The Obligation of Human Conscience, Lecture 2

The Obligation of Human Conscience · Lecture 2

p. 35THE SECOND LECTURE. In which it is declared that in the Conſcience of a good Intention there is not ſuch a Protection, that a man might ſafely reſt therein.

ROM. 3. 8.

And as we are blamed, and as ſome affirme that we ſay why do we not evil, that good may come thereof whoſe damnation is juſt.

THat the mind of man doth contain ſomething in it of Divinity, is with a great conſent confeſſed by the wiſdome of the An…ients,Horat. 2. Satyr 2. who have termed it to be Divinae particulam aurae, a particle of the Divine Ayre;…pictetus. foreign and have affirmed that our minds have been taken from the immortal Gods, and are pure as Heaven it ſelf; Nay ſome of them riſing higher and ſpeaking p. 36more boldly, have not been afraid to ſay, that the mind is God himſelf, and have raiſed Temples to it as to a Diety, foreign ſaith Menander in Plutarch, and Ovid, Mens quo que Numen habet, Menti aed…s in Cop… tolio vid. Cic 2. de nat. deor. & Liv. lib. 23.and Seneca, Quid aliud voces animam quam Deum inhumano corpore hospitantem, What elſe will you call the mind but a God lodging in a humane body. In which words as ſome of them ſeem to have moſt reference to the foreign or the ſubſtance of the ſoul, which being void of matter and bulk, and free from Death and Corruption,Plutarch. in quaeſt. platon. Ovid. 2. Faſt. Senec. Epiſt. 31. and endued with underſtanding and the liberty of will doth ſeem rather to come nearer to the nature of immortal Gods then of corporal things, ſo the others do reflect upon that Power and foreign againſt energetical Virtue, which we call the Conſcience. And from hence it is of Menanders foreign.foreign. Xenocrat. apud Ariſtot. 2. Top. 6. To mortals every ones Conſcience is a God. And in this ſence the Lord ſaid that he had placed Moſes as a God to Pharoah, becauſe he did inculcate into Pharoah the will of God, he did excite Pharoah to the performance of it,M… min…rit Deum ſe ad ibere teſtem, id est ut arbit…o, méntem ſuam. Cic. 3. Offic. and for not obeying it, he did proſecute him with continual plagues, and in the ſame ſence it may be ſaid that God hath given to every particular man a proper Conſcience to be as a God unto him, which in Gods ſteed, as the Preacher of his eternal Law; ſhould dictate to him what he ought to do, and what to avoid, and which ſollicitouſly ſhould importune him to the performance of theſe duties which are commanded,Exod. 8. 1.Exod 8:1 and ſeverely ſhould call unto him for an account of his actions good or evil, which ſhould extort from the moſt wicked an acknowledgement of the Divine Juſtice, & as a moſt juſt Judge ſhould diſcern p. 37and aſſign unto every one either rewards, or puniſhments, according to their deſerts; for by nature the ſtate of Conſcience is placed as it were in the middle betwixt both, beneath God, but above Man, ſubject unto God as a Hand-maid, but ſet over man as a Miſtreſſe.

II. From hence it is, that Conſcience is taken into 2a double conſideration, as it cometh to paſs in all other things which are in an order diſpoſed according to the Rules of Sub and Supra, Above or Under, in which thoſe which poſſeſs the middle place have a two-fold relation, the one to the thing Superiour, under which they are, and the other things to the Inferiour which are placed under them; Thus a Captain obeys his Lieutenant Colonell, but commands the common Souldier. I am a man placed under Authority, having Souldiers under me, Math. 8. 9. And in the praedicamental courſe and order, thoſe things which are placed between the higheſt Genus, and the loweſt Species, are both the Genera of thoſe Species of which they are predicated, and the Species of thoſe Genuſſes to which they are ſubjected. In the ſame manner Conſcience receiveth a diverſe Condition, as it hath a relation unto diverſe things, for it hath the condition of a power regulating, or of a thing regulated; In the reſpect of God, and the Law of God, it hath the condition of a thing regulated, but in reſpect of man, and of humane actions, the condition of a power regulating. And ſince it is our purpoſe to expound unto you the uſe of Conſcience, of which in our laſt Lecture we have given you the Definition, eſpecially ſo far as it pertaineth to the performance of things, and is commodious for the Inſtitution of our life, and manners, the p. 38courſe of the Subject, and of our ſtudies doth here require, that we ſhould now ſpeak of the double obligation of Conſcience that ſhall be uſefull to us, which is the Active and paſſive obligation; The paſſive obligation of the Conſcience is that by which it is obliged to confirm it ſelf to the Divine Will, to which as to a Rule it is ſubjected. The Active obligation is that which obligeth all humane Acts to a conformity thereunto, and is as a rule over them; There are therefore two parts of this preſent treatiſe, the firſt of the ſubjection of Conſcience, or the paſſive obligation. The ſecond, of the power of Conſcience or the active obligation of it.

III. Of the firſt of which, that this diſcourſe may more legitimately proceed, this is firſt to be premiſed, ſeeing that the Rectitude of every thing conſiſteth in its conformity to its next and immediate Rule, and ſo gradually aſcendeth to its firſt and moſt chief Rule, and ſeeing the immediate Rule or Law of Conſcience, is right Reaſon, but ſubject to the Superior Law which God hath praeſcribed to it, the Conſcience may there be ſaid to be right when it is conformable to right Reaſon according to that Law which God the ſupreme Law-giver hath praeſcribed to it, for the condition of that Act or Work, whatſoever it be, which at that time we are performing.

The laſt Explication or reſolution of Conſcience is into a certain Law impoſed by God on a rational creature, as being the Lord of Conſcience alone, and the Supreme Legiſlator, who indued man with a Conſcience, and who is the only knower and the Judge of it, & who alone hath power to ſave or deſtroy a Soul, accodingly as it hath kept or broken his p. 39Commandements, James 5 12. There is but one Law-giver who can ſave and who can deſtroy. Which is ſo confeſſed by all men in whatſoever parts of the world they live, that there is hardly one to be found who will not of his own accord allow it to be moſt true in the Theſis or the Poſition of it; but in the Hypotheſiis or Suppoſition, (when any thing is to be done,) I know not by what depravedneſs of the heart it comes to paſs that many men (and even thoſe men who appear neither to themſelves nor unto others to have thrown off all care of Conſcience) are with ſuch prone affections tranſported to thoſe things which they deſire to be done, that they do not only forbear to bring them moſt faithfully to be examined by that moſt chief and ſupreme rule, which is onelyonly able to ſecure the Conſcience, but they conceive it is enough for the ſecurity of their Conſciences, if either by the pretence of a good Intention, or by the Example of ſome holy man, or if by the Authority of ſome great Divine they can any ways defend themſelves, and what they have acted. And becauſe this Deceipt in the hearts of men hath been too prevalent in all ages, and eſpecially in theſe laſt times, I perſwaded my ſelf that it would be a work moſt profitable, and moſt neceſſary for the manners in which we live, if I could expound thoſe three vulgar ſuppoſitions, which are ſo full of the trepanne, and ſo dangerous unto ſo many Conſciences, therefore before we do diſcend to ſeek and find out the true rule of Conſcience, we muſt firſt remonſtrate that there is not any protection enoguh for the ſecurity of the Conſcience, in the performance of any affair, if that which is do…e be not performed only with a good intention, or be ſupported by the p. 40example of a Godly Man, or by the Judgement of a Learned one. Of the two laſt (God willing) we ſhall treat hereafter, our Diſcourſe at this preſent ſhall be of that ſubject which in the firſt place doth incounter us, viz. Of a good Intention.

IV. Where I ſhall lay down this Concluſion, That the goodneſſe of the Intention is not enough to juſtifie the goodneſſe of the Act. That is, a good Intention cannot alone, and of it ſelf procure that any humane Act ſhould be morally good, or, which is the ſame, and they are the very words of the Apoſtle, that Evil ſhould be done that Good may come thereby. When I ſay an Act, I underſtand both the inward Act, which is in the Will, and all the exterior Acts in the executing faculties, which are flowing from it, it being my meaning, that out of a good Intention alone it doth not follow that either the Will it ſelf, which is the firſt principle of acting, or any externall Act flowing from it ſhould be ſaid to be good. The Intention may be taken two wayes; firſt properly and formally for the Act of Intending, that is, for the motion of the Will, tending to the end by ſome certain mediums. Secondly, materially, and objectively, for the thing it ſelf intended, that is, for the end to which the Will ſo tendeth. For the Act intending, and the end intended are of one and an alike conſideration to the goodneſſe or the evilneſſe of the Act, if we look upon the quality of the Act, but if we ſhall reflect upon the quantity of the goodneſſe or of the evilneſſe of it, there will be found ſome diſproportion in the conſideration thereof. For it being granted that ſuch a… Act is good in its own Species, and upon the account of its Object, and that it may be done for a good end, or on p. 41the contrary it being granted that the Act is evil, and is done to an evil end; by how much the ſtronger the Will is moved whiles it tendeth to that end, by ſo much the Act reſpectively, will either be the better or the worſe; As if a man ſhould partake of the Supper of the Lord, to that end, to put himſelf in remembrance of the death of Chriſt; the more entirely that he applyes the mind to the remembrance of his death, the better he performes the duty of a true Communicant. Again, if a man ſhould ſlander his neighbour, intending the ruine of him, by how much the more violently he intends it, by ſo much the worſe is his Act of Calumnation, The quantity therefore of a good or an evil Act is correſpondent to the quantity of the goodneſſe or the evilneſſe of the Intention, and is commenſurate with it, if the Intention be underſtood according to the Act of intending, and not as to the thing intended. But the intention taken either way doth not ſuffice to prove this, that any Act which otherwiſe is evil, ſhould be made good.

V. This concluſion is proved by many and moſt ſtrong arguments, firſt by the words of the ſacred Text, in the third Chapter of the Romans where the Apoſtle not without indignation doth deteſt that grievous ſlander by which it was ſaid to be taught; That evil may be done that good ſhould come thereof. That the ſence, the ſcope, and the force of this place, may be the better underſtood, that St. Paul amongſt all the Apoſtles was abundantly the moſt copious in aſſerting every where, the mercy of God by Grace, making a Covenant of grace with ſinfull men, and faithfully fulfilling the Evangellical promiſes, notwithſtanding all that unrighteouſneſſe and unbelief of p. 42men, which lyeth within their hearts, and openly and abundantly doth declare it ſelf in their dayly lives, and converſations, which he profeſſeth to be ſo far from making theſe promiſes of God by Grace to be in vain, that on the contrary they do render the glory of his grace and truth to be far more illuſtrious,Rom. 5. 2.Rom 5:2 for where that the offence abounded, there it is manifeſt that Grace ſuperabounded. From hence the Sophisters and Impoſters took on one ſide to themſelves an advantage to ſlander, and to diminiſh if they could the authority of the Apoſtle. On the other ſide the Hypocrites and profane did take an occaſion to live more licentiouſly, and to ſin more ſecurely; For if that be true (ſaid they) which is preached by Paul, that the ſins of men do redound to the greater glory of God, there is no reaſon that God ſhould puniſh ſins, or be angry with ſinners; There is no reaſon that a man or woman ſhould abſtain from ſinning, nay they ſhould ſin more abundantly that God might receive the more abundant glory, and evil things are altogether to be done, that good things may come thereby. The other objections the Apoſtle confuteth, but to this, let us do evil that good may come of it, he doth not vouchſafe any anſwer at all; he only cryeth out, that it is a manifeſt ſlander, and near of kin unto blaſphemy, and unleſs they repent, the juſt judgment of God is threatened to ſuch importunate ſlanderers, as if this Sophiſm was of that kind of arguments which Ariſtotle adjudged not to deſerve an anſwer, but rather a reproof;. It is hence manifeſt, and all Interpreters do acknowledge it, that the Apoſtle moſt conſtantly denyeth that any evil ought to be done for any intention be it never ſo good. It much availeth p. 43(ſaith St. Auguſtine) to conſider what, Aug. contra meudaciam.what end, what intention ſuch a thing is done, but thoſe things which are manifeſt ſins ought not to be done under any pretence of a good cauſe, or a good end, or of a good Intention. This is the firſt argument.

VI. The ſecond it is taken from the nature of evil or of ſin, which of its own nature is not firſt to be choſen, foreign. Hiercl. pag. 78.neither is it ſecondly, ordinate to a good end, neither is it thirdly, apt of it ſelf to produce any good, firſt it is not eligible, or it is not to be choſen by reaſon of its own nature, qua tale, as it is of ſuch a nature, for there is nothing eligible which is not alſo Expitible, and all things that are deſired, are deſired under the account of good.

Neither is evil of its own nature ordinable to any good end, for if it were, it were alſo to be deſired; for the appetite in Philoſophy is not only carryed to the end propounded by the Agent, but to thoſe things alſo which ſeem to conduce for the obtaining of that end. If you object▪ God doth dispoſe of our evils into a good end of his own, and therefore it is not againſt the nature of evil to be ordinated to a good end. I anſwer in the firſt place, that the ways 1of Almighty God who is the Lord of Nature, and according to his good pleaſure can produce good out of evil are farre different from ours, who have not the ſame right or the ſame power; neither is it for us either too curiouſly to enquire, or too magiſterially to pronounce any thing of the Providence of God concerning evil. In the ſecond place I anſwer, 2that God indeed is able and accuſtomed to make uſe of our ſins to ſerve his Glory, Grace and Providence, and that it is lawfull for us alſo, as opportunity ſhall ſerve, to follow his example and to p. 44make uſe of the ſins of other men for our ſpirituall or temporall advantage; Notwithſtanding, as God, although he maketh uſe of the evil of others, and produceth Good out of it, yet he never doth evil himſelf, that from thence he might abſtract good; ſo neither is it lawfull for us to do evil, that good might proceed from it; It is one thing to make uſe of the 3evil of others, and turn it into good, and another thing to do evil with an intent of good. Thirdly, I anſwer, a thing may be ſaid to be ordinated in a twofold reſpect; either improperly, in the ſame manner, as a thing which way ſoever it is made uſe of by the Agent, doth notwithſtanding tend to its end, being ſo done by the wiſdome and power of the ſupremer Agent, contrary to the will and intention of him that did it, or it is taken more reſtrictly, and properly, and ſo that only is ſaid to be ordinated to its end, which antecedently is choſen by the Agent as a medium that by the nature of it is convenient, and conducible to ſuch an end. In the firſt ſence, that is to be underſtood, when we ſay that God doth ordinate and diſpoſe of evil to a good end, that is, when God,Non co… venire homo viro Vitiis uti Quint 6. Inſtit. 1. out of his infinite mercy and power, either abſtracts good from evil or turneth evil into good; But we muſt above all things take heed, that theſe expreſſions be not underſtood in the latter, and proper ſence, as if God antecedently did well approve or make choice of any evil, as a medium convenient by the nature of it to the aſſecution of any good end.

VIII. Moreover it is oppoſite to the nature of ſin to produce of it ſelf any good effect, as an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit, Mat 7. 18.Matt 7:18nor darkneſſe produce light of it ſelf;2 Cor. 4. 6.2 Cor 4:6 but the ſame great and glorious p. 45God who out of his omnipotence, brought forth light out of darkneſſe, can alſo out of our ſins take an occaſion to illuſtrate his infinite wiſdome, his righteouſneſſe, and his goodneſſe; But theſe are the effects of a divine power, as of a cauſe working properly, and of it ſelf, to the production whereof there needs no aſſiſtance, nor ſtrength from our ſins, which as to thoſe effects are but meerly contingent, and but by accident. Thoſe words therefore of David Pſalm 5. which St. Paul alleageth, Rom. 3. 4. I have ſinned againſt thee foreign that thou mayeſt be juſtified when thou speakeſt, are not ſo to be underſtood, that David for that end committed murder and adultery, or that it was lawfull for him ſo to do, that God might be juſtified in his words but the word foreign and ſome other Greek particles of the ſame ſignification in many places of Scripture are to be underſtood, according to the interpretation of St. Chryſoſtome not foreign but foreign to denote and inferre the event only, and not the true cauſe of the thing; For as he who is in a ſerious argumentation can inferr a true concluſion from the falſe praemiſes which before were granted by another, and yet the ſame Diſputant would ſhow himſelf ridiculous, if to prove a true concluſion, ſhould willingly make uſe of ſome ſalſe aſſumptions, for Truth doth not ſtand in need of the patronage of Falſhood; ſo Almighty God (and we alſo in ſome reſpect may do the like) can diſpoſe of things that are ill done into good, but it is neither congruous to the divine Juſtice and Goodneſs, neither is it any ways lawfull for us to will and to do evil that good may come thereby.

IX. The third argument is taken a naturâ boni Actus, from the nature of a good Act, to the complement p. 46whereof the concurſe of all requiſite conditions is ſo neceſſary, that if one be but abſent amongſt ſo many of them, although all the other be preſent, and ſubſervient, yet that Act ſhall not be morally good. Moſt remarkable is that Axiom, Bonum ex cauſa integra, malum ex quolibet defectu, Good proceeds from an upright and an entire cauſe, but evil from any defect. And it is beſides manifeſt in all kind of things that there are more required to raiſe up, than to throw down; or to deſtroy. The defect of a good Intention is enough to prove any Action evil (for that, the end whereof is evil, muſt of neceſſity be evil it ſelf) but it is not enough, it is not ſufficient that a good end, or a good Intention ſhould prove the Action good, unleſs all the other requiſite conditions be conjoyned; Now that any Action whether the internall of the will or the externall of the work, may approve themſelves to be good, we are to underſtand that there are three diſtinct goodneſſes, viz. the goodneſs of the object, the goodneſſe of the end, and the goodneſs of the circumſtances. The quality of every Act doth firſt of all, and principally depend on the quality of the object, or of the matter, about which it is converſant, ſo that from thence every Act may indefinitely and according to the whole ſpecies of it be denominated, either good or evil; in this reſpect we affirm that Theft and Adultery are evil in the whole Species of them, and that Prayer and the giving of Alms are good in all their ſeverall reſpects, and the acceptations of them; but with this difference, that things which in themſelves are ſimply evil, are ſo evil, that neither upon the account of the end although good, nor yet on the account of their circumſtances, although never ſo promiſing, they can ever p. 47be made truly good; But things which are good in their own nature, may yet be ſo corrupted by the end, or by undue circumſtances, that they may leave off to be good, and become evil; The pravity therefore of the object being preſuppoſed we are altogether to abſtain from the Acts of Theft or of adultery, as being ſimply evil in themſelves; But the goodneſſe of the object being preſuppoſed it is not ſafe for any one, at the firſt, either to undertake to do it, or to approve it being done, unleſs he hath diligently weighed before hand the end, to which it is directed, and the ſeverall circumſtances with which it is attended, and cloathed: In theſe things therefore in which it is ſaid that the Goodneſs of the Act doth depend on the end, and that the end doth diſcriminate and crown the actions, they may be ſaid ſo for to be true, if the Acts be good in conſideration to the object, or the matter, or at the laſt, if they be of a middle nature and indifferent, but not if they are evil. For the goodneſs of the object being ſuppoſed the Act doth chiefly take its goodneſs or its evilneſſe from the end. For examples ſake, the Act of giving a poor man an alms though it be a good Act in reſpect of the matter or the object, yet if it be done for vain-glory it is morally an evil Act, becauſe it is not ordinated to a good end. The ſame Act, if it be to relieve the neceſſities of a neighbour is an Act ſo far good, that it hath a lawfull matter, and a right Intention and ſo partaketh of both the goodneſſes above mentioned, to wit, of the object and the end, but it cannot yet be affirmed to be ſimply good, unleſſe it be moreover duely circumſtanced, for to this complement of a good work, beſides that goodneſs of the object and the end, there is required the goodneſſe p. 48of circumſtances; And from hence it is, that commonly it is ſpoken that the goodneſſe of the Act doth depend upon its circumſtances not primarily, and principally, but ultimately, and for the accompliſhment of it, the goodneſs of the object and the end being firſt laid down, ſeeing therefore theſe three things are required to the goodneſs of every moral Act, and they are all to be conjoyned, to wit, the matter lawfull, the intention right, and the circumſtances due, it is moſt manifeſt that a right intention cannot alone ſuffice by it ſelf, and by conſequent, that nothing can be performed out of a good Conſcience, whatſoever the Intention be, that is either unlawfull in the object or defective in the circumſtances.

X. But ſome there are who peradventure will object unto this, thoſe words of our Saviour, Mat. 6. 22. If thy eye be ſingle thy whole body ſhall be full of light, but if thy eye be evil thy whole body ſhall be full of darkneſs. Where if the intention be undeſſtood by the eye which is the judgment of almoſt all the Interpreters upon it, it ſeemeth that the goodneſſe of the Act doth altogether depend on the goodneſs of the Intention, & that adaequately, ſo that what power an evil intention hath to corrupt an Act although otherwiſe good, the ſame power a good intention hath to approve and to render an Act good, which otherwiſe is evil, for a good or a ſingle eye is as efficatious to inlighten the whole body, as an evil eye is to infuſe darkneſs on it; To adde more ſtrength to this opinion much may be alledged from the Fathers and other Divines, of this nature is that in the Gloſſe; As much good as you do intend, ſo much you do perform; And that verſe in the mouth of every Scool-boy.

p. 49Quicquid agunt homines, Intentio judicat illud.

It is th' Intention judgeth true

Of whatſoever things we do.

XI. But in the way of anſwer, as to that place in the 6 of St. Mat. I am not ignorant in the firſt place, that ſome learned men of this age do give an interpretation to it far different from that of the antient Fathers, and not conſonant to that we have now in hand; But in reverence to thoſe antient Doctors, be it granted that thoſe words of our Saviour had a proper relation to the Intentions of men; I make anſwer, that the intention (when it is a motion of the Will tending to ſome ends by certain mediums) is taken into a twofold conſideration, firſt whether it be for the intention of that good into which the Will is finally and preciſely carryed, being taken from all conſideration of the mediums to attain it; As if a man ſhould ſay he intends the glory of God, or his own profit, and pleaſure: or ſecondly whether it be for an entire ordination of the whole progreſſe of the work, from the beginning of the work unto the end, including alſo the mediums or the means to attain it; As if a man ſhould ſay that he intends the glory of God by building a Temple, or ſtaining an Idolater, or that he intends his own profit, by getting riches by his honeſt labour, or by theft, and plunder, And as he may be ſaid, that he intends a journey to Rome who only thinks of going thither, and hath not yet reſolved with himſelf which way, or upon what accounts he will go, as well as he who hath reſolved with himſelf, when to go, which way, and upon what occaſions. We ſpeak p. 50in this whole diſcourſe of the Intention taken the firſt way, viz. on the intention which looks altogether upon the end, and not on the means, & which is ſo taken in the common uſe of ſpeaking; but thoſe words of the Fathers and other Divines which ſeem by the intention alone to meaſure the goodneſs or the badneſſe of mens actions, and which are grounded on thoſe words of our Saviour, in relation to a ſingle eye, and to an eye that is evil, do receive their intention in the latter ſignification, as they include the means with the end; obſervable is that of St Bernard, That the eye (ſaith he) be ſingle, two things are neceſſary, viz. that truth be in the election, and Charity in the intention. That is, that our intention be abſolutely right both are required, that ſo we may not propound unto our ſelves ſuch an end which is averſe unto the love of God, and of our neighbour, and that we make not choice of any means that are not joyned with honeſty & righteouſneſs. In every work therefore we muſt not only look to propound unto our ſelves a good end, but we muſt withall endeavour to the end ſo propounded by apt, lawful, & honeſt means, for ſeeing that the election of the means or the mediums do ariſe from the intention of the end, & is ſo neceſſarily joyned to it, that in the reſpect thereof, it hath the place of an accident inſeperable, or a neceſſary circumſtance, Animum laudô: Conſilium reprehend…. Cic. 9. ad Attic. 11.the School-men do almoſt all of them conclude, that an evil election doth corrupt an intention that is otherwiſe good, by rendring that evil which before was good, in the very ſame manner as evil circumſtances do corrupt thoſe Actions, to which they are retayners.

XII. The fourth argument is taken from the perfection and obligation of the Law of God; For there p. 51is a Law propounded from God to men, a moſt perfect Law, which commandeth things to be done, and forbiddeth thoſe things which are not to be done; It hath ſhewed unto thee O man what is good, & what the Lord requireth of thee Mich. 6. 8. This is the Law which we muſt obey if we will fulfil our duties, by this Law we are commanded (as the Scriptures every where do declare) to do good, and to eſchew evil; But if we on the contrary, without the leaſt regard to the law of God, ſhall meaſure out unto our ſelves things to be avoyded or performed, according to our own profit, and as we ſhall think good, and ſhall either omit thoſe good things which God commandeth to be done for the fear of ſome following evil, or ſhall commit thoſe evil things which God forbiddeth, for the vain hope of ſome good to come, what is this but (worms as we are) to preferre our own Counſels above the expreſſe will of Almighty God, and the wiſdome of the fleſh above the Authority of the moſt holy Spirit. Farre otherwiſe did that holy man David, By thy precepts (ſaith he) have I gotten underſtanding, therefore have I hated all unjuſt wayes, Pſal. 119. 104. As if he ſhould ſay, being inſtructed by thy Law which both night and day is in my heart, my mouth, & before mine eyes, I do plainly underſtand what I have to do, and what I have to eſchew, wherefore I do not only decline but hate every way which is not conſentaneous to thy Law, whither ſoever it may ſeem to lead me. Therefore ſince every ſin is forbidden by the Law of God, and that Law of his containeth not the leaſt exception of any good Intention, or Event, and we ought not to diſtinguiſh where the Law maketh no diſtinction, nor to except where the Law maketh p. 52no exception it is moſt manifeſt, that he whoſoever he is who for what Intention, or what cauſe ſoever it be, doth knowingly and willingly do that which is evil, he doth ſin againſt the Law of God.

XIII. The fifth argument followeth, drawn from the examples of thoſe who under the pretence of a good end being ſo bold as to diſobey the expreſs Commandment of God, have ſatisfied his anger by the juſt puniſhment of their raſhneſs, and diſobedience. The Prophet Samuel being ſent to Saul the King of Iſrael, who ſaved ſome of the cattle of the Amalekites, which God had commanded ſhould be totally deſtroyed, for no other end, as he pretended, than by the bulk and fatneſs of his ſacrifice to make it the more acceptable, the ſaid Prophet did lay before his eyes the grievouſneſs of his ſin, and for the puniſhment of ſo great a diſobedience, did propheſy unto him that his Kingdom ſhould be taken from him; If any man ſhall think this example not congruous to prove this truth, becauſe it doth not appear that Saul did this with any good intention, neither was the end which afterwards he pretended, fixed and grounded in his reſolution when he did it, but it is more likely that he looked after his temporal advantage and commodity, both becauſe it was objected to him by the Prophet, and laid unto his charge that he obeyed not the commandment of God, and becauſe (which is common with Hypocrits) he did make an excuſe for his diſobedience; That this exception may be waved, & create no more trouble or ſcruple, it is to be obſerved, that where Hypocriſy is joyned to diſobedience, the crime is not ſo much increaſed, as it is doubled. There is no man doubteth but that Saul was guilty of a double p. 53fault, of diſobedience, and diſſimulation, not to make mention of the third crime which was the root of the two former, viz. a mundane affection, and a deſire of gain, and of his own glory. The ſins of diſobedience and of diſſimulation were diſtinct in Saul & neither conjoyned by nature or by time; not by nature, for one of them can be in any man, without the other; nor by time, for diſobedience had the precedency, to w^ch. afterwards upon another occaſion was added Dſſiimulation, which not obſcurely may be collected from the very words of Samuel himſelf, who making no mention of the diſſimulation of the King, did only ſharply and ſecurely reprehend him for his diſobedience; obedience ſaith he is more acceptable than ſacrifice, as if he ſhould have ſaid, What do you tell me of ſacrifices, which if you did in earneſt before intend them, or now to excuſe your diſobedience you do pretend them, it is all one in relation to your duty. You ought to have obeyed the commandment of God, and without the leaſt murmuring or diſpute to have fullfilled that which he preſcribed: But whatſoever this miſcarriage of Saul was, moſt certain it is, that Uzzah, whoſe Hiſtory is written 2 Sam. 6. did put forth his hand to the holy Ark not deceitfully, but devoutly, and with a moſt pious Intention, that the Ark of the Covenant ſhould not fall on the ground (which at that time under the …economy of the old Teſtament was a dreadfull Symbol of the Divine preſence) when the Cart in which it was carryed being violently ſhaken, it ſeemed even ready to ſlip down out of it; By this ſlight (as ſome have thought) but importunate temerity, although he had not the leaſt ill intent, yet he merited (a multitude of people beholding it) that he p. 54ſhould ſuffer the puniſhment of a ſudden death, w^ch. God then did inflict upon him.Num. 7. 9.Num 7:9 Indeed the Lord Jehovah had before declared that the Ark of the Covenant ſhould not be carryed in a Cart, but on the ſhoulders of the Prieſts, neither was it lawful for any, who was not of the order of the Prieſthood, & of the Family of the Koathites to carry the Ark, or to touch that ſacred veſſel, Numb. 4. 15.Num 4:15he that ſhould preſume to do it was to periſh by an evil death; Therefore by this ſevere puniſhment on the firſt violator of that Law, God did ſtrike into the hearts of men a reverence to the more ſtrict obſervation of the Law, and preſerved its Authority, that no man under any pretence whatſoever ſhould boldly preſume to do or to attempt againſt that which he had ordained; And the anger of the Lord was kindled againſt Uzzah, and God ſmote him there for his raſhneſſe, and he dyed by the Ark of God 2. Sam. 6. 7.

XIIII. The laſt argument is taken, from the inconveniences that do attend the contrary opinion, And they are many, I ſhall only urge but one inſtead of all, and it is often mentioned by St. Auguſtine, which is, that the reſtraint of the Law being taken away, all things would be carried at random, as the barrs being broken, when once the waves of the Sea do exceed their banks they will not endure to be contained within any bounds, but will grow upon all places, by an unruly uſurpation, that are farre or near them. He who hath once tranſgreſſed the bounds of modeſty will quickly grow into a heighth of impudence, ſaith Petronius. But let us rather be attentive to St. Auguſtine, Quod ſeeleratiſſimum facinus, quod turpiſſimum flagitium, quod impiiſſimum ſacrilegium. non dicatur fieri poſſe recte at que p. 55juſte, ſi ſemel conceſſerimus, in omnibus malis operibus hominum ideo non quid fiat ſed quare fiat quaerendum ut quaecun que propter bonas cauſas facta obtendantur, nec ipſa mala eſſe judicentur, What abom nable act, what moſt filthy wickedneſſe, what moſt impious, ſacriledge, (Ah do you not gueſſe that he propheſyed of this our age, and of our affairs?) may not be ſaid to be done juſtly, and uprightly, if we ſhall once grant, that in all the evil works of men we are not to demand ſo much, what is done, as wherefore it is done, that ſo thoſe things which are pretended to be done for good cauſes, may not at all of themſelves be judged to be evil.

And again, Cum conceſſeris admittendum eſſe aliquod malum ne aliquid gravius admittatur, non ex regula veritatis ſedex ſua quiſque cupiditate aut conſuetudine metietur malum, et id putabit gravius quod ipſe amplius exhorreſcit, non quod ampliùs revera fugiendum eſt. When you grant that ſome evil is to be admitted, that a greater one may be omitted, every one will be ready to meaſure that evil, not by the Rule of truth, but by his own deſires, or by Cuſtome, and will think that to be moſt grievous which he doth moſt abhorre, and not that which indeed is moſt to be avoyded.

The ſtrength of the argument is in this, If evil things are to be done that good things may come thereby, when moſt ſure it is that all things evil are not to be done, and not for all things that are good, we muſt put ſome limitation or rule to both theſe doubts, as firſt to know what evil is to be done that good may come thereof, and what not; and Secondly for what good things ſome things evil are to be done, and for what they are not to be done) or it muſt be left to every mans judgment, to arbitrate p. 56according to the nature of the thing, and as himſelf ſhall think good, what is to be done, and what is not to be done, and for what it is to be done; If any of which be granted, there will be nothing ſafe amongſt men, nothing ſacred, nothing free from injuries, perjuries, deceits, rapine, ſlaughter, and deſtruction. Thoſe things without which Common-wealths and the ſocieties of men cannot be preſerved, muſt all be baniſhed from the earth, in which number are, Religion, Juſtice, Righteouſneſſe, Faith, and Peace.

XV. The concluſion which I undertook to prove, being now, as I conceive, ſufficiently confirmed; I hope it will not be inconſonant, nor ungratefull, certainly not unprofitable to you, to derive ſome corallaries from it which may be uſefull to us all for the inſtitution of our lives and manners. It followeth therefore in the firſt place, from that which is already ſpoken, that all pious men muſt take heed, leaſt being tranſported by a zeal to the glory of God, they be carryed away to unlawfull Acts. There is no true Chriſtian will deny but that the glory of God is the ſupreme and ultimate end of all our actions. Whether we eat or drink or whatſoever we do, it muſt be all done to the glory of God 1 Cor. 10 31. But being tranſported with too haſty, and too prepoſtrous a zeal to the glory of God, what contumelies, what ſlaughters, did not thoſe men of that faction amongſt the people of the Jews commit, who peculiarly were called Zelots; And amongſt Chriſtians in the memory of our Fathers the ſame things have been recorded (by men worthy of belief, and who were no ways ignorant of the tranſactions of the affairs of their times) to have been done in Germany, and other p. 57places by the Anabaptiſts, in whoſe Chronologies ſuch horrid acts, and ſo far from all humanity are reported, that we ſhould hardly have given any belief unto them, if we had not of late ſeen the ſame tragedies every day to be prodigiouſly acted to the life, by their unhappy off-ſpring, the diſmal ſcene being tranſlated into our Britannies.

XVI. That none of you may be deceived therefore with ſo ſplendid a deceit, and that you may not deceive others; Conſider with your ſelves in 1the firſt place that all Seducers, the miniſters of Satan, and inſtructed by Satan himſelf, the chief Seducer, 1 Cor. 11. 14.1 Cor 11:14who is accuſtomed to transform himſelf into an Angel of light have not more advanced themſelves by any artifice, nor impoſed more upon the belief of the common people of Chriſtendom, nor more vigorouſly troubled the peace of our Churches, and Common-wealths than under the pretence of the glory of God, and of the reformation of Religion, and of the propagation of the Gospell, and of rooting out ſuperſtition, and of the exalting of the Kingdom of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt. The moſt eminent of the Proteſtant Miniſters in the preceeding age, as Calvin, Bucer, Zuinglius and others have all along in their writeings grievouſly complayned of this; Amongſt whom Jerome Zanchius a man ſecond unto few in learning modeſty and piety hath this expreſſion, Ego non intelligo iſtam reformatorum mundi Theologiam, Zanchius.I do not underſtand this divinity of the new Reformers of the world. I would to God that the experience of what is dayly acted amongſt us did not confirm too much the truth of that vulgar Proverb, In nomine Domini incipit omne malum. Secondly, Conſider 2with your ſelves with how great, and how perverſe p. 58a heat of Spirit, the glory of God is pretended to all wars, tumults, quarrelling, contentions, and unprofitable diſputations, of which the holy Apoſtles of our Lord Jeſus did hardly ever make mention of, (and full often they have mentioned it) but in order to peace and brotherly-love, and that ſweet deportment in things indifferent, which eſpecially becommeth Chriſtians, that ſo no man might abuſe that liberty which we do by the benefit of Chriſt, to be an 3offence or a ſtumbling-block unto his Brother. In the third place conſider, that the man who doth propound unto himſelf the glory of God to be his End muſt alſo propound unto himſelf the Law of God, to be the Rule of all his actions. Ad Legem, & Teſtimonium, to the Law, and to the Teſtimony Iſa. 8. 20. Grant that the reſpect unto the glory of God is the final cauſe of thy acting, as it is fit it ſhould be ſo, but the Rule and as it were the formal Reaſon of thy acting is not to be the glory of God, but his revealed Will; In the whole courſe of our lives the glory of God is to be looked upon as the mark or the Gole to which we run, but we muſt look upon the Rule alſo, that ſo we may go the right way which doth bring us to it, leſt that deſervedly be objected to us which is commonly ſpoken, Benè curritis ſed extrà viam, 4You run well, but you run out of the way. Laſtly, conſider, that the glory of God in the reſpect of ſingular actions hath the eſtimation of an end tranſcendental. Now it is manifeſt that to a Tranſcendent no Individual can immediately be ſubjected, ſo not of any ſingular Ens or being, whether it be ſubſtantial, or accidental, is immediately ſubjected to the ſummum Ens or the chief being; Therefore as Ens tranſcendentale, the tranſcendental being is verified of every p. 59very being which is in one of the ten praedicaments, whether it be univerſal, or ſingular, ſo the glory of God is the end of all duties, & of all acts thereto pertaining which expreſsly, and virtually are contained in any praecept of the Decalogue; God is to be worſhipped, our Parents honoured, our Neighbours beloved, our promiſes performed, Juſtice, Truth, and Chaſtity preſerved, and other duties of Piety and Charity performed, to the honour and glory of God. Now as nothing hath truly the condition of an Ens or being which may not aptly be reduced to ſome ſpecies of it in ſome one of the ten praedicaments, ſo no particular action, let men that mind their own ends ſay what they will to the contrary, can ever truly and properly be referred to the glory of God as to its end which is not reducible to ſome duty of piety and charity; grounded in ſome one of the ten Commandments, of the Law of God. He but deludes you therefore, whoſoever he is who obſtreperouſly cries out the glory of God, the glory of God, and yet is not able to tell you by what commandment in the Law of God he can maintain that, which he vainly profeſſeth that he performeth for the glory of God.

XVII. From the Concluſion above named it followeth in the ſecond place that they are in a great error who think it is lawfull for them to commit a leſſe ſin that a greater ſin might be avoyded, many things are alledged to maintain this error, as in the firſt place, that common ſaying which is in the mouth of every man,**foreign. Ariſt. 2. Ethic. 9. Of evils we muſt chooſe the leaſt, and to give a reaſon for what they ſay, they alledge that of Ariſtot. that a††foreign, Id. 5. Ethic. 7. leſſe evil being compared with a greater, may be taken for a good. To p. 60which is added that of Gregorius magnus, Dum mens inter minora, et maxima peccata conſtringitur ſi nullus omninò ſine peccato evadendi aditus pateat, minorà ſemper elegantur, When the mind is perplexed betwixt leſs ſins, and thoſe of a higher nature, if there be no poſſibility to eſcape without ſin, the leſſe ſins are always to be choſen. Neither to this are wanting the examples of godly men, in which that Act of Lot is remarkable above all the reſt, for in the nineteenth of Geneſis we do find that he perſwaded the filthy and moſt impure Inhabitants of Sodom to the Act of incontinency with his own Daughters, to divert them from more nefarious luſts. I ſhould appear too tedious if I ſhould here inſiſt upon too many examples, 1to contract much therfore into few words, I ſay firſt of all that thoſe words, Of evills the leaſt, is properly, and primarily to be underſtood of the evills of puniſhment (as they call it) & not of the fault, that is to ſay not of Sir, but of Externall evills compared amongſt themſelves; In the ſame ſence as David did, who, the choyce of three evils being propounded to him,1 Sam. 24. 14.1 Sam 24:14 viz. of War, Famine and Peſtilence, foreign Vid. Suid. foreign.did make choice of the leaſt of thoſe three: In the ſecond place I affiirm that the ſame proverb, in the interpretation of it, is extended to a further ſence, For two evils being propounded, the one of puniſhment, the other of the fault, if neither of them can poſſibly be avoyded, but of neceſſity one of them muſt be choſen, the evil of the puniſhment is to be made choice of, and not the evil of the fault, for it is the leaſt evil of the two, to ſuffer evil than to do evil. We ought therefore rather to chooſe, to loſe our goods than to renounce our faith; and to ſuffer baniſhment than to be guilty of perjury; And from p. 61hence it is that the Martyrs, of old, were indued with ſuch a gallantry & ſtrength of courage, as to be plundred, and tormented, and to loſe their lives, rather than to burn incenſe u…to Idols, or to conſent to any thing which were diſhoneſt, or unworthy the name of a Chriſtian. In the third place, if it 3were propounded to any one to commit two ſins, and moſt manifeſt it is unto his Conſcience that both of them are ſins, I do affirm that he is not to make any choice of either, but to eſchew both of them. If you object, that put the caſe that neither of them can be avoided, but one of them muſt of neceſſity be committed, as thoſe words of Gregory do manifeſtly imply, what will you perſwade a man unto being in theſe ſtreights. I anſwer, that this cannot be ſuppoſed, for ſeeing that all ſin is ſo voluntary, that if it were not voluntary it were not ſin, as St. Auguſtine truly affirms, it cannot be that any man ſhould be brought into ſuch a ſtreight that of neceſſity he muſt ſin, foreign Ariſt. 2. Eudem. 11.he therfore doth contradict himſelf who ſhall affirm that he committed ſuch a ſin being compelled by meer neceſſity, for there is no man ſinneth unleſſe it be by his own Will, and the will is ſo free that it cannot be compelled; And ſurely this is the ſence of St. Gregory although at the firſt ſight the words do ſeem to bear another conſtruction,Nulla eſt neceſſitas delinquendi, quibus una eſt neceſsitas non delinquendi. Tert. de Cor. Mil. Cap. 11. theſe words eſpecially, (Si nullus ſine peccato evadendi aditus pateat) But if it be impoſſible to make any evaſion without the committing of ſin. For St. Gregory doth not here ſpeak of two things propounded to be done, both whereof are ſins (which is the ſubject of which we now do treat) but of two things whereof it is manifeſt to the perſon that doth commit them, that one is a ſin, and the other by a miſtake p. 62of the Conſcience is conceived by him to be a ſin, when indeed it is not ſo, but upon ſome ungrounded ſuſpition, or ſome new ſcruple that doth invade his Conſcience, he is affraid leſt peradventure it be a ſin, which caſe is different from our preſent inſtitution.

XVIII. If you demand, is it lawfull for Caius to admit unto himſelf a leſs ſin to hinder a far greater one, which Titius otherwiſe would have committed, as to be guilty of ſome petty larceny, that the other might not commit a murder. I ſay with St. Auguſtine, that it is not lawfull, his words are theſe, Si quaeratur quid duorum potius debuit evitare qui utrum que non potuit, ſed alterutrum potuit, respondeo ſuum peccatum potius quam alienum, & levius potiùs quod ſuum, quàm gravius quod alienum. If it be demanded of me (ſaith he) what of the two he ought rather to avoid, who cannot eſchew both ſins, but may one of them. I anſwer his own ſin rather than anothers, and more eaſily his own than anothers. The reaſon is ready, for it is in my power that I do not ſin, but not if another ſinneth. And thus he proceeds, Ego utrumque malum fieri nollem, ſed id tantum cavere potui, ne fieret quod erat in mea potestate. I would have neither of the two evils committed, but I could only be cautious in this, that the evill ſhould not be committed which was in my power. But man-ſlaughter is a greater crime then theft, St. Auguſtine doth confeſſe it, and makes anſwer that nevertheleſs it is worſe to act a theft, then to ſuffer a man-ſlaughter; And to the ſame purpoſe he expreſſeth himſelf in another place, Quantumlibet diſtet inter tuum & aliennm, hoc tamen erit tuum illud alienum. Let the crime be never ſo rightly ſtated, yet this ſhall be thy own, and p. 63that ſhall be another mans. This is cleer, and I need no longer to inſiſt upon it.

XIX. In the fifth place, if it be yet demanded, is it lawfull at leaſt for any man to perſwade a leſs evil to him who is ready to commit a greater, as if a man be ready to cut the throat of his enemy, to perſwade him to inflict only ſome ſlight wound upon him. The ſpeech of Lot to his fellow Citizens tendeth to this purpoſe; And there are many who differ in their judgment concerning it. I do not much wonder that Chryſoſtome doth excuſe it, for it is the inclination of his Genius and in the ſame manner he excuſeth all the infirmities of the Patriarches. Ambroſe doth excuſe him alſo, and ſo do many more, eſpecially the Antients. But St. Auguſtine doth cenſure him as guilty of ſin, and his judgment hath been approved of by many who ſince have followed him; and undoubtedly it doth appear, that this holy man out of a pious affection to his Gueſts, being extreamly ſollicitous, that no force or inj…ry ſhould be offered to them, did ſome things, and peradventure ſpoke more out of the diſtemper of a troubled mind, than might eaſily be excuſed. Therefore to paſſe over this fact of Lot, we will return from the Hypotheſis to the Theſis, or to the queſtion now in hand; I do conceive that it is lawfull for a man to perſwade a leſs evil unto his friend to avoid the commiſſion of a greater. If peradventure you ſhall alledge, whoſoever perſwades a ſin unto another, although it be but a little one, doth nevertheleſſe perſwade him to a ſin, which whoſoever doth do, he in that very Act doth make himſelf guilty of another mans ſin. I make anſwer, that it is one thing abſolutely to perſwade a man to this or p. 64that ſin, which whoſoever doth, he doth undoubtedly ſin, and another thing to perſwade him to a ſin conditionally, and upon that ſuppoſition that he cannot otherwiſe eſchew a greater ſin, which being ſuppoſed, and granted, he is not ſo much to be eſteemed, to have induced by his Counſel another to a leſs ſin, as to have diverted him from a greater and a more crying one, for he did not perſwade him to ſin as it was ſin, but as it was a leſs ſin, and the hinderer of a greater one. If you ſhall again object; If it be lawfull for me to perſwade another man to make choyce of a leſs ſin, why is it not lawfull for that man of his own accord to make choice of that ſin, I not perſwading him to it, nay, why may I not do that ſafely my ſelf, which lawfully I do perſwade unto another, and that is of two ſins propounded to make choice of the leſs. Or of the three ways here ſpoken of, why is the firſt only thought to be lawfull, and neither of the two others, the manner and the account of all the three appearing to be the ſame. I make anſwer, and do conſtantly deny the condition and the reaſon of them to be the ſame, the difference being moſt manifeſt, that it is not lawfull for him on his accord, nor for me on my own accord to chooſe a leſs ſin to avoid a greater, is becauſe it being in both our powers (respectively) to forbear both, we are both obliged to make choice of neither, but that it is lawfull for me to perſwade unto another, a leſs ſin that a greater may be abandoned, doth proceed from this, that it is not in the power of me the perſwader, (for that is already ſuppoſed) to hinder or to ſtop the courſe of either of them; I muſt do my endeavour indeed, as much as lies in the power of my perſwaſions, to give a ſtop p. 65unto them both, but when I find that I cannot perform that, which above all I would, and have a deſire to do, I do at the leaſt perform that which I am able, and which I ought to do, to perſwade to a leſs ſin to hinder the commiſſion of a greater.

XX. By theſe things hitherto diſcourſed of it is eaſy to be underſtood, what is the ſence of that Proverb, E malis minimum, Of evils the leaſt, and what is the uſe of it in all humane conſideration, whether it be applyed to the evils of puniſhment or to the evils of fault, for (as St. Auguſtine doth rightly lay down the ſtate of the queſtions) it holds and that univerſally alſo, and in both the kind of evils, as often as things do come ſo to paſs when it lyes in our power, to eſchew one of the two evils if not to avoid them both. Indeed every evil as it is an evil is to be eſchewed by a pious and a prudent man as much as lyes in his power, therefore two kind of evils, of what kind ſoever, being propounded, he ought to avoid both, if poſſible, if not he may give ear to his admoniſher, and chooſe that which is the leaſt; Nevertheleſſe it doth not follow that although he may chooſe the leaſt of two evils, whether the evil of the fault, or the evill of puniſhment, that he may chooſe the leaſt of two ſins, for in ſins both of them may be avoided as is already above demonſtrated; And thus much concerning the ſecond corallary.

Out of this principal concluſion, it followeth in the third place, that they are in no leſſe, if not a greater errour who conceive, that ſin may drive out ſin, as one nayl doth drive out another, as for example, Superſtition is to be driven out by Sacriledge and Tyranny by Sedition &c. And this commonly is the p. 66error of thoſe men who think themſelvs to be then moſt wiſe, when like Gardiners, when their plants and twigs being crooked, & ſtooping too much on the one ſide, they bend them ſo much on the other ſide, to make them ſtraight, that they quite do break them off, and by taking too much care to avoid one extreme, they improvidently do fall into another, ſo.

Stulti dum vitant vitia in contraria currunt.Hor. Satyr.

Whiles fools ſome vices ſtrive to ſhun,

Into their contraries they run

Whiles they endeavour to keep off from Scylla, they fall into Charibdis; And as that Aphoriſm hath ſome place in curing the affections of the body (which notwithſtanding is not altogether approved by all the ſons of Eſculapius) viz. Contraria contrariis curari, extrema extremis, that Contraries by contraries, foreign.and extreams are cured by extreams, ſo in correcting the manners, and reforming the corruptions of the Church and Common-wealth, inſtead of remedy, it bringeth for the moſt part a certain ruine. Grave is that ſaving of Sophocies, in his Stobaeus, foreign. Hence it is that the affairs of mortals do ſo much decay, that with one evil they would cure another, and much of the ſame nature is that in his Ajax.

—foreign,

foreign.

foreign

One being tame, no more ill medecines try,

Leſt you contract ſome greater grief thereby.

p. 67XXI. But if no other remedy can be procured for the publick evils, unleſſe ſome go…ly couſenages be adminiſtred, and the lawes of God and men be violated, were it not better to ſuffer for a little time that ſuch things ſhould be done, than that the Common-wealth ſhould be ſick and periſh? I do read indeed in the Holy Writ that Chaiphas the high Prieſt of Jeruſalem was of that opinion, who in the Senate of his Nation, all the reſpects to Law and Juſtice being laid aſide,John 11. 50.John 11:50 pronounced that Jeſus though guilty of no crime, was to be put to death, becauſe it was expedient; I do remember I heretofore have read that one of the Biſhops of Rome being preſent at a great debate in the conclave of the Cardinals, when it was told him by one of them that the counſel which was then propounded did not appear to be juſt unto him, he made anſwer, Although it may not be done by the way of juſtice yet it muſt be done by the way of expediency. This you ſee what is the only way to be wiſe; This is the Divinity of thoſe men whom they call Polititians taken (as I believe) from the counſels of the Jeſuits, to meaſure all things by the profits of the holy mother the Church, to write the word of God himſelf as they pleaſe, and this way and that way to bend it like a noſe of wax, and to inforce it to an interpretation for their own profit, according to their own ſence; And as that Lacedemonian ſaid, that all things at Sparta were honeſt which were profitable, theſe ſparks of Sparta think nothing is filthy enough, nothing is to be avoided that may be ſubſervie…t to their advantages; But fie on this mad Divinity, let it be f…r from our Schools, Pulpits, and Breſts. The holy Apoſtles of our Saviour, have far otherwiſe inſtructed p. 68us, who would give no place to that queſtion, Is it expedient or not, 1 Cor. 10. 23.1 Cor 10:23before they were fully ſatisfied in that other queſtion, is it lawfull or not? Nay the more ſober ſort of the Heathens themſelves were of another judgment, who as often as Honeſty did ſeem to diſagree with profit, they ſo always have made the reconcilement, that they have pronounced that the ſame is not profitable which is not alſo honeſt.

XXIII. But to make no long digreſſion, St. Paul in this verſe doth altogether deny, that any evil is to be done that good may come thereby, than which words what can be ſpoken more plainly, or effectually to prove our concluſion; But not long ſince I heard with theſe ears when thoſe words of the Apoſtle were urged, and ſome then preſent could not otherwiſe defend what they ſo much deſired to maintain, they made uſe of this diſtinction, that it was not lawfull indeed for a private man to do evil at his own pleaſure that good may come thereby, and this was only that which St. Paul in theſe words did prohibit, but it was lawfull notwithſtanding for the common-Council of a Nation to whoſe care it doth belong that the Common-wealth ſhould receive no detriment to do it, if the publick neceſſity and the ſafety of the people do ſo require; What and how much is to be done for the ſafety of the people I ſhall hereafter God willing examine, and determine: In the mean time it is in the firſt place to be obſerved that this is but an extravagant ſuggeſtion, and that there is nothing in the whole diſcourſe of St. Paul, on which that diſtinction may rely. Secondly, If we ſhall mark the force, and the ſcope of St. Pauls argument in this place, we ſhall perceive that all ſuch limitations, and ridiculous inventions p. 69of deceitfull men, for the Apostle here meets with the objection for promoting the glory of God, by the ſins of men, he denyeth that evil is to be done for that end to render the glory of God more illuſtrious. It followeth therefore, a fortiori, from the stronger, that no evill things are to be done, for any thing that is inferiour to the glory of God; And ſeeing the glory of God is infinitely to be preferred to all humane good whatſoever, whether publick, or private, and it is not lawfull notwithſtanding to do evil for Gods glory, certainly it is not lawfull for a private man or for the Repreſentatives of a whole Commonalty for the redreſſe of any publick or private inconvenience to do evil themſelves, or to commend it to be done by another.

XXIV. Let us meditate I beſeech you (my hearers) on theſe things with our ſelves and that moſt ſeriouſly, and the worſe that the dayes are, and the more that the ſnares of temptation are, and the aſſaults more violent, let us walk the more exactly, and look unto our ſteps with a greater circumſpection, let us not ſuffer our ſelves by any machinations of the Devills, or allurements of fleſh & the world to be led aſide, though never ſo little, from that right, & that ſtreight path of the Commandments of God; carrying allwayes in our memoryes that the evils which wittingly and willfully we have committed, ſhall find no excuſe in that day when God ſhall be our Iudge, and our Conſciences our witneſſes, And thus much concerning the pretence of a good Intention: what remaineth to be ſpoken concerning the examples & placits of men, ſo far as it appertaineth to the regiment of conſcience, I will (God willing) proceed to give you a full account of it in my following Lecture.