Vindication of the Treatise of Monarchy, Chapter 7
CHAP. VII. An Anſwer to the 7th Section of his Replie, of places of Scripture out of the old Testament.
HIs ſixt Section doth wholly concerne the Authour of the fuller Sect. 1 Anſwer, which I paſſe over, becauſe I am chargeable for no more then is my owne. And come to his ſeventh which containes an Examination of places alledged in this Queſtion out of the old Teſtament. Where he begins confidently that there is no warrant for Reſistance, p. 56. and he yeelds two Reaſons why. 1. Becauſe the Inſtitution of that Kingdom was ſuch as doth plainly exclude Reſiſtance. 2. Becauſe the Prophets never call for it. Anſ. I grant it doth exclude it, as farre as in an abſolute Monarchie it may be excluded; and therefore there is no need of anſwering his Arguments. But yet let us conſider them ſith he is ſo large in them.
To ſhew us the Inſtitution of that Kingdome he brings, 1 Sam. 8.11. Where he ſayes we have it. For Samuel is commanded, v. 9. To tell the people (Jus Regis:) Now this jus Regis he makes a great matter of, and tels us it implies not a Right of doing ſuch unjuſt Acts, but a ſecuritie from Reſiſtance and force, if he does them. p. 56.
Anſ. 1. It is no prejudice to the cauſe I defend, if I ſhould grant all he would worke out of this Text; for it prooves no farther then of that particular Kingdome, inducing no neceſſitie that all others muſt have the ſame Inſtitution. Alſo that which he concludes is but a ſecuritie for the Perſon of the Prince from force if he doe ſuch unjuſt Acts: which we grant him not only in that, but all Monarchies, even the moſt limited.
2. If he have any further reach, and would conclude out of it a generall binding Ordinance of ſecurity from Reſiſtance entending even to ſubverſive Inſtruments of Will. The world will wonder at him for ſuch an audacious concluſion from ſuch premiſes. And we will look a little nearer to what he ſayes. All is grounded on his Interpretation of Jus Regis. Which he ſeeks to confirme by Calvins Authority.
Firſt, for his Interpretation. I ſay the Originall words in this place are not to be tranſlated jus Regis, the Right of the King. Becauſe 1. There is another more fit ſignification of them: the words are foreign now the word foreign being applied to unjuſt Acts, as here it is ought not to be rendred jus, but mos, not Right, but manner, as appeares by another place anſwerable to this, 1 Sam. 27.11. foreign ſpeaking of Davids roving, This will be his manner, 'twere ridiculous to render it, this will be his right or priviledge. This out laſt Interpreters knowing, did willingly depart from the Ʋulgar Latine; whoſe Authour either ignorantly or inconſiderately did render it jus Regis; which this Doctour for his advantage doth here make ſo much of. 2. That rendring of it, cannot be juſtified by any other Text of Scripture; for wherſoever it is rendred Jus, it imports a morall Right; not a priviledge or ſecuritie in ill doing. I challenge any skilfull in that tongue to bring one place where it is or can be ſo rendred.
Then for Calvins Authority. I anſwer. 1. What if Calvin or any other deceived by the vulgar Latine, or ignorance of the extent of the Originall word, have rendred it ill; muſt that be a preſcription to others who know a better? 2. Neither doth Calvin, though he follow the Latine and render it jus, meane ſuch a jus as the Doctour doth, ſc. An abſolute immunity, or ſecurity from Reſiſtance: but onelyonly from private men. For after he hath in all thoſe paſſages, which the Doctour cites, exempted Kings from violence, truly and piouſly urging patience in Subjects under the injuries of their Princes, at length Inſtit. l. 4. c. 10. (the ſame out of the which the Doctor brings his proofes) num. 31. He explaines himſelfe, De privatis hominibus ſemper loquor, that all is to be taken of private men; not of the States of a Kingdome, in their publike meetings: never diſcerning of ſuch a univerſall immunitie, as the Doctour would put upon him to maintaine. And here I challenge not the Ingenuity, but the Conſcience of this Replier, who cites Calvin at large in the former place, as agreeing with him in this caſe of Reſiſtance, when he cannot be ignorant of the contrary, and therefore conceales his following words in the 31. num. Where he expreſſely teaches the ſame Truth which I have aſſerted in my Treatiſe. Heare him ſpeaking his judgement, De privatis hominibus ſemper loquor: Nam ſi qui nunc ſunt populares magiſtratus ad moderandum Regum libidinem constituti (quales olim erant, qui Lacedemonijs regibus oppoſiti erant, Ephori, aut Romanis Conſulibus, Tribuni plebis; aut Athenienſium Senatui, Demarchi; & qua etiam forte potestate (ut nunc res habent) funguntur in ſingulis regnis tres ordines, cum primarios conventus peragunt) adeo illos fenocienti Regum licentiae pro officio intercedere non veto, ut ſi Regibus impotenter graſſantibus, & humili plebeculae inſultantibus conniveant, eorum diſſimulationem nefaria perfidia non carere affirmem, quia populi libertatem cui ſe, Dei ordinatione, Tutores poſitos norunt, fraudulenter produnt. He is cleare, that the Eſtates in Parliament, not only may, but are Gods ordinance for it, and are bound to reſiſt, and not ſuffer the deſtruction of liberties, by exorbitating Princes; ſo that I may juſtly retort the Doctors words, p. 57. There can be nothing ſpoken more plainly for the power of reſiſtance in the Houſes of Parliament then this.
Then for his other reaſon from the 18. verſe, Ye ſhall cry out in that day, and the Lord will not heare you. As in my Treatiſe I called it inconſequent; ſo alſo now: He is a good Logician which can draw his concluſion out of thoſe premiſes. But he blames me, p. 58. for ſaying it was an abſolute Monarchy, and cannot ſee how it can be ſo, according to my deſcription of abſoluteneſſe. Why not? In Abſolute Monarchy, there are no limits but the Monarchs own will; but theſe had a fixed judiciall Law, p. 59. I anſwer, That judiciall Law was no limits of their power; but of the exerciſe only; for the non obſervance of it by the King did not amount to an untying of the bond of ſubjection in the people. The Judiciall Laws being from God, not from any contract of the people, were in the ſame nature to that people, and for the time, with the Morall Laws; and in the ſame manner did limit their Kings, and no otherwiſe. But for the Abſoluteneſſe of that Monarchy, here Lyra (more faithfully cited,Lyra, in 1 Sam. 8. then he did Calvin above) Conſtitutio Regis juxta poteſtatem ſibi conceſſum eſt duplex.) 1. Plena & legibus abſoluta, prout legiſte de Imperatore dicere ſolent. 2. Cum poteſtate limitata. Now ſayes he, the people ſinned, not ſimply in asking a King; but in asking a King of the firſt ſort, to judge them as the Nations, that is, abſolutely. He is expreſſe. 1. That limitation of power makes a limited Monarch. 2. That Iſrael deſiring ſuch a Government as the adjacent Nations, deſired an abſolute Monarch. And indeed as the definement of the morall Law doth not diſparage the Abſoluteneſſe of the Monarch, becauſe it is from God, not the people; ſo did not their judiciall, for the ſame reaſon.
Sect 2 Next he comes to the peoples reſcue of Jonathan, p. 60. He may give their reſolute Oath what names pleaſeth him, a loving importunate violence, a ſouldierly boldneſſe, or the like; it was a peremptory expreſſion of no leſſe then an intent of reſiſtance, in caſe there had been need. Then for Davids purpoſe in having armed men about him; He ſays it was only to ſecure his perſon against the cut-throates of Saul, that is, againſt his private Emiſſaries. But who ſees not a large difference betweene ſecuring a mans ſelfe from private Emiſſaries, and appearing in the field with Armies against the Armies of the Prince, p. 61. Anſwer, 1. It is againſt reaſon, that he ſhould retaine an Army of 600. valiant Souldiers, yea a great Army, like the Hoſt of God, 1 Chron. 12.22. to ſecure himſelfe meerely againſt private Emiſſaries. 2. Let us grant him that there is a difference between ſecuring againſt private Emiſſaries, and the open Army: yet if he grant it lawfull to uſe force againſt one, he grants the cauſe by it, of all; for a warrant from an act of the Kings will is as valid to ſecure a few Emiſſaries, as a whole Army: and Gods Ordinance in one man, is no more reſiſtible, then in a multitude. Then for Davids intent to keep Keylah againſt Saul, it is ſo evident, by the hiſtory, that I will ſay no more about it; but doe refer him to that which the Pleaders for defenſive Armes ſay about it. The Doctor ſeeks divers evaſions, to get out of the reach of this example; but doth not ſatisfie himſelfe, much leſſe others, and therefore adds the fourth on which he muſt reſt when all is ſaid, That Davids example was extraordinary: Hereon he brings ſome things in him which were extraordinary; We grant it in many things; but we deny it in this. If the Doctor will prove him to have a ſpeciall priviledge to reſiſt Gods ordinance in his Soveraign, more then other men; he muſt bring the grant and warrant for it: otherwiſe David muſt come under the common condition for this matter: He himſelfe acknowledges he had none for violating the perſon of his Prince; and ſure then he had none for violating the Authority of his Prince, conferred on private Emiſſaries, if they had any. But in his p. 65. He layes hard at me, and challengeth not only my Reaſon for calling this a ſhufling Anſwer, but alſo my ingenuity, who confeſſe the people in that Government might not reſiſt; and yet doe urge theſe examples for Reſiſtance. Anſwer, 1. For my Reaſon: I have made it appeare I have reaſon to call it ſo; is it not a meere evaſion, to affirme in him an extraordinary priviledge, and can bring no word, nor warrant for it? 2. For my ingenuity it is without cauſe challenged by him; for from the lawfullneſſe of Reſiſtance of unreaſonable Acts of will, in an abſolute Monarchy, where Reaſon is the Princes law; I may a fortiori conclude the lawfulneſſe of reſiſting of inſtruments of illegall Acts in a limited Monarchy, where the Law of the Land is the Princes Law and bounds.