The Obligation of Human Conscience, Lecture 1

The Obligation of Human Conscience · Lecture 1

p. 1THE FIRST LECTURE▪ In which the Definition of Conſcience is propounded, and unfolded.

1 COR. 2. 11.

What Man knoweth the things of a Man, but the Spirit of Man which is in him.

I. THat the power of Conſcience is very great,aaCicero pro Milone. either in the reſpect of Fear or Confidence, hath been of old declared by wiſe and learned Men, and more neerly and abundantly atteſted by the ſence and the experience of all Men. It is therefore the more to be lamented that many (while greedily they imploy all their ſtudies in the knowledge of things indifferent) are in ſo dark an ignorance in the knowledge of their own Conſciences, notwithſtanding there is no where to be found, a more faithful Admoniſher, or a more diligent Accuſer, or a Severer p. 2Witneſſe, or an uncorrupter Judge, or a ſweeter Comforter, or a more importunate Enemy. That therefore I may inſtill into the Minds and Ears of the ingenious, that old, and ſo often repeated inſtruction foreign, that is, Know thy ſelf, and divert them a little from the too immoderate deſire of a more unprofitable knowledge, gradually by inviting them to a greater care and ſtudy of their Conſciences; I thought it would be a work worth the labour, if I ſhould a little more diligently inquire into the uſe, & Nature of Conſcience, and in this place, according to my obligations, communicate to you, my Auditors, thoſe Meditations which I ſhall find moſt obſervable on this Subject. I have determined therefore in this firſt Lecture to lay open the Nature of Conſcience by defining it, and in my following Lectures, by the Almighties permiſſion, I will expound unto you the uſe and office of the Conſcience, eſpecially as it reflecteth on things to be done, and that in a double reſpect: the firſt, to the rule of the Law to which it ought to be Subject, and the other in reſpect to former actions over which it is ordained to govern.

II. But the method of defining being twofold, the one Synthetical, or by the way of Compoſition, when by due weighing of every part of the premiſes, the definition at laſt is perfectly collected: the other Analytical, and by way of reſolution which doth take aſunder every peice of the definition, and open and unfold that, which at firſt was propounded entire; Although the former may peradventure ſeem more convenient to the order of Nature, yet I have made choice of the latter, which I conceive more fit for inſtruction. Thus therefore p. 3I do briefly define Conſcience. Conſcience is a faculty, or a habit of the practical underſtanding, by which the mind of Man doth by the diſcourſe of reaſon apply that light with which he is indued to his particular moral Actions. In this definition two things do preferre themſelves to obſervation. Firſt, the name of the thing defined, which is the voyce of the Conſcience it ſelf. Secondly, the particular members of the definition, which are all thoſe that are ordinary in the definition of the qualities of the firſt and ſecond Species; that is to ſay, the Genus, the Subject, the Object, and the proper Act.

III. As to the Name of the thing defined, it is obſerved by learned men that in all the old Teſtament there is not found a Hebrew word which preciſely, and peculiarly doth ſignifie the Conſcience; But the Hebrews, according to their cuſtom of ſpeaking, as often as mention is made of Conſcience, they make uſe of one of thoſe two words to expreſſe it foreign or foreign, and foreign, the firſt whereof is known by all to ſignifie the Heart, and the other the Spirit of Man. According to this is that of Solomon in the fourth of Proverbs; Prov. 4. 23.Prov 4:23Keep thy Heart with all diligence, as if he ſhould have ſaid, Le every one have a diligent care of his own Conſcience; And in the ſeventh of Eccleſiaſtes, where according to the old interpretation the words are,…ccle. …. 23. Thy Conſcience knoweth that thou thy ſelf hath often curſed others; And according unto the Tranſlation of Tremellius, thy Mind is Conſcious; It is in the Hebrew Text foreign that is, Thy Heart knoweth, And in the new Teſtament, eſpecially in St. John, in whoſe writings there are many Hebraiſms; the word foreign, the Heart is often put for the Conſcience p. 4as John 1 3.1 John 3▪ 21.1 John 3:21 If our heart condemneth us not, that is if our Conſcience doth condemn us not, it being the proper office of the conſcience to condemn, or not to condemn the guilty perſon ſtanding before the tribunal of Juſtice; From this proceeds that common alluſion of St. Bernard, and others; Conſcientia quaſi cordis ſcientia, The Conſcience is the hearts conſciouſneſs. The conſcience alſo in the holy Scripture oftentimes by the Hebrews and the G…ecians is called and expreſſed by the name of Spirit; I will only inſtance two places, for what needs any more in a thing ſo evident: In the Old Teſtament Proverbs the 18 and the fourteenth verſe, The Spirit of man will ſuſtain his infirmity, but a broken Spirit who can endure? As if he ſhould ſay, a man of a ſound and unſtained conſcience will endure with as much courage as patience whatſoever calamities ſhall befall him, but an afflicted and guilty conſcience is a burden inſupportable. And then in the new Teſtament, I ſhall make uſe of that of St. Paul, 1 Cor. 2. 11. which is the Theme and foundation of this preſent diſcourſe. What man knoweth the things of a man, but the Spirit of man which is in him. That is his own Conſcience.

IIII. But moſt certain it is that the Latin word Conſcientia, Conſcience and the Greek foreign, which in all things is moſt reſponſible to the Latin, did both of them receive their de…ivations a ſciendo, from knowing; but a praepoſition being added to both the words in the pronunciation of them, doth ſeem to imply more then can hereby be contained in the ſingle word Science; but ſeveral Authors do give a ſeveral ſignification of it. To omit thoſe two alluſions that by many are alleadged, (which if p. 5we look on the nature of the thing it ſelf, may peradventure be retained as altogether not improper, but if brought to the exactneſs of a lawfull examination, will preſently appeare but vain and not worthy to be inſiſted on.) viz. that Conſcientia eſt quaſi cordis ſcientia, Conſcience is no more than the hearts conſciouſnes; And Conſcientia quaſi concludens ſcientia; Conſcience is as it were a concluding Science: It is moſt certain that thoſe two words foreign and Conſcientia, beyond the bare notion of a Science, have a certain order and relation of that ſcience to another; for ſuch is the force of the two particles, foreign and Con, that in their compoſition they imply a certain conjunction and an aſſociation of many things, ſo that this word Conſcientia or Conſcience may be ſaid to be conjuncta multorum ſcientia, a conjoyned ſcience of many things, which two ways may be underſtood; For it may be ſaid to be the ſcience of many things, in reſpect of the ſubjects, as the ſcience or the knowledge of many men that do know; as when many perſons do know the ſame thing: or in reſpect of the objects, when it is the knowledge of many things that are known, as when the ſame perſon knows many things alike. Let the word Conſcience be taken either in the one ſence or the other, the account of the word neither much borrowed nor incongruous may be given, whether we look on the thing it ſelf, or the uſe and manner of ſpeaking amongſt approved Authors.

V. For in the firſt place when many men know the ſame thing, they may be ſaid to be conſcious of it, and to know it altogether; So thoſe whom Catiline had choſen into the ſociety of his wickedneſs, and were made partakers of his counſels, were ſaid p. 6to be conſcious of that conſpiracy. And he is ſaid to be conſcious of the Kings ſecrets, to whom his privy counſels are intruſted, Aſcitus in conſcientiam facinoris, ſaith Tacitus, Drawn in into the conſcience of the villany.Mrrtial 12. 24. O ſi conſcius eſſet hic Avitus ſaith Martial in his Epigrams,Juven. Sat. 14. O that this man were conſcious of it, and Conſcia Matri Virgo fuit, the Daughter was conſcious to what the Mother did; And Meorum omnium conſiliorum periculorum que teſtis conſcius, et adjutor, ſaith Cicero in his orations; A Conſcious witneſs, and a helper to me in all my counſels and dangers. I ſhould here be infinite if I ſhould collect whatſoever to this purpoſe I every where do meet with in the Authors of greateſt reputation; But that may ſerve which already is alledged, unleſs peradventure you exact of me to produce ſomething from the puddle of the Grammarians which may conduce to this purpoſe; I will do it, not that the authority of thoſe men is ſo much to be valued, but becauſe in theſe things they ſeem as it were by right to arrogate a kind of pre…eminence to themſelves. In the firſt place, hear Nonius, In hoc differunt, ſaith he, Scius & conſcius, ſcius ſecum, conſcius cum alio ſcius eſt, That is, the knowing or ſcious man doth differ in this frō the conſcious; the ſcious knows by himſelf, the Conſcious is ſcious with another.

From this original of the word, they who thought that Conſcience was ſo called as one Science with another, doe give this reaſon for their opinion, that man not only knows what things he hath committed, but he hath God who ſearcheth the heart and the reins, to be a conſcious witneſs and an inſpector into all his works, nay, into his moſt ſecret thoughts, And this is moſt certain, though words be p. 7tongue-tyed, and the Voyce be dumb. Behold my witneſſe is in the Heavens, and foreign my Record that is conſcious of me is on high: Job. 16. 19. The bleſſed Apoſtle alſo St. Paul, in the ninth of the Romans and the firſt, when he had called on God to be the witneſſe of the truth he was about to ſpeak, he preſently ſubnecteth foreign, my Conſcience bearing me witneſſe; As if he ſhould have ſaid, foreign. Chriſt knows it, and I know it with him, foreign. Chriſt doth teſtify it, and my Conſcience doth a…eſt it with him. Let this therefore be the firſt reaſon of the derivation of the word, that Conſcience is ſo called, becauſe the deeds of Man are known unto God, as well as to himſelf.

VI. In another ſence the Conſcience is called the conjoyned Science of many things, as of Objects, or of things that are known, when a man knoweth many things at once, or (which ſtrikes on the ſame ſtring) when he conjoyneth and joyntly applyeth the knowledges of ſeveral things, that are in themſelves diſtinct. From whence proceedeth this ſecond reaſon of the word, which pleaſed much St. Thomas of Aquine, and a great part of the Schoolmen; and which ſeeming to be deſervedly preferred above the other already mentioned, doth bear no unprofitable light to illuſtrate the Nature and the force of Conſcience, which is, that Conſcience is ſo called, becauſe it addeth Science unto Science, that is, the univerſal knowledge, or the knowledge of Law, and Right, to the particular knowledge, or the knowledge of the fact by applying one unto the other; I ſhall make this more manifeſt to you p. 8by one or by two examples, in the firſt of Samuel the 24 Chapter, and the 50 Verſe, it is ſaid that Davids Heart did fail him, after that in the Cave he had cut off the wing of Sauls Garment, that is to ſay, his Conſcience did prick him; for we may imagine that David thus reaſoned within himſelf; I know that I ought not to offer any violence to the Sacred Perſon of the King, I know alſo that very lately I have done that which commeth very near unto violence; I am afraid therefore that I have done that, which peradventure I ought not to have done, and I give thanks unto God who held back my hand from acting that which certainly I ought not to have committed. In this manner alſo the Conſcience of Judas the Betrayer did object unto him: Thou knoweſt that thou oughteſt not to betray thy Maſter, and thou knoweſt that moſt baſely thou haſt done it. The ſence and knowledge of a particular fact either committed, or to be committed, comming in this manner to the univerſal knowledge of Law and Right which is in the mind, and being conjoyned, and applyed, and wholly reflecting on it, there ariſeth from thence all that which we call Conſcience. The words which by way of Reciprocation are expreſſed, and are moſt frequent in this kind, do confirm this derivation of the name of Conſcience,Iſocrat. ad Dem. of which nature is that of Iſocrates, foreign; Although you lye hid from others, yet you your ſelf will be Conſcious to your ſelf,Horace 1. and that of Horace, Hic murus abeneus eſto, Epiſt. 1.Nil conſcire ſibi; This is as a Wall of Braſſe, to be conſcious of no offence; And that of Virgil, VirgilMens ſibi conſcia recti; A Mind which is conſcious to it ſelf of its own uprightneſſe;Anaead. 1. And p. 9to conclude all, of the ſame ſence, is that of St Paul, 1 Cor. 4. 4. foreign, I am conſcious to my ſelf of nothing.

VII. I do believe that it is now manifeſt to you from whence the word Conſcience is derived, and it is left to your choyce to preferr the one acceptation, or the other, or to receive them both with an equal approbation. The other Reaſons which the common Schoolmen, according to their own capacities, do produce, are too weak to ſtop the progreſſe of this diſcourſe, of which there are many things that are yet remayning to be ſpoken. I proceed therefore to open to you the foreign or the cognomination of the word, from whence there ariſeth amongſt grave Authors ſo wonderful a difference in the definition, that as yet the controverſy is high, and difficult concerning the very firſt Term of the definition to find out what is the Genus of it. To remove therefore all Ambiguity, it is in the firſt place obſervable, that there is ſuch an affinity, by nature, of the Indowments of the mind, viz. of Potentia's, Habits, and Acts, and ſo near a conjunction, ſo cloſe a connexion, according to the uſe and exerciſe of them, that not only the appellations of words, but the offices, and real proprieties of every one of them, are promiſcuouſly, and without any diſtinction attributed to one another, and that not only in the Rhetorical expreſſions of the Poets and Orators, and others the Profeſſors of Humane Literature, to whom a Liberty was permitted; but even in the Dogmatical poſitions of the Philoſophers and Schoolmen themſelves, who were denyed that happy elegancy. Nevertheleſſe, although it was p. 10alwayes accounted a great task, in their own certain bounds, to define and diſtinguiſh of things ſo united by Uſe and Nature; yet as to the word Conſcience which is a kind of Science, and ſo named from it, it will be no little advantage to us, in this place a little more preciſely to explain the foreign or cognomination of this word Science, that ſo, by the manifold uſe of the ſingle word, the ambiguity of the compounded may more rightly, and more throughly be underſtood.

VIII. In the firſt place therefore (as the Names of Habits do familiarly paſſe into their Objects) Science is taken in a double conſideration, formally and objectively. And as the Divines do diſtinguiſh of Faith, that, Faith by which we do believe, which is a Habit of Faith exiſting in the mind, is one thing; and that the Faith which we do believe, which is no more than a thing believed by Faith, and but the object of the former, and extrinſical to it, is another thing; the firſt whereof may be called Faith formally, and the or the but objectively: ſo in the ſame manner we may diſtinguiſh of Science, and conſequently of Conſcience, that they are taken either properly, and formally, for the very Habit of the Mind by which we know ſomething our ſelves, or acknowledge it with others; or improperly, and objectively for that thing it ſelf which we know, and know that others do know it with us. In which latter and improper ſence, the Law which is written in our Hearts, and is as it were a rule of well living may be called Conſcience; And in this ſence is that to be underſtood, which is ſo often repeated in the Schools of Damaſcene, that Conſcience is the Law of the Mind, when indeed Conſcience p. 11is not properly and formally the Law of the mind, but rather an object of the Conſcience either adaequate or in part.

IX. Secondly, Seeing theſe three things Potentia…'s, Habits, and Acts, are pertaining to the Soul, and although diſtinct in themſelves, they are yet ordinated to one another, Potentia's, as the natural vertues of the ſoul it ſelf, Habits, as formes perfecting thoſe Potentia's, & enabling them for the more ready, & the more pleaſant exerciſing of their Acts, and Acts which are the exerciſings as much as the Potentia's, as the Habits, as the names of Science, and of Conſcience doe in ſome meaſure extend it ſelf to all theſe. For as the Carpenter is ſaid to cut, or hew, firſt with his Axe as his Inſtrument, ſecondly, with the edge of the Axe, as the formal diſpoſition of the inſtrument, and thirdly, with the cutting or hewing it ſelf, as the uſe and action of the Inſtrument: in the ſame manner the mind of man may be ſaid to know; Firſt, with the Potentia of knowing, as the Inſtrument, Secondly, with the Habit of knowing, as a diſpoſition that brings that Potentia to perfection; and thirdly, with an actual conſideration as with the uſe, & operation of the Potentia & the Habit. Science hereupon is taken in threefold reſpect Subjectively, formally & effectively. Firſt Subjectively, 1for the Pote…tia in whom it is and which it is apt to bring to perfection, as every form in ſome meaſure doth perfect its Subject; For example, when we ſay, that the myſteries of Faith do exceed our underſtanding, the meaning is, that they exceed the meaſure of our cognitive power. Secondly, Formally, 2(the moſt uſual ſignification of this word) for the Habit of knowledge, either innate, or acquiſite; p. 12in the ſame ſence we are ſaid to know principles known by themſelves, and concluſions by a legitimate diſcourſe of reaſon deduced from them, and univerſally all things of which by the aſſiſtance of ſence, and reaſon, we have any certainty. Thirdly, Effectively, for the actual conſideration of things before known; In which ſence (to touch upon it by the way) the words of St. Paul the Apoſtle, in the 23 of the Acts, and the 5 verſe (in the expounding whereof, Interpreters have wonderfully perplexed themſelves) are abſolutely to be underſtood. Brethren (ſaith he) I knew not that it was the high Prieſt, foreign that is, I did not think, I did not diligently enough conſider of it. As if he ſhould have ſaid; Brethren, pardon my juſt indignation, if tranſported by the heat of a troubled Spirit I have ſpoken ſomething more liberally than what became me, being at that inſtant forgetfull of his place, and perſon, and of my duty, I ought not to revile the High Prieſt, although he hath done ſomething unworthy of the honour of it; but the exilience of my paſſion did prepoſſeſſe me from giving that reſpect unto him, which by a more attentive deliberation I ſhould have done. This is the ſence of the Apoſtle in that place, and it is as eaſie, as it is proper and pertinent.

X. But I proceed, as Science, ſo Conſcience alſo is taken in three ſeveral wayes or acceptations 1Firſt Subjectively, for the intellective, practical 2power, as when we ſay that the Law of Nature is written in the heart or the Conſcience. Secondly; Formally for the Habit pertaining to that Potentia…, and informing it; In the ſame ſence, making mention of a perſon notoriouſly wicked, we ſay he is a p. 13man of no conſcience, & that he hath either thrown off or loſt all conſcience, Thirdly Effectively, for any 3actual motion, exerciſe, or operation of that Habit; as when a man ſaith that he is conſcious of this, or that fact; In which ſenſe is that of St. Peter, the firſt Book, ſecond Chapter, and 19 verſe. If any man for his conſcience to God doth ſuffer troubles.

XI. Again, ſeeing that Conſcience is properly foreign or a knowledge Syllogiſticall, inſomuch that all who do treat of the nature and the method of it do conceive that it cannot more openly or more aptly be illuſtrated than by a practical Syllogiſm; It is to be obſerved that the word Science in the very ſame reſpect doth fall under a fourfold conſideration. Firſt, and moſt properly, 1for the preciſe knowledge of the concluſion, and thus it is taken by Ariſtotle in his Analyticks and many other places, Secondly, for the 2knowledge of Principles from which concluſions are demonſtrated, as if a man ſhould ſay he knoweth that Omne totum eſt majus qualibet ſui parte, Every thing that is whole is more and greater than any part thereof. Thirdly for the knowledge of the whole ſyllogiſm, 3for he who knoweth the premiſes, and the Concluſion, doth know the whole argumentation. Fourthly, for the aggregated knowledge of many 4concluſions or demonſtrations pertaining to one Subject; in the ſame ſence we are ſaid to know natural Philoſophy, Geometry, Phyſick &c. The very ſame is to be affirmed of conſcience whoſe full diſcourſe many Authors do comprehend in one practical Syllogiſm. But Conſcience (as is already mentioned) being a conjoyned Science, that all which comes under this name may more fully, and as it p. 14were at one ſight be diſcerned: the whole buſineſſe (as I conceive) will more commodiouſly be diſpatched, if we ſhall frame the whole diſcourſe of Conſcience ſo to conſiſt of two Syllogiſms, that the concluſion of the firſt Syllogiſme be the Major propoſition of the following.

Every thing that is unjuſt is to be eſchewed,

Every Theft is unjuſt, therefore

Every Theft is to be eſchewed.

Let this be the firſt Syllogiſm, the firſt propoſition whereof is known of it ſelf by the light of Nature: Reaſon doth prove the Minor, and the Conſcience doth bring in the concluſion; which concluſion it preſently takes up to be the beginning of the following Syllogiſm▪ and applying it to ſome particular Fact, accordingly as the Will ſhall propound unto it, it argues in this manner.

All Theft is to be eſchewed.

This which is now propounded to me to be done is

a Theft, therefore it is to be eſchewed.

And the Name of the Vice being changed, it proceedeth in this manner, as often as it judgeth of any paſt particular Fact.

XII. Theſe things being thus ſtated, I ſay that Conſcience as well as Science is taken four wayes; 1Firſt, and moſt properly for the laſt concluſion in the courſe of both Syllogiſms, as that, in which the laſt Judgem…nt of the practical underſtanding is contained. As if a Man ſhould ſay, my Conſcience doth ſuggeſt unto me that this Theft is not to p. 15be committed, or my Conſcience cryeth out unto me, that it ought not to be committed; And the knowledge of this concluſion is properly foreign or Conſcience, as it is diſtinct from foreign, or a guiltleſſe conſervation of ones ſelf. Secondly it is taken 2for the knowledge of that firſt univerſal principle known by the light of Nature, or Revelation on which the whole thred of this diſcourſe depends; As if a Man ſhould ſay, my Conſcience dictates to me that no unjuſt thing is to be done. The word Syntereſis which is a guiltleſſe converſation of ones ſelf, is often uſed for Syneideſis or Conſcience, but improperly, as in this and ſuch like expreſſions; The Conſcience is nothing elſe but a Syntereſis, or a guiltleſſe conſervation of the mind from falling into any Vice, when indeed between Syntereſis, and Conſcience properly ſo called, there is no little difference; for there is as great a diverſity betwixt this Syntereſis, and Conſcience, properly ſo called, as betwixt Science, and the Habit of the Intellect, which are two habits of the mind ſpecifically diſtinct as heretofore we have read in the fifth of Ariſtotles Ethicks. As therefore in Speculatives, Intelligence is a habit of the firſt principles, about Truth and Falſhood, from whence concluſions are deduced, out of which proceedeth Science; So in practicks, Syntereſis is the habit of the firſt principles, about Good and Evill, from whence concluſions are deduced, out of which proceedeth Conſcience. Thirdly Conſcience is taken 3more largely for that whole practical diſcourſe of the mind, from the firſt beginning to the laſt concluſion which is contained in two ſuch ſyllogiſms, as a little above I have propounded to you, and in its circuit comprehendeth Syntereſis, and Syneideſis alſo properly p. 16ſo called. For a mans Conſcience doth eaſily ſuggeſt unto him all theſe things viz. that no unjuſt thing ought to be done, and that Theft is deſervedly ranked amongſt thoſe Crimes which do carry on them the face of injuſtice, and that this particular act which is by me now committed, or which opportunity doth tempt me to commit, is the guilt of 4Theft. Fourthly Conſcience is taken for the aggregated knowledge of many particular acts of which the whole account of our life and converſation doth conſiſt; In which ſenſe thoſe words of the Apoſtle do ſeem to be underſtood; Men and Brethren in all good Conſcience foreign I have converſed with God unto this day, Acts 23. 1. To the ſame ſence is that of the Author of the Hebrews, Cap. 13. ver. 18. we do aſſure our ſelves we have a good Conſcience deſiring to converſe honeſtly with all men; and that of St. Peter in the firſt Book, third Chapter, and fifteenth verſe, where (as a godly and learned man hath obſerved) that which in the beginning of the verſe is called a good Conſcience, the very ſame thing in the end of the ſame verſe is called foreign, a good converſation, for as often as we do praiſe and diſpraiſe any one, to be a man of a good or a bad Conſcience, it is by reflecting altogether on his manners, and dayly converſation, without reſpect to any particular fact he hath committed.

XIII. I have expounded theſe things more largely I confeſſe, then at the firſt I determined, or peradventure then you expected; but I preſume you will be more favourable to me, if it ſhall appear that this prolixity in explaining the thing defined, will be the means to make the reſt of the treatiſe p. 17more compendious, I ſhall now proceed in the explication of the Definition of Conſcience it ſelf, and give you an account of every part, and member thereof; I ſhall only praeadvertiſe this, (which indeed is clear of it ſelf) that the Definition which before I gave you of Conſcience, doth adaequately pertain to Conſcience properly ſo called, As it is taken for the knowledge of the laſt Concluſion, of a practicall Syllogiſm, nevertheleſſe with the due permutation of ſome words it may ſerve to explain the other ſignifications as uſually it is done in almoſt all other words which Analogically are aequivocall. The Definition of Conſcience, which I ſhall repeat again, becauſe of many other things ſince intervening, is this, Conſcience is a faculty or a Habit of the practical underſtanding by which the mind of man by the diſcourſe of reaſon doth apply the light with which it is indued to its particular moral acts. In this Syllogiſm theſe four things are contained, which by themſelves are ſeverally, and ſingly to be expounded, viz. The Genus, the Subject, the Object, and the Act.

XIIII. There is a great and fierce controverſy amongſt the School-men concerning the Genus of Conſcience; But in the firſt place they do all agree that Conſcience pertaineth to the mind of man, but whether to the Potentia, or the Habit, or the Act, thereof, is a wonderfull diſſention. Aquinas who in the Schooles hath a great trayn to follow him,Aeſtimare conſc…entiam m…is ſuae Cic. pro Cluent. doth ſtate it to be an Act; whoſe opinion many have entertained, and not only the School-men, who are ſwayed (as I believe,) more by the authority of ſo great a man, then convinced by his reaſons, but the Divines alſo of the reformed Churches, bbAqui. 1. qu. 97. 13.out of a faſtidiouſneſs to that contentious generation, had p. 18rather in theſe things follow the moſt received opinions (if cleer from all tincture of prophaneſſe, and ſuperſtition) then to make too curious a ſearch into their thorny ſubtilities. But if I may freely expreſs my ſelf, this moſt common opinion is altogether to be diſproved, and to overthrow it there needs no other argument then this. In Conſcience there are very many Acts; It dictates, it forceth, it holdeth, it teſtifies, it excuſeth, it accuſeth, it comforts, it gnaweth, it tormenteth, &c. But of Acts there are no Acts, but of Forms, Potentia's and Habits; therefore Conſcience of neceſſity muſt be, a Forme, or a Potentia, or a Habit, but no Act. To the argument of Thomas Aquinas and thoſe that follow him viz. That Conſcience is an application of the knowledge or light which is in the Syntereſis, or the unſtained conſervation of the mind, and that every application is an Act; I anſwer that the word Conſcience (as may appear by what is already ſpoken) is taken ſometimes Effectively for ſome certain Act of it, in the ſame manner as the word of Science is taken for an actual conſideration, but improperly. For to ſpeak properly, the Application of Science or Knowledge, is not Conſcience it ſelf, but an Act of it; as conſideration is not Science or Knowledge, but an Act of it, therefore Conſcience is not an Act.

XV. It muſt be therefore a Power, or a Habit; for that it is not a Form, (to wit the Soul it ſelf, but ſomething of it) is confeſſed by all men: there are many of the Moderns who do deny it to be a Habit, and labour to prove it to be a Potentia, and 1thus they diſpute it. Firſt, becauſe it is a kind of Memory, for the Intellect reflecting on things Agible, that is, on things done, or to be done, hath a relation p. 19to the Conſcience, as the Intellect reflecting on things ſpeculable, hath its relation to the Memory. And it is ſufficiently known that the Memory is a Potentia, or Power, and not a Habit. Secondly, becauſe 2the Potentia is that by which the faculty Acting is primitively enabled to Act; Now, by Conſcience a man is able to dictate to himſelf what is to be done, and either to approve or to diſprove what hath been performed by it, and that in the firſt place; becauſe, let him admit but of the Conſcience, he can do all theſe, take away the Conſcience, and he cannot do them. Thirdly, becauſe it is contradistinct 3to another Potentia as Tit. 1. 15. where foreign and foreign the Mind and the Conſcience are openly deſcribed as oppoſite Species; It is therefore neceſſary, according to the rules of contrary Species, that they both muſt have one, and the ſame Genus, now the mind is a Potentia; and therefore ſo muſt the Conſcience be alſo. Moreover it is abundantly 4proved that the Conſcience is not a Habit, both becauſe it ſeemeth to be as natural to a man, as the Will and Affections; & becauſe it is found in all; even in Infants and Sucklings, by a certain inſtinct of Nature▪ at that Age when they do not ſeem to be capable of Habits.

XVI. Scotils nevertheleſs, & Durand, & ſome others of the moſt ſubtile School-men, are of another opinion, viz. that Conſcience is a Habit, & to ſpeak the truth, their judgment is grounded on no contemtible 1arguments; Firſt, becauſe that Conſcience is a kind of Science, whereupon the very ſame Acts are attributed to it, as to know, and not to know. And thus in the 7 Eccleſi. 23. Scit conſcientia tua, thy Conſcience knows; And in the 43 of Gen. 22. p. 20Neſcimus quis repoſuerit pecuniam noſtram in faccis noſtris, we know not who did put our mony into our ſacks, where the vulgar tranſlation reades it, Non eſt in conſcientia noſtra, It is not in our Conſciences. Nil mihi conſcius ſum (ſaith St. Paul,) in the 1 Cor. 4. 4. I am conſcious to my ſelf, that I am faulty in nothing, but Science is a Habit and therefore 2Conſcience. Secondly, becauſe by the right inſtitution, and the new information and illumination of the Conſcience, a man is enabled to do that, to which he was before unable, but by the acceſſe of the ſame illumination, there is no new Potentia ingendred in 3the Soul, but rather a new Habit. Thirdly, becauſe from meer Potentia's, no man is morally denominated either good, or evil, but from the Habits, neither is he prais'd or diſprais'd for Potentia's, but for the Habits; but men are ſaid to be good, or evil, and are either prais'd, or diſprais'd for the quality of their Conſciences, therefore Conſcience is a Habit. 4Fourthly, becauſe it is not proper unto Potentia's, but to Habits, to be obtained, to be aſſumed, to be layd down, or to be loſt; but men are ſaid to find, to loſe, to take up, and to depoſe their Conſciences. The Conſcience therefore is not a Potentia, but a Habit.

XVII. I do therefore thus ſtate it. The Conſcience properly, and formally and by a direct praedication is a Habit, yet notwithſtanding it may be a Potentia, and that two ways, firſt materially, becauſe it is in the Potentia as in the Subject, foreign that is to ſay in which; Secondly by approximation, for being placed as it were in the midſt, betwixt Habitum acquiſitum, and puram potentiam a Habit acquired, and a pure potentia, it can aſſume the name of either, p. 21as the Mediums do participate of either of the Extreams; And hereupon it is that Conſcience is found in little Children, who are not capable of acquired Habits; Neither is it altogether neceſſary that foreign and foreign the mind, and the Conſcience, in Tit. 1. be contradiſtinct as bare Potentia's, but it ſeems rather that both words are there taken by a Synecdoche; the mind for the ſpeeulative Intellect with all its pertinences, as the Schoolmen ſpeak it, and the Conſcience for the practicall Intellect with all its pertinences, that is, with all the faculties, Habits, and Acts, and what do reſpectively pertain to any of them.

XVIII. In the Definition of Conſcience, I have placed the word Faculty, which in ſome meaſure doth ſeem to me to be common to the Potentia's and Habits, and is very proper to ſignifie Habits innate. Peradventure you will object, that every Habit is acquired by often actings, and therefore this doth ſo appertain to the eſſence of a Habit that Habits are eſpecially to be known from Potentia's by it, as by a ſpecifical difference, to wit, that the Potentia's are accquired, and the Habits natural, therefore unleſs a man will maintain meer contradictions, he ought not to ſay that Conſcience is a Habit innate. To this I anſwer, that it muſt be indeed confeſſed that all Habits whatſoever, both are, and ought to be called accquired, nay even thoſe Habits which ſeem to be moſt natural, and for this cauſe, becauſe they want the aſſiſtance of the ſences, and many praevious ſenſible actions that ſo the Species of things ſenſible (in reſpect whereof the Soul of it ſelf is like a clear table-Book) may be conveyed into the Phantaſy, and become at laſt intelligible; p. 22Nevertheleſſe ſome Habits may be called, and with great reaſon too innate, for as much as the mind by an inbred-light doth immediately give an aſſent to the thing propounded, without any fear of the oppoſite to it, only the Apprehenſion of the Terms being ſuppoſed; neither to procure its aſſent, doth it want the helps of internal ſtudy or external inſtitution. For example, The Intellective Habit of this Principle, Omne totum eſt majus qualibet ſui parte, Every thing that is whole is greater then any part of it, is a Habit innate ſo far as by the force of the light of Nature, and only out of the apprehenſion of the Terms, the truth thereof of its own accord doth enter into the mind, without any ſtudy or Teacher; And yet nevertheleſs this Habit is acquired, ſo far as it needeth the aſſiſtance of the ſences, that ſo by often actions in ſenſible things, one may arrive unto the knowledge of the Terms, that is to ſay, what belongeth to the whole, and what unto the parts.

XIX. If it may be yet objected that the Conſcience cannot be called an Innate Habit, for thoſe things which are Innate, are not capable of errour, neither can they be defective, and they are the ſame in all, in whomſoever they are, but the Conſcience can erre, and be evil, neither is it the ſame in all men, I make anſwer, that it doth indeed follow from this that the Conſcience is not a Habit ſimply innate (which no reaſonable man will affirm, for it is repugnant to Nature, but as partly (as before mentioned) it is innate, ſo alſo it is partly acquired. The Soul of man doth bring with it as it were, ſome ſeeds of knowledge of good, and evil, which grow up and are perfected by ſtudy and inſtitution; In the ſame manner, natural agility is compleated by Exerciſe, and p. 23natural Logick, by Logick artificial; the Conſcience therefore in reſpect of thoſe morall Agibles, which as the School-men ſpeak, are of the firſt Dictates of Nature, and are its primary objects, is a natural or an innate Habit, and is alike in all men, and is always right, without any errour or depravation; but in reſpect of thoſe things which are afterwards learned and come cloſe up unto thoſe firſt principles, foreign whether it be by an internal and proper meditation, or an external inſtitution, it is a Habit acquired, and may be erronious, and defective.

XX. But this is enough, if not too much, of the Genus of Conſcience. I ſhall more briefly diſpatch the reſt. The ſecond member of the Definition is the Subject which is twofold, viz. Subjectum foreign and Subjectum foreign the Subject, in which, and the Subject of which; The Subject foreign or of which, is man, or rather a reaſonable creature,Math. 8 29.Matt 8:29 if we will ſpeak more exactly, for it is found in holy Writ, that the Angels themſelves are conſcious of their Rebellion,James 11 12. and of the puniſhments thereby due unto them,1 Corinth. 6. 3.1 Cor 6:3 and that they know they ſhall be tormented, yet nevertheleſſe they tremble at the revealed word of God, as alſo that they are to be judged at the comming of the Lord, and to give an account of all things they have done. But becauſe it belongeth not much to this diſcourſe to know the nature of Angelick minds, and it hath pleaſed the moſt wiſe God to make but little mention of it in the Scriptures▪ I have appropriated this Definition of the Conſcience unto man only; For although in brutiſh creatures there appeareth a ſhadow of Conſcience, as of reaſon, and many things are performed by them which do bear p. 24a ſhow of Juſtice, and Prudence, (as indeed what is reported of Elephants, and of the policy of Bees, and Dogs, and of ſome other living Creatures is much to be admired) yet they are all but the works of the Phantaſy, and not of Reaſon, and they proceed from a natural Inſtinct, and not from Conſcience. Man therefore is the proper Subject as well of Reaſon, as of Conſcience, and every man is ſo, the very Heathens, the Reprobates, and even Infants themſelves, being not excluded. As for the Heathens, St. Paul Rom. 2. 15. expreſsly ſpeaketh, that they do ſhow the works of the Law to be written in their hearts, their Conſciences bearing them witneſſe; And the ſame Apoſtle▪ Tit. 1 15. declareth, that the filthieſt perſons have a Conſcience although an impure one, for the uprightneſſe and integrity of Conſcience is loſt by the Fall, and not by nature. And being regenerate and new born, there as no new Conſcience infuſed, which before was wanting, but the Conſcience foul before, and impure by ſin, being ſprinkled with the blood of Chriſt, is purified by Faith▪ according to the eternal Counſels of the Almighty God; And even in young Children (that the name of God may be magnified in ſucklings) ſome Sparks do fly from the aſhes of the old fire, and though but very weakly, there is ſome light of reaſon to be ſeen, the force of Conſcience ſo early working in them, that if they have committed any treſpaſſe, they will modeſtly ſtrive to cover and conceal it.

XXI. Subjectum foreign The Subject in which; now the Potentia of the Soul, in which the Conſcience hath its ſeate, is the practical Intellect, I ſay, the Intellect and not the Will, and the practical, not the p. 25Speculative Intellect. There is a great controverſie amongſt the School-men; whether the Conſcience doth pertain to the Intellect, or the Will, or unto both. I will not thruſt my ſelf into theſe contentions, you have had enough, if not too much already of the nicetyes and difficulties of the School-men. I ſhall therefore in few words diſpatch unto you what I ſhall find expedient for my preſent purpoſe. Ariſtotle in his third Book de anima, doth number up three diſtinct Potentia's of the part intellective, two whereof are Cognitive, that is to ſay, the ſpeculative Intellect, and the practical, and the third appetitive, which is the Will. Of theſe three, the Extreams are the Intellect ſpeculative which looketh on Truth as Truth, and preciſely reſteth in it, without any order or reſpect to practice; and the Will which is nothing at all ſpeculative, and preciſely tendeth to operation, Now amongſt both theſe Potentia's the practick Intellect is ſeated in the middle, and according to the Cuſtome of things intermedial, doth in ſome part concord with either of the Extreams, and in ſome part doth differ from them. The practical Intellect doth agree with the Speculative in this, that it doth look on Truth, and with the Will in this, that it inclineth to operation. As for the Conſcience, it is moſt certain that it doth not pertain to the ſpeculative Intellect, becauſe it altogether doth direct its Science into practiſe, neither doth it properly pertain unto the Will, for if it were ſo, it would be in it as a Potentia, and be the ſame as liberum arbitrium or free-will, or as a Habit, and ſo it would become one of the moral Vertues, neither of which was ever admitted, or aſſerted by any Divine, or any Philoſopher. It therefore altogether p. 26belongeth to the cognitive, practical potentia, that is, to the practical Intellect. And thus Ariſtotle, although he had placed the moral virtues in the power appetitive, yet he placed the Habits of Arts and Prudence (though ordinated to practice) in the cognitive power, as may be ſeen in the fifth book of his Ethicks. This opinion is confirmed by 1theſe Arguments; Firſt, that Conſcience is a kind of Science, and all Science is in the Underſtanding. Secondly, 2that it is capable of Error, and Error is a 3Diſeaſe of the Understanding. Thirdly, according to the common uſe of ſpeaking, he who underderſtandeth the Kings Secrets, whether he approveth them, or not approveth them, is properly ſaid to be Conſcious of them; therefore the proper Seat, and Subject of Conſcience in the Soul of Man is the practical, cognitive power, which is the practical Intellect.

XXII. We have ſeen the Genus, and the Subject, the Object followeth, which is that about which the Conſcience is verſed, and they are the particular 1and proper Moral Acts. In the firſt place I ſay Acts, that is, ſomething done by a Man, as he is a Man, or a rational Creature, whether it be for the future or to be done, or whether it be paſt and already done, or preſent, and now in doing. The Conſcience is compacted of Eyes, it ſeeth, and ſearcheth into all things; It beholdeth things to come, if you are about to commit any filthyneſſe, it doth Councel you to forbear it, it beholdeth things preſent, and in the very act of ſinning, it murmureth, checketh, biteth, picketh, it juſtles, and joggs you to give off; It looketh back on things paſt, and when you have ſinned, it reproveth, it ſtingeth, and accuſeth, p. 27it condemneth, and tormenteth you. On the other ſide, to good deeds it exhorts you, and whilſt you are a doing of them, it doth incourage, and excite, and provoke you, and having done them, it crowns your head with Honour, and fills your breaſt with Peace and Joy. In the Second place I ſay particular Acts; not by limiting the Subject, 2as if there were ſome Acts that were not particular; but oppoſitely to that Science which the Conſcience doth ſuppoſe and apply, and although this Science be univerſal, it is yet referred to particular Acts. In the third place I ſay particular, proper 3Acts to exclude that ſignification of Conſcience, which more largely accepted, is extended to the Actions of other Men; as when a man may be ſaid to be Conſcious of the Kings ſecrets, to be conſcious of Catilines conſpiracy, and the like; Such Actions do not belong to our intent in this place, who do here treat of Conſcience properly ſo called, which is exerciſed in Agibles, either performed, or to be performed by it ſelf. In the fourth place, I ſay 4Moral Acts, where it is to be obſerved that ſome things are brought about by neceſſity, and ſome things do fall out by contingency; By neceſſity, as the Riſing of the Sun, the Eclipſe of the Moon, &c. of which there is a Science, by reaſon of their certitude, but they have not the leaſt relation either to Conſcience or Free-Will. Thoſe things which caſually come to paſſe, are either foreign things in our own power, or things not in our power; Things not in our power, as the flying of Birds; a Tempeſt ſuddainly raiſed, &c. which come not within the compaſſe of Science by reaſon of their uncertainty, and being out of our power, they may be as well put p. 28out of our care, the Will having nothing to do to chooſe, nor the Conſcience to determine of them. Again, things that are in our power, are ſome of them morally neutral, and foreign that is, which neither of themſelves, nor on the account of any, permanent circumſtance do contain any moral good or evil; as to go into the market, to write a letter &c. And ſuch things indeed may pertain to the freedom of the Will, if at leaſt they be worthy to be taken into conſideration, becauſe they may come under the compaſs of Choyce, but of themſelves, they do not pertain to the Conſcience, I ſay, of themſelves, for they may pertain unto it by accident, by reaſon of ſome Scandal, or any other circumſtance of which the Conſcience may take cognizance; Other things there are, which are morally good or bad, as to ſerve God, to honour our Parents, to reſtore the pledge, to oppreſſe the poor, to plunder, to keep or to break our truſts, and all other things which the Philoſophers call foreign or foreign that is, worthy praiſe, or reproof, and the Schoolmen meritorious or demeritorious. And theſe things are properly the objects of Conſcience.

XXIII. The object therefore of the Conſcience of man is a moral operable that is either done, or to be done, either omitted or that may be omitted; Nevertheleſſe it is to be advertiſed, that in men as they are Chriſtians, the object of the Conſcience is further to be extended, and not only oblige them to the performance of their duties, as they are men, but to believe the myſteries of Faith revealed in the word of God, as they are Chriſtians, for infidelity doth cauſe the Conſcience to be impure, Tit 1 15. p. 29And the Conſcience doth ſting that man as much, who diſpiſeth what he vowed in Baptiſm to believe, as him who violates the commandment which he promiſed to keep; And it may not unfitly peradventure be ſaid that even the Evangelical Faith it 2ſelf is to be accounted amongſt the moral operables. They are the expreſs words of our Saviour, This is the work of God that you believe in his Son, Joh. 6. 29. And the like in the firſt Book of the Apoſtle St. John, the third Chapter, and twenty third verſe. This is his Commandment that we believe in the name of his Son Jeſus Chriſt, as he hath commanded us.

XXIIII. The laſt member of the Definition remaineth, which is, The proper act of Conſcience, to wit the application of the light which is in the mind by the diſcourſe of reaſon to particular Acts; I ſay in the firſt place, that application is the proper, and primary Act of the Conſcience. That Axiome in the Schooles is in every mans mouth; That of, one Habit there is but one Act, to wit, the primary and the chief, and unto which all the other Acts pertaining to it, may be reduced; It may ſufficiently appear by what is already ſpoken, that there are many Acts of the Conſcience in the Species of it, but what is that moſt common Act, which brings all the other within its compaſſe, is moſt of all to be inquired after; for no other Act but that prima…ry one, which is adaequate unto Habit, and to which all other Acts are reduced, ought to come into the 3Definition of Habit; And hereupon it is that many when they obſerved that moſt of thoſe Acts exerciſed by the Conſcience may in ſome meaſure be referred to the Act of judging (for the Conſcience doth judge of Acts paſt, preſent, and to come, they p. 30concluded that this primary Act was the Act of judging. But there are ſome Acts of Conſcience which cannot but hardly and with reſtraint be referred to it; As that Act (for example) by which the Conſcience gives teſtimony of ſome thing committed, or omitted; For it is not for a Judge to be a witneſſe, nor for a witneſſe to paſs judgement on a Treſpaſſe; Moreover that Act of judging doth neceſſarily preſuppoſe the Act of applying, as going before it, for it cannot be but that the Conſcience muſt firſt apply the Fact, which it is about to judge, to the light of the mind, before it can give true judgment on it; And this Act of application is very neer of kine to the derivation of the word, of which I have before ſpoken, that Conſcience is ſo called becauſe it is an application of knowledge unto knowledge.

XXV. In the ſecond place, I ſay, that this application is an application of the light which is in the mind, that is of the light preſent to the mind at that time when the Application is made, whether it be that light of Nature, viz. common notions written in the Hearts of men by the dictates of nature, and kept in the Syntereſis or guiltleſſe conſervation of the mind, as a treaſure ſnatcht from the Common fire, and the reliques of the Image of God after the Fall, or whether it be a light of Divine revelation either extraordinary by Viſions, Dreams, and Propheſies, or ordinary, being laid open to mankind in the bookes of the old and new Teſtament. Or laſtly, whether it be the light of reaſon, to wit, whatſoever from the principles of both kinds, from the law of nature and the Divine revelation, is ſo immediately and evidently deduced, that no man who doth grant the one can doubt of the other.

p. 31XXVI. In the third place I do ſay that this light is applyed by the diſcourſe of reaſon, for this light that is to be applyed being quid univerſale, ſomething univerſal, and that which it is applyed to, being particular, or ſingular Acts, ſuch an application cannot be made but by the mediation of this diſcourſe of reaſon which is able to unite Univerſals unto Singulars; And this is the work of Reaſon, by ſuch a Syllogiſm, foreign. Ariſt. 1. Poſter 17.or ſuch practical Syllogiſms, as already I have exhibited unto you. Moreover it often comes to paſs, (as it is commonly ſpoken, and experience doth prove it to be true) that we erre by going downwards, and ſo it is, that although we do not eaſily fall into an errour concerning the Prima & Univerſalia principia the univerſal principles which do carry with them a greater evidence; yet in the application of thoſe principles, and in deducing concluſions from them, errours moſt often are committed, wherefore we muſt uſe the greater care,foreign; Ariſtot. 2. Metaph. 1. and diligence, that we do not deceive our ſelves, but that in this diſcourſe of reaſon all things be exactly conſidered, that ſo we may juſtly proceed, and as legitimately and duely conclude.

XXVII. Fourthly, I ſay that this application ought to be made to particular Acts, which four ways may be done, for the Conſcience doth apply the light of the mind, with which it is endued, either to things already done, or to things to be done. To things already done in a twofold conſideration, firſt by bearing teſtimony that this is done, or that it is not done by us, in this manner are thoſe formes of the Rhetoricians in the queſtion of the Fact, Creſtes haſt thou killed thy mother? the Conſcience maketh anſwer, I have killed her; Secondly by … p. 32judgment whether the fact committed or omitted, be well or ill done, or whether well or ill omitted; as in the queſtion of right or Law (among the Rhetorici…ns) where the Fact is evident, as Didſt thou kill Clodius, Milo? the reply is, I kill'd him. Doſt thou therefore confeſſe thy ſelf guilty? I have killed him lawfully Here in the firſt application the Conſcience proceeds by the way of a witneſſe; in the ſecond by the way of a Judge; for the offices, and Acts of Conſcience in the firſt proceeding are to bear witneſſe, in the ſecond to reprove, to accuſe, to excuſe, to condemn, to abſolve; From hence there doe ariſe diverſe effects in the Soul from the Conſcience reproving, accuſing, and condemning; a great ſadneſſe and trouble of mind, remorſes, terrours, and torments; and on the other ſide, from the excuſing, defending, and abſolving Conſcience, there proceeds an extraordinary peace, and tranquility, an unſpeakable joy, and ſolace, an erected hope, an unſtartling confidence, and a moſt ſtedfaſt and unſhaken conſtancy of mind. The third application of Conſcience doth look on things, future that are to be done, in which the Conſcience doth proceed as a Law-giver, Schoolmaſter, and Admoniſher or a Counſellour: And in this manner of proceeding, the offices and Acts of Conſcience are to dictate, to oblige, to incite, to retract: theſe are the principle Acts of Conſcience to whoſe voice incouraging to righteouſneſs whoſoever ſhall give ear, he ſhall not fear her as a witneſſe, or as a Judge.

XXVIII. I have now finiſhed what I conceived neceſſary to be ſpoken concerning the nature of Conſcience, in which I have been longer (I fear) p. 33but certainly more obſcure then either I would or ought to be (if the Subject could otherwiſe have born it,) or then I hope I ſhall be in the following Lectures concerning the uſe of Conſcience; But truly all diſputation concerning the faculties and Potentia's of the Intellective ſoul, is intricate and perplexed, as moſt grave and learned men have already complained of it, both becauſe the things themſelves are ſomething more remote from ſenſible matter and motion, as alſo by reaſon of their mutual relation and connexion. But peradventure you will ſay unto me, by your Definition you have rather obſcured, then any ways illuſtrated a thing that is manifeſt, and vulgarly known, which is in the daily uſe, and in the mouth of all men; truly in this, I cannot deny the objection, ſo empty are the ſtudies and cogitations of men, and ſo weak are all our endeavours, Thoſe things which are before our feet, and eyes, which of themſelves do jump into our thoughts, and ſences, thoſe things which are not unknown to the Cobler, and the Weaver, things which the moſt illiterate men do think they underſtand,Odi ego in quit definire—facilius eſt mihi videre in alterius definitione quid non prob m, quàm quicquam be…è definiendo … Auguſt. 2. de Ord. 2 and indeed in ſome meaſure do underſtand them, the ſame things are not underſtood by the greateſt of the Philoſophers, and the moſt refined wits are here at a ſtand. VVhat Clown almoſt is there that thinks himſelf ſo wretchedly ſil…y, as not to give you a perfect account, of what is Time, or Place, or Motion, and the like, into the diving into, and the unfolding of the Nature whereof, Profound, Accute, Angelick, Seraphick, Doctors have for many ages paſt, exerciſed, and are ſtill exerciſeing themſelves, and after ſo much ſweat, and labour, have, not yet attained their deſired Gole. p. 34In time I am, and of time I ſpeak, and yet I know not what time is, ſaith St. Auguſtine of time. In which I cannot ſufficiently admire the infinite wiſdome of the Almighty, by this means beating down all humane pride,Gal. 6. 3.Gal 6:3 and preſenting to mortals as in a miror that empty foreign ſeeming wiſdom, by which they would appear to be ſomething when they are indeed nothing,Hor. 1. Epiſt. miſerably deceiveing their own hearts, that ſo men might learn metiri ſe modulo, 7. Rom. 12. 30Rom 12:30ac pede ſuo to meaſure themſelves by their own Laſt & their own Module, & not to be wiſer than it becommeth them, but to be wiſe unto ſobriety, acknowledging their own fooliſhneſs, that to God alone may be the glory of his wiſdome.