Vindication of the Treatise of Monarchy, Chapter 6
CHAP. VI. An Anſwer to his 5. Sect. of Reſistance in Relation to ſeverall kinds of Monarchy.
THE reſidue of his Book is ſpent about the Queſtion of Reſiſtance; Sect. 1 I might well ſpare the labour of any farther Anſwer; for now having ſo apparently made good theſe two Aſſertions. 1. That ſoveraignty may be limited in the very power. 2. That de facto, it is ſo in this Government, every one may diſcerne the neceſſary truth of theſe inferences, 1. That in this Government, the exceeding Acts of the Princes will, being out of the compaſſe of his Authority, can not authorize their Inſtruments. 2. That hereon Reſiſtance of them is no other then of private men, not of Authority, or Gods Ordinance. But becauſe the Doctors chiefe confidence is in this part of his diſcourſe, and he is large in it, I will therefore goe on in my work, and will briefly make appeare that his Reaſons are infirme, and his Authorities impertinent, and his Anſwers very inſufficient: for having been ſo large in making good my ſuppoſals, and overthrowing his, I may the more contract my ſelfe in this remaining buſineſſe. In this Section he propoſeth two things. 1. To conſider how I ſtate the point of Reſiſtance in the kinds of Governments. 2. To prove that Limitation and Mixture in government doe not imply a forceable conſtraining Power in ſubjects, p. 39. I will follow him in both.
My ſtating the Queſtion vindicated.He begins with a charitable cenſure of my ſtating the Queſtion, and ſayes he finds it to be in a way that lies very open to Rebellion, p. 33. Let the Reader judge: I am ſure, his Reſolves and Determinations are not in a way to deſtroy all liberty, and make all Governments Arbitrary, but directly doe it. Then for my maintaining the Perſon of the Monarch in all Formes to be above the reach of Force, he approves it; yet ſayes I allow ſubjects to raiſe Armies, to give battle to thoſe that are about him as his guard. He wrongs me, I ſay not his guard but ſubverſive ſeducers and inſtruments: Thoſe which he called cut-throates in his firſt booke; now he repents he gave that hard name to his clients, whom he pleades ſo hard to ſave harmeleſſe, and makes them amends with the ſtile of a Guard. A guard which bring him into greater danger then all his enemies; who bring him into battell to ſave themſelves, where Ordnance and Musket can put no difference: No; They uſe him as their guard. If harme befall him, which God avert, the guilt and puniſhment will fall on them who are ſo prodigall of hazarding his ſacred Perſon, not on thoſe who could deſire nothing more then his ſecurity, by abſence from a multitude, who by undertaking the ſubverſion of Religion and Lawes (for that is the Doctors ſuppoſition) bring themſelves in danger of condigne deſtruction.
Then he proceeds to Reſiſtance in an Abſolute State. Where I affirme, If ſuch a Monarch ſhould ſeeke the deſtruction of the whole Community, his inſtruments of ſuch inhumanity may be reſiſted. He dares not deny it; but would know what I doe meane by the whole community. I meane the whole ſimely, or the whole interpretatively; that is, the greater part; and therefore his exception of the Jewes in the Kingdome of Ahaſuerus, or the Templers in the Weſterne Kingdomes, is not to the purpoſe: but the inſtance which I bring of the Law-Countries, comes home: for they were the whole community; but the Replier corrupts it, when he ſaith the Spaniſh King intended the extirpation of the Proteſtants only, p. 34. For he intended not only theirs, but of all, Papiſts and elſe, which would not admit the introduction of an Arbitrary Government, and the ſubverſion of their liberties, as the hiſtories thereof make plaine. Here in this 34. page, the Doctor ſhewes a bad mind: Taking occaſion to excuſe the Rebels in Ireland, as if they might juſtifie themſelves on theſe grounds; and intimating a falſhood, as if the Parliament did intend their extirpation, hereby declaring how ill he likes any effectuall courſe for the rooting out of Popery out of the Kingdomes. Indeed, he ſayes, he pleads not for them, but yet he doth it. He finds out arguments for them; and ſhews them a way, both how to excuſe themſelves, and accuſe the Parliament; and to call a reſolution of cleanſing that Iland from Popery, an extirpation of their Nation. He ſayes, the example of David proves not this, being but a particular Man. I ſay, it proves it the more ſtrongly, as ſhall appeare. Then if a particular mans life be invaded without any plea of reaſon, I ſuppoſe it hard to deny him the liberty of poſitive reſiſtance of agents; and prove it by the inſtance of the peoples reſcue of Jonathan; and Davids of himſelfe; where the peoples Oath; and Davids Army, with his enquiry at Keilah doe prove a ſerious and reall purpoſe of Reſiſtance, let the Doctor ſay what he pleaſe to the contrary; ſo that theſe examples come home to juſtifie reſiſtance in ſuch caſe, even in an Abſolute Monarchy; for here are particular men, in an abſolute Monarchy, aſſaulted without plea of reaſon; for that Jonathan, who had wrought ſuch a deliverance, ſhould die, for taſting in his ignorance a little honey, there was no colour of reaſon; the Kings raſh oath was none. And that David ſhould be put to death, whom Saul himſelfe oft with his own mouth profeſſed innocent, and abſolved, was as much without plea of reaſon: ſo that here I need not flie to the Doctors ſhift of an extraordinary caſe, as he tells me I muſt, p. 35. I acknowledge no extraordinary caſe in theſe examples: Take them in their due extent, and they juſtifie no more then I have aſſerted; and ſo much they doe. In my 5. Aſſertion, p. 11. Of ſubmitting States, Liberties and Perſons to the will of an Abſolute Monarch carrying any plea of reaſon; He faults my Order, and tells me, it ſhould have been firſt. It ſeems this mans eye can ſpie ſmall faults; but why firſt, he doth not ſay. I think in ſtating of the queſtion of reſiſtance I may as well begin with the Affirmative, and ſhew firſt when it may be uſed, and then when it ought not; as on the contrary; but he will make a fault, where he finds none. But what ſayes he to the Aſſertion? He grants it; but diſlikes the limitation, ſo it carry plea or ſhew of reaſon: and ſayes here the way is open enough to rebellion, p. 36. No opener then himſelfe makes it, p. 10. This is uſuall with him, when he diſlikes a thing: He can ſpeak no leſſe words then Rebellion. But why ſayes he ſo? Every man will be ready to think there is no reaſon nor equity in the will of the Monarch when he is oppreſſed by him. He may well enough, if hee be oppreſſed: but yet there may be a plea and colour of equity even for an Act of Oppreſſion; and in an Abſolute Monarchy it will little availe a man though he think there is no reaſon for it: for he muſt not be his own judge; nor hath he any outward judge to appeale to; but the Reaſonable will of the Monarch himſelfe; if he ſubmit to its determination, there is no feare of Rebellion; if not, I have done with him, in ſuch a Government. Of Saules cenſure of Jonathan and David I have ſpoken already and made it appeare it had no plea of reaſon, was not the act of a reaſonable will; and therefore I may hold their examples ordinary, without impeachment of this Aſſertion.
Then he proceeds to Reſiſtance in limited and mixed Rules, p. 36. Concerning which I ſaid, p. 17. If the exorbitances be of leſſe moment they ought to be borne, and p. 18. If mortall and deſtructive neither can be otherwiſe redreſſed, then prevention by Reſiſtance may be uſed. Here firſt he challengeth my ingenuity, for words ſpoken in my 49. page. He ſaid Sect. 1. of his firſt booke, We may and ought to deny obedience to ſuch commands of the Prince as are unlawfull by the Law of God; yea by the eſtabliſhed lawes of the Land. I cenſured this ſpeech, that it is more then ſhould be ſaid, ſure, a hainous fault in me: I ſay more; he hath ſaid more then ſhould be ſaid, by all theſe three bookes, in which he ſayes that which diſſolves all frames of Government into arbitrary, overthrowes all effectuall limitation of Power; and ſure that is more then ſhould be ſaid. And for that particular clauſe; Is it not more? He ſpeakes without reſtriction: Doth joyne things unlawfull by the law of God, and things unlawfull by the lawes of the Land: And puts the ſame may and ought to both; if the affirmation muſt be underſtood univerſally of one, how can it be underſtood otherwiſe of the other: It cannot be excuſed from the cenſure of a confuſed and unwary ſpeech. He paſſeth, p. 37. to the Queſtion, Who ſhall be the ultime judge of ſubverſive exorbitancies. He would know who? I have told him my opinion hereof at large in that Tract: Here I would faine know his; but he would rather carp at mine, then give his own. When I ſay there can be no Authoritative judge to determine it. He commends my ingenuity, p. 37. but I doe not only ſay it, but at large doe prove it, there p. 67. as well againſt him, as againſt thoſe others; why doth he not undertake that Queſtion againſt me, if he hath any mind to it. He much diſlikes when I ſay, p. 18. The fundament all Lawes muſt judge in every mans conſcience. This is, ſayes he, a ready way to anarchy and confuſion, p. 37. I referre not this caſe to the conſciences of men as to an Authoritative Judge, but a morall principle of diſcerning Right: And who can deny unto man ſuch a liberty to conceive of right according to the light he hath from the fundamentals of a State? Let the judicious reade what I have ſaid here-about, p. 67. of that Tract; and let him then tell how that Queſtion can be otherwiſe determined, unleſſe he overthrow. Monarchy, by giving a finall judgement to the States; or all Liberty, if he give it to the Monarch; and ſuppoſing the Ayme at ſubverſion be evident to mens conſciences, can we deny them a naturall power of judging according to that evidence; or liberty of aſſiſting the wronged? So when I ſay the wronged ſide muſt make it evident to every mans conſcience: alſo the appeale must be to the Community, as if there were no Government; and as every man is convinced in conſcience he is bound to give aſſiſtance, p. 29. of my Tract: He calls this good ſtuffe, p. 37. Why? becauſe I ſay, the people are at liberty as if there were no Government; and this appeale is diſadvantagious to the Monarch; for they will be more ready to believe their repreſentative: This would in the conſequence be dangerous, the high way to confuſion, p. 38. Anſw. 1. I ſay, not ſimply, that people are at liberty, as if there were no Government; but in this particular Question; bound ſtill, as before, in all beſides. 2. He takes me as if by Community I meant only the Commons; when I expreſſe it by genus humanum, eſpecially of that Kingdome. 3. He cenſures the Reaſon of Man-kind of partiality towards their Repreſentatives. Not ſo; for in ſo great a Queſtion Wiſe men cannot be blinded: Honest men will goe according to their conſcience, and Reaſonoble men according to evidence, and will ſee it concernes them as well to avoid Anarchy by aiding a wronged Monarch; as Tyranny by aiding an oppreſſed State. But ſith this Replicant is ſo bitter an enveigher againſt an Appeale ad conſcientiom generis humani, in this laſt caſe ſo uncapeable of an Authoritative deciſion: 1. Let him conſider on what foundation God hath built Monarchy and all other powers, but on the conſciences of men, Rom. 13. 2. Let him weigh whether, when he hath ſaid all he can ſay, ſuch an appeale be avoidable. For, 1. If a controverſie ariſe between the King and a particular perſon or place; the King ſhall Judge it in his Courts by his Judges, and the ſentence ſhall be executed by the force and armes of his other ſubjects. 2. If it be between Him and the Repreſentatives of his whole Kingdome, and ſupreme Court of Judicature in which the Acts and Perſons of all other Courts and Judges are to be judged. The King cannot judge this in his other Courts and by his Judges; nor yet by himſelfe; for a King out of his Courts cannot judge in a Legall Government, eſpecially the acts of his ſupreme Court. But be it ſo: ſuppoſe the Doctor and I ſhould agree in this, that the King by himſelfe is the ultime Judge of Controverſies: Yet it is very like thoſe States with whom the Contention is, will not yeild him ſo, to judge againſt them, in his own cauſe. But ſuppoſe they doe not ſubmit to his determination: He will ſay, then they ſin, and rebell againſt him. Well, let it be granted; yet ſubmit they doe not: I demand in this caſe, what courſe the King hath to make effectuall his ſentence? It muſt be by force of armes, by the ſword: but of whom? Either the peoples whoſe repreſentatives they are; or other mens: but what ſhall bind them to afford their Force to make good his ſentence? It muſt be their conſcience of his right: Thus when all is done and ſaid, To the conſciences of Men muſt his appeall be; and to them muſt he make evident his right, in this extreme contention. Yea this man in a controverſie of the like nature, is compelled to acknowledge as much: For the Pleaders put the caſe; If a King be diſtracted, I may adde, if his Title be dubious, &c. The Doctors anſwer is, if it be cleare that a King is ſo, &c. p. 8. but who ſhall determine this If? muſt not ſelf-evidence in the conſciences of Men? This is all the judiciall power the Doctour can referre us to in theſe caſes. Laſtly, He would know what power there is in a Community to make reſiſtance; and anſwers himſelfe, A Parliamentary and Legall; not Military and Forcible, p. 38. Thus he ſpeakes of theſe as contradiſtinct, when they are ſubordinate, Forcible being ſubſervient to Legall to make it valid and effectuall, which elſe were meerely morall and ineffectuall; but this is one of his ſuppoſals whoſe vanity I have before diſcovered: And p. 51. of my Treatiſe, in a full diſpute have I proved the Parliaments power in reſiſting deſtructive inſtruments; which I doubt not, will appeare cleare, notwithſtanding any thing ſaid in this Reply. But that is very ſtrange which he affirmes, p. 39. That if they uſe a Legall reſtraining power, the Monarch cannot alter the establiſhed frame. Sure, by cannot, he underſtands fallaciouſly, as he uſeth to doe, a morall cannot, that is, not without ſin; which is a poor ſmall cannot now adays: if he mean indeed cannot, that is, is not able, it is againſt reaſon, by his grounds; for what is not he able to doe, whoſe loweſt, moſt deſperate inſtrument of pleaſure is unreſiſtible? Let him remember where he ſaid, p. 19. A forcible conſent cannot be wanting to a Conquerour, and a Conquerours power is no more then unreſiſtible. Nay; I am ſenſeleſſe on the Doctors grounds, if he cannot lawfully; for ſuppoſe he be pleaſed to make it a Queſtion, whether he were not better governe by the Civill-Law, as more conducent to Gods glory, and the end of Government. He is by Law the laſt judge of this Queſtion, if he determine it beſt: then he may lawfully doe it.
Now we are come to the ſecond part of this Section: in which he Sect. 2 undertakes the proofe of this Aſſertion, His Arguments againſt power of reſiſtance reſerved. anſwered.that Limitations and Mixtures in Monarchy doe not imply a forcible conſtraining power in ſubjects for the preventing of diſſolution, but only a Legall, p. 39. Anſw. He failes in the very propoſall of his Aſſertion in three points. 1. He propoſeth it of Limitation in generall; whereas I grant it of that which is only in exerciſe; affirming it only of that which is of the power it ſelfe. 2. He ſayes, Forcible conſtraining power in ſubjects, when he ſhould have ſpecified againſt ſubverſive inſtruments, for I grant it of the Monarch himſelfe. 3. He oppoſeth forcible to Legall, when it ſhould be oppoſed only to meere Morall, not to Legall, as before. Now let us weigh his Arguments. Firſt, Such a power muſt be in them by reſervation, and then it muſt be expreſſe in the conſtitution of the Government and Covenant, or elſe by implication. I will anſwer diſtinctly concerning this Reſervation of power of forcible Reſiſtance. 1. There is a Reſervation of liberty, or power of not being ſubject neither actively nor paſſively to the exceeding Acts of the Monarchs will: This is by implication, for what they did not reſigne up, they did reſerve. 2. A power of Authoritative judging and reſiſting the Monarch thus exceeding. This neither expreſſely nor implicitly is reſerved; not becauſe it is unlawfull, as the Doctor imagins, but contradictory to the very inſtitution of a Monarchy, and ſo, under that intention, impoſſible. 3. A power of forcible reſiſtance of ſubverſive inſtruments. This by the Authority of the Law, is, not reſerved, but expreſſely commited, not only to the Houſes of Parliament, but all inferiour Courts; for the Law, whoſe execution the King committeth unto them, commands them not only to reſiſt, but puniſh its violaters, much more its ſubverters, without exceptions of Perſons, or reſpect of their number, or ground and reaſon why they doe it, whether with or againſt the Kings private and abſolute will or Warrant: ſuppoſing ſuch men to be without warrant. And this power of judging all violators and ſubverters of Laws being committed to them, includes a power of imploying the force or Armes of the County, or whole Kingdome, if need be, to make good the ſentence of the Law againſt them: This power being a neceſſary attendant to the former. And they who have the power of judging by Commiſſion, have the power of force by implication. To his five Arguments therefore by which he proves this power not reſerved by implication; I briefly Anſwer. 1. Limitation cannot infer it, &c. Anſwer, Limitation in exerciſe only doth not: but in the power it ſelfe doth infer it, as I have often ſhewed. 2. The inconveniencies of exorbitancie cannot infer it. Anſwer, They doe not infer it of themſelves, for they are the ſame in abſolute Rule: but ſuppoſing a people mind in their Frame effectually to prevent thoſe inconveniencies, that doth infer it. 3. The conſent and intention of the people, chooſing a Monarch cannot infer it, becauſe it is not the meaſure of the power it ſelfe. Anſwer, I have before proved the contrary, and made the Doctors ſuppoſall appeare a groundleſſe falſhood concerning unlimited power by Gods ordinance. 4. The intention of the people in procuring Limitations of power cannot infer it. Anſwer, If the peoples intention in it, be a greater ſecurity from oppreſſion then in an abſolute Government they can have, or a meere morall limitation can give them; then it doth inferre it. 5. If the Architects did intend ſuch a forceable power to theſe States, they would not have beſt it in his power to diſſolve them, p. 42. This hath had its full ſatiſfaction before. Theſe are poore infirme arguments, as the reader cannot but ſee, yet he ends in a triumph. Therefore I conclude here as I promiſed in the ſecond Section, where the Prince ſtands ſupreme, &c. there Subjects may not by force of armes reſiſt, though he be exorbitant, &c. p. 43. 'Tis true he concludes as he promiſed, but he hath not proved, as he promiſed; nor as we expected; for here is nothing, but that which fals to the ground with his ſuppoſals on which they are built; and which I have demoliſhed in the 4th Chapter.