The Divine Right and Original of the Civil Magistrate, Chapter 1

The Divine Right and Original of the Civil Magistrate · Chapter 1

p. 3CHAP. I. Of the Subject here ſpoken of, Power, the Powers.

SECT. I. An Enquiry whether Power be put for the Perſon inveſted with Power, or for the abſtract, the Office ſeated in him?

IT may be of ſome uſe for the underſtanding of the meaning of this word Power, to take notice whether it be put here for the Officer, or for the Office, for the Magiſtrate, or for Magiſtracy. The Scripture uſeth the term both wayes. Sometimes in the abſtract, or for the form, office, or ſtate, which makes and denominates one a Superiour to others. [So Luk. 20.20. Joh. 17.2. Rev. 17.13.] Sometimes in the concrete, or for the perſon in whom that abſtract form, or office is ſubjected. [So it is Luk. 12.11. Rom. 8.38. Eph. 1.21. & 3.10. & 6.12. Col. 2.15. Tit. 3.1. 1 Pet. 3.22.] That it is this latter way to betaken in this place, not only Commentators agree, [for which ſee Auguſtin Tom. 4. part. 2. Expoſ. propoſ. ex Epiſt. ad Rom. Piſcator, Rollock, Pareus, Dr. Hammond, Eſſius, Vignerus in loc.] but the Text it ſelf may lead us to reſolve. Power in the abſtract p. 4cannot be the ſubject, or recipient either of the duties required, and argued for in this text to be payed to the Power therein mentioned, or of the offences forbidden, and threatned (if done) againſt it: neither can it be the agent, or adminiſtrant of thoſe acts which are aſcribed to the Power here intended. It cannot be the object of that Fear, nor the author of that Praiſe mentioned verſ. 3. The accident, or abſtract power is, indeed, the Reaſon of mens Obligation to the performance of thoſe duties, and the refraining of thoſe injuries to the perſon empowered; and it is the form, or principle which thoſe acts do flow from in him. But it cannot be that ſuppoſitum which is the object of the one, and the agent of the other. Moreover, that the concrete, the perſon in power is here meant, may be clear from the following words in the context, in verſ. 3. the Apoſtle puts the title of Rulers, and this of Power identically, Rulers are not a terror, &c. wilt thou not then be afraid of the Power? and in verſ. 4, 6, 7, 8. his arguments for the ſubjection to the Power in this verſ. injoyned run all upon the perſon, for he is the Miniſter of God — he beareth not the ſword in vain, &c.

p. 5SECT. II. The main enquiry, to wit, What kind of Power it is which the Apoſtle intends in thoſe words, Power, the Powers.

Subſection 1. Of the force of the word, foreign.

POwer ſignifieth here the perſon empowered. Yet in as much as the Text muſt needs ſuppoſe, imply, and refer unto Power in the abſtract, as the form which doth conſtitute, and denominate the perſon in whom it is ſeated a Power, and only he can be ſaid to be the Power, who is endued with that Power: the way to explain this term, and to underſtand who are the Powers here intended, will be, in taking the Apoſtle to ſpeak of the concrete, or perſon, to caſt our eye upon the abſtract, or the habit of Power placed in him, and to enquire what kind of Power is that which the text preſuppoſeth, and referreth unto, as that endowment which makes the perſons here ſpoken of to be termed the Powers.

The notation of the propriety, or uſe of the word foreign, may be ſomewhat conducing to this enquiry. The obſervation of a diſtinction betwixt foreign and foreign; betwixt potentia and poteſtas, and that the former is of a larger acception, and ordinarily ſignifies a p. 6meer mightineſs, or ability; the latter is of a ſtricter uſe, and uſually ſignifies ſuch a Power as conſiſts in right, intereſt, or property, is an obſervation not only given us by ſome of late, but avowed by Divines and Criticks of chiefeſt note, and will upon due ſearch (I believe) be found to hold good.

It muſt be remembred, that the propriety of a word is not a thing of ſo preciſe a nature, as that it is ever and invariably kept, or ſo as the word may never be obſerved to be otherwiſe uſed. There is not (I think) any term that is frequently made uſe of, but ſometimes it is taken out of its proper and peculiar ſenſe; and ſo perhaps may be ſometimes this word foreign; but as far as I can learn, either by mine own obſervation, or from the incomparably more mature experience, and judgement of other Authors, the propriety of this word is of this meaſure, that properly taken, it only ſignifies that power which conſiſts in right, and when it intends a power of Superiority of one perſon over another, it ſignifies an Authorized power only, or that Superiority which is lawful, or juſtly intitled to rule. And I believe (if poſſible) it will not be eaſie, or obvious to meet with it in any other acceptation in the New Teſtament.

For the former, mine own obſervation; I ſhall not trouble the Reader with reciting the places of Scripture in which the word is found, whereby the conſtant uſe of it may appear; but ſhall ſum up under a few heads the variety of uſe which I have noted in the word in reſpect of divers objects it is applyed to, and refer to the ſeveral places for peruſall.

I have noted that in the new Teſtament this word foreign is applyed,

1. Sometimes to things privately poſſeſſible.

p. 72. Sometimes to matter of action.

3. Sometimes more ſpecially to matter of command, or authority over perſons.

1. It is applyed to matters privately poſſible: and ſo it ſignifies a right, or juſt intereſt in a thing, ſo as the perſon in whom the Power is, may lawfully diſpoſe of, or injoy it. [So Job. 1.12. Act. 1.7. & 5.4. & 8.19. Rom. 9.21. 2 Theſſ. 3.9. Rev. 23.14.]

2. It is applyed to matter of action, and ſo it ſignifies a Warrant, Commiſſion, Licence, or Rule, enabling a man to the doing, or executing of any action, or work in the ſaid Rule determined. [So Mat. 9.6. & 10.1. & 21.23. Mark. 13.34. Luk. 9.1. Joh. 10.18. Act. 26.12. 1 Cor. 8.9. & 9.4, 5, 6, 18. 2 Cor. 10.8. & 13.10]

3. It is applyed more ſpecially to matter of Command, or Authority over perſons, and ſo it ſignifies an Authority, or lawful calling to rule and bear ſway over others. [So Mat. 28.18. Mark. 1.27. Luk. 4 36. & 12.5. & 19.17. & 20.20. Joh. 17.2. & 19.10. 1 Cor. 11.20. & 15.24. Col. 2.10. Jud. v. 25. Rev. 17.13.]

Theſe are the ſeveral kinds of objects or matters (in my obſervation) to which the Power ſignified by this word foreign relateth in Scripture. And by the many inſtances under each of theſe heads may be gathered the propriety of the word in Scripture-accep…ation. And the Reader that will pleaſe to ſearch all theſe tex…s, and examine the currantneſs of my citing of them, will (I doubt not) upon impartial view, finde alſo theſe two things true which I ſhall further obſerve unto him of them.

Firſt, That in all theſe places, the ſenſe of this word foreign is confined within the limit of a juſt and lawful Power, and cannot be p. 8extended to the bare act of meer Occupation, or forcible poſſeſſion, or command: hence it is rendred by our Tranſlators, not alwayes by the word Power, but (in the forecited places) ſometimes by this term, Right, [as Joh. 1.12. in marg. Rev. 22.14.] ſometimes Authority, [Mat. 21.23. Mark 13.34. Luk. 4.36. & 9.1. & 20.20. Act. 26.12. 1 Cor. 15.24. 2 Cor. 10.8.] and ſometimes Liberty, [as 1 Cor. 8.9.] And further in divers of thoſe Texts it is put to ſignifie the Right, or Warrantedneſs of a thing, when as the point of Right is either queſtioned, or aſſerted in a contradiſtinction to an arbritrary, and unwarrantable aſſuming, or uſurping. [So in that of Mat. 21.23, 24.] the chief Prieſts and Elders ask Chriſt, foreign; By what authority doſt thou theſe things, and who gave thee this authority? The authority here demanded to be ſhewn is a warrant; or lawfull commiſſion for the doings of our Saviour; the things done they had ſeen, his foreign, the act of Power, or force he had put forth, in his Doctrine, Miracles, and imperious driving out of the Temple the traffiquing profaners of it; but they call in queſtion, and therefore demand of him, and accordingly he conditionally promiſes to tell them by what authority he did thoſe things, and who gave him that authority. So again [in that of Mat. 9.6.] our Saviour aſſerteth to himſelf the having, foreign, the power on earth to forgive ſins; they that were preſent had heard him executing the act towards the Palſie-ſick perſon, in his ſaying to him, thy ſins be forgiven thee. But they doubted of, or rather denyed his authority or lawfull power to do it, and that was the thing therefore which he there avoweth. In like manner [in that of Joh. 19.10.] Pilate thought Chriſt now ſtanding before him, and p. 9not making any anſwer to his examinations of him, implyed that he took him to have no lawfull power over him in that cauſe; and therefore asks him, Knoweſt thou not that I have power to crucifie thee, and have power to releaſe thee?

[Where by the way the allegarion which ſome make of this Text, as though the word here ſignified an abuſive, or unlawful power… in as much as what ever power Pilate might have to releaſe Chriſt, he had none to crucifie him, is utterly impertinent. For it is not materiall to the uſe of the word here to ſay, what power Pilate really had, or what he had not; but the matter is, what power he thought and meant to aſſert that he had; for the word there muſt needs bear that ſenſe which the ſpeaker meant it in: and for that there is no doubt but Pilate looked on himſelf, as the lawful, Governor of that place, and at Chriſt as a common perſon of that Nation, and ſo intended; that himſelf was the competent Judge, of the perſon and cauſe of Chriſt then before him, and that he had therefore power to crucifie him, and power to releaſe him, viz. reſpectively, accordingly as he ſhould finde his cauſe to deſerve.]

So [in that of Rom. 9.21.] the Apoſtle diſputing for the equity and juſtneſs of Gods purpoſes, and proceedings in his acts of Free Election and Reprobation, in order to the benefits of his Grace, and in his excutions thereof, he alleadges by way of compariſon the example of the Potters power over his clay, to make a veſſel of it to what uſe he pleaſeth. Where if the word foreign were ambiguous, and did not clearly ſignifie right and juſt power, the argument were of no force or evidence.

Secondly, The other thing I obſerve is, that this word is in thoſe forequoted places put for ſuch a power, as doth not neceſſarily p. 10import, or require to its being, or depend upon poſſeſſion, actual tenure, or exerciſe of the matter, or object of the power, but is in ſome of thoſe inſtances de facto ſeparate, and in all ſeparable therefrom; yea in ſome of them the power is ſo affirmed, as that the act or exerciſe of it is expreſly ſecluded, and laid aſide, as neither done, nor to be done in the particular caſe. That univerſal Power which Chriſt aſſumeth to himſelf [Joh. 17.2. Mat. 28.18.] was then in him in regard of grant and inveſture, and in reſpect of right and title to all the things to which it referreth, but a jus in re, a ſeiſure or poſſeſſion of them he had not. For before his paſſion, being then in the ſtate of humiliation, he was far from an actual dominion, or command over all; nay after his riſing again, and his aſcending up unto, and ſeſſion at the right hand of God in heaven; the Apoſtle ſaith of him, We ſee not yet all things put under him, [Heb. 2.8.] That power of Believers to eate of things unto Idols, And that of Paul and Barnabas to marry, and to take with them in their travail Wives, and to receive maintenance for themſelves, and them of the Churches of Corinth and Theſſalonica, [1 Cor. 8.9. & 9.4, 5. 2 Theſſ. 3.9.] theſe were powers inherent in thoſe perſons reſpectively, but they were not acted, no nor could lawfully be put forth by them as the caſe then ſtood with thoſe Chriſtians.

It is againſt this Obſervation of the force of this word objected by ſome, that foreign is put for a Power unlawful as to title, in two or three places, [viz. Luk. 4.6. Rev 13.2, 4. Epheſ. 6.12. Col. 2.14.] Unto which I ſay,

1. It ſhould ſtill be remembred (what was before ſaid) that the propriety of a word is not a thing of ſo preciſe a nature, as that it is ever punctually kept; and that it is to be p. 11judged, not by its uſe once or twice, but by its common and frequent uſe.

2. Let the Texts brought for this be ſeverally looked into.

For that [of Luke 4.6.] I can ſee no reaſon to conclude the word is there uſed for a rightleſs power. Who can think but that Satan there intendeth to aſſume to himſelf a good title, and juſt intereſt over this worlds kingdoms, and not a falſe or uſurped claim? and according to his intention that ſpeaks muſt the ſenſe of the word be conſtrued to be. Indeed he lyed in taking that large compoſs of power to himſelf, and this he had done whether he had ſpoken of that power in point of right, or in point of fact, for in neither ſenſe had be all that power either given to him, or to give to others; but his lie had not been ſo ſpecious or to his purpoſe, had he not meant of a real and good authority.

For that [of Rev. 13.2, 4.] where it's ſaid The Dragon gave the beaſt his power, and his ſeat, and great authority; and the Dragon gave power unto the beaſt: preſuppoſing that by the Dragon is meant Satan, and by the Beaſt the Roman Empire, as diſtributed into ten Kingdoms, or States, upon the diſſipation of the Monarchy of the Caeſars, by the wars of the Barbarians; which ten are therefore, it may be, called one Kingdom, Rev. 17.17. or that part of the ſaid Empire, which is called the Weſtern Empire, as reduced partly in regard of ſecular State and Title into the hands of the Exarch of Ravenna firſt, then of the French, and after of the German Emperor, but acted, and over-ſwayed by the Pope of Rome **See Mr. Mede on Revel. com. part. 2. cap. 13. Napier. Simſon. Ds. Annot. in loc.. Now where it is ſaid, this Dragon gave this Beaſt his power, and ſeat, and great authority, the poſſeſſive his, is I take it neceſſarily to be referred to the Dragon, not to the Beaſt, for the pronoun foreign carries it to the agent, or giver. p. 12Now the Dragon might be ſaid to give his power and authority to the Beaſt two wayes.

1. By way of ſurceaſe, or ſurrendry. The Devill when he ſaw the authority of the Heathen Emperors come to an end, upon the riſing up of Conſtantine, he layd down that ſway he had held in the uſe of them, in whom he had played the Dragon, by inſtigating them, and their people by them, to groſſe Paganiſh Idolatry, and to open enmity againſt Chriſtianity, and now gave way to the Beaſt.

2. By way of allurement and aſſiſtance. Satan ſeeing he muſt perforce leave that his way of working, and leading the world which he had long held by means of the Heatheniſh Empire, he now applies himſelf to the preſent Secular powers, the Chriſtian Potentates, riſen up in the room of the former, to draw them over to his intereſt of Idol-worſhip, and Saint-perſecution, though in another forme and method; unto which be makes it his deſign firſt to perſwade, and then to aſſiſt them, in the promoting and executing thereof. In reference, to the latter his aſſiſtance, eſpecially, may thoſe words be underſtood of the Dragons giving his power and authority to the Beaſt q. d. Satan joyneth his power unto the Roman State or Magiſtracy, become Chriſtian, and after a while degenerate in Religion, by Hereſie, and Superſtition, to further them in their way (which was alſo his own main work) of Blaſphemous Idolatries, and cruel perſecutions, drawing in alſo the Nations of the world to follow them therein. A like manner of ſpeech to this we have, Rev. 17.13, 17. where the ten Kings are ſaid to give their power and ſtrength unto the Beaſt; that is, by way, not of inveſting it in him, but of aſſiſting him with it. And thus it may be plain how the word foreign, is here uſed. For what is that Power, Seat, and Authority which Satan hath in humane affairs? p. 13Verily none properly ſo called; that is, he hath no temporal Government, no formal, profeſſed, open, and acknowledged rule amongſt men, either by commanding in word, or compulſion in deed, as Princes have over their Subjects, Maſters over their Servants. The term therefore cannot here be put to ſignifie any Civil Empire, either lawful or unlawful, as to title. The Devill hath indeed a phyſical power, or potency in material or elementary things, to produce effects in them above the ordinary courſe of nature; and there is in him a properly political or governing Power, in relation to his fellows, the evill ſpirits, and hence we read of his Angels; and him called, the prince of Devils: But in moral, and humane proceedings, he hath no more but a ſuggeſting or counſelling, a tempting or perſwaſive power: the only way he hath to ſway men after him (that we know) is by illuſion and enticement. When therefore we finde theſe titles, the God, and the Ruler of the darkneſs of this world, the prince of this world, and the prince of the power of the air, aſcribed to him, and here a power, ſeat, and great authority, which he lends in aſſiſtance to the Beaſt; we muſt take theſe attributions figuratively, and improperly ſpoken; and to import no more, but that, as it were, and in effect, he is, and hath theſe things, in as much as by his ſtratagems, or ſubtile arts, he leadeth men both of high and low degree, in a manner at his pleaſure; and by crafty inſinuations, he is as prevalent, and bringeth men as wholly to his bent, as if he had a direct Empire over them, and they owned him as their Lord. Satans power being then ſpiritual, not temporal, perſwaſive or precarious, not imperious, his giving his power to the Beaſt, whether by reſignation at the Beaſts advancement, or by way of aſſiſtance to him when in authority, and in relation to his uſe thereof, as p. 14it could no way concern the Beaſts temporal title, or intereſt in his civill authority, in point of lawfulneſs or unlawfulneſs, ſo it affords no inſtance for the taking in of an unentitled Civil power (whether in the Dragon or in the Beaſt) into the ſignification of this word, foreign.

Laſtly, for thoſe places [Eph. 6.12. Col. 2.15.] Principalities, and Powers, are the titles both of good and evill ſpirits, in reference to other ſpirits; there being an order, and a diſtinction of ſuperior and inferior, in reſpect of dignity and rule, among them by creation; the which the fallen Angels doe ſtill retain among them; and this they do (in all probability) both by virtue of their firſt ordination, the preſent diſpenſation of God, and their own mutual conſent: now what power is in any Angel by creation, and primitive inſtitution, cannot be unlawful.

Secondly, for the obſervation and judgement of the Learned concerning the notation of the word foreign, I will not detain my Reader ſo long as to cite to him all that I have found in ſuch to this purpoſe, nor to rehearſe the words of any, but I ſhall only mention theſe following Authors thus interpreting this word, and refer him to the places in them. Zanchius To. 2. de natura Dei, lib. 4. cap. 8. quaeſt. 3. Theſ. 3. pag. 424. Beza in Marc. 1.27. Piſcator, & Elnathan par in Loc. Janſenius Concord. cap. 113. pag. 822. Daniel Heinſius exercit. in Mat. 7.28. Gataker Diſſertat. cap. 43. pag. 457. Ms. Leigh. Critic. Sacra in voc.

p. 15Subſection 2. Power diſtinguiſht into Natural and Moral.

BUt it is not the meer notation of a word that will lead to the diſtinct and adequate conception of the matter, or thing thereby ſignified. Wherefore let us proceed to a more reall conſideration of this ſubject Power.

I will not run through the whole ſcheme of diſtinctions upon the word. There are many ſorts of Power which may eaſily appear to be of a remote and diſparate conſideration to what this Text will bear. To omit therefore the Explication of thoſe diviſions of Power, into increate and create; of create, into active and paſſive; of active into immanently and tranſiently active. That Power which is in a created and corporeal ſubſtance, and is tranſiently active, or importeth the influx of one body, or ſuppoſitum upon another, may be twofold:

1. Natural.

2. Moral**Of this Diſtinction ſee Mr. Whites Way to the tree of life, pag. 45. The Treatiſe of Monarchy part. 1. cap. 3. Sect. 2. pag. 19, 20.

1. Natural, or phyſical power, is the ſame which we call (more diſtinctly) ſtrength, might, and vigor. It conſiſteth in an ability to enforce or make impreſſion upon another thing, or to cauſe it to yeeld or give way.

2. Moral power, is that which we call property or dominion; it conſiſteth in a right, title or intereſt, to order, diſpoſe or govern. This Moral Power, as ſeated in man, may be taken either more extenſively, ſo the object p. 16of it may be things inanimate, or brute beaſts; for over them man hath a dominion given him of God**Gen. 1.2…. Pſal. 8.5.Gen 1:2Ps 8:5: or more ſtrictly, as it reſpecteth man only; and this Power this related we peculiarly call Authority: And this again is diſtinguiſhable according to the diverſity of humane ſocieties, ſome whereof are private, and domeſtical; and ſome are more publique. But as it is found in, or related to a publique civill community, or body politique it's tearmed Magiſtracy, or political power.

That there is a reall difference to be found betwixt thoſe two powers, the Natural, and the Moral; as in general, ſo as they may be ſeated in man as the ſubject, and reſpect man as the object, and particularly as they are competible to a body politique; and that the difference lies, as was ſaid, herein, that the one conſiſts in a meer impetus, or prepotency, or a ſufficiency of ſtrength to impoſe, or make impreſſion on another; the other in a right, or imereſt to bear ſway, may be eaſie to fe….

1. The reality of the difference is evident, Natural power is found not only in man, but in brute beaſts, yea in inanimates: Moral is proper to reaſonable creatures. Again, although reaſonable creatures be enduable with both, yet among men the natural and the moral, might, and right to rule may be, and for the moſt part are diſtinct or ſeparate each from other in regard of the ſubject of inherence**Poteſtas in populo, Authoritat in Senatu. Cicero de leg. lib. 3.. The Natural power is ordinarily in them that do not, ought nor to rule, but to obey and be in ſubjection. There is a Moral power, or right to rule in Man over the other Creatures, yet in natural power he is inferiour to many of them. And amongſt men, in Natural power, that is ſtrength, or might of body, the family in greater then the Maſter, the Subjects excel… p. 17their Soveraign, the Souldiert overmatch their Leaders; whereas the Moral power in relation to each of theſe is in the Maſter, the Soveraign, the Leader. It is very ſeldom ſeen, if ever, in any humane Society, that Natural, and Moral power do meet in the ſame perſons, as the ſubjects of inheſion. Suppoſe a City or Nation ruled by ſome ſtrong hand, or a military force: even in that force there muſt needs be ſome one head, or councel of a few to guide, and command it, ſome Pretorian Magiſtracy to govern the Army, and in that head or Pretorian office (far inferior in Natutal power to the Army, as the Army poſſibly is to the City, or Nation under its beck) would the ſupreme Power lie, and the military force would but be ſubordinate, and miniſterial to that command, in like manner as the unarmed people are to that force. And although it be both right, and neceſſary to the well-being of a political Society, that the Natural and Moral power do concur, the former to ſerve and ſupport the other, and the diſcord of theſe is the high way to the ruine of both; yet it is not ſimply neceſſary to the being either of the Moral power, or of the community. Every ſudden mutiny, or temporary Sedition, which is the Inſurrection, and prevalency of the Natural power againſt the Moral, doth not diſſolve the preſent Society or Magiſtracy, Political, or Military. The uproar at Epheſus [Act. 19.] was within a few houres quelled, and the City remained in its former ſtate. Although upon the death of Ahaziah [2 Chron. 22.9.] his houſe had no power (viz. natural) to keep ſtill the Kingdom, but Athaliah uſurped it, yet within a few years it removed the uſurpreſſe, and repoſſeſſed both Power and Kingdom as in its former right.

2. And that the difference twixt thoſe two Powers lies (as was ſaid) in the meer forcibleneſſe p. 18or prevalidity of the one, and the right or legitimacy to command of the other; that the one can, the other only may or ought to rule; the one poſſibly hath the appetite and act of governing, the other hath only the commiſſion and warrant, ſhould me thinks eaſily be conceived. Natural power we oppoſe to impotency, weakneſs; Moral power we oppoſe to illicitneſs or wrong. Thence that ſaying, Id tantum poſſumus quod jure poſſumus; whereby it appears that Natural power conſiſts in ſtrength, Moral in rightfulneſs. And indeed wherein elſe ſhould the difference be placed? What difference is there to be made betwixt the power of one Brute prevailing over another, or over a Man, and that of the owners ruling over that Brute? or betwixt that of a Manſtealer that hath gotten anothers childe into his hand by ſtealth, and that of the true father over his childe? or betwixt that of a Rout, or Band of Rogues, or drunken companions that may have aſſaulted and beaten the Magiſtrates officers, and perhaps himſelf too, and that of the Civil Magiſtrate? each of theſe may de facto be Maſter; each of them may be found aſſuming, and exerciſing rule; they cannot therefore be diſtinguiſhed by their acts: The d ſtinction then betwixt them muſt be taken from the ground, riſe, or principle from which the acts of rule are put forth; which in the one and the other are divers. In the one thoſe acts are from meer force and will; in the other, they are from authority, or a will authorized to preſcribe or command. Each of theſe Powers (I ſay) may be found exerciſing rule; for we cannot call any power morall, meerly becauſe it acteth in, or manageth thoſe we call Moral or Civil affairs; for that a Natural power in a ſubject endued with reaſon may do: there may be an intermedling with Civill matters, where p. 19there is no moral power, as in caſe of Sedition, where they that are to obey will needs rule: as on the other hand there may be a Moral power, that is, a right to command, or diſpoſe where the object is not moral, or civil; ſuch is the power of man, given him of God, over other creatures (animate and inanimate) of diſpoſing according to his reaſon and will, of their natural acts of feeding, generating, labouring, &c. But that is a moral power in relation to any of theſe objects or matters about which power is exerciſed, which hath a moral riſe or deduction, viz. an authorization, and right, and what hath not ſo is meerly natural.

The proper character then, or formall difference of each of theſe two Powers is, that the Natural power is no other then a brutiſh predominancy or violence**Potentia eſt id quod per ſi eſt effican. — Vit eſt majoris rei impetus, qui repelli, vel ſaltem ex arbitrio, & commode non poteſt. Greg. Tholoſ. Synt. Juris. lib. 11. cap. 2. Sect. 3. & cap. 1. Sect. 4.: the reaſon of its ſuperiority, is its own might and will; it knows nothing of any civil liberty, order, or right; its proper act is ruere, impetere, or impellere, to ruſh in upon, aſſault, or bear down before it what ſtands in its way: if it uſe reaſon ſo far as to give out commands, to ordain, or proceed by any laws, or to take cogniſance of cauſes by any rule, it is but ad libitum, without any obligation, certainty, or conſtancy, only as far as ſtands with its own humor or intereſt; for as its riſe is its own force and appetite, ſo its end is its proper and private accommodation, and ſafety.

The Moral power (to ſpeak of it only as ſeated in, and relating to man, and more particularly that of the Civil Magiſtrate) is a ſpecial ſtate, or function, or adminiſtration amongſt men. Its original is not its own inherent, or adjacent robi…, or main ſtrength, but poſitive conſtitution. It conſiſteth in, not only an ability, but a right to command. It hath indeed de jure, and ſhould have de facto, a Sword as well as a Scepter; a coactive, as well as p. 20a directive power; the Natural power joyned to its Moral: but its Moral power lyeth in its word,Eccl. 8.4.Eccl 8:4 not in its ſword; Where the word of a King is, there is power, Solomon ſaith. It is its reaſon, not its might which gives law, and its reaſon is legiſlative, whereas anothers is not Ratio cujuſlibet non eſt factiva legis, ſaith Aquinas **Aquinas 1. 2a. quaſt. 96. artic. 3. & Cajetan in quaeſt. 96. artic. 5. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 4. pag. 46.. Its proper, primary, and genuine act is to preſcribe, guide, and direct: the ſword is requiſite to it, but ex accidenti, upon occaſion of others pravity; compulſorineſs is not of its eſſence, but an after addition to it, for its preſervation and efficacy††It's probably conceived that the ſword is a ſuperaddition to the Civil power, annext to it, Gen. 9.6. See Dr. Hammond of Reſiſting, &c. pag. 27. It could not be from the beginning, for in the ſtate of integrity there was no uſe of it.Gen 9:6. It never uſeth the ſword, but where equity and dignity are conſemned; where, by reaſon of the ſubjects either vitiouſneſs, or defect of reaſon, bare authority cannot take place. The ſpecial reaſon of its erection by men, is the proneneſs of ſome to take the advantage of their natural power to invade, and the inability of others to defend themſelves againſt ſuch; and a prime end of it is to prevent or remedy the …xorbitances of Natural power in ill diſpoſed perſons; and thereby to ſecure the community, in order to the general, and each ones particular good. Again, it doth not take the Sword in the ſenſe of our Saviour. [Matth. 26.25.**Per accipere gladium intelligitur propria authoritate, & voluntate uti gladio. Principes enim, & judices non accipiunt quaſi a ſeipſis, ſed conceſſo ſibi gladio a deo utuntur. Cajetan Jentac. 6. quaeſt. 3.] but beareth it [as Rom. 13.4.] that is, it doth not ſnatch it up, or wreſt it from another to it ſelf, but hath it delivered. It hath the Sword not only in its hand, but in its commiſſion, and the Sword that it hath is not the cauſe, but the conſequent of its ſuperiority: It doth p. 21not aſſume, or hold its authority by vertue of the ſword, but it aſſumes and holds the ſword by vertue of its authority. The Scepter goes before the Sword, and is that which legitimates it**Potentia vero debet ſequi juſtitiam, non praire. Aug. To. 3. de Trinit. lib. 13. cap. 13. Obſervemus jus glad…i magiſtratibus eſſe a deo datum, tanquam neceſſarium adminiculum & nervum ſuae poteſtatis. Pareus in Rom. 13.4.Rom 13:4: when it draweth the ſword, the difference betwixt its Sword, and anothers, (that is armed only by natural ſtrength) is, that its edge is not meerly backed with mettal, or in an arme of fleſh, and ſinews, but with warrant, and commiſſion, and that ſigned by God.

Let me add by way of Supplement, to what hath been ſaid, to demonſtrate both that there is a reall difference betwixt Power Natural, and Moral, and what it is, this further. That even in God we diſtinguiſh betwixt his Power by which we mean his arme of ſtrength and might, and his Power by which we ſignifie his throne of authority, or Soveraign rule: betwixt his power of command, and his power of efficiency: betwixt his working power, and his legiſlative or willing power: betwixt the power of his right hand, and the power of his ſcepter of righteouſneſs: in the Lords-Prayer, Kingdom, and foreign, Power, aſcribed to God are diſtinguiſhed: and though both be natural, that is eſſential to God; yet the one we may call his Phyſical, the other his Moral power††Vide Zanchium de Nat. Dei lib. 4. cap. 8. qu. 3. Theſ. 3. Arminium Diſ. priv. Theſ. 22. Sect. 2. & Theſ. 27. Sect. 2..

Anſwerable to this twofold power in Man, there is a twofold ſubjection; one of the body only, which reſpecteth the Natural power: the other of the body with the minde alſo, relating unto the power wich is Moral**Duplex eſt ſervitus, corporis, & animi. vis quippe in corpore, in externis, prohibitio autem Juris animum po…iſſinum cogit. Greg. Tholoſ. Synt. Jer. lib. 11. cap. 1 Sect. 4.. The Morall power layeth an obl…gation upon the conſcience: to it a man p. 22doth or ought to ſubmit, as of right and duty: It may challenge our obedience though, and where it cannot compel to it: and we are to ſubject though there be nothing to overaw us to it: and this is the property of this Power in diſtinction from the natural: that which is but natural reacheth not the mind: the acts it putteth forth may lay a coaction on the body, but not a tie on the conſcience. What ever be the natural, or armed power of one perſon, or party above another; no man is under any obligation to obey, nor hath he any claim to rule by virtue of it: if he had, there could be no ſuch thing as Moral power in the world, this being (as was before ſaid) for moſt part, if not ever, ſeated in thoſe perſons who in regard of Natural power, are inferiour to them whom they ſhould reign over. If Natural power could oblige to obedience, the Monarch were bound to reſign his Crown to the multitude; and the Senate or Parliament muſt receive laws from the community. Every heady commotion, or rout of a multitude riſen up, were to be ſubmitted to, and were not to be repreſſed: the Town-clerk did not well to check the tumult at Epheſius, or to refer the plaintiffs from the preſent uproare to a court or lawful aſſembly, he ſhould have let them go on, and have both ſubmitted to, and aſſiſted them. But this is abſurd enough to appear ſo to any man; the commonly received maxime is, By nature men are (in regard of Civill juriſdiction) all equal, no man a Ruler, or ſervant to another**Hooker Eccl. poſit. lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 26, &c. Aſcham Diſcourſe, &c. part 1. cap. 1. Sect. 4. Hobs Elem. part. 1. c. …. 1.. So that the effect of a natural power, where it conquereth is but to involve them that are under it in an actual ſubduedneſs, that they touch down, as a man doth to a Lion being under his paw, or as a traveller doth to a highway-robber that hath ſet his piſtol to his breaſt, that is, without either will or duty owed to the prevailer, or obligation to go any further in p. 23ſubjection then ſelf-preſervation, or the like conſiderations (irreſpective to the invader) may ſuggeſt. This then is the different effect or relative ſtate produced by Natural and by Moral power in the perſons to whom theſe reſpectively are extended; the Natural power involveth men in an actual ſubduedneſs: the Moral reduceth them to a rational and conſcientious ſubordination.

Subſection 3. That Moral Power only is intended in this word Power in this place.

HAving obſerved and explained this diſtinction of Power, it may perhaps remain a queſtion with ſome, Whether this term Power, in the text, be not of ſo general an extent as to contain both the members of this diviſion, or whether it be to be reſtrained to Moral power only. The word indeed is put indefinitely, or without expreſs limitation; but it may nevertheleſs be doubted whether it can here bear a ſenſe as illimited as the words are. My apprehenſion is (and I think I ſhall make it good) that only Moral power can be meant by this Text; that is, not that which meerly hath might, force, or bodily maſterdom; but that which, beſides that, hath right, title, or warrant to govern.

My Argument for it (beſides what ſhall afterwards be ſaid) ſhall here be this; Political, or Magiſtratical power, or the power of the Civil Ruler only is intended in this Text, but p. 24this is only a Moral, warranted, or authorized power; Therefore it is only a Moral, or warranted power which is here intended in the Text.

For the firſt, or Major propoſition, That the Political or Magiſtratical power only is intended in this text; this, I ſuppoſe, will not be ſtuck at. The ſubject of this Propoſition, There is no power but of God, is the ſame, and of equal extent with that of the reſt of the context, viz. the diſcourſe from the beginning of the Chapt. to verſ. 8. but therein, it is manifeſt, the Apoſtle ſpeaks only of the Civil Magiſtrate, as the adequate or the ſole object of the duty he is therein perſwaded to. What power elſe can he call foreign, Higher Powers, and foreign, Rulers? of what power elſe can it be ſaid, that he beareth the ſword, he is the Miniſter of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil, a receiver of tribute, cuſtom, fear, honour? Our Divines both Commentators and Controvertiſts, do ſtrongly evince this againſt the Romaniſts, who would upon this text found the Popes power; and againſt this text defend a ſuperiority for him over, and an exemption for his Clergy from the power of the Civil Magiſtrate. Againſt both which our Proteſtant Authors do make good that in this text Political, or State power only is intended, and unto it ſubjection is inj…yned univerſally, or unto all perſons, whatſoever other power they be endowed with. Vide Whitakar To. 2. Controv. 4. cap. 3. pag. 647, 648 & quaeſt 7, 720. Pet. Martyr loc. com. …laſ. 4 cap. 13. Sect. 22. pag. 906. Chamier To. 2 lib. 15. cap. 17. Sect. 8. &c. pag. 637, 638.

For the Minor, that Political or State powe… is only a Moral, warranted, or authorize p. 25power; or, which is equipollent, all Political or Civil power is Moral, warranted, or authorized**Facultas moralis civitatem gubernandi poteſtatis civilis vocabulo nuncupari ſolet. Grot. de Jure lib. 1. cap. 3. Sect. 6.: this alſo may be evident. They are called Gods, that is, Civil Magiſtrates, unto whom the word of God came (ſaith Chriſt) [Joh. 10.35.] that is, to whom the commiſſion came to put them in the place wherein they were [So Mr. Burroughes paraphraſeth it††Mr. Burroughes on Hoſ. lect. 1. pag. 10.] and they are Judges of Iſrael whom God commanded to feed his people, [1 Chron. 17.6.] Political or Civil power (as this text will tell us) is in genere ordained of God, is his ordinance: By Ordination here (as I ſhall after undertake to prove) is to be underſtood the Inſtitution, warrant, approval, or authorization of God, or his appointment by his revealed Will, Law, or Word: and if Policy or Magiſtracy in its general concept or nature be ordained, that is, authorized of God, then is all Political power in ſpecie, and every particular Civil Government, contained under or reducible to this Genus, warranted and authorized by God: and what is by him unwarranted, unauthorized or illegitimate, is in truth, no Political or Magiſtratical power. When a perſon becomes a Magiſtrate, or a M…g…ſtrate is made, what is the change or effect that is thereby wrought in that man? or what new habit, or endowment doth the inveſting of a perſon into Magiſtracy, either by election, ſucceſſion, or otherwiſe, produce in him? He hath no more Natural power in him, then he had before; neither hath he ordinarily more underſtanding, judgement, reaſon, counſell to govern, then was before in him. Where is the change then? what doth this office add or put into him? why this is it, It gives him a moral capacity, or a warrant, right, authority to rule: it legally empowers, or enables him to command over, and obliges to be ſubject to his command all the natural power that is in the multitude, p. 26or body politique, however vaſtly ſuperior to his own perſonal, innate, and natural power.

I am confident beyond all doubt, that no man ſhall be able to give a perfect definition of Civil Magiſtracy, or Political power, which ſhall ſolely belong to it, and diſtinguiſh it from all other power, but he muſt take into his definition, warranted, authorized, lawful, or ſome other term that is equivalent thereto. In this I am confirmed in that I finde the concurrence of learned Authors in their definitions of Magiſtracy expreſly going this way. I ſhall give ſome inſtances.

Auguſtinus To. 3. De Trinitate lib. 13. cap. 13. Potentia quippe adjuncta juſtitiae, vel juſtitia accedens potentiae, judiciariam poteſtatem facit.Auguſtine. For Power joyned to Juſtice, or Juſtice added to Power, makes a judiciary power.

Polanus Partit. Theolog. lib. 1. pag. 330. Eſt autem Magiſtratus politicus perſona publica, poteſtatem in ſubditos legitime gerens.Polanus. The Political Magiſtrate is a publique perſon lawfull bearing ſway over the Subjects.

Bucanus Inſtit. Theolog. loc. 49. quaeſt. 13. pag. 853. Magiſtratus eſt officium politicum a Deo inſtitutum, quo ceria perſona, vel plures cum dignitate, & poteſtate legitime accepta, totam Rempub. vel ejus partem, quoad foreign (i. e.) res quae ad hujus vitae uſum pertinent, honeſtis legibus regunt.Bucan. Magiſtracy is a political office, inſtituted of God, by which one certain pertain perſon or more do rule, with dignity and power lawfully attained, the Commonwealth whole or part with honeſt Lawes, as to the things that concern this life.

p. 27The profeſſors of Leiden in their Synopſis. Synopſis purioris Theolo. per. 4. profeſſ. Leid. Diſp. 50. Sect. 29. Forma Magiſtratus poſita eſt in legitima poteſtate ipſi a Deo conceſſa, haec enim inflar anima functioni ejus vitam inſpirat, atque efficacitem largitur.The forme of the Magiſtrate is placed in the lawfull power granted to him of God: for this like the ſoul breathes life into his function, and gives it efficacy.

Zanchius. Zanchius de Nat. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 8. quaeſt. 3. Theſ. 3. Ad verum enim, legitimum, liberum que dominatum conſtituendum neceſſarium eſt liberum, abſolutum que jus, libera, abſolutaque poteſtas, quam Graeci foreign vocant, qua res quarum dominatum quaeris tuae fiant.For unto the making of a true, lawful, and free dominion, is neceſſary a free and abſolute right, a free and abſolute power, which the Greeks call foreign, by which the things of which thou wouldeſt have the dominion, are made thine.

Grotius. Grotius de jure belli, & pacis lib. 1. cap. 1. Sect. 4. Jus eſt qualitas moralis perſonae competens ad aliquid juſte habendum, vel agendum; qualitas autem moralis perfecta, facultas nobis dicitur, minus perfecta, aptitudo. Sect. 5. Sub facultate continetur poteſtas, tum in ſe quae libertas dicitur, tum in alios, ut patria, dominica, &c.Right is a moral quality belonging to a perſon, whereby he may have or do a thing juſtly; a perfect moral quality we call a faculty, an unperfect, an aptitude. VnderUnder a faculty we comprehend Power, both that which is over a mans ſelf, which is called Liberty, and that which is over others, as the power of the Father, of the Maſter, &c.

p. 28Sect. 6. Sed haec facultas rurſum duplex eſt, vulgaris, ſc. qui uſus particulalaris cauſa comparata eſt, & eminens, quae ſuperior eſt in re vulgari, utpote communitati competens in partes, & res partium, bon… communis cauſa. Sic regia poteſtas ſub ſe habet, & patriam, & dominicam poteſtatem.But this faculty is again twofold, viz. Vulgar, which is for particular uſe; and Eminent, which is above the ſaid Vulgar, as that which belongeth to a Community over its members, and their things for the common Good. So the Kingly power hath ſubject to it that of the Father, and of the Maſter.

Mr. John White his way to the Tree of Life, Chap. 3. pag. 46, 47.In Scripture as well as in other Authors the name of Authority, and Power are uſed indifferently, as if they were one, and the ſame thing: although in ſtrictneſs of ſignification we may finde a real difference between them; for Power implies that ſtrength by which any thing not only ſubſiſts, but withal bears out it ſelf againſt whatſoever oppoſeth it, and beſides is enabled to work any notable effect. Authority being moſt properly reſtrained to the government of reaſonable creatures, is that power by which a ſuperior hath right to preſcribe unto ſuch as are under him. By Right in this diſcription we exclude Tyranny, which is, the uſurping of authority without and againſt right.

To theſe I may add that of Tacitus, Agricolae vita cap. 10. he ſpeaking of the perſon of Galgacus our own Countrey man, Auſetre, trucidare, rapere falſis nominibus imperium appellant; To deſpoil, to kill, to ſnatch away they miſcal by the name of Empire.

p. 29Subſection 4. What is required to the making of a Moral Power.

BEing come to this reſolution that only Moral, viz. authorized or lawful Power, and that ſpecies only of it, to wit, Political, or Magiſtratical power is meant in the text; It may make for the further illuſtrating of this ſubject we are upon, and the confirming of what hath been ſaid upon it, to conſider what it is that makes a Moral Power, or a Power to be warranted, authorized, and awful: and for that end to take notice of the divers wayes wherein a power may be ſaid to be warranted or unwarranted, lawful or unlawful.

Unto a moral or authorized power, and ſo to the power intended in the Text, it is neceſſary not only that the thing to be had and held, or to be acted and done, be in it ſelf lawful, but that it be lawful to the perſon in whom you ſubject the power, that it be lawfully inveſted in him, or that there be a due authorization, or call of the perſon to it.

For the yet clearer underſtanding of this, let it be obſerved that there are four ſeveral wayes wherein Power may be ſaid to be lawful or unlawful, warranted or unwarranted.

1. In regard of Matter.

2. In regard of Perſon.

3. In regard of Title.

4. In regard of uſe.

p. 31Let us take notice wherein each of theſe conſiſteth, and differeth from the other, and how far they, or any of them conduce to the making up of a Moral power.

Firſt in regard of Matter. Power is in this reſpect lawful and warranted, when the work or act to be done by it is in its own nature allowed, or approved of God to be done by man. The Scripture declares to us a multitude of things which are put into mans power, or are made lawful or warranted to him; as, for inſtance, there is a power to eat, and to drink, to eat fleſh, to eat without diſcriminating betwixt clean and unclean; and to eat without reſpect to an idol conſecration. [1 Cor. 9.4. Gen. 9.3. Rom. 14.14. 1 Cor. 8.…. & 10.23, 27.] On the contrary many things are for their matter unlawfull, and alſo the power of them is unwarranted or forbidden to men. Such is the power claimed by the Pope many wayes, as the power of diſpenſing with divine laws, or of making of new in matters of Faith and Religion; the power of judiciary binding the conſcience, or forgiving ſins; the power of an Eccleſiaſtical ſupremacy over all Chriſtians; the power of diſpoſing of ſouls in another world: theſe are ſuper-humane acts, or ſuch as were never concredited to man. Such again is the power of Witchcraft, Sorcery, falſe miracles, Divination, and the like preſtigiatory deluſions, or pernicious ſeats, practiſed by men from their own preſumption with the aſſiſtance or inſtigation of the Devil.

Secondly in regard of Perſon. There are in Scripture ſome Powers lawful for the matter of them, but variable in point of warrant as to the perſon, the tenure of them being allowed to one ſort of perſons, and inhibited to others; ſome perſons only are made competent, and others are diſenabled to aſſume them; and conſequently in the perſons capable to hold p. 30them they are lawful powers, in others not ſo. The Prieſthood of the Law was inveſted in the ſons of Aaron, with excluſion of all other: if any therefore beſides them ſhould have taken to them that function (as did Korah and his company) there was a power unlawful in regard of perſon. The Miniſtry of the word, or Office of teaching in the Church is expreſly forbidden to women.1 Cor. 14.35. 1 Tim. 2.11, 12.1 Cor 14:351 Tim 2:111 Tim 2:12 If then a woman ſhould take up this work (as ſome, they ſay, of late have done, and as the Pepaſians, Quintillians, and Maxionites are ſaid to allow and practiſe**Auguſtine de Haereſ. cap. 22, & 27. Et Daneus in cundem.) there were a power in this ſenſe unlawful. Maſter Knox of Scotland held a woman uncapable (otherwiſe then by extraordinary call) of Civil Magiſtracy, or Supreme rule††Hiſtory of the Reformation of the Church of Scotland, pag. 220. & 311.. So did the Jews, as Mr. Selden tels us**Jo. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 7. cap. 6. pag. 812.: and others conceive it ſimply prohibited by our Saviour unto a Miniſter of the Goſpel, by thoſe words of his [Matth. 20.26.] According to theſe opinions if a Woman, or if a Miniſter ſhould undertake the Civill power (however humanely admitted to it) their power would be unlawful in regard of Perſon.

This is a ſecond way of a powers lawfulneſs and unlawfulneſs. Where note, that under this head the perſon is conſidered in ſpecie, or in ſome common condition, or rank, for as …o perſons individual warrant, or the want of it, that's reducible to the next particular.

Thirdly, in regard of Title. A power may be in it ſelf, or for matter abſtracted from perſons lawful, and a perſon may be in common qualified for inveſture with it, that is, as capable to receive it as another, but all this makes not this or that man a Moral power. There muſt be put one thing more to both theſe to conſtitute an authorized or lawful, and ſo a moral power; and that is a right or title to rule.

p. 32This is of the nature and eſſence of Moral power; for what is Authority, but a right to Rule? As private dominion or property conſiſts in a right to employ, and diſpoſe of the thing owned; ſo publique dominion or authority conſiſts in a title to rule.

That right or title is neceſſary to all tenure, or to Civil dominion in general; or, that ſuch right in moſt worldly things conſiſts in a ſpecial property, or ſequeſtration of the things from common claim, and uſe to one, or ſome peculiar perſons, it may ſeem too much digreſſive and not needful to go about here to prove. For however ſome things by reaſon either of their vaſtneſs, and inexhauſtibleneſs, or their joint-occupyableneſs by all without interruption to any, are expoſed to the common, arbitrary, and promiſcuous uſe of every man, as are the great Ocean, the light, the air; and however at the beginning of the World, and for ſome time after, by reaſon of the fewneſs and ſimplicity of mank…nde, dominion or right, in reſpect of the objects, was not reduced to diſtinct property; yet now, upon the multiplication of occupants (beſides the emergent pravity, into which men are lapſed) in moſt things dominion, or right is ſtated by ſequeſtration, or peculiar appropriation; and that doubtleſs agreeably to the law of Nature, and from the dictate of right Reaſon, and the general agreement of all men that are but ſound witted, and any thing moralized. Yea it is delivered to us by Scripture to be the act of God, The earth hath he given to the children of men, [Pſal. 115.16.] he hath given it, as the experience of this, and all precedent ages diſcoverable to us, tell us, not to be catched up as fodder and harbor are by brute beaſts in the Wilderneſs, among whom the ſtronger and fiercer ſeize on what, and where they pleaſe, the weaker take only what the other p. 33leave them; but under a rule of equity and right apportionated or diſtributed by property: according to that of St. Paul, He hath determined the bounds of thei… habitation, [Act. 17.26.] and that of Moſes, When the moſt high divided to the nations their inheritance, when he ſeparated the ſons of Ad m, he ſet the bounds of the people according to the number of the children of Iſrael, [Deut. 32.8.]

But to follow this Argument only with application to our particular ſubject. Amongſt the things that are ſubjected to property, or a ſeq…eſtred right, all authority of one perſon over another muſt ne…ds be one, yea, and that more, or rather then other things. For, though other things in the firſt age of the world migh… have been common: as ſoon as ever matrimony, or other domeſtick or civill ſocieties were inſtituted, he rights of the correlatives of theſe ſocieties were diſtinguiſht, and appropriate; neither could it be other ways: for whereas there was poſſible to be a community of right, or uſe at the beginning in things of ordinary and external poſſeſſion, whether moveable or immoveable, yet in matter of authority this could never be: It is repugnant to the nature of the thing; it cannot exiſt without the ſubjection of ſome determinate perſons to it; and you muſt of neceſſity put, and tie up authority, and ſubjection in diſtinct and ſeveral ſubjects, ſo as it may be ſaid, this man is to command, and theſe are to obey; whereupon it is inevitably to be yeelded, that authority conſiſts in a right or title to rule appropriate to one, or ſome certain perſons, & reſerved from others.

That to the producing, or conſtituting of a moral power (whether Civil Magiſtracy, or any other) there muſt go the entitling or intereſting of the perſons to it, or an inveſting him, or them with a right thereto, may be thus further manifeſt.

All Moral power is derived from God as the fountain or Author. That which the Apoſtle here ſaith of the Civil Magiſtracy in ſpecie; There is no power but of God, the powers that he are ordained of God, is true of all power in general, and he might have ſo expreſly extended it, had his ſcope in this place p. 34been ſo large. Gods derivation of authority to men muſt needs import two things.

1. His inſtitution of authority in the general, with the ſeveral ſpecies of it, as conjugal, parental, herile, magiſtraticall.

2. His communicating, conferring or conveying that power, which he hath ſo inſtituted to be, to particular perſons.

There muſt be this latter as well as the former to the real & actual conſtituting of an authority, or putting it into exiſtence. Gods ordaining at the firſt the conjugal, parental, herile, and political power, that is, his appointing that the husband, parent, maſter, or prince ſhal have authority over their reſpective correlatives (ſuppoſe by thoſe words of the commandment, Honour thy Father, &c.) doth not of it ſelf put any of thoſe authorities in being, or in one perſon more then another; or it makes no man a husband, father, maſter, or Prince. Wherefore, if we will make this good, which cannot be denyed, that all Power, viz. Authority, is derived from God, we muſt ſay God doth by ſome act of his (beſides his allowing or preſcribing Government, with ſuch and ſuch ſpecies of it to be) convey authority to individuals, or particular perſons. It muſt further be acknowledged that this act of God muſt be ſuch as that by it, not only the perſon authorized, but the reſt that are concerned in that eſtate, in point o… uſe of it, or duty to it, may underſtand that ſuch an one is ſingled out by God to ſuſtain this authority. How elſe could any in conſcience of Gods ordinance, either aſſume ſuch authority over others to themſelves, rather then yeeld it to others, or others attribute it to them rather then to others, or to themſelves? Now can it be imagined how ſuch an act of God ſo humanely intelligible ſhould be paſſed, but either it muſt be by his immediate revelation from heaven, and thereby indigitating, or pointing out (as it were) ſuch a perſon, or perſons to ſuch an authority, in ſuch a place; or by chalking out a way to men, or giving rules in general to them, how ſuch and ſuch authorities, p. 35ſhall accrew unto men; which wayes or rules ſhall ſerve in all caſes (unleſſe where himſelf ſhall immediately interpoſe) to create ſuperiority, or convey power to men, and to diſcover the empowered.

The former way, Gods deſignation of particular perſons unto authority by immediate revelation from heaven, is not now exerciſed or expected, neither was it ever in ordinary, or conſtant uſe. The latter therefore is the way remaining to us.

That there are ſuch wayes ſtated, or rules preſcribed by God for mens entry into relations of power over others, and thoſe neceſſary to the being thereof, ſo as without them all ordinary claims to ſuch conditions are null, is very evident, and confeſſed in the relations of parents, maſters, husbands, paſtors of the Church, and many others; and there is no reaſon in the earth (to me excogitable) to think it is not certainly ſo alſo in the Magiſtratical ſtate; What thoſe rules or wayes in particular are, in reference to Civil Magiſtracy, here is not the fit place to enter upon the ſet enquiry, but I ſhall for this have fuller opportunity (as alſo for the proving more largely that ſuch rules there are given of God) afterward in this diſcourſe. But if thus much be admitted (as I ſee not how it will be gainſayed) it ſufficeth to prove the thing we are about, viz. that the eſſence of Moral power conſiſts in a title, or right to rule. For if all power be from God, not only as appointing, the office to be among men, but as appointing the perſon, or perſons to the office: and his ordinary, conſtant way of appointing the perſon to the office, be the preſcribing of a rule for mens ingreſſe into the authoritative relation, or acceſſion to power, by which way he communicates that power to them which is not in others, and which otherwiſe is not in them, it muſt needs be that as ſuch admittance unto power moſt certainly gives right and title to it, ſo upon mens having, or not having ſuch p. 36entrance to it depends the reality, or nullity of the power they to) themſelves challenge. We have ſeen this third kind of lawfulneſs or warrantableneſs of power (viz. in regard of Title) and the neceſſity of it to the being or conſtituting of a moral power.

Fourthly, there is yet behind another way wherein power may be ſaid to be lawful, or unlawful, viz. in regard of uſe. That power which in reſpect both of matter, and of perſon, and of title is lawful, is yet to undergoe a further qualification to regulate it, which concernes the uſe, or employment of it: a power lawful, and right for its compoſure muſt alſo be legal, and right for its practiſe; its courſe, and proceſſe in government muſt be altogether juſt▪ it may decree, and do only equal and right things, and in this reſpect that power is unlawful, or culpable which doth enact, or execute any injuſtice or wrong. So were thoſe ten Kings, [Rev. 17.13, 14.] who gave their power up to ſerve the Beaſt, and to make war with the Lamb.

But among theſe four wayes of the lawfulneſs and unlawfulneſs of a power, which we have thus diſtinguiſhed of and explained, there is this difference to be noted. The three firſt wayes do concern the being, compoſition, habit, and conſtitution of an authority or Moral power; the fourth only concerns the act and exerciſe thereof: and conſequently the three firſt conditions of lawfulneſs are ſimply neceſſary to the making of the power, the fourth is but accidental; and exterior to its making; an unlawfulneſs in any of thoſe three reſpects is inconſiſtible with, deſtructive to the nature of a moral power, and conſequently ſecludeth the power that is in any of thoſe things peccant from any claim to this text; whereas that power which only offends in its uſe, or acts of power, may well, as to its being, and conſtitution be moral, and intereſted in the text, and its univerſal actings only be accounted forein, or diſallowed ground therein. For this is p. 37(as far as I have obſerved) yeelded by all, and is very certain, that every unlawful power, ſo far as it is unlawful, muſt be excluded out of the meaning of this text**See the Authors quoted by Mr. Prinne, his third part of the Power of Parliaments, p. 14.. The power therefore that is unlawful as to its being, and conſtitution, is wholly and abſolutely ſecluded; the power that is unlawful only as to exerciſe may be for its habit, or being included in it, and its irregular acts only diſcarded from it.

To make this obſervation (if need be) yet more evident, as to that lawfulneſſe which concerns the being of a power. Unto the conſtitution of a power in its individual eſſence and exiſtence, you muſt neceſſary take in theſe three things:

1. The matter of the power.

2. A ſubject or perſon to ſuſtain it.

3. An inveſture or conveying of that matter of power unto that ſubject or perſon.

If all theſe three muſt go to the making of a power, then a legitimacy in every of theſe muſt go to the making of a Moral power; or a power lawful in its conſtitution or being; and an illegitimacy in any of theſe is an illegitimacy in the very being, and ſo a nullity to the power as moral, or a making of it no authority.

1. An unlawfulneſs in the matter of a power deſtroyes its moral being. The Pope aſſumes to himſelf a power to diſpenſe with the conſciences of Chriſtians in divine Lawes. This power, we ſay, is unlawful for the matter, or in the whole kind of it diſallowed to all, and every one of mankinde: and therefore we ſay it's null; we deny any ſuch power to be in him.

2. An unlawfulneſs in regard of perſon evacuates the power. Korah and his company arrogated to themſelves the office of the prieſthood; this power, lawful in it ſelf, as for the matte, was not lawfull, but prohibited to be in them; their Pr…eſthood therefore was a nullity, they were indeed no prieſts.

p. 383. Let there be a power lawful for matter, and a perſon capable, or induable with it, yet if there be not a lawful inveſture, or conveyance of this power to this perſon, there is yet in him no moral power; an unlawful, entry, or tenure nullifies the power in that reſpect. John Becold (called John of Leyden) takes upon him in Munſter to be King, and as King acteth and ruleth all at his pleaſure; this King being deſtitute of a juſt call, title, or tenure, was therefore but ſcenical, and nothing as to a moral power, or real magiſtracy; he was in truth no King, but a traiterous Villain; the unlawfulneſs here is in the conſtitution of the power; that his having, and holding the pretended Soveraignty, that his being in power was unlawful.

In any of theſe three wayes of unlawful power, you cannot ſever the unlawfulneſs from the being of the power; take away that which is unlawful in any of them, take away the matter, or take away the perſon, or take away the tenure, and you deſtroy the very being of the power. For example, in the third (which moſt concerns our purpoſe) where one takes and holds the place of Power without right, or title, the thing which is here unlawful is the very tenure, or holding of power; if then you will take away that which is unlawful, you muſt take away the perſons tenure, or holding of power, and ſo you take away the being of this power. No otherwiſe is an unentitled tenure taken away, but either by depoſing the unlawful poſſeſſor, or by creating to him de novo, a juſt title, and conferring on him a right: now either of theſe two wayes the power that was unlawfully occupyed ceaſeth.

If then it be granted that from this Text is excluded every unlawful power ſo far as it is unlawful, or whatever in the power is unlawful; Seeing the unlawfulneſs of a rightleſs, or unentitled power, is in the being of it, not in p. 39the exerciſe meerly, and for that reaſon the unlawfulneſs is inſeparable from the power, it muſt needs be that an unentitled power is utterly and abſolutely excluded from the meaning of this Text: or, in ſhort, ſeeing the being of the power is unlawful, the being of the power muſt be ſhut out of our text. In this reſpect the reaſon is the ſame betwixt an act of injuſtice of a power lawful as to title or conſtitution, and an unjuſt occupants act of being in, or holding the power; betwixt Ahabs ſeiſing of Naboths vineyard, and Athaliahs intruding into Joaſh his kingdom, the one is an act of Tyranny as to exerciſe, the other is an act of Tyranny as to title. You cannot otherwiſe either give admittance to the Text, and to the ordination of God, or deny it unto the one, then you may do to the other: if you ſay the unlawfulneſs of oppreſſion excludes Ahabs act from this Text, I may with as good reaſon ſay the unlawfulneſs of wrongful occupation excludes Athaliahs act, which is her being in power from the ſame.