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Brief Account of One Suggestion of the Romanist · Henry Hammond

Brief Account of One Suggestion of the Romanist, Chapter 1 · Section 1

SECT. I.

The manner of his writing. The advantages and disadvantages of it. Launoy's judgement of this method; the like of Plutarch and Chrysostome, and Phavorinus. S. W's defences examined. His notion of Preaching, and Saint. The Bill of fare. His confession of rude blowes: the injustice equall to the rudenesse. An Essay of S. W. his Logick. Twitchings by the beard, defended with what truth. Of Scripture Testimonies against contumelies, and the appliablenesse of them. His passages from Tertullian and Augustine repayd him. Six pleas for contumelies evacuated. His admirable inferences. His disclaiming all contumelies. His definition of Such. Personal and morall faults. His artifice in pretending my confession, and in concluding me a railer.

1. THE first attempt of our Dispatcher, is to give an account of his writing at all, and his second to defend his manner of treaty from the charge or blame of contumeliousnesse: These two were to march together in the front, and Syllabus of his first Section, being so ingaged, and intricated the one in the other, that if he may not have liberty to write in that style of scoffe, and declamation, he must not write at all, his ovation being the prime of his strength, his noise and report of his victories the only means to perswade the Reader that he hath obtain'd them.

2. This stratagem promises it self many advantages; for, 1. It hath the reputation of having gotten some conquests, routed the unexpert adversaries, by crying they flie (a strange priviledge of confident fiction, by majoration, to lose its nature, and become truth.) And being thus incouraged, it (2) likes the augurie, and hopes still to be in like manner successefull; the slow ravener, whose speed serves him not to overtake and seise his prey, on design to charm, doth roare after it; and if it thrives not, yet (3) 'tis the putting a good countenance upon an ill matter, and that is the only relief in an irremediable misadventure. Mean-while the admission of this among other of Polyaenus's stratagems is so far from being any ingredient in the Christian warfare, that it is an unquestionable indication of the want of those weapons, with which that arraies its champions; and the artifice is still so mean, that they must be very importunate interests, that shall be able to recommend it to any trafficker, but ordinarily ingenious, and that can but live without it; There is none but the profess'd Quack or Mountebanke, that avowedly brings the Zany upon the stage with him; such undoubtedly is this scoptical humor, when 'tis allow'd to bear any considerable part in the Christian palaestra, let it call it self what it please, zeal or drollery, 'tis at best the Buffon, designed to assist and combine with Sophistry, (as the Ballad-singer with the Cut-purse) to ensnare and lurch the simple; so one of your Sorbon Doctors lately advertiseth the Benedictine Monke *Launoy de Prim. Cenoman. Praes. Epoc. p. 167., Convitia apud imperitos et st…lidè credul…s rationum instar haberi solent, this kind of treaty uses the Reader, as ill as the adversary, calls them fools, that are moved by it; The managing a controversie, saith he, with ostentation of words, secularis potius quam Monasticae militiae professorem decet, becomes a Fenser better then a Monke, but for rudenesse or incivility to him that had given him never an ill word, he must more seririously instruct the brother, what character belongs to it. *Ibid. p. 180.Modestia virtus est tum omnium, tum maximè Christianorum, & inter Christianos vel maximè Clericorum, & Monachorum, qui caeteris virtutum omnium exemplo praelucere debent: veritas quoque non indiget patrocinio convitiorum, ipsa sibi sufficit, & quò nudior est, ac simplicior, eò comptior, eò amabilior, eò fortior & ad vincendum mendacium aptior. Modesty is the duty of all Christians, especially of Ecclesiasticall persons, and truth needs not contumely for its Advocate, is much more lovely, and apt to convince without this Auxiliary. This I choose to say in his, rather than in my own words, that it may not come to him under the prejudice of preaching or saint-like; and if Greek, though heathen, may not be as nauseous as either of those, I shall give it a perfect parallel out of†foreign. Plutarch, foreign, Valour needs not anger, having imbibed reason. Which made*Tom. IV. p. 709. l. 33. St. Chrysostome conclude, foreign. Of all men living they that strive, (controvertists) are obliged not to be angry. And if S. W. will turn to a saying of Phavorinus in†l. 19. c. 111. A. Gellius (which assures me the degree of praise which he hath afforded me, p. 18, 19. was more skilfully designed to my*Turpius est exiguè & frigidè laudari, quam insectanter & graviter vituperari. Qui infoecundè & jejunè laudat, destitui à causae videtur. disadvantage, than all his Index of Contumelies; giving this reason for the Aphorisme, Quoniam qui maledicit & vituperat, quantò id acerbiùs facit, tam maximè illi pro iniquo & inimico ducitur, & plerumque propterea fidem non capit: The bitterer his reproaches are, the lesse they are credited) he will h…ve reason to think, that what I have hitherto said in these wordish testimonies (as he will call them) is more for his, than mine own advantage, if his cause will but allow him to make use of it.

3. For my self, as I must professe to believe that there is no one simple error in Popery more pernicious, nor consequently more fit to be resisted, and contested with, than are the contrarieties to charity, the fermentations, and paroxysmes of bitter zeal, which are here avowed and justified by S. W. so I have not a greater obligation to any part of this Reply, than to proceed yet farther on this proemiall Theme, how extrinsecal soever it may seem to the main Controversie; and examine (with what brevity I may, being herein tied to anothers motions) all that he hath here said in defense of it, separating as well as I can his pleas from his scoffes, his Logick from his Rhetorick, and making my rejoinder only to the united force of the former, not to the diffused of the latter.

4. And first to the plain texts of Scripture, which I produced against railers, revilers, contumelious persons, he replies, A sad case, that no punishment lesse than hell must be poor S. W's doom, because he layd open the weaknesse of D. H's defense of a pernicious cause, after the manner that such a defense deserved; and he wonders I had no more charity, than not to be afraid, lest I should drive S. W. into despair of his salvation, by denouncing and preaching to him such horrid judgements for writing against the Saints.] To this I reply, 1. That it is indeed a sad case, that Gods denuntiations against a sin, so charitably, and affectionately mention'd by an Apostle as a speciall part of his Apostolicall office, to call all to self-examination, but the guilty to repentance, should be entertain'd with so little of earnest, or of that temper of mind, which is due to any Apostolical denuntiation. 2. I demand as sadly, whether if S. W. did but suspect that any Christian (though most unknown to him) which he had to deal with, were guilty of drunkennesse, or adultery, and should thereupon mind him of the Apostles denuntiations against such, that neither the Drunkard nor Adulterer should enter the Kingdome of God, and the other should return, whether seriously or but scoptically, that he wondred S. W. had no more charity, than not to be afraid of driving him into despair of his salvation, he would think it a Christian reply, and either an argument of his innocencie, or a symptome of his relenting? 3. I hence learn somewhat of his dialect, 1. His notion of preaching, which he so oft useth as a style of scorn. 2. That other of Saints, which with him is wont to sound the same way. Preaching is here joyned with denouncing such horrid judgements, as were cited out of St. Paul, and can signifie no other than what St. Paul was guilty of, and I no otherwise, than as I transcribed St. Pauls words. And let him then judge, if 'twere truely his art, as elsewhere he pretends, which suggested this ironie, this part of his dialect to him. Next [the Saints] can signifie no more or other than Dr. H. for against him only it was that S. W. was charged to have written that, which he here affirms written against the Saints: and then he that most seriously thinks himself ten thousand times lesse than the least of all Saints (and never assumed more, if so much as this) that knowes it hath been the general practice of Hereticks and Scismaticks, to call themselves by titles of this kind, the pure, the perfect, the spiritual, the holy, the Saints, the godly, (and the very worst of men, the Gnosticks, meant the same, when they assumed that title) must yet be as solemnly scoff't at under that style, as if he had indeed assumed it. 'Tis true I had mentioned saints in that Paragraph, to which he thus replies, and so also the true prophets of God, but the former in the expresse Scripture notion, for those that reign in heaven, and shall judge the world; and the second for those very Prophets whom the Jewes defamed and persecured; far from imagining, and as far from appearing, to include my self in either number; and if he meant to perswade any incautious Reader, that I did, then this was very injurious to us both, and an early instance of the undue and undeserved manner of his replies to my defense, which yet he averts in this period, and pretends no farther to vindicate his practises from the Apostles sentence, than he can justly avert it. I demand therefore, did I in the Paragraph he now replies to, (or any where else) assume to my self or party, the title of Saints? If he saith I did, I leave him to his own eyes and conscience to refute him; If I did not, then this part of my defense deserved not this manner of Reply which he hath given it; and having nothing to pretend for it but my desert, he hath already lost his only plea, as soon as he hath produced it.

5. Secondly, he proceeds to view the charge of contumelie, how he may appear to be concerned in it, and begins with my acknowledgement (as if that would yield him some advantage) that it was not he which wrote the Bill of fare, to which he saith he may with truth adde, that he did not so much as know of it.] I reply, 1. That my confession of the Romish factor, concerned only the style of drollery and Picquant sauce, by him made use of, and is no farther to be extended, then that the publisher gave a civiller title to his contumelies, than the Author himself. 2. That the list which the publisher set in the front of the book, was exactly conformable to what the Author had dispe…sed in the body of it, and can no more lessen by dividing and taking part of his blame, than the divulger or proclaimer of a libell extenuates the crime of him that pen'd it, and delivered it to be publisht. Nay 3. the bill of fare is so imperfect an Index of the contumelies of the book, that I have reason to think it set as a blind rather to conceal the greater variety of them, which was sure to be found in the Book, than a map only to point at them. 4. That as I, whose only businesse it was to consider the contumelies, can be no more presumed to know, or consequently to reflect on the person of S. W. than of the Romish factor, the Master of the Feast, than the collector of the bill of fare: so nothing that I have said in this matter is concerned in that inquiry. I have indeed oft heard the names, by which both of them are known, but as I am no whit satisfied for the injustice of their contumelies, by my having those imperfect images of them, or by their having shared it betwixt them, (the heap, or load of soil smells never the more temperately, that there were more hands joyned to the collecting of it) so the Apostles sentences against that sin were produced by me for the use of all that had any part of that guilt on them, and meant not to raise a suspicion of guilt on any, that had it not. And yet 5. if S. and W. be characters that any one person means, or is willing to be known by, whoever it is that hath the comfort of being, or vanity of assuming to be the Author of these Answers, he is certainly responsible for all that appears from the Presse under his Signatures, as a Merchant is for the transactions of his Factor. Lastly, I have now no motive to incline me to affixe the collecting of the Index of Schisme dispatcht to any other hand, than what compiled the book, and that is much more contumelious, and injurious, than the former bill of fare, and so here be grounds enow to supersede and deprive him of all benefit of that confession of mine, with which he begins his defense.

6. But, saith he, Dr. H. thinks he hath got a notable advantage against me from my own confession, that my blowes were rude and my adversary civil, whereas I used both those phrases as an objection of the Readers, as is most palpable.] I reply, 1. How he used them, must be judged by his own words, to which I referred in the Epistle to the Reader. Before, saith he, you can have past three Chapters, I know you will be objecting, that the blowes I give are too rude for so civil an adversary.] From hence all that I assumed was, that the Author who was fittest to name his own births, hath allowed them the plainer title of rude blowes. And what can be more palpable, than that he hath done so? 2. 'Tis as palpable that when this was written to the Reader, to meet him, as he saith, in the very entry, the Reader, of whom he speaks, could not as yet have made this objection, or be with truth by him pretended to make it, any otherwise then as S.W's conscience assured him, there was place for this objection; These words [I know you will be objecting] being spoken by the Disarmer, can import no lesse to my understanding, than that this was a reflex't act of his own conscience, that there were in the three first Chapters competent motives to suggest to the Reader this objection, and I am not subtile enough to distinguish betwixt this signification of this reflex't act of conscience, and his own confession, which yet he here vehemently averts, with what palpablenesse or evidence of truth, let him now judge. 3. If the Reader indefinitely taken, i. e. (in materia necessariâ, which alone is the matter of knowledge, here mention'd) every Reader be by S. W. yielded to object this, then is this as fair and large a testimony as may be, of the truth of the thing questioned, viz. That S. W's blowes were not only rude, but too rude, which was all that I designed to conclude from this medium. Other collections I might have made from his mentioning the three first Chapters, and no more, and his mentioning them in an undue style, when that book of his is not divided into Chapters, but into three parts: and 13 Sections in the first part: But I desired not then, nor am yet fond of making impertinent discoveries.

7. But he hath more to say to this head. Had I, saith he, used them, the rudenesse of blowes argues not that they were not just, since none doubts but malefactors are very rudely, yet most justly whipt, and the courteous Epithet of civl denyed not, but the oyle in his tongue was accompanyed with venome in his heart, and so made it more necessary to discover that, whose only advantage it was to lurk undiscoverable. I reply, 1. That I assumed no more from his confession, than that the blowes were rude, and the adversary civil, and if that be granted, I have no more to demand, nor he to quarrel in this matter. For 2. if rudenesse should not conclude injustice, much lesse will it conclude the contrary; there will need other mediums to prove the blowes just, than [that they are rude, or that malefactors are punished justly] And till those mediums are produced and proved effectual to the end, the affirming them just, is the begging the question, and so of no force to his present defense, and will be proved but a new contumelie, as oft as I shall in the process of this answer shew, that there is as much injustice, as rudenesse in his blowes. 3. I shall appeal to custom of speech, the best Dictionary, whether when a malefactor is whipt by the Lictor, or beheaded by the Executioner, without any addition of his own spleen to the Judges sentence, he shall be said to have dealt rudely, or contumeliously with the malefactor? or whether strength of argument in a disputant would by the Reader indefinitely be certain (and so, as to be the object of S.W's knowledge) to be styled rudenesse? If so, he hath not lost by this instance, though withall he hath not gained by it; but if not, let him then judge what cause it is, that is capable of no better defenses. But then 4. I must set a remark on that piece of Logick that follows, [The courteous Epithet of Civil denyed not, but the oyle in the tongue was accompanyed with venome in his heart, and so made it more necessary to discover that—] The force of this consequence and propriety to its being a part of S. W's defense, depends on these two things, 1. That under the outside of Civility, poyson was discovered to lurk. 2. That the rude blowes were some way necessary to the making this discovery; now 1. I demand, is that presently eo ipso inferred and proved, that every thing else doth not deny: The word [civill] is not pretended by me to have any force of probation, either as to the truth, or the wholesomenesse of what is propounded, but neither is it any symptome of falsehood or poyson, any more than the contrary rudenesse is of the contrary. By what means then is the discovery made, which is here supposed? The only medium here mention'd, is, That [The courteous Epithet of Civil denyed it not.] But 1. it doth as much deny it, as words signifie things, or lips are interpreters of the heart, (for he that treats a man civilly, doth at least tell him, that he means him no hurt) and all humane affirmations and negations are thus transacted; though it is true, there is frequently deceit in them, when false hearts have the managing of them. 2. Therefore, if it doth not deny it, what is gained toward the discovery? There be ten thousand propositions (which are more than single words) in the Bible, none of which deny Lucifer to be the Messias; will this yield him any assistance toward the acquiring of that dignity? To suppose then this lurking poyson without any other ground of inferring it, than that the Epithet of Civil denyed it not, is one essay of his discursive faculty that I was here to consider. And another is, the influence that this hath on the rude blowes, or propriety to be an ingredient in the plea for them. For I must again demand, In case there were any latent poyson in the civil Tract of Schisme, was not civil reason able to search and discover it? Doe Physitians use to inveigh, or scoffe at poysons? tell them they are absurd and ridiculous, and Saint-like; or do they not think it sufficient to furnish their patients with Antidotes against them? If there were never a Smith in Israel, could not the true Religion be preserved, without going down to the Philistins Grindstones to whet their piety, as well as their Shares? If all the Romanists were throughout good Christians, and so really the meekest men upon the earth, and such as would not rail, any more than ly for God, were the Infallibility and visibility of their Church ascertain'd (or but more likely) to be lost by this means? If so, then S. W. need no more be rude, Dr. H's civility hath insured and prepared his own ruine, and then still, be the supposition of the poyson never so certain, and the discovery never so necessary, yet ad quid perditio haec, why were these loads of contumelies brought in, which might have been sold to the Jewes for some price (it matters not how great) or laid out in charity on some strong-hearted Heretick, which were like to dye a lingring death, without them. If a wordish testimony or two may here have place against such rigorous evidences as these, I shall propose to him the words of Cicero and Seneca, which may deserve to be believed in their own faculties*Cic. Tusc. Qu. l. IV.. Non desiderat fortitudo advocatam itacundiam, satis est instructa, armata, parata per sese; An non vir fortis nisi stomachari coeperit, non potest esse fortis? Gladiatorum id quidem est. And*Senec. de Ira. l. 1. c. XVI. Nil aliu instrumentis opus est, satis nos instruxit ratione natura: Haec dedit telum firmum, perpetuum, obsequens, nec anceps, nec quod in dominum remitti possit: The common notions that prevailed uniformly with these, might, if consulted, have assured S. W. that reason, without the rude blowes, was his best armature, such as would not fail to doe, what he would have it, could not be taken out of his hands, and used against him, as all other weapons may, but especially that of contumelie, if the adversary be no better man than S. W. is a Disputant.

8. I shall not now further disquiet him, by examining how he could, as he saith, discover that venome, whose advantage, he also saith it was, to lurk undiscoverable, because I doubt not, but this new tube hath the faculty of discovering things, which are otherwise undiscoverable, this magnifying glasse hath alwayes been able not only to inlarge, but create, first to improve Mites into Swine, and then each single meer nothing into the largest Colossus, and all this by the rules of severe reason, and rigorous demonstration.

9. 'Tis time we now advance from the rude blowes (for which I am to account not with S. W. it seems, but with the Reader only, it being so palpable, that the Reader was the man, that put those words into S. W.'s mouth, without any the least consent of his) to the twitchings by the beard] which he cannot, doth not deny to have been his own style; Nay, (that I may not conclude, as he doth, from not denying) he expressely confesses, he spoke it. But to this he hath some few things to say also. 1. That I reiterate it to make my Reader smile. 2. That the twitching by the heard is indeed somewhat too rude a carriage, if understood in the down right sense, as, saith he, I seem to take it, but he spake it only in an allegory, and in order to my wearing a Vizard, which he pluck't off. 3. That since he did only so, let me but acknowledge that he found me attired in such a Mask, and he is contented to be thought so unreasonably uncivil, as to plucke it off so rudely.]

10. This, it seems, is all the satisfaction that may be expected to attend on S.W's confession, when himself is both the penitent and the confessor. But to these I reply, to the first, 1. That it were not unreasonable in him to allow me the comfort once to sollicit the Readers smile, when he hath the profuser joyes of entertaining him with a loud laughter, whole dayes together. Hath he the Leviathans priviledge of sporting alone in the waters, the inclosure of game, the patent of having all mirth wrapt up in his papers? Was it an undecency in me thus to refresh the Reader, once in a long wearisome journey, or was it not? If not, why is it mention'd by him, whose every word is presumed to be immediate, and so to have demonstrative force in it? If it was, why doth S. W. so over-imitate what he thus condemns? But 2. for the truth of what he charges on me, either that I reiterate it at all, or to that end of making the Reader smile, I have been at so much leisure, as to read over all I have said in that matter, and find his suggestion very distant from all appearance of truth, in both particulars. I name the phrase but twice, and that at no lesse distance than is between the first part of the 2d, and the last of the 6th page, once in reciting his words, the other time in refuting them, and if this had been called iterating, I had not resisted, but I am sure it is not reiterating. And when the Reader turns to the places, he will find, that as the iteration had no propriety to make any man smile, so each passage was delivered with as much of earnest, and as little of irony, as any other line of the Book, and then again he will judge, what credit is to be given to S. W's relations.

11. To the second, 1. What appearance or semblance is there, that I took the phrase in the downright sense? or how was it possible I should so take it? Could I think his printed sheets had fingers, or pincers, or other instruments of violence or rud…nesse, properly so called? or did I expresse an attempt to phancy what was thus impossible? Nay, are not these my words? Rude blowes and twitchings by the beard, declamation and satyre, are none of these justifiable and lawfull means? What could more witnesse my understanding his allegory, than my interpreting it? 2. If in the down-right sense his twitching be acknowledged somewhat too rude, can it avoid being so in the allegory? Are his tropes so inartificial, his expressions so feeble, and imperfect, as to signifie lesse than they sound? Is not that which was allegorically meant by that style, as really rude in another kinde, as the down-right twitching would be? If it be, then what a defense is this? [if understood in the down-right sense it was somewhat too rude, but being spoken in a sense that signified as much as the downright, it did not yet signifie so much rudenesse.] If it be not, we have then lost our Rhetoricks too, as well as our Logick formerly. 3. Then, hath he mended the matter by adding, he spake it in order to my wearing a Vizard? Is a contumely allayd by being doubled, shall falsities imitate negations, and two Pasquils become a Panegyrick? I must not blame S. W. but his art, for this also.

12. Yet all these are but preparatives to his third, and last medicament, wherewith he hath throughly purged himself. Let me confesse that he found me in a vizard, and he is content to be thought so uncivil— It seems, I must justifie his calumnies, and then he will bear the blame of them. My avowed guilts must evince me injured, and the truth of his accusations demonstrate them unreasonable: Mean while, till I deserve rudenesse, he that heaps it on me, is innocent. Thus deer must a man pay for S. W's repentance, for which yet there is no place, till it be confess'd, that he hath not offended. I may court the Readers compassion, though not his smile, when a hundred such Monsters of discourse as this, are all commenced branches of rigorous evidence.

13. His next Paragraph, p. 4. and 5. is spent in inquiring with what Logick I huddle together those testimonies out of Scripture for S. W's pasport to hell, unlesse I could evidence that they were particularly appliable to him.] I reply, 1. That I should think it strange Logick indeed, to inferre from my producing the sentences of Scripture against railing, that I gave any man that is most guilty of it, a pasport to hell. I had thought denuntiations of Scripture had been designed to bring sinners to repentance, to rescue from hell, not to conveigh any man thither. I had thought, that this was one of our Saviours means to demonstrate himself a Saviour, by warning of the danger of sin, to redeem men from it, and so to blesse by turning, and by terrors the means of turning. And I am sure no man can evacuate this Logick, but he that resolves he will not amend what is under those denuntiations, and till S. W. professe finally to be of that number, he will make good my Charity, as well as my Logick, and when I know he is of that number, I will no more importune him with that kinde of exercise of either. But then 2. what defect could there be in my evidence, that those testimonies were particularly appliable to him? When the crime to which those testimonies belong'd, was so visible almost in every page (of the first part especially) of his Book, that himself profess'd to know that the Reader would think him guilty of it, and as plainly acknowledges it, as twitchings by the beard shall allegorically be able to signifie contumelies, and when I had first laid that for the ground of my procedure, before I advanced to produce those testimonies.

14. But it seems another kind of particular application he requires of me, that of shewing that contumelious words are so perfectly damnable, that no circumstance can render them inculpable, or at least venial, if not necessary or convenient.] But I reply, that if this strict manner of application be with any reason required of me, to be super-added to the producing of so plain, and general, comprehensive testimonies, that very reason is alone sufficient to evacuate the main of his Apology, that either in his Epistle to the indifferent Reader, or in this place, he hath offer'd for himself. For it falls out this one time, that he that is so profess'd an enemy to testimonies, hath yet in this matter specially applyed himself to this advocate; 1. In his Epistle to the Reader, in defense of his smiling, he sends them that are wedded to a severer humor, to Tertullian, concerning some passages of his book that move to laughter, and St. Augustine of the unreasonablenesse that Catholikes should be bound to write in a dull and drousie style, reciting words from each of them, (the very same which the late Author of Les Provinciales in his 11th Letter had done against the Jesuites) but utterly failing of what he here exacts of me, i. e. neither comparing, nor considering the appliablen sse of circumstances, nor so much as quoting the places in either of the Fathers, (that Author having in like manner failed herein) by help whereof his Reader might have considered them, much lesse deducing the parallel either betwixt me and those against whom those Fathers wrote, or betwixt me and the Jesuites, against whom only this Author of Les Provintiales produced them; from whom as I differ in nothing more, than in their moral Divinity, (which Montalt there principally paradigmatizes) so I need give no other instance of my differing, than that they*Let. XV. professe it lawfull for the preserving a mans own honour, to calumniate where there is no crime, but I think it unlawfull to reproach where there is. Who now it is which is most guilty of the crime which he†P. 5. l. 5. here objects, of laying about blindly against friends and foes, the Reader will best judge, when what is produced (I must suppose pertinently) by his own friends against others of his own friends, he cites against me, whom he owns for his adversary, and that (I say not blindly, but) upon trust, without examining, or leaving any possibility to others to examine his testimonies, or so much as directing to the coast where they are to be found. This being said in general to his two pretended testimonies, I shall not adde any thing more particular (though by what is recited of them, 'tis manifest, they come not home to contumelies) till I am certainly informed by him, that they are to be found in those Fathers and then shall not doubt to shew him, that they belong not to his circumstances. Meanwhile I shall pay him in part with two visible passages of the same Fathers, of*Edit. Pamel. p. 145. C.D.E. Tertullian, De Patient. c. xv. Satis idoneus patientiae s…quester Deus, si injuriam deposueris penes eum, ultor est, si domnum, restitutor est. Quantum patientiae licet, ut Deum habeat debitorem, fidem munit, pacem gubernat, dilectionem adjuvat, carnem regit, Spiritum servat, linguam froenat, manum continet, tentationes inculcat, nec inflatur, nec inquietatur, sedet in thron… Spiritus mitissimi & mansuet…ssimi, qui non turbine glomeratur, non nubile livet— Ʋbi Deus, ibidem & alumna ejus patientia scilicet. God is the proxy and advocate of patience, lay up your injury with him, and he is the avenger, your losse, and he is the restorer. What an advantage hath patiente, which hath God for its debtor? It defends the Faith, governs peace, helps love, rules the flesh, keeps the Spirit, bridles the tongue, restrains the hand, repells temptations, is not puffed up, is not disquieted, sits in the throne of the most mild and calm spirit, which is not carried about in the whirle winde, nor discol…ured with the cloud— Where God is, there also is this his Client, patience. And of St. Augustine in his†L. III c. 1 Op. Aug. Tom. VII. Ed. Basil. p. 163. D. 16…. A. Answer to the Letters of Petilian the Donatist (I suppose as professed a defender of acknowledged Schismaticks, as I am pretended to be) Si et ego tibi vellem pro maledictis maledicta rependere, quid al…ud quam duo maledici essimus, ut ij qui nos legerent, alii detestat…s abjicerent, sanâ gravitate, alii suavitèr haurirent malevolâ voluntate. Ego quando cuiquam vel dicendo vel scribendo respondeo, etiam contumeliosis criminationibus lacessitu…, quantum mihi dominus donat, froenatis atque coercitis vanae indignationis aculeis, auditori lectorive consulens, non ago ut efficiar homine convitiando superior, sed errorem convincendo salubrior. If I would repay you contumelies wi…h contumelies, what would the result be, but that we should be two contumelious men, that of them that read us, some would detest and reject us with a sober gravity, others would take down our writings with pleasure but maliciously. When I make answer to any by word or writing, though I am provoked by contumelious charges, yet as far as God gives me strength, I bridle and restrain the stings of vain indignation, thereby taking care of the auditor or reader, and endeavour not to overcome the adversary in contumelies, but to cure him by convincing his error. And much to the same Theme to the end of the Chapter, which if it be not exactly applicable to our present circumstances, it is because S W's adversary hath offered him no exercise of his patience, neither hegan to him, nor attended him in reproachfull language; I hope he will forgive me that injury, and wink at that unevennesse in the parallel. And let this serve for his two testimonies in his Epistle.

14. In this place also p. 4. he appeals to testimonies (such as when I produced, brought the irony of preaching on me) 1. Of good John Baptist, who called the Jewes a generation of Vipers. 2. Of St. Paul, that called Elymas sonne of the Devil, &c. 3. Of our Saviour, who called Herod fox, the prophaners of the Temple thieves, the Scribes and Pharises hypocrites. 4. And to come neerer the present circumstances, of St. Policarpe, who meeting an heretick, who began complementally to insinuate himself into his acquaintance, rejected his courtesie with this rude language, I know thee to be the first-born of the Devil. 5. Of St. Jude, who calls hereticks clouds without water, autumnal trees,— And 6. to come yet neerer home, of Gods Church, whose custom it is to anathematize and curse hereticks, and of St. Paul, who bids anathema even to an Angel from heaven, if he should preach false d…ctrine.] But in all these six there is no evidence tendred of the particular appliablenesse of them to the case in hand, for that must consist of two branches. 1. A parallel betwixt me, and those Jewes, that Elymas, that Herod, those profaners, those Scribes and Pharises, that heretick, and others of the same denomination, and 2. a parallel betwixt S. W. and the Baptist, St. Paul, our Saviour, St. Polycarpe, St. Jude, Gods Church, and St. Paul again. Either of these was 1. as necessarily his task, as it can have been mine, to evidence the words of St. Paul particularly appliable to him; and 2. so much more his, as he that censures a defect in another, is obliged to repaire it in himself, yea and 3. much more difficult and impossible for him to repair, than mine is.

15. To shew him this, and at once to give him an example of perfecting incomplete discourses (which I acknowledge need not be so perfect at first, that nothing can be added to them, if they must, the Dispatchers pains were very unseasonable) I shall now for distinctnesse sake adde, that St. Pauls denuntiations against foreign, are (at least) in force, 1. against all those that are confessed to have used contumelious speeches to them who have not at all offended, 2. against all that have laid them out above proportion of the offence, 3. against all that lavish them out indifferently on their aequals, who are in no wise subject to any authority of theirs. The two former are immediately deduced from the foundation of St. Pauls doctrine, the express words of Christ, Mat v. 22. where the old Commandement, Thou shalt not kill, v. 21. is by him extended to the interdict of being angry with the brother, and calling him Racha and thou fool, foreign either without any cause, or above the proportion of it; and the third also from the analogy which is there observed betwixt killing (the original precept there) and such expressions of anger or contempt, for as in the one the justice of the cause, the reality (much lesse pretence) of a crime is not sufficient to justifie him, who hath not a competent authority for it, so neither is it in the other.

16. I shall purposely omit to reflect any farther on the two former, 1. Because although S. W's insinuations, that all his displeasures are just, and proportionable, are not sufficient to prove any one to be such, yet my denying it must be as weak, or else be founded in some better evidence, and there is no giving that, but by the view of each passage, and that is too long for this preliminary, and must wait the leisure of the subsequent discourse; and 2. because still there will remain place for passion, and prejudice in this matter, and he that is already known to call one heretick, whatsoever the matter of the pretended heresie be, will think he hath this cause of just and ordinate anger on his side. I shall rather choose to pitch on the third, wherein the application will be most visible and particular, and all his instances as yet proposed, expressely excluded from being argumentative for him, or against me. I shall demand then, In case a private man, without any signature of authority upon him, shall take upon him to kill another, will it in the least avail to his defense or excuse, to pretend the examples of Kings and Magistrates, nay of Prophets and Apostles, and of God himself, that have done so before him? If it will not, then what can be said for an uncommissionated S. W. who certainly is invested with no sort of authority over D. H. if he shall call him Racha and the like, upon no other pretense of claim to such liberty, but what is deduced from this argument, Because Christ, Prophets, Bishops and Governors of the Church have all used it toward their inferiors? A Bishop, 'tis certain, may excommunicate an heretick of his diocese, but may a Presbyter by that argum…nt doe the same to another Presbyter, or but to a Lay-m…? A Bishop though he must not be foreign a striker, 1 Tim. 3. (which the Fathers interpret of the allegorical strokes, foreign, saith Theophylact, not striking unseasonably the brethrens conscience) yet he is required foreign, to rebuke sharply, or by way of excision; But doth this office ly in common to all men, or to any others that are not so called? or can it by the Judaical pretended right of zealots, belong to any private man, that can but pretend a zeal for it, which is all that S. W, doth at this time? If not, as certainly it doth not, then is the application of general denuntiations, as particular as can be, and S. W's cloud of witnesses to the contrary perfectly ineffectual.

17. If this were not in both parts sufficiently cleared, and thereby the whole debate concluded, I would minde him further, not of the size, and notoriety of every of those guilts, by him specified to have been rebuked by Christ, the Baptist, the Apostles, &c. (though I hope I am not arrived to those heights, am no profess'd opposer of Christianity, no Sorcerer, no Gnostick, or Cerinthian, or Marcionite, whatever more minute name of heresie he is pleased to think due, and so to bestow upon me) but of the spirit of discerning, which most of these confess'dly had, by which they infallibly pronounced, not only that the crimes were crimes, and that of a first magnitude, but also that those, whom they rebuked, were ominently guilty of them; such constantly is the word of God, the rebukes of Scripture, foreign, discerners of thoughts, and could not misse in the propriety of the applications to the guilts and persons, a priviledge to which I hope S. W. doth not pretend, how infallible soever he supposes the doctrine, which he asserts; which also being only supposed, not infallibly proved by him, can bear no kind of proportion with the discerning of thoughts, that was in Christ, and the Apostles. And this is all I shall reply to his second offer of testimonies, by which he will now further discern his main conclusion superseded, and see that there was no such necessity *The Texts alleadged by Mr. H. are very general, and he allowes them here no exception at all, or if he does, the reason must be, because the words spoken to such persons as hereticks, the common good concern'd made the private persons repute not considerable, p. 5. l. 4. &c., as he pretends, of fetching the reason of difference betwixt these censures of Christ and Apostles, &c. and S. W's contumelies, from the quality of the persons, against whom they were delivered; the difference of the persons that did deliver them, would be sufficient, if there were no other.

18. I demand then, was his†The Reason must be, &c. ib. [must be] a sign of a rigorous evidence and demonstration, or was it not? If it was, then I learn hence the interpretation of that style, rigorous demonstration, that it is competible to those things which are not only not demonstrably, or but probably true, but even evidently and demonstrably false, (and then next to S. W's contumelies, I must except against his demonstrations, which till they are mended, will spoil him for a controvertist, as he is willing to style himself) for 'tis manifest I have assigned another reason of difference, beside that which he confidently affirms must be the reason. But if that be not the interpretation of [must be] our language is not yet understood, and so one way or other we have our choice, to get us new Logicks, or new Dictionaries, new measures of discourse, or else new means of expressing our notions.

19. The same strein further shewes it self in the next Paragraph: [Whence (saith he) followes first, that I am not excommunicate, or in the state of damnation, for having used contumelious words, since the use of them, if taken simply in it self, is not impious, but for having used them against D. H. Ʋnhappy I, who was not aware how sacred a person my adversary was!] I desire to be shew'd the ground or bottom of this consequence, I suppose it is this, that seeing contumelious words used by Christ, &c. against Herod, &c. are not impious, there can no other reason be pretended, why S. W's contumelies should be thought impious or dangerous, save only this, because they are against D. H. But I have already shewed him another double reason, viz. that there is not a greater difference betwixt Herod and D. H. than there is betwixt Christ and S. W. both in respect of the authority of the one, and none of the other, and the discerning of thoughts in the one, which is not, I hope, pretended to in the other; On both which accounts, I acknowledge my self inforced to yield, that if S. W. after he hath done with me, should be divided into two Catholicks, and those fall out among themselves, one departing into the Jesuites quarters, and t'other remaining among the Jansenists, and as in Epiphanius the great Snake in the bladder after it had devoured all the lesser Snakes, one end of it seized and preyed on the other, so S. should heap loads of contumelies on W. or W. on S. the texts in St. Paul would be then as fitly appliable to either of them, as now they are to both of them together, when D. H. is concerned in it. It is then the shortnesse of S. W's discourse, that he could discern nothing beside his adversaries being a sacred person, (as he will speak) which brought the unhappinesse upon him. The incompetentnesse of his own person was sufficient without any other.

20. As little doth it follow, which he next superstructs, [Next it followes, that if D. H. evidence n…t his cause to be no heresie, and himself in maintainer of it, all those former harsh expressions against hereticks are his due, and without scruple of sin might be given him by S. W.—] For 1 D. H's cause may be no heresie, though. he should die before he wrote one word more to evidence it to be none. 2. He cannot be bound both to evidence his cause to be no heresie, and himself no maintainer of it, which are two distinct things: of which certainly one were abundantly sufficient; for if he be no maintainer of it, how is he concerned, though it were evidenced to be heresie? (which yet is much more than being not evidenced not to be) or if it be evidenced by him not to be heresie (which again is much more than not to be, because all things that are, are not by him evidenced) why may not he blamelessely be the maintainer of it? 3. Every supposed heresie is not so criminous, as that abomination of the Gnosticks and Gerinthus, nor consequently will it follow that all that was certainly due to that, shall without scruple of sin be heaped on this, though it were not really free from all heresie. But then 4. the incompetency of S. W's person, in the two respects forementioned, is a further addition of a double barre against the demonstrativenesse of his deduction. And these are infirmities enow in one inference.

21. And yet on the back of that, he hath made hast to fasten another, [Wherefore unlesse D. H. makes his evidence good, S. W. may also justly retort on him the charge of contumeliousnesse—] But 1. this wherefore hath no more possible force in it, than the ground on which it was built gave it, and that having no lesse than four faileurs in it, cannot communicate that strength, which it hath not. 2. In case I should never make my evidence good, yet so long as that were imputable to any thing else, save to the weaknesse of my cause, yet still I were freed from this charge, though all else were granted, which he supposes. 3. If as I did not make my evidence good, so he did not evince it bad, (which yet certainly he hath not) there could yet be no place for his contumelies, according to his own grounds of the dueness of them, nor consequently for retortion of the charge of contumeliousnesse on me, who may lawfully warn him of the danger, that but seems to incurre the guilt, much more him that hath really incurr'd it, and cannot on his own (and those insufficient) grounds, excuse, or free himself from it. But then 4. I am now actually entred upon the task of making my evidence good against all, he hath suggested to the prejudice thereof, and if herein I doe not finally fail, I shall then have abundantly disproved this inference also, though as yet I had not replyed a word to it.

22. He hath yet a third inference behind, that [it were easie, and he saith, as easie for S. W. using the Drs. method, to gather out of Scripture all the vigorous words and severe execrations against the wicked, and then by his own voluntary explication and application, clap them all upon the Doctor; as for example, that of Curse yee Meroz, &c. and then say, that by Meroz is meant such as Ma. H. who writes against Gods Church.] This Consequence depends upon a supposed exactness of proportion betwixt these two things, on one side the express denuntiation of S. Paul, against the contumelious, applied to a Writer of Controversies, so far proved to be contumelious, as his own confession of twitching by the Beard, allegorically understood, amounts to, and on the other side, all the Curses of Scripture, not only against Meroz, but against the Wicked indefinitely, i: e. all the wicked that are execrated in Scripture, clapt on the back of one that S. W. hath nothing to object to, but that he is pleased to affirm he writes against Gods Church. To make good which proposition, 'tis necessary that whosoever is by S. W. affirmed to write against Gods Church, be, eo ipso, proved to be as guilty of all the wickednesses execrated in Scripture, be they never so incompetible one with the other (i. e. to be an Atheist, a Polytheist, an Idolater, a Church-robber, a Necromancer, and so on, to the end of the beadrol of the blackest, and withall most contrary sins) as contumelies cast by S. W. upon D. H. are proved to be contumelies. The proportionableness of which two Schemes I must leave to those brains of the now grown wiser World (as he phrases it) that are most sublimed with the Mathematicks, to endeavour to demonstrate, and till that be done, behold with some kind of astonishment the admirable discursive, and illative faculties of my unparalleld Adversary.

23. This is the sum of S. W's first plea for Contumelies, which was therefore necessary to be attended and backt with a second, Pag. 6.and that I acknowledge prudently chosen [his disclaiming in behalf of his book, any such language toward Dr. H.]

This indeed made good, will soon end these debates; only it will declare the Authors great leisure, and accuse the foregoing Pages of great impertinency, and improvidence, that they had not foreseen this guard, but preferred the sensuality of an harangus, before the more solid comforts of innocence. As it is, let us now see, upon what grounds his temerarious confession of twitching by the Beard, and the Readers falsely foreseen charge of the rude blows, are retracted, and called in, and so his repentance, such as it was, soon repented of. Why, only upon a more advised description of a Contumely, which, saith S.W. [notes some personall and morall fault in another] and then he asks [Did I note any … him?]

24. Let us stay here a while, 1. A Contumely is defined or described by noting some personall and morall fault in another: To this I reply, That either this is a sufficient description of Contumely, or it is not: If it be not, then how can it be of use to prove that S. W. is not guilty of contumely, by not falling under the parts, (one or both) of this description, as long as there be others, omitted in this unsufficient enumeration, under some, or any of which, he may still be chargable to have fallen? But if it be a vow'd to be a perfect, and sufficient description, then I appeal to him or his Reader, in either part of it, 1. Whether all Contumelies note some personall fault? whether the calling one Bastard be not contumelious? and whether that be a personall fault in him, that is, or is thought chargable of it? So in like manner for the reproaching a Christian, of any denomination, be it a Jesuite, or Jansenist, with the Crimes of any of his party, whereof he is no otherwise guilty, than that he herds with many, that are guilty of it, whether this be the noting of somewhat personal in him, in whom it is not, and whether it be not contumely? That this is my case with S. W. I am not bound to shew, whilst my present business only is to consider the insufficiency of his description of Contumely. So again, 2. Whether the faults being personal, be obliged to be moral also? or else the noting of them be no contumely? May not intellectual faults be the matter of contumely? and sure those are not moral. Doth not Christ describe Contumely, Mat. V. by saying to thy Brother, Racha, and thou Fool? And is not emptiness, and folly, an intellectual, no (necessarily) moral fault? Thus infallibly convincing is each of the two words of S. W.'s description of Contumely.

25. But then 2 When he asks, Did I note any (either personal or moral fault) in him? I take my turn also of asking, whether being insincere, blasphemous, weak, ridiculous (all which S. W. avows in the ensuing words, and saith,P. 7. l. 7. It were madness to expect that he should not shew them, where his Adversary writ insincerely, &c. i. e. writ what he will thus accuse of these Crimes) be neither personal, nor moral faults? Is not weakness personal, and blasphemy moral in the highest degree? but I shall not exagitate this any further, in relation to my own concernments, but from his [did I note any in him?] conclude (by the help of that Art, which hath as well taught me, that an affirmative Question doth strongly deny, as him, that ridiculous things ought to be exprest i…nically) that he utterly disclaims having noted any such: And if indeed he hath not noted any personal or moral fault in me, the Consequence is natural, that either all his Charges affixt on me, that have formerly made up the Bill of fare, and now fil'd the Index of Schisme dispatcht (to the number of 356. beside many more sans nombre, and among them blasphemies and calumnies, and false dealings; and omissions of necessary duty) are neither personal nor moral, or at least that those that are moral, are not personally mine, or those that are personally mine, are not moral, which when the Reader hath laid up in his memory, I hope S. W.'s Index would not much inflame him, though I should add never another word to demonstrate, that there is not the least appearance of truth in any one of those numberless Charges, or other imaginable design of framing them, than that of the persecuting heathen Emperor, Galerius, who made a Law that Christians should be infamous, and then by another Law, any man might despoyl them that would, there being no other real Crime in his Adversary to deserve the rudeness of his blows, save only that through that rudeness his Adversary hath been defamed by him.

26. But 'tis possible he may mean somewhat else by fault personal and moral, than vulgar language (my only Instructer) understands by them, for as clear as he is from noting either of these in me, he confesseth, that as a Writer, I was his and the Churches Adversary, and as such it was irrational he should spare me.] But I demand, Are not faults objected to a Writer, as a Writer, supposed to be personal, and may they not also be moral faults? if they be blasphemies, insincerities, and the like: If not (as his distinction implies) then I begin to discern the one way in the world to free S. W. from the guilt of Contumelies; His being a Writer may salve them from being personal or moral in him, as well as the imputing blasphemy to me may, by my being considered as a Writer, be freed from noting in me any personal and moral fault. This is still more of the refined faculty, of distinguishing betwixt the Writer and himself, not sparing the one, and yet using no severity to the other, telling the Writer of his falsifications and blasphemies, without noting any thing personal or moral in him.

27. There is more added on this subtile Theme, to all which I make no other return but this, that if S. W. could really have shewed one blasphemy or falsification in all the Tract of Schisme, he needed not so industriously have defamed it, His Logick would have served his turn, without that which he calleth his Rhetorick; one solid proof of such a Charge having much more force in it, than all his ostentation of words hath. As for the proportionableness of my deserts to the excess of his expressions, the triall must be in the due place, where particulars come to be examined; mean while, he must not begg the principle, and have the priviledges of my Judge, while he is but my Adversary.

Pag. 7.28. But beyond expectation, I am in the next Paragraph appealed to, and S. W. undertakes the Dostor shall inform the Reader, that all his pretended revilings are no other, then the proper treaty, which Reason grants, Religion avoucheth, and the circumstances make necessary.] This is another Magistery, let's see what will be made of it. The words of mine, from whence this unexpected conclusion is drawn, are affirmed to be these: The Doctor complains pag. 2. that the Publisher of the Book hath solemnly annext a list of the Contumelies, three and thirty pickt out by specialty, &c. Upon which he straight-way infers, Since then these, as he sayes, are the speciall or chief Contumelies, not to trouble the Reader with the whole Roll, we will only take notice of the first of them, which is this; How the Doctor of Divinity hath forgotten his Accidence.] Thus far S. W. at his Limbeck, to draw water out of a Flint, and to yield the Reader a large Confession of mine, overthrowing all my defences past and future at one dash, out of plain words that signifie not a syllable toward it.

29. This could not be attempted without a conspiration of many Artifices; let us view them orderly: 1. My words are mutilated, with an &c. which was probably meant to do some small service, for if he had read out, my period had thus evidenced its own sense, He hath solemnly annext a list of the contumelies, 33 pickt out by specialty out of the farre greater number. Here then I supposed and affirmed, that there were a far greater number than 33, and nothing hinders, but several of those omitted, might be far greater then any that were set down in the publishers list, and I never informed him or the Reader, that there were not. For 2. that I say these were the special or chief, is absolutely imposed upon the Reader, who at the first cast of his eye on my words, will discern 'tis S. W. not I, that sayes it. 3. That by picking out these by specialty, I should mean, though not say, that these were the special, as that word signifies the chief of them, is a great violence to the words, and as great to my sense, of which those were the Interpreters. To pick out by specialty, I conceived to signifie, choosing out so many particulars, and setting them down distinctly and severally, as in common speech it hath been familiar to my ears; And what if special oft signifies chief, that use of the adjective hath no influence on the (as common) use of specialty. Had I meant as he would have me, I had certainly said, pickt out as the prime, or special, or principal, but because I meant not so, these were not my words, but others which to any that understands plain English, sufficiently exprest this my other meaning. 4. Of these 33. he will instance only in one, and his only pretended reason of doing so, is, that he may not trouble the Reader. But he hath not been so tender of the Readers trouble, when he hoped for advantage thereby, and I can tell him another more usefull, and so not improbable reason of his reservednesse; When that one is produced, he knowes it is but one, and that there be 32. behind in that list, and many more not entred into that catalogue, every of which is as contumelious as this one, and all together, by accumulation, much above 32 times as great, as this one by it self is: And yet this one must be the only measure, by which the whole matter must be judged, as if he that had stollen many more than 33 prizes, or committed as many acts of drunkennesse or fornication, should make a slight confession of one of them, and then were presently free from the guilt of that, and of all the rest also. 5. This one, that is named, hath not a word said in defense, or extenuation, or excuse of it, either to shew that it is no contumely, or that there was the least pretense of justice in it (as in my Answer to the Disarmer, I had shewed there was not, Chap. 3. Sect. 2.) which alone could have had any semblance of force to support his pretended conclusion, that this was no other than the proper treaty that reason grants, religion avoucheth, and the circumstances make necessary. Hence again we see what kind of inferences must be expected of these demonstrators, even no other, nor more immediate, than this, when examined and driven to the issue, [The Doctor, saith the Publisher, hath set down 33 several contumelies of a far greater number, one of which S. W. be it never so unjust, hath had the confidence again to name, though not to say any thing in defense of it, ergo, the Doctor hath informed the Reader that S. W. hath used no other contumeliousnesse, but what reason grants, Religion avoucheth, and the circumstances of the matter do more than justifie, even make necessary in him.] If this be not an essay of high Chimistry, I know not where to direct any young Student to seek for it.

30. And in the strength of this he goes on in full triumph to the end of the Section, 1. Saying what he had said, over again, to the wits of the Ʋniversity, then 2. framing a dilemma to demonstrate it charity in him to shew me my greatest faults. And 3. by long beating about the bush, discovering at last, that my producing St. Pauls words against him concludes me the greater railer of the two, and to this the Puritanical Dame cudgelling her maid in Scripture phrase,] is resolved to be appliable. Lastly, objecting to me, that I flatly accuse him of falsifycations, calumnies certainly, if not avouched. To all, and first to the first of these, I reply, that I have replyed already, when the same thing was said, though not address'd to the wits, and though he seek advantage by repeating in another mode, I need it not, and therefore do not seek it. To the second, that his Dilemma takes for granted my pernicious errors, and confound… discovering of errors, with contumelies, whereas 1. I have already shewed him, that contumelies are not the proper glasses to discover errors, be they never so pernicious; nor ordinarily made use of by such artists as S. W. but when the errors are so far removed from vulgar sight, that they may well passe for invisible. 2. That he is not a competent Judge in this matter; Let his Reader by the direction and conviction of his Logick discern the error, and not be born down with his noises. And 3. that whether there be any one such error duely noted by him, is the main question still, as confidently denyed by me, as pretended by him, and as it must not be granted him for supposing it, so much lesse by it can any thing else be justified, that he shall unduely build upon it. To the third, 1. That producing St. Pauls plain words against a sin, is far from railing at all, farther yet from exceeding him in that language. 2. That for the parallel of his dame, which is his (only rhetorical) argument to prove it, it is of no force, because though I should allow the parallel to hold in one part, between St. Pauls words produced on one side, and Scripture phrase on the other (which yet till I know what that phrase was which the Dame used, but S. W. hath not recited from her Lecture, I am not obliged to doe) yet still the question remains, what parallel will be found for the cudgell, wherein surely all the weight of the simile, and the Dames severity consisted, and not in the Scripture phrase; To the last, that when it appears that I have accused him of falsifying, if I do not render a reasonable account of it, I will, as he requires, confesse, and make satisfaction for the calumny; but as yet he hath not directed me to the place, and my memory suggests it not, and therefore I discern not my self to be under any further present obligation. Only I shall demand, who it is, whom he can think it possible I should have accused of falsifying? Is S. W. the name of any man, or be there any Lawes of Brachygraphie, by which those letters are authorized to signifie any more than N. N. are wont to doe? Is any person living vulgarly known, or called by that name? If not, 'tis not only not true, but not possible, that in answering N. N. or S. W. I have calumniated any man.

31. And thus at length we are at an end of the first Section, which coming to recapitulate in the beginning of the second, he avoucheth to have conteined ordinary considerations, and obvious to common sense (with what truth, hath now been examined) letting the Reader see, that this manner of writing is very rational, but that not absolutely, but on a double condition, if the cause deserve any zeal, and the truth of the thing makes good what is said. But we have seen the bottom of these two conditions, and found 1. That though the cause were granted to deserve zeal, it must yet disclaim contumelie, for so every true Christian cause doth. 2. That the truth between disputants is to be contested, not supposed. 3. That the truth of a proposition is no competent commission, or authority for (and so cannot make good) a contumely.