Vindication of the Treatise of Monarchy, Chapter 4
CHAP. IV. Wherein the vanity and falſhood of the ſuppoſals whereon the Doctor hath built all his diſcourſes is made appeare.
Sect. 1 AFter a ſcattered gleaning of paſſages in the former Sections, the Doctor undertakes the two great Queſtions. 1. Of the Conſtitution of this Monarchy, in his Sect. 4. 2. Of Reſiſtence, in the remainder of his book. Which two, we ſhould now immediately purſue; but that another work more conducent to the ending of this contention will for a while divert me.
Errour in the ſearch of controverted truths doth more often ariſe from the judgement, then from the reaſon: Men doe more offend in laying falſe grounds; then in deducing falſe inferences from true grounds; This I have obſerved in the Doctors bookes: He truly argues, but from falſe principles; and then the ſuperſtructure muſt needs be anſwerable, ſo that, overthrow his foundations, and then all his building will of it ſelfe ruine into apparent falſhood. I confeſſe he every where ſayes the ſame of my Grounds, on which I have built that Treatiſe: He cals them falſe and groundleſſe ſuppoſals, and fancies, and what elſe he pleaſeth: I will therefore make him a fayre offer: Let us make a ſhort work of it: let us joyne iſſue upon our ſuppoſals, on which both our diſcourſes are built.
This Doctors ſuppoſals which he ſcarce ever makes ſhew to prove and on which he hath built his Reſolves and Diſcourſes I doubt not to call unſound and falſe: and doe profeſſe the contrary to be my grounds whoſe truth I will maintaine. His may be reduced to foure heads. 1. Concerning the Ordinance of God in Soveraignty. 2. Concerning the Nature and Quality of Limitation. 3. The Meanes and cauſes of Limitation. 4. The Conſtitution of this Monarchy. And according to this order we will take them into examination.
Firſt, Of the Ordinance of God in Magiſtracy, Of Gods ordinance in ſupremacie.He proceeds on two falſe principles. 1. That the Governing power is one and the ſame which God gives and ſettles upon the perſon that is ſupreme, p. 13. that is, it is abſolute and unlimited in the power it ſelfe; and may be limited only in the exerciſe thereof, p. 17. 2. Which followes from the former, that Conſent of people may be the meane of deſigning the perſon, and yeilding ſubjection to him, who elſe could not challenge it more then an other man; alſo a meane of limiting that power in the exerciſe of it; but not the meaſure of the power it ſelfe, which in ſuch a meaſure is given of God to all Soveraignes, p. 41. ſo then;Queſtion propoſed. let this be the Queſtion, Whether it be Gods Ordinance that Governing power in all Soveraignes be one unlimited thing; and can receive no meaſure from the people? The Doctor affirmes it; and p. 84, tells us he hath often inſinuated it; but he ſhould once directly prove it, if he be able, ſo he might have preſcribed to the whole controverſie; for if he can make this good, in vaine doe we enquire about the conſtitution of this Monarchy; or the lawfulneſſe of reſiſtance of ſubverſive inſtruments of the Princes will. Doth he think a covert inſinuation would ſerve the turne to impoſe ſuch an Aſſertion, which fruſtrates the intent of mankind in framing limitations of Governing power; and captives all into an abſolute paſſive ſubjection to the vileſt inſtruments of the will of him who is ſupreme. In all his reply I find but two places which have any ſhew of proofe of this overbold Aſſertion. One is p. 14. Before Government eſtabliſhed the people have not any power of a community duplicate page duplicate page or politick power whereby a command may be laid upon others; but only a naturall power of private reſiſtance. The other is p. 42. The people have not of themſelves out of Government, the maine power, the power of life and death, how then can they give it either for Government, or reſerve it for Reſistance? Here be weake foundations to build ſuch an Aſſertion, and three ſuch inſulting books on. What a nothing this is, I ſhall make appeare anon.
Queſtion ſtated.Now I hold the Negative of this Queſtion; and doubt not to approve it firme truth: To that end, firſt I will premiſe ſuch things as we agree in, that ſo the point in queſtion may the more diſtinctly appeare. Which I apprehend are or may be theſe. 1. That Governing power is originally from Gods Ordinance. 2. That it being ſo, is unreſistible in its whole latitude, in all the acts which flow from it. This the Apoſtle is cleare for, Rom. 13. and for no more, that I know. Alſo that this is true as well in Limited as Abſolute Governments; v. g. In abſolute Monarchy, where Authority doth inveſt the whole will; the Monarch is unreſiſtible in all the acts of his reaſonable will; becauſe all are acts flowing from Gods Ordinance. So in limited Monarchy, where Authority doth not ſimply inveſt the will of a Monarch, but ſo far forth as it is regulated by ſuch a law, the Monarch is unreſiſtible in all the acts of his will which are according to that law; becauſe they are acts flowing from Gods Ordinance: Yea though either of theſe doe limit himſelfe in the exerciſe of his power, no way thereby diminiſhing the fulneſſe of his power; and afterward exceed thoſe limits, yet he is unreſiſtible, and to be ſubjected to actively in lawfull things, and paſſively in unlawfull: my reaſon is, becauſe even thoſe acts, notwithſtanding limitation, flow from Gods Ordinance of Authority, which remaines the ſame, and not leſſened by ſuch limitation. 3. This governing power is ordinarily conveyed to perſons by publick conſent, which is a point made good in my former Treatiſe, and in the former chapter hereof. 4. That this publick conſent is not only a meane, but hath a cauſall influence in conveying Authority to perſons. 5. That men working by ſuch conſent as ſecond cauſes, doe neceſſarily convey ſuch Authority, as God hath ordained; ſo that, if it can be proved either by Scripture or ſound reaſon, that it is Gods ordinance, that ſupremacie ſhould be unlimited, and as large as all the acts of his will which hath it, then whatever men capitulate about limitation of it, is vaine, ſo that the Doctor need prove only that point; and for my part I will give him the cauſe. 6. Limitation of Power may be either of Acts, when Power is conveyed to Perſons to doe certaine Acts of Power; but not all. Or elſe of Manner of working; when Power is conveyed to doe all Acts of Authority, but according to ſuch a preſcribed Rule. Now I grant the former cannot be in the conveyance of Soveraigne Power, an inferiour Officer may be limited by commiſſion to certaine acts of Power; and have no Authority to do other Acts of power; but when Soveraignty is conveyed, and the Perſon is ſet up next to God, above all the people, as the Doctour ſaith. He muſt have an unlimited Power in reſpect of Acts of Government: for Gods Ordinance is not onelyonly that there ſhould be Power for ſuch an end; ſc. a Peaceable life in godlineſſe and honeſtie; but ſufficiencie of Power for the attainment of that end: So that all Power of doing any Act needfull for that end, muſt be in him who is ſupreme, and the comprehenſive Head of Power to inferiour Magiſtrates. So that all the Queſtion truly ſtated is about the other ſort of Limitation, ſc. Whether Soveraigne Power be ſo unlimited in its Rule of Acting, that it inveſteth the whole Reaſonable Will of him who hath it: So that all the acts which proceed from him who hath it according to the rule of his owne Reaſon, be potestative, and from Gods Ordinance.
Secondly, having thus punctually ſtated the Queſtion,Queſtion determined. the Determination muſt proceed in a double way, ſc. 1. In ſimple Governments. 2. In mixed Governments. I do maintain the Negative in both: and my proof ſhall be formed accordingly.
Firſt then, In ſimple Government, Power is not one Ʋnlimited thing Aſſert. 1 in the ſupreme: But may be limited in the very being and root of it. 1. The cauſe or meane by which alone it is conveyed, if it beſtow or Reaſ. 1 convey only a limited Power, then it is limited in the very Being of it. For there can be no more then is conveyed: Now we know, the people by their publike act of conſent and compact, may either bind themſelves to a full ſubjection to the Monarchs Will guided by his owne Reaſon; or by ſome conſtituted rule or law ſet him to governe by; which latter if they doe, then is his Authority radically limited: For they owing no more ſubjection; He can have no farther Power. 2. If ſoveraignty may be ſo limited, that Active Obedience is not Reaſ. 1 due to the commands which exceed thoſe limits, but may lawfully be denied to them (as the Doctour acknowledges it may, p. 16.) Then it may be limited in the Power it ſelfe: For in ſuch caſe the Power exceeds not the limitation; for if the exceeding Acts were poteſtative, we owe Active ſubjection to them, in as much as they are the Ordinance of God, to which in omnibus non prohibitis, Active ſubjection Reaſ. 3 is due. 3. If Power in the ſupreme be ſuch, that it cannot be limited, then either becauſe it is Gods Ordinance; or elſe becauſe it is ſupreme: but its being Gods Ordinance hinders not; for we ſee, Rom. 13. All Powers as well ſupreme, as ſubordinate are Gods Ordinance, yet ſubordinate Powers may be limited, not only in the Rule of Acting, but in the kind of Acts; as none can denie. Neither its being ſupreme doth hinder its limitableneſſe; indeed, as before it hinders it from being capable of confinement, in the kind of Acts: but in the meaſure or rule of working, it doth not hinder, in as much as a Soveraigne Power may as well attaine its end, by being confined to another Law from without, as by the Law of its own Reaſon, if not much better; alſo we no where finde Gods Word making any difference or giving power to confine ſubordinate Powers; but forbidding it of Soveraignes. Reaſ. 4 4. That is to be granted, which denied makes all Soveraignes arbitrary, and of equall Power; but to affirme that Power is one, unlimited, and inveſting all the Acts of the Soveraignes Will doth ſo, for then is ſoveraignty arbitrary, not when it hath no morall bounds, for then none were or could be arbitrary; but when Power is ſo fully in Reaſ. 5 one that every Act of his Arbitrium or Will is Poteſtative and ſoveraigne. 5. I have the judgement of all the Reformed Churches and Divines in Germany, France, Belgia, Scotland, on my part; who have both allowed and actually uſed forceable Reſiſtance againſt ſubverſive Inſtruments of their Soveraignes Will; yea our owne famous Princes Elizabeth, James, and our preſent Soveraigne, both by edicts, and Aſſiſtance have juſtified the ſame: which they would not have done, had they been perſwaded of ſuch an unlimited Ordinance of God inveſting all the Acts of the Will of him who is ſupreme. So that by all this it appears that the Doctors conceit of ſuch an unlimited Ordinance of God, which he brings not a tittle of Gods word to prove, is a meere chimera and groundleſſe conceit.
Object.Now the onelyonly difficulty, which I can thinke on, is this. Gods Ordinance in ſoveraignty, as before, is not onelyonly Power to ſuch an end; but ſufficiencie of Power to the aſſecution of that end: now a limited Power ſeemeth not to be ſufficient for the end of Government, becauſe there are two Powers neceſſary to the end of Government, ſc. Power of making and authentique Interpreting of Laws, which are not conſiſtent with a Limitation of Power.
I anſwer: It is true of Limitation in reſpect of Acts; Sol.and therefore I averre, that ſuch a Limitation cannot be where Power is ſupreme: but for Limitation to a Rule and defined way of Working, I cannot ſee how it with-ſtands the end of Government: So that ſuppoſing Power of making and Interpreting Laws be neceſſary to the end of Government, yet that they be Abſolutely reſident in him who is ſupreme, ſc. To make Lawes and Interprete Lawes authoritatively without being bound to follow any Light or Rule therin, but his owne Reaſon is not neceſſary to the end of Government: In theſe Acts a regulated Power is enough in the moſt ſimple State, ſc. a Power to make new Lawes, if any be needfull; and Interpreting the old, if ambiguous, according to the Rule of the former eſtabliſhed Laws; and by the adviſe of his learned Counſell and Judges of his ſupreme Courts of Juſtice. We ſee in matters ſpirituall, there is no Legiſlative Power reſident, to ordain or give authentique ſence in matters de fide, yet the Church ſtands well enough; one ſtanding Rule of Scripture being ſufficient with a miniſteriall Interpretation: So it is probable a State might, by a complete ſtanding Rule of Law, and a Miniſteriall Power of Interpretation, were there no Legiſlative Power reſident in any Supreme Magiſtrate thereof.
But the matter is farre more cleare in a mixed Government; ſo that Aſſert. 2 were it neceſſary in a ſimple Government, that the Supreme ſhould be unlimited in his Power, yet in a Mixed (which is enough for us in this Kingdome) evidently it is not ſo: And to make this appeare, I will lay downe three grounds. 1. Such a Government may be eſtabliſhed that the ſupreme Power may be placed in many perſons, either of the ſame, or divers condition, that is, in a mixed Subject: elſe all formes were unlawfull except ſimple Monarchie. 2. If this ſupreame Power be inequally placed in theſe Perſons or States of men; ſo that a reall ſublimity and Principality be given to one, then the denomination may be taken from that Principall: and ſo it is a Monarchy, or Ariſtocracy, or Democracy mixed in the Power it ſelfe; however it pleaſeth this Replier to deride it, with the top, or Crowne of the head: of which more hereafter. 3. Where the Supremacy of power is thus in many, although all taken together have an unlimited Power, as in ours, yet neither of them ſeverall by himſelfe hath, or can have; for it is a contradiction, that it be reſident in many, and yet unlimitedly in One.
Now to thoſe two ſhewes of Argument, which in the beginning I produced out of this Reply, I ſay, before Government be eſtabliſhed it is true the people have no formall Politique Power of Life and Death; yet they have a ſeminall; that is, every one for himſelfe, his family and poſterity hath a power of reſigning up their naturall liberty, to be governed by One, or many; after this or that forme as they ſhall judge fitteſt. God ordaining that Powers ſhould be to ſuch an end, hath thereby legitimated and ratified any Conſent or Contract which people may make of parting with their liberty and giving Magiſtrates a common Power over them to that end. And Gods not preſcribing any Rule or Meaſure of Power by his Ordinance of Authority, hath left it in the peoples liberty, to reſigne up themſelves according to ſuch Rule and Termes, as they judge fitteſt, ſo it be ſuch as the end of his Ordinance may be attained thereby. Thus although by it ſelfe, and excluding Gods Ordinance they have no immediate Power to lay a command on others, nor Power of life and death, yet in vertue of Gods Ordinance their common conſent and contract is ſufficient to ſet up ſuch a Power which is endowed with a ſufficiency of Command for Government and the end of Government over thoſe which have, each man for himſelfe and his, ſet it up. So although ſecond Cauſes have no Power by themſelves to produce their effects, yet working in vertue of the firſt Cauſe they have Power to produce effects, ſometimes farre beyond their own Meaſure. Therefore I deſire this Doctour either to bring ſome Ordinance of God expreſſely forbidding to ſet any bounds or Rule of Power upon the Will of the Magiſtrate; or elſe let him ſuffer Man-kind to uſe their Right in reſigning up that liberty which God and nature hath given them upon ſuch termes and conditions as they apprehend beſt for their own good: and the due end of Government.
Summe.In the cloſe of this Queſtion, I will lay downe three Concluſions concerning the Ordinance of God, and the Nature of Soveraigntie.
Concluſ. 1 1. God hath ordained that in Societies of Men there ſhould be a Politike Power, for a peaceable and godly life: This Ordinance hath put a Seminall Power in all the Societies of Men, ſc. a Liberty and Power by common Conſent to reſigne up themſelves and theirs to one Supreame; thereby conſtituting a common Politique Power.
2. God in his Ordinance for Government having not determined any kind Concluſ. 2 or forme of Power; hath left it to the libertie of Societies of men to chooſe to which kind they will reſigne up themſelves, either to a ſupreme regulated in the Acts of his Will by his owne Reaſon, as in abſolute Government; or to one regulated by a Common Reaſon or Law conſtituted by publike conſent, as in Limited.
3. God in his Ordinance for Government having not determined the ſubject Concluſ. 3 of this Power, hath left it to the choice of Societies to inveſt with this Soveraigntie, either one Perſon or many, and thoſe either of the ſame, or divers ſorts and rankes of men; Whence ariſe ſimple or mixed Governments, and this is the Architectonicall Power left in ſocieties before they are engaged in a Government, which the Doctour doth ſo cauſleſly deride: Here is the ſumme of what I do averre concerning Gods Ordinance in Soveraigntie, which I challenge the Doctour or any elſe to gain-ſay.
The ſecond ſort of the Doctors falſe ſuppoſals reſpect the Nature and Sect. 2 Quality of Limitation, Of nature and Quality of Limitation.where alſo I obſerve that he proceeds on two falſe and fallacious Principles, ſc. 1. He every where confounds Morall and Civill or Legall Limitation, ſo p. 18. 93. 39. 2. That Soveraignty is capable onelyonly of a morall Limitation, p. 39, 42., So that if any other be in any State ordained, He cannot beleeve but ſuch a condition is unlawfull, and unreaſonable againſt the Order of Government. p. 39. If the nature of Limitation be well knowne, it will appeare that the Doctor hath done very inconſiderately, or rather very fraudulently (for he hath obſcured the Truth much by it) in confounding morall and Civill Limitation. We will therefore conſider the nature of Limitation ſomething more accurately then I have done in my former Treatiſe; for it will be a great light to the whole controverſie.
Firſt, We muſt conſider a diſtinction of Power, which is either, A Poſ. 1 ſimple Power of Willing or Doing, which is in every Morall Agent. 2. A Power of Authoritative and obligatorie Willing or Doing; ſo that an act of it, whether a Will of Command or Cenſure expreſſed, hath in it a binding power to ſubjection, this is that which we call Magistracy, of whoſe Limitation now we treat.
Secondly, concerning Limitation; we muſt know that it induceth Poſ. 2 an abſolute neceſſity of not producing any Act beyond thoſe Limits. For a Power having bounds beyond which it can exceed, if it pleaſe, though with difficulty, it is not properly limited, but hindred.
Poſ. 3 Thirdly, This neceſſity of not exceeding thoſe bounds is ſuch as the bounds themſelves are; ſo that it is ever true, That a Power in what way it is limited cannot exceed thoſe limits.
Poſ. 4 Of Moral limits.Fourthly, There are of this Power but two ſorts of Limits, ſc. 1. Morall, and 2. Civill or Politique. Of which two we muſt diſtinctly conſider. 1. Morall Limits is the Morall Will or Law of God; and a Power is ſaid to be limited by this, not when it cannot produce any Act at all: but when it cannot morally produce it, that is, without ſin. For the ſupervening of a morall bond, doth not take away the Power of doing, but of right or ſinleſſe doing: v. g. in Naturall Powers. Gods prohibition of eating Swines fleſh, did not take away from the Jew the naturall Power of eating it; but the power of ſinleſſe eating it. So in Civill power a prohibition of God comming upon it, doth not take away the Power of Civill and Authoritative Doing; but of lawfull, or ſinleſſe doing. And hence it followes, 1. That Morall Limitation is only of the Exerciſe of Power; not of the power it ſelfe: for the power is not thereby taken away, but remaines equally extenſe and able to all its acts, as it was before; only now it cannot put forth it ſelfe unto certaine Acts without ſinne, which it could before: Thus an Abſolute Monarch who hath a power of doing, as extenſe as his Reaſonable Will, promiſes to doe but this, or in this manner: now he is morally bound, by vertue of this promiſe; and cannot without ſinne doe otherwiſe: yet if he doe, his Commanding Power is the ſame, and its act binding to the Subject. And ſo it is proportionably in Legall Governments. Cyprian Biſhop of Carthage hath by the Canons a power of judging Eccleſiaſticall cauſes committed to him: He reſolves and promiſes to doe nothing of moment herein, but by the conſent of his Clergie, now he is morally bound: and if afterward he doe a thing by himſelfe without their conſent, he ſins: yet no man will ſay his Epiſcopall power is leſſened; or the act he ſo doth, is canonically invalid, and not obligatorie. 2. Yea it followes alſo that it is not properly a Limitation of the Exerciſe of power neither: for by a morall bond, the Power is not ſo bound up, but that it can exerciſe it ſelfe, and that validly too, though not without ſinne, as appeares before. 3. Alſo that it is no detraction from Abſoluteneſſe of Power; nor is it ſufficient to make a diſtinction of it into Abſolute and Limited. For, 1. It cauſes no reall Limitation of power, either in the nature, or exerciſe of it. 2. It is not diſtinctive, being to be found in the moſt abſolute power under heaven,Legall Limits. all being bounded by Gods Law, the Law of Equity, and many promiſes by themſelves made.
2. Civill or Legall Limits cauſe a Civill and Legall definement of Authority, ſo that, its exceeding acts are not Legall and binding, that is, are non Authoritative: for as a Morall bond induces a neceſſity of confinement in eſſe morali; ſo a Civill and Legall bond doth in eſſe legali & obligatorio. Hence follows, 1. It is theſe Legall and civill bounds which conſtitute a Government in a limited condition, not thoſe morall; for this is diſtinctive and is never found in an abſolute Governement, for there the Soveraigne by promiſe or Oath binding himſelfe to a ſtated courſe doth put no Law civill upon his power, or the exerciſe of it; for though he ſinne in exceeding afterwards, yet his acts are truely Legall and Authoritative. 2. This induceth a reall Limitation of power, neither can it be only of exerciſe; for ſith it brings an illegality and unauthoritativeneſſe on acts exceeding, that is, makes them none in eſſe civili & politico, it is a limitation of Power it ſelfe; for when a Power can produce no potentiall acts beyond ſuch limits, then it is limited in the very being. 3. Acts exceeding politique and legall Limitation, being not Legall nor authoritative in that State can give no authoritie to the Inſtruments, and therefore they may be reſiſted without reſiſtance or violation of Authoritie. Whereas it is otherwiſe in Acts exceeding morall Limitation; for being authoritative, they authorize the Inſtrument, and give him an unreſiſtance.
In ſumme: Limitation morall and civill or legall doe differ in three main particulars.
1. Morall, ſith it is no politique or Authoritative Act, Concluſ. 1 makes no reall detraction either in power or exerciſe of it, and therefore agrees with the moſt abſolute Government: whereas Legall, being a politique and authoritative Act makes a reall diminution; and ſo is the ratio formalis, or diſtinctive conceit conſtituting Limited government; nor can be found in abſolute.
2. Hence, Exceeding Acts notwithſtanding morall limitation are Concluſ. 2 authoritative, proceed from Gods Ordinance, and challenge ſubjection: but they are otherwiſe which exceed a legall limitation. Concluſ. 3
3. Exceeding Acts in morall limitation being authoritative have the Sword or compelling power annexed to them, which may not be reſiſted: but in Legall, being not authoritative, they have not the ſword or compelling power annexed, and therefore may be reſiſted in their Inſtruments: I will illuſtrate all this by a familiar inſtance. In our Government, a Iudge hath a Commiſſion to heare and determine Cauſes according to the Verdict of twelve men. Here is a Power limited in the very being, that is Legally and Civilly. This Iudge uſeth indirect meanes to corrupt the Iurie to bring in an unjuſt Verdict; but judgeth as his Commiſſion binds him according to their Verdict: Here is a morall exceeding, yet the Act of judgement is Authoritative, becauſe according to his Commiſſion, and muſt not be reſiſted. Againe, He paſſeth ſentence in another cauſe expreſſely againſt the Verdict of the Iury, in an arbitrary way. Here is a Legall exceeding, and the ſentence is non authoritative. He having no ſuch Power committed to him, the ſentence can have no binding power in it. Hereby it appeares how without any ground of Truth, the former ſuppoſals are.
Sect. 3 Thirdly concerning the Cauſes and Meanes of Limitation the Doctors ſuppoſals are,Cauſes & meanes of Limitation. 1. That Radicall Limitation, that is, of the Power it ſelfe requires an expreſſe and notorious act, it muſt be done in the beginning and at once. p. 15. 24. 39. 2. That a Prince may ſo limit himſelfe, as not to require to be actively ſubjected to, and yet be limited only in the exerciſe, not in the power it ſelfe, p. 16. 3. That no Limitation by after condeſcent, is of the Power it ſelfe, p. 28. this being a conſequent from the firſt. Now that the falſhood of theſe and the like grounds every where ſcattered in his bookes may appeare; Let us a little more diligently handle the Cauſes and Meanes of Limitation, which, as before,Cauſes of Moral Limitation. being twofold, Morall and Civill; We will begin with Morall. 1. Now the Formall cauſe of a meere Morall Limitation, is that which morally bounds or makes ſinfull any act of Power. We are therefore to enquire what it is which can doe that. And this is, 1. Principally the Morall Law of God forbidding ſuch an exerciſe of Power. This is an univerſall, perpetuall and invincible Limitation of all power of Government, either abſolute or legall, yea of all Active Power of reaſonable creatures. 2. There is another meane of Limitation morall, ſc. a Promiſe, Oath or poſitive constitution, whereby a Prince puts a bond upon himſelfe, making that now ſinfull to be done, which before was not ſo. This alſo induces a morall Limitation, as well in abſolute as legall Governments; as if an Abſolute Monarch promiſe to follow ſuch a Rule, which hath a Power to uſe any which his reaſon ſhall dictate. Or if a Legall promiſe to abridge himſelfe in a courſe, in which the Law hath left him indeterminate: in this reſpect, they come under a morall limitation. But concerning this poſitive meane we muſt note. 1. This promiſe, how ſolemne ſoever it be, muſt be a ſimple bond: It muſt extend to no diminution of power, or diſcharge from duty of ſubjection; for then it is not meerely morall, it makes the exceeding act not only ſinfull, but non obliging: whereas it is the note of a meere morall bond, that it extends not to any leſſening of Authority, or diſcharge of duty: as if a Captaine take his enemy priſoner; he to ſave his life ſweares him a full vaſſalage afterward, his Maſter promiſes to command him only ſuch ſervices, never abſolving him from his former bond of abſolute ſlavery: here is a morall bond; yet ſtill a full debt of ſubjection in caſe the Maſter ſhould breake his word, and put him on other employment. 2. If the matter be more throughly looked into, this poſitive meane of limitation is either none at all; or elſe addes nothing to the former, of the morall law of God: For in ſuch promiſe or Oath whereby a Governour limits himſelfe there is an expreſſe or tacite condition, if it conduce to the end of Government, the glory of God, and publick good: For if ſuch Oath or bond hinder the end of Government, it is eo nomine, unlawfull and invalid; but if conduce to it, then it was no more, then was virtually required of him before by the morall Law; this promiſe or Oath being but a more ſolemne profeſſion and proteſtation to doe that which before implicitely he was bound morally unto. Thus we ſee all that Doctor ſpeakes of Morall and irrevocable limitation by promiſe and oath comes to nothing in the iſſue: ſo that this being granted that the Monarchs power in this State were only Morally limited in the Doctors ſenſe; We are as much under and owe as much ſubjection as the captive ſlave to his Maſter; and all our Laws and Statutes being but morall limitations of this ſecond ſort, are not ſo much as morall limitations any farther then the Prince ſees them conduce to the end of Government, if any ſeem to ſtand in his way, and hinder him therein, he is no longer bound to it; but may account it an ill made promiſe or Oath which is better broke then kept. 2.Cauſes of Legall limitation. Of the Cauſes and Meanes of Civill and legall limitation, whereby not only the exerciſe, but the power it ſelfe is confined. 1. The formall cauſe hereof is the limitation of the duty of ſubjection in the people: The duty of ſubjection is the originall of the power of Authority. People by becomming debtors of ſubjection doe ſet up Authority; and by ſtinting and terminating the duty of ſubjection doe put bounds and termes to the power of commanding. 2. Let us ſee then by what meanes the duty of ſubjection may be terminated. I conceive it may be done two wayes. 1. At firſt, when a people reſigning up themſelves to a ſtate of ſubjection doe it not abſolutely, but impoſe only a limited bond on themſelves; for if they impoſe no more duty: the Governour can aſſume no more power. Now this may be done, not only by poſitive, expreſſe and notorious act, as the Doctor ſpeakes; but alſo by a negative; a meere not impoſing of an abſolute bond of duty on themſelves is enough: ſo that if it cannot be proved either by records of the firſt inſtitution, or preſent obligation that a people have put themſelves into a ſtate of abſolute ſubjection, then it is to be held but limited: For whatſoever is ours by the law of nature, cannot be taken from us but by ſome poſitive act done by our ſelves or Anceſtors: Thus in private men; Liberty which is mine by nature, none can take from me, unleſſe he can bring a title or right whereby it became his, and I his ſervant. Nor am I any farther his ſervant, then he can bring proofe of his right. The ſame is true of a ſociety of men. In this caſe it belongs to the challenger, and not to the defendent to bring his poſitive notorious act for proofe of his title, and meaſure of his title: So that the Doctors demand is unreaſonable, who ſtanding for a full right in our Government, puts on the peoples part to bring evidence that they have not. Rather it is juſt, that he ſhould bring ſome poſitive and notorious act wherein it appeares that this people have fully reſigned up their liberty to an abſolute Government; or make it appeare that it is Gods ordinance that where ever a people doe conſtitute a ſoveraigne power, they muſt make an abſolute reſignation of their liberty. 2. By after-condeſcent, for this may be a meane of civill limitation, unleſſe any will imagine that a people once putting themſelves into abſolute ſubjection, are irrevocably ſo. And thus a Monarch becomes limited, when the promiſe or Oath he limits himſelfe by, is not ſimple, but amounts either expreſſely or equivalently to a relaxation of the bond of ſubjection: whether it proceed from meere grace, or conſcience of equity, or by Petition, or importunity of the people, it matters not what was the ground of it, if it carry with it a relaxation of the dutie of ſubjection, it is a meane of civill limitation, in the very root of power; for power can be no larger in the Prince, then duty of ſubjection is in the people; for theſe two have a neceſſary dependence, and relation of equality either to other. Thus if a Monarch, taking advantage of force of armes, impoſe a new Oath of full ſubjection on his people, who before were but legally bound; and prevaile ſo farre, that the whole or major part of his people doe take it for themſelves and theirs, here is a chang of Government from Legall into Abſolute, an enlargement of power: ſo on the contrary. And for this matter we need looke no farther, then the Nationall Oath, or Eſtabliſhed Lawes; for if they bind the people to an abſolute ſubjection; ſuch is the power; and though it have morall, yet it hath no legall limitation: And ſo on the contrary if they bind only to a ſubjection according to the Law; the Government is limited in the very power of it. Hence it appeares to be falſe which the Doctor hath, p. 16. that a Monarch may ſo tye himſelfe as to require not to be ſubjected to but according to ſuch Lawes, and yet not be civilly limited, in his very power; for if he ſo far require not to be ſubjected to, that he untye the bond of ſubjection beyond thoſe Lawes; then is his Authority limited, and can proceed no farther; neither are the inſtruments of his will exceeding thoſe lawes, authorized, but private perſons, and reſiſtible: And alſo falſe, which he ſayes, p. 28. That limitation by condeſcent cannot be radicall. Now if enquiry be made concerning the ſimplicity of antient formes of aſſuming into ſoveraignty, as when the people are ſaid to make one King; to endue him indefinitely with Kingly power; not confining his Government by any expreſſe limitations. Anſ. I conceive in ſuch caſe to know how far a people are bound by ſuch an indefinite contract, theſe things are to be looked into. 1. If the intent of the people can be diſcovered in ſuch a conſtitution, for if it can, doubtleſſe the contract binds ſo far, and no farther. Thus Lyra concludes concerning the requeſt of the people of Iſrael for a King, that it is to be underſtood of an Abſolute King, by that clauſe in the petition, 1 Sam. 8.5. a King to judge us like all the Nations, for all thoſe Eaſterne Nations having Abſolute Monarchs, they deſiring to be governed like them; muſt be conceived to intend ſuch a government. 2. If there be no expreſſion of their intention: then a light concerning it muſt be borrowed for circumſtances; ſc. the kind of government whereunto they have been formerly accuſtomed; or that of the Nation from which they proceeded: And thus the Saxons giving Kingly ſtate to their Captaines in this Land, cannot in reaſon be interpreted to intend any other, then that whereunto they were accuſtomed, and which was the forme of the Nation whence they came. This Rule is ever to be kept as well in publike, as in private contracts of that ſimple indefinite forme, that they are to be construed, as far as may be, in fovour of the granter.