Brief Account of One Suggestion of the Romanist, Chapter 1 · Section 2
SECT. II.
The pretended necessity of this course, in writing Controversies, founded on the certainty of his Faith. Begging the question. Examples of Jude, the Fathers, Elias, answered. Pretense of Charity. Meeknesse accused of inconfidence. The uncertainty of Protestants faith said to be confess'd. Their vertues, their special charge. His praises and rebukes, using of Greek and Testimonies.
1. HIS second Section is yet of severer concernment, recommended to the attentive consideration of the Reader, and undertakes to prove upon a fundamental ground (as if every ground were not fundamental) that this kind of writing, which I have hitherto accused in him, and he laboured to vindicate, is (not blamelesse, but) necessary in controversies about Faith, against the deemed adversaries thereof, and this ground of that necessity no other, than the certainty of faith it self, which certainly is founded in his way of universal Tradition.] And then ere we proceed any further, what will become of all Catholike Writers, dead and living, which having not S. W's faculties, or temper, or being not aware of this necessity, have not so much as endeavoured to attain to this height of bitter zeal, which now appears to have been their duty? In this matter I must not admonish him of the other as severe denuntiations of Scripture, against those, who adde to the word of God, or teach for doctrines the commandements of men (which certainly he will be guilty of, who teaches and undertakes to demonstrate that to be necessary, which God hath never made so, especially if it be that, which God hath forbidden, as he hath all bitternesse and evil-speaking, Eph. IV. 31. commanding kindnesse, tender-heartednesse, &c. v. 32.) for I see he is fortified against such impressions, and the improsperous attempt will but exasperate, and conclude me again the greatest railer. Wherefore I shall only demand, whether since all Christian duties, righteousnesse and temperance, &c. are eminent branches of the Christian faith, as well as believing the judgement to come, &c. the acknowledging this his method to be necessary, and so duty, be any part of that certain faith, that hath this universal testification; whether all the Catholike world, if but for these last ten years, have said, they received from their forefathers as received from theirs, that contumelies are necessary to a Catholike Writer of controversies; for otherwise I hope, be the Faith never so certain, the means to propagate or propugne it, may be those prescribed by St. Paul to Bishop Timothy, gentlenesse, readinesse to teach, patience, 2 Tim. 2.24, 25.in meeknesse instructing those that oppose themselves, and so not contumelie, which is contrary to these. And let him not in his Answer deal with me, as Mr. White doth with Monsieur Dallee, p. 221. rebuking him for asking from St. Jerom, Whether it be a part of faith to visit the Holy Land, as if (saith he) et adorasse ubi steterunt pedes Domini pars fidei est,] signified truly that to exercise adoration were an Article of faith, than which what can be spoken more sencelessely, whereas, saith he, the true meaning is, that 'tis a duty of Faith.] Where truly I should have conceived, that a duty of faith was a part of faith, though not such as we vulgarly call Articles, and so I suppose now, and ask of a duty, not an Article, whether it have this universal testification, which all are supposed to have, which are truly duties, as well as those which are articles of Faith. This therefore I may be allowed to have ask'd in passing, because this Section is such, as will not afford any store of matter for debate, how demurely soever he hath offer'd and recommended it to our attentive considerations.
2. I shall shortly reduce it to these heads, concerning 1. the deemed or believed certainty of S. W's faith. 2. The one ground of that, universal Tradition, together with the notion in which he understands that phrase. 3. The duty consequent to this, of using the means and wayes, which wit and art can invent to confute, and discredit his adversaries harmfull sophistry, and disparage his authority, as far as truth can justifie his words. 4, The deemed uncertainty of their faith, who rely on any other but this one deemed certain Rule, together with the obligation incumbent on them, and arising from the deemed uncertainty of their faith, to write without any great zeal, heat, or earnestnesse, which in them, saith he, can arise from nothing but passion and interest. 5. What he hath thought fit to adde concerning my person, abstracted from the cause.
3. For the first of these he is carefull himself to propose it under that cautious style of deemed certainty, foreseeing as he saith, that else the Doctor would mistake him (as his custom is) to begge the question, by supposing their faith certain.] But to this I make my demands, 1. Whether it be indeed, or possibly could be a mistake in the Doctor, contending with S. W. concerning the truth of his faith, to affirm that his supposing his faith certain, is the begging of the question? Might he not as well have said that the Doctor was apt (as his custome is) to mistake in affirming twice two to be four? For is not the supposing that certain, of which the question is whether it be true, as evidently the begging the question, as it is evident, that what is certain, is true, and more than true, true with the advantage of certainty? And is any common notion, or any axiome, or conclusion in the Mathematicks more evident than that? What semblance of truth then is there in suggesting, or intimating this to be a mistake in the Doctor? or how can his art, as he saith, bear him out in thus suggesting. 2. Doth S. W. mean to keep himself precisely from the guilt of this fallacy for the future? Is he so sensible of the unskilfulness of it, as seriously to disclaim having any more to do with it? Nay, hath he indeed by this early caution shut it out of this Section? or is it sufficient to fore-see crimes and then presently to rush into them? 'tis the begging of the question for him to suppose his faith certain, and is it not so also to suppose contumelies a lawfull means to defend a deemed truth, at the very time when we are in the debate, whether such means are not utterly unlawfull? This certainly he supposes at this time, for else 'tis not imaginable how the deemed certainty of his faith should found a necessity of his contumelies. That which is in it self lawfull, may by circumstances become necessary to some man, and so to S. W. but if it be in it self unlawfull, neither the deemed nor real certainty of their faith can make it lawfull, much lesse necessary. This then of its lawfulnesse, which cannot be founded in his deemed certainty, nor is endeavour'd here to be inferr'd either by that, or by any other medium, and yet is necessary to be supposed in that discourse, where the necessite is inferr'd from some circumstances, is no other than the begging of the question, for no doubt that is said to be begg'd, which is supposed, without all attempt of proof. And so visibly here is the lawfulnesse, though not the necessity, which yet also is uncapable of any solid proof, till the lawfulnesse be first proved. This is therefore that which I now charge as guilty of this fallacy (and not the deeming his faith certain) at the time when he so sollicitously averts it. And this is all I need say to the first point, his deemed certainty, being in charity as well as civility ready to allow him to deem or believe (whatsoever his grounds are) whatsoever he affirms himself to deem or believe. And I hope he will anon do as much for me, who believe my faith as certain, as he can his, and have one ground more to believe it, (as anon will appear) than I see he means to have.
3. To the second head also, the one ground, on which he is pleased to build his deemed certainty, that of universal Tradition, together with the notion in which he understands that phrase, the same which the Author of, and Apologist for Rushworths Dialogues hath of it, I have nothing to object in this place, knowing de facto that this is his ground, and allowing it as fit to support his deemed certainty, whil'st 'tis no more than deemed, as any other medium could be, for as long as he is granted to deem it, it matters not to our present debate, on what grounds he deems it. And indeed having first profess'd that he speaks now only of a deemed certainty, 'twas not needfull to adde at the same time upon what grounds he built it, the deeming being the onelyonly thing, on which the reason (insisted on in this Section) was founded, and not the real, or grounded certainty. What therefore he hath for several pages inlarged, on this Theme of the grounds of his deemed certainty, I should think inserted by another hand, and not by him that was so carefull to professe that he spake only of a deemed certainty, but that it is possible it might have another design, the amusing of the Reader, and the supplying some other vacuity in this reasoning, or the drawing of his adversary from the point in hand, to this other, wherein S. W. deemed himself more conversant; which motives have not prevailed on me so far to gratifie him in this place, (having allow'd another fitter season for it, in my next Chapter) as to forget my present Theme, and follow him through his whole field of Tradition, so wide and distant from it, and wherein so few others beside himself will be concern'd, himself having here told me, that few there are who have refined their understanding to this degree of discerningnesse, and that only the best (which in his opinion are not the greatest) sort of wits do as yet begin to own their reason so far.
4. For the third then (which alone is pertinent to the argument in hand) the necessity, and so duty consequent to this deemed certainty, of using the means and wayes which wit and art can invent to confute and discredit his adversaries harmfull Sophistry, and disparage his authority, as far as truth can justifie his words.] I shall bring it to a speedy issue by asking, Of what latitude is that phrase [the means and wayes that wit or art can invent?] Is it designed to take in, or not exclude all manner of means and wayes, that the most riotous wit, or forbidden arts can invent, or that the tropes of Rhetorick, or good managery of words (be they never so contumelious) can yield toward the mention'd end, that of discrediting the adversary, &c. only with that one restraint as far as truth can justifie his words? or is it no further to be inlarged, then all other Christian rules, as well as that one of truth, permit one private man to treat another? If he take it in the second sense, I grant it, and he hath gained nothing by it, for I willingly yield him the freest exercise of the nimblest wit, and all lawfull arts, to discover, and so discredit any weaknesse in my defenses, but think not a multitude of contumelies to be any of those lawfull, no nor so much as proper means toward that end, being only a cloud cast before the eyes of the Reader, to hinder his discerning any difference betwixt true, and pretended discoveries, betwixt boasts and victories. But if his indefinite words [the means and wayes] must be more largely extended in the first sense, I then deny that the greatest justice of a cause, be it a deemed, or a real certainty, can convert any the least or greatest sin into duty, christianize or consecrate contumely, though it should not have calumny joyned with it; and I hope I shall have no need of proving what is thus obvious, when the more excellent the cause is, the more it abhors and deems it self defamed and polluted by whatever unlawfull arts, and can no more justifie any one of them, than either want, or be gratified with them; Si malo religionem defendere velis, jam non defendetur illo, sed polluetur, atque violabitur, saith Lactantius. If you will defend religion by any thing that is evill, you shall not defend, but pollute and violate it. Should I endeavour to assist this evident truth, it would by others, as well as S. W. be call'd preaching.
5. This ambiguity then of his words being removed, there remains no kind of difficully in the whole Section, as far as concerns the argumentative part, the conclusion which the deemed certainty of his faith was obliged and undertook to inferre; the whole question being, not whether any, or all lawfull arts are to be used, but whether the cause, whatsoever, or how certain soever it be deemed to be, can render any one unlawfull means, by name contumely, lawfull; which unlesse it can, 'tis certain it cannot on this account become necessary. Here then the one condition of restraint which he takes care to adde [as far as truth can justifie his words, and If his Adversary be found to deserve it, and the like] will avail him nothing, 1. Because he is not the judge of the truth of that which he endeavours to disprove, nor of the deserts of him whom he thinks himself obliged to disparage. The Disputant must prove, and the Replyant defend, but neither assume the office of judging, but leave that to the Reader only, and till that judgement be past, 'tis not yet his time to deal with his Adversary as his captive, to lead him in triumph, to represent him, as he saith, ridicul…us, nonsensical, weak, blasphemous, &c. every of which, as far as they want in truth, abound in calumnie, and must not be supposed to have truth, whilest they are contested to have none, and no judgement is yet pass'd between the litigants, but what one of them, who must be supposed partial, gives in his own favour. Nor will the deemed certainty of his own faith (the one medium of this Section) herein assist him, 1. Because a deemed certainty inferres not a real truth, and to suppose that without proof in time of arguing, is the begging of the question. 2. Because the, whether deemed, or real, certainty of his faith concludes not the truth of every discourse which he can make use of, to demonstrate that certainty; Truth hath oft-times been ill defended, and so still, notwithstanding the certainty in the main, the weaknesse in the retail may be as probably on his side, who chargeth his adversary of weaknesse, and in some respects more probably, on this prejudice, that he already appears so weak, as to mistake his businesse, to fly to indirect means, to endeavour to forestall the Readers judgement, to vaunt of his feats, all which are the effects and known symptomes of weaknesse.
5. Secondly, as I said, this restraint pretends only to guard him from calumny, and there be other sins of the tongue and pen beside that. He knowes, I must instance in contumely, for though every calumny be a contumely also, and most contumelies have somewhat of falsity, and so calumny in them, and I doubt not to prove, that every one which I have received from S. W. is of this sort, yet I have that respect to ordinary style, and that reverence to our Saviour, Mat. V. 21, 22. who referres contumelies [Racha, and thou fool] to the sixt Commandment of the Decalogue, as to discriminate them from calumnies, which undoubtedly are forbidden in the ninth. And indeed he that shall bestow either of those titles on his fellow Christian, and then adde, that he hath said no more than is truth, or then he deserves, is so far from lessening, that he cannot use any surer means to inhanse and multiply the contumely. Thus far is S. W's one restraint from justifying the practises, which his wit or art have suggested to him.
6. As for his examples of Jude to the Gnosticks, of the Fathers to Porphyrie the enemy and derider of Christianity, and Elias's scoffing the Priests of Baal] 1. The deemed certainty of his faith, the one medium in his present argument, is not sufficient to complete the parallel between them and me, the utmost that principle can assist or authorise him to deem of me, is, that I deny some few things to be true, which he deems certain, but neither that I deifie Simon Magus, nor deny Christ to have come in the flesh, nor offer sacrifice to Idols, nor joyn with the Jewes to persecute the Christians, nor forbid marriage, and set up unnatural lust instead of it, nor profess'dly maintain Heathenisme, nor the worship of Baalim or dead Heroes, nor any thing which he can deem equivalent to all or any of these, which consequently are necessary to make good his parallels. Neither 2. will that or any other imaginable medium make that lawfull to him, which was lawfull to Jude, or the Fathers, or Elias, the first being an Apostle, the third a Prophet, and such as whose Spirit was interdicted the Disciples of Christ, the second Governors of the Church, in none of which capacities I discern S. W. to be placed over me, nor consequently to be commissionated or priviledged to do whatsoever they did; if he were, the fire from heaven, and the fate of the Priests of Baal, might soon become mine, and be by the same art of concluding ab exemplo, justified also.
7. On this head comes in one auxiliary more, the pretense of charity to undeceive my adherents, and preserve others from a certain believed danger, and that the greatest of dangers, eternal damnation.] Thus hath Gregory Nazianzen long since told us, That Christian Religion was the foreign, apple of contention, and the pretense to enhance it, foreign, that some men were vehement lovers of Christ, of God. But neither will charity justifie the doing of any ill, on the most charitative intuitions, or make that necessary, which is not lawfull; On the other side, what shall otherwise be approved to be lawfull, is already freely allow'd him to exercise his gifts in, upon the bare pretense of his deemed certainty; and so sure the consideration of charity might here have been spared, and being used, doth gain him nothing. Especially when 'tis considered that my adherents (as he will call them, to whom he aims the first fruits of his charity) professe to have never the worse opinion of a cause, that 'tis persecuted with the Sword, and therefore are not in much danger to be disheartened with the meeker dangers of the tongue, or pen, by seeing some scoffes and contumelies fall upon it; having learnt from our Saviour Mat. 5.11. whilest he was in preaching (but I hope not to be scofft at for it) that they are happy which are reviled, as well as persecuted falsely for his sake. We see then what this grand argument pompously introduced, by being recommended to the attentive consideration of the Reader, and fetcht from the deemed certainty of his faith, amounts to, even the gaining him that which was willingly yielded him before, the use of all lawfull means to support that deemed certainty, but not the authorizing unlawfull, or making that necessary, which was, sub lite, depending, whether it were lawfull, or no, and could not be proved to be so by that argument, whose whole force was founded in supposing it.
8. And then what heed is due to his conclusion from hence, that*Pag. 12. though S. W. may perhaps be blamed for holding his faith certain, yet he is inculpable for proceeding consequently to the former tenet.] and again, He who holds ill principles is blameable indeed in that regard, but yet he is worthy of praise for proceeding consequently upon them, since to deduce consequences aright is very laudable.] As if he had said, He that is fallen into one absurdity, is not only to be excused but commended for heaping the thousand more upon the back of it, he that is once out of the way, doth very well to go on in the road before him, though it lead him into hell; he that is once drunk, is to be reproved for that, but that Lecture being over, he is to be praised and so rewarded for all the oaths, or rage, or murther, or incontinence, which that, by a chain of consequences, one after another, very regularly leads him to. I had thought that the one thing, which such a man could do laudably, was to unlearn his ill principle, to get to be rightly informed, and the next to that, or the most tolerably ill, to sit still, and act nothing upon it: Nor indeed did I ever learn that deducing of consequences, though it were not of one vice or error from another, would presently be of the number of things very laudable, for such is nothing but what is morally good, and very good. And no doubt such the nature of the consequential discourse may be, as the picking of thrums ends (to which he compares the producing of testimonies) may be an employment as highly dignified, and praise worthy, as that, and yet the deducing of a consequential ill practice from an ill principle be still lesse laudable, because more blame-worthy than that.
9. One thing more he after reverts to cast in on this head,Pag. 15. that it beiongs to the Catholike who holds his faith certain to manifest the contrary to be perfectly absurd, and nonsense, and since the knowledge of this must in his grounds be held so necessary for the salvation of man-kinde, he ought in plain terms let men know it is such, otherwise he breeds a just apprehension in his Readers that the contrary (else why should he proceed so reservedly) may have some degree of probability—] In this place I might ask, whether the Archangell wanted confidence in the infallible certainty of his cause, when he refused to bring any railing accusation against the Devil, as St. Jude assures us he did. But my reply to this his reasoning will be sufficient, if instead of asking more, I only answer his one question in the parenthesis [else why should he proceed so reservedly?] by telling him that there are other very pregnant reasons of that kind of reservednesse, we now speak of (which consists, as the Archangels did, onelyonly in abstaining from all contumelie, as well as calumny) beside the want of certainty in his faith, or the apprehension that the contrary is in any degree probable. As 1. a conscientious regard to the precepts of Christ, and his Apostles, which expressely forbid contumely, and of which we have oft minded him. 2. A well-grounded opinion that truth is able to propugne and evidence it self by its own light, and wants not (as he imagines) plain terms, as those signifie revilings of his adversary, to let men know it is such. 3. The daily experience, that reason is most expedite in its motion to any sober dispassionate minde, when it comes like David with the Staffe in the hand, and the five smooth stones, and is not incumbred with Sauls Armour; And 4. an apprehension of that which is most obvious, that ruffling will not be interpreted solid confidence, but rather consciousnesse of weaknesse, as we know he that dares fight, will seldome give any ill words, the tongue being not oft called in to the assistance, but to divert, and supply the place of the hands; and lastly, a dependance on God in his own way, that the means which he hath directed us to, will in fine be most successefull; which till S. W. hath chosen to make use of, he can have no experience of the force of them, and consequently must judge as worldlings doe, that charity and liberality, added to observation of strictest rules of justice, will never tend to the inriching, but impoverishing, and upon that account continue to apply himself to those only means, to support his faith, which are most proper to betray it. And this is all the advantage I mean to take (and not that other which he was willing to foresee) in that Paragraph. And thus we have the upshot of what he hath cast in on the third head for the assisting his grand argument.
10. Fourthly for the deemed uncertainty of our faith, and the obligation to write without any great zeal, heat, or earnestnesse,—] which he here insists on, I reply, 1. That his words of Protestants [that they confesse their faith fallible, P. 14.i. e. such as may possibly be otherwise for any thing they know] are either very equivocal in the phrase [for any thing they know] or in the word Protestants, and so belong to other men, whose words I assume not to defend, or being singly understood of me, and those whom I undertake to vindicate, and of a confessed uncertainty, and fallibility of our faith, are far removed from all degree, or appearance of truth. For this I appeal to expresse words in my Answer to Schisme Disarm'd, p. 36. l. 2. He that is in many things fallible—may yet infallibly know or believe some one or more other things, (In this number I professe to contain all matters of our Christian faith) either by his own senses, or by the testimony of others, founded in their several sensations, which being faithfully conveighed to us by undenyable Tradition supply the place of an foreign, are as unquestionably certain, as what we have seen our selves. And again lin. 8. I know infallibly that I now write,—and the same I affirm of all other matters of fact, testified by my own senses, or by universal unquestionable Tradition, for that is founded in the repeated sensations of so many other men, which being communicated and sufficiently testified to me, I have no more reason to doubt of, then of my own sensations. And of this sort is the Tradition of the Ʋniversal Primitive Church, concerning the Apostles delivering some Doctrines (here again I professe to mean our whole Christian faith) and some Books (viz. all the Canonical Books of the New Testament) &c. With what semblance of truth then can I be told, in a reply to this very Book, where I have thus profess'd the infallible certainty of our faith, that Protestants confesse their faith fallible, i. e. such as may possibly be otherwise for any thing they know.] Can this be suggested of those things, which I say are as unquestionable as what I have seen my self, and that I know them infallibly? Is this dealing tolerable in a plain matter of fact (for so it is, that we, of whom I am one, and that book, acknowledged to be mine, confesse our faith fallible) and can the deemed certainty of his faith support this part of his earnestnesse of affirming what is quite contrary to his own eyes, as well as mine? If so, then I professe to allow him the inclosure of such kind of zeal, as this, for I hope I shall never, whilest I am in my right wits, make use of it: If I would, I should have cut this whole Section of his short, by denying the ground of it, not only the certainty of his faith, but even his deeming it certain, for this is his dealing with me, contrary to what was visible to him.
11. I cannot pertinently insist longer on this Theme of the certainty of our faith in this place, to which it is so unsuteable, and then there is no more needfull to be added on this fourth head, but that if deemed certainty of our faith would support, or authorise contumely, I were also commissionated to make use of such gifts, and might be as bitter as he, but 1. I am as confident it cannot, as Scripture (which is the ground of my faith, as well as Tradition, and I hope written and unwritten Tradition both will amount to as much as one of them, without the other) or any other ground of credibility which the matter is capable of, can afford me. And 2. (besides many other motives) I professe to think I have no need of such auxiliaries, and that is with me as prevailing an argument against, as his pretended necessity is to him for the use of them.
12. One thing only I shall further note on this head of discourse; Otherwhiles as the Romanist can project advantages to his cause from the Protestants charitable perswasion of them, whilest they cannot afford any like return to us, and by this their Proselytes are obliged to be averted from us, as from those who can yield them no degree of safety, and to adhere confidently to them, who are not by Protestants denyed it; On another occasion the Roman is presumed to be the Only infallible Church, because no other doth (i. e. is so assuming, or self-opinionate, as to) pretend to that vast title. And now it seems Protestants are obliged to be meek, and the Romanists as much obliged to be zealous and earnest, which are S. W's style for the rude blowes, and so signifie contumely. From these three all the conclusion I can make, is this, that we Protestants are willingly allowed the exercise of the greatest morall and Christian virtues, such are ingenuity, and meeknesse, and charity, and the Romanist must have the inclosure of the contrary, and pretend necessity and obligation of zeal for all three, and if this be it, 'tis not hard to foresee who will be the greatest looser by such advantages.
13. Lastly, for his page and half of my practises, he will allow me the modesty not to make any more particular recitations of, or reply to them, than this, that Tertullian hath long since told me of the Votaries of Saturn, who though in their zeal (and that also founded in the deemed certainty of their faith) they were so cruel, as to expose and slaughter their most blamelesse Infants, yet at the same time they*Infantibus blandiebantur, ne immolarentur lachrymantes, Apol. c. IX. stroked and flattered them, that they might not be sacrificed weeping; and the like must I look on in S. W. not as an effect of his tendernesse (which he thinks himself obliged to disclaim) but of his care of averting ill omens, or some other such like consideration, on account of which, and in complyance with his design, I am cheerfully to support, and take in good part, whatsoever afterward falls upon me, from the necessity of his zeal and d…votion, as that is but consequent to the deemed certainty of his faith. And I am resolved to do it, having one motive more to it, beside his commendations, viz. this very advertisement of his, that 'tis the deemed certainty of his cause (a thing which I can no way help or be answerable for, either in it self or its consequences) which, as he*P. 20. saith, concludes me certainly pernicious, and upon†P. 17. which he doubts not to affirm that it is most perfect nonsense, to think all the testimonies in my book can bear so much as a show of probability, if compared with that clear evidence he deems to shine in the other. For by this I am assured that all the reproaches that fall upon me, are deserved (and so ought not to be complained of) yet not by me personally, or by any avoidable misadventure of mine, in the retail, but only in the general, and the grosse, because I am not of S. W's faith in all things, from which grand comprehensive original guilt, as from my destiny, and not from mine own superadded miscarriages, I am to derive all my calamities, the sharpest effects of his displeasure. And with this comfort his second Section, and the pursuit of the grand argument of it hath furnished me, and so resolving to continue my good humour, in despight of his other discouragements, I shall hasten to take my leave of it.
13. Yet before I do so, I am a little concerned to take notice of his more than oblique intimation (least I should be too insolent on his praises) 1. Of my too much vanity in using of Greek on all, or rather no occasion. And 2. my chief and almost only talent lying in the way of testimonies. Of both these I shall give the Reader and him this short account. 1. That of citing Greek Authors in the language wherein they wrote, or using a Greek word or phrase, which appeared most expressive, I never heard any man, till now, admonished, as of a fault, but by those Readers, which profess'd their want of skill in that language, and for the sake of such, I have been carefull so far to translate, or otherwise to supply that want, as to leave them no just occasion of complaint, or cause of interruption. And then for the vanity, possibly adherent to this, as to other lawfull, and prudentially chosen actions, if I ever were guilty of any degree of it, I shall now sure be effectually cured by S. W. who assures me, how far I should be mistaken, if I projected any mans praises by this means, and that on the contrary, I hereby give my Readers a fair title to suspect me either of too much vanity in that, or emptynesse in other knowledges. And truely I shall not so far heed, as studiously to avert the Readers suspicion of either of these (though if S. W's authority were of force, I might have thus much to plead, that 'tis no more liable to the suspicion of vanity in me to use Greek, than in him to say he much loves it, and thinks it a great ornament to a Scholar, for he that were jealously disposed, would have temptation to suspect, that he that thus said, either had or desired to seem to have a liberal portion of it, and I hope S. W. will thank me, that I make not this conclusion) but expect from him that justice for the future, that when I do use Greek, it shall be thought I am not a Platonick lover of being esteemed vain and empty, and therefore that I have some (with me prevailing) reason, that moves me thus far to deny my self, and contemn my reputation, rather then omit to do that which is most for the Readers profit, in my opinion. I know no possible way of superseding this conclusion, but by surmising, that S. W. was not the reporter of any other mens sense, but his own, and that his judgement bears not much weight with any. But I supose he hath a better opinion of himself, than to suspect himself liable to such surmises.
14. Secondly, then for the way of Testimonies, I must not avert or disclaim it, or be troubled that my adversary acknowledges my chief talent to lie that way. For as long as matter of Faith is founded not in natural reason, but divine Revelation, and consequently is not determinable from common notions, like problemes in the Mathematicks (neither hath any such close connexion with them, as that it can duely be said, what yet*Apol. for Trad. p. 11. Mr. White hath adventured to say, that God must of necessity pitch upon this or this way, resolving that if God hath not already taken this course, certainly he should have done it) but depends wholly on the evidence of its delivery from Christ, and his Apostles, and so is establish'd either by Scripture, or by Oral Tradition of the Apostles, or by both (and the latter of these is most surely conveighed to us at this distance, by the writings of those which dwelt neerest to them) so long, I say, I must think it reasonable to make my appeals to testimonies both of Scripture and ancient witnesses of Tradition, and if there be possibility of misinterpreting either or both of these, yet however to use them diligently, and use the best means I can to conduct my self and others to the right understanding of them▪ hoping confidently that St. Chrysostome said true, foreign, and that I understand his meaning, that as what is necessary is plain, so what is intelligible is not necessary. And there being two obvious means to this end of attaining the sure meaning of a period, by searching the notion of the original words and phrases, and 2. by adverting to the rational importance, in conjunction with antecedents and consequents, if both these will not competently assist me to conclude inerrably from plain, and not enigmatical testimonies (written by pious and prudent men, to instruct, and not to torment, to benefit and not amaze and pussle their Reader) I must then give over the trade whether of writing controversies, or reading books, yea, and conversing with men, whose words may by this account be as great riddles, as sacred or Ecclesiastical writings, and so be obliged to take my leave of my Dispatcher abruptly, whom certainly I may not seasonably attempt to answer, till I do understand, and can no more hope that I doe not erre in thinking I do understand him, than in thinking I understand St. Augustine, or St. Matthew, or in expecting their words will bear the same sense with all other men, as they do with me, when I fairly make my representation of them.
15. How unkind and fastidious soever he shewes himself to testimonies, even to all in my book (whether from Fathers or from Scripture it self) upon the account of a thousand Grammatical, Philological, Sophistical, Historical, and Logical difficulties, P. 17.'tis certain he must in the change of the Scene, when he hath no interest concerned, or hypothesis served by it, discern his mistake, or else he would not so impertinently wast his time in reading, and answering, and writing of books, each of which are his silent confession, that books are intelligible, that words and periods, written, as well as unwritten, read, as spoken, found in antient records, as delivered from the antients by Father to Sonne, by word of mouth, which he styles written in mens hearts, are surely and equally intelligible, and then again I may have his leave for all this rebuke, to make use of my talent, of producing testimonies, and not to complain of my portion, if whilest the matter chiefly, if not only depends on testimonies, my chief, if not only talent lye that way.
16. And so much for his foreign (I am still very subject to this vanity of using Greek, when I might have lived without it) his sweet and bitter cup, his praises, and his rebukes, mixt prudently, that I might not be immoderately afflicted with the one, or transported with the other.