needs agree, that which is Good is Good to Me. Yea, how void of Envy at anothers good, and thoughts of Revenging injuries? ſince that I have a Propriety, a Poſſeſſion, in that which is anothers, hee and I being One: Injuries are nothing and cannot hurt; Good things, though anothers, doe ſerve me.
But to this Good Conſequent of his Lordſhips Tenet, I can oppoſe another every way as Bad: For as it would make us not afraid of Miſery, ſo withall, not afraid to Sinne. It propoſeth ſuch an Impunity to Sinning, as that it makes the Devils as happy as the bleſſed Angels. For thus we might argue; The Devils are Beings, and therefore Good, becauſe Ens & Bonum convertuntur: Every thing that is, is Good, and Good to …hem; for both They and It being good, and Good admitting of no other difference but of degrees, Good and Good muſt needs agree, and ſo be good to them: The happineſſe of the Angels doth ſerve Them, ſince (as his Lordſhip ſpeaks) it is not onelyonly foreign but foreign, They have a propriety in it; all things being One. Their own Miſery and Torment is nothing▪ and cannot hurt: And (which is the only difference can be imagined) if they Think otherwiſe, (I uſe ſtill his Lordſhips expreſſion) this muſt be a Lye, and cannot hurt. And if this be Hell, who will be afraid to Sinne?
My judgement cannot aſſent, to make the Torments of the damned only Imaginary, to make Hell a Fancy; yea, to affirm, that it is good to Sinne, becauſe the act of ſinne is really Good, and the Evill of it is only Imaginary, a Vanity, a Nothing, and cannot hurt.
As for the Theoreticall part; it is confeſſed, that there be many doubts in Naturall Philoſophy, concerning the Being, the Nature, the Cauſes of things; There be doubts alſo in Morall Philoſophy, in Metaphyſicks, in Mathematicks, in Divinity: But in telling us this, his Lordſhip advanceth nothing for the commendation of his new invention; except he could ſhew us how this Tenet will reſolve them.
And thus Sir, I have given you a ſhort account of the chief things in his Lordſhips Treatiſe, and my Reply, ſo farre as concerns the ſtate of the main Queſtion controverted: Wherein you may take a briefe Survey of what is there more largely proſecuted. Which may give ſome Light for the better diſcovering the principall intent of his Lordſhips Tenet; and may be a guide in your pe…uſing the larger Diſcourſe that you looſe not your ſelfe in the prolixity of the proſecution, and the variety of digreſſions. When I firſt undertook the Taske, I intended no more in all, then ſome ſuch briefe notes as theſe, to ſatisfie your deſire: But being once entred I have not alwayes the command of my own pen; variety of matter carrying me beyond my intended bounds. The faults if you will be pleaſed to pardon, and to accept the reſt, I ſhall commit the whole to be as I am, that is
Yours to command, J. W. Aprill. 10. 1641.
FINIS.