The Obligation of Human Conscience, Lecture 6

The Obligation of Human Conscience · Lecture 6

p. 195THE SIXTH LECTURE, Of the Obligation of Humane Laws in reference to their material Cauſe.

PROV. 8. 15.

Per me reges regnant, et Legum conditores juſta decernunt.

By me, Kings reign, and the makers of Laws do decree Juſtice.

I Have reduced to two general Queſtions, or to two heads, what I have propounded to be ſpoken concerning the obligation of humane Laws; The firſt is, whether humane Laws do oblige the Conſciences of Subjects? Concerning which in the former Lecture I have expounded to you what was my Judgment of it; The other Queſtion is, How they oblige? To which queſtion, I have told you, there p. 196belongeth the de…ding of ſome Caſes and Doubts which mee… in this …ubject; And becauſe they are … few, no… of one kind, therefore to avoid Confuſion, and that we may proceed in ſome Order and Method to that which is to be ſpoken, I have thought is not impertinent to give you a rough Repreſentative of the whole Treatiſe now in hand; And that Method which moſt of you do remember, I obſerved in thoſe my former exercitations concerning the obligation of an oath, I here conceive it very neceſſary for me to uſe again, that thoſe things may all of them be reduced to the four kind of Cauſes which I conceive may commodiouſly be referred to them▪ But becauſe I do find many things to remain which cannot eaſily be included in thoſe bounds, we will aſſigne them their ſeveral …laſſes; And they are chiefly two, the firſt of Perſons who are under the obligation of thoſe Laws; and the other in the comparing of the obligatory Vertue which is in Humane Laws, with that which ariſeth from the Judgement of the Conſcience, by Vowes, Oaths, Promiſes, Contracts, and from the Law of Scandal, or if there be any thing elſe which elſewhere obligatory, for theſe two obligations do ſeem to be in a conteſtation and (juſtling for precedency) to ſtrive which of them ſhould give place unto …. To add the third Claſſis for ſome certain ſpecies of Laws which ſeem to contain in themſelvs ſomthing ſingular to themſelvs, ſuch as are Eccleſiaſtical Laws Penal Laws, & the local ſtatu…es of Colleges, and leſſe ſocieties, will not peradventure be very neceſſary ſeeing in ſome manner they may be reduced to ſomthing in the four kinds of Cauſes, and though not ſo aptly as to ſatisfy the p. 197curious, yet ſo fully as to ſerve our preſent purpoſe; for whilſt our hearers underſtand what it is we ſpeak of, we have never taken any great care in what method we have gone. We will in the firſt place therefore (if God ſhall grant life, health, and opportunity to accompliſh what we have propounded) ſpeak of the obligation of the Laws as to the four kinds of Cauſes; In the ſecond place of the perſons who are obliged to the obſervation of thoſe Laws; And laſtly, of the compariſon of the obligations which quarrel amongſt themſelves, giving you before-hand one or two diſtinctions which will be of great concernment in the whole management of this diſcourſe.

II. We muſt underſtand therefore in the firſt place, Seeing that to the end of Political Government and order, there is a two-fold power in thoſe who are inveſted with Soveraign Authority, A directive power, by which the Subjects may underſtand what they have to do, and a Power Coactive or Coercitive (for, by reaſon of the Analogy, it is better ſo to call it than Coercive) by which the Subjects may be compelled to the performance of thoſe things that are commanded, if of their own accords they ſhall refuſe to give obedience to them, both which are ſo contained in the Laws, that the one conſiſteth moſt in precepts, and the other is moſt to be ſeen in puniſhments; there ariſeth from this double power of the Magiſtrate, a double duty of the Subject which anſwereth to that double power; The duty of Obedience in reference to the Directive power, and the duty of Subjection in reference to the power Coercitive; I here underſtand ſubjection as it is properly ſo called p. 198by an appellation Generical, which as elſewhere it often comes to paſſe, is reſtrained to one certain Species; For obedience alſo is a Species of Subjection largely taken; The Apoſtle comprehends both thoſe duties, Heb. 13. 17. and ſignifies them in thoſe two words foreign Obey them that have the overſight of you, and ſubmit your ſelves; The firſt whereof pertaineth to the Duty of obedience, or of performing that which is commanded by a lawful Superior, the other to the Duty of Subjection, or of induring what by him ſhall be inflicted. Furthermore, As from a double Power, there ariſeth a double Duty, ſo from a double Duty, there ariſeth a double Obligation, for every Duty doth infer an Obligation, and every Obligation doth ſuppoſe a Duty; Therefore one kind of the Obligation of Humane Laws, is that, by which Subjects are bound to obey the precepts of the Law it ſelf, and the other, by which they are bound to ſubmit themſelves to the power of the Law-giver, one of the Obligations belongeth to Active Obedience, the other unto that Obedience which is called paſſive, and to which we give the Name of Submiſſion.

III. If it be here demanded how farr Humane Laws can oblige the Conſciences of the Subject; It is to be ſaid in the firſt place, that all Laws made by one inveſted by a lawful Power, do oblige to Subjection, ſo that it is not lawful for a Subject to reſiſt the Supreme Power by force of Arms, whether things juſt or unjuſt be commanded. This w… evermore the mind, and practice of the Chriſtians in the firſt Age of the Church, living under the moſt griev…us Tyranny of the greateſt Enemies p. 199to the name of Chriſt; & to make no mention herein of the Conduct, and the inſtinct of Nature, and the light of right Reaſon, this is moſt manifeſt by the Doctrine of the two chiefeſt of the Apoſtles. For ſo Peter the Apoſtle of Circumciſion▪ doth diligently inſtruct the Jews; And ſo Paul the Doctor of the Gentiles, doth as carefully inſtruct the Gentiles; St. Peter in the firſt book and ſecond chapter, commands Servants to be ſubject to their Maſters, not only good and gentle Maſters, but thoſe ſeverer ones, who would puniſh them with Scourges, when they had not deſerved it. Saint Paul, Rom. 13. doth urge in many words the neceſſity of Subjection, but granteth unto none the Liberty of Reſiſtance, be their caſe, or their pretence, never ſo good. In the ſecond place, I ſay, That although this Subjection is ſimply neceſſary, yet it is not ſatisfactory as to Duty, unleſſe the command of the Law be obeyed where it can be done without Sin, And therefore the Subject is bound to Obedience in Conſcience, in all things that are lawful and honeſt. Hence it is, that this word be Obedient is ſo often, and ſo expreſſely inculcated by the Apoſtle. Eph. 6. Col. 3. and in other places. In the third place, I ſay, Where the precept of the Law cannot be obſerved without ſin, if the Subject ſhall patiently ſubmit himſelf to the Power of the Law-giver, he hath ſatisfied his Duty, and is not obliged in Conſcience to perform that which the Law commandeth; nay, he is obliged not to do it; for there can be no Obligation to things unlawful; It is alwayes neceſſary therefore to be ſubject, but not alwayes neceſſary to obey.

IV. Furthermore, ſeeing both are certain, that p. 198duplicate page p. 199duplicate page p. 200the Conſciences of Men are free,Servitus in totum hominem uon deſcendit. Sen. de Bencf. 20. and ought to be ſo, which Liberty no Humane Power can, or may infringe; And that an Obligation is a kind of a Bond, and doth induce a neceſſity, which ſeemeth to be oppoſite, and to fight with juſt Liberty (for neither is he any wayes free who is bound, neither can he be free to both, who by ſome neceſſity is bound to either) that it plainly may appear that this Obligation of Conſcience, of which we now do treat, may conſiſt with the juſt Liberty of Conſcience, we muſt neceſſarily in this place give you another diſtinction, which is, that the Precepts of Humane Law may be taken two wayes, either formally for the Act it ſelf of giving the precepts, or materially for the thing precepted; If the Law-giver therefore ſhould intend an Obligation, or impoſe on the Subject a neceſſity of obeying, from giving the Precept of his Law taken materially, that is, from the neceſſity of the thing it ſelf which is precepted, which notwithſtanding in the truth of the thing, was not neceſſary before that Law was made, he in that very fact ſhould lay a force upon the Conſcience of the Subject, which ſhould be repugnant to the Liberty of it; But if he ſhould derive his Obligation from giving the precept of his Law taken formally, th… is from the legitimate Authority with w^ch. he himſelf is inveſted that gives it (a moral indifferency of the thing precepted in the mean time remaining, and in the ſame ſtate in which it was before the Law was made) although the obligation followeth which impoſeth on the Conſcience a neceſſity of obeying, yet the inward Liberty of the Conſcience remaineth uninjuried and intire.

V. If this ſeems obſcure to any, I will illuſtrate p. 201it unto him by an Example; A Civil Law being made, that no man ſhould eat fleſh during all the time of Lent, if the Law-giver either in the preface or in the body of that Law ſhould ſignify that he laid this Command upon his Subjects, becauſe it were ungodly, and unlawful for them in that time to eat fleſh, This were to throw a Snare on the Conſciences of his Subjects, & as much as in him lay to weaken their Liberty; But if expreſſely he ſhould ſignify, that the thing being otherwiſe free in it ſelf, he did ſo ordain it for the profit of the Commonwealth, that his Subjects according to the Example of the antient Church, ſhould thereby take an occaſion to exerciſe a more abſtemious and ſeverer Diſcipline; or if by the words of the Law it ſelf, or elſewhere it might appear, that the Law-giver intended not by that Law to faſten any opinion of neceſſity on the thing ſo commanded, there would on this account no injury be done to the Conſciences of the Subjects, and the liberty thereof. For there is a great difference, when one thing is commanded by the Magiſtrate, becauſe it is thought to be neceſſary, oris prohibited, becauſe it is conceived to be unlawful, And when another thing begins then only to be thought neceſſary and lawful, after that it is commanded by the Magiſtrate, and unlawful, becauſe it is forbidden by him. The firſt Neceſſity which anteceded the Law, and is ſuppoſed by it to be ſome cauſe of it, is contrary to the liberty of the Conſcience; but the other, which followeth the Law, and proceedeth from it as an eſſect thereof is not repugnant to it; The reaſon of this difference is, becauſe the antecedent neceſſity which the Law ſuppoſeth, doth p. 202neceſſarily require ſome aſſent of the practical judgement; but to the following neceſſity which proceedeth from the Law, the conſent of the will is ſufficient to the performance of that outward work which by the Law is commanded. Now an Act of the Will cannot prejudice the liberty of Conſcience, as an Act of the judgment doth, for the Act of the Will doth follow the dictates of the Conſcience as the effect followeth its cauſe, but the Act of the Judgment doth precede thoſe Dictates, as the Cauſe goeth before its effect.

VI. Theſe diſtinctions being premiſed, I proceed unto the Doubts, where in the firſt place thoſe which we meet with concerning the material Cauſe ſhall be examined and diſcuſſed at this time. The firſt doubt is De materia impoſſibili, of a matter in it ſelf impoſſible, concerning which I ſay in the firſt place, That no Law ought to be made concerning a matter altogether impoſſible; If ſuch a Law be 1made, it is tyrannical, and by right null, and obligeth no man in Conſcience; The firſt reaſon is, becauſe that Laws are made in relation to Acts, as, to be acted by a man who is a free Agent; now liberty ſpeaketh a power unto both, but in things impoſſible there is no ſuch liberty of power, as by 2it ſelf is manifeſt. Secondly, No man by right can be obliged to the performance of that, the omiſſion whereof cannot be imputed as a fault unto him, nor ought to be imputed to him for puniſhment (for every obligation is either to a fault, or to a puniſhment, or to both) but the omiſſion of a thing impoſſible cannot be imputed to any man for a fault, nor ought it to be imputed to any one for a puniſhment: Ergo &c. But that there is no obligation of a thing p. 203impoſſible (whether it be impoſſible by the Nature of the thing, or by circumſtances,Praelect. 2. Sect. 12. or any other way) hath already by me been proved in my treatiſe of the obligation of an oath, and there is no need of repetition.

VII. I ſay in the ſecond place; A Law which is poſſible to ſome, but ſeemeth to any other, or to but few, or peradventure but to one or two to be impoſſible, may lawfully be made, if it be uſeful to the Common-wealth, but not unleſs there be ſome extraordinary great cauſe, and a manifeſt neceſſity doth require it; but being made it doth oblige all thoſe who are able to keep it, but not thoſe who cannot keep it; as if ſome great Tribute were commanded for the neceſſary uſe of the Common-wealth, for the payment whereof ſome of the Subjects are nothing ſo able as others, Thoſe who are ſo poor that they cannot pay the ſum which the Law lays upon them, are not bound in Conſcience to do that which they are unable to perform, as is already apparent by the propoſition above mentioned; Nevertheleſſe they are obliged to make their addreſſes to thoſe who are over them,foreign. Nazianz. Orat. 9. Debeone omittere quod poſſum, quoniam quod debeo minime poſſum. Bernard? and openly, and ſincerely, and without the leaſt falſhood, to profeſſe the ſlenderneſſe of their Eſtate, and unleſs they can prevail to be quite exempted from the Law, or to procure a remiſſion of ſome part of the ſum with which they are taxed, they are to bring into the publick as great a part of it, as poſſibly they can; for he who cannot do what he ought to do, he yet ought to do what he is able to do.

VIII. The ſecond doubt is, concerning a thing commanded by the Law, not impoſſible, but very grievous, and very burthenſome, and which the p. 204Subject cannot perform without great inconvenience, loſſe, danger of life, and the ruine of hi… whole Eſtate; I ſay in the firſt place, That in this caſe the Law-giver (if he foreſeeth this will come to paſſe) ought to uſe ſome caution in the clauſes of that Law, and as conveniently as he can, he is to provide a remedy for this Evil; And if it cannot ſo well be done in the form of the Law it ſelf (le…t ſubtile and deceitful Knaves, and too much intent to their own profit may thereby find a hole to eſcape,foreign. Iſae …s ap. Stob. foreign. and ſo elude the force of the Law) yet what poſſibly in him lyeth, he ought to provide, that in the execution of that Law ſome qualification may be had, le…t a Law otherwiſe profitable and neceſſary may become a ſn…re or a detriment to any honeſt man. I ſay in the ſecond place, That the Subject, though ſo heavily taxed, is nevertheleſſe bound in Conſcience to obey that Law, although with the ruine of his whole Eſtate, if any evident or neceſſary Cauſe for the good of the Common-wealth doth ſo require. For example, ſuppoſe a hoſtile Army be invading the Kingdom, if a Law be made that all the corn in the Fields, for ſome miles, not far from the Shore, be ſpoiled, and all the Corn in the Barnes or Ricks which cannot be carried away, be burned, and that all the Houſes in the Suburbs be pulled down, and that all the Sluces thereabouts ſhall be opened, and the Fields be drowned, every Citizen and Subject is directly bound to obey this Law, and cheerfully, and willingly to obey the Commands thereof, and with the loſs of his own goods to redeem the publick ſafety, & not only upon that account, that his Country being betrayed to his Enemies by his unſeaſonable p. 205parſimoniouſneſs, it is ſure enough that every private perſon will be ſuddenly ſenſible of the enſuing calamity, but eſpecially out of the Conſcience of his duty; becauſe that every good man is to prefer… the publick above all private intereſts; I ſay in the third place, That a Subject, unleſſe ſome remarkable neceſſity doth appear or fear of publick 3danger, is ordinarily not obliged to obey a Law that is ſo extremely burthenſome as to bring with it the certain ruine of his whole Eſtate, or the imminent danger of his life; But he is bound, as generally hath been already ſpoken, (and which almoſt in all caſes I would have you to obſerve, that we may need not any more to repeat it to you,) to make not the leaſt reſiſtance, but patiently to endure whatſoever injury or contumely ſhall be brought upon him by the ſuperiour powers.

IX. The third doubt, is concerning things neceſſary, as if the Law of men ſhould command any thing which was neceſſary before, and commanded by the Law of God, or forbid any thing which was before unlawful and prohibited by the Law of God; What is the obligation in this caſe? I anſwer briefly, That the Subject by this Law is abſolutely obliged; For firſt, the obligation which was 1in force before the Law of God doth not hinder the effect of the Law of man by excluding a new obligation, for a man by many bonds may be obliged to the performance of one and the ſame duty, as I have already declared in the former Lecture; to which reaſon we may alſo adde another, which is that oftentimes the Law of man doth adde ſomething to the Law of God, to wit, by determining the Act, as to the ſubſtance of it commanded by p. 206the Law of God, and therefore neceſſary, as to the manner, quantity or ſome other circumſtance… of it which was free before, or by adding ſome determination to the Law of God prohibiting a thing unlawfull, as to the degree of the Crime, or the manner of the puniſhment, or the meaſure of it, or other things of the like nature; for examples ſake, it is by Divine right that there ſhould be publick congregations to perform the duties of Divine worſhip, but at what hour the people ſhall meet, and in what place, what form of words are to be uſed, and what muſt be the geſture of the body the ſeveral parts of the ſervice, and other things of the ſame nature, are all of them to be determined by Humane conſtitutions. In the ſame manner, the Law of God forbiddeth Theft to be commited, but what kind of Theft is to be animadvertiſed againſt with ſuch a puniſhment, and what with another puniſhment, is from the Laws of man; From this determination of a general thing and undetermined by the Law of God, the Law of man hath this privilege, that it can induce a new obligation on the Conſcience of the Subject, not only different from the firſt obligation in number, and in reſpect of the Term, becauſe it is of another dependency, but alſo diverſe in the Species, and in reſpect of the matter, becauſe it is exerciſed on another object; for the firſt obligation, which ariſeth from the Law of God is to the thing it ſelf as it is a ſubſtance, but this obligation which the Lawes of men do ſuper-induce, is to the manner of the thing or to the circumſtance of it.

X. The fourth Doubt, is of a thing that is foul and unlawful, which is indeed a Doubt of great p. 207moment, and containeth many caſes: for almoſt all the Conditions which are required to the right Conſtitution of Lawes,aaforeign. Ariſtot. 5. Ethic. 3 are reduced to Juſtice alone; And not only for that reaſon that univerſal Juſtice doth in her Circle comprehend all Vertues, but eſpecially for this reaſon, that particular Juſtice, and more ſpecifically that Juſtice which is called Legal Juſtice, is above all other Vertues the chief and the only Pillar of Common-wealths and all humane Societies. Concerning this Doubt, In the firſt place it is queſtioned, Whether an unjuſt Law ought to be made for the publick profit; Of which opinion was Nicho. Machiavel, who affirmed, that the due matter of Laws, whether juſt, or unjuſt, was that which was moſt commodious for the preſerving & the encreaſing of a politick State; for when, in his opinion, the end of Civil Power is the preſervation of it ſelf, and the encreaſe of Soveraignty, which Power cannot vigorouſly be preſerved, much leſs the Soveraignty enlarged, if all the Lawes, and Councils of Princes were examined according to the exact Rule of Juſtice, and Honeſty, It concerned thoſe who ſate at the Helm, ſo to bend (as occaſion ſhould require) the Rule of Honeſty, as to make it ſubſervient to the publick advantage; for the end in all things is to know how beſt to meaſure thoſe things that are of a middle nature; what ſo ever was the opinion of Machiavel, this was certainly the Judgment of a perſonage of great account amongſt the Lacaedemonians, who openly pronounced, that was moſt honeſt to the Spartans which was moſt profitable to them; To confirm this opinion that of Horace is alleged, Ipſa utilitas juſti propè mater et aequi▪ Hor. 1 …a…yr. 3.Profit almoſt the very mother p. 208of Juſtice and Equity; And how thriving a Principle this is, may be proved by the Example and ſucceſſe of the Turks, who relying on this Foundation, moſt happily have far and near extended the bounds of their Empire throughout Aſia, Africa, and Europe. And to ſpeak the truth, had not ſome men (who above all others do profeſſe themſelves to be Chriſtians, nay the only Chriſtians, and delight to be called the Reformers, and the Reſtorers o… the purer Religion) made a great uſe of this moſt wicked principle, the Chriſtian World had not every where groaned under ſo many Sacrileges, Perjuries, Seditions, Warrs, Tumults, and Tyrannies.

XI. But on the other ſide; Princes on earth ought not to abuſe that power which they have received from God, againſt his will, or otherwiſe than he intended, for this power is not given them ſo much as to Lords, as it is intruſted▪ to them by God as his Miniſters, foreign, Rom. 13. 4, 6. It is intruſted to them upon that account, that they ſhould work righteouſneſſe, and not exerciſe Tyranny, and an unjuſt Domination: And this is manifeſt by the very words of the Text; By me Kings Reign, and Princes decree juſt things; As if to Reign, and truly to be a Prince, were nothing elſe but to decree thoſe things which are juſt and righteous; And the Prophets do every where denounce the moſt ſevere anger,Eſai. 10. 1.Isa 10:1 and vengeance of God againſt thoſe Kings & Princes who had decreed unjuſt Judgements,Pſal. 94. 20.Ps 94:20 and had meditated iniquity as a Law. Neither is the inlargement of Empire, the …nd of Civil Power, as the Politicians of this world do affirm, but the preſervation of the people p. 209in Tranquillity, and peace, with all Godlineſſe and Honeſty, 1 Tim. 2. 2. For Juſtice (if there be any other) is the beſt preſerver of the publick peace; And as the Righteouſneſs of Faith doth procure and conſerve the inward peace of the Conſcience, ſo legal Juſtice doth preſerve the outward peace of the Common-wealth,Eſai. 32. 17.Isa 32:17 the fruit of Juſtice, ſaith the Prophet,Pinda…. ſhall be Peace, and the Theban Poet, calleth Quietneſſe the Daughter of Juſtice; Neither is that the meaning of Horace, as if Honeſty were meerly to be meaſured by profit, the ſcope of his ſenſe is far otherwiſe, to wit, that men wild at firſt, and wandring, by the obſervation of the publick profit, and the common good, were brought at the laſt to draw together into one Body, and maintain Societies, and by juſt Laws and Puniſhments to reſtrain injuries, and wickedneſſe. The Arguments drawn from the Turks (whom it appears that God eſpecially had raiſed up, and made them as his Scourge to correct the great perfidiouſneſſe, and other Sins of the Chriſtians) or from any others, to maintain a bad Cauſe by the proſperous ſucceſſe that did attend it, do favour rather of the Alcoran of ſome abhominable miſcreant, than of the Purity of the Goſpel of our Saviour Chriſt.

XII. The ſecond Queſtion is, Whether an unjuſt Law (though it ought not to be made, yet being made) may oblige the Conſcience of the Subject ſo far, as to be bound to obſerve it? For many things there are which ought not to be done, yet being done are valid; And it may ſo come to paſſe, that what could not without ſin be commanded, yet without ſin may be performed, as abundantly we have confirmed in our fore-going p. 208duplicate page p. 209duplicate page p. 210Lectures. The reaſon of this doubt is, Becauſe that true obedience is no Diſputreſſe; for the practice of obedience doth properly conſiſt in this, to ſubject ones ſelf to the will of another without the leaſt murmur or diſpute; Nimis delicata eſt obedientia, ſaith Bernard, quae tranſit in genus cauſae deliberativum; That Obedience is too delicate when it comes once to be ſo deliberate, as to inquire after the Cauſe thereof. But I anſwer briefly, the Conſcience of the Subject is not bound by that Law; It was my firſt Concluſion in the former Lecture, and confirmed by many Arguments, and if any man be yet unſatisfied, it may be further proved; For no inferior power can oblige againſt the will of the ſuperior power; therefore the power of God being above all the power of Men, there is no power of any man whatſoever that can oblige againſt the will of God, who by his Law hath forbidden all wicked and filthy things; from whence is that of Saint Auguſtin, There can be ſeen no Law which is not juſt; And by this reaſon, the Argument drawn from that of obedience is anſwered, by granring that the Subject ought to ſubmit himſelf without diſpute to the will of his Superior, to wit, the ſupreme ſuperior, into whoſe will, all obedience is ultimately reſolved;Quod jubet homo, prohibet Deus: & ego audiam hominem, ſurdus Deo? Be…nard. Epiſt. 7. and not of the ſubordinate Superior, if it appeareth that his will is averſe to the ſupreme ſuperior; Now, God is abſolutely the chief Commander, the bare ſignification of whoſe will is ſufficient to induce an obligation of Obedience, eſpecially ſince it is moſt certain, that his will cannot be unjuſt; Therefore Abraham obeyed God commanding thoſe things, which if God himſelf had not given him the charge, might ſeem not only to p. 211be hard, and unjuſt, but impious and full of wickedneſſe; To wit, that his Father, his Country and kindred, being all abandoned, he ſhould become a poor baniſhed Man, and travel into a remote, and an unknown Country, nay, that with his own hand he ſhould cut the throat of his own Son, in whom alone was not only all the Comfort, and the Succour of his Age, but all the Hope of the Promiſes of God, and that he ſhould lay him on the Altar, and offer him as a Sacrifice to that God who commanded of him ſuch cruel things. He did rightly indeed, and as it became a man who deſerved to be called the Father of the Faithful, and to be the ſingular Example of an unſhaken Faith to all the world; without the leaſt haeſitation and with a moſt willing obedience he made himſelf ready to put in Execution the Commands of God; But as for the Commandments of men, ſeeing that every man is lyable to Errour, and ſin, and his Will may be depraved, it is very lawful, nay where there is a juſt Cauſe of ſuſpition, it is needful alſo, to examine and to try them. That admonition of the Apoſtle, 1. Theſs. 5. 2. Try all things, and keep that which is good, may with great right and as fitly be applyed to the commands of the Superiors, as to the Inſtructions of Teachers, of whom notwithſtanding St. Paul in that place doth eſpecially ſpeak. Away then with the haughtineſs and proud commands of overlording Spirits; ſic volo, ſic jubeo; This will I have, This I do command; Away with the baſe flattery of the Papiſts, who think it a ſin for any man in any manner whatſoever, to ſuſpect the Dictates of their Lateran Jove: Away with their blind obedience, by which thoſe that enter into their Religious p. 212Houſes do by a vow oblige themſelves to obey their Superiors in every thing, and in all things without diſtinction.

XIII. In the third place it is propounded; Whether it be Lawful for a Subject to depart from his own right,Pura mala, ut nunquam juſtè juberi, ſic nec licite poſſunt fieri. Bernard. Epiſt. 7. and although he be not obliged, yet of his own accord to obey ſuch an evil Law? I anſwer, it is not lawful; for the law of God doth ſimply oblige to the not doing of any thing that is evil, or unlawful; Therefore an unjuſt Law (I underſtand unjuſt in that ſenſe in which we now ſpeak, as unjuſt in relation to the matter) cannot lawfully be kept, becauſe God cannot lawfully be offended; For whatſoever is repugnant to the Law of God, or to the light of Nature known and written in our hearts, or revealed in the written word, is not to be admitted by a Chriſtian, either to avoyd any particular detriment whatſoever, or the ſcandal of our Neighbours, or to promote the favour, or to decline the hatred of our Superiors; Daveniam Imperator▪ tu Carcerem, ille Gehennam, were the words of the primitive Chriſtians, Excuſe us Emperor, you can only condemn us to priſon, but God unto Hell. And ſo before them, ſaid the Apoſtles of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, Whether it be right in the ſight of God, Act. 41. 9.to hearken unto you rather than unto God, judge yee; And before them, the three young men of the Hebrews in the third of Daniel;Dan. 3. 18.Dan 3:18 Be it known unto thee O King, that we will not ſerve thy Gods, nor worſhip the Golden Image which thou haſt ſet up.

XIV. In the fourth place, it is demanded, What Law is to be thought ſo unjuſt, that it is not only not obliging, but moreover it is unlawful to obey p. 213it? I anſwer, a Law may be ſaid to be unjuſt for manifold conſiderations; Firſt if it be made by 1one who is not inveſted with a lawful power, and ſo it is unjuſt Proper defectum Juſtitiae Commutativae, for the defect of Juſtice commutative, becauſe the Lawgiver aſſumeth more than is due or by right doth belong unto him, it doth not therefore oblige the Subject to obedience, nevertheleſſe the Subject if it ſeems expedient to him, and he be not otherwiſe hindred, may depart from his own right, and obey that Law. Secondly in conſideration 2of the Final cauſe, if it doth not tend to the publick good, nor preſerve the rights due unto the Commonalty; And this Law is unjuſt by reaſon of the defect of that Juſtice which they call Legal, which alwayes intendeth the common good, and that the republick may receive no detriment;aaforeign. Homer. …. ad …. But this Law, howſoever it be unjuſt, doth notwithſtanding oblige the Subject, for the Subject is no competent nor fit Judge of Legal Juſtice, and if by his obedience any thing doth follow which is either incommodious, or noxious to the Commonwealth, it is not to be imputed to him, who performed his part well enough, but to the Supreme Magiſtrate, whoſe duty it was to provide for the preſervation and advancement of the publick good. Thirdly in conſideration of the Formal Cauſe, if 3the Law by an unequal proportion, and not by merit of the Citizens, doth diſpence and diſtrbute Burdens and Favors, P…niſhments and Rewards, This Law is unjuſt by reaſon of the defect of Juſtice diſtributive, which commandeth to give all things by equity to every one, as every one hath deſerved; And this Law, howſoever it be unjuſt, p. 214doth notwithſtanding oblige, as well as that, of which but now I ſpoke of, and for the ſame Cauſe; for the diſpenſation of theſe things doth not belong to the office of a Subject, but of the Supreme Magiſtrate. Fourthly, in conſideration of 4the material Cauſe, of which we do now diſcourſe; if the Law doth command any thing that is baſe, diſhoneſt, or any wayes unlawful, the ſaid Law is unjuſt, for the defect of that Juſtice which is called Univerſal, which requireth a due rectitude in every Action; And this alone is ſo far from obliging the Subject to obedience, that it doth altogether oblige him to render no obedience to it.

XV. It is demanded in the fifth place, What Juſtice is required, and how much of it will ſuffice as to this, that a Law may be ſaid to be juſt, and eſteemed obligatory? For anſwer, I ſay in the firſt place, It is not neceſſarily required, that what by the Law is commanded, ſhould be juſt poſitively, which the Philoſophers call Honeſt, that is, that it may be an Act of ſome Virtue, but it doth ſuffice, if it be juſt negatively, that is, if it be not unjuſt, or ſhameful, as are the Acts of all Vices; Otherwiſe there could no Laws be made of things of a middle nature, or of things indifferent, which notwithſtanding (as by and by ſhall be manifeſt) are the moſt apt matter of Laws. I ſay in the ſecond place, Grant that ſome Law be unjuſt, in regard of the Cauſe efficient, or the final, or the formal Cauſe, in any of thoſe reſpects newly mentioned, yet if there be no defect of Juſtice in reſpect of the material Cauſe, that is, If by the force & power of the Law the Act to be performed by the Subject be ſuch that he may put it in Execution without p. 215any ſin of his own, that Juſtice of it is ſufficient to induce the obligation.

XXVI. But leſt the Subject (too licentiouſly to withdraw himſelf from the yoak of the Law) ſhould give ſome pretence for his diſobedience (as it is a wonder to ſee how many men do ſuffer themſelves to be deceived by this paralogiſm) and ſhould allege that the Law doth ſeem too unjuſt unto him, and which with a good Conſcience he cannot obey, & therefore ought not to obey, for this they ſay were to obey with a doubting Conſcience, which cannot be without Sin, as the Apoſtle, teacheth Rom. 14. 23. For whatſoever is not of Faith, is Sin; It is neceſſary therefore in the ſixth place, to inquire farther, and to demand, What certainty is required to know whether any Law be unjuſt or not, that ſo a Subject may be ſecure in his Conſcience whether he be bound or not bound to the obſervation of it. I anſwer 1in the firſt place; If the Law be manifeſtly, & notoriouſly unjuſt, it is certain that the Subject is not bound to the obſervation of it, which is alſo to be affirmed, if by any moral certainty (after ſome due diligence in ſearching out the Truth) he judgeth it to be ſimply unjuſt. I ſay in the ſecond place; If out of any confirmed Error of his Judgement, which it is 2not eaſy for him to leave, he thinks the Law to be unjuſt, when indeed it is not, yet for all that Error in his mind, the obligation of the Law doth ſtill remain, inſomuch that he is guilty of Sin, if he doth not obey it; but ſhould Sin more grievouſly, if, that Error not yet left off, he ſhould obey it; Of this Caſe we ſhall have a greater opportunity to ſpeak, when (if God ſhall permit) we ſhall come to the Compariſon of both the ſorts of obligations. p. 2163I ſay in the third place; If out of ſome light doubt or ſcruple he ſuſpects it may be ſo, that the Law is unjuſt, that ſcruple is to be contemned, & the Law altogether to be obeyed, And no man under the pretence of his tender Conſcience, is to excuſe him ſelf from the neceſſity of giving obedience to it.

4XVII. I ſay in the fourth place (And I would to God that thoſe whoſe Cuſtom it is to defend their groſſe diſobedience under the pretence of their tender Conſciences, would give due attention to it) If becauſe of ſome probable Reaſons appearing on both ſides, the Subject cannot eaſily determine with himſelf whether the Law be right or not, inſomuch that his mind is in a great incertainty, and knows not which way to incline, he is bound in this caſe, actually to obey it, ſo that he ſinneth if he obeyeth it not, and doth not ſin if he obeyeth 1it. My reaſon is; Firſt, Beca…ſe by the Rule of Equity, In dubiis potior eſt conditio… …oſſidentis, In doubtful things the Condition of the Poſſeſſor is the better. Therefore when there is a Caſe at Law betwixt the Law-maker, and the Citizen, unleſſe there be ſome apparent reaſon to the contrary, it is preſumed alwayes to be on the ſide of the Law-maker againſt the Citizen, as being in the Poſſeſſion of Right; But if there appears any ſound reaſon to the contrary, the Caſe is altered, becauſe it is againſt the ſuppoſition of Reaſon; for we then ſuppoſe that they contend in Law, one having as much Right as the other. The ſecond Reaſon ariſeth 2from another Rule of Law; In re dubia tutior pars eſt eligenda, In a doubtful Caſe, the ſafer part is to be choſen; And its ſafer to obey the Conſcience doubting, than the Conſcience doubting not to obey; Becauſe p. 217it is ſafer, in the honor due unto Superiors, to exceed in the mode that is due unto them, than to be defective in it. The third Reaſon proceedeth 3from the ſame Rule; for generally it is ſafer for a Man to ſuppoſe himſelf to be obliged, when he is free, than to ſuppoſe himſelf free, when he is indeed obliged; For ſeeing by the inbred depravation of the Heart of Man, we ſin oftner by too much Boldneſſe, than by too much Fear, and are more prone than it becomes us, to the licentiouſneſſe of the Fleſh, and leſſe patient to bear the burthen, unleſſe we were throughly before hand reſolved to obey thoſe Laws which are not apparently unjuſt, the Wiſdom of the fleſh, & the Craft of the old Serpent, would ſuggeſt unto us excuſes enough which would retard and hinder us from the performance of our Duties. And ſo much of the fourth doubt.

XVIII. The fifth followeth; Of the permiſſive Law of Evil; Wether it be lawful, and how far lawful? And whether it be obligatory, and how far obliging? Where in the firſt place we are to obſerve; That an evil thing may three wayes be admitted by the Law, that is to ſay, privatively, negatively, and poſitively. Privatively to be 1permitted is the very ſame, which is pretermitted by the Lawgiver; And in this ſenſe all thoſe things are permitted, concerning the forbidding of which, or the Puniſhing of which, the Laws do determine nothing. That negatively is permitted, the excerciſe 2whereof the Lawes do define and limit with certain bounds, within which thoſe are ſafe and without fault, who do contain themſelves, but thoſe who do exceed them, are to be puniſhed by the Law; And in this ſenſe▪ the Laws of moſt Nations do p. 2183permit of Uſury. Thirdly, that is permitted poſitively, the excerciſe whereof is tolerated under a certain pay of ſome Tribute; and thus houſes of Incontinence are permitted at Rome.

XIX. This diſtinction being permiſed; In the 1firſt place I affirm, That privatively many Evils are neceſſarily tolerated in all Common-wealths; for it is impoſſible that the Laws ſhould extend themſelves to all the Species and kinds of vitious Acts, or that all kind of Sin ſhould be reſtrained by humane Laws; The Law of God hath this only which is admirable and peculiar to it ſelf, that it alone commandeth all things that are to be done, and forbiddeth all things that are to be avoyed. Now in this permiſſion there is no place for obligation, for it is neceſſary that every obligation ſhould ariſe from 2ſome Act, and not by the privation of an Act, or a Non-Act. I ſay in the ſecond place, That the negative permiſſion of evil may be lawful; For if there be ſome evils that cannot be quite taken away without ſome great Inconvenience to the publick, it pertaineth to the political prudence of Government, ſo to moderate the uſe of it, and circumſcribe it within certain bounds, as to make it ſubſervient to the Publick profit; And this by the Example of God himſelf, who permitted the Divorce of Wives to the people of Iſrael, to that purpoſe, as Chriſt the moſt excellent Interpreter of the Law expounds it,Mat. 19. ….Matt 19 Leſt by the hardneſſe of their hearts, and the unbridled roughneſſe and cruelty of Husbands to their Wives, there ſhould ariſe 3more grievous inconveniences. I ſay in the third place; That by this Law, there is no man notwithſtanding obliged to perform that which this p. 219Law permitteth, for the end of permiſſion is, not that that be done which by this Law is permitted, but that nothing be done beyond that which the ſaid Laws permit. Therefore as the permiſſion it ſelf is only negative, ſo it induceth only a negative obligation; That is, the Subject is obliged to do if he pleaſeth what the Law permitteth, and not to exceed the bounds which that Law preſcribeth. I ſay in the fourth place, That the poſitive 4permiſſion of Evil is not lawful, if there be more, or more grievous Evils which follow that permiſſion, than thoſe are for the remedy whereof it was pretended; eſpecially if to the permiſſion and impoſition of a filthy thing, there is added a ſuſpition of filthy lucre. I ſay in the fifth place, That by ſuch a Law, no man is bound to the performance 5of that which is permitted, nay for all the permiſſion of that Law, every man is obliged to a non-performance; My Reaſon is, as to the former part; Becauſe it is againſt the Nature of a permiſſion to oblige, for a permiſſion granteth Liberty, and every obligation is a kind of a Bond. As to the latter part, Becauſe we ſuppoſe that what by the Law of man is ſo permitted, is of it ſelf evil, and by the Law of God, we are obliged not to do Evil; The permiſſion therefore of Evil, as it is a bare permiſſion, doth oblige no man to the performance, but as it is the permiſſion of Evil, it doth oblige every man not to do that which is permitted.

XX. But it hath often heretofore been ſpoken, that every Law hath a power obligative, which ſo individually doth accompany it, as but to grant the Law, the obligation muſt neceſſarily follow, p. 220and take away the obligation you take away alſo the Law with it; It may therefore be objected▪ that we muſt hereupon either deny the permiſſive Law to be a Law, or acknowlege it doth oblige. To anſwer to this objection, we need not fly ſo far as to deny the Law permiſſive to be a Law, which we do acknowledge not only to be a Law, but a Law properly ſo called; Certainly that Moſaical Law of Divorce mentioned. Mat. 19. Though it comes by name of permiſſion, foreign, in the eighth verſe, yet in the ſeventh verſe of the ſame Chapter it is called a command, foreign. What, & is not the very name of a Law every where given to it, & is not the Definition of that name as congruous to it as to a Law either commanding or forbidding ſomething to be done, ſo that it cannot be denyed but that the Law is predicated of them all univocally and as a Genus in reference to its Species? it is not then to be granted, that the Subject by this Law is obliged; I do ſo conceive it altogether to be granted; which that it may more rightly be underſtood to be not incohaerent with thoſe things which have been already ſpoken 6of a permiſſive Law, I ſay in the ſixth place, That every Law permiſſive, as it is a Law, doth oblige the Subject in his Conſcience to the obſervation of it. The reaſon is manifeſt; for an obligation (as often it hath been already ſpoken) is a neceſſary effect of the Law, and not to be ſevered from it; Which that it may not ſeem to be quite contrary to what now hath been delivered, theſe two things are to be obſerved, which therefore the more remarkably I ſhall give unto you; The 1firſt, that I ſaid the permiſſive Law doth oblige to p. 221the obſervation of it; Now it is one thing that the Subject is obliged to the obſervation of the Law, which I ſtill affirm, and another thing that the Subject is o…liged to do that which the Law permitteth, which I have before denyed, and do deny it ſtill. The ſecond, that I ſaid the permiſſive Law as a Law 2doth oblige, which is true, but I did not ſay it did oblige, as it was permiſſive, for that is falſe; becauſe we are to know, that the force of a permiſſive Law, as it is a Law, doth not conſiſt in the permiſſion it ſelf, which being differentaa diviſiva, but a diviſive difference of the Law, it muſt needs come in order after it, as every difference diviſive is by nature in a poſterior place to the Genus which doth divide it and preſuppoſe it, but is for the moſt part expreſſely or at leaſt virtually contained in that praeception which is as it were the conſtitutive and formal difference of the Law, and in the very words of the Law it ſelf; For this preception is that from whence the obligation of the Subject doth firſt ariſe, and to which his obedience is ultimately terminated; I will make it manifeſt unto you by example. By reaſon of the neceſſity of borrowing of money, the maker of the Law permitteth of Uſury in a moderate proportion amongſt the Citizens, a puniſhment being denounced to thoſe who ſhall exceed by taking more uſe than the Law allowes. I will not here define whether Uſury be ſimply, and in every kind of it, unlawful or not, neither doth it belong to my preſent purpoſe, nevertheleſs this is certain, that were it never ſo lawful▪ no man by that permiſſiou is obliged to the exerciſing of it, But in this Law beſides this permiſſion which obliges no man, there are two things which belonging to p. 222the Precept of the Law, have thereupon from the Intention of the Law-giver a force of obliging the Citizens to the obſervation of them; One whereof is enjoyned formally and in expreſs words, to wit▪ That no man exact monies beyond the allowance preſcribed in the Law, the other virtually and by Conſequence, That no man be puniſhed for trading in uſury as it is by that Law permitted; To conclude therefore in a word, the Precept or Injunction of the permiſſive Law doth oblige all Subjects, but the Permiſſion no man.

XXII. The ſixth doubt is of things indifferent, and of a middle nature; Now theſe things indifferent, or of a middle nature are ſuch, all the Species whereof are neither commanded nor forbidden by any Divine Law, (natural, or poſitive.) They are therefore of themſelves, and of their own nature, lawfull to be obſerved as they are not forbidden, and free to be obſerved as they are not commanded. There were ſome of an opinion that there ought no Laws of man to be made concerning things indifferent, but of thoſe things only which are of a natural, or a divine right, and thereupon they ſaid, That Civil Laws were not ſo much the Conſtitutives of a new Law, as the Declaratives of the old, and explications and evolutions of the Divine will; But what need we to confute an opinion ſo abhorring from all ſound reaſon, that rather to the contrary we may rightly judge, that theſe things indifferent are the moſt proper and the only moſt fit matter of Humane Laws? For we are bound to the obſervation of thoſe things which God hath commanded, although the commands of all men whatſoever, are either ſilent, or do contradict them; And as for thoſe p. 223things which by God are forbidden, we are obliged to the not performance of them, the Laws of men being ſilent, or never ſo importunately commanding them. Therefore theſe things indifferent do remain, as a large Field in which the power of man might exerciſe it ſelf, and put forth its force by inducing an obligation where there was none before. That manifeſtly it may appear that the civil Magiſtrate in things indifferent, and which before any Act of his were free to both, may ſtate and decree ſomething on either ſide, by determining that indifferency, which may oblige the Conſciences of his Subjects to obedience; For as in Meat and Drink, and Pleaſures, as alſo in giving and receiving, the moral prudence of a privare perſon, by allowing unto himſelf a golden mediocrity, doth ſo far advance his natural and indifferent Acts beyond their ſtate and native Condition, that from thence they begin to be Acts of Vertues, to wit, of Temperance, and Liberality; ſo a perſon inveſted with the publick Authority doth by his politick prudence in giving certain bonds of mediocrity to his Subjects concerning things free, and of a middle nature, ſo advance thoſe Acts enjoyned in his Laws beyond the degree of their former State, that they now begin to be Acts of virtues, to wit, of Obedience and Legal juſtice.

XXIII. A thing moſt plain, and which would have found no Adverſary, if ſo manifeſt a truth had not preſtringed ſome Reformers of our age, nay, and of our own Nation, who to make a way to that wild Reformation for which they ſo much contended, had rather againſt common ſence to take away from the world all indifferency, than p. 224to grant unto the Magiſtrate any power of determining of Rites & Laws, Altogether like that Macedonian who with his Sword did cut that Gordian knot aſunder, which by no Art he was able to untye; In this, as in many other things the true Diſciples of the old Stoicks, who aſſerted that there was nothing indifferent to a wiſe man, but that he mannageth all things from the greateſt to the leaſt, & even to the paring of his nayles, with the higheſt point of diſcretion; But they ſo took away this indifferency out of affairs with words only, that at laſt being enforced to it by the reaſons of their adverſaries, they in deeds did grant it, having invented ſome frivolous diſtinctions, more honeſtly to hide their errour, that they might not ſeem to have erred at all. But there have been found ſome amongſt us, who have been ſo bold as to defend their odious, & exploded Doctrine in their publick writings, & that more pertinaciouſly than the Stoicks themſelves did heretofore. Two eſpecially, the one of them a Divine, a man of ſome account amongſt thoſe of his own party, the other a Lay-man, & one of the Peers of the Land, both of them now dead, with whom, becauſe I believe their Doctrine to be dead alſo, and not eaſily to be received into the belief of ſober men, much leſſe to find a patron amongſt them, I think it not worth my labour to inſiſt on the confutation of it.

XXIV. I do receive therefore as granted, that there are things and actions indifferent, at leaſt in their own nature, and in the Species of them which I believe there is no man ſo Stoicized that will de…y; Of which in reference to our preſent purpoſe, …is is next to be advertiſed, that an Act indifferent in its own nature, that is, in reſpect of the matter p. 225or the object of it, if it be commanded by the Law, from good and lawful, doth become honeſt and neceſſary, and if it be forbidden by the Law, from good and lawful, it becomes evil, and unlawful; which come… not to paſſe by reaſon of any change made of the thing it ſelf, (which whether it be commanded or forbidden, both phyſically, and morally doth remain the ſame as it was before, for there is no reſpect that alters nature) but proceedeth from that obligation which the Law induceth; From whence it is, that being before, both in nature and of it ſelf, ſo alſo in uſe and as to us, free unto both, the authority of the Law being added to it, it becomes in the uſe of it, and as to us, no longer free, but it is either neceſſary, or unlawful according to the exigence of the Law.

XXV. If it be demanded, ſeeing the Law appeareth to have an equal power on either ſide, how comes it to paſſe, that the Law by forbidding an Act, can make it of being good and lawful, to become evil, and unlawful, but the ſame Law, (as heretofore we have denyed it) cannot by commanding an Act, make it from being evil & unlawful, become good, and lawful; I anſwer, the reaſon of the difference is moſt manifeſt, from that moſt known Axiome, Bonum ex cauſ… integrâ, malum ex quolibet defectu; An Act therefore that is evil in its own Species, and in the reſpect of the object of it, muſt of neceſſity be always evil, neither in any exerciſing of it, be the circumſtances what they will, may it be made good, by reaſon of the defect of goodneſs in the part of the object, which defect is ſufficient to corrupt the whole Act; But an Act, good in its own kind, or at leaſt not evil, if it be attended p. 226but with ſome one circumſtance that is indirect, it becometh wholy vitious, by reaſon of the defect of a due rectitude in that circumſtance; From whence ariſeth another difference betwixt an affirmative, and a negative Humane Law, or a Law commanding, or forbidding; For a Law affirmative doth not give any goodneſs to the Act which it commandeth, if it be otherwiſe evil in any part of it; But a Law negative doth contribute evilneſſe to the Act which it forbiddeth, although it be otherwiſe good in every part of it; Or, which is the ſame again, a Humane Precept affirmative doth make that neceſſary which it finds to be good, a humane precept negative doth make that unlawful which it found to be good, both of them what they found evil do leave it to be evil as they found it; Notwithſtanding both do oblige in their manner and as to us, this, to the doing of that which by commanding is now made neceſſary, and that to the not doing of that which by forbidding is now made unlawfull.

XXVI. The ſeventh Doubt remaineth of Eccleſiaſtical Lawes in Special. By Lawes Eccleſiaſtical I do not underſtand thoſe Lawes which are conſtituted by Eccleſiaſtical Perſons without the Authority of the Civil Magiſtrate, (which conſideration pertains not to this caſe, but to a Cauſe of an other kind, to wit, the Cauſe efficient) but thoſe which, being made by any lawful Power, doe treat of Eccleſiaſtical things, for at this preſent we diſpute only of the material Cauſe. I have never heard of any beſides thoſe two above named who denyed all Indifferency, or who would not grant to the political Magiſtrate ſome Power in things indifferent, p. 227meerly political; But we meet every where with a great number of Innovators, who would take from men all Power of making Rites and Ceremonies in the publick worſhip of God, beſides thoſe which are preſcribed by Chriſt and his Diſciples in the Goſpel; But ſincerely I profeſſe, that to give ſatisfaction to my ſelf and to others in this particular, Having peruſed many Books written by many Authors, but eſpecially of our own Nation, concerning this Subject, I find not any one, that can produce any juſt or any likely Reaſon of Difference, why there may not be a Power of ordaining and determinating concerning things indifferent, as well in Caſes Eccleſiaſtical as Political; For the Arguments which are urged from Scandal and Chriſtian Liberty and other common Places of the ſame Nature doe equally fight againſt the Lawes, and Conſtitutions of both Kinds, and do overthrow them both, or neither of them. Thoſe which are thought to carry a peculiar force againſt Eccleſiaſtical Laws and Rites are four, which as the time will permit, I will briefly, and orderly examine, they are derived 1. From Chriſt the Lawgiver; 2. From the perfection of the Scripture; 3. From the nature of holy Worſhip; 4. From the example of the antient Church.

XXVII. In the firſt place they object that of the Apoſtle James, 4. 12. There is one Lawgiver who can ſave and deſtroy; In the reign of Elizabeth many who were the Coriphaei of that Diſciplinary Faction did make very much of this argument as the foundation of their whole Cauſe; They alleged that Chriſt was the only Prince, and Legiſlator of his Church; And the Laws which he made did oblige the Church to a perpetual obſervation of p. 228them, and that no other Laws ought to be admitted, nor any other Legiſlator acknowledged; whoſoever ſhall preſume to make any other Lawes beſides thoſe which Chriſt made, ſhall act the part of Anti-Chriſt, and declare himſelf a raſh Invader into the Office of Chriſt. We have diſcourſed on this place, and expounded it already as occaſion did require, eſpecialy where it was to be proved, that God only and his Chriſt did exerciſe an abſolute and a direct Command on the Conſciences of Men; But that this hath no greater a place in Lawes politick, than in Eccleſiaſtick, he muſt needs be blind that doth not obſerve it. For why can the obligation of humane Laws in civil things conſiſt with the legiſlative Power of Chriſt alone, and why cannot there be the ſame conſiſtence in Lawes Eccleſiaſtical? Who can diſcover or produce the leaſt ſhadow of any difference from that Text. Be Chriſt the Law-giver of the Chriſtian Church, Is he not as well the Law-giver of the Chriſtian Common-wealth? But the Apoſtle in that place made not the leaſt mention of the Church, nor inſtituted the leaſt diſputation concerning things Eccleſiaſtical, neither doth he treat there at all, of Political Lawes or Rites but of the Cenſures of Private Men. He would have the faithful admoniſh…d to be mindf…l of Chriſtian Charity, and that they ſhould forbear from paſſing a raſh Judgment on their Brothers, for God was only the Judge of Conſciences, who alone made that Law by which every man in the laſt Day ſhall be judged. This is the true ſcope of that place, This is the mind of the Apoſtle. What is here I pray you, that tendeth to the condemning of Humane Lawes? or p. 229if to the condemning of them, why of Eccleſiaſtical Lawes, more than Civil? Neither of which, either the one, or the other, are aſſerted by us, by themſelves, and of their own Vertue to oblige the Conſcience.

XXVIII. In the ſecond place they object the Perfection of the Holy Scripture. This they ſay is the Rule both of Life, and Manners, and which can make a man of God wiſe to every good work, to which if any man ſhall adde any thing of his own, he ſhall commit a moſt remarkable treſpaſſe againſt God, and pull moſt heavy puniſhments on himſelf. All this is moſt certain: But if the Scripture in all conſiderations be the abſolute rule of our lives, & of all things whatſoever to be done, and (if we may believe theſe Stoicks) it extends to the ſlighteſt things, inſomuch that it is not lawful to take up a ſtraw, unleſſe it be by the preſcribed word of God, will it not ſuffice as well for the regulating of things Civil as Eccleſiaſtical? or how can the Laws of …he Church derogate more from the perfection of the Scripture, than the Laws of the Commonwealth? or who is he who rightly can ſay that he hath added ſomething to the word of God, who for Honeſty and Orders ſake, did make the Eccleſiaſtical Laws, ſeeing he propounded not his Laws unto the people as the word of God, and God in his word hath commanded that all things in the Church ſhall be done honeſtly and in order?

XXIX. In the third place they object the Nature of worſhip, to wit, that the worſhip of God is a thing ſacred, in which worſhip all things are to be done by the Command of God, and all Humane inventions are to be driven far away as ſuperſtitious, p. 230nay plainly Idolatrous, and traditionary Rites; Indeed the worſhip of God is a ſacred thing, neither is it lawful for man to inſtitute any other worſhip beſides that which God hath ordained; But becauſe there is an Ambiguity in the word, we are to diſtinguiſh of the worſhip of God, which is taken in a threefold conſideration; 1And firſt of all, the worſhip of God properly ſo called, and the chiefeſt, is that inward wordſhip of the mind, which conſiſteth in the exerciſe of inward Vertues, as of Faith, Hope, Love, Invocation, 2Confidence, &c. Secondly, thoſe outward Acts by which that inward worſhip of the mind is partly expreſſed, and partly helped, and foſtered, ſuch as are publick Prayers, Singing of Pſalms, the Hearing of the word, and the participation of the Sacraments, &c. may reducibly, and leſſe properly be called, and oftentimes are called the worſhip of God, as they are the outward Teſtimonies and Helps of that worſhip which ſo properly is called. Thirdly, Seeing it is impoſſible that any outward action, eſpecially if it be a ſolemn one, ſhould be performed without ſome Circumſtances, either more, or leſſe, of Time, Place, and Gesture, from whence it comes to paſſe, that the very ſame Circumſtances (which if eſtabliſhed by Laws or Cuſtomes, are called alſo Rites) do ſometimes receive the appellation of worſhip, although very improperly, and only for that Concomitancy which they have to that outward worſhip, which it ſelf alſo is improperly called a worſhip. It is therefore to be affirmed, That the inward primary worſhip, & properly ſo called, doth only ſo acknowledge God to be the only Author of it, that it is p. 231not lawful for any man either to inſtitute a new worſhip, or being inſtituted by God, to exhibit it to any other beſides God himſelf. We are to affirm alſo, That the outward worſhip, according to its ſubſtantials, is inſtituted only by God; but there is a far different account to be made of the circumſtances which are acceſſary to this outward worſhip, and thoſe which do accompany it, If there be any who will Honor them alſo with the Name of worſhip. For ſeeing that the outward worſhip of God cannot be performed without Circumſtances, and God in the Goſpel hath not given any certain particular Circumſtances perpetually to be obſerved in ſacred Aſſemblyes, but only hath lay'd down ſome Generals as may conduce to Order, Honeſty, and Edification, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that the Determination of the ſaid Circumſtances, which are but Accidental to the worſhip it ſelf, and mutable according to the reſpect of Times, Places, and Occaſions, muſt pertain unto thoſe, who under Chriſt have a Right and Power of Governing the Churches, which that they may be impoſed by thoſe, who in the ſeveral Churches are inveſted with publick Authority, and being impoſed, may Religiouſly be obſerved by all the Members of the ſaid Churches; the nature of Holy worſhip doth not forbid, but Solemnity rather, & Decency doth require; We obſerve alſo, that even thoſe Men themſelves who ſo Lordly & bitterly do inveigh againſt the Canons, and Eccleſiaſtical Conſtitutions, yet as often as they pleaſe, do uſe thoſe Rites in the outward worſhip of God no where preſcribed by Chriſt or his Apoſtles, as the lifting up of their hands in the taking of an Oath, the uncovering p. 232of the Head in the Holy Conventions, and many other things, which becauſe we dayly obſerve to be done, it is unneceſſary to rehearſe them.

XXX. In the fourth place they object, that Moſes, the pattern of the old, that is, of the Jewiſh Church, who was given by God to the people of the Jews to be their Lawgiver, did not only by his Law define the Subſtantials of the Jewiſh worſhip, but according to that fidelity which was in him, he omitted not the leaſt Circumſtances, and in building the Tabernacle which was to be a Type of the Chriſtian Church, he moſt compleatly and perfectly finiſhed all things according to the Idaea of the Example which was propounded to him in the Mount; And now if Chriſt the-Lawgiver of the new Teſtament ſhould not have preſcribed all things, and every thing even to the leaſt Circumſtances which are to be performed in the Eccleſiaſtical worſhip, it may juſtly be believed (to ſuſpect which is near to Blaſphemy) that he was leſſe faithful in the Houſe of God than Moſes, and thereupon there is a remarkable injury and contumely done unto Chriſt▪ if any new Rites never inſtituted by him ſhould by humane Authority be brought into the Church, or be received by the Chriſtian common people. But they who do object theſe things, ought in the firſt place to have conſidered that by this Argument, all humane political Laws are no leſſe everted than Ecleſiaſtical, for Moſes by the commandement of God did give unto the people of Iſrael, a certain, and a defined Law, not only of thoſe Rites which belonged to the worſhip of God, but alſo of thoſe Decrees, and Judgments, which belonged to the Adminiſtration of Civil Government.

p. 233XXXI. In the ſecond place, it is a wonder moreover, that they obſerved not that by this compariſon of that fidelity which was in both Lawgivers, Moſes and Chriſt, that they could not more importunately have alleged any thing that could bring a greater dammage to their own Cauſe, or more ſtrongly have confirmed ours; For, as from that, that Moſes both in rituals and judicials did give many Laws unto the people of the Jews, we do truly collect it was the will of God, that the people of the Jews ſhould be ſo reſtrained in their duties under that paedagogy, and Moſaick Diſcipline, as under a Yoak of ſervitude, ſo that very few things ſhould be free unto them; ſo from that alſo, that Chriſt the moſt faithful Interpreter of his Fathers Will, did give unto the Chriſtian Church but a very few Laws of Ceremonies, we do truly collect that it is the will of God, that the Magiſtrates, and Chriſtian people, ſhould be permitted in thoſe things to their own Liberty, ſo that it is now free for any private Man of his own accord (no command, or prohibition of a ſuperior intervening) to do as ſhall ſeem in his own Judgement to be moſt expedient, and to the ſeveral Churches, and their Governors, to preſcribe thoſe things which according to the condition of the time and place ſhall ſeem to them to be moſt ſubſervient to Order, Honeſty, Edification, and Peace.

XXXII. Moreover, Thoſe who do make uſe of this Argument, ought in the third place to have conſidered, that under that Paedagogy of Moſes, the Jews themſelves had not all the Liberty of Rites in things pertaining to the worſhip of God ſo take away, that it was not lawful for them by their p. 234own Authority, to obſerve and to inſtitute thoſe things, which it is manifeſt were never commanded either by God himſelf or by Moſes his Servant. Of many take theſe few inſtances; Firſt, the ſolemn feaſt of the Paſſover which by the Law of 1Moſes was commanded ſhould be obſerved but ſeaven dayes, was by a ſpecial Law of Hezekias (who received a ſingular teſtimony of his piety from God himſelf) and by the conſent of the people, continued ſeaven dayes longer; The Hiſtory 2is extant 2. Chron. 30. Secondly Eſther and Mordecay did inſtitute that the ſeaſt of Purim ſhould be yearly celebrated in memory of that Deliverance which God vouchſafed to the Nation of the Jewes under Ahaſuerus King of the Perſians, Eſther. 9. 3Thirdly when Moſes commanded but one day only in the year to be obſerved in the ſeaventh month for a ſolemn Faſt, the Kings and Magiſtrates of that people (for what cauſes it is not known, but likely in the remembrance of ſome remarkable Judgements of God) did by their own Authority inſtitute annual ſolemn Faſts, inſomuch, that in the dayes of the laſt of …he Prophets, there were four ſolemn Faſts kept every year, viz, three others beſides that of the ſeventh month, in the fourth, fifth, and tenth month, of all which 4mention is made, Zach. 8. 19. Fourthly, the Feaſt of the Dedication of the Altar, called Encoenia, was inſtituted by the Aſamonians without any command of God; The Hiſtory is to be read; Maccab. 4. 59. And by the Judgement of the moſt and beſt Interpreters, Chriſt himſelf is thought not only to have approved of it, but to have honoured 5it with his preſence, Joh. 10. 20. Fifthly, we find it no p. 235where to be enjoyned by any Commandment of God, that in ſolemn Faſts and penitential mourning, they ſhould put on Sack-cloth, and ſtrew Aſhes on their hair, but amongſt the Jews for ſome Ages paſt, the long cuſtom was ſo received, and ſo obtained the force of a Law, that Chriſt himſelf did uſe that manner of Speech, as from the cuſtom of that Nation, and ſhowed not the leaſt diſlike of it; Mat. 11. 21. Sixthly, it is manifeſt 6by the writings of the Rabbins; that it was the manner alſo of the Jews before the ſupper of the Paſſeover, that the Maſter of the Family ſhould ſtoop ſolow, as to waſh the feet of thoſe of his own houſhold, which although commanded by no Law of God, we find it to be obſerved by Chriſt, as it is manifeſt in the Hiſtory of the Goſpel, John 13. Why ſhall I here number up the Synagogues every where builded in ſo many Cities, and Towns, for the Conveniency of ſacred Conventions, and many other things, a long Catalogue, whereof the Jewiſh Commentaries doe afford us; From all which this may be concluded, If ſo many things pertaining to the worſhip of God were lawful for the Jews to alter under that yoak of Severer Diſcipline, there can no probable Argument be derived from their Example to overthrow the force of Eccleſiaſtical Humane Laws.