The Divine Right and Original of the Civil Magistrate, Chapter 2
CHAP. II. Of the term of GOD.
THeſe words, of God, ordained of God, are the two Predicates or things which in this ſentence are enunciated, or ſpoken of the ſubject, the power. And they are the medius terminus, or the bottome or ground of the argument; the firſt and principal argument which the Apoſtle in this his diſcourſe of the ſubjects duty to the Civil Magiſtrate, bringeth for ſubjection to the higher powers. And they are a medium of a very great force and authority: being they offer to conſideration the higheſt deſcent, origination or derivation of the powers here pleaded for, viz. that they are of God, ordain'd of God. Theſe terms then are of a very main, and material importance; and the defining and clearing of the ſenſe of them cannot but be chiefly neceſſary and uſeful.
It will eaſily be granted only thoſe Powers are here intended unto which theſe predicates (of God, ordained of God) are truly, and in the ſenſe of the Apoſtle in this place attributable. The buſineſs then will be to enquire, How theſe words muſt be here taken, and what is their ſpecial meaning in this place.
Both of theſe terms refer the ſubject they are ſpoken of, the pow rs that be, unto God as the author of them; but the former doth it in a more general word,Pareus Tolet. the latter more expreſly; the latter therefore may be, and is by Expoſitors taken as the explication and limitation of the former. We will firſt examine the former, the more general term, of God, and after deſcend to the following, the more ſpecial notification of the powers derivation, ordained of God.
SECT. I. The divers Scripture-acceptations of this term, of God, recited.
THere is no power but of God. This phraſe, of God, is of a divers acceptation and uſe, both in Scripture and in Theology. That we may come the more clearly to the meaning of it in this text, I ſhall endevour, firſt to ſum up the different uſes of it in Scripture, as I have collected them.
In the general all the wayes of the being of things of God may be reduced under two heads, that is, [1. Of his hand. 2. Of his mouth.] or, [1. Of his work. 2. Of his word.] or, [1. Of his doing. 2. Of his declaring.] But then each of theſe may be ſubdiſtinguiſhed.
Of the former, the being of a thing of Gods hand, work, or doing (which we ordinarily call his Providence) we muſt again diſtinguiſh. It may be taken either,
1. In a more general and large ſenſe, ſo as to import only that ſome diſpoſings or proceedings of God, are the antecedent or occaſion upon which certain things come to paſſe. And thus the ſinful actions of the creature are ſaid to be of God.Judg. 14.4. Samſons unlawful deſire to have to wife a daughter of the Philiſtims: 1 King. 12.15.Rehoboams either unjuſt or imprudent refuſal to ſatisfie the ten tribes in their deſire of eaſement of their former burdens:2 Chron. 25.20. Amaziahs inſolent, and fooliſh rejection of the peaceable overture and advice returned him from Joaſh: theſe ſinful courſes of theſe perſons are ſaid to be of or from God; that is, in the ſame ſenſe wherein God is ſaid to hearden the heart; Exod. 7.11. Ezek. 14.9. 1 King. 22.23. Judg. 9.23. Iſa. 29.10. Mat. 6.13. 2 Theſſ. 2.11. 2 Sam. 16.11. 1 Kin. 11.14, 23, Iſai. 10.5. Pſal. 105.25. Rev. 17.17. Zeph. 3.5. Jam. 1.13.to deceive; to put a lying ſpirit in the mouth of ſome; to ſend an evil ſpirit between men; to powre out upon men the ſpirit of deep ſleep, and to cloſe their eyes; to lead men into temptation; to ſend men ſtrong deluſions that they ſhould believe a lie; to bid a wicked man curſe a righteous; to ſtir up and to ſend men when they enterpriſe, and go on ſinful atchievements; to turn the hearts of men, and to put in their hearts to do evil. Not as if he poſitively acted theſe things, or efficaciouſly infuſed them into men, he will not do iniquity, he tempteth not any man, but in as much as he leaveth men to themſelves and to Satan, he layeth no impediments upon their power, or active reſtraint upon their wils; yea, he ſo ordereth outward occurrences, as that they meet with fit occaſion and ſuiteable inducements to thoſe evils, (which his carriage to men he predetermineth before to uſe for holy ends, and moſt righteouſly, and foreſeeth infallibly what men will thereupon do) hence therefore their running into thoſe ſins is (in a large and leſſe proper ſenſe) ſaid to be of God.
2. Secondly, things are ſaid to be of God providentially, or of his hand, worke, and doing, more directly, or in a more proper and poſitive acception, that is, ſo as he is the author, or efficient cauſe of them, or ſo as they are not meerly from his working providence, as the hint or occaſion only, but from him as the worker, or agent producing them, or putting them in rerum naturâ. Thus all poſitive beings are of God. [Rom. 11.36. 1 Cor. 8.6. Heb. 2.10.] that is, the exiſtence of all individuals or ſingulars, with all their motions, effluxes or actions, Act. 17.28. whether the agents be irrational, Mat. 10.29 or moral, rational and free, [Iſa. 28.29. Prov. 16.1, 9. & 20.24. & 21.1.] and all the conditions, and events; all the evil; and all the good that befals any creature, [Pſal. 75.7, 8. 2 King. 6.33. Ia. 1.17.] and theſe whether they be from ſecond cauſes adviſedly and intendedly, or they be meerly caſual and contingent in reſpect of them [Prov. 16.33. 1 King. 22 34. 2 Chron. 22.7. Gen. 50.20.]
And things are this way of God, viz. of his direct and poſitive proceeding two wayes:
1. By his ordinary providence, or as he worketh in, and by natural cauſes, and in a natural courſe, as in the aforegiven inſtances.
2. In a way of ſupernatural efficiency, or working of Grace. So perſons are of him in their eſtate of Grace, [1 Joh. 5.19. 3 Joh. 11.] and ſo the gracious effects that are in perſons, are of him, [2 Cor. 5.18: & 2.17. 1 Chron. 29.14.] the former way the Schools call his general, the latter his ſpecial concourſe.
Secondly, of God, ſignifies of Gods mouth, word, or declaring: a thing is ſaid to be of God that proceedeth out of his mouth, or is ſpoken, or uttered by him. Now we muſt note, the things that proceed out of the mouth of God are more principally of two ſorts, in as much as the mouth or word of God is a declaration of his will, and the will of God is diſtinguiſht by a twofold acceptation.
1. The firſt is, his foreign, or will of Decree, or that will which himſelf purpoſeth to execute, or have to be.
2. The ſecond is his foreign, or his Legiſlative or preceptive will, which delivereth the rule or law which man is to do, or walk by. Hence it is, that the declarations of the mouth of God are ſutably twofold, and of two ſorts of things. [1. Narrative or manifeſting. 2. Imperative or regulating.] Under the firſt ſort are compriſed all the diſcoveries of Gods own wayes, and works, or of what God himſelf hath done, doth, or will do; all the revelations or propheſies of Gods proceedings, paſt, preſent, and to come; all Divine hiſtories, promiſes, threatnings, or other predictions. That (ſaith the Prophet) which I have heard of the Lord of hoſts, the God of Iſrael, have I declared unto you, [Iſa. 21.10.] Under the latter head, the declarations of his Imperative, or regulating will, are contained all his Commandements, or conceſſions unto men; whatſoever God injoynes or allowes man to do, or not to do; all divine warrants, commiſſions, precepts, or permiſſions touching humane actions and affairs. According to this laſt acception that is of God that is authorized by him unto men; that is not of God, which he diſapproveth, prohibiteth, or warranteth not unto men.
Let us, in reference to the latter, the being of a thing of Gods mouth by way of declaring his approving or authorizing will, obſerve, for explications ſake, ſome inſtances of both ſorts, viz. both Poſitive and Negative out of Scripture.
1. According to this ſenſe both perſons and things are affirmed to be of God.
1. Perſons are owned thus to be of God; that is, to be authorized, and approved of him to be in their reſpective ſtates and places. Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher come from God, ſaith Nicodemus unto Jeſus, [Joh. 3.2.] and Chriſt ſaith, He that is of God, he hath ſeen the Father, [Joh. 6.46.] If this man were not of God, he could do nothing, ſaith the blind man of Chriſt, [Joh. 9.33.] And the Apoſtle John often hath this phraſe, Try the ſpirits whether they are of God, every ſpirit that confeſſeth that Jeſus Chriſt is come in the fleſh is of God. Ye are of God little children, —we are of God, [1 Joh. 4.1, 2, 4, 6. & 5.19.]
2. As perſons, ſo wayes, doctrines, and practiſes are in this acceptation ſaid to be of God. If any man (ſaith our Saviour) will do his will, he ſhall know of the Doctrine whether it be of God, or whether I ſpeak of my ſelf, [Joh. 7.17.] If this counſel or this work be of God, ye cannot overthrow it, quoth the Doctor in the councel at Jeruſalem, [Act. 5.38, 39.] And David ſaid of his enterpriſe of bringing up the Ark of God to his C…ty; If it ſeem good unto you, and that it be of the Lord our God, Let us ſend, &c. [1 Chron. 13.2.] A parallel phraſe to this of being of God is that of being from Heaven, in diſtinction from that which is of men. As in that queſtion of our Saviour to the chief Prieſts, [Mat. 21.25.] The baptiſm of John, whence was it? from heaven, or of men?
2. Negatively, in this ſenſe many both perſons, and things are denyed to be of God.
1. Perſons are ſaid not to be of God. Whoſoever doth not righteouſneſs, is not of God. Every ſpirit that confeſſeth not that Jeſus Chriſt is come in the fleſh, is not of God. He that is not of God heareth not us, [1 Joh. 3.10. & 4.3, 6.] This man is not of God becauſe he keepeth not the Sabbath, [Joh. 9.16.]
2. Wayes are denyed to be of God. All that is in the world, the luſt of the fleſh, &c. is not of the Father, but is of the world, [1 Joh. 2.16.]
I have thus endevoured to gather together, and lay down diſtinctly the ſeveral wayes wherein perſons and things may be ſaid to be of God, and ſo the various ſenſes of this phraſe, of God. The ſum is, of God is firſt either of his hand, and providence, and ſo a thing may be of God, 1. Either occaſionally: 2. or, caſually. And this latter way things are of God, either, 1. By his general, or, 2. By his ſpecial concourſe. Or ſecondly of his mouth, and word, and ſo a thing, may be of God, 1. Either Narratively: 2. or, Legiſlatively, and by way of authorization, approbation, or warrant to men. And this laſt way Scripture declares, 1. Some both perſons, and wayes, to be of God. 2. And ſome both perſons, and wayes, not to be of God.
SECT. II. For the clearing of the Queſtion which of theſe acceptations are proper to this Text, divers things diſcuſſed.
BUt now the Queſtion is, in which of thoſe ſenſes the term of God muſt be taken in this Text? Some of theſe acceptions are ſo plainly, and remotely diſtant from the purpoſe of the Apoſtle, that they need not at all come under this enquity. Of this ſort is the being of a thing of Gods hand, or providence occaſionally, as the ſins of men are, which I ſhall therefore paſſe over, as alſo the being of a thing of Gods mouth narratively, or prophetically.
Subſection 1. The difference betwixt the Narative, and the Legiſlative word of God: and that Scripture predictions are not a warrant for us to act upon in the things predicted.
ONly to give this note of difference betwixt the Narrative and Legiſlative expreſſions of Gods mouth.
1. The former is the ſcheme or platform of Gods own wayes, and of his will of purpoſe or decree ſo far as he pleaſeth to reveal it. And the ſame things which are of his hand acting, are thus of his mouth declaring, either the hiſtory of them, as things done, or the prediction of them as things to be done by him. The latter, that which is Legiſlative is the model, or rule of mans duty and wayes. This is one difference.
2. The Narrative word is the object or matter of our faith: the legiſlative of our practice.
Theſe differences are well to be obſerved. When God reveales in his word that ſuch a thing is, or ſhall be done by himſelf; that ſuch things have been or ſhall come to paſſe: theſe revelations are the objects of our faith; we may, yea muſt believe them to be as they are revealed, either paſt, or future. But they are not therefore, or by virtue of ſuch revelation, a rule or warrant for us to walk by; that is, we are not authorized or obliged thereby to act, or put our hand to the effecting, or promoting the execution of ſuch things*Vide Ameſium Medull. Theolog. lib. 2. cap. 1. Sect. 22, 23. Grotium de Jure Belli. lib. 2. cap. 22. Sect. 15. cum Annotat.. God foretold he would raiſe up evill againſt David out of his own houſe,2 Sam. 12.11. Luk. 24.46. Act. 3.18. & 13.27. and he would take his wives before his eyes, and give them to his neighbor, and he ſhould lie with them. But this was no allowance for Abſalom, Ahitophel, or any of that party to counſel, or act to the accompliſhing of theſe things. The people and Rulers of the Jewes did moſt wickedly, and undutifully in the ſufferings, and death of Chriſt: But they did nothing therein but what God before had declared he would bring to paſſe by them.
There are ſome now a dayes who make it not only lawful, but a duty of the Saints of this preſent age, yea their main work or maſter-piece, to ſtickle againſt Civil Powers, both with tongue, and hand, both to cry and to pull them down; and their ground which they lay for this ſo ſtrange a Poſition, is this double ſuppoſal;
Firſt, That the Propheſies and predictions of Scripture declare the ruine of all eart… potentates to be a work which God will effec… … this time.
Secondly, That whatſoever be not…d to us …y Scripture propheſie to be the purpoſe, cour… ▪ or diſpenſation of God in our generation, that we are bound to act for, and promote to our uttermoſt, and are to take the ſaid diſpenſation of God for our call, rule, and warrant for the ſame. Both theſe ſuppoſals and that concluſion inferred from them, I finde laid down and inſiſted o… in the books of one Mr. Tillinghaſt *The former of the ſuppoſals is in his Generation work, part. 1. pag. 42, 55. the latter, pag. 19, 43. 63, 72, 73. and part. 2. pag. 7. The concluſion is in his knowledge of the times, the Appendix, concluſ. 30. pag. 344. and Gener. work part. 1. pag. 55, 66.To debate theſe poſitions with him is not my enterpriſe here. This only will I ſay to them, The former of his two ſuppoſals is a thing to me very inevident, and will (I think) ſcarſe be cleared ſo well as to be made a principle upon which a practical concluſion may be built. The latter is a moſt unſound and preſumptuous poſition†See this well diſcuſſed in Dr. Sclater his Sermon on 2 King. 9.31. pag. 25, &c.. The Scripture aboundeth with multitudes of inſtances of divine predictions, and humane executions; the former expreſly owned, the latter as plainly diſowned and condemned by God. The examples above given of the ſufferings of David, and of Chriſt, may ſerve to be produced inſtead of all. And I ſhall add only, that Baaſha had a propheſie for all that he did againſt Jeroboams houſe, yet is he not excuſed by that, but condemned nevertheleſſe*See 1 King. 14.14. & 15.29. & 16.7.. It is very ſtrange that men of ſober heads, and ſavoring of Godlineſſe, ſhould in theſe dayes under the name of Saints, lick up the vomit of Hacket, of Mountzer, and of John of Leyden †See Camdeni Annal. To. 2. p. 37. Joh. Sleiden Comment. lib. 10. pag. 253. Muntzers life in Roſſe his foreign.. If divine providence and diſpenſation of it ſelf make out a rule to us to walk by, their horrid miſcarriages,CHAP. II. SECT. II. Subſect. 2. and fatal ends ſhould have taught the men of theſe No ions quite otherwiſe. I will but make up this (ſomewhat neceſſary) digreſſion with a paſſage in Daniel, and the explication of it given by Expoſitors. It is ſaid [Dan. 11.14.] Alſo the robbers of thy people ſhall exalt themſelves, to eſtabliſh the viſion.
This ſentence expoſitors apply to Onias the Prieſt, and certain Apoſtate Jewes, who in the dayes of Antiochus the great his reign over Judea fell from him, and went into Egypt, and ſided with the King thereof, his enemy, and by petition obtained of him, that they might there in the Countrey of Heliopolis, build a temple, and an altar unto God, like that at Jeruſalem. And for this their both civil and religious Apoſtaſie they pretended the fulfilling of the prophecy of Iſaiah [Cap. 19. v. 18, 19.] In that day ſhall five Cities in the land of Egypt ſpeak the language of Canaan, and ſwear to the Lord of Hoſts; one of them ſhall be called the city of Deſtruction, (in the margent of the Sun, that is, Heliopolis.) In that day there ſhall be an Altar to the Lord in the mideſt of the Land of Egypt, &c] And becauſe of the Apoſtaſie of thoſe men upon that pretence the tex ſaith, (as Commentators refer it) they ſhall exalt themſelves to eſtabl ſh the viſion *Divines Anno. & Diodate in loc. Vide Uſſer Arnal. part. poſt. de M. 3854. Edw. Simſons Chron Cath. A. M. 3853..
Subſection 2. Certain Propoſitions to explain thoſe ſeveral wayes wherein things are ſaid to be of God.
BUt the queſtion will be concerning the being of a thing of Gods hand by way of efficiency, and the being of a thing of Gods mouth by way of warrant, rule or precept; whether both of theſe, or but one of them, and if but one, then which of them is it which is intended by this clauſe, of God?
Before I come to determine this queſtion, as it lies betwixt theſe two in particular, it may be ſomewhat conducible to compare them together, and to explain them a little more, and the reduceableneſs of things to both, or each of them. For the which obſerve▪
1. Sometimes a thing is both theſe wayes of God, viz. both of his mouth authorizing, and of his hand working it. That which his mouth enjoynes, his hand ſometimes effects. [2 Chron. 30.12.] In Judah the hand of God was to give them one heart to do the commandement of the King and the Princes by the word of the Lord. The like ſee [1 Chron. 29.14. Phil. 2.13. 2 Cor. 5 5, 18.]
2. Sometimes a thing is of Gods mouth commanding, but not of his hand working, God ſhews, injoynes to men their duty m…ny times when as it is not performed in them, [ſee Jer. 7.23, 24.]
3. A thing is ſometimes of Gods hand, but not of his mouth. Many things come to paſſe by divine providence, or working, which though himſelf effect, and that by mans agency, yet he allowes not of that agency of man in them. Take for inſtances Gods ſending of Joſeph into Egypt, by his Brethrens ſelling of him [Gen. 45.5, 7, 8. & 50.20.] the expulſion of David out of his Kingdom, and the raviſhment of his Wives by Abſolom, [2 Sam. 12.11, 12.] The deſtruction and captivity of Judah by Nebuchadn…zar, [Iſa. 10.5, 6, 15. Jer. 51.7. & 25.9. compared with Chap. 47.6. Jer. 50.17, 18. & 51.24, 34, 35, 36.] The ſufferings of Chriſt by the Jews, [Act. 2.13. & 4.28.] with many other things [as 1 King. 11.14, 23. 1 Sam. 26.19. Judg. 2.14, 15. Hab. 1.6, 13.]
4. Some things are neither of Gods mouth, approving; nor of his hand, acting. So are the ſins of men in their formal, preciſe, or abſtract conſideration, [Jam. 1.13. Gal. 5.8. 1 Joh. 2.15.]
Subſection 3. CHAP. II. SECT. II. Subſect. 3.Of Gods working in humane actions, whether good or evill; and the difference betwixt the being of the one of God, and of the other.
FOr the better underſtanding of theſe four particula…s, eſpecially the two laſt of them, upon which there may lie ſome obſcurity, let theſe Propoſitions be thereto added.
1. All beings, or things; whatſoever hath ſubſiſtence or exiſtence; all events, effects and productions, as to their matter, or poſitive entity, are of Gods hand, and working, [Rom. 11.36. 1 Cor. 8.6. Epheſ. 1.11.]
2. Of thoſe things that are of Gods hand, of working, 1. Some are of him as the ſole efficient of them. So are thoſe things which receive their being by creation, regeneration, or other ſuch like ſupernatural, or miraculous production. 2. Others are ſo of God, as to be alſo the work, and effect of ſecond agents. So are all thoſe things which come to paſſe here below, and in the order of nature, or the ordinary courſe of providence.
3. In the cauſing of the latter ſort of effects, viz. thoſe wh ch are both of God, and the creature, theſe two are not coordinate agents, or ſet collaterally, or in parity, or equality of order; for that would import that both were firſt, and but partial, ſociall cauſes, and as well the one as the other to be independent, or to have their cauſality in, and from themſelves alone. But the one is ſubordinate to the other, that is, God is the ſupreme and firſt, the creature is the inferior, and ſecond cauſe, and is dependent on, and receive its phyſical efficiency, or attingency of the effect from God, and that not partially or by way of addition or ſupply, but wholly. [Act. 17.25, 28. Iſa. 54.16. Ezek. 30.24. & 32.3.11, 12.] and this holdeth in all acts of the creature, whether holy or ſinful, good or evill, as to the natural being of the action. That which the Apoſtle ſaith of his gracious workings, Not I, but the grace of God which was with me, [1 Cor. 15.10.] the ſame Joſeph ſaith of his brethrens ſinful deed, It was not you that ſent me hither, but God, [Gen. 45.8.] The creature acteth, yet not it, but the power of God with it.
The creature hath truly, and really in it an active principle, and that principle truly and really exerteth or putteth forth acts, but it hath both the principle, and the activeneſſe put into it of God. His influence not only toucheth the effect, but the ſecond cauſe, and moveth it*Contrary to this ſome of the Schoolmen. Molina de lib. Arbitrio. qu. 14. Diſp. 26. pa. 111. & Diſp. 32. pag. 133,. He worketh not only with, but by it, and that though in ſome ſenſe mediately, in regard of his elevation, and uſe of the ſecond cauſe, yet immediately alſo in regard of his neareſt attingency, and that both by immediety of perſon and of virtue.
4. It behoves us to conſider the ſubordinacy of the ſecond to the fi…ſt cauſe, of the creature to God ſomewhat more diſtinctly. Obſerve therefore it is twofold:
1. Phyſicall.
2. Morall.
The former ſimply and abſolutely concernes the being of every reall effect, and the virtue, or power by which it is produced by any ſecond cauſe.
The latter reſpecteth the manner of the procedure of an eff…ct f…om a rational agent, and the relation, and correſpondency it bears to the revealed, and preceptive will of God given unto him.
All creatures in all their actions are phyſically ſubordinate to God; but reaſonable creatures moreover are, and particularly man is morally ſubordinate to him; viz. as he receives all his activity from him, ſo he is to act by his Commiſſion, and in a conformity to his direction, or command given forth by word: the ground and reaſon of the former ſubordination is his being a creature; for as ſuch he totally depends on God for his being and operation; the latter is from his being a creature endued with reaſon and will, and therefore working with deliberation and free volition; thence his perſon and actions are qualifiable with a moral goodneſs, and evilneſs, and are capable of being regulated by a law, and proſecuted with rewards and puniſhments. Man therefore in reſpect of his moral actions, ſtands in this twofold ſubordination unto God, phyſical, and moral.
5. There are divers differences twixt theſe two ſubordinations of man unto God, ſome of which it is to our preſent purpoſe to conſider. They are different.
1. In the formall reſpect, or term to which they refer; the phyſical ſubordination reſpecteth Gods will of purpoſe, and hand of providence; the moral reſpecteth Gods revealed will, or word of precept.
2. In point of neceſſity, the phyſical ſubordination is certain and immutable, ſo neceſſary as that it cannot be otherwiſe, it is impoſſible the creature ſhould not be in all things ſubject to, dependent on Gods decree and hand of providence, both paſſively and actively: the moral is not ſo, but may be, and is varied from, though this ſubordination be neceſſary de jure, and ought to be kept inviolate, yet it is not de facto, but it is oftentimes infringed. And here comes in ſin; what is ſin but the creatures breach, and tranſgreſſion of the moral ſubordination he ſtands in, and owes unto God his preceptive will or word, either by a non acting, or by a contrary acting to the ſame?
6. By theſe differences it may appear (for I ſhall not ſtrive to take notice of all) that theſe two ſubordinations are in humane actions, not only diſtinguiſhable, but ſeparable and diſſociable. Man may be ſubordinate to God phyſically in thoſe actions wherein he is inordinate morally. And Gods will of purpoſe, and work of providence may go on, and be done, when his preceptive will takes no place, but is directly croſſed, as it is in all the ſinful motions of man. And hence it may appear of the ſinfull acts of men, as they are ſomething in rerum naturâ, how it may be ſaid (as in the third Propoſition above) the thing is of Gods hand working, but not of his mouth warranting it to man.
If it be here asked, Why God makes uſe of ſuch agents to act by, as are diſpleaſing and croſſe to his preceptive will, when as he hath ſuch choice of other miniſterial agents, yea, and makes uſe of his creatures agency meerly of choice, not of neceſſity?
I anſwer, though mans ſinful acts cannot but be diſpleaſing and diſhonorable to him, yet the uſe he can, and doth make of them, is not ſo. It is for his honour to work by variety of inſtruments, and the commendation of his workmanſhip to bring to paſſe a ſtraight and perfect work, with crooked and untoward tooles. His providences of this nature are the probations of men, both good and evil; and hereby he both worketh out more good then there is evill in the act of the ſubordinate agent ſo peccant, and accompliſheth the juſt puniſhment, both of others and of thoſe he ſo imployes.
7. We muſt obſerve in the ſubordination of the creature to God in its production, though it receive all its efficacy and working from God, yet the cauſality of the firſt and ſecond, of the ſuperiour and inferiour cauſe, and the efflux of the effect as from the one, and the other, are diſtinguiſhable. As the creatures eſſence, and exiſtence are wholly in and from God, yet far enough different, and diſtinct from Gods: ſo the creatures power and operation, unto the cauſing of an effect, is totolly received of God, yet Gods agency therein is one, and the creatures is another. Hence our ſenſe tels us the ſun ſhines, the fire warmes, chalke whitens, and it is ſo really. If we ſhould ſay (as many Schoolmen do) that in this ſubordinate agency of the creature under G d, and their working together unto any effect,Molina. Suarez. the action of God, and the creature is the ſame ſtrictly and properly, as action is taken for productio activa (for as taken for productio paſſiva, or the effect, it may be clearly granted) yet, (although I ſee not why totall dependency, and derivation ſhould more infer, or be a reaſon for the confounding, or identifying Gods and the creatures actions, then it is for the identifying of their beings) we muſt underſtand it of the materiale, and not of the formale of their actions, and ſo muſt be forced to put ſome diſtinction, betwixt the creatures cauſality, and the virtue by which he cauſeth; betwixt the divine influx to the creature agent, and the creatures foreign, or efflux to the eff…ct; betwixt the creatures taking in the concourſe of the firſt cauſe, and his iſſuing or putting it forth. That God and the creature are different agents in their producing of the ſame effect is granted, but how ſhould they be ſo, if their action or agents were altogether the ſame? Beſides, if it were ſo, then the ſame action muſt be ſaid to be morally good (viz. as from God) and evill (as from man) to be ſubordinate to a law (…s from man) not ſubordinate (as from God). Again, if in this concurrence of theſe two agents to the cauſing of the ſame effect, the action of each were wholly the ſame, then the ſame action would denominate them both, which we ſee it doth not. When a ſtone fals downward, a plant growes, a beaſt goes, eats, ſleeps, we do not (nor can properly) ſay that God fals, growes, goes, eats, ſleeps. For although all theſe acts are in and from his concourſe, yet, as they only are in the creature, as their ſubject, ſo they are alſo from the creatures natural principles, from which there is a procedure of theſe acts different formally from that of the divine cooperation, for which they peculiar denominate the creature and not God. In man, whoſe actions have a moral … different from their phyſical, and who acteth with deliberation and choice, this difference (though it … in all creature act…) is more apparent. Let it be granted that in all his actions he is phyſically …ed by God, (though ſome admit it only of his imperate, tranſient and productive actions; unto the immanent and illicit acts of his underſtanding, and will, they will only allow a moral motiveneſs*Jo. Cameron Reſp. ad Epiſt. viri Docti. cap. 1. in operibus eius pag. 736. a, & 737. a., but whether way ſoever it be (let the phyſical influence be ſuppoſed of all) in theſe humane actions the ſtrength and virtue is from God, the actuoſity or agency is formally mans. Though the action be good, and ſo more peculiarly of God (he not only ſuſtaining the will in the uſe of its freedom, but determining and carrying it (whether by a phyſical or moral influence, is not here to be diſputed) to the willing and working of that good) yet the formal agency is only aſcribed to man. Hence he is ſaid to believe, hope, pray, and do the like gracious acts, and not God.
Hence it may appear (which is the reaſon I have travailed ſo far in theſe School intricacies) how in the ſinful acts of man, the uſual diſtinction betwixt the action and the moral obliquity of it, and that the former is from God, the latter is mans only, may hold. For,
1. Take it only in its natural or phyſical conſideration, and ſo the action is both from God, in as much as from him is the energie, or force that goes to it; and from man alſo, in as much as he hath an hand, or activity in it, diſtinct, though inſeparable from that of God.
2. And take it as a moral act, in which the creature oweth ſubordination and conformity to Gods law, and which floweth from a moral faculty in man, and ſo it is only from man, from his own will, according to that of our Saviour, That which cometh out of a man that defileth a man, for from within, out of the heart of men proceed evill thoughts, &c. All theſe things come from within, and defileth man. And that of the Apoſtle,CHAP. II. SECT. II. Subſect. 4. God gave them up to uncleanneſs through the luſts of their own hearts, to diſhonour their own bodies.) God not at all inclining or drawing, or intrinſecally determining the wil in the election of evil, as neither doth he in its act of averſation, or refuſal of good, or in a ſin of omiſſion. And thus it is manifeſt (according to our fourth propoſition above) it may be ſaid that ſome things (taking the term Thing in a vulgar ſenſe) are neither of Gods mouth (approving) nor of his hand (working.) For mans ſinful action, though the matter, virtue, or activity be of Gods hand, yet in its formal and moral ſtamp, it is neither of Gods hand nor mouth.
Subſection 4. How the hand of God is clear from the ſin of man when it acteth in mans ſinful action, and from injuſtice in puniſhing him for that action.
IF it be here asked, How this may be, that God may uſe, and be the author of thoſe actions, or motions of his creature in ſubordination to his working providence, which in their formal and moral habitude are evill, and ſo deordinate or repugnate to his word, and yet his hand and providence be as clear from the ſin, as his word is clear againſt it: and how the creature is in this caſe juſtly puniſhable by God?
I anſwer briefly:
1. For the former, How God is clear from being the authour of the ſin?
1. It is not the ſin formally taken which God makes uſe of to the production of any natural effect, but the phyſical motion of the creature to which the ſin is adherent.
2. Let it be conſidered how man acteth in this phyſical ſubſerviency to God. He is not impelled by God, but he moveth of his own accord, and free choice; he is not moved (as I think it may be affirmed) phyſically of God, till he firſt move himſelf morally. Unto every moral act of man that is tranſient, and productive of any thing, there are required two things to be in him, Will and Power; the power, how great ſoever, doth nothing of it ſelf, it is the wils injuction that educeth the act; though both concur to the action or effect, yet the power doth not lead or draw forth the will, but the will actuates the p…we…. The power in it ſelf is neither good nor evill, poſſe peccare was no fault in Adam, he had it in his integrity; a defectibility was both in him, and in the nature of Angels originally: neither doth the power make the action to which it is exerted, either good or evill; but the moral tincture is wholly from the will, and ſo intirely doth it reſult thence, that the will in ſome ſort (whether to good or evill) ſtands for, or is equivalent to the deed in Gods account. The queſtion then is, Whence is the will moved to this or that ſinful act? God indeed uſeth the creatures hand or power, but who or what is the mover or ſwayer of the will? The Philoſopher ſaith, and it's true, God is primus motor, the firſt mover, but this he underſtands of phyſical motion, and therefore in the external execution of that deed which is ſinful, let it be granted that God begins, but in humane actions, there is a moral act which goes before the natural, an elicite act precedes the imperate, an election of the will before an elevation of the power. Now for the volition of the wil in reference to a ſinful work, that's of it ſelf, and its counſellor or dictator, the practicall Intellect, as they may be each in their kind morally excited, or induced by their objective attractives without, or the ſuggeſtions of Satan; It muſt neceſſarily be acknowledged unto an evill courſe the will is not intrinſecally determined by God: he neither morally perſwades, nor phyſically impels it to ſuch reſolution, purpoſe or choice. God tempteth not any man, &c. [Jam. 1.13.] all, I think, that can be ſaid of God, as to that act of the will, is that he abandons, or leaves the man to himſelf, and to his objective and injective temptations, which though it may be an antecedent, yet is not in the leaſt a poſitive cauſe of the wills default; and yet he never doth that, but very righteouſly, both in regard of his diſobligation from any debt of aſſiſtance to his creature, and in regard of juſt provocation from him, ever ſince his firſt defection.
3. There are cauſes imaginable wherein even one man may honeſtly joyne in the ſame act with another, when it is to his knowledge in that other a ſinful action: the diverſity of the principle and end making the concurrence of the one juſt, of the other wicked. Take for inſtance Reubens counſelling and acting with his brethren in the caſting of his brother Joſeph into the pit, which they did for a miſchief, he for a deliverance to him, [Gen. 37 21.] and Huſhaies counſel to Abſalom (which Abſalom and his companions embraced) in ſhew for Abſaloms ſervice againſt David, but in intention and real tendency quite contrary [2. Sam. 17.11, &c.] And this is ſeen in the guiltleſs concurrence of one that is neceſſitated to enter into any contract that is unlawfull in the party voluntarily contracting, whether uſury, or other*Vide Grotium de Jure Belli lib. 2. cap. 26. Sect. 5. & lib. 3. cap. 1. Sect. 22..
How much more may it be yeelded to be ſo betwixt theſe two, in this reſpect, as in other infinitely diſpar agents, God and man; eſpecially when we know there is no leſſe diſtance betwixt the end which the one hath, and that of the other: according as Joſeph expreſſeth it in the caſe between his brethren and himſelf. But, as for you, ye thought evill againſt me, but God meant it unto good to ſave much people alive, [Gen. 50.20.] could it not be ſo betwixt man and man; that one might lawfully joyn his hand in that act wherein another joyneth ſinfully, yet God, though moſt righteous, is unconfined to the bounds of mans righteouſneſs: it is his prerogative, as the ſupreme cauſe, not to be tyed within thoſe rules, which ſubordinate agents are.
4. Let it be added, when God uſeth mans efficiency to inflict that upon one which from the ſubordinate agent is ſinfully inferred, as ſuppoſe ſlaughter, robbery, defamation, or the like, there what is wickedly done by man, is alwayes juſtly from God upon the patient: he no leſſe righteouſly (as to the ſufferer) takes away a mans life by the hand of an aſſaſſinate, then if he did it by a diſeaſe, or any other means: and being ſo, if we think it no impeachment to the juſtice of a ſupreme magiſtrate to take away the life of a capital offender by ſuch a judge, or executioner as may act corruptly in it, as doing it with a minde meerly acted by cruelty, or mercenary reſpects; much more may we abſolve the providence of the Almighty in the imployment of a ſinful inſtrument to the accompliſhment of his moſt juſt purpoſe and act.
2. For the other part of the queſtion, The puniſhableneſs of a perſon by God thus ſerving his providence by his ſinful action: the ſame things will ſerve for anſwer.
1. Man hath a concurrence or agency of his own formally different from Gods in the action.
2. That his concurrence is free, from his own will, without all compulſiveneſſe.
3. He therein propoſeth to himſelf, not Gods end, or the ſerving of God in it, but he hath his own proper aim different from, and often contrary to that of God*Who ſo forlorn or impudent amongſt miſcreants as to ſay, that in his damned ambition, or covetouſneſs, or luxury he had reſpect to the will of God, which no man lightly knows but by the event? Dr. Sclater Sermon on 2 King 9.31. pag 27..