The Oath of Allegiance and National Covenant Non-Obliging, Reply
A REPLY TO AN ANSVVER Pretending to Refute ſome POSITIONS Which tended to make the OATH of ALLEGIANCE Void, and not Obliging.
THE Anſwerer begins with the Drift of the Firſt Poſition, which he ſaith is, To ſhew the Oath to be unlawful in the taking of it.
Reply. The Drift of the Firſt Poſition is to ſhew the unlawfulneſs of the Oath upon a Suppoſition, that the Oath was Abſolute and not Conditional, that it was Single and not Mutual, &c. and not otherwiſe.
He falls upon Premiſing ſomething in theſe words: An Oath may be unlawful, 1 Either in regard of the matter or thing ſworn, as when it is ſome ſinful act: Or, 2 In regard of the manner, as when the thing is unadviſedly ſworn: The former way of unlawfulneſs makes the Oath Void in the taking of it, but not the latter: which appears by the validity of that unadviſed Oath of the Princes to the Gibeonites, Joſh. 9. 15. 18, 19. 2 Sam. 21. 2.
He erreth at the firſt daſh; That Oath of the Princes was a ſinful Oath Reply. in the matter of it, becauſe expreſly againſt the command of God, Deut. 7. 2. Exod. 23. 32. yet it was not void, but was kept by them.
He falls upon Obſerving, and ſpeaks of A groſs imputation that is laid upon very many Worthies of all ſorts and kinds of men, as if they had preſſed, taken, and juſtified an Oath in the matter of it unjuſt and ſin…ul.
If there be any Charge at all upon any, it is upon thoſe that make the Reply. Oath to be Abſolute and not Conditional, &c. But if any perſon hold otherwiſe, that it was a Mutual Conditional Oath that was taken when Allegiance was ſworn, then there is no imputation at all upon one or other, which the Author of the Poſition rather conceives then the contrary.
He mentioneth the general Exception againſt the lawfulneſſe of the Oath, and Objects againſt it in that branch of it that reſpects Judgment, and ſaith, That Defectiveneſſe in that will not invalidate the Oath, It is but a fault (ſaith he) in the manner, not in the matter; in the Perſon, not in the Oath.
If it be ſo, Whence is it that the Law provides, That no Vows, Oaths, Reply. Deeds, or Acts that are done by perſons in their Nonage (becauſe it is ſuppoſed they are not done in Judgment) ſhall ſtand, but be all invalid, unleſſe ratified afterwards when they come to age. This man (whoever he be) ſpeaks againſt the Law herein, which is more groſſe then to ſpeak againſt perſons. Notwithſtanding it muſt not be conceived, That the Author of the Poſitions doth intend, That every oath that is defective in judgement, is ipſo facto void; but he connects Judgement and Righteouſneſſe together, as adding ſtrength to each other, and making ſuch an oath ſo unlawful, as not to be obligatory.
He deſcends to particulars, and objects againſt that Conditionality which in the Poſition is made neceſſary unto an oath, that it may agree with Jer. 4. 2. And he diſtinguiſheth in theſe words: I conceive the words (Conditional and Abſolute) may be taken, 1 Either in reference to the thing ſworn, which is Obedience or Allegiance to the King; and ſo the Condition is, it muſt be Honeſt; Or, 2 In reference to the Tye or Obligation of the Oath: And of this latter, he makes another diſtinction concerning Conditions, in theſe words: Some Conditions are general, and ſuch as no promiſory Oath that is lawful can be without: And he makes (Honeſt) this general Condition. 2ly. Others are ſpecial and proper Conditions.
He makes, Honeſt and Iuſt, to fall under the oppoſite members of his Reply. own diſtinction, and ſo confounds that which he would diſtinguiſh.
He comes to oppugn the Reaſon, that is brought in the Poſition, that the Oath muſt not be Abſolute, but Conditional, viz. That it is againſt the Ground and Reaſon of the Primitive Inſtitution of Government, which is the good of the Subject, that there ſhould be any Oath to bind him abſolutly whether the Prince Rule for the Subjects good or not. And his firſt Exception is,
That this Reaſon wants proof.
There was ſuch cleerneſſe in the Reaſon, that it needed not proof. For Reply. if an abſolute Vaſſalage (with firſt or laſt will infallibly be the Conſequence of an abſolute Oath) be not for the good of the Subject, and ſo not ſutable to the Primitive Inſtitution of Government, then an abſolute oath cannot be for the good of the Subject, and ſo not ſutable to the Primitive Inſtitution of Government.
His Second Exception is, The Reflection that this Argument in the Poſition would have upon the Parliament (ſhould it be granted to be true) who Enacted the Oath of Allegiance, and all ſubſequent Parliaments confirmed it, which if it were not for the good of the Subject, would call their wiſdom and goodneſſe into queſtion.
There is ſomething inſerted in this, that is not granted, viz That the Reply. Parliament intended this Oath to be Abſolute, without implying in it ſo much as this Condition, While the Prince ſhould rule according to the Laws of the Kingdom. For, 1 They never declared ſo much, That they intended the oath to be abſolute. 2 The Oaths that Kings in this Nation have alwayes taken, ſhew the contrary, and their Oaths to him muſt be interpreted by his Oath to them: Now his Oath to them is, To Rule according to the Laws of the Kingdom, therefore their Oath to him muſt have the ſame reſtriction, and ſo cannot be abſolute. 3 The Parliament is ſharer (at leaſt) by this mans own confeſſion, pag 5. with the Prince in Government. For, he ſaith, It is a mixed Government that is amongſt us in this Nation; and in a mixed Government, the Prince hath his ſhare; and the People, in their Repreſentatives, have their ſhare; therefore the Parliament would never make the Oath abſolute, leaſt thereby they ſhould give away to the Prince that part in Government which is theirs. 4 It was to recover this ſhare in Government, and the Peoples Liberties thereby out of the hand of the Prince, that this WAR was undertaken againſt him. Which if they had never Conditioned with the Prince for, in their Oath to him, (neither expreſly, nor implicitly) had not been juſtifiable upon this mans Aſſertion, That an abſolute Oath is lawful.
His third Exception is ſetcht from Experience, His words are, It hath conſiſted with the publick good (yea contributed to it, or elſe the Papiſts would not have ſo oppoſed it) from the time it was firſt ſet forth, until now, and no complaint at all hath been heard againſt it …ill now.
1 It had been neceſſary that he ſhould have ſhewed what good it Reply. hath contributed to it, and how it hath been conſiſtent with it, conſidered as abſolu…e, as now he and many more do underſtand it, and hold themſelves ſtill obliged by it.
2 The Papiſts …ad reaſon to oppoſe it, becauſe it was given out to be intended principally (if not ſolely) againſt them. And their Allegiance in reference to their Religion (which ſubjected them to a forreign power) tell juſtly under ſuſpition, to engage them therefore more firmly to the Prinee, this oath was contrived and Enacted.
3 Many precions conſcientious men were long ſince (much more then Papiſts) offended at it, foreſeeing that there would be a great ſnare in it, as it was urged without an explication, Yea, It was preſſed more upon them▪ then upon the Papiſts; and the Papiſts (moſt of them) knew how to get off from it, and to avoid it, but not they. When the Perſecution was ſo ho… againſt Inconformiſts that many thouſands were forced to fly the Land; then was there a command, That all Ports and Havens ſhould be narrowly looked unto, that none might be ſuffered to paſſe out of the Nation, till they had firſt taken this Oath; and my ſelf hardly eſcaped at that time.
4 It might …ave proved fatal to this Nation, had this Parliament underſtood it as this man doth in an abſolute ſenſe, and not according to the Laws of the Land▪ For then had the Deſign of the late King and his Father (to make themſelves abſolute Mona…chs, and to bring the peointo an abſolute ſubjection to their arbitrary Government) been accompliſhed, and there had been no place ſo much as for a Defenſive War, but abſolute ſlaves the Kingdom muſt have been, as they were ſeveral yeers before this Parliament ſate.
He comes to diſtinguiſh of things that are againſt the peoples good; and, ſaith he,
That ſome things are againſt the peoples good in their own nature, and other things accidentally▪ and ſaith, That any thing almoſt that falls under a Political conſideration may be againſt the peoples good in the latter Conſideration though unlawful, and for the preſent, probably (yea neceſſarily) for the peoples good: and of this ſort (I ſuppoſe) he makes this abſolute oath of Allegiance to be. It is but by accident that it proves hurtful, but it is good in it ſelf.
He might and muſt diſtinguiſh of things accidentall; ſome things are Reply. accidental in reference to the time when, and yet ce…ain that they will be, in reference to the Cauſes whence they come, and the Courſe of Gods Providence: other things are ſo accidental, as that it is contingent, whether they will be at all. Chriſt ſpeaks of offences, That it is neceſſary that they ſhould come: and the Apoſtle of Hereſies, That there muſt be Hereſies, and yet both the one and the other are accidental, in reference to the perſons by whom, and the time in which they ſhould come: So it is in Common-wealths, there are many things that are againſt the good of the people, which though accidental in reference to the perſons and time, yet certain and in…allible, in reference to the Cauſes, and the courſe of Gods Providence; and when there is not proviſion againſt ſuch evils, but rather a door ſet open for them, by either perſons or things done, 'tis againſt the good of the people, becauſe all knowing men may eaſily foreſee ſuch things, though they cannot ſo punctually diſcern the times and ſeaſons of them.
I ſhall give ſome inſtances: Wars, are things accidental, yet certain, at one time or another; and that Government that provides not againſt it, but rather invites it by ſecurity and negligence, is againſt the good of the people, and ought to be either redreſ…ed, or removed: Murthers, Rapes, Fellonies in a Common-wealth are accidental, yet they will certainly be, and thoſe States-men, and L…giſla…ors that provide not againſt them, are againſt the good of the people.
There may be Inſtances of other kinds: Wolves amongſt the Flock are accidental, yet they will be, and thoſe Shepherds that provide not againſt them, by feeding the Church of God with wholſome ſound Doctrine, are againſt the good of the Flock. Storms and Tempeſts at Sea are accidental, yet they will certainly come; and thoſe Ship-maſters and Marriners that go to Sea without good Tacking, they are againſt the good of their Principals, and thoſe that fraught them, and againſt their own lives alſo. And ſo it is with Tyrants in Government, they are accidental in a Common-wealth, yet it is certain ſuch there will be, ſince ſo great corruption ſell upon mankind, and thoſe Oath-impoſers, and Oathes that are impoſed, that provide not againſt ſuch, but rather invite and ſet open a door to Governors to be ſuch, are againſt the good of the Common-wealth, and people; and ſuch is that Oath of Allegiance, if it be abſolu…e and not conditional, as this man would have it.
2 He diſtinguiſheth again of the goodneſſe of the End, and of the means tending to that End; and he makes the happineſſe of the Community to be the goodneſſe of the End; and this to be intended and not deliberated on, or choſen by the Law-gi…ers. The means he makes variable, in relation to times and people, and ſaith. That that may be good in the nature of a means, for one people or time, that is not good for another.
Reply. I allow of the Diſtinction in the former branch of it fully, and ſay with him, That the happineſſe of the Community is the goodneſſe of the End. And I ad this, That the juſt freedom o… the Subject is the happineſſe of the Communitie, which an abſolute Oath of ALLEGIANCE fights againſt.
I alſo concur with him in the ſecond branch of the Diſtinction of the goodneſſe of the means, that it is that which falls under Deliberation and Counſel: but that all means is variable and changable after Counſel hath found it out, I deny: For the goodneſſe of the means may be conſidered Generally, or Specifically. Conſider it in its general nature, and it admits not of any ſuch variation according to times and places: but conſider it in its ſpecial nature, and then it may admit of variation. For Example, Government in general, is a good of the means, reſpecting the happineſſe of the Community, and yet is neceſſary for all Communities, that they may be happy: but this, or that ſpecial kind of Governmentis not necſſary for all Communities, in all places and at all times, but there may be ſome change and variation. So to Govern according to Laws, and to obey according to Laws, is neceſſary, and admitts of no variation, becauſe it conduceth abſolutly to the good of the Community: but to govern and obey according to the ſame Laws, is not neceſſary, but variable, according to places and times.
Unto this head of the goodneſſe of means conducing to ſuch an End, viz. The happineſſe of the Community, he makes a firm Sanction by an abſolute Oath (that there may be a kind of immutability in States and Governments thereby) to appertain. And ſaith, It is the wiſdom of moſt States ſo to ſetle them, to prevent the danger of Innovation and changes. And …e makes this to be a better means of the Communities happineſſe, then the other of Conditional parts and Covenants with the Prince. For he ſpeaks of the evil of ſwearing to a Prince abſolutly, to be but inconvenience, diſadvantagiouſneſſe, prejudice, outward incommodity, impeachment of the Subjects good: but the evils of a Conditional, or unabſolute Engagement, he ſpeaks of them, as Miſchief and Miſery: and when the other is in his accompt but uncertain danger, he makes this inevitable hurt.
Reply. If all this be true, then the Conſtitution of our State, was not ſo prudently conſidered by our fore-Fathers, when they Eſtabliſhed a mixt Government, as might have been; and ſo much expence of Bloud to recover the Subjects Liberty and Propriety, was a great ſin. For it had been better for the Subject (if he have ſaid truth) to have yeelded themſelves up to the Will of their Prince, to have ſubmitted quietly to an arbritrary power, and to have borne an Iron yoke for ever, then to have contended with him: and our Brethren of Scotland did ill to give us ſuch an Example as firſt to appear in Arms againſt him: But rational men muſt firſt put out their eyes▪ before they can beleeve ſuch a Paradox. For can there be a greater Miſchief and Miſery, then thraldom and ſlavery? then loſſe of Religion, Liberty, Propriety, Life it ſelf? For all theſe will lie at ſtake, and be hazarded, by an abſolute Oath firmly kept and obſerved. War with all the effects of it that can follow ſuch conditional Engagements, is but a ſhort Miſery, and not ſo ignominious as the other, for perſons live and die like men in it; but in the other, they live and die like beaſts, and all their life is but a long-lived death. But many in theſe dayes, are like the Iſraelites, who when in bondage and under Pharoahs yoke, cryed to God, and ſighed and groaned, and then it was a condition intollerable; but when they were delivered and ſaw War, and found ſome evils they expected not, then they judged it better to be in Egyptagain: and then the ſtate of cruel Servitude was but an inconvenience in compariſon of the other Miſchief. But let the miſchief of a Conditional Engagement be what it will, it muſt be choſen, and the abſolute muſt be avoided, becauſe Liberty, and Propriety, &c. are the happineſſe of a Community, and the end of Government, and the birth-right of all the Subjects which have not forfeited it, and ought not to be given away to the will of the Governor, and a Conditional Engagement is the means to preſerve it.
He ſaith, Such things as may by reaſon of their changeable nature prove in the iſſue ſomewhat diſadvantagious, may yet, if for the preſent good, and probably hopeful ſo to continue, be ſworn to abſolutly, as in voluntary Promiſes, Leagues, and Contracts, both publike and private, among all Nations hath been the practiſe, and by good Scripture-preſident it is juſtified, ‡Gen. 47. 31. Exod. 13. 19. Joſh. 9. 15 14 9 Judg. 21. 5. 18. 15. 12. 13. 1 Sam. 14. 24. 19. 6. 20. 12. 17 1 King. 1. 13. 29. 2 Sam. 19▪ 23..
Reply. 1 Allegiance (which is the thing that he would have abſolutly ſworn unto) may not only prove through the changable nature diſadvantagious, but alſo hath, and doth often, and will certainly at one time or other prove pernicious, not to perſons only, but to Commonwealths.
2 An abſolute Contract of Allegiance, ſets up the Prince too high, and puts down the Subject too low: The one is made by ſuch a Contract more then a man, the other is rendered leſſe then a man, and more like unto a Beaſt. And it is neither for the preſent good, nor hopeful to continue ſo▪ to put ſuch a diſtance betwixt them. For abſolute Sovereignty is Gods Prerogative, whoſe Will is perfectly holy, and juſt, and good, and not to be attributed to the Creature, ſo full of imperfection and corruption; and it layes a temptation before him to miſcarry in his Office.
3 Some voluntary Promiſes and Contracts are diſſimilia, things unlike, holding no proportion to the thing in Controverſie, viz. To the Oath of Allegiance, the abſolutneſſe whereof is by him Aſſerted, and the Inſtances or Examples in Scripture carry not any kind of Analogy. Let them be pe…uſed, and rational men will wonder, that ever they were produced. 1 Some of them, are not Oaths made to men at all, but to God, as that in Judg. 21. 5. 18. and ſome others. 2 Others of them are Oathes, the performanee whereof lies only on one Party; the other is to receive advantage, but to do nothing, as that in Gen. 47, 31. Exod. 13. 19. Joſh. 9. 15. & 14. 9▪ 3 Others of them were Oathes of things, that were in their nature pernicious and ſinful to be ſworn to, as that in 1 Sam. 14. 24. Ionathan ſpeaks of it, That his Father had troubled Iſrael and hindred the Lords Work by that Oath of not touching any food till evening. And when Saul would have had Ionathan put to death in reference to his violation of that Oath, the people reſcued him, and did well in it. And there is none that comes ſo neer the caſe, as Ionathans and Davids Oath, which was not abſolute, but conditional, ſo as that if the one had broken it, the other would have been abſolv'd upon it. But this Oath of Allegiance is an Oath betwixt perſons, that owe reſpective duties to each other, and the Obligation of the one, hath a reſpect unto, and a dependance on the performance of the other; and ſo is an Oath of another kind, then thoſe mentioned in his Scriptures, and cannot be abſolute, as he from theſe patterns would prove.
But he gives his Reaſons, why abſolute Allegiance doth not ſo neerly and probably tend to the Subjects hurt, as the Conditional doth.
1, He ſaith, The Prince may prove juſt and vertuous.
Reply. 1 The Conditional Engagement is the beſt way to make him prove ſuch, when he Rules upon his good Behaviour, he is more likely to Rule well. 2 Moſt Princes prove not ſuch but unjuſt and vitious. 3 To be left to his own arbitrary Will in Governing, is like to prove a temptation and ſnare to him. A lawleſſe Liberty to do what he liſteth many times corrupteth the Prince.
2, He ſaith, If he degenerates, the Subjects are bound to obey him actively, but in lawful things.
Reply. What then? If the Oath be abſolute, they are bound to obey him paſſively in all other things, wherein they cannot obey him actively, even to the loſſe of Life, Limb, Liberty, and Eſtate, which will certainly bring calamity enough upon them. Nor were the Children of Iſrael bound to obey Pharaoh actively, ſave only in lawful things; and yet they were miſerable enough for all that. And the Condition of the Subject may be no better then the Condition of Gally-ſlaves, if this be all the comfort that the Subject hath, that he is bound to obey actively but in lawful things,
3, Heſaith, In his lawleſs Acts there may be a remedy (as the puniſhment or reſiſtance of his bad inſtruments by the Parliament, without whom, though he may Will unjuſt things, yet he cannot Execute them) and yet his Government be continued.
Reply. 1 What Juſtice is in this, To reſiſt, and puniſh his bad Inſtruments, and not him who is the principal efficient? For if they be in fault, he that ſets them on work much rather. And uſually it hath been ſaid, The Meſſenger bears no blame, but if there be a fault, his it is that ſent him, and certainly the Servant is in leſſe fault. 2 This reſiſting of his bad Inſtruments, is a reſiſting of him, as Chriſt ſpeaks to his Apoſtles whom he ſent forth, He that receiveth you, receiveth me; and he that deſpiſeth you, deſp…ſeth me: So it may be ſaid of Reſiſting, in reference to the Inſtruments of the Prince, He that puniſheth, or reſiſteth them, puniſheth and reſiſteth him in them; and this is abſolutly againſt the Oath of abſolute Allegiance. 3 This reſiſting and puniſhing of the Princes Inſtruments, is as unſafe and dangerous, as the not continuing of his Government when it is degenerated to Tyranny; for it will inevitably bring on a War betwixt the Prince and People: For the Prinee, if he be able, will maintain his Inſtruments in what he ſetteth them about, and vindicate their Cauſe, while they do nothing but what they have his authority for; and this is the evil that this man declines ſo much, that to prevent it, he pleads for an abſolute Engagement, whatever the miſchief be to the Subject; and yet in this place he brings this in as a Remedy to prevent the danger of the other. 4 This Remedy begins at the wrong end, goes not the next way, but far about to work redreſſe, and reacheth not the end, nor effects any cure; for a corrupt Prince will never want bad Inſtruments, his greatneſſe will have a corrupting influence upon thoſe about him; and like Prince, like Officers and Servants under him. But let the Prince be fettered by wholſome Laws, tending to his own juſt Honor, and the Subjects juſt Freedom, and the Miſchief will not only be redreſſed, but might be pre…ented, and with leſſe …azard alſo. 5 The Parliament are Subjects, in this mans account, as well as other men; and therefore by his Aſſertion, muſt be abſolutly engaged to the Prince; and wherein they cannot obey actively, they are bound to obey paſſively, and therefore may not actively appear againſt his authority in his Inſtruments, for where is then Allegiance, which an abſolute Oath will alwayes bind too?
4, He ſaith, And ſuppoſe the caſe that there be no remedy, as when he hath got a party ſtronger then can be reſiſted, or ſubjected to puniſhment, then to caſt off his power and depoſe him (ſuppoſe it lawful to do) will be no relief, his ſtrength will command ſubjection.
Reply. 1 The way to prevent the getting of this ſtrong Party, is to keep the Subject from the ſnare of abſolute Oathes, and to let them know their Liberty, and that their Allegiance is but Conditional. 2 Concerning depoſing (if an abſolute Oath be once taken, and be lawful both to be taken, and kept when taken) it cannot be lawful; no nor yet the putting of his Perſon into hazard by War, pretended to be undertaken againſt his Miniſters and Servants under him. 3 When the Subject hath a juſt Cauſe to contend for; viz. For Covenanted Rights, they may caſt themſelves upon God; for God hath made it to appear, not by Might, nor by Arms, but by his Spirit, great things have been accompliſhed.
5, He ſaith, The miſcarriages of a Prince ordinarily extend but to the detriment of ſome particular perſons, rarely doth any Nero-like, ſeek the deſtruction of the whole.
Reply. 1 Let the Declarations which have been ſet forth by the Parliament (when both Houſes ſate, and were moſt full) be viewed, and it will appear, That the Miſchiefs and Miſeries that came by the corrupt Mind and Will of the Prince, were general, and reached the whole Nation: What can be ſaid of Ship-money, and multiplicity of Monopolies? Did they not, one way or other, reach all? Were ſome particuperſons only annoyed by them? 2 If at firſt few be like Nero, to ſeek the deſtruction of the whole; yet being croſſed, and thereby incenſed and vexed, if it come to a publick Conteſtation, almoſt every one will chuſe to deſtroy all, rather then to miſſe of their Will, and fall ſhort of their Deſign.
6, He ſaith, In that caſe Subjects ſworn, and unſworn, (if their Cauſe be good, and the Parliament authorize their ſtanding up) are in the ſame capacity of Reſiſtance.
Reply. 1 Not ſo, if their Oath be abſolute and obligatory, (as this man will have it) for an abſolute obligatory Oath to obey actively or paſſively, and yet a capacity of Reſiſtance (if the Parliament warrant it) are contradictory one to the other. 2 Nor can the Parliament authorize it, if themſelves have abſolutly, and irrevokably, and lawfully alſo ſworn Allegiance, and in ſuch ſort alſo impoſed it upon the Subject.
7, He ſaith, Set the people free to ſhake off the reins of their preſent Government, when they ſhall think it unequal, and, 1 You deſtroy the nature of Government; and, 2 You expoſe the people to an immediate loſſe of the very uſe and enjoyment of any Government.
Reply. 1 The People act all in, and by their Repreſentatives, who are ſo wiſe and faithful to the Common-wealth, that they wil not ſleightly ſhake off the preſent Government; but when it is to preſerve the Common-wealth, after they have had long patience, and plentiful experience that there is little hope of good whilſt it ſtands, much leſſe wil they ſuffer the Common-wealth to be without a Government, and to lie in Confuſion; the proof of both which we have had amongſt our ſelves. 2 How the change of Government ſhould be againſt the nature of Government, I cannot apprehend; and he ſhewes no Reaſon for it
What is ſpoken by him, in way of Compariſon, betwixt a bad Government, and no Government; betwixt one, or a few, doing that which is right in their own eyes; and every mans doing ſo, the one he makes an accidental effect of abſolute Allegiance; the other he makes an inevitable effect of conditional Allegiance, becauſe they be naked unconfirmed Aſſertions, and experience amongſt our ſelves hath ſo evidently confuted them, I ſhal therefore paſſe over them.
Afterwards in the Second place he layes down a contradictory Aſſertion in theſe words, The Oath of Allegiance may be Abſolute, or unconditional: And he renders Reaſons for it:
1 He ſaith, Were there no Oath, the limitted obedience which is due to Princes and Magiſtrates, is due to them abſolutly, whether they Rule well, or no; and that which is abſolutly due, may be abſolutly ſworn.
Reply. This is only true while they acknowledge them to be their Princes and Magiſtrates, and do continue them in thoſe Offices and Places: and it is as true of every Conſtable, what miſdemeanour ſoever he be guilty of, yet he muſt have that obſervance of his Place from all, while in his Place: But the Queſtion is, When Princes and Magiſtrates Rule amiſſe, not to the welfare, but ruine of the people over whom they are Magiſtrates, Whether the People be not (in that caſe) abſolved from al Tye and Obligation to them, as Magiſtrates, if they will: that is, Whether the Repreſentatives of the People, which have the Peoples power, for the Executive part of it, may not if they wil, (yea, and in many Caſes are bound in faithfulneſſe to the People, and for their good, to) declare ſuch Princes and Magiſtrates, in reference to ſuch miſcariages, to be no longer Governors, and ſo therein to free the People from their Allegiance to them. And it is aſſerted in the Poſition, That they may if they wil. A Paſtor of a Church miſcarries in the execution of his Office, and becomes a Wolf to devour, rather then a Paſtor to feed the Church of Chriſt, Is not his Flock notwithſtanding bound to obey him in the Lord, and according to Rule, whileſt he remains a Paſtor to them? But the Queſtion is, Whether it be not the Duty of ſuch where the Power is, To Depoſe him from his Office, and therein to abſolve the People from ſuch Duty as ſuch an Office cals for? And ſo it is in this Caſe of a Prince or Paſtor to a Common-wealth.
But he Confirms this REASON, by Seven other Reaſons.
Reaſ. 1. The Precept of Obedience to Civil Governors, is without any condition or reſerve from a diſingagement of the Subject in caſe of the Governors miſcarriage, reade the 5th Commandement, and thoſe other Injunctions, Rom. 13. 1, 2, &c. Tit 3. 1. 1 Pet. 1. 13. &c.
Reply. It is to be underſtood whileſt they are Governors, and whileſt they are Fathers: and the ſame may be ſpoken of Paſtors of Churches, for they are Fathers; and there is no reſerve for a diſingagement from duty towards ſuch, whileſt the office of ſuch laſts. But the Queſtion is, Whether there be no Reſerve for a diſingagement from the Office it ſelf, and the Relation in reference to that Office, as it reſpects ſuch a perſon who hath miſcarried in it? If that be aſſerted, the Fifth Commandement wil not prove it, not thoſe places quoted. For there are Two ſorts of Fathers included in that Commandement; there is a Natural Father, whoſe relations is indiſſolvable, what ever the miſcarrying be: and there is an Inſtituted Father, which originally the People both in Church and Common-wealth were wont to create, for the Common good of them all. And ſuch a Father as the People make, or their Elders, or Patriots for them, the People may lay aſide; or their Repreſentatives on their behalf, upon miſdemeanors in Government, the relation in this Fatherhood is not indiſſolvable; and thoſe Scriptures quoted, contradict not this; For it is known wel, That in thoſe times there were great Changing of the Chief Magiſtrate, which took off the People, and freed them from their duty, when their relation ceaſed.
Reaſ. 2. God cōmands his people to be ſubject to Heathen Princes, and the moſt abſolute and oppreſſive Tyrants that likely ever have been, Jer. 27. 12. Mat. 22. 21. 1 Pet. 2. 13. I ſpeak not here o… Tyrants, in regard of Title, or Right; that is, Uſurpers: but of Tyrants whoſe …itles a…e juſt, but their Government unjuſt, and oppreſſive.
Reply. 1 But did God ever Command the Heads of the people, who had the power of al the people, to continue ſuch in their Places, if they had power to remove them? It is one thing what God Commands particular parſons to do, that have no Power no manner of way, and what the duty of the Chief of al the people (who repreſent them) is to do. 2 Were not thoſe very perſons many of them …yran…s in Title, aſwel as in Government, concerning whom God Commands his People, That they ſhould be ſubject to them? Did not the Emperors advance themſelves by the power of their Armies that they commanded, to whom the Senate was forced to yeeld, and yet ſubjection is required whilſt they were in Place? What can be ſaid of Nebuchadnezzar himſelf? Was his Title good, getting all by the Sword as he did? and yet Subjection is commanded to him, as his own quotation proves. So that it is manifeſt, That al the Scriptures which he produceth, are as ſtrong to prove that which he diſapproves of, as they are to prove that, which he would prove by them.
Reaſ. 3. Servants are to be ſubject to their Maſters, not only to them that are good and gentle, but thoſe that are froward, and that do them wrong, 1 Pet. 2. 18, 19, 20. and by Analogy Subjects are tyed in the ſame …erms to their Governors.
Reply. Servants in thoſe dayes were ſuch who were bought with their Moneis, and were their Slaves, as now many Chriſtians are to the Turks; therefore in ſubjection they muſt be, both to the Good and Froward, and could not help themſelves; and the Apoſtle exhorts them to be contented, and patient in their condition for the Lords ſake: But yet elſewhere he exhorts them, That if they could be free, they would chuſe it rather. Now I hope this mans ſcope is not, To put Commonwealthes into this Condition of Servility and Slavery to Princes. Nor will he grant ſuch an abſo…ute Dominion to Princes, as to Maſters over ſuch Servants. Such Servants were for their Maſters, when their Maſters had bought them: But Common-wealths are not for Princes, but Princes for Common-wealths; therefore there is no parity betwixt the one and the other. The ſubjection of Common-wealths, muſt not be a bondage, as the ſubjection of ſuch Servants was, unleſſe it be that ſom people have forfeited their freedom by ſome Rebellion, or wicked bloudy hoſtile acts, as the Iriſh have done. The yoke may be hea…ie on ſuch juſtly, and yet they have no cauſe to kick againſt it.
Reaſ. 4. David would not ſtretch out his hand againſt Saul upon this ground, for that he was his Maſter the King of Iſrael, and the Lords Anointed, though he was then in actual, violent, and unjuſt purſuit of his life, 1 Sam. 24. 5, &c. 26. …. &c.
Reply. David at that time was but a private man, and Saul was King unqueſtioned by the Heads of Iſrael, and Sauls perſecution was but of one private mans life, it appears not that he was a Tyrant unto the Comwealth. However it i… e…ident that he was given of God immediatly, without the interpoſition of the people, and therefore it might be, that he muſt be taken away by God, though he had been a Tyrant. But what is this to Princes in theſe times, that have no ſuch immediate Cals to Kingdoms?
Reaſ. 5. Otherwiſe you leave no place for paſſive obedience to, prayer for, and patience towards Magiſtrates in caſe of their wrong doing, and your own innocency, which yet is generally acknowledged to be a duty.
Reply. There will be particular wrongs enough, to exerciſe the patience of particular perſons, before it come to be miſcarriage againſt the Common-wealth: and there will be miſcarries enough through weakneſſe and invigilancy againſt the Common-wealth which will exerciſe the patience of all the people, and yet at laſt, if the miſchief grow very high and threaten ruine; ſubjection is not ſo abſolute, but that the Heads of the people may free themſelves, and the people, from ſuch a yoke.
Reaſ. 6. Els you diſſolve all Magiſtracy, it wil be impoſſible in mans corrupt eſtate to retain or continue any, in as much as no man, or men, can in the vaſt multitude, and difficulty of Magiſtratical affairs avoid offending every day, 2 Sam. 23. 3, 5.
Reply. If the people themſelves were ſuch Ideots and Children as to expect a Government that ſhould be perfect, yet I hope it wil hardly be aſſerted of their choſen men, whom they make their Repreſentatives, that they are ſuch; and therefore I wonder that ever ſuch a Reaſon ſhould be produced. The High COURT where Wiſdome ſhould be ſeated (if any where) wil not run ſtark mad, to diſplace the Supream Governor for infirmity and weakneſſe, which (as a man) he is incident unto every day, and ſo therein overthrow al Government: No, no, there hath been experience enough of their long ſuffering. But when a Prince to maintain his Luſt, wil raiſe a War, to endanger the deſtruction of al his Subjects; then let the REPRESENTATIVES of a people know their Priviledg and Duty, which is to ſerve the People, however it goes with the Prince.
Reaſ. …. The Doctrin of orthodox Proteſtant Divines generally is, That obedience is due (in lawful things) to the moſt degenerate, oppreſſing, and tyrannical Princes.
Reply. Theſe orthodox Divines ſpeak of ſubjection of particular perſons to ſuch Princes while they are in place and power; but they ſpeak not of States which are ſet up to be (at leaſt) ſharers in Government with the Prince. Nor do they preſſe obedience upon them, without any allowance to help themſelves, by calling him to an accompt in the peoples name.
2 He ſaith, We find oaths of Allegiance in Scripture, ſworn to Princes without any Conditions inſerted, Judg. 11. 9, 10. 2 King. 11. 4. 2 Chron. 36. 13. Ezek. 17. 13. & Nehem. 10. 29. Their Oath was to obſerve all the Commandements of the Lord, whereof the fifth Commandement, with application to their preſent and future Magiſtrates, was one.
Reply. 1 If there be no Condition inſerted, it wil not follow, That therefore there was no Condition; but the juſtice and equity of the thing is to be conſidered, whether i… doth not require a Condition; and the Rules of general Equity are to be followed, which is conſonant to, yea, commanded in the Scripture, viz. To do, as one would be done unto. 2 The places quo…ed, prove not the thing; That in Iudges, of the peoples Oath to Iepthah may well be underſtood with this reſtriction, According to the Laws of the Lord, and of the Land: for Iepthah was a Beleever, and a Judge whom God raiſed up; and it is probable, that he would not deſire Headſhip over them upon other terms. They were alſo an unfree people when they Covenanted with Iepthah to advance him to Government: and if their Oath were abſolute, they did not put themſelves into a worſe Condition thereby, but might think it better to be ſervants to him, then ſlaves to the Ammonites: and if it were an abſolute Rule which he had, he muſt Merrit it before he had it, and was to become their Saviour, before their Ruler: ſo that this Inſtance is not applicable to the thing in Controverſie. That place in 2 King. 11. 14. muſt be interpreted by Verſ. 17. where it is ſaid, That Ie…o…ada made a Covenant betwixt the King and the People, which implyes, that he mutually engaged them, and ſo it was not an abſolute Oath. That in 2 Chron. 36. 13. ſpeaks of Zedekiahs breach of oath, but nothing of any abſolute Oath. That in Ezek. may receive the ſame Anſwer with the former, becauſe it belongs to the ſame thing. That in Nehemiah, which reſpects the Obſervation of the Fifth Commandement, h…th had its Anſwer before.
3 He ſaith, It is a thing within our power to ſettle our Allegiance abſolutly, as well as it is within a mans power to diſpoſe of himſelf to ſervice, whether his Maſter prove good, or evil; or as it is in a man or womans power to beſtow themſelves in Marriage, whether the Mate be obſervant of duty, or no?
Reply. The Queſtion is not whether it be in our power to ſettle our Allegiance abſolutly, but whether it be in our lawful power to do it or no; and the doubt is not the leſſe in reference to theſe Inſtances which he produceth of a Servant his giving of himſelf up to his Maſter irrevokably, whether good or bad; and of a Man or Woman giving themſelves up in Ma…riage, whether the Mate be obſervant of duty or no, but the grea…er? For it perſons be bound to be wiſe, and juſt, and merciful to themſelves, then they cannot do ſuch a thing without ſin: and it would be counted a deſparate wicked part in a man, to bind himſelf to another to be ſervant for ever, whether he be kind or cruel; whether he give him any thing or nothing; yea, though he take from him that which he hath. And the unrighteouſneſſe of the thing is the ſame, in the caſe of an abſolute Oath to a Magiſtrate.
4 He ſaith, A conditional oath is not conſiſtent with a neceſſary duty; obedience to Magiſtrats is not left arbitrary, but cōmanded, & that though they be bad; but now the duty being neceſſary, if you would have it ſworn with a proviſo of the Rulers performing his duty, you nullifie the end of an Oath, which is to confirm, put out of doubt, and give ſecurity of what is due. A thing ſworn may become due, either by the rule of Equity, or by a voluntary Covenant: That which is due the latter way, if the Covenant be conditional▪ the Oath that is to ratifie it, may be alſo ſo far conditional, but what is due in the former kind, to wit, by abſolute and unalterable rule, or precept of Juſtice, cannot be ſworn to conditionally; for that would be no ratification to it, nay it would be a debilitating, and rendering more inſecure of that which was ſimply due without an oath, a condition put into your oath, being a very probable medium to perſwade the ſwearer that he is no otherwayes bound to the things ſworn, then upon that Condition▪ which being broken by the party ſworn to, he will eaſily conceive himſelf altogether free: Thus the abſolute Rule will receive impeachment, and not ſtrength in its obligation by the conditional oath: ſuch an oath therefore is in its end inconſiſtent with it.
Reply. 1 This Reaſon is much like to the Firſt, and hath its Anſwer there: But, 2 It may be demanded, Whether obedience to Magiſtrates, be more neceſſary, or due by more abſolute unalterable Rule and Precept of Juſtice, then obedience from Servants (which came free, and upon Covenant to their Maſters) is? If not, then, Whether obedience to Maſters may not (and ought not to) admit of a Conditional promiſe or oath to the performance of it, without any inconſiſtency with the neceſſity of ſuch a duty: and if, in the neceſſary obedience of Servants, ſuch a Conditional promiſe or oath may be admitted, Why not in the neceſſary obedience of Subjects to Magiſtrates? And, 3 It may be asked how, and when obedience to Magiſtrates came to be neceſſary▪ He wil not ſay, That before Magiſtrates were, obedience was neceſſary to them; but Magiſtrates, and obedience to them, came in together. But how came Magiſtracy▪ (I ſpeak of individual perſons put into the Office of Magiſtracy) Not by an immediate cal from God, as David did and ſome few others which Scripture mentioneth: nor were they (originally) born to that ſuperiority over the people, but were firſt exalted to that power by the Choice of the People: then there was a voluntary Covenant at firſt betwixt them: then (if the people looked at their own good) the Covenant was Conditional, and ſo their Oath (which was to confirm it) was Conditional, and ſo their obedience (which is the thing ſworn to) was Conditional, and ſo it was neceſſary not otherwiſe but upon a Condition. And ſo it's commanded in Scripture, not otherwiſe but upon the Condition it was firſt grounded on, and in that way it is neceſſary and unalterable, the Condition being obſerved upon which it was built and bottomed; and more then this cannot be inſerted by divine Precept. And whereas he makes this diſtinction, A thing ſworn may become due either by rule of Equitie, or by a voluntary Covenant: It appears by what hath been preſented, That both members of the diſtinction without jarring meet in this. 1, There is a voluntary Covenant which is Conditional; and 2, There is a Rule of Equity neceſſitating upon that Covenant and Condition; ſo that obeying comes to be due both wayes. 4 A Conditional Oath doth not weaken, but ſtrengthen ſuch obedience which is neceſſary and unalterable upon ſuch a Condition. For the Magiſtrate comes to be aſſured by ſuch an Oath, that he ſhall be obeyed, upon his good behaviour, and juſt, and upright carriage in his Office, and that the people wil not be fickle to him, if he be faithful in Government to them. After his large diſpute againſt the Conditionality of the Oath, he proceeds to arguing againſt the Mutuality of it; and Firſt he mentioneth ſo me of the words in the Propoſition, and blames them for defectiveneſſe in point of cleerneſſe, in reference to the Senſe in which the Poſition is to be underſtood, and takes occaſion thereupon to ſpeak of different ſenſes, and gives one ſenſe which he ſuppoſeth will not be owned by me; and then an apter ſenſe, which he ſuppoſeth was in my Intention: For thus he ſpeaks;
1, His words ſound, as if he would have the ſame oath to be taken mutually both by Prince and Subjects, which he will not, cannot (I ſuppoſe) own to be his ſenſe.
2, But the apter ſenſe, and that which (I ſuppoſe) was in his intention, is, That the Ruler and Subject, ſhould each ſwear to his reſpective duty; the Prince, That he will Command and Govern lawfully: the Subject, That he will performe all lawful Homage, and Obedience.
Reply. And what needed ſo much ado? Was the Propoſition ſomewhat defective in words? And was it not immediatly made full in the Reaſon which followed the Poſition? So that he needed not to have ſaid, For want of Explanation he muſt obſerve ſome different ſenſes applyable to my words; nor needed he to have ſaid, (I ſuppoſe) for he might have been at a certainty, what my ſenſe was; For my words in the Reaſon are theſe, It is againſt the good of the Subject that he ſhould be further, or longer bound to the Prince, or Ruler, to ſubmit to him, then the Prince or Ruler is bound to the Subject to Rule well, and to Adminiſter Iuſtice rightly. Let the Reader judge, whether he needed to have come with his different ſenſes: or, whether the different ſenſes that he brings were applyable to my words, when theſe words were before him.
After he pretends to have found out the ſenſe of the Propoſition, he concludes it falſe. But how doth he make it out?
1 He ſaith, We read of many undoubtedly righteous Oaths in Scripture, undertaken in Covenants between men and men, wherein one party only ſweareth, and not both mutually, Gen. 24. 2. 47. 31. Exod. 13. 19. Joſh. 2. 12. 9. 15. 14. 9 Judg. 15. 12. 1 Sam. 19. 6. 1 King. 1. 13. 29. 51. 2 Sam. 19. 23. Neh. 5. 12. Jer. 38. 16.
Reply. The Scriptures that he quotes to prove undoubtedly righteous ſingle Oaths, taken by one party, and not by both parties, are Oaths moſt of them of another kind then that which the Poſition ſpeaks of, viz. Oathes, the performance whereof lies only on one party, the other is to receive advantage, but not to do any thing: but the Oaths that the Poſi…ion ſpeaks of to be Mutual, are of things and duties which both parties are equally with reſpect to their ſeveral places bound to by the Command of God: For the Command to Obey, lies no more ſtricktly upon the Subject, then the Command to Rule, lies upon the Prince; and theſe Scriptures have been moſt of them Anſwered before: Only in Joſh. 2. 12. and Jer. 38. 16. the performance whereof lies on both ſides, and whether the Oath were reciprocal, is not ſo cleer; but conditional it was, as from Joſh. 2. 17, &c. Jer. 38. 24. appears; and conditional in the very ſenſe I have urged: So as that they were diſcharged if the Condition were not kept; and they aſſented to the Condition whether they ſwore, or not; and they are full againſt him as any text in Scripture.
2 He ſaith, We find in Scripture, Oaths of Allegiance taken by Subjects to the Rulers, without the reciprocal ſwearing of the Rulers to them ‡2 King. 11. 4. Judg. 11. 10. Ch. 36. 13; ſuch was that engagement, Joſh. 1. 16, 17, 18.
Reply. 1 To the Scriptures in the Margent, I have Anſwered before, yet this may be added, That if there be ſome examples of Oathes of Allegiance without reciprocal ſwearing through over much credulity of the Subject, or becauſe in a neceſſitous condition, yet the equity and juſtice of the thing, viz. That the Oath ought to be reciprocal, is nothing leſſe by ſuch examples. 2 That in Joſh. 1. 16, 17, 18. which he ſeems to lay moſt weight upon, is rather againſt him then for him, for it was conditional as the laſt words in Verſ. 18. ſhew, Only (ſay they) be ſtrong and of good courage: It is as if they ſhould have ſaid, Upon this Condition we wil harken unto thee as unto Moſes before, if thou be ſuch as Moſes was, if thou be ſtrong and of a good courage to do the work of the Lord in thy Place and Office; they require as much from him in his Place, as they promiſed to him in their places: for there is not any thing ſpoken of an Oath, on either ſide.
3 He ſaith, Oathes are never to be taken, but neceſſarily.
1 When the matter is of great weight.
Reply. Is there not as much neceſſity for the Prince to ſwear, as the People? Is not Ruling wel as weighty, if not much more weighty then Obeying? Hath not faithfulneſſe in Ruling, begotten Loyalty? Hath not a wiſe, juſt PRINCE, made an obedient, upright People?
2 When it cannot otherwiſe be ſufficientlie confirmed.
Reply. This Reaſon of an Oath is much more ſtrong in reference to the Prince, then to the People: For when once the Prince hath the Power of the Kingdom in his hand, What can be better ſecurity of his faithfulneſſe, then his Oath? As for the people, if they ſwear not, yet if they be diſloyal, their lives, and al they have, are in the Princes hands. But it is nor ſo with the Prince, til there hath been a Conteſtation firſt, and his power is broken.
3 It comes to paſſe ſometimes, That the Performance is onlie on one Partie.
Reply. But that is not the caſe betwixt Prince and People, for the performance muſt be on both ſides, elſe the Common-wealth is miſerable.
4 Sometimes there is other Satisfactorie Aſſurances given beſides an Oath.
Reply. But what is that the Prince can give to ſatisfie the People beſides ſwearing, and yet the People cannot give the ſame, but they muſt needs ſwear?
5 Sometimes the danger of the breach lies onlie, or more on one Partie then another.
Reply. So much more need hath the Prince to ſwear then the People, becauſe the danger of the breach lies moſt on his part. For, for one Inſtance that can be given of the Peoples diſloyalty to a juſt Prince, there may be twenty given of the Princes unjuſt oppreſſive carriage to an obedient People.
6 Sometimes there is other remedies, if there ſhould be a breach, then the forfeiture of an Oath.
Reply. I hope the Remedy whatever it be beſides an Oath, may be applicable to the People, if they break, as to the Prince, if he break.
4 He ſaith, But ſuppoſe the caſe, that it be as neceſſary for ſecurity, that the King ſwear to the people, as the people to the King; yet if (through overmuch credulity, or otherwiſe) it be that the people do ſwear, and not the Prince, this cannot be the leaſt colour of the nullifying of the peoples Oath: For that which makes the Oath obliging, is, That in a juſt and poſſible matter promiſed, God is invocated as a witneſſe of the promiſe.
Reply. Grant it be as neceſſary, that the King ſwear as the People, and that through the credulity of the people the King ſwear not, or that through fear of incenſing him, they dare not demand an Oath from him, and yet through his power and wrath they are forced to ſwear to him, (and this is the caſe many times) and ſuppoſe that the King after this Oath of the People to him turn Tyrant, and prey upon them, Is this Oath of the people obligatory, or is it not? I have Aſſerted that it is not, and for this Reaſon, Becauſe whether the King ſwear, or ſwear not, he ought to do the thing that he ſhould ſwear, or elſe not expect that which he makes the People ſwear to, becauſe the juſtice of the thing in the peoples Oath, depends upon a Condition, that the King perform his duty. For its impious and wicked for a people to promiſe, much more for a people to ſwear, that though it ſhould come to paſſe, that the King ſhould turn all his power and force againſt them to deſtroy them, yet he ſhal be their King, and they will obey him ſtill, while any of them are le…t alive. And this man himſelf, ſaith nothing in his Reaſon which he renders Contradictory to this, but what rather ſerves to confirm it. For he ſaith, That which makes the Oath obliging is, that in a juſt and poſſible matter promiſed, God is invocated, as a witneſſe of the Promiſe: He ſaith, The matter muſt be juſt that is promiſed and ſworn to, or the Oath is not obliging: now the juſtneſſe of ſuch a promiſe and oath, is the Condition upon which it is made, viz. That the Prince Rule for their welfare, and not for their Ruine, otherwiſe the Subject is moſt inhumanly unjuſt againſt himſelf, and God is invocated to ſuch wickedneſſe, which is high preſumption in thoſe perſons that do it: and the thing is not ratified thereby, but repentance ought rather to be ſhewed. But (indeed) it is to be ſuppoſed, that the people ſwear not at any time, but that at leaſt this Condition is tacite, in the Oath; and that the King is engaged unto his part with the people in the ſame oath. And if any man argue otherwiſe and ſay it is not ſo; I ſay then, Such an Oath is unlawful, and holds not longer, then in the true ſcope and extent of it, it ought to hold.
After that apter ſenſe of (Mutual) which he ſaith is my ſenſe, he comes to give another ſenſe of (Mutual ſwearing) which he ſaith is ſtricter then the former, and that is ſaith he, When not onlie two perſons ſwear to each other their reſpective parts, but both ſwear with a mutual reſpect; that is, The Obligation of the one partie, hath a reſpect to, and a dependence upon the performance on the other partie: as when one man ſwears to give another ſo much for his Land, the other ſwears to convey to him his Land for ſo much Money, in this kind the breach of the one, is the releaſment of the other.
Reply. This is not another ſenſe, but the ſame with the former; for this is in al mutual Oathes that are made by two perſons to each other reciprocally, they are Oathes made with mutual reſpect; that is, The obligation of the one party, hath reſpect to, and dependence upon the performance of the other partie, as in Gen. 21. 31, 32. betwixt Abimel…ch and Abraham. Gen. 31. 52, 53. betwixt Iacob and Laban. Joſh. 2. 12. 17. to 21 betwixt Rahab and the Spies. 1 Sam. 30. 15. betwixt David and the Amalekite. 1 Sam. 20. 16. 17. betwixt David and Ionathan. 1 King. 2. 42, 43. betwixt Solomon and Shimei. 2 King 11. 17. betwixt Ioaſh and the People. And where wil it be found otherwiſe, but ſtil in mutual Oathes of two perſons to each other, they are with mutual reſpect, and the obligation of the one, hath reſpect to, and a dependence upon the performance of the other, ſo as the breach of the one, is the releaſment of the other, as in the Oath betwixt the Spies and Rahab is moſt cleerly manifeſt. For there it is expreſſed in ſo many words, and it is perpetually imply'd in al other ſuch like Oathes which we reade of in the Scripture, where it is not expreſſed. Of this nature are Oathes betwixt Prince and People if they be mutual, (as (by the grant of this man) in Englands caſe they be) then they be with reſpect: for the Prince doth not ſwear to give himſelf up for the Peoples good, to be ſhepheard of them, and Captain over them for nought, but for ſuch homage, obedience, fear, duty, tribute, cuſtome, revenue, to be performed and given by the People uuto him: So the People do not ſwear to give unto the Prince ſo much fear, obſervance, ſubjection, revenue, abſolutly and cleerly, but for ſuch a work of faithful Ruling and Governing them. And it is yet more cleer in the Relation betwixt Paſtor and People, the Covenant betwixt them is with reſpect, and the obligation of the one party, hath reſpect to, and dependence upon the performance of the other. The People do not promiſe or engage to give ſo much of their Eſtates for the maintenance of him abſolutly and cleerly, but with reſpect to his labouring in the Word and Doctrine among them; neither doth the Paſtor engage abſolutly and cleerly ſo to labour amongſt them, and give out his ſtrength in ſuch ſort for their good, but with reſpect to ſuch double honor, as the Scripture obligeth them to give him. And yet it cannot be denied but that (notwithſtanding this mutual reſpect that ſuch an Engagement hath to each other, and dependence which the one hath upon the performance of the other) both of them are tyed and engaged to God, and that the duties which they do performe are duties to God, becauſe God hath commanded them ſuch duties, but not without, but upon ſuch mutual reſpect to each other, and it is no duty to God without this reſpect, for a people to give this double honor to him, that wil not Rule wel, and labour in the Word and Doctrine among them, but they ought rather in diſcharge of their duty to God, to remove, or cauſe to be removed ſuch a perſon from his office, and ſo to with-draw their double honor from him: and ſo it is in theſe relative duties betwixt Prince and people. And ſo let this man (if he can) or any other, ſhew by divine Rule a more abſolute engagement betwixt Prince and people, then betwixt Paſtor and people.
But he ſaith, This ſenſe of ſwearing cannot come in to be meant in the point of Controverſie: But why ſo?
1 Saith he, Such an Oath is plainlie Conditional, as when one gives ſo much Monie for ſo much Land, he gives it not cleerlie and abſolutlie, but for ſo much Land.
Reply. So it is in this caſe plainly Conditional, perhaps not alwayes expreſly Conditional: If a people ſhould ſay nothing to him that is to be their Paſtor of any duty that he is to perform to them, but only promiſe ſuch maintainance to him, the Condition of Preaching to them is plainly enough imply'd though not expreſſed. It cannot rationally be conceived, that they would give ſo much to him, as being their Paſtor, for doing nothing: ſo of the People it may be ſaid, in reference to their Allegiance to their Prince, that there is no abſolute neceſſity that the Condition ſhould be expreſſed, eſpecially in the caſe of the Subjects of this Kingdom, becauſe the King was ſworn to Rule according to the Laws, and that was the Condition of al after Oathes taken by the people to him.
2 He ſaith, The Oath of Allegiance is granted to be abſolute by the Author of the POSITIONS, and diſputed againſt by him, as ſuch.
Reply. It is a miſtake to ſay ſo: The Diſpute was to prove, That either the Oath was Conditional, or ought to be; was Mutual, or ought to be; if lawful: And therefore if broken on the Kings party, then the people are abſolved. And though he himſelf was ſatisfied that it was Conditional, and Mutual, and with Reſpect; yet becauſe others did deny it, therefore he expreſſed himſelf in a disjunctive [either was mutual or ought to have been.]
3 But ſaith he, The Kings Oath is abſolute, and binds without dependence on the Subjects Loyaltie; no man will ſay, That the King is diſcharged from Ruling juſtlie, and may turn Tyrant, if the People fail in their Oath towards him.
Reply. It is denyed, That the Kings or Peoples Oathes bind without dependence any more then Paſtors and Peoples Engagements do: and though no man wil ſay, That the King is diſcharged from Ruling juſtly, and may turn Tyrant; yet rational men wil ſay, That he may ceaſe his Ruling, and lay down his Office of Government, if the People generally with-hold their Subjection, and his Revenue from him. Nor can any one rationally think, That the Governor ſhould ſtil carry the weight of ſuch a Truſt over ſuch a People, who do with-draw their fear, and reverence, and obedience from him, and wil pay him no tribute, and withhold his Re…enue, and abuſe his perſon: but that he may in ſuch a caſe, be abſolved from all engagement in reference to ſuch a Function over ſuch a People, and ſo the caſe is with the Subject. There is difference betwixt non adjuration, and male adjuration, the latter is in no caſe warrantable, but the former is juſtifiable upon the breach of the people in diſloyalty to him.
4 But (ſaith he) ſuch mutual Oathes are entred into by both Parties at the ſame time, but neither doth the King nor Subjects ſwear to each other at the ſame time.
Reply. This is not neceſſary in mutual Oathes betwixt two parties which are with reſpect; ſuch mutual Oaths may be betwixt two Princes of divers Nations, and ſo depending the one upon the performance of the other; that if there be a breach on either ſide, the other is free upon it from ſuch obligation, and yet theſe Princes not meet together, nor ſwear at one time.
5 Such mutual reſpective Oathes, have onlie place in matters arbitrarie, which are in mens choice to do, or not to do before they ſwear, but not ſo in theſe relative duties betwixt Kings and Subjects.
Reply. It is arbitrary (though not in reference to Government it ſelf, yet) in reference to the diſignation of the perſon or perſons that are to be put in place of Government, before there be a Pact or Covenant betwixt ſuch perſon or perſons, and ſuch a people whom they are to Govern. And though there be a neceſſity after ſuch Pact and Covenant, yet ſuch neceſſity is bottom'd on ſuch a Pact or Covenant, and ſo it is not an abſolute neceſſity, but a neceſſity upon ſuch a Condition. The duties of Maſters and Servants, are neceſſary in the general, but particularly conſidered in reference to this or that perſon giving up themſelves to be Servants unto ſuch and ſuch Maſters, it is meerly arbitrary before the Pact, and there is place for ſuch reſpective Oathes betwixt them, and that the one breaking, the other is free upon it.
But he goes on to conſider of the Reaſon of the Poſition, viz.
That it is againſt Equitie and Reaſon, that the one ſhould be further or longer bound to the other, then the other is bound to him: And he ſaith, That if that be granted, yet there is no neceſſitie that the Oath be mutual, for the Prince may be bound, and is bound, and it cannot he otherwiſe, but that he ſhould be bound to his dutie as long as the Subject is to his, by Scripture, Conſcience, and poſitive Laws, and yet not ſworn at al.
Reply. If al be granted that he ſaith, let the Reader judge whether if the Subject be bound to the Prince by Scripture, Conſcience, and poſitive Lawes, and by an Oath to the Prince over and above al the other, and the Prince be bound to the Subject by Scripture, Conſcience, and poſitive Laws, but not by an Oath; Whether the Subject be not further bound to the Prince, then the Prince to him. But in this particle (further) he meddles not, which yet was in the Reaſon of the Poſition: but ſaith, The Prince is bound (and that as long) but he ſaith not (and that as far) and yet he would ſeem to grant the whole Reaſon, and notwithſtanding deny the mutual Oath, but it is without Reaſon.
The Propoſition remaining ſtil in ſtrength (as I ſuppoſe) and the Reaſon of it alſo, notwithſtanding al that hath been endeavoured by him againſt it; the Conſequence remains firm alſo. And as he diſables them not, ſo need not I to confirm them.
Only in the end of the Conſequences there was (for further illuſtration rather then confirmation) the Parliaments Fact, in taking up Arms produced as ſutable to thoſe inferences, and ſerving to cleer the Oath of Allegiance to be Conditional, and not Abſolute; to be Mutual, and not Single; in the very accompt of the Parliament it ſelf, who beſt underſtood it. For had not they in that Oath of Allegiance ſworn with this limitation in their own underſtandings, (viz. According to the Laws of the Kingdom) as the Condition whether expreſſed or not, and had they not known that the King was ſworn to them, to Govern according to the Laws, and that theſe two Oathes had mutual reſpect to each other, this Oath of Allegiance in an abſolute ſenſe Conſidered, had they not renounced it as unjuſt and wicked, would have made them guilty of diſloyalty and Rebellion in taking up of Arms, which I am ſure my Antagoniſt (whoever he might be) would not charge them with.
Now unto this he Anſwereth two things:
1 He ſaith, If their taking up of Arms againſt the King were Rebellion, their abſolution from their Oathes by the Kings breach of his, could not unmake, or make it no Rebellion; for the debt of Obedience is exiſtent in the Subject before any Oath taking, and it is not founded on ſwearing, but only confirmed by it, and therefore ſurvives after the Oath ſhould be diſſolved.
Reply. But in this argumentation, he builds upon that which I have oft deſtroyed, and takes that for granted, which I have oft denyed, viz. (That there is an abſolute debt of Obedience to this or that Magiſtrate) which is not ſo, ſave only upon mutual Covenant, which comes afterwards to be confirmed by Oath, and from which by the breach of Covenant and Oath upon the Magiſtrates ſide, the Subject is acquitted, viz. From his Oath and Covenant together; ſo that the one doth not ſurvive the other, as in al mutual Oathes it is; there is an abſolution from the oath, and from the thing (of which the oath is) together; as in Joſh. 2. 20. appears: they would be quit of the oath, and not only ſo, but of the thing alſo, if ſhe kept not within, or ſhould diſcover.
2 He ſaith, We muſt therefore ſay, as the Parliamentarian party hath beleeved, declared, and in many Treatiſes in Print, maintained al along the late Wars, That the Armes of the Parliament were not againſt any brance of the Subjects Allegiance, or the Oath for it (which they profeſſed ſtil to perſiſt in, yea, and in the act of their Armes bearing, Covenanted to yeeld and maintain) but concordant with the ſame. In as much as they enterprized not againſt the Kings Perſon, his State, or Government, they went not againſt his Majeſty, his Heirs, or Succeſſors, they joyned not againſt his Crown and Dignity, the Rights whereof, and the Bounds of the Subjects Obedience, are perfixed by the Lawes of the Realm, the ultimate interpretation whereof, is in the Parliament which declared their Arms to be for, and agreeable to the Laws. The King, as King, acts only by his Courts and Laws, what he doth beſides, or againſt theſe, is the mans, not the Kings acting. What is done by Order of the Courts of Juſtice, and by vertue of the Laws, is done (though againſt his perſonal preſence or command, yet) for the King, his Crown, and Dignity.
Reply. In this ſenſe that he puts upon the taking up of Arms, there is enough to ratifie and confirm that which al along I have been contending for; and there is nothing that contradicts me, but what contradicts it ſelf. I ſhall take up ſome paſſages in the Relation which he makes:
1 He ſaith The King, as King, acts onlie by his Courts and Laws, and what he doth beſides, or againſt, theſe is the mans, not the Kings acting: It is as much as if he ſhould ſay, The King fals under a double conſideration, as a man, and ſo when he departs from Laws, and from Juſtice, he is only to be lookt upon as ſuch, and as a King, and ſo only when he keeps to his Laws, and to his Courts of Juſtice. Now we know that the oath of Allegiance was made to the King, as King; and ſo the Subject hath nothing to do with him in point of obedience or Allegiance, ſave only as King; that is, When he Rules according to Law. Again, The oath of Allegiance being to a legal King, when the perſon of the King is a Tyrant, and breaks al Laws and overthrowes al Courts of Juſtice, where is then this legal King? and if there be none, the ſubject is then diſcharged from their oath of Allegiance.
This diſtinction betwixt the man and the King, is but a notional conceit; for take away the man, and where is then the King? and ſure I am, that God wil make no ſuch diſtinction when he ſhal come to judg Princes; but al their miſcarriages in Government, & irregularities in the managing of their Offices ſhal be charged upon them as Princes ſet over the People: then it wil not be ſaid, What he doth beſides, or againſt the Laws and Courts of Juſtice, is the mans, not the Kings acting; it wil appear then, That Kings, as Kings, have offended, and been unjuſt and tyrannous.
2 He ſaith, That the Parliament hath declared their Arms to be for, and agreeable to the Laws; that is, for the King ruling by Laws: and againſt the King; that is, the perſon that carrieth that name, which is indeed but the man, when he violates al Laws in Ruling; for they were only ſworn to the King, acting by his Courts and Lawes; and what is this, but the ſame that I have aſſerted in the Poſitions, viz. That if the Subject were abſolutly engaged by oath to the perſon of the King, whether he Rule wel or il, and that this oath were lawful, the PARLIAMENT muſt needs be diſloyal in taking up Armes againſt the perſon of the King.
3 He ſaith, That which is againſt the Kings perſonal Preſence, or Command, is not againſt the King: that is, is not againſt the King in Law, or againſt ſuch a one as the King ought to be according to Law. So that he grants, That Allegiance is not to a perſonal King, or his Commands, unleſſe he be a legal King, and a King according to Law; for things may be done againſt his perſonal Preſence and Commands, wherein he concurs with the Poſitions, but contradicts himſelf: For, where is any place for paſſive obedience, if that be true, which yet is one of his Reaſons of unconditional, or abſolute Allegience.
4 Now whereas he ſaith, The Parliamentarie Partie enterprized nothing againſt his Perſon, &c. There ſeems to be a contradiction in it; For he ſaith, They declared their Arms to be for the Laws, and ſo againſt al that oppoſed them, which his Perſon, perſonal Preſence, and Commands often did. And (indeed) did they not make his Perſon flye from place to place? And was not his Perſon often in danger, as the perſons of thoſe that fought under him were? And was not his Perſon ſecured in Holmeſby-Houſe? And had their Allegiance been to his Perſon as diſtinct from the Laws, they had violated it.
And whereas there is mention made of the Covenant which they entred into to preſerve his Perſon, and that in the very times of their Arms bearing: It is manifeſt, That they bind themſelves firſt to maintain Religion, and the Liberties of the Kingdom; and then in Religion and Liberties to preſerve his Perſon and Honor, and no further, but as might ſtand with them; which ſhews that they were bound to them firſtly by Law, and not to any Allegiance to his Perſon againſt them, but ſo far as they might preſerve them: and therefore in the very time of this Covenant, they are found in wayes of chaſtizing him, though with a ſcope of preſerving him, if poſſibly Religion and the Subjects Liberty may ſubſiſt with it. And firſt, they correct him in his Inſtruments, and then in Perſon in ſecuring him, which was not very honourable unto him, but the preſervation of Religion, and Liberty of the Subject forced them to it. At laſt their Counſels were to make no more Addreſſes to him, but to lay him aſide, and to ſettle Religion and Liberty without him, and this was more diſhonarable to him; but their Covenant which bound them firſt to Religion, &c. compelled them to it: and there was yet further liberty in the Covenant left for them to cut him off, and his alſo, if the neceſſity of the preſervation of Religion and Liberty of the Subject ſhould require it. And indeed it is not rational to think, That they could have a lawful power, without contradicting the oath of allegiance or the Covenant, of inflicting leſſer Cenſures and Penalties upon him, and yet want power to inflict higher and greater puniſhments if the nature of the Crime deſerved them, and the neceſſity of conſerving Religion and Liberty required them.
But he comes to conſider of the Second Exception againſt the Oath of Allegiance which the Poſition mentions, viz. as there is in it, A ſwearing to the Kings Heirs, he mentions my words in the Reaſon that I lay down of my Exception againſt it, viz. Who knows whether he will be a wiſe man or a foole, &c. And he mentions my Conſequence, viz. The Oath of Allegiance was in that branch of it an unlawful Oath. And he makes this Anſwer;
Firſt, I allow of the Antecedent, but utterlie denie the Conſequence of it.
Reply. But it muſt be underſtood that I mean it (as it is now made uſe of, and inſiſted upon, and urged by many who have taken it) of an abſolute Oath to them whatſoever they prove to be. For the ſtrength of the Reaſon which I bring againſt it, lies in theſe words, They may bind themſelves therebie to their own hurt and ruine; which if it be not abſolute they cannot do: therefore I diſpute againſt it, as abſolute as I did againſt the other branch of it.
But let his Reaſon of the whole CONSEQUENCE be weighed.
1 Saith he, This Inference is directlie contrarie to that which Solomon in the place cited, Eccleſ. 2. 19. makes from the words: Solomons is, Yet ſhall he have Rule over all my labour, wherein I have laboured, and wherein I have ſhewed my ſelf wiſe under the Sun; This mans is, (in effect) becauſe no man knows, whether he will be a wiſe man or a foole, therefore he ſhall not have Rule.
Reply. 1 Let the text be weighed and truly examined, and it wil appear that Solomon ſpeaks not of the kingdom which he was to leave to his Son, whether a wiſe man or a fool, but he ſpeaks of his labour, wherein he had laboured in getting Riches, in gathering Wealth, in building Houſes, in planting Vineyards, in improving of his earthly Eſtate in the World. He ſhewes there is a vanity in it, His Son ſhal have Rule over al. In Verſ. 18. he ſaith, He hated all his labour becauſe of this; which cannot be meant of his labor in the Kingdom in Government: and it is ſutable to that in Job 14. 21. Pſal. 49. 10.
2 If Solomon ſhould mean it of the Rule of the Kingdom, yet he ſpeaks not of it as a thing that he did approve of, but of it as that which he counted vanity.
2 He ſaith, The ſame Reaſon if it hold, would be againſt anie Oath or Engagement to anie Rulers in being whatſoever they are, for ſay they become to maturitie, and for the paſt and preſent time have given proof, yet who knows what they that are now wiſe and juſt (morallie) may hereafter come to be? The Scripture ſuppoſeth, That not onlie a juſt Father may have a wicked Son, but a righteous man (in Profeſſion and External carriage) may turn from his carriage, &c.
Reply. 1 This Reaſon of his wherewith he diſputes againſt the Exception that I make, viz. Of Oathes to Heirs; is very ſtrong againſt himſelf in reference to abſolute Oathes which he would maintain, and ſhews how dangerous abſolute oathes to Princes or other Governors are, and how deſtructive they may become, if not only a juſt Father may have a wicked Son, but a righteous man (Prince or other) may turn away from his Righteouſneſſe.
2 Notwithſtanding there is this difference betwixt the one and the other, that whilſt a man ſwears Allegiance to a Prince, at preſent wiſe, and juſt, and pious in profeſſion, but mutual and changable he ſwears in judgment to him, he exerciſeth his underſtanding and beſt abilities in judging, beyond which a man cannot go, nor doth God require him to go: but in the other, he exerciſeth not his judgment at al, but ſwears handover-head to a thing he doth not know what, and to a perſon he knoweth not whom. And I would ask this man, Whether (if it were ſo) in al the under-Offices in the Kingdom, That perſons ſhould come by Succeſſion to their Places? If all Judges ſhould, and al Magiſtrates and other perſons in office ſhould, whether there were not like to be a miſerable Common-wealth? And whether he durſt reaſon after this manner, and make a parity, betwixt chuſing men juſt at preſent and wiſe men, and men of truth to ſuch places, and making ſuch places Hereditary; becauſe if there be an Election, the perſons that are good and able for ſuch places may degenerate, and if it be Hereditarie, they may be good, and can be but naught as the other may prove to be. I would ask him alſo, Whether there be the like caſuality in reference to the one as to the other? Though there be a poſſibilty in reference to both. And if this Reaſoning be ſhameful in referenee to under Officers, then, Why is it not ſo in reference to the ſupream Officer? Beſides, there is an expreſſe Command for the one in Exod. 18. 21. 23. campared with Numb. 11. 16, 17. but where is there any Command for the other?
3 He ſaith, This Conſequence were it of force, would equallie condemn all promiſorie Oathes, and other Covenants and Engagements between man and man; for it cannot be foreſeen in anie, what the perſons contracted with will prove.
Reply. This Reaſon of his (thus far of it) is of the ſame nature with the former, and receives its Anſwer in the former; But he goes on, and ſaith,
It is alſo againſt the Laws and Sanctions of thoſe Nations in all ages, which have ſettled ſucceſſive Regalitie, or other Governments for longer then the preſent poſſeſſors of the power endure.
Reply. Nations have ſo done, and they have been plagued in doing ſo alſo.
But (ſaith he) its warranted by the Word of God. Iſrael offered a ſucceſſive power to Gideon, Judg. 8. 22. God himſelf inſtituted and bound his people to a lineal GOVERNMENT, in David and in his Seed, 2 Sam. 12. 15. 2 Chron. 13, 5. The Patriarchs power which was political, was ſucceſſive; ſo was the Government of the Jews for a hundred yeers, in the linage of the Macabees.
Reply. 1 The inſtance in Gideon proves nothing; though Iſrael offered it, being deeply affected with the greatneſſe of the deliverance of which he was inſtrumental, (and it was only a ſudden expreſſion of their love, and not ſo deliberatly done) yet Gideon accepted it not.
2 As for Gods inſtituting it lineally in David: 1 God raiſed up Saul to the Kingdom, but ſettled it not lineally in him; let the one be ſet againſt the other. 2 It appears not that God ſettled it in the next of bloud in Davids lineage, or that the next of bloud had it; for Solomon was not his eldeſt Son living, but Adonijah was before him, yet God gave it to Solomon not to Adonijah; therefore this ſetting it in Davids ſeed, is not pattern for ſucceſſion among us. 3 It was done in reference to Chriſt, who was to come from Davids loines, and was to have his Throne, Luk. 1. 32.
3 The Patriarchal Government, whatever it was (for we are left much in the dark about it; and this man makes uſe of it, but holds not out any light concerning it) the Law of Nature inſtituted it, for the Father is greater then the Child, and his Governor, from that act of his in begetting of him; as God is Governor of the World, by that act of his in Creating it: but mixed Families, as in Common-wealths, the People make their own Father, that is, their own Governor. And they ought to do it with the beſt underſtanding they have.
4 The example of the Maccabees proves nothing. For they were Saviours whom God raiſed up ſucceſſively, and therefore they might wel Rule ſucceſſively; but for the thing it ſelf, God ſeems to di…alow it, for Iſrael had a Government ſetled by God amongſt them, before Sauls time, but not Kingly, nor in Succeſſion, but of another kind. And this Government they liked not, but would have a Government according to the Nations, viz. Kinglie Government in Succeſſion; but God was diſpleaſed with it, and ſaid they had rejected him in it.
4 He ſaith, We have Scriptural examples of an uncontroverted integritie, of Oathes to Princes and their Heirs, and to Princes in their yong▪ unripe, and untryed yeers. Take (ſaith he) that inſtance of Abrahams ſwearing to Abimelech, his Son, and his Sons Son, Gen. 21. 23, 24. And that of Davids making Solomon King in his own life time▪ when he was yong and tender, 2 Chron. 23. 1. & 29. 1. And that of Jehojada's and the Peoples making of Joaſh King, and ſwearing to him when he mas but ſeven yeers old, 2 King. 11. 4. 21.
Reply. 1, Abraham ſwore to Abimelech, and to his Son, and to his Sons Son, not to deal falſly with them, but according as Abimelech had dealt kindly with him. This was not only a ſafe oath without dāger in Abraham, but a juſt Oath, and of a thing neceſſary in it ſelf to be done; and of an unchangable nature ſo far as concerns falſneſſe, and it was a mutual oath, and alſo therein conditional ſo far as concerns kindneſſe, and therefore no way applicable to the oath of Allegiance in reference to Heirs which (as was ſaid in the Reaſon) may bring Ruine, and is like to prove ſooner or later, pernicious. 2 That inſtance of David in making Solomon King in his life time while yong and tender, hath little ſtrength in it. Solomon was the perſon appointed thereunto of God, and therefore he was ſure to be competently furniſhed with abilities for it from God, what ever his age might be; and he grown up to ſuch yeers, that excellent Wiſdom, and an excellent Spirit fit for Government appeared in him. 3 That of Ioaſh hath more in it in reference to unripe yeers, but reacheth not the caſe, becauſe he was al that was left of thoſe Heirs that were to ſucceed in Davids linage in the Kingdom, which God had eſtabliſhed by Covenant upon David and his ſeed.
2, He denyeth the two parts of the Conſequence, 1 That part, viz. The Oath is not in judgment, becauſe no man knows what the Heir will prove. But what are the words wherein he denyes it?
1 It may be (ſaith he) in judgment ſo far as a future contigencie can be deliberated upon, and this may be concluded on adviſedlie (as morallie certain) that it is better to have the Crown ſetled in a Line wherebie ſometimes a vitious perſon may be advanced, then to have it under Election at everie perſonal change: This hath been the experimented Maxime of the wiſeſt States.
Reply. The true ſenſe of this Anſwer is, That there is no place for deliberation in ſwearing to Heirs, of whom we can know nothing how they wil prove, ſave only how to prevent a greater miſchief which is ſuppoſed wil come by new Elections upon every change, which wiſe States do decline: but what evil there is at al in a wel Governed State by new Elections at every change I am not able to reach, but experience wil inſtruct, That the greateſt, and longeſt laſting Wars have been, where Competitors in point of Title, have contended for the Crown. And how frequently one hath ſupplanted another to obtain the Kingdom, Stories do plentifully ſhew.
2 If it were not in judgment (ſaith he) this defect makes not an Oath unlawful as to the nullifying of it, a raſh Oath (if of a lawful thing) binds, as before was proved, Judg. 21. 2. 7. 1 Sam. 14. 24. 37. Joſh. 9. 14, 15.
Reply. 1 Nor did I ever aſſert, That an Error in Judgment when the Oath is righteous in the nature of it, might be broken, though there are caſes which are very dubious. 2 The Scriptures which he cites are none of them in a righteous thing, nor did they al of them bind, nor ought they to have done, therefore he mentioneth them improperly. For, Firſt, That Oath which the Tribes did make, of not giving their Daughters to the Benjamites, after they had cruelly cut off al the Women appertaining to that Tribe, was an unrighteous and cruel Oath, and ſhould not have bound them. Secondly, That Saul ſhould lay a Cu…ſe upon the People, that taſted any thing til evening, was alſo not only a raſh, but an unmerciful, and unjuſt Oath; and Ionathan ſaid as much of it when he heard of it, ſo far was he from being troubled that he had broken it, and he thought not himſelf guilty of death, Shall I die (ſaith he) for this? And the People reſcued him, and the Oath ſtood not in that branch of it. And that of Joſh. 9. reſpecting the Gibeonites was a ſinful Oath in the matter of it, as it proved though they knew it not, as wel as a raſh Oath; and there was Error perſonae in it alſo, which is enough to break any Oath, and therefore there was ſpecial reaſon why it held, and it reacheth not to us. And it is againſt this mans own Poſition, That an unrighteous oath in the matter of it ſhould hold; now this oath to Heirs is of this nature, not only raſh, and not in judgment, but unrighteous, and therefore ought not to hold.
2 He denies that part of the Conſequence, which concerns righteouſneſſe in an oath, which I lay down in the Poſition thus, Nor is it a righteous Oath for the Subject may bind himſelf to his own hurt, yea ruine. His words are theſe;
Though the Subject may not bind himſelf to what is neceſſarilie, or at the time of his ſwearing may appear probably to tend to his hurt or ruine; yet he may ſwear (intending the publick good) to that which is of a mutual nature, and may in the event turn to his own hurt and ruine. And might he not ſo ſwear, yet having ſo ſworn he is bound to ſtand to his Oath, Pſal. 15. 4. Ioſh. 9. 15. Ezek. 17. 13. 1 Sam. 14. 26. 28. 37. Iudg. 21. 5. 15. 18. which is contradictorie to what this man here ſaith.
Reply. He ſtates the Queſtion amiſſe, and puts the caſe ſo, as that it is not the caſe, for to ſwear to Heirs from generation to generation, though it be uncertain which Heirs, and at whattime ſuch Heirs wil prove corrupt and unjuſt in adjuration, yet it is more then probable (even as certain as that there wil be change of weather, when yet for the preſent it is fair and pleaſant) that ſuch Heirs wil ſtand up in enſuing generations.
2 Though there may poſſibly be caſes in which oathes that were taken with a good intent, but proving accidentally pernicious to the takers, muſt be kept: yet if this be aſſerted by the Anſwerer, That meer voluntary arbitrary oathes made without any Condition, and at the beſt (if not forced) in favour of ſuch a Family, and intended for mutual good, but proving ruinous to the makers, and ſerving only to ſtrengthen cruelty and unrighteouſneſſe in the perſons to whom made, that ſuch oathes ought to be kept, hath neither the colour of Reaſon nor Scripture for it; and this is the caſe directly in ſuch abſolute oathes to Heirs: Nay, in the caſe which himſelf makes, it wil not hold that ſuch an oath ſhould be kept: For ſuppoſe a man ſhould ſwear to another to go to ſuch a City for him at ſuch a time, to effect ſuch a buſineſſe; but he afterwards comes to underſtand, That at his return there are perſons that wil be in ambuſcado to take away his life; … this man bound to keep his oath, if the other wil hold him to it?
3 As for the Scriptures, they are not pertinent, and ſome of them have been oft Anſwered: That in Pſal. 15. 4. is meant of an oath that is made to another, by which that other may be profited, and the perſon himſelf that ſweirs, comes at unawares to be thereby damified; ſuch an oath oug… to be kept, though it be to a mans loſſe: but the oath … we are diſcuſſing, is of another nature, an oath by which not one … but a Nation, not diſadvantaged ſomewhat, but even ſold (as it is … times) to ruine, or (what is worſe, even) vaſſalage, by which not the perſon to whom the oath is made is profited, but his baſe luſts ſatisfied, to his own ruine at the laſt. That in Joſh. 9. 15. is not exemplary, as I have often ſaid before; For I would ask, Whether if a Counterfeit Prince (as ſtories make mention of many) had under pretence of being ſuch a one (viz. The right Heir to the Crown) gained an oath of Allegiance, would that oath have ſtood againſt the right Heir? I am ſure this man wil not aſſert it. The other Scriptures have been anſwered already, therefore I paſſe them over.
If the Heir (ſaith he) ſhould miſprove, his power is bounded by the Law, and commixed with Parliaments if he vary, the power of Parliament, the Lawes and Libertie of the Subject, are the ſame. The late King confeſſed and declared a remedie againſt Tirannie to reſide in the Parliament, there may be prevention then of the Kingdoms ruine, whatever the Heir prove, if the Kingdom be faithful to it ſelf.
Reply. But what are Parliaments, if the Prince wil not cal them, or may ſpeedily diſſolve them? Or what are Laws, if the Prince wil not keep them? Or what are the Liberties of the Subject, if the Prince wil overthrow them? As the late King gave out, He would never have anie more Parliaments. And if the Scots had not frighted and forced him, probably he would have made his ſaying good. What are al theſe, if the People be abſolutly bound to Alleg…ance, whether the Prince Rule wel or il, and muſt obey in lawful things, and be paſſive in al the reſt? And ſuppoſe they may oppoſe, Wil it not engender a War? and how that War may iſſue, who can foretel? It may be a Kingdoms Ruine: here is then but a poor Remedy, ſuch an oath then as endangers al this cannot be lawful, nor is it fit to be kept.
But he comes to examine my Third Exception againſt the Oath of Allegiance, Which is againſt ſwearing to anie one kind of Government abſolutlie wiihout admitting of a change, for a greater good and benefit, and to prevent inconvenience and hurtfulneſs, which hath been obſerved to come through ſuch a Government.
And, 1 He blames the form of arguing in theſe words;
I obſerve (ſaith he) there is a fault to be found with the whole Argument as ſomewhat tranſgreſſing the Rules of Arguing: 1 In the Conſequent, there is ſomething of the Error called Ignoratio Elenthi, for we ſwear not in the Oath of Allegiance indefinitlie or indeterminatlie to uphold one Government continuallie and not to change.
1, We ſwear onlie to his Majeſtie, his Heirs, and Succeſſors, ſo that when ever they are extinct (which may be ſooner or later as divine Providence diſpoſeth) the Oath of it ſelf ceaſeth and determineth.
Repl… …n ſwearing to Heirs, we ſwear to al that are of the blood, for the … Heirs in Law, and while any of them are alive, the oath never ceaſe…; and the blood hath laſted neer 600 yeers already, and may laſt probably enough til Doomes Day. 2 Swearing to Succeſſors (though not of bloud, though al the bloud ſhould be extinct) is a ſwearing that there ſhal be Succeſſors, and that we wil obey them; And is not this to ſwear indefinitly to uphold one kind of Government, where is then that fault, viz. Ignoratio Elenchi?
2. Notwithſtanding the Allegiance ſworn to the ſaid perſons, there is power of change in the Government left to the mutual Conſent of both parties, to wit, thoſe ſworn to, and them ſwearing, as it is in al humane Contracts and Oathes of this nature.
Reply. 1 But this man hath ſure forgotten, that which he hath often aſſerted, viz. That the Precept of Obedience to Civil Governors was without anie Condition, or reſerve of a diſingagement, or that it was due by abſolute and unalterable Rule, and without dependance upon another, and not with mutual reſpect. Which (if he have ſpoken the truth) wil be an impediment to this power of change by mutual conſent. However it be, its very palpable that he hath contradicted himſelf in his Aſſertions.
2 If the Oath be to Heirs and Succeſſors, and binding, how can he ſay, They may be diſcharged through mutual conſent from that part of it which concerns Heirs, without Contradiction again to himſelf, in reference to what he aſſerts afterwards in pag 8. His words are theſe, Is not the Fifth Commandement the Law of God? And thoſe Precepts, Rom. 13. 4. Tit. 3. 1. 1 Pet. 2. 13. Repetitions and divine Ratifications thereof? And dotl… not that Law Command everie People and Perſon Allegiance to their lawful Governors? And was not the King in Being, and his Heirs in Capacitie and Deſignation ſuch?
Thus he Diſputes againſt abſolution from the Oath of Allegiance, not only in reference to the King in Being, but alſo in reference to his Heirs in Capacity and Deſignation, as a breach of the Law of God: and yet it ſeems by mutual Conſent, the King in Being, and the People may diſpence with this Law of God, and may cut off the Heirs from Regnancy, and change the Government, and not be guilty of breaking this Law of God.
3 This grant that he makes of a power of change through conſent, is as good as nothing, for how unreaſonable wil it be to conceive, That a Perſon in Poſſeſſion of a Kingdom, wil conſent to looſe it, and alter the Government?
The Second fault he finds in the form of Arguing, is in the Minor: There is (ſaith he) ſomewhat of the fallacie called Petitio principii, namelie, That anie kind of Government granted to be lawful can prove inconvenient and hurtful to the Subjects. The Governors (indeed) may prove bad, and ſo (indeed) a change in the perſons, or a regulating of them, is the apt remedie for that hurt: but the Government is the Ordinance of God, and hath a political goodneſs ſeated in its being.
Reply. But he forgets himſelf again, and makes that to be Petitio Principii, which he had before granted; and doth afterwards grant in that compariſon which he makes betwixt ſeveral kinds of Governments, and ſeveral Callings. He had ſaid, pag. 2. in that diſtinction of the goodneſſe of means tending to the happineſſe of a Community, That it was variable in relation to times and people, and that that may be good in the nature of a means for one people or time, that is not ſo for another. And he cites out of Ariſtotle Pol. Lib. 3. theſe words, Eſt enim genus hominum naturâ varia comparatum atque affectum, aliud ſervile, aliud colendis Regibus accommodatum, aliud timo craticum & populare, atque horum generum ſuum cuique, eſt ac diſtinctum commodum. And more there is exſerted by him out of Ariſtotle to this purpoſe. And then afterwards, in comparing diverſity of Governments to diverſity of Callings, he doth by Conſequence ſpeak the ſame thing again, viz. That though al Governments be according to God, warranted in the Scriptures, and in that ſenſe Gods Ordinance, as al lawful Callings are, (for there is no difference, but what may be ſaid of the one in this reſpect, may be ſaid of the other) yet al Governments are not alike good and profitable, alike congruous and agreeable, alike ſafe and ſutable to al people; nay, there may be a comparative evilneſſe and hurtfulneſſe in ſome Governments to ſome Common-wealths; ſome Common-wealths know how to put a bridle upon Kings better then others can: and ſo it is in Callings, which is his own Compariſon, ſome Callings though good in themſelves and Gods Ordinance in the ſenſe before expreſſed, yet hurtful to ſome perſons, and pernicious alſo; and therefore to bind up to one Calling is unlawful, eſpecially when by experience it hath been found hurtful, through the unſutableneſſe thereof; and ſo it is of Governments: and ſo he cavils againſt that as not granted, which yet is granted by himſelf more then once.
Having done with the form of Arguing, he comes to conſider of the Argument it ſelf, which is, That man may change Government for his greateſt good, and muſt change it, upon experience of the hurtfulneſſe of it. And he flatly denyes it, and ſaith,
No Poſition is more Anarchical then this is.
Reply. 1 But it was neceſſary, that firſt he ſhould have done me right, and taken up my words in a right ſenſe, and then have ſhewed the Anarchie in them; but he puts a falſe ſenſe upon my words, and then diſputes againſt them. It is ſaid in the Argument, That man may change Government; he takes it up for every particular man, and then cryes out of Anarchie, but without al reaſon, for this word [man] is frequently in common phraſe of Speech, and in Scripture acception, the ſame with [men] Let not (man) prevail, is the ſame with Let not (men) prevail. Vain is the help of (man) is al one with Vain is the help of (…en) and ſo here, man is put for men. And (man) is ſometimes in Scripture put for Rulers, and the great ones amongſt men; Who art thou, that thou ſhouldeſt be afraid of a (man) that is, a man in power and authority, who is wont to be a terror unto other men; and ſo here, (man) is put for the principal Men amongſt the People, and my inference which I make from 1 Pet. 2. 13. ſhews the ſenſe in which I underſtood it as he might eaſily have conceived (if he had pleaſed) It is this, If an Ordinance of man, then man may change it; that is, If it be not expreſly commanded of God, but left to the liberty of man at the firſt, to eſtabliſh what form of Government he liketh beſt, then man, that is, ſuch men which at firſt Erected it, may change it. Now theſe are chief men choſen out of al the People (becauſe al the people cannot meet together conveniently, nor without confuſion act) and which have the peoples power, if theſe ſet up Kingly Government, they may upon experience of the hurtfulneſſe of it, change it, and eſtabliſh another, which they apprehend more ſafe and profitable: And where is the Anarchie in this Poſition or Aſſertion? And what is become of al his Diſproofs which he offers? Are they not Shafts ſhot againſt the wal, and break themſelves?
2 He himſelf confeſſeth man may change it; For doth he not ſay, That the perſons ſwearing, and the perſons ſworn to, may by mutual conſent change it? And are not theſe [man]? And is not he become Anarchical now in his own Poſition?
But let the ſtrength of his Diſproofs be weighed.
His Firſt Diſproof is from Prov. 24. 21. His words are theſe:
1, He ſaith man may change the Government, &c. but the holie Ghoſt, Prov. 24. 21. ſaith, My Son, fear thou the Lord and the King, & meddle not with them that are given to change. He alloweth a change to be for greater good: but the holie Ghoſt tels us in the next words, verſ. 22. For their Calamitie ſhal riſe ſuddenlie, and who knoweth the ruine of them both?
Reply. The ſenſe that he puts upon this Scripture is abuſive to the place, and a wronging of the holy Ghoſt therein: For the firſt words, Fear the Lord and the King, ſerve to give light to al the reſt, and the ſenſe of the after words, muſt carry reſpect unto thoſe former words, Meddle not with thoſe that are given to change: It is as if he ſhould ſay, Meddle not with thoſe that wil change the Decrees and Precepts of God and the King, and ſo neither fear God nor the King. The wife man admoniſheth that we would abſtain from the fellowſhip of thoſe which detract from the Commands of God and the King, ſpeaking evil of them, and bringing others to the contempt of them; So Ianſenius upon the place. And Wilcock, Such as varie, viz. from the Command of God and the King, agreeing together, are the perſons that are given to change. And Tremelius upon the place, underſtands it of perſons violating the Commands of God and of the King, and departing from the reverence of God and of the King, in the diſobedience of their Life and Converſation; the Calamity of ſuch ſhal riſe ſuddenly, and who knoweth the Ruine of them both? that is, of ſuch who do ſo contemn God and the King, and others who are aſſociated with them. And what is this againſt changing the Government, when it is (by the Governors breaking of Gods Laws and the Laws of the Land) become hurtful and ruinous.
2, He ſaith, If men may change for the better, and muſt change, then are all Oathes, Engagements, Promiſes of Obedience to Magiſtrates unlawful to be undertaken; for all ſuch Bonds are in relation to a preſent and particular Government the Engagers are under, and they are not for the time preſent, or for an inſtant▪, but for a future Continuance. And there is in all ſuch Engagements a making over the right, which the Engagers have in the matter Covenanted, to the perſons engaged to: either then ſuch a change may not, muſt not be; or ſuch Engagements may not, muſt not be by them undertaken. But the Scripture is cleer enough for ſuch Engagements, Eccleſ. 8. 2. 2 King. 11. 4. Ioſh. 1. 16, 17, 18. Iudg. 8. 9, 10. 2 Chron. 36. 13.
Reply. 1 All ſuch Oathes ſhould be Conditional, and then they cannot be unlawful, as hath often been ſhewed: and as for the perſons, where the chief Power reſides, viz. The Repreſentatives of the people, they ſhould never abſolutly bind their own hands in Engaging to any Governors or Magiſtrates whatever; for they ſel away the peoples Liberties, and betray their truſt in ſo doing. But they are to be the Eyes of the People, to ſpie out the wayes of the Peoples ſafety, and …elicity. No more then the preſent Parliament ought to make any abſolute Engagement to any Councel of State, but with Limitation of the good of the Subject of which they muſt be Judges: and yet it will not follow tha… ſuch an Engagement would be only for an inſtant, but it may be for long Continuance, if the good of the Subject wil permit it. And as for the People, their ſwearing ought to be with Subordination to their Truſtees which Repreſent them. There is therefore no ſtrength in the Conſequence, viz. If there be a libertie to Change, there muſt be no Engagement. There may be liberty of Change in Servants that live with ſuch Maſters, yet there may be an Engagement to them. There may be liberty of Change in people in reference to Paſtors amongſt them, and yet there may be Engaging alſo. And as for the Scriptures that are brought to prove the lawfulneſſe of Engaging they might have been ſpared; for the lawfulneſſe of it is not denyed, Provided, That ſuch Engaging be Conditional: and therefore they need no Anſwer.
3, This his Poſition not onlie diſaloweth all ſuch Engagement, but diſſolves the Natural and Moral Bond it ſelf of Dutie and Subjection to Magiſtrates; For to be free to Change when a man judgeth it beſt, is to be free when he wil; and that is, Not to be tyed at all, &c. and then a man may diſobey Commands, and take up Arms, and be exempt from the Sword of the Magiſtrate, becauſe ſuch an Oath to continue anie Government longer then he thinks it ſafe, ſaith this Doctor, is ſinful.
Reply. It is not my Poſition, but his own Fiction, that diſſolves al Government: For I have not aſſerted [but he hath imagined ſo much] That any man may be free to Change when he judgeth it beſt, but I place the power of erecting, and plucking up, and changing for the Common-wealths Good, where it ought to be of right, in the Repreſentatives of the People. As for that Title, which in ſcorn he puts upon me, I paſſe it over, knowing, That it is more his ſhame to do it, then mine to ſuffer it.
But ſaith he, I would fain have him declare what thing Magiſtracie and Subjection is.
Reply. The Apoſtle hath declared, Rom. 13. 1, &c. Tit. 3. 1. 1 Pet. 2. 13. to which I adhere: Magiſtracy is a Principallity or higher Power ordained of God, and (yet in reference to the ſpecial form of Government and the perſons holding it) choſen, and immediatly conſtituted by men, for their good; And Subjection, is the Peoples acknowledging and obeying for their own good this Principallity, to ordained of God,2 Sam. 15 20. 1 Kim. 11. 26. 1. 12. &c. Act. 5. 36. and ſo conſtituted by men.
4, He ſaith, This Doctrine wil acquit, and juſtifie all the Conſpiracies and Treaſons that ever were enterpriſed againſt the power of the Magiſtrate ſince the World was, for all will be pretended to be for the great good of the Commonwealth.
Reply. This is a great ſlander that is caſt upon this Doctrine ſo far as it is mine, for ſeeing that it only reſerves a liberty in Common-wealths, to change upon weighty Cauſes which their Repreſentatives are Judges of, and Agents in; it juſtifies no particular perſons, no… particular parties Riſings, but it may be truly ſaid, That this Doctrine cuts the comb of al Tyranny, and wil force, and conſtrain Go…ernors to a good behaviour.
But after he had ſo greatly aſperſed and vilified this Doctrine (as he cals it) which (indeed) was formed in his own heart; he approacheth ſomewhat neerer to the truth of my Aſſertion by way of Objection, but reacheth not fully the ſenſe in which I intended it; His words are theſe, But it may be ſaid, Not particular men, or a leſſer partie, are to judge of the expedi…ncie, or take in hand the change, but the whole People. And he argues againſt it thus,
1 He ſaith, Seldo…e or never doth a whole Nation under a lawful Government of themſelves, affect, or move to a Change, it is the flatterers and d…ceivers of the people that lead the people to it.
Reply. If they do not affect, and move to a Change, yet if their Repreſentatives do it, who are not (I hope, in this mans accompt) the flatterers and deceivers of the People, but the Truſ…es or t…e people for their good, the people do it in them, unleſſe they do in their Petitions generally appear againſt it.
2 How the judgement and will of the whole Bodie of the people (ſaith he) ſhould be known and declared unto execution, before particular men Act to a Change of their own private judgement, is to me a thing unimaginable.
Reply. When the whole Body of a people have entruſted certain Selected ones with their Power, their Truſtees meeting together, and holding Coreſpondence with the ſeveral Counties, and Places that Choſe them; and ſent them out in their Name, mav act for a Change for the peoples good. And is this unimaginable? Beſides, If this were not, yet the Common-wealth conſiſts of rational, ſociable Creatures, which meet at Church and Market (as the ſaying is) that is, have occaſions of the Communication of Councels; and ſo it comes to paſſe, That the apprehenſions of ſome men comes to be the Spirit of the moſt of the People, nor is there any indirectneſſe or unlawfulneſſe in this.
5, He ſaith, This neceſſitie of retaining a power in Subjects to Change, and of uſing it for a greater good, or removing of a temporal hurt, in oppoſition to an Oath ſworn againſt that Change, is directlie againſt theſe Scriptures, tying men that ſwear to their own …urt not to Change, Pſal. 15. 4. Ioſh. 9. 18, 19. and condemning thoſe that for ſuch ends have receded from their Oathes, Ezek. 17. 13. &c. Ioſh. 9. 15. compared with 2 Sam. 21. 2.
Reply. 1 Theſe Scriptures have been oft made uſe of, and often Anſwered; That in Pſal. 15. 4. ſpeaks of particular mens ſwearing for the ad…an…age and good of another, and their own diſadvantage; but ſpeaks not of things that have been, and may be pernicious; not to ſingle perſons alone, but to Common-wealths; and not profitable to any, unleſſe to ſaitsfie the luſts of ſome parricular perſons. And I would ask, Whether if a Common-wealth ſhould ſwear Succeſſion of Judges in al the Courts within it ſelf, ſhould ſuch an Oath ſtand or not? Or, whether would not ſuch an Oath, rather fal under his own Exception, That the thing ſworn to muſt be juſt and honeſt, elſe it is not obliging▪ And I would know a Reaſon wherefore it ſhould not much rather be aſſerted of the ſupream Judge▪
2 If there hath been ſuch a perpetuating Oath to any Family, yet it is Conditional while that Family carrieth it juſtly, and according to the Laws of the Kingdom: and ſo it is, That as a Family advanceth it ſelf ſometimes by vertue over the people, meriting their favour as Gideon did, and gaining their Promiſe (yea oath) that they ſhal Rule, and their Son, and their Sons Son: So a Family may by vice, diſhonour it ſelf; and loſe that favour, and be adjudged worthy to be ſleighted, and Caſhiered; yea, Cenſured and Puniſhed, as Sauls houſe came to reproach and ignominie: And an Oath, or many Oathes, would not have ſupported it, or confirmed it.
3 That Oath of Joſh. 9. 18, 19. to the Gibeonites was ratified after they knew that they were their neighbors, and after they knew that they had tranſgreſſed the Commandement of the Lord (though unwillingly) by making peace with them; and therefore if they had not had ſome ſpecial warrant from the Lord for it, it would have been in them double iniquity to have confirmed it. But its more then probable, That (being it was in Ioſhua's dayes, to whom God did much reveal himſelf, and ſeeing they had miſt it by raſhneſſe before in not enquiring at Gods mouth) they went to God about it, and had his direction in it; therefore the offence of Saul became ſo heinous, as 2 Sam. 21. 2. ſhews.
4 That in Ezek. 17. 13. &c. is not for his turn, but rather againſt him; For, 1 Nebuchadnezzar made Zedekiah King, who was not King til he made him; and ſo he was of Nebuchadnezzar's ſetting up. 2 Nebuohadnezzar took of him an Oath to be faithful, and he brake this Oath. 3 Therefore Nebuchadnezzar juſtly came againſt him, and depoſed him, and put out his eyes, and carried him to Babylon; and ſo (indeed) originally it was the Common-wealth in their Repreſentatives, make the King (for their beſt Title was from Parliament) and they take him ſworn to Rule according to the Laws, and he breaks his oath, and they declare the Common-wealth diſingaged from him, and they not not only remove him, but ſuffer not any of his Seed to Reign. Thus it appears he ſtrengthens that by Scripture which he would invalidate: Other Anſwers have been given beſides this, when this Text hath been urged, to which I refer the Reader.
6, That Poſition ſo much inſiſted upon now a-dayes, of the Peoples tower to depoſe, aboliſh, and alter the power of their Governors at pleaſure, which is actuallie ſetled, and both in it ſelf lawful, and lawfully ſet over them, I hold is a groſſe error.
Reply. I know no ſuch Poſition inſiſted on in Terminis, as he layes down; nay, I know, That al wiſe godly men do abhor ſuch a Poſition, of depoſing, aboliſhing their lawful Governors at pleaſure: But that Parliaments may do it in the Peoples Name, upon juſt, and weighty Cauſes; is aſſerted, and wil be maintained.
But ſaith he, Some of my Reaſons in ſhort are:
Reply. His Reaſons might be over-paſſed with out any anſwer, becauſe they be Reaſons of a Poſition of his own Invention, and will not be owned by them, at whom he ſtrikes at in it; yet they ſhal be conſidered of.
1, He ſaith, Such a courſe (ſuppoſing the Governors diſſent) is no other then that reſiſtance of the Ordinance of God, condemned Rom. 13. 2.
Reply. 1 This Reaſon ſuits not with the Poſition, which he undertakes to Confute, in the limitations that he gives it; For he ſaith, That the Governors muſt be lawfully ſet over, but the Governors, Rom. 13. 2. were ſet over the People by the Souldery, by the power of the Sword. And yet he ſaith, To remove ſuch (when their continuance is for the peoples hurt, without their own conſent) is a reſiſting of an Ordinance of God, which (I beleeve) when he conſidereth more ſeriouſly of, wil not appear truth in his own eyes.
2 The Text of Rom. 13. hath nothing at al to do with (neither meddleth it with) a States Changing his Governors, and altering for the better; but he requires obedience to received Governors in lawful things, while they remain Governors, and are in their Offices. I ſuppoſe he wil not deny, but that the Senate of Rome, while the power was theirs (though they obeyed Dictators, and Emperors, whilſt they continued▪ them) might yet upon juſt cauſe remove them, without falling under the guilt of reſiſting the Ordinance of God, condemned in Rom. 13. 2.
2, It is directlie oppoſue to that Subjection commanded every ſoul, that is in relation of a Subject, Rom 13. 1. 1 Pet. 2. 13.
Reply. This may receive the like Anſwer with the former; and in the inſtance of Paſtors in reference to their flocks may be morefully cleered. Is it required in Heb. 13. 17. That the People obey them that have the Rule over them in the Lord, and to ſubmit unto them: but this doth not take away their power of removing them from their Offices, upon their unworthy and un-Paſtor-like carriages; Suppoſe (to prevent controverſies) it be in a place where there is no Claſſis.
3, It the People may do it, then it muſt needs be that they have a Civil Power over their Magiſtrates which is contrarie to thoſe Scrip…ures which make the King Supream, 1 Pet. 2. 13. and call the Powers that the People are to be Subject to, Higher Powers, Rom. 13. 1. higher in relation to them, &c. And if the Magiſtrates be over the People, how are they under them, to be removed or changed by them, &c? If the Magiſtrate be under the People whom are they over? If the People be above the Magiſtrate, whom are they under, &c?
Reply. The People may be conſidered, either in Themſelves, or in their Subſtitutes and Repreſentatives; in Themſelves, and ſo they may be taken as they are a Community or Common-wealth collectively; Or diſtributively, as individual perſons and members of the Community or Common-wealth. If they be conſidered as a Community, the Root of al Civil power is in them, and they are Supream, and greater then all the individual members of them, ſo far as concerns right, but not ſo far as concerns the exerciſe of power, for that is in their Subſtitutes, and Truſtees, who have the power of the Community for the exerciſe of it. The Repreſentatives alſo may be conſidered in a two-fold Reſpect; as a Parliament and Court Collectively, and ſo they ſet up Judges, and Officers, and Magiſtrates, both the Superiour and the Inferiour, and are greater then they: Or they are conſidered ſingly, and perſonally, and as out of Courts, and as pri…ate men; and ſo they are leſſer, and inferior; to the very Officers which they themſelves in Court do make: So any Parliament-man is ſubject to inferiour Courts and the Judges thereof, as other men are. And a King, or any other Chief-Magiſtrate, or Magiſtrates, by what Title ſoever you wil cal them, may be conſidered in reference to the People, as they are a Common-wealth, Collectively; and ſo he is not Superiour, or greater then they, in the right of Power, though in the exerciſe, he is. But conſider him, in reference to any of the members ſingly, whether in Office, or Office, he is greater both in power, and in the exerciſe of it, then any other, either perſon, or party: So of the Repreſentatives, they are al Subjects ſingly and a part conſidered; and he is ſupream over them al; but Collectively conſidered, they having the power of the Common-wealth, and he ſet up by the Commonwealth, (or by them in the Common-wealths name) they are greater then he; and he himſelf in that ſenſe is but a Subject, though the principal in reference to that great authority, wherwith he is entruſted. Thus a Prince is Major ſingulis, & Minor univerſis; greater then any part, but leſſe then the whole. And (indeed) there is ſound Reaſon for it: Kings are for Common-wealths, and not Common-wealths for them; and therefore Common-wealths are greater. They are Miniſters (ſaith the Apoſtle) as to God; ſo in a ſenſe, to Common-wealths for their good: Common-wealths create them, and impower them, therefore they are leſſe then them. The Repreſentatives alſo, may be conſidered, as Sitting, and then no Magiſtrate is ſupream to them; or as not Sitting, and then the Magiſtrate, King, or other chief Governor, may be called ſupream in the exerciſe of Power, though not in the right of it.
4, The holie Ghoſt commands the People, To render Tribute, Cuſtome, Fear, Honor, not at random to the Magiſtrate, leaving them at libertie to what they pleaſe, but to whom they are due; which reſpects a determinate object, the preſent Magiſtrate.
Reply. The whole of this may be granted, for it ſerves only to prove ſubjection to the preſent Magiſtrate, but it hinders not a Change; but that if Reaſon, and the good of the Community require, one may be removed, and another ſet up in his ſtead; and he who is impowered, is to have the tribute.
5, Magiſtrates are of God, his Ordinance, and Miniſters, and Iudges for him, and his Vicegerents, Rom. 13. 24. 2 Chr. 19. 6. and therefore cannot ſtand at the meer will of the People; God muſt have a hand in their removal, as he hath in their admiſſion, or elſe it is injurious: he r…moves and admits now, not by immediate revelation, as ſometime in Iſrael, but by the rule of his Word, executed by man: He hath given a rule for the ſetting up of Magiſtrats, but where hath he given anie for their depoſing?
Reply. As Magiſtrates are Gods Ordinance, ſo they are Mans Ordinance; becauſe man determines both of the kind of Government, and doth alſo deſign the men, but alwayes, according to Gods Word: And as they are Judges for him, and his Vicegerents, ſo they are Judges for the Common-wealth and their Subſtitutes. They Judge for God, viz. His Glory: and for the People, viz. Their Good, Rom. 13. 4. And it being confeſſed, That their admiſſion and removal is not immediatly from God, but by men, according to Gods Word; it wil follow, That in that way, by which Regularly they enter into Power and Office, by that way, they may be put forth, and removed from Office: For, Eorum eſt deponere, quorum eſt ponere. And let me ſee that Rule that God hath given for ſetting up, and I doubt not, but I ſhal make the ſame Rule ſerve for putting down. Indeed, That Scripture wherein it is ſaid, That Kings, &c. are the Ordinances of Man, doth impower man, both to ſet-up, and to pul down.
6, If it were in the Peoples power to change their Magiſtrates at pleaſure, then how could it be ſuch a heinous ſin, as it is challenged to be, for the People to reject Samuels Government, & deſire, & move for a King, 1 Sam. 8. 6, 7. & 12. 17?
Reply. Samuels Government, was Gods Government; for there were Elders of the People, and Princes of the Tribes, by whom the People were ordinarily Governed; and there were Judges raiſed up by God immediatly, at certain times when they were moleſted by the Nations round about them, of which Samuel was one: Now that which God had Conſtituted, That, they might not Change, eſpecially not for a worſe, as they did, when they choſe Kingly Government after the manner of the Nations.
After al his own Reaſons againſt change of Government, he comes to weigh my Reaſon for the lawfulneſſe of Change; which was this, That though Civil Government in general be the Ordinance of God for mans good, therefore to reject it would be ſin: yet, this, or that kind of Government is not the Ordinance of God, but an Ordinance of man, and therefore man may change it. And againſt theſe words (is not the Ordinance of God, but an Ordinance of man) he bends himſelf by ſeveral Arguments to overthrow it; and yet in the iſſue he eſtabliſheth it. And becauſe my words in point of cleerneſſe were not ſo ful, he takes advantage; but yet opening that text of Peter, which I aleadge for the proof of my Aſſertion, he gives my ſenſe wherein I made uſe of it; but I ſhal ſet down his Exception in his own words:
Civil Government in the general cannot be ſaid to be Gods Ordinance, and therfore unrejectable; but this, or that kind of Government that is a legitimate, and true ſpecies of it, muſt neceſſarilie be yeelded to be Gods Ordinance and unrejectable.
Reply. When I expreſſe my ſelf in theſe words, This, or that kind of Government is not the Ordinance of God, but the Ordinance of man: my meaning was, This, or that kind of Government, is not in ſuch ſort, or ſenſe, the Ordinance of God, as Government in general is; that is, Is not by ſpecial Inſtitution impoſed upon al, or any people, as Government in general is; is not by Commandement laid upon any people to neceſſitate the receiving of it, as Government in general is: So that it cannot be ſaid of any ſpecial Government, That if a Nation, or People, receive it not, admit it not, it ſins in not doing it; as it may be ſaid of Government in general, That if any People receives it not, that People ſins in not receiving it. And becauſe I ſpeak of ſinning, in the not-admitting of the one, and not of ſinning in the not-admitting of the other; it is plain, That I meant it in the ſenſe that I have now expreſſed it. And in this ſenſe he concurs with me; his words are, Government in its ſpecial nature, is Warranted for anie People, but not Commanded, or Impoſed (as Government in general is) upon everie Nation: and he ſaith afterwards, That Peter terms Government Mans Ordinance, becauſe both the ſpecial form of Government, and the perſons holding it, are choſen, and ſo immediatly Conſtituted by man. And this is that which I aſſert: So that when I ſaid, That Government in ſpecie, was not an Ordinance of God; my meaning was, It was not an Ordinance by any ſpecial Commandment, as government in general was; it was not immediatly Conſtituted by God, but by men. God doth not ſo Inſtitute the kinds of Officers in Common-wealths, as he doth the kinds of Officers in Churches. And in this lay the ſtrength of my Reaſon; Therefore if the ſpecial kinds of Government be not Commanded by God, but choſen, and immediatlie Conſtituted by men, then they may be changed by men; Provided, That their grounds be ſufficient to bear ſuch a Change. And to this he replyeth nothing, nor diſables it at al; ſo that the Reaſon ſtands in ſtrength, and the Conſequence is firm and unſhaken; viz. That ſuch an Oath, that tends abſolutlie to uphold anie one forme of Government, is unlawful.
But he urgeth this Argument againſt my words in the ſenſe that he took them; as if I had aſſerted, That they were not the Ordinance of God at al: and ſaith thus, Whatever is predicated of the genus, or general nature; is predicated of the ſpecies, or ſpecial nature.
Reply. I appeal to the Reader, Whether he doth not herein Contradict himſelf afterwards, when he ſaith, That of the general nature of Government, it may be ſaid, That it is the Commandment of God; but of the ſpecial kind of Government (he ſaith) that it cannot be ſaid, That it is the Commandment of God, but warranted onlie by God.
There is alſo a Second Contradiction in his words, whilſt he proſecutes againſt my Expreſſion ſo earneſtly; (if my underſtanding fail me not) he ſaith in one place, That Government is Inſtituted in its ſpecial nature by God; and afterwards he ſaith, It is not Commanded by God, and that both the ſpecial forme of Government, and the perſons holding it, are immediatlie Conſtituted by men.
There is alſo a Third Contradiction (which in this bad Cauſe which he manageth) he runneth into; He had ſaid in pag. 5. The King, as King, Acts onlie by his Courts and Laws, and what he doth, beſides theſe, is the Mans not the Kings; and that things may be done againſt his perſonal Commands. Yet in this place he ſaith, The Magiſtrates, not the Government abſtractlie are called Gods Ordinance: the meaning is, The King, not King-ſhip (where Kingly Government is on foot) the perſon of the King, the Man, not the Power (as it ought to be exerciſed according to Law) is the Ordinance of God, and muſt be obeyed.
After the Conſequence, by way of Illuſtration, I expreſſed my ſelf in ſome words, concerning the heavie plague that hath been upon this Nation in Kingly Government, and of the many bleſſings that have followed the Change of it, among the United Provinces, which he takes great offence at, wherein I ſhal be juſtified by the Chronicles, that record the Reigns of the Kings of this Nation, and the plentiful experience which many thouſands living have had of the truth thereof in ſome of them. Notwithſtanding leſt I ſhould move his patience further, I ſhal forbear any further Reply. It is enough what the Parliament when the Houſe was ful, and Voted, NO more Addreſſes to be made, hath publiſhed to the World concerning the late King.
In the laſt place, in the Cloſe of the firſt Argument, he comes to conſider of the Objection which I (knowing many other would be ready to make it) both framed, and anſwered: The Objection was, Though the Oath might be unlawful to be taken, yet being taken, it ought to be kept: The Anſwer was, That if Herods Oath was unlawful to be taken, and much more unlawful to be kept, being only an Oath againſt the life of one man; then this Oath of Allegian…e (if abſolute) was not onlie unlawful to be taken, but alſo to be kept, becauſe verie dangerous to the lives, ſtate, and liberties of a Common-wealth of men.
His Anſwer hereto, in ſubſtance is this;
He cannot paralel Herods Oath and ours in the mater, wherein Herods was unlawful both in the taking and keeping. What was the matter of that? To ſhed innocent bloud: To maſſacre a guiltleſs and holie Perſon. Now what is the matter of ours? To yeeld Obediance in lawful things, to a lawful power: Is it anie more? And are not the matter of theſe two Oathes, as far unlike as light and darkneſs?
Reply. There's only this difference, That Oath was to kil directly; This conſequently: That ſpeedily and out of hand; This ſurely and undoubtedly, though uncertain in reference to the time when. For if the Oath be of abſolute obedience, to the Father, and Son, and Sons Son, and al after-Heirs, then not only active, but paſſive obedience muſt be yeelded; and if the perſon be the power, as he aſſerts from Rom. 13. 2. compared with verſ. 3, 4. (his words are theſe, The Magiſtrate, not the Government abſtractlie (are called Gods Ordinance) then the perſon may not be reſiſted in any thing, let him do what he wil; let him become a Nero, yet he may not be reſiſted, no not in his Miniſters; For his name and his authority is in them, and it is impoſſible to reſiſt them, but there wil be a reſiſting of him in them. And if this be ſo, then the Floud-gates are ſet open to al Iniquity, and corrupt men which are chief in power, and are ſecure from al oppoſition and reſiſtance, that know that they may have life and ſtate and al at their demand without contradiction, are invited to al unrighteouſneſſe and oppreſſion. Even as a graceleſſe perſon, that is in want, and knoweth that the Judge wil neither hang him, nor puniſh him, is invited to rob and ſteal: what an unrighteous Oath then is this, in the very matter of it, that tempts the Prince in ſuch ſort to al lewdneſſe and wickedneſſe, and that wil certainly, either ſooner or later, be deſtructive? And how unmeet is it to be kept? It is as it a Judge ſhould ſwear to al poor perſons that are in want, That whatever they do, he wil not queſtion them: thoſe who are good, would be good ſtill, notwithſtanding this Oath; but yet it would invite naughty minded perſons to al diſhoneſty and unrighteouſneſſe, and it would expoſe the lives and eſtates of men that have any thing, to extream danger, though it would be uncertain who the perſons are that would ſuffer, or at what time they might ſuffer violence, but they are not ſecure any moment, ſuch is the Oath of abſolute Allegiance, and ſuch an Oath as this kept, is more murtherous then the Oath of Herod.
In the Second place he comes to Conſider of the Second Poſition, viz. That the Repreſentatives of the People, (which in reaſon are the Supream power) impoſed this Oath, by an Act of Parliament, this was the Subjects free Act in their Repreſentatives, no Law of God or Nature obliging them to accept of ſuch a perſon and his Heirs, and to ſwear Allegiance to them; if therefore the Repreſentatives take away and Repeal this Act, as this Parliament hath done, they thereby ſet the Subject at liberty from ſuch Allegiance, and from their Oath binding to it, there remains no more Conſcience of it to ſuch which have taken it. Abraham that impoſed the Oath upon his Servant, might acquit him of it.
He begins with the Antecedent of this Poſition, and Notes Three things;
1 He ſaith, He ſets up a Supream power over us by Reaſon, not by Law or the Peoples Conſtitution.
Reply. Though it be by Reaſon, yet it is by Law and by the peoples Conſtitution alſo, for the People appoint their Repreſentatives, and the perſons whom they appoint, are the Parliament; and this is according to Law: And this Parliament hath the power of making Laws, and repealing them, and the King by Oath is ſworn to confirme what they conclude on, and preſent unto him; as at the beginning of the War was held out in thoſe Declarations which they put forth for the Kingdoms ſatisfaction. The Parliament then is above the King according to Law, and the peoples Conſtitution: For, he is bound up to their Concluſions which they make for the good of the Kingdom, and they are not bound up to his, yet it is according to Reaſon alſo.
But he asketh, What Reaſon? Private, or Common Reaſon?
Reply. 1 Common Reaſon ſhewes that in the mixture of Families in one Common-wealth, where there is no natural headſhip (as in one Family there hath been) there, without conſent, there can be no headſhip, or power, or Government; And thoſe that muſt Conſent, are the Root of that power or Government that comes to be amongſt them.
2 Common Reaſon ſhews alſo, That al the people that give this Conſent unto a power or powers to be over them, cannot act this power which is founded in their Conſent.
3 Common Reaſon ſhews, That thoſe whom they Subſtitute for the acting of their power in matters of Supream concernment, are the Supream power.
4 Common Reaſon ſhews, That if theſe Subſtitutes or Truſtees for the people do chuſe one Stateſman to Rule over al, or a Councel of State to do it, yet they that chuſe and ſet up ſuch perſons, are greater in power then they that are choſen.
5 Common Reaſon ſhews, That if ſuch Princes who have gotten Poſſeſſion of the Kingdom by the Sword, have yet Complyed with the Parliament to obtain a ſure Title, then the power of putting in and eſtabliſhing ſuch Chief Commanders, appertaineth to the Parliament.
But how comes it then (ſaith he) that there is ſuch variety of kinds of Supream Government?
Reply. This hath come to paſſe ſometimes becauſe the peoples Right hath been invaded by force and power, and ſo the people hath not acted freely; and ſometimes by the intereſt of ſome perſons in the people, they have been wrought up to give conſent to this or that kind of Supream Government, or it may come from the variety of apprehenſions in ſeveral Common-wealths, affecting and chuſing rather this then that kind of Government. Notwithſtanding, in thoſe Common-wealths where the people chuſe their Repreſentatives to act their power for them, Common Reaſon ſaith that ſuch Repreſentatives are the Supream power.
2 He ſaith, In citing the power that Enacted this Oath, he omitts the King and Houſe of Lords, who in the then Parliament Concurred in this Enacting, and Impoſition.
Reply. Neither King, nor Houſe of Lords had power to make a Law, that was the Prerogative of the peoples Repreſentatives, and the King muſt confirm what they did. Herein was the Repreſentative Supremacy above the other.
3 He ſaith, That although the King was then rightfully and actually Enthroned in the Regal Power and Dignitie, and both the Law, and the Oath of Supremacy obliged the People to his Heirs, yet he dares to ſay, That no Law of God or Nature obliged them to except of ſuch a Perſon and his Heirs. Is not the Fifth Commandement the Law of God and Nature? And thoſe Precepts, Rom. 13. 1. Tit. 3. 1. 1 Pet. 2. 13. Repetitions and divine Ratifications thereof?
Reply. 1 I ſpeak of things Originally as they were at firſt, himſelf ſpake a little before, That Government in the ſpecial forme of it, and the perſons holding it, was Choſen and immediatly Conſtituted by men; Where then is either Law of God or Nature, determinatively binding to it? Therefore what Right any ſuch Family hath, it was Originally by the Peoples receiving ſuch a Family, and therefore it was free and voluntary. 2 The 5 Commandement, Rom. 13. 1. Tit. 3. 1. 1 Pet. 2. 13. exalts not any Family to the Throne, nor doth require the people to accept of ſuch and ſuch a Family to be over them; but being accepted, and while continued, requires ſubjection, but no further. 3 The Kings Anceſtors came by Conqueſt, and if rightfully Enthroned in Regal Power, then the Title by Conqueſt it ſeems is good by his Aſſertion, which yet in the preſent change, I beleeve he wil not acknowledge, nor dare I grant it without the conſent of the Repreſentatives in Parliament. Ther…ore it is that Kings themſelves, when they have got the Crown by the Sword, have deſire to hold it by Conſent of Parliament, and their Acts for it. 4 What Right came Originally by Parliament, and the Acts thereof, and not by any expreſſe Law of God or Nature, cannot be an everlaſting Right, but may be with-drawn, together with al the Confirmations of it, if the Cauſes be juſt, by the ſame power that ſet it up.
But for the Conſequence, he ſaith,
It hath no Truth in it, or colour of Reaſon, nor Inference from the Antecedent. But what Reaſon ſhews he for blaſting the Conſequence, and reproaching it in ſuch ſort?
1 He ſaith, The Act cannot (for ought appears to me) be Repealed but by the ſame power that made it.
Reply. If he mean by the ſame power, the Repreſentatives in Parliament, then the ſame power that made the Act, hath Repealed it; but if he mean, by the ſame power, the King and Houſe of Lords, together with the Repreſentatives in Parliament, I have ſhewed, That the King and Houſe of Lords have no Legiſlative power at al, and that it is the Repreſentative ſole priviledge to make Laws, and the King muſt Confirme, therefore they could do it without him.
2 He ſaith, The Allegiance ſworn was not founded upon that Act, or Oath, but due before.
Reply. I have not Aſſerted, That the Allegiance is founded upon that Act or Oath, but I hold the contrary, viz That the Oath is founded upon Allegiance that was due before. But this I Aſſert, That Allegiance was never abſolutly but conditionally due: 1 While the Prince keeps his Oath in the Coronation, taken to adminiſter Juſtice. 2 While the Parliament have not declared him to have broken his Oath, and ſo that relation ceaſe betwixt him & the people, & conſequently the Allegiance to be at an end, and conſequently the Oath of it to be extinct. This is cleerly my Tenant, That while Allegiance is due to any Governor whatever, the Oath that hath been taken of it is binding, and that al perſons and powers in the World, are never able to abſolve or acquit the perſons that have taken it, from it: But yet withal this I hold, That 1 Allegiance may expire, 2 That it then expires when the Condition of it is not kept. 3 That the Parliament is the Supream power, and ſo the Judge o… this when the Condition is broken. 4 When they declare that the Condition is broken (unleſſe there be a palpable unrighteouſneſs in their Declaration) and when they by their Acts do diſcharge the people of their Allegiance, and do Repeal the Act for the Oath of Allegiance, then the people are free, firſt, of their Allegiance, and then of the Oath which they took of it. And this is that which I further hold, That the People or Common-wealth are firſtly and principally ſubject to the Parliament their Repreſentatives, for they have put their whole power into their hand, ſo far as concerns the exerciſe of it, and have put themſelves into ſubjection under them, and therefore their Allegiance is firſtly due to them, and through them to any Governor or Governors, Prince or other Magiſtrate or Magiſtrates, whom they ſhal either ſet up and entruſt with the exerciſe of Supream power when they Sit not, or whom they ſhal confirm finding in that power, when they came to Sit. Why elſe have perſons who have come to the Throne by Conqueſt, immediatly called Parliaments to ratifie and confirme their Title, which they foreſaw might be juſtly queſtioned without ſuch ratification. And in this ſenſe it is, That the Parliament it ſelf hath taken the Oath of Allegiance to Princes, not Collectively as an Houſe ſitting in power and authority of Parliament; for in that ſenſe themſelves were Supream, but as ſingle perſons and members of the Common-wealth, they themſelves are ſubject to the power that as a Parliament themſelves erect and confirm. And I alſo conceive, That hereupon there is no Allegiance to any Magiſtrate againſt the Parliament, but that the Parliament may make it void, while they remain the Peoples Repreſentatives, and continue in that place and power. As now in this Change of things, the Councel of State, is the Supream power of the Nation, at al times when there ſhal be no Parliament ſitting; but in the time of Parliament, the Parliament it ſelf is Supream, and not they. And though the perſons of al Parliament men, and al the Nation with them, ſhould ſwear Allegiance to that Councel, yet it is in, and not againſt the authority of Parliament, that they ſo ſwear; and if the Councel of State ſhould miſcarry in point of Government, and the Parliament ſhould declare them to be no Councel of State, both themſelves who in their perſons were ſworn, and al the people who have taken that Oath with them, are acquitted from it. For the Allegiance it ſelf and the Oath to confirme it, are firſt due to the higher power, who hath power over both the Councel of State (and for maleadjuration may cal them to accompt) and the people alſo, and ſo may diſcharge the one of Government, and the other of duty to them. And ſo I look upon the Parliament, as the principal party in the Oath of Allegiance to any Prince, and the Oath to the Prince is through them, and in them, and not againſt them; and ſo the Parliament (the Cauſes being juſt and weighty) have power to acquit from it▪ And in that ſenſe it was that I produced the inſtance of Abraham▪ So if a Magiſtrate ſhould … a Conſtable, to obey … is lawful Commands, according to his place; a ſuperior power to the Magiſtrate, who hath power over them both, by removing the Magiſtrate from his Truſt, abſolves the Conſtable from the Allegiance, and from his Oath alſo. And this is ſo cleer, that none can rationally deny it. Yea, he himſelf grants it, in his firſt Argument againſt my Conſequence, only he denies that this is the Caſe in Controverſie, (but it is but a bare denial) for he ſaith,
Where the impoſers are alſo the partie ſworn to, there it is granted that there may be abſolving from the Oath, or a diſpencing with it.
And this is the Caſe becauſe an Oath to an inferior power is made in and not againſt the ſuperior power, in and through whom, Duty and Allegiance is due to the inferior power, I hope then there is both Truth, and colour of Reaſon, and good inference in the Conſequence. He grants further, and ſaith,
There are Caſes wherein a ſuperiour, as a Husband, Maſter, Father, Magiſtrate, may make void the Oath of their reſpective inferior, by an Analogie or equitie of that Rule: but theſe are (ſaith he) in matters belonging to the right and power of the Superiour to diſpoſe of, as the Repreſentatives may acquit from an Oath in point of their own right.
Reply. This is the very Caſe, it is the right of the Repreſentatives to be Supream; therefore any Oath of the Subject, to any Magiſtrate, (ſuppoſe a Prince) is not againſt them, bnt in them, and they are the principal party; it is to the other in them, they may therefore abſolve from it, by taking Rule from the one, and Duty from the other, becauſe both are ſubordinate unto them, and they are principally concerned in the Oath that paſſeth betwixt them.
Thus I have endeavoured to maintain the Truth of the Poſitions: Let the Reader judge betwixtus.