Vindication of the Treatise of Monarchy, Chapter 3
CHAP. III. An Anſwer to the third Section which concerns ſeverall kinds of Monarchy.
IN my opinion it had been fitter to have treated firſt of ſeverall kinds Sect. 1 of Monarchy; and then of Caſes of Reſiſtance; for the ſubject in which ſhould precede the Queſtion whereof, in all methodicall proceeding. Here againe in the firſt place, this Replier would make his Reader believe that penury of Scripture-proofe put me upon diſtinguiſhing of ſeverall kinds of Monarchy, That ſo I might lay all the defence of Reſiſtance upon Reaſon drawne from the ſeverall condition of Monarchies, p. 11. I have ſufficiently before diſcovered my intention in that Treatiſe. The Reſiſtence which I defend hath as much proofe from Scripture, as a matter of that nature need to have. Then he abuſes me, as finding fault with Divines, that pleading for abſoluteneſſe of Monarchicall Power in this Kingdome bring proofes from places of Scripture, p. 12. I complaine not of all Divines, but ſome, ſuch as this Reſolver is: Some, and that but of late yeares; and that but in this kingdome, where ſuch doctrines are the rode to preferments: nor doe I blame them for bringing proofes for ſubjection, and against Reſiſtance from places of Scripture, as he calumniates me; but I blame their groſſe perverting of Scripture; bringing prohibitions of Reſistance of Powers againſt them who condemne it as much as themſelves; And of violating the Lords annointed againſt them who hold them as ſacred and inviolate, yea on more ſolid grounds then themſelves doe. And their fraudulent reaſoning from one kind of government to another, as if all Politicall proviſions of States for their Liberties did make no variation in the caſe; but that ſtill they were in the ſame State, as the people ſubject to the moſt abſolute vaſſallage.
Sect. 2 But becauſe he boaſts ſo much of ſetling mens Conſciences on warrant from Scripture, that he expects command or allowance of Reſiſtance from Scripture, p. 6. That his Adverſaries reſolve all their faith and perſwaſion on an appearance of Reaſon drawne from Ariſtotles grounds, ib. and here that I obſerve there is but little pretence from Scripture for Reſistance; and thus would perſwade men, as if he had all Scripture for him; we nothing but a few huskes of reaſon for us: Let him not thinke to carry it thus away with vaunts and big words: I will profeſſe here once for all. He hath not a ſillable of Scripture or right reaſon to ſatisfie the conſcience with in this controverſie: If it pleaſe this Doctor, let us joyne iſſue upon it, and put the whole caſe on this point. The Queſtion betweene us is, Whether in a limited Monarchie, Reſiſtance of ſubverſive Inſtruments be unlawfull. He affirmes, I denie. He undertakes to ſatisfie mens conſciences that it is unlawfull: bringing not one Text of Scripture, which ſpeakes to the point: Something he brings to proove it unlawfull to reſiſt the Ordinance of God: that the Magistrate which is ſupreame under God is above all Reſiſtance, p. 84. He doth great matters; who doubts of theſe things: Then p. 84. he accumulates nine Arguments, but all ſo non concluding, that nineſcore of them will not make one ſound proving Reaſon of the point in queſtion, as it will appeare when we come to conſider them. On the other ſide we have both to ſettle mens conſciences on. 1. Examples of Scripture, ſc. The peoples reſcue of Jonathan: Davids armie againſt the cut-throats of Saul, that is, ſubverſive Inſtruments: Theſe being particular men, and in an abſolute Monarchie proove the point the more ſtrongly, ſo ſtrongly that the Doctor is faine to flie to that ordinary evaſion, of an extraordinarie priviledge. Beſides all thoſe places which prove it lawfull to reſiſt private men, ſeeking to ſubvert Lawes and Religion, and the publike good; ſith in a limited State they are but private men, though backed with a Commiſſion from the Kings will and pleaſure. 2. Then for Reaſon; I have ſet downe five, p. 53. all unanſwerably concluding the point in Queſtion, as I doubt not the conſiderate Reader will acknowledge.
He profeſſes, p. 12. That it was never his intent to plead for abſoluteneſſe of Power in the King, if by abſoluteneſſe of Power be meant a Power of Arbitrary Command. What his intent is I know not, but he hath fully done the thing, or I have no underſtanding to ſee when a thing is done. In the precedent Section, he reſolves all caſes into the Arbitrium Regis, the meere pleaſure of the King: allowing the Houſes of Parliament only a power of ſtaying the hands of deſtroyers, till it be expreſſely knowne whether it be the Kings pleaſure they ſhall be deſtroyed: And I am confident the meaneſt apprehenſion will diſcerne, that they who make the Monarchs ſole Will the laſt judge of all controverſies: and ſimply deny in the laſt caſe of ſubverſion, all Power of Reſiſtance of Inſtruments, even to the ſupreame Courts of Law and juſtice, doe without any controverſie, reſolve all government into an Arbitrarie Abſoluteneſſe. He adds, We allow a diſtinction of Monarchies and admit the Government of Kingdomes to be of divers kinds, and acknowledge a legall reſtraint upon the Power of the Monarch in this Kingdome. Verba datis, rem negatis; you allow indeed a kind of diſtinction of Monarchies, but all within the compaſſe of Abſolute: A legall reſtraint you ſeeme to acknowledge; but ſuch an one as reſolves into the Arbitrary Will of the Monarch, as I have made it appeare in my former Treatiſe; and you will never be able to wipe off by this, or any other Reply. Then he promiſes that in this Booke certaine points will appeare to be truth, agreeable to Scripture and Reaſon: ſc. That Government is not the invention of man, but the inſtitution of God: That Governours have their Power not from the people, but from God: That Governing Power is one and the ſame in all ſupreames, and can only be limited in the exerciſe. And that where a Prince ſtands ſupreme, and next to God above all the people, there the Subiects may not take armes and make forceable reſiſtance for any exorbitances. Theſe ſeverall Propoſitions how farre they contain Truth, and how far not, I ſhall in the ſequell make appear.
After theſe great promiſes, he proceeds, p. 13. to ſpeake ſomewhat of the Originall of Governing Power: and accuſeth me as if I ſeemed to Sect. 3 affirme it to be from God; but in the proceſſe of my booke, he finds me deriving it indeed from the people. I perceiving two contrary opinions concerning the Originall of Government, did in that Treatiſe endeavour to reconcile them, and to ſhew in what ſence both are true. To that end, as there is manifeſt, p 4. I diſtinguiſhed 3 things. 1 It's conſtitution; 2 It's Limitation to one kind. 3 It's determination to one individuall Perſon and Family. The firſt of theſe I did affirme to be from God: The two latter from Men, and then concluded, In theſe things we have Doctour Fernes conſent. Let us ſee what exceptions he can take at this peaceable aſſay of Reconcilement. In the proceſſe of my Diſcourſe he findes me deriving it from the people. What then? Doe I denie it thereby to be from God? as if Subordinates did exclude one another. God hath ordained that Powers ſhould be: People by vertue of that Ordinance give them exiſtence in this or that kind and ſubiect. The Doctor acknowledges all this, but not in my ſence, p. 14. He grants the Deſignation of the Perſon, and the Limitation of the Power to ſeverall kinds to be from the conſent of the People. I ſay no more; why doe we not then agree? The plaine truth is, The Doctor will not have Limitation of Power to be at all from the people, what ever he pretends: How then the Limitation of the Power to ſeverall kinds is from the people, as the Doctor yeelds, I cannot tell. Is not Limitation of it into kinds, Limitation of the Power it ſelfe? But he is poſſeſſed that my ſound ſence is another ſence from his; what other he doth not ſhew: but it is another which he likes not. Why? Becauſe ſometimes I ſay, the people reſerve a Power to oppoſe or diſplace the Magiſtrate: Sometime they diveſt themſelves of all ſuperiority. 'Tis true, I ſay ſo, but withall I ſay, that when they reſerve ſuch a Power, they conſtitute no Monarchy. Is it not ſo, in the higheſt Miniſters of Power in Ariſtocracies and Democracies? What can he ſay againſt ſo apparent a Truth? 2. I call them, p. 63. Architectonicall Powers. This he derides and ſaies, This is the riddle of this Governing Power originally in the people. They are Architectonicall Powers, but build upon foundations laid in the aire, p. 14, Then he gives his reaſon, For before Government eſtabliſhed they have not any politique Power, whereby a Command may be laid upon others, but only a naturall power of private reſistance. This is falſe, that they have onelyonly a naturall power of private Reſiſtance. They have indeed no formall politique power, for we ſpeake of a people free from all government; but they have a virtuall radicall power, by publike conſent and contract to conſtitute this or that forme of Government, and reſigne up themſelves to a condition of ſubjection on Termes and after a form of their owne conſtitution; ſo the Athenians, Lacedemonians and Romans of old having expelled their Kings: and the Ʋnited Provinces, with others of latter times have done: This is that which I called Architectonicall Power; and the Replier vainly carpes at the name, when he cannot denie the thing. But I know what he aimes at in all this, ſc. That Gods Ordinance is an abſolute boundleſſe Power in all Supremes, uncapable of any limitation, but in the exerciſe. Of which fully afterwards. Sect. 4
At length He takes a nearer view of the Formes of Monarchie, ſpoken of by me, and makes a few obſervations upon ſuch particulars at him pleaſeth, p. 14. Let us follow his ſteps. Firſt, for Abſolute Monarchie, whereas I ſay it is, when Soveraignty is ſo fully in one, that it hath no limitation under God, but the Monarches owne will. He approoves my deſcription; but threatens to remember it below, p. 15. Let him doe ſo; and make his beſt advantage of it, only here he cannot forbeare one note, that then it is not the deniall of reſiſtance which makes a Monarch abſolute; but the deniall of a law to bound his Will. I doe grant it; but with all I ſay, that it is neceſſariò conſequutivum, though it be not conſtitutivum: for ſith a Monarch which is obſolute hath no Law to bound his Will; but his very Will is the Subjects Law, then every act of his Will is Gods Ordinance, and ſo by conſequence it is unreſiſtible. Alſo, p. 15. He allowes it, when I ſay, A limited Monarch is he who hath a Law beſides his owne Will for the meaſure of his power. But yet he diſlikes that I ſay, He muſt be limited in the Power it ſelfe, and not only in the exerciſe; and I added a reaſon, for an Abſolute Monarch may ſtint himſelfe in the exerciſe of his Power, and yet remaine abſolute. What ſaies he to this? True, if ſuch a Monarch limit himſelf and reſerve a Power to vary,—but if he fix a Law with promiſe not to varie, then in thoſe caſes he is limited. Note the fraud of this Replier, he alters his terms and puts things as oppoſite which are not ſo: He ſhould ſay, if be limit himſelfe, and reſerve a power to varie; then he is abſolute; but if he limit himſelfe and reſerve no Power to varie (for then the oppoſition is direct) then he is limited. But in ſtead of ſaying (and reſerve no power to varie) he ſaies, but [if he promiſe not to vary] I ſay that promiſe not to vary, if it be a ſimple promiſe of not varying, it doth not make him limited in his Power, any more then morally, and ſo every Abſolute Monarch is limited. I affirme ſtill, it is Limitation of the Power it ſelfe, not barely of the exerciſe, which conſtitutes a Limited Monarch: for Monarchy is a ſtate of Power, and therefore it's ſpecificative diſtinction muſt be from ſomething which diſtinguiſheth Powers, and not the exerciſe of Powers; but this is enough proved in the 5t page of that Treatiſe.
Secondly, he blames me for that I ſuppoſe a Limited Monarch muſt be radically, that is, originally inveſted with ſuch a meaſure of limited Power, and that limited, ab externo, and not from the free determination of his owne Will. Here he adds originally of his owne; that ſo he might ſeeme to finde a contradiction, when I afterward ſay, that it may be done by originall conſtitution, or by after condeſcent; but yet he confeſſeth, I have a ſalve, when I make it ſuch a condeſcent, as is equivalent to an Originall Conſtitution, becauſe amounting to a change of Title, and a reſolution in the Monarch to be ſubjected to, no other way. I make no ſalve, nor doe I need any; he who weighes the Uniformity of Truth in that Treatiſe will ſee it needs no ſalves: OnelyOnly I diſtinguiſh thoſe things which are in their natures diſtinct, which if the Doctour had done, this Contention either had not been begun, or would ſoon have an end: Who ſees not that a Promiſe, whereby a Monarch may bind himſelfe may either be with a limitation of the bond of ſubjection, or without: And that this makes a reall difference: for in this the Government remaines the ſame, becauſe the Dutie of ſubjection received no variation; but in that there is for ſo much a Tranſitus into a limited condition. But theſe things cannot be more fully and clearly expreſſed then they are in the page 13. of that Treatiſe. But he anſwers, Where there is ſuch a change of Title, it is done at once, and by expreſſe and notorious reſignation of former Power; but it is not neceſſary that an abſolute Monarch ſhould come to a limited Condition after that manner. I ſay, if he will paſſe into a limited condition, it is neceſſary there be a limitation of his Power, elſe he is not truly limited: But that all ſuch limitation be done at once and by notorious reſignation, it is not neceſſary, as will appeare afterward where this matter of Limitation is more diſtinctly handled.
Sect. 5 His next complaint is againſt ſomething I have in the page 25. ſc. That in a mixed Government (if it be of three) the Soveraign Power muſt be in all three originally, and from fundamentall conſtitution. He judges this not neceſſary, p. 17. and he gives a wonderfull Reaſon: For as Limitation may be only of the exerciſe of the Power, and not of the Power it ſelfe; ſo mixture is in regard of Perſons ioyned to the Monarch for certain acts and purpoſes; but that they ſhould have any ſhare in the Soveraign power, the nature of Monarchy will not admit. 1. Juſt ſo; for as a Monarchy is not limited unleſſe there be a limitation of Power, for Monarchy is a Power; ſo a Monarchy cannot be mixed, unleſſe there be a mixture of Powers, for Monarchy is a Power; and to ſay a mixt Monarchy, and yet the Power not mixt, is to ſpeake contradictories. 2. If the mixture be not of divers concurrent Powers; wherof is it? He tells us, of the Monarch and certaine other Perſons joyned with him for certaine acts and purpoſes. Theſe joyned Perſons, have they any concurring Power to doe thoſe acts for which they are joyned? If not; then the adjoyning is futulous and vaine, and the Power of Monarchy is mixed of a Perſon having Power, and of others having no Power to doe that for which they are joyned. You will ſay, They have Power, but not diſtinct from that of the Monarch: that is, they have none; for in mixture, if it be not diſtinct, it is none at all. Againe if they have any, it muſt be diſtinct, for ſubordinate it cannot be; if the Acts to which they concurre be ſupreme Acts, unleſſe we ſhould be ſo abſurd as to ſay, They may concurre to ſupreme Acts, by a ſubordinate Power. But let us ſee, what a maine Reaſon he hath for averring a conceit ſubject to ſuch abſurdities. Such a mixture would make ſeverall independent powers in the ſame State or Kingdome, which is moſt abſurd. I grant it is abſurd, if he ſpeake of ſeverall complete independent powers; but to affirme ſeverall incomplete independent powers concurring to make up one integrall mixt power, it is no abſurdity at all for ſo it is, in all Ariſtocracies and Democracies, and muſt be acknowledged in all mixed States, where the ſupremacie is not wholy in the hands of one perſon. Yet here we doe not ſo make them independent, but that we give a large predominancie to One, as, in nature, in all mixed bodies there is, as I have at large explained my ſelfe in the next Section, if the Doctor had been at leaſure to have taken notice of it. I yeild to that which he ſayes, p. 17. that it is not neceſſary the Mixture ſhould be ſo Originall, but that it may alſo come afterwards by condeſcent: It matters not, ſo it be originall, that is, radicall: of Powers, and not of meere Acts: And indeed, there cannot be a mixture of Acts, unleſſe it be alſo of Powers: for Acts are from Powers: and where Powers are ſubordinate, there can be no mixture in their Acts; the Acts of cauſes ſubordinate, are alſo ſubordinate, and not coordinate and mixed. But I there brought two Arguments to prove that in a Mixed Government, the Concurrents muſt have independent and diſtinct Powers. Let us ſee how he anſwers them. 1. Becauſe elſe it would be no mixture, but a derivation of Power, which is ſeen in the moſt ſimple Monarchy. He anſwers, that derivation of Power is either upon ſubſtitute Officers ſupplying the abſence of the Monarch in the execution of Power: and this is in the moſt ſimple Monarchy. Or elſe upon Perſons whoſe concurrence and conſent is required to certaine Acts of Monarchicall Power; and this makes a mixture, though they have no ſhare in the Power it ſelfe, p. 17. I anſwer, 1. Abſence or preſence of the Monarch; whether they Act for him, or with him, varies not the caſe, If the Power they work by be derived from him, then it is his Power, and ſo conſtitutes no Mixture. 2. As if in the moſt ſimple Monarchy, the Soveraigne doth mannage the ardua imperij, the weightieſt matters of State alone; and not by conſent of his Counſell; without whom he is morally bound, (that is, on the ſinne of raſhneſſe) not to tranſact them, and that is all, which the Doctor yeilds to the Houſes of Parliament, ſc. that the King is morally bound to their concurrence and conſent in certaine Acts. This is nothing but the ſhadow of a Mixture; If the Power of Acting be ſo in one, that, if he pleaſe, he may doe thoſe Acts without the concurrence of thoſe adjunct Perſons, though he ought not, it is no Mixture, becauſe the Power is ſimple and One; and mixed Acts cannot flow from one ſimple Power. This the Doctor ſees, and therefore ſayes, If this Authour will not call this a Mixture, we cannot help it, p. 18. We doe not enquire of Names, but of things; nor whether it make a difference in Government or no; We treat of a Mixt Governement: and, I think, no man of common ſenſe will affirme, that a Government can be really mixed, and yet the Power be ſimple. 2. Becauſe the End of Mixture (which is Effectuall Limitation) cannot be had by a derivate Power. He anſwers; Though a Derivate Power cannot ſet new bounds to the Soveraigne Power, yet may it ſtand to keep in a legall way thoſe bounds which the ſoveraigne Power hath ſet to it ſelfe. Obſerve, He dares not to ſay, They may keep: but only ſtand to keep; nor ſtand neither, but by advice; that is morally: If he will exceed thoſe bounds, the Act is valid, and hath all its Authority without them: Only he ſins, if he doe ſo; becauſe he hath promiſed he would not doe it without them: Here's excellent Limitation and Confinement from exorbitancies: A bare promiſe, without ſuch adoe, in conſtituting States and Mixtures, would be altogether as good a bounds; but of this we ſhall have more occaſion to ſpeake afterward.
In the cloſe of this Section he turnes back to the p. 21. of my book, Sect. 6 and hath ſomewhat to ſay to my Aſſertions about Monarchy by conqueſt. There firſt I ſay, If the invaſion be made upon pretence of Title, and the pretender doth prevaile, it is not Conquest properly, but a Vindication of a Title: and then the Government is ſuch as the Title is by which he claimed. He tells us, He ſees no injuſtice in it, if ſuch a one having prevailed ſhould uſe ſuch a people as a Conquerour, p. 19. The Lord keep us from this mans juſtice. What; No injuſtice? If the Pretenders Title allowed by a great part of the people, he by their aide ſubdues the reſt, ſhall he for their labour cruſh them into ſervitude, and uſe the power of a Conquerour, without injuſtice? 2. Suppoſe the people not convinced of the right of his Title make at firſt ſome oppoſition; but yet the pretence of his Title, and apprehenſion that he ſeekes no more power then his Title imports, work a yeilding diſpoſition in them, ſo that they withſtand not ſo univerſally, nor ſo long as they might have done; but at length ſubmit to him on his pretended termes: were it not high injuſtice to take advantage on ſuch a people, and having them under hatches to deſert thoſe termes on which they yeilded, and uſe the full right of a Conquerour: This was Englands caſe with Duke William. But the maine thing which ſticks by him is ſomething I have delivered, p. 23. It is an uncontrolable truth in policie, that the conſent of the people, either by themſelves or their Anceſtours, is the only meane in ordinary providence, by which ſoveraignty is conferred upon any perſon or family. Againſt this he is very angry; and oppoſeth it in many words; but to my Argument from the Morall bond of ſubjection, he ſayes nothing at all. He termes it good policie, but bad divinity, p. 20. And ſets up an Antipoſition, that when the invading Prince has perfectly ſubdued a people (there being no heyre to whom they are bound) and hath ſetled and conſtituted a frame of Government, then providence doth ſufficiently diſcover it ſelfe, and ſuch a people ought to ſubmit and take this Prince as ſet over them by the hand of providence. As if theſe two were contrary: I ſay, They are not bound untill they conſent: He ſayes, in ſuch a caſe they are bound to conſent, becauſe then providence diſcovers it ſelfe: And he brings Calvin at large to prove that which none denies: I grant a people (not preobliged,) fully overcome ſhould much ſin againſt Gods providence by obſtinacie, if on a meere will, they conſent not to reaſonable termes of ſubjection: But this I ſay, There is no morall obligation to Authority, before that conſent bind them: Conqueſt may be an Antecedent cauſe; but the immediate and formall cauſe is only the conſent of the people; which he cannot ſay againſt; for that muſt be morall, and not meerely violent. The call of providence challengeth a contented ſubmiſſion, if there be no reaſon hindring it; but if a precedent Oath or ſome other ſound reaſon intervene, then it is no call requiring ſubmiſſion: Neither can the fulleſt conqueſt make a people debtors, but they remaine free from any morall bond; for the providence of God being of it ſelfe externall, can induce no morall ſtate; but that providence which on one diſcovery calls to a ſubmiſſion: on a like diſcovery may free them againe, if nothing elſe come between, to render them morally bound: A Travellour, by the providence of God ſhut up into the hands of a Robber, hath his life and protection promiſed him in his journey, if he will promiſe to pay him ſo much money: I ſay, this Travailor ſhould ſin againſt his own life, and the providence of God, offering him thoſe termes, if obſtinately he refuſe ſubmiſſion: Yet no man will ſay he owes the robber ſo much money, becauſe he hath him at his mercy, untill he by promiſe make himſelfe a debtor: Thus have I made good that maxime of mine to be an uncontrouleable Truth, good Policie, and good Divinity too; maugre all the Doctor hath or can ſay againſt it.