The Obligation of Human Conscience, Lecture 5
THE FIFTH LECTURE, In which the Queſtion is thorowly handled, concerning the Obligation of Humane Laws in general.
ROM. 13. 5.
Wherefore you muſt be ſubject, not becauſe of anger onelyonly, but for conſcience ſake.
HAving begun the laſt Term to treat of the paſſive obligation of Conſcience, I proceeded ſo far, that having diſcovered and diſclaimed thoſe ſubterfuges, in which a ſeduced generation of men do vainly fl…ter themſelves, that there is ſome excuſe or protection either for the fruit of their Conſciences, as to things already done, or ſome ſecurity for things that remain to be done, for the Intention of a good end or by the authority of another mans example, or judgment; I have proceeded, I ſay, ſo far as to examine and repreſent unto you that proper and Adaequate Rule of Conſcience to which abſolutely and ſimply it ought to conform it ſelf, where in the firſt place I ſhewed you that God only hath an abſolute and direct command over the Conſciences of men. Secondly, that the next, and immediate Rule of Conſcience, is the light with which the mind at that preſent is endued, or (to ſpeak after the Schoolmen) Ultimum judicium Intellectus practici; The laſt judgment of the practical underſtanding. Thirdly, that the written word of God, is indeed the ſupreme and primary, foreign.but not the Adaequate Rule of Conſcience. *4.Fourthly, that the proper and Adaequate Rule of Conſcience is the will of God, which way ſoever it be revealed, or (which is the ſame again) the Law impoſed by God upon the reaſonable Creature; Moreover, (that more fully and more diſtinctly we may underſtand what this will of God is,) I made manifeſt unto you, that Almighty God did lay open his Will unto mankind by a threefold means. Firſt, by the Law of Nature, which conſiſteth of certain practical Principles known by themſelves, which is called the Law of God written in our hearts, Rom. 2. 15. Which is with an inward light, and of the ſame o…iginal as our minds; Secondly by the written word of God, which is contained in both the volumes of the holy Writ, and is an external light ſupernaturally revealed, and infuſed into our minds; Thirdly by a knowledge obtained from both the former, either by our own meditation, or from the Inſtruction and Inſtitution of others, and this as it were by an acquired light, the chief helps and introductions whereunto, are the Diſcourſe of Reaſon, and the Authority, that is to ſay, the Judgment and the practice of the univerſal Church.
II. I alſo did advertiſe you (to make ſome way to this following Treatiſe) that beſides the Law of God, which abſolutely by its ſelf, and by its own peculiar power doth oblige the Conſciences of all men, and that in the higheſt Degree, there are alſo many others which do carry an obligation with them, but inferiour to the former, and do oblige the Conſcience not primarily and by themſelves, but ſecondarily and by conſequence, not abſolutely, but relatively, not by its own power, but by the vertue of ſome divine precept or Inſtitution on which they are grounded; which although they do all agree in this, that whatſoever power of obligation they have, they altogether acknowledge it as proceeding from the Law of God; For the firſt in every kind whatſoever it be is the cauſe of the reſt, neither would the Law of God (as already it is ſtated) be the Adaequate Rule of Conſcience, if it ſhould oblige any beyond it ſelf, which it did not oblige by vertue of it ſelf; yet theſe things (as I have ſaid) that do ſo agree in one, do notwithſtanding every one of them differ amongſt themſelves, not only in the Species by reaſon of the diverſity of the matter, but alſo in the Degree according to the efficacy of the obliging; and they chiefly conſiſt in a threefold difference, for ſome of them do oblige conſtantly, of which there are two kinds, The one in reference to thoſe things whoſe obligation doth ariſe from the power of another, as humane Laws, the Commandements of Parents, Maſters, and the like; The other in reference to thoſe, whoſe obligation doth ariſe from the free election of the will it ſelf, As Vows, Oaths, Contracts, Promiſes and the like; Somthings again do only oblige by accident and as it were curſorily, according to Time and Place and the exigence of other circumſtances, as the Law, or Reaſon of Scandal.
The privilege and priority of order and method do require that we begin with humane Laws, concerning the obligation whereof thoſe things which at this time ſhall be ſpoken of, may all of them be reduced to theſe two queſtions. 1. Whether humane Laws do oblige the Conſciences, and ſecondly, how far they do oblige them. The determining of moſt of the particular caſes do pertain chiefly to the latter Queſtion, which, God willing, ſhall be the Subject of our following Lecture, we ſhall only at this time touch upon the firſt,Delectus vim in lege ponimus Cicero 1. de legibus. which is, Whether humane Laws do oblige the Conſciences. The Subject of the queſtion needeth not any large expoſition. Lex or the Law is firſt ſo called in an active conſtruction, a legendo, id eſt eligendo, from chooſing, as Cicero will have it; becauſe the Lawgivers do make choyce of thoſe things which they conceive to be moſt profitable to the Common-wealth. Or ſecondly as others will have it, Lex, or the Law, is ſo called a legendo, from reading, and that in a paſſive conſtruction; becauſe the Laws after they were Enacted were engraven in Tables of Braſſe, or otherwiſe legibly written, and faſtned unto Pillars to be read in publick by the people;Aquin, 1. 2. quaeſt. 90. Arti 16. Biel. 3. diſt. Arti 1. Or laſtly, according to other mens derivation. Lex is ſo called a ligando that is from binding; becauſe it doth bind the Subjects to the obſervation of it; but in the Genus of it, it is nothing elſe, than a Rule of acting impoſed on the Subject by the Superiour being impowered thereunto. They are called humane Laws in oppoſition to Divine; for as thoſe Laws are called Divine, which immediately are conſtituted by the authority of God himſelf, whether they be Laws Natural, or Laws Poſitive, ſo thoſe Laws are ſaid to be Humane, which although they have an authority derived to them from God, yet they are immediately commanded by men, and impoſed on their Subjects.
III., The Law of man is thus defined by Aquinas, 3. 1 a. 2. ae. quaeſt. 90 arti 4.It is the ordination of Reaſon to a common good promulgated by him who hath the care of the Commonalty. His words are, Lex humana eſt Rationis ordinatio ad Bonum Commune, ab eo qui curam Communitatis habet promulgata. By others it is defined otherwiſe, they differ in the words, but almoſt all of them doe agree in the ſenſe; and well ſo they may, for this Definition is very ſuitable to the publick Law which is the moſt known and the moſt uſual acceptation of that word. And ſo we uſe to ſpeak, Analogum per ſe poſitum pro famoſiore ſignificato praeſumitur, an Analogick being placed by it ſelf is preſumed to ſtand for that which is the moſt remarkable in the ſignification; But in this preſent queſtion, and to our preſent purpoſe, Under the Notion and Name of Humane Laws, the publick Lawes of Cummonalties are not only to be underſtood (although moſt chiefly they are, and primarily) but even the particular Commands of Parents, Maſters, Magiſtrates, and all other Superiors, impoſed on their Children, Servants, or their People; for when both of them are a kind of Precept, in this one thing eſpecially there is a Difference betwixt a Law properly ſo called, and a Mandate; for a Mandate or Command is but the Precept of a private perſon inveſted with a private Authority; but the Law is a publick precept of a perſon indued with a publick Authority. In all other conſiderations there is but little diverſity. Certainly, as to the effect, and force of obliging, ſince it is apparent by the tenth verſe of this Chap. that all Legitimate Power whatſoever it be, not only publick, (which notwithſtanding I muſt confeſs to be the only meaning of the Apoſtle in that place) but alſo all private power is conſtituted of God, and the Command of a Father to his Son, is no leſſe a Rule for acting, than the Law of the Prince to his Subject; all thoſe things which I ſhall now diſcourſe of concerning the obligation of humane Lawes, are ſo to be underſtood, (and let this one premonition ſuffice) that the mandates of private perſons be comprehended in the publick Lawes, and oeconomical Commands with Politick Conſtitutions, and others of the like nature, as far as the Courſe, and Conſideration of the Analogy will permit. And thus much be ſpoken of the Subject of the Queſtion: The Praedicate followeth.
V. The Praedicate of the Queſtion is the obligation of the Conſcience. Now what Conſcience is, and what is an Obligation in the generality of it, hath largely enough been already unfolded by me, neither is there any need of repetition; When we ſay the Law doth oblige we mean nothing elſe than that the Law doth impoſe on the Subject a Neceſſity of obſerving and obeying it.
You are to know that the Law of its own Nature, and as it is a Law, doth cary in it ſelf a double force or neceſſary effect, that is, the force of directing, from whence it is called a Canon or a Rule, as it layes open to the Subject the will of the Superiour, and ſheweth what it is that he would have to be performed by him; and a power of obliging (by which it differs from Counſel and Admoniſhment,) becauſe it commandeth the Subject to obey his will, and doth ſo oblige him to the performance of it, that if he doth not obey him, he doth ſin or erre, for Sin is nothing elſe but an aberration or a receding from that Rule or Law which we ought to follow, foreign, ſo Monſters by receding from the ordinary Law of Nature, are ſaid to be the ſins of Nature. In the ſecond place you are to know, that the effect of this Law, that is the obligative power of it, is grounded on the Will, and the power of the Lawgiver, ſo that to ſpeak properly, the Law it ſelf doth not bind ſo effectually, as the Will and Power of the Lawgiver, by cauſing and inducing an obligation by the means of the efficient Cauſe; but it may be ſaid, and indeed uſually ſo it is, that the Law doth oblige terminatively, that is, as a Term of obligation, and by the vertue of an exemplar Cauſe, becauſe it is that, to which a man is ſo obliged, that he may work according to the Rule of it; as an Artiſt in working is directed by the Copy that is propounded to him. In the third place it is to be obſerved, that to oblige the Conſcience, is ſo to bind a man up unto obedience under a mortal fault (as the Schoolmen ſpeak it) that if he prove diſobedient, he is not only lyable to a temporal puniſhment, either ordained by the Lawes, or to be inflicted according to the ſentence of the Magiſtrate, but he is deſervedly checked by his own Conſcience, as guilty of the neglect of his Duty, and thereby of the Anger of God contracted on him.
V. The ſenſe therefore of the Queſtion is, Whether Humane Lawes have the power to oblige the Conſciences of thoſe men to whom they are exhibited, in the ſame way as I have now explained; amongſt the Proteſtants Calvin doth deny it (as Bellarmin at leaſt doth object againſt him) it is denyed alſo by Beza and many others; Amongſt the Papiſts it is denyed by Gerſon (Bellarmin himſelf confeſſing it) and by Almain; Bellarm. 3 de laic. 9.And as ſome affirm by Navarrus. Amongſt the Proteſtants again it is affirmed by Muſculus, Urſine, and others; And amongſt the Papiſts it is confirmed by the Jeſuits, and a great number of the Schoolmen; Some there are who do diſtinguiſh on it,Rom. 13. as David Paraeus and others; And it muſt needs indeed be acknowledged, if by the heat of too much oppoſition, and the affectation of contradiction, they had not on both ſides erred, this controverſy had long ago been caſt out of the world; In diſputations ſuch as theſe, I oftentimes do call that to mind, which when I was a young man, I did read in Ariſtotle foreign. It is manifeſt that it is ſo, but not why another doth diſpute it ſo, In which place he diſputes, An principia ſunt contraria? Whether Principles are contrary? An detur infinitum? Whether there be an infiniteneſſe or not? and the like, And therefore in theſe doubts (for this is the true ſenſe and reading of that place in the third of the Phyſicks) we had more need of an Arbitrator (who may reconcile both opinions differing rather in ſhew than in ſubſtance) than of a Judge, who while he determins one part doth condemn the other; And this indeed would prevail much in a great part of the controverſies which with ſuch contention of minds and bitterneſſe of ſtile are now amongſt parties carried on in the Chriſtian world, if Divines would not ſuffer themſelves to be ſwayed rather by faction than affection. Indeed in this preſent queſtion (as far as I can judge by the peruſal of thoſe few books which the infirmity of my health, and the ſtreightneſſe of my time doth permit to look over) the height of the Spirit of contention being on both ſides taken away, they neither of them do ſeem to me to be in any great errour; but I conceive that thoſe who affirmatively have defined this queſtion (to ſpeak freely what I think) have ſpoken more commodiouſly to the inſtitution of our lives, & more carefully & ſafely to avoid the danger of error, and more properly to the form of ſound Doctrine, than thoſe who have defined it negatively. But that more diſtinctly I may propoſe unto you what I conceive is to be determined in this queſtion, I will as briefly, and as cleerly as I can, with ſome Concluſions comprehend and terminate the whole Subject; I will confim my own opinion with ſome reaſons, as need ſhall require, and I will anſwer the arguments which commonly are alleged by the adverſe party.
VII. The firſt Concluſion is, that Humane Laws if injuſt do not oblige unto obedience; The thing is manifeſt enough, if the words be rightly underſtood, and that no man might give a miſunderſtanding to them, we are to be advertiſed, that a Law may be ſaid to be unjuſt either in reſpect of the End, or the Manner, or of ſome Circumſtance extrinſecal to the Law it ſelf, or in reſpect of the Matter and Object of the Law; For it differeth, if that be commanded which is manifeſtly unjuſt, or whether that which peradventure is not otherwiſe unjuſt, be yet unjuſtly commanded. That kind of Injuſtice which adhereth to the Law it ſelf, per ſe, that is, of it ſelf in reſpect of the thing commanded doth take away the obligation; but it taketh not away that obligation which commeth unto it extrinſecally, and as it were by accident, that is to ſay, by the fault of the Commander; For ſuppoſe that a Prince ſhould by a Law made command ſomething to be done, the doing whereof of it ſelf were not unlawfull to be done; or ſhould forbid that to be done which were not ſimply neceſſay; And ſuppoſe withall, there ſhould be no ſuch juſt cauſe why he ſhould command this, or forbid that, being induced to it either by the deſire of filthy Lucre, or the meer Luſt of exerciſing his Tyranny, or by ſome other depraved affection of his mind, this Law is unjuſt indeed on the part of the King that did command it, but the Subject nevertheleſſe is obliged to the obedience of it. The Reaſon is, becauſe that Injuſtice doth hold altogether on the part of the party commanding, and not of the thing commanded; So that although the King could not without ſin make ſuch a Law, yet the Subject without ſin could perform that which by that Law is commanded; And whatſoever the Subject can perform without ſin, he is bound if commanded to perform by the Duty of obedience▪ Let the Prince himſelf look to it by what Counſel or Intention …e inacted ſuch a Law, It doth not belong to me who am but his Subject to examine it, neither ſhall it be imputed unto me if he hath offended in it, but as long as nothing is commandmanded but what Lawfully may be performed, it ſhall be imputed to me if I am wanting in my Duty, and ſhall not obey him.
VIII. Moreover, I add this alſo, if the Law it ſelf either in reſpect of the Object or the Matter be peradventure unjuſt, and grievous to the Subject, as for examples ſake, if he demands the payment of a greater Subſidy than the occaſion doth require, the Conſcience of the Subject is not here freed from the obligation; But here again we are to diſtinguiſh; For a thing may be ſaid to be unjuſt, either as it is unfit or grievous to be born, or unlawful to be done; In the firſt Interpretation, if it be unjuſt what by the Law is commanded, that is if it be unequitable and not diſhoneſt, yet if it be done, it is the fault only of him who doth command it, He that obeyeth the Command is ſo far from fault, that he ſhould be a great Tranſgreſſor if he did not obey it; But in the latter ſenſe, if any thing what is commanded be unjuſt, that is not only grievous to be born, but alſo ſhamefull to be done, and notwithſtanding it is done, the Sin lyes heavy on both, Firſt on the Magiſtrate who commanded an unjuſt thing, Secondly, on the Subject, who acted an unlawful one. The ſenſe of the Concluſion is this, Whereſoever the Law by its Command doth forbid any thing to be done which is ſo neceſſary that it cannot be omitted by the Subject without Sin, or whereſoever the Law doth Command any thing to be done which is ſo unlawful that i… cannot be put in execution without Sin, that Law doth not oblige in Conſcience.
IX. My firſt reaſon is,De jura. praelec. 2. Becauſe (as elſewhere I have fully explaned) there is no obligation for an unlawful Act. Sect. 13.Secondly (becauſe as there alſo I have expreſſed) the firſt Obligation doth prejudge the following; inſomuch that a new obligation contrary to the former cannot be ſuperinduced; Now any Law commanding a thing unlawful, as homicide, Perjury, Sacrilege, or forbidding a neceſſary duty, as the worſhip of the true God, or the performance of our Dutyes to our Prince or Parents &c. doth exact that of us which is contrary to our former obligation, by the vertue of which divine Precept we were before obliged; therefore that humane Law cannot induce any obligation on us; The third Reaſon is, Becauſe that no man can at the ſame time be obliged to Contradictories, but if that Law were obligatory, it would oblige to the performance of that thing which the Law of God at the ſame time doth oblige to the not performance of it; Now to do and not to do are Contradictories. The fourth Reaſon is deduced from the examples of godly men, who have been always ſo inſtructed by the principles of their Faith, that with a cheerfull ſpirit they have undertaken, and performed the grievous but not diſhoneſt Commands of the Emperours; But if any thing though by the authority of Law was required of them which was againſt Faith, or good manners, or any ways repugnant to common honeſty, they openly and couragiouſly did deny the Command, and for the fear of God deſpiſed all humane Laws, and inſtitutions. The Decree being made at Babylon, that the concent of muſick being heard, they all ſhould worſhip the great golden Image which the moſt mighty monarch had ſet up, and a moſt ſevere puniſhment threatned to thoſe who ſhould do otherwiſe, the three young men of the Hebrews would not ſuffer themſelves to be obliged by that Law; Dan. 3. Becauſe an unlawful thing, the worſhiping of an Idol, was commanded. In the Law again of the Perſians it being commanded, that no man for certain days ſhould make a Petition to any God or man for any thing but to the King of Perſians only, Daniel did not obey that Law, but as his Cuſtom was, at his ſet houres he prayed unto God, Dan. 16. And Peter and John being forbidden to ſpeak any more in the Name of Jeſus, they not only diſobeyed the Command; but confidently anſwered; Whether it be right in the ſight of God to obey you rather than God judge yee. Acts. 4. The Reaſon indeed was, becauſe the things that were forbidden were neceſſary, viz. The worſhip of the true God, and the preaching of the Goſpel committed to their Chatge.
X. The ſecond Concluſion. The Law of man prohibiting a thing ſimply evil; as Theft, Adultery, Sacrilege, or commanding a thing good and neceſſary, as the worſhip of God, the diſcharge of Debts, the Honour of Parents, doth induce a new obligation in the Conſcience. My firſt reaſon is, becauſe the proper Cauſe being given, the neceſſary effect of it will follow, unleſs it be hindred by ſome other means; But an obligation is ſo neceſſary an effect of the Law, that ſome have thought that the very Name of the Law hath received its derivation from it, as already I have men…ioned; And nothing ſeems to be here aſſigned which may hinder the conſecution of its effect. The ſecond reaſon is a Minori ad majus, from the Leſs to the Greater. By the confeſſion of all men, a Law prohibiting a thing otherwiſe Lawful, or commanding a thing otherwiſe free doth oblige; therefore much more prohibiting a thing unlawful, or commanding a thing free. But ſomething there appears that may be objected to both theſe reaſons, viz. Non eſſe multiplicanda Entia ſine neceſſitate; Beings are not to be multipled without neceſſity; For every man by the power of the Divine Law being obliged to the performance of what is neceſſary, and the eſchewing of what is unlawful, the ſame obligation doth exclude that, which we think to obtain by humane Laws, as ſuperfluous, as water praeexiſtent in a full veſſel doth hinder the infuſion of new moyſture; And it ſeemes that two obligations to the ſame thing can no more be admitted in one Conſcience, than can two Accidents of the ſame Species in one Subject. To this I anſwer, that it is uſu…ly ſpoken, and indeed truly enough, Obligationem priorem praejudicare poſteriori, The former obligation doth prejudice and take place of the poſterior, which Argument we our ſelves have even now made uſe of for the confirmation of the former Concluſion; But this Saying hath place only amongſt thoſe obligations which are Deſtructive to one another, and whoſe effects have ſo great a Contrariety, and Repugnancy amongſt themſelves, that one being admitted, the other of neceſſity muſt be taken away; Notwithſtanding this doth not hinder, but that another and a new obligation may come unto the former, provided it be of the ſame reference, and can be conſiſtent with it. Neither, in this conſideration, is that of any moment as is alleged of water in a full veſſel, for the impediment why the full veſſel admits of no more liquor, doth not conſiſt in the part of the liquor, but proceeds from the incapacity of the veſſel, and the nature of the place, which cannot at once receive more bodies; And nothing hindreth but there may be many Accidents of the ſame Species in one and the ſame Subject, provided they be Relative and not Abſolute; as ſuppoſe that Socrates had ten Sons, there muſt be in Socrates ten Paternities, for relations are multiplied according to the multiplication of their Terms; And we ſaid but even now, that the Law did oblige according to the manner of the Term. Therefore ſeeing that every Law, according to the nature of it, and as it is a Law, is an Inductive to an obligation, there will be ſo many obligations as there are Lawes being correſpondent to them as to their Terms; Neither is this Multiplicare entia ſine neceſſitate, to multiply Beings without neceſſity, for the cauſes being multiplied, it is neceſſary that the effects of thoſe cauſes ſhould be multiplied alſo; And that it may ſeem incredible to none, we may behold it, or ſomething very like unto it, to come to paſſe every day, both in things natural and moral; It is evident to the ſenſe that a man may be tyed to a Pillar with two or three cords, as Peter. Acts, 12. 6. He ſlept foreign, bound with two chains; And it is to be doubted by none, but that a man having obliged himſelf to the performance of ſuch a duty which by the Law of God was incumbent on him, he (notwithſtanding that firſt obligation) may again oblige himſelf by Vow, or Oath, or Promiſe, to render that obligation the more effectual. Thus Jacob the Patriarch vowed that Jehovah ſhould be his only God, Gen. 28. 21. And David ſwore that he would keep the righteous Judgments of God, Pſal. 119. 106. And all of us who are Chriſtians, when we were ſprinkled at the Fount, did by a new Covenant of Baptiſm bind our ſelves to Faith in Chriſt, to renounce the Devill, the World, and the Fleſh, and to keep the commandements of God, to the performance of all which duties moſt ſure it is that we were obliged before.
XI. The third Concluſion. Humane Lawes (whether things unlawful, or neceſſary, or things indifferent be commanded) being made by a ſingle Perſon or by a Commonalty not having a lawful power, do not oblige in Conſcience. As if the Mayor of this City ſhould impoſe Laws on this Univerſity, or my next Neighbour ſhould command my ſervant to yoak my Oxen to bring in his harveſt, &c. Or as if a company of ſeditious Perſons being met in ſome one County of England (as they did heretofore under the conduct of Ket in Norfolk, and many times in other places) ſhould demand of the inhabitants a certain Sum of money, or ſhould publiſh Edicts to exact a ſervitude of their perſons not due unto them, and by force of Armes ſhould compel them to obedience, although it peradventure were lawful for them to do as they were commanded (it being found they were unable to make reſiſtance) yet certainly their commands ſhould oblige no man in Conſcience to the obſervation of them;Aquin. 1. 2. quaest. 96. art. 4. Firſt, becauſe the ſaid Laws are Laws only in name, and aequivocally; But in deed, and in earneſt they are rather violences than Laws, and an aequivocal Cauſe doth inferr no effect; as a ſentence ſpoken by one who is no Judge doth not oblige the Parties; And Secondly, Becauſe the Power of obliging (as already hath been mentioned) is not effectively derived from the Law it ſelf, but from a will joyning with the power of the Law-maker; therefore where Power is wanting, the Cauſe that is properly the efficient of that obligation is wanting alſo, and the proper Cauſe being defective, it is neceſſary that its Effect ſhould be deficient alſo; And this is eaſie to be collected by the words of the Apoſtle in this place, who deduceth the Duty of obedience on the part of the Subject from the Power of Juriſdiction in the Magiſtrate; from whence it is, no man is bound to obey him who hath not the Right of Commanding.
XII. If you ſhall object, that an un…uly multitude of factious perſons, ſuch as before I have made mention of, have the Power of Commanding, becauſe they can compel thoſe to the performance of their commands, over whom they exerciſe their Tyranny; I anſwer that the Power of which I ſpeak, and on which Obligation doth depend, is not that Power which the Greeks call foreign, that is Might or Puiſſance (which by moſt is uſed in this ſenſe) by which a man is potent to give ſuch an effect to his Intention that it finally cannot be hindered, but that Power, which the Greeks call foreign, that is a lawful Power, which cometh by ſome Right of Nature, or of Nations, or by a Civil Right, in reſpect both of the perſon who bears it, and of thoſe who are any wayes ſubſtituted under him. This Power in this preſent Argument the Apoſtle doth ſo much preſſe, that in the ſpace almoſt of three Verſes he names it five times, and makes not the leaſt mention of the other.
XIII. But you will allege, that thoſe, who in the time of the Apoſtles were the ſupreme Governors, did aſcend unto the height of the Empire, not by any Right of Inheritance, nor by the free Suffrages of the people, or any lawful Authority, but by Force and Treachery, or military Tumult, and yet the Apoſtle notwithſtanding doth expreſſly attribute an foreign, that is a lawful Authority to them, as unto legitimate Magiſtrates, and impoſeth on their Subjects a neceſſity of obeying them, and that not for fear of Puniſhment, but for Conſcience ſake. We muſt confeſſe indeed, that the firſt Emperors of Rome, after the everſion of the Common-wealth, did not attain unto the Empire by any great lawfulneſſe of Right, yet withall we muſt confeſs, that they were inveſted with the Right of the Sword, and a legitimate Juriſdiction, to which all whoſoever were under the Roman Power ought to be ſubject, for there was not then any ſingle perſon that could challenge it as due unto him by more Right, and the Senate, and People of Rome in whoſe Power not long before, and for many Ages alſo was the chief Command, what by fear, and what by obſequiouſneſs, did give way to the loſſe of their Privileges, and acknowledged thoſe for their lawful Princes, who had obtained the Empire by unlawful Acts. This being granted, which certainly in my opinion can no wayes be denyed, there can remain no other doubt concerning the neceſſity of obeying. But in a dubious caſe, what is the duty of a Chriſtian, whether and how far he is obliged in the Court of Conſcience to give way unto the Times, and to accommodate himſelf to the preſent manners, and be obedient to the Lawes, the Edicts, and the Commands of one who in his Judgment at leaſt hath attained to the Soveraignty de facto, that is by Power and by no Right at all, it is no eaſy thing to judge, neither is it the part of a wiſe man to determine any thing on ſo great, and ſo high a Point.
XIV. I here therefore do conclude on nothing poſitively; but that I may not be cenſured to be wanting in my duty, or at leaſt to your expectation, if I ſhould make mention of a Queſtion, and give you not the leaſt ſatisfaction in it, I will in a a few words expound unto you what ſeemeth to me (having been very ſerious hereupon) to be moſt conſentaneous to true reaſon, unleſs peradventure ſome circumſtances, as oftentimes it comes about in ſuch deliberations, ſhall grow too much upon my Judgment. In the firſt place therefore I ſay, That he who de facto is chief Magiſtrate in a City, or Nation, although he hath attained to that power by evil Arts, is neverthheleſs to be eſteemed by the Citizen as his lawful Prince, and by the obligation of his Conſcience he is accordingly bound to obey him, provided there be no juſt cauſe of any doubt to the contrary; And in this caſe, this ſeems to be the only and juſt cauſe of doubt, when moſt certainly it is manifeſt, or at leaſt when it ſeems very probable to the Citizen, that there is ſome other perſon to whom the chief power is due by greater right. If this be not ſo, the Citizen cannot in a good Conſcience refuſe the commands of the preſent Poſſeſſor; For ordinarily, it doth not belong unto a Citizen too curiouſly to enquire by what right the poſſeſſor doth poſſeſſe, it may ſuffice him for the ſecurity of his Conſcience that he doth poſſeſſe de facto, and there is no other man, at leaſt ſo far as he knows, who ought by right to poſſeſſe that place; And beſides that which I have already ſpoken concerning the Roman Emperors, the Government of that Common-wealth being ſubverted; to this the whole Hiſtory almoſt of all the Kings of Iſrael doth pertain, many of whom relyiug not ſo much as on the leaſt ſhaddow of Right, but having obtained the Kingdom by unjuſt Arms, and nefarious wickedneſſe (the Royal off-ſpring of their Predeceſſors being utterly extinguiſhed, that not one of them might remain to ſucceed in their Fathers Dignities) did aſcend the Royal Throne, and governed the Kingdom, by a full and as it were a proper Power, and the people rendred obedience to them no otherwiſe than if they had been inveſted in it by the greateſt right; Neither do we find that the people were ever blamed for it, But right reaſon rather perſwaded that it ſo ought to be done; For it concerned the publick ſafety, that there ſhould be one who ſhould ſit at the Helm of Government, and it could not otherwiſe be better provided for the affairs of his people, and himſelf, than that he ſhould be eſteemed to have the greateſt right, who as a true poſſeſſor had no right at all; And by the Law of Nations, thoſe things which belong to none, do paſſe into the right of the preſent poſſeſſors of them.
XV. In the ſecond place I ſay, That in an Hereditary Kingdom, where the right is doubtful betwixt two or more Competitors, it is the part of a good Citizen whiles the contention is yet depending, and the right to be deſcerned by a friendly treaty, or by war, to obey him as his lawful Prince who is in preſent poſſeſſion of the Soveraign command. Of this Hiſtories can every where afford us very many examples; amongſt thoſe which are moſt remarkable, are the many differences which happened amongſt the competitors of the Kingdom of Portugall after the death of King Sebaſtian; And the ſix conteſtations at leaſt for the Kingdom of Scotland after the death of Alexander the King; And the moſt fierce and laſting contention for the Government of the Engliſh Nation between the moſt noble families of York and Lancaſter; Moſt certain it is, by the conſent of all nations throughout the world, that the Law did alwayes favour the Perſon poſſeſſing; And in theſe Caſes that remarkable ſaying of the Civilians always prevailed, In rebus dubiis melior eſt conditio poſſidentis, In doubtful things the condition of the Poſſeſſor is always the better.
XVI. But again, the lawful Prince and Heir of the Kingdom being forced away by the Power of Arms, or being ſo oppreſſed that he cannot proſecute his own Right, If any perſon whatſoever (the ſaid Prince yet living) ſhall violently take into his own hands the Reigns of Government, and deport himſelf as a King, when he is more truly an Uſurper, ſo that now it is no longer a doubtful right, but an open injury; If you demand of me what a good Ci…zen ſhall do in this condition, who peradventure hath taken the Oath of Allegiance in the b…hal… of his lawfull Prince, or if he hath not, yet he is no leſſe indutyed to him, than if he had taken it, I ſay in the third place, that a good Citizen may not only lawfuly obey the Laws of him who Governs de facto, and not de jure, that is, by preſent power, and not by right, and perform all his commands (provided there be nothing in them that is uniuſt, or foul,) but according to the condition of humane affairs, there may be ſuch an exigence of neceſſity (as oftentimes it ſo comes to paſſe) that he may be adjudged to fail even in his duty, if he doth not do it. It may be objected, that but even now it was ſaid, that Laws made by one who hath no lawful power do not oblige in Conſcience; It was ſo ſaid indeed, and it was truly ſaid ſo, and I believe what I have now propoſed is not repugnant to it; For ſuppoſe that a Subject be obliged to perform what by the Law is forbidden, yet he is not bound to the Law, but to himſelf and to his Country. The obligation is annexed to that Law which is truly ſo of it ſelf, & as it is a Law, and it neceſſarily followeth it, as the Effect followeth its Cauſe. We have already ſaid, that a Law made by one who hath no right unto the Government is not a Law properly but aequivocally, & therfore hath no power to oblige; Therefore whatſoever obligation doth from hence appear to charge the Conſcience of the Subject, doth ariſe from another account, and not from the Law it ſelf to whom this obligation comes extrinſecally and only by accident, as if a profeſſor of Muſick ſhould act the part of a Maſon.
XVII. You will demand, If not from the Law, from whence then proceedeth this obligation of the Subject? I anſwer; It being the part of a pious and prudent man, not only to attend on that which is lawful, but alſo to obſerve what becometh himſelf, and is expedient for others; A good Citizen may be obliged to do that for the advantage of himſelf, and his fellow-Citizens, to the performance whereof he is not upon any account, or by any right obliged. For this obligation doth ariſe from that double part of duty, by which every man is a debtor to himſelf, and a debtor to his Country; In the firſt place it belongs to a prudent man to provide for himſelf, and for his own affairs, and it belongs to an honeſt man to conſider in what preſent condition he is; For no man will deny, even by the Dictates of Nature, but that all muſt endeavour by all lawful ways and means, to defend their lively-hood, and themſelves, and ſo to deport themſelves, that they may live ſafely, and in peace, to have and to hold to themſelves their own Fields, Houſes, and poſſeſſions, and be careful not to offend thoſe who at their pleaſure can take from them both their lives and their fortunes; And from hence is the firſt neceſſity of obedience, which our Apoſtle therefore doth not ſo much urge as ſuppoſe, becauſe that every man is endued with the ſenſe thereof by Nature;Rom. 13. 5. foreign, not only for wrath, as if it were not the part of a diſcreet man raſhly to provoke his wrath who hath the power of the Sword in his own hand, and by his contumacy to incurre his diſpleaſure upon no occaſion; It ſhould become him for the advantage of his own ſafety, to endure many affronts, to obey Laws, and as much as can be without Sin, foreign, to ſubmit to the preſent powers; and thus, though he cannot ſhake off the yoak, yet by well enduring it, to make it more gentle, and more eaſy.
XVIII. But he whoſoever he is who from a Politick Government ſhall diligently obſerve with himſelf what good from thence may be derived to his Country, ſhall find himſelf bound to the performance of this, with another, and a ſtronger obligation, and which more properly pertaineth to the Conſcience; and ſo indeed St. Chryſoſtome in this place doth interpret thoſe words of the Apoſtle foreign, as if the Apoſtle chiefly attended to the benefit received by that protection which a Civil Government conveyeth to the Subject; As if he ſhould have ſaid, Seeing that every Citizen is conſcious to himſelf how many benefits he doth enjoy under a politick Government, he muſt know, that for the requital of ſo many and ſo great favours, he is bound by a certain Law of gratitude to pay due obedience to him who is inveſted with the higheſt Authority, foreign, as Chryſoſtome there ſpeaks in a ſenſe not much incommodous, … unſuitable to the meaning of the Apoſtle, as by … by we ſhall repreſent unto you; I acknowl…dge the truth of that which by Tacitus is obſerved, Raro fieri ut quis imperium flagitio quaeſitum bonis artibus exerceat; It ſeldom comes to paſſe, that any man with good Arts doth exerciſe the ruling of an Empire which he hath obtained with wicked artifices, for with what Arts that Empires have been gained, by the ſame for the moſt part they are preſerved, and wickedneſs is to be defended by wickedneſſe; Nevertheleſſe that it may be done, the examples of Hiero the Sicilian, and of Edgar King of England, and of many others do ſufficiently declare, who modeſtly have mannaged the Government of a Nation which not ſo rightly they had obtained; But howſoever a Prince doth mannage his affairs, he can never ſo abuſe his power, as … in the mean time to be foreign, the Miniſter of God, for good, as the Apoſtle …aketh in the fourth verſe of that Chapter; for there cannot be ſo great a Tyranny which doth not retain ſome ſhew of a juſt Government, and doth not, at leaſt a little, conduce to maintain the ſociety of men, as Calvin rightly on this Text obſerveth it. Seeing therefore that we are Maſters of our own Eſtates, and do live ſafe from ſlaughter, and rapine, & ſeeing that even that we live is a Debt we do owe to the chief Powers (without which there would be no defence or remedy againſt the luſts, fury, and injuries of wicked perſons) a moſt reaſonable and righteous thing it is, that at leaſt we ſhould return ſomthing for ſo many benefits. The old form of Trafficking (an excellent Law of good and right) doth exact the ſame of us, foreign, Give ſomething, and take ſomething; And certainly it argueth a moſt perverſe mind, to be willing to live under the protection of his Government whom you are unwilling to obey, and to refuſe his commands, under the umbrage of whoſe patronage you do find your ſafety.
XIX. Moreover, ſince no man is born only for himſelf, but for publick profit, and for mankind in general, there ariſeth from hence a third neceſſity of obeying the preſent power, although it hath been procured by never ſuch indirect means. From hence alſo it may in ſome manner appear what meaſure, and what bounds are to be given to that obedience which by the duty of Conſcience is to be given to him who uniuſtly ſits in the throne of ſupremacy; For whatſoever is to be done in a peculiar reference to its end, ought ſo to be done, as ſhall appear moſt neceſſary and profitable for the obtaining of that end; Now the end of Civil Government and of the obedience due unto it, is the tranquillity and ſafety of Humane ſociety; As far therefore as the peace and ſafety of that ſociety of which that Citizen is a Member doth require, ſo far he is bound to obey the commands of that perſon, who de facto is the chief Magiſtrate in that ſociety. Now for the preſervation of Humane ſocieties there are three things very neceſſary; The firſt, the defence of our Country againſt all Forein force, and endeavours of our Enemies. Secondly, the adminiſtration of right, that due rewards may be given to deſerving Citizens, and puniſhments to the bad which is the office of diſtributive Juſtice. Thirdly, the care of Commerce, and Merchandize, concerning buying, ſelling, exchangeing, and all manner of contracts, which belongs unto Juſtice Commutative; In theſe three the ſafety of mankind is ſo contained, that unleſs they be executed, it cannot be but all things preſently will run to ruine, all things and all places will be filled with Plunder, Slaughter, Deceit and Injuries, the lives of the moſt innocent Citizens, their Wives and Fortunes will become a prey, and a ſport unto the luſts of our armed Superiours; to prevent which calamity, and that the petulancy of wicked men may timely be reſtrained, the only remedy is for good Citizens to remember that it belongs unto them in all things pertaining to the publick ſafety, to be obedient to their Laws, and Commands, by whoſe Sword, & authority they are defended from the injuries & the violence of the Spoylers.
XX. But that no man may give a falſe interpretation to what here is ſpoken, they are to pay only ſuch an obedience, that at the ſame time they are to remember, that they are no further obliged to it, than either the account of gratitude, or the ſafety of the publick do require; And the Laws of an Uſurper are to be obſerved, not as obligatory by any right of the Commander,1. a 2. ae. quaeſt. 96. art. 4. but as Aquinas rightly hath it, to avoid offence, and the trouble of the Common-wealth. In which caſe he ſaith we ought to depart from our own right, and he proves it out of the words of Chriſt, Mat. 5. 40, 41. Ei qui vult tecum litigare, et tunicam tuam capere, dimitte et pallium, Et qui te angariabit ad miliare unum, abi cum eo duo, If any man will ſue thee at the Law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak alſo; And whoſoever ſhall compell thee to go a mile, go with him twayn. A man therefore may, and if occaſion ſo requires, he ought to depart from his own right for his own peace, but much more for the publick tranquillity, and obey him who hath no lawful power to command; But above all he muſt have this Reſerve, ſo to depart from his own right, that by ſo doing, he taketh not any thing away from the right of another; And Abraham in this did juſtly and wiſely, Gen. 14. who though he made the King of Sodom partaker of the ſpoils which by the right of war was his portion from the five Kings that were overthrown, yet he cautelouſly provided, that both the Prieſt ſhould have his Tenths, and his three Aſſociates in the War ſhould not want of their full proportions. In the like manner obedience is ſo to be payed to an Uſurper, that the fidelity due unto the lawful Heir be no ways violated, and that his right ſuffers no prejudice by it.
XXI. But it may be objected; How can this be done? That which is grateful to an Uſurper cannot but be moſt ungrateful to the lawful Prince? No man can ſerve two Maſters that look ſo contrary, all whoſe Votes,Mat. …. Studies and Counſels are violently carryed on to the ruine and deſtruction of one another. I anſwer, the account being well computed, there is no reaſon that we ſhould think that this obſequiouſneſs of the Citizen, ſo ordered, and bounded, as we before have delivered, ſhould be unpleaſing to the lawful Prince, but altogether to the U…urper; nay we may preſume that with the conſent of the true Prince himſelf, it ought to be ſo; For by this obedience the Citizen is not to be accounted to have aſſiſted ſo much the unjuſt Poſſeſſor as the whole Commonalty, or Republick, the ſafety whereof doth no leſſe concen the true Heir, than the unjuſt Poſſeſſor: Nay peradventure much more; becauſe being the true Father of his Country he is to be believed to love it ſincerely, & to wiſh it more happineſſe, than the other, who (having excluded him) hath thruſt himſelf into his houſe, and hath excerciſed a command over his Family; and by how much the affections of a Mother to her Children are more pure, & vehement, than a Step-mothers, as may appear by that remarkable conteſtation of the two Harlots before Solomon, the true Mother who knew the Child to be her own deſiring the ſafety of it, and that it ſhould be given rather to another, nay, unto her Adverſary, than that it ſhould periſh by the Sword; ſo it is moſt likely, and it is to be preſumed▪ that the lawful Heir hath a greater care of the ſafety of his people (whom although for the preſent under the yoak of a Stranger, yet he doth acknowledge them to be his own, & hopeth well that in time they will prove profitable to him) than he who having newly uſurped the ſupreme Magiſtracy will be more careful, it is likely, to eſtabliſh his newly acquired Greatneſs, than to procure the ſafety of the publick, and therefore the lawful Heir had rather that as modeſtly as they could they ſhould accommodate themſelves to the preſent affairs for their own ſafety, than to run into a certain deſtruction, by making an unſeaſonable, and an unſucceſsful oppoſition againſt one that overpowers them. And thus I have given you my opinion concerning this moſt difficult and high queſtion, determining poſſitively of nothing, but being ready, if any man ſhall render more certain reaſons, to correct what hath been ſpoken, and to jump in to the ſame Judgment with him.
XXII. The fourth Concluſion followeth, Humane Laws concerning things not unlawful, do by themſelves, and directly, in the general oblige the Conſcience. Which is as much as to ſay, This general precept, that Subjects ſhould obey humane Laws being duly made, is obligatory directly and by its ſelf; And this Calvin himſelf, who doth not uſe to attribute too much to humane conſtitutions, doth acknowledge, who in the 4 Inſtitute, 10. §. 5. doth adviſe that ſuch a diſtinction be made inter Genus et Speciem, betwixt the General, and the Special, that although it be denied that Laws in the Special do oblige the Conſcience, yet it muſt be granted, that they have an obliging power in the General. The reaſon is perſpicuous, for this general precept doth pertain to the eternal and Divine Law, every part whereof doth directly, and by it ſelf, and not only by conſequence, oblige our Conſciences. It pertains to the Law of God in a double reſpect; Firſt, Becauſe natural Reaſon dictates, that Peace and Order, which is the Soul of Common-wealths, and of all humane Societies, cannot be preſerved but by an Obedience to the Lawes, according to the ſolemn Conſtitution of them. Secondly, Becauſe that God in the Holy Scripture doth command us to be ſubject unto thoſe who are over us, in that Order as God hath appointed, and to obey foreign, he Higher Powers, as may appear in the firſt, and ſecond verſes of this Chapter, and not to draw back our necks from their yoaks, upon a bare pretext, that they are meet men,2 Pet. 2. 13. and Creatures ſuch as we are, foreign, the Sons of Adam, of the ſame …ace of mankind, and ſubject to the ſame Affections, Sufferings, In…irmities, and Caſualties as our ſelvs, but rather being mindful, that Almighty God by a delegated Power, did ſet them over us as his Vicegerents on Earth, and hath been pleaſed to vouchſafe them ſo much honour, as to communicate his own Name unto them as to ſo many viſible and mortal Gods,Pſal. 82. 6. I have ſaid you are Gods, we ſhould reverence, honour, and obey them with the greateſt Reverence, and though not for their own ſakes who are but men as we are, nor compoſed of better Clay, yet in reſpect to the Divine O…dination, who making them to b… Pr…nces, hath preferred them into a higher place abov… other men, and in ſome meaſure made them Partakers of his own Power, foreign, according to the Lord as the Apoſtle S…. Peter …n another place, and by conſequence foreign, …ccording unto Conſcience, as the Apoſtle S…. Paul hath it in this place.
XXIII. The fifth Concluſion. Humane Lawes, according to the ſolemn Conſtitution of them, doe oblige the… …ſcience, even in particular, and although not directly and by themſelves, yet by Conſequent, and by … of the general Divine Commandment. I ſay in the firſt place Lawes ſolemnly and rightly conſtituted, that is, both by reaſon of the efficient Cauſe, being made by him, who is indued with lawful Power▪ and by reaſon of the matter, commanding nothing unlawful, diſhoneſt, or filthy, or any wayes unworthy the Duty of a Chriſtian; For we already have aſſerted, that the Lawes which do offend in either of thoſe two ſenſes, are not obligatory. I ſay in the ſecond place, In the particular, that is, to a particular Determination, in things of a middle Nature, and in others; As what, and how much tribute is to be paid; What merchandiſe is lawful, and what unlawful to be exported or to be imported in ſuch and ſuch a Country; What habits are ſuitable to ſuch and ſuch degrees in an Univerſity; What Statutes are diſpenſable, and what not, &c. I ſay in the third place, that ſuch Lawes doe not oblige by themſelves, and directly; I prove firſt becauſe, that God alone is that Law-maker, who hath a moſt peculiar and direct Command over the Conſciences of men. There is but one Law-giver, who is able to ſave and deſtroy, James 4. 12. In things of a middle nature, & which are indifferent (which for the moſt part are the ſubjects of humane Laws) we do ſuppoſe that God made no Law in particular, but left them all to the arbitration of thoſe who are his Vice-gerents on Earth. It is proved thus in the ſecond place, becauſe that thoſe things only do oblige directly, and by themſelves, which oblige by reaſon of the matter as of an internal Cauſe, without any reſpect to the external Cauſes, the Efficient and the Final, which would have obliged of themſelves, if they had not been commanded by Men; But things indifferent, and of a middle Nature, determined by a particular and poſitive humane Law, when they are ſo qualified in themſelves, that before the Determination of them, they may freely be made, or nor be made by any, they doe not oblige in reſpect of the matter, therefore not of themſelves. I ſay in the third place, that the ſame Lawes notwithſtanding doe oblige in particular by the Conſequent and by Vertue of the general Divine Commandement; And becauſe in this laſt poſition, the hindge of the whole controverſy is turned, I will more plainly propound the Concluſion, which by and by I will more fully confirm; The Concluſion is this, Poſitive humane Laws being rightly and lawfully conſtituted, which contain particular determinations concerning things of a middle Nature and in themſelves indifferent, and which before they are determined are free to be made, or to be unmade, do by the vertue of of the Divine Commandement (by which we are bound to obey thoſe who are ſet over us by God) ſo oblige the Conſciences of the Subjects to perform obedience to them, that they are bound under the pena…ty of mo…tal Sin, and the fear of Gods diſpleaſure, to give obedience to the ſaid Laws, and if they ſhall fail in the performance thereof, they ſhall endure the checks and ſ…ings of their accuſing Cōſciences.
XXIV. This Concluſion is confirmed by divers Reaſons, the firſt whereof is taken from this preſent Text, we muſt therefore be ſubjected, not only for wrath, but for Conſcience ſake. The words in themſelves are perſpicuous enough; In the former verſes the Apoſtle had largely inſiſted upon the neceſſity of Chriſtian Subjection, which he urged chiefly by two Arguments, the one from the Inſtitution, and the Ordination of God, in the two firſt verſes, and the other from the fear of the Puniſhment of man, in the two verſes following; In the way of recapitulation he briefly recollecteth either Argument, and repeateth them in this fifth verſe, and (as it is very uſual in the Scripture) in an order inverted, beginning the repetition from the latter, and the next member; As if he ſhould have ſaid, A great neceſſity of Obedience doth lye upon you in both reſpects, whether the fear of puniſhment may deterr you, or the Conſcience of the Duty may incite you; If you deſpiſe the Power and Authority of the Lawes, and do evil, conſider with your ſelves, that the Magiſtrate who is ſet over you is the Miniſter of God, the Revenger of your neglected Duty, and ready to draw the Sword (with which God hath intruſted him) to inflict a corporal puniſhment due to the deſpiſers of his Lawes. But if theſe things move you not, being deluded by a vain hope to find out one ſubterfuge or another to eſcape the force of his Arm, yet think on God the juſt Remembrancer of a…l Acts committed, whether they be good or evil, ſtand in awe of him as of a juſt Judge, Fear your own Conſciences, thoſe ſevere accuſers, thoſe faithful witneſſes, and importunate Tormentors; you cannot avoid them by any Artifices, not elude them by any Inventions. From the ſcope of this place, the Argument is thus framed; Thoſe things, which being violated, do leave a Remorſe upon the Conſcience, do oblige the Conſcience, for ſo it muſt neceſſarily be, that all remorſe or reproof of Conſcience muſt proceed from the ſenſe of ſome obligation, as all other effects do follow their cauſes; but humane Laws being violated, do leave a remorſe upon the Conſcience, for that is the expre…e ſenſe of thoſe words in the Text, Neceſſe eſt ſubjici propter Conſcientiam, You muſt of neceſſity be ſubject for Conſcience ſake, you cannot keep your Conſciences upright, and ſafe, unleſſe you be ſubjected; Therefore humane Laws do oblige the Conſcience.
XXV. But ſome there are who to un-nerve the force of this Argument, do in this place give another Interpretation unto Conſcience, and chiefly herein they defend themſelves by the Authority of Chryſoſtome, as if no, other Conſcience was to be underſtood in this place, but a Conſcience only of benefits which is derived unto Subjects from the Political Government; I have made mention of this heretofore, and prayſed it; for the ſenſe, I confeſſe, is pious, though not ſo genuine; And I have thus much againſt it; For in the firſt place amongſt the Ancients Chyſoſtome is ſingular in this Interpretation, whom hardly one or two amongſt ſo many Interpreters have followed, Theophy…act only, and Oecumenius excepted, Who are not to be reputed in the number of witneſſes, for they ſo tread in the footſteps of Chryſoſtome, that all three of them do make only but one witneſſe. Secondly, No place can be aleged in the Scripture, in which either St. Paul, or any other of the Apoſtles have made uſe of the word Conſcience, in that ſenſe as Chryſostome here doth feign unto himſelf. Thirdly, the Apoſtle in this place (as it is very manifeſt) would induce ſomething which ſhould be of more moment, and more effectual to ſtir up the minds of men than temporal puniſhment; for which end it was better to affright them with the fear of the Divine anger, than to admoniſh them of any benefits received from men. Fourthly and laſtly, the Apoſtle here in a ſhort repetition of thoſe reaſons before alleged, would conclude his diſcourſe of Chriſtian Subjection; now in the two firſt Verſes of this Chapter he did bring the reaſon, not from the Conſcience of the benefit, but of the duty.
XXVI. The ſecond reaſon followeth, from the uſe and the end of the Laws; It being moſt neceſſary that they ſhould be made and obſerved, for the preſervation of humane ſocieties in peace, and publick tranquillity, for otherwiſe there would be no certain rule of Contracts, no meaſure of Faith, and Civil Juſtice, which are the firmeſt bands of Cities, and ſocieties; for the natural, and the written Law of God, although both of them by themſelves are moſt perfect in their own kind, and being joyned do contain the particular Principles of ſupernatural faith, and the general Principles of things to be done, accommodated to all parts of life, yet neither of them doth deſcend to all thoſe particulars, which either may be, or for the moſt part are neceſſary for the preſervation of Peace and Order, in Cities, and Governments. For examples ſake, the Law of reaſon, which is the ſame with the Law of Nature doth dictate, and the Scripture alſo in the next verſe of this Chapter doth teach, that Tribute is to be paid for the maintainence of Princes, and of the charges of Wars, and other publick uſes, but unleſſe it be by a L…w determined, how much is to be payed, and by what proportion, and by whom, and in what ſpace of time, and other circumſtances, either th… payment will miſcarry, or not be made timely enough, or elſe it will not be enough for the uſe; of the Common-wealth; If you ſay, that by this▪ Argument the neceſſity of Laws is proved indeed, but the obligation of them is not determined, for Subjects may be enforced to their duties by the … nunciation of puniſhments; We confeſſe indeed the truth of this, if we ſhould go no higher, but it furthermore we ſhall conſider without ſelves how headlong man is burryed to forbidden ſins, and how bold to venture through them all, & how … a Keeper Fear, is of Duty, unleſſe that withall there be ſome ſenſe of Religion to contain men in their duties, it will moſt eaſily appear how wiſely▪ Almighty God, the moſt prudent Moderator of all things, hath provided for the affairs of men, who hath endued their Conſciences with a certain religious reverence to the Law, which doth grow up together with their uſe of Reaſon: From hence it comes to paſſe, that amongſt the Heath… ignorant of the true God, there were ſcarce any one found of the antient Legiſlators but pretended to the people, that the Laws which …e made were delivered to him by ſome God; to … need not give you the names of … Lycu…gus, and many others who… the …; duplicate page duplicate page make mention of, it being a truth ſo well known to all.
XXVII. The third argument is this; What is to be done for the Lord, we are bound in Conſcience to the performance of it; But we are bound to be ſubject to Humane Laws rightly eſtabliſhed (that is, ſo conſtituted by the ſupreme power, or by others receiving their Authority from it) for the Lord, … Pet. 2. 13. Be ſubject to every Ordinance of man for the Lords ſake, whether it be to the King, foreign, as the Supreme (which ſufficiently expounds the meaning of St. Paul foreign, the Higher Powers, in the firſt verſe of … Chapter) or unto Governours, as unto them that are ſent by him, &c. And that theſe words foreign, For the Lord, or for the Love of God (as the French Tranſlation hath it) doth imply the obligation of Conſcience, is manifeſt in the firſt place by the uſe of the ſame expreſſions in other places of the Scripture, as Eph. 6. 1. where ſpeaking of the Duty of Children towards their Parents, the words of the Text are, Liberi obedite Parentibus veſtris foreign, in Domino; Children obey your Parents in the Lord; And by the Duty of Servants to their Maſters, in the ſame Chapter v. 7. With good will foreign, ſerving the Lord and not men, which in the third of the Col. v. 23. is foreign, as to the Lord and not to Men, as if he ſhould ſay, For Conſcience and not for Wrath only, or for the fear of God, rather than the dread of Men. It is manifeſt, Secondly, from the following words in that place of St. Peter, foreign, for ſo is the will of God; And …o St. Paul in the ſaid ſixth chapter of the Epheſians, and the ſixth verſe, ſpeaking of the Duty of Servants, he exhorts them to obey their Maſters in the ſincerity of Heart foreign, doing the will of God from the Heart; Now the will of God is the very ſame Rule of Conſcience which I have ſaid to be the Rule Adaequate.
XXVIII. The fourth Argument; What Natural Reaſon doth ſo preſcribe to be done, that both the fault and the guilt of the fault are contracted, if it be not done, we are without all doubt obliged in Conſcience to the doing of it; For ſince the ſenſe of Sin pertaineth to the Conſcience, as alſo doth the fear of Puniſhment which ariſeth from it, whatſoever it is that the Mind rightly conceiveth doth induce the ſtain of a fault, and a guilt of puniſhment for that fault, it doth directly appertain to the obligation of the Conſcience; Now Natural Reaſon (whoſe Judgement cannot be indirect) doth ſo far command us to obey Humane Laws, that if that obedience be not performed, we are immediately conſcious to our ſelves, that it is meerly by our own fault that we fayl in that Duty.
XXIX. The fifth Argument; …he Violation of that which neceſſarily draweth along with it the Violation of the Laws of God, doth oblige the Conſcience (becauſe no man with a ſafe Conſcience can viol…te the Law of God which is the Rule of the Conſcience) but the violation of every particular Law ſolemnly conſtituted by Men, doth neceſſarily draw along with it the violation of the Law of God, to wit, of that General Commandment by which God commandeth obedience to the Magiſtrate; Therefore the ſaid Violation of the particular Law of Men doth oblige the Conſcience.
XXX. The ſixth Argument; We are bound in Conſcience not to Act that, which (if it were acted) is in a manner to reſiſt God himſelf; For we are bound to be ſubject, and to ſubmit our ſelves unto God, and therefore not to reſiſt him, for Subjection and Reſiſtance are contrary unto one another, neither can any Man at the ſame time, be ſubject unto, and reſiſt the ſame perſon; But not to obey Humane Laws ſolemnly conſtituted, is, interpretatively, to reſiſt God; For he who obeyeth not the Laws, doth diſobey the Legiſlative power of the Magiſtrate, which whoſoever he is that doth it (the ſaid power being ordained by God) he doth oppoſe himſelf againſt Gods Ordinance, and by Conſequence & interpretatively he doth oppoſe God himſelf, which is the Determination of St. Paul in the ſecond verſe of this chapter, and from whence he orderly concludes the neceſſity of Subjection foreign, …ccording to Conſcience, in this ve…ſe.
XXXI. From what hath been already ſpoken, it will be no great difficulty to anſwer to the Arguments which commonly are objected by the Adverſaries to this Truth: The firſt and chiefeſt whereof, is taken from Chriſtian Liberty, and to the Confirmation of it, many places of Scripture are alleged with much pomp & circumſtance, which ſeem to adſtipulate to that Liberty; And many are the objections wch. from hence do take their Riſe. They allege, it is written by St. Paul, 1 Cor. 7. 23. Yee are bought with a price, be yee not made the Servants of men; And ag…in Gal. 5. 6. Stand firm in that liberty in which Chriſt hath ſet you free, and be not intangled again with the yoak of bondage. And again Col. 2. 16. Let no man judge you in meat or drink &c. and other places to the ſame effect. They diſpu…e alſo that it is not likely that Chriſt at laſt ſhould have freed us ſo from the poſitive Laws of God himſelf, which were certainly moſt juſt, to leave us captivated under the ſlaviſh Bondage of the Laws of Men.
XXXII. I will anſwer to all theſe places, but I would have you firſt preadvertiſed, ſeeing that there are many Texts and heads of Chriſtian liberty, that we diligently do take heed not too raſhly to confound them, neither rudely and unskilfully to wreſt and cite thoſe places of Scripture which pertain to one kind of Liberty to another kind to which they do not belong; which tranſition to another kind is not only the perpetual and Solemn vice of the Antinomians, and the Anab…ptiſts, but of many others who would be eſteemed the Reformers of this age; and this as they often put in practice in other diſputations, ſo moſt eſpecially in thoſe where the debate is concerning the Rites of the Church; having thus preadmoniſhed you of their Errors, I now proceed to the ſolution of their Arguments. In that Text to the Corinthians the Apoſtle would exhort the faithful, that in whatſoever place God had conſtituted them, and with whatſoever gifts he had indued them, that contented in that Station they would modeſtly contain themſelves within their own limits, meaſuring themſelves by the gifts, and calling of God, and acordingly accommodate their lives and actions, whether they be ſervants or free, and not ſo inſlave and emancipate their Conſciences to the Judgment and command of any Man, as wholly to depend upon his Will and Opinion, but being mindfull that he is the ſervant of God, and of the Lord Jeſus, ſo to ſtudy to pleaſe men, and to be ſubſervient to their affections and commands, as to do nothing unworthy of a man who profeſſeth himſelf to be the Servant of God and Chriſt; And this being the certain ſenſe of the Apoſtle in that whole diſcourſe, we may moſt truly conclude from hence, that we ought not to be obedient to the pleaſures of Maſters, Parents, or Princes, or any Mortals whatſoever, if they command any thing to be done which is wicked, or unlawful, for inſtead of being the Servants of God, this were to make themſelves the Servants of Men; But he, who out of Conſcience doth obey the juſt, honeſt, and profitable Conſtitutions of Men, is ſo far from being thought, that he is therefore the Servant of Men, that by the two chiefeſt of the Apoſtles, he is expreſſely ſaid to ſerve the Lord God, and not Men. Eph. 6. 7. Col. 3. 23. and 1. Pet. 2. 16. In this Text, To ſerve the Lord and not Men, the particle of Negation (as uſually in other places) is taken comparatively, that is to ſay, rather God than Men, he ſerveth God for himſelf, and Men for God; He ſerveth Men, as he performeth what is commanded by them, and he ſerveth God, as he doth it out of the Conſcience of his Duty.
XXXIII. That other place to the Galathians is beſt of all to be underſtood by the whole ſcope of the Epiſtle; Some falſe Apoſtles in the Churches of Galatia, being either Jews, or Judaizing Chriſtians, did violently contend (contrary to the inſtitution of the Apoſtles in the Council at Jeruſalem) that the Gentiles newly converted to the Faith, ſhould not only be baptized but circumcized alſo; And thoſe Impoſtors, as their cuſtom is, under the pretence of piety, and a wicked diligence amongſt the credulous vulgar, did ſo wonderfully prevayl, that they had drawn many into ſo great an errour, that they thought they could never attain unto everlaſting happineſſe, unleſſe they ſuffered themſelves to be circumcized; The Spirit of the bleſſed Apoſtle not induring this wretched and growing Impoſture, doth inveigh againſt the groſſeneſſe of the error of it, with more than ordinary Indignation throughout the whole courſe almoſt of the Epiſtle; And amongſt other Arguments he admoniſheth the Galatians of that liberty, by which Chriſt after his comming did free his Church from the unprofitable burden and yoak of the Moſaick Ceremonies, and doth exhort them conſtanly to maintain the liberty obtained by the death of Chriſt, and not to ſtoop their necks again unto the yoak of ſlavery, which they ſhould altogether do, if they ſhould believe the ritual obſervation of the dead letter of the Law to be neceſſary. Now how incongruouſly this is by the Anabaptiſts applyed to the Laws of Men, profitable and neceſſary for the Commonwealth, from which the Scriptures do no where tell us that Chriſt hath freed us, he is wilfully blind that doth not diſcern it.
XXXIV. The third place taken out of the Epiſtle to the Coloſſians, doth not at all appertain to Humane Laws rightly conſtituted concerning things of a middle nature, but to the Doctrines of Impoſtors, who dogmatically propounded to the people of God ſome things to be neceſſary, which God never commanded (which was the Cuſtom of the Traditionary Phariſees, whom Chriſt Mat. 15. reprehends upon that account for making the Commandements of God of no effect by their Tradition) or clean contrary, they as dogmatically did forbid other things as unlawful, which God never did prohibit, injoyning the people as to ſuch, and ſuch things, Touch not, taſte not, handle not. The Apoſtle admoniſheth the Coloſſians to have a care of ſuch dogmatizing Teachers, and not ſuffer any ſnare to be thrown upon their Conſciences by theſe Impoſtors; Magiſtrates therefore in a political Government do not offend, who in things of a middle nature, do either command or prohibit any thing to the people for Profit, Honeſty, Decency, or for Orders ſake, but without any opinion of neceſſity on either ſide, which belongeth to the thing it ſelf that is commanded or forbidden; Thoſe pittiful Miniſters (I may more truly call them Magiſtrates, ſo Magiſterially they do pronounce all things do rather offend, who ſo importunately vex and inveigh againſt the harmleſſe Laws of Magiſtrates, and exerciſe a Tyranny o…er the Conſciences of the people, and whatſoever is diſtaſtful to them, is preſently condemned for Impiety, or at leaſt for Superſtition.
XXXV. That which in the fourth place they do allege, tha… becauſe Chriſt hath freed us from the poſitive Laws of God, therefore much more from the Laws of Men, is in many reſpects erroneous, and abſurd; For in the firſt place it is not truly ſaid, that Chriſt hath freed us from the poſitive Laws of God, by which we never were bound; For the poſitive Laws of God, or Men, do only oblige thoſe on whom they are impoſed; Now thoſe Laws of God which they call poſitive, and from which they would have us freed by the death of Chriſt, whether they be ritual or judicial were only impoſed on the Jews, but not on us who are Chriſtians. Again, where it is manifeſt what God would have done, it doth not belong to us by any collation of Comparatives too ſaucily to determine what ought to be done; Now it is manifeſt that God would have both, he would have that his poſitive Laws delivered to the Iſraelits by Moſes ſhould not oblige the Chriſtians, and that the Laws of men rightly and ſolemnly conſtituted by the Magiſtrates ſhould oblige the people under their Authority. Thirdly, If this Argument indeed were of any force, thoſe that make uſe of it do not obſerve, that by it they do not only take away the obligation, but altogether the uſe alſo of all humane Lawes; For Chriſt hath no otherwiſe freed us from the obligation of the Moſa…ck Laws, than ſo by taking away the uſe of them, that by us they are no more to be eſteemed as Laws. Therefore if in the ſame manner he would have us to be free from the obligation of humane Laws, it muſt of neceſſity follow, that he would have no humane Laws to be any longer extant amongſt us. So wild a propoſition is this of the Anabaptiſts and other fanatick perſons, neither is it admitted by themſelves who do propound it.
XXXVI. Again, they object that of Saint James, Chapter the fourth, there is but one Law-giver, to wit God and Chriſt, who is only Lord of the Conſcience; He is an invader thereof of Chriſts right, and thruſts himſelf into the Throne of God, whoſoever he is that aſſumeth unto himſelf a power of obliging the Conſciences of other men. I anſwer, There is indeed but one ſupreme Law-giver, who hath a direct and Soveraign command over the Conſciences of men, as by himſelf and by his own virtue and authority to oblige them, which Law-giver is God and Chriſt, as the Apoſtle hath it; But this hinders not, but that there may be other Law-givers of an inferiour order and degree, who by a power granted and derived to them from that ſupreme Lawgiver, have of themſelves a right of making Laws which may conſequently oblige the Conſcience; Juſt as a King who ſolely in his own Kingdom hath a peculiar Legiſlative power, yet notwithſtanding by his Charter he may give to ſome College or Corporation, a right of making Laws, which may oblige all the members of that body, not by their own power, but by the force of the royal Donation, and the Authority granted to them from the King; Our Univerſities (as you all know) are happy and rejoice in this privilege, that in a Legitimate Convocation they may make Laws which we call Statutes, and ordain puniſhments for Delinquents, and if it be expedient, they may abrogate again and cancel the ſame Statutes; Now there is no man of a ſober underſtanding who will conceive that the excerciſe of this power doth any wayes derogate from the Legiſlative right of the King, or can be any deceit, or prejudice unto it, unleſs it be extended beyond the limits of the Donation defined in the Charter; Nay it is rather an excellent, and a ſingular mark of the royal autocraſy, that the King hath not only the Legiſlative power himſelf, but that he can vouchſafe it unto others to be had and uſed, his own right being notwithſtanding ſafe and entire into himſelf.
XXXVII. The other objections relying on one & the ſame Foundation may be reſolved by one a and the ſame labour; I will briefly run them over. In the third place they object, that the Civil power is meerly temporal, & therefore belongeth not unto the Conſcience which is ſpiritual. Fourthly, the end of Humane Laws is the external peace of the Common-wealth, and not the internal peace of the Conſcience; therefore the Laws themſelves do only oblige the outward man, and not the Conſcience which lyeth within. Fifthly, the Magiſtrate cannot judge of Conſciences, and therefore can make no Laws over them, it being the ſame extent of power, to give Laws, and to judge according to them. Sixtly, the Magiſtrate in making of Laws hath no intention of binding the Conſciences of the people, but only to oblige them to perform that which the Law commandeth, which if it be done, it is all one to the profit of the Commonwealth, whether it be done out of any Conſcience of duty or not, and it is enough if the effects of Actions be commenſurated to the intention of the Agents, and they ought not further to be extended.
XXXVIII. I anſwer, and firſt univerſally to them all; By all theſe Arguments, this only is obtained, that humane Laws do not oblige directly and by themſelves, or by their proper force, which of our own accord we grant; for we aſſert no other obligation but what comes to them ex conſequenti, by Conſequence, and by the virtue of the general command of God of rendring obedience to the higher powers; And from this ground, I anſwer to the particular objections; And as the to third, I ſay, that the Civil power being meerly temporal, cannot of it ſelf, and in reſpect of the Object in which properly and immediately it verſeth, have a ſpiritual effect, and therefore of it ſelf cannot induce a ſpiritual obligation; nevertheleſſe by conſequence it may have a ſpiritual effect, by a derivation from the power of ſome ſuperiour cauſe, in the virtue whereof it worketh; Now every Magiſtrate, as long as rightly and d…ely he doth exerciſe the Legiſlative Power which God hath put into his hands; he worketh in the virtue of God himſelf, and by ordination of him who is himſelf a Spirit, and as the Lord and Father of Spirits hath a Command over the Spirits of men.
XXXIX. I anſwer to the fourth; that although peace be an external bleſſing of a Commonalty, yet the internal Conſcience is obliged to the uttermoſt to the procuring and preſerving of it by all lawful and honeſt means, becauſe that God the Lord of Conſcience hath commanded us to love and follow peace, and if private, certainly much more publick peace. Neither is it any way inconſiſtent, that although Conſcience be internal, yet it is obliged to a thing external; for the obligation of Conſcience doth not ariſe from the Nature, or any condition of the thing or Object into which it is carryed, but from the will of him who hath the right of obliging, that is God himſelf.
XL. I anſwer to the fifth; that the Legiſlative and Judicial power doth originally pertain to the ſame perſon, that is, to him who hath the ſupreme juriſdiction over the Subjects; nevertheleſs diſpenſatively and by the will of the ſupreme Magiſtrate it may both of them and both ways be adminiſtred by other perſons, as he ſhall think expedient. Therefore although God alone hath in himſelf a peculiar power over the Conſciences of the Creature, and maketh as well as judgeth Laws by an original, proper, and abſolute right, yet according to his good pleaſure he may either delegate a diſpenſation of either power to another, or he may reſerve it to himſelf; Therefore it would not be abſurd if any man ſhould grant that God in ſome meaſure hath delegated a Legiſlative power to the Magiſtrate of obliging Conſciences, but hath reſerved the Judicial power over them entire unto himſelf; But there is no neceſſity that compelleth us to grant …, or to uſe any expreſſions that may be helped although by never ſo gentle an interpretation; For we do not ſay this, that God hath given to the Magiſtrate a power to oblige by his Laws the Conſciences of thoſe that be under him, but this rather (which is a more wary and a more commodiou… kind of ſpeaking) that God hath given to the Magiſtrate a power of making Laws, which (but by the only Authority of God himſelf) do oblige the Conſciences of his Subjects; For to ſpeak properly, the Magiſtrate doth not oblige the Conſcience to obey the Law, but God obligeth the Conſcience to obey the Magiſtrate.
XL. And by this, a way is made for an … to the laſt objection. I do grant indeed … effects of Actions ought not to be extended … the intention of the Agents, nevertheleſs where there are more Agents ſubordinate there is … hindreth but that the effect may be extended beyond the intention of the inferiour Agent, provided it doth not exceed the Intention of the princip… Agent; As in the generation of a Monſter (which being but boyes we have learned from Ariſtotle) the effect, which is the production of the Monſter, is beſides the intention of the ſecond cauſe, or as they ſpeak it, of Nature natured, that is to ſay, of the perſon that begets or brings it forth, but it is not beſides the intention of the firſt Cauſe, or of Nature naturing, that is, Almighty God. Therefore although the Magiſtrate in the making of a Law hath no explicit intention of obliging the Conſciences, yet by inſtituting the Law, he doth inſtitute that, which by the intention, & ordination of God, hath an implicit force of obliging them, & which neceſſarily is conjoyned to him. And this may ſuffice to be ſpoken of the obligation of Humane Laws in general; I will ſhortly proceed to the Queſtions, or particular doubtful Caſes, if God ſhall permit, and my health be more conſtant to me.