The Oath of Allegiance and National Covenant Non-Obliging, Answer 1
AN ANSVVER TO A PAPER Pretending to prove the OATH of ALLEGIANCE Void, and non-Obliging: Containing TWO POSITIONS, The Subſtance whereof is Repeated in the Proceſs of this ANSWER.
THE drift of the Firſt Poſition, and the proſecution thereof, (with which I begin) is to ſhew the ſaid Oath to have been unlawful and unwarrantable in the taking of it, and ſo void in the fact, or making.
1 I ſhall premiſe for the cleering partly of what follows, That anD. Sand. de Iuram. obl. pr. 2. §. 14 Oath may be unlawful, 1 Either in regard of the matter, or thing ſworn, as if a m…n ſwear to do any impoſſible, or ſinful act. 2 Or in the Manner, or Circumſtances of ſwearing; as if a man ſwear unadviſedly, or with a falſe intention or other-wayes unduly for manner. The former way of unlawfulneſs makes an Oath void in the taking, but not the Latter: So that though a man ſwear an Oath (in ſome ſort) not in Truth, that is, not intending to be tyed to, or to keep it; or not in Judgment, that is, not conſideratly enough; yet if the Oath be in Righteouſneſs, that is, of a juſt, and lawful matter, or thing, it is of Force; otherwiſe no Oath could bind in foro externo, or be of any uſe for Confirmation, for who can diſcern with what mind another man Swears? Again, This evidently appears by the validity of that unadviſed Oath of the Princes to the Gibe…nites, Joſhu. 9. 15. 18, 19. 2 Sam. 21. 2. And of that Oath of Z…d…kiah, and his people to Nebuchadnezzar, 2 Cron. 36. 13. Ezek. 17. 13 21. 2…. which they entred into treacherouſly, Hoſ. 104.‡Annotat of …mes & Diodat. on Hoſ. 10 4.
2 I obſerve what a groſs Imputation the firſt Poſition layeth upon the King, and Parliament that framed and Ordained the Oath of Allegiance, and all other Parliaments ſince that have Continued, and the Succeſſive Houſes of Commons that have Sworn it, with thoſe multitudes of Magiſtrates, Miniſters, and of other Profeſſions in the Kingdom that have taken, and ſtill hold themſelves bound by it (having had all the while ſo much Divine and Goſpel▪ light ſhining forth to and in them) as if they had publiſhed, preſſed, taken, and juſtified (as againſt the Papiſts by writing) an Oath the matter of it unjuſt and ſinful. This man had need bring cleer Reaſons for what he here thus chargeth upon ſo many Worthyes, for place, piety, and judgment; and declare themA Lye againſt the Title, or the Title a Lye againſt this. more publickly then by a Private Paper, that he may call to Repentance the whole Nation, that is (as he ſuppoſeth) involved in this impiety of an unlawful Oath. But let us firſt by the Tryal of his Reaſons, ſee whether he hath not more need to repent of this his Charge.
His general exception againſt the lawfulneſs of the Oath is, That it is not according to the rule Jer. 4. 2. in Iudgment and in Righteouſneſs. Were it defective [in judgment] that is (in deliberatneſs of taking) that would not be (as I have ſaid) a ground to invalidate its obligation ipſo…acto: ſeeing it were but a failing in the manner, not a corruptneſs in the matter: a fault in the Perſon ſwearing, not in the Oath ſworn: and in the perſon a defect internal, or of the mind, not externally viſible in the act: and to be preſumed to be found only in ſome perſons ſwearing, not in all. That part therefore of the Allegation, were it true, might have been left out, and as often as it is brought in to prove the Oath unlawful ſo as not to bind, it addes no ſtrength to the Concluſion. But to deſcend to his particulars, 1 To manifeſt the Oath's diſagreement with the ſaid rule of Ieremiah. His firſt particular Exception is, That it ought to have been Conditional, not Abſolute; Mutual, not Single. His Argument in effect runs thus, That it may be in Iudgment and Righteouſneſs, it muſt be Conditional not Abſolute; Mutual, or taken both by Ruler, and Rulled; not Single, or taken onlie by one Partie. But this Oath is not ſo Ergo, &c. That the Reader may underſtand us both, and I may more cleerly paſs on in my Anſwer, I muſt interpoſe a diſtinction or two upon the Terms.
1 Saith he, The Oath muſt be Conditional, not Abſolute. 1 I conceive the words [Conditional, and Abſolute] may be taken, 1 Either in reference to the thing ſworn, which is Obedience, or Allegiance to the KING; thus the Oath muſt be Conditional, not Abſolute; that is, the obedience which we bind our ſelves to, muſt be with limitation, and c…ndition, reſtraining it (as all obedience to men in any relation is to be, to juſt, honeſt, lawful things, or ſo as to Conſiſt with our obedience to God; not abſolute or illimited in that ſenſe. 2 Or in reference to the tye, or obligation of the oath, as the qualification thereof; and ſo I ſay it may be Abſolute, and muſt not of neceſſity be Conditional, that is, The ſubordinate and limited obedience which is due to the Prince or Magiſtrate, I may ſwear unto abſolutely, or withour any ſpecial Condition annexed to my Engagement. Special Condition I ſay, for I muſt once again diſtinguiſh, to wit, of Conditions. 1 Some are general, and ſuch as no promiſary oath that is lawful can be without, thoſe are (I think) all of them reduced to theſe two heads, namely that the thing ſworn be Honeſt and Poſſible. Theſe Conditions are preſuppoſed, and not wont to be expreſt, and notwithſtanding the including of them an oath may be ſaid to be Abſolute. 2 Others are Special, and Proper Conditions, which are ingredients in ſome oaths, the which are (by reaſon of them) termed Conditional. They are uſually either ſomewhat that is Contingent, as when a Merchant Covenants and Swears to give an hundred pounds to another man, or to a publick Uſe, if his Ship (that is gone to Sea) return home ſafe with her Merchandize; or, that which is Arbitrary, or in the choice of mans Will, his (commonly) to whom the oath is Engaged; as if a Maſter Covenant and Swear to maintain his Servant with Meat, Drink, and ſuch Wages, if he be a true and diligent Servant to him. It is not the Former, but this Latter Conditionality which he requires in the oath of Allegiance, to wit, That the Subject be only bound to his Duty of Allegiance if, and ſo long as the Prince obſerveth his duty of Government inviolate: and this in truth is not in that oath, nor is it neceſſary to make the oath lawful. The Major therefore of this Oath-impugners Syllogiſme I deny in that firſt part of it, viz. It muſt be Conditional, not Abſolute: To make good my Denial, 1 I will Anſwer what he ſaith to prove it. 2 Bring in my Reaſons againſt it: and leave the Reader to judge betwixt us.
1 All that he ſaith for proof of that Aſſertion is this, It is againſt the ground, and reaſon of the Primitive Inſtitution of Government, which is the good of the Subject, that there ſhould be any Oath to bind him Abſolutlie, whether the Prince Rule for the Subjects good, or not. This were ſomething if it were proved, but the Reader is left either to take it upon his word, or to remain unſatisfied both of it, and the concluſion which depends upon it, if he like to do neither, let him try whether I can ſatisfie him to the contrary.
1 The Parliament that Enacted this Oath, and all ſubſequent Parliaments who were intruſted with, and moſt able (in all probability) to judge what would be for the Subjects good, and who (without all controverſie) were more ſufficient and competent Judges thereof then this man, have adjudged it not againſt, but for the Subjects good.
2 It hath conſiſted with the publick good (yea contributed to it, or els the Papiſts would not have ſo oppoſed it) from the time it was firſt ſet forth, until now, in impartial mens judgments, and no complaint hath been at all heard againſt it from the Kingdom, nor ſcarcely, if at all, from particular men, till within theſe few dayes, what the ſuppreſſing of it on the other hand will tend to, a little time may fully enough manifeſt.
3 A thing may be ſaid to be againſt the peoples good in two very far different ſenſes: 1 Either in it ſelf of its own nature, or ſimply conſidered: of this ſort are injuſtice, impunity of offences, ſedition, conſpiracy, hoſtile invaſion, and the like; ſuch things are in their own nature oppoſed to the publick good. 2 Or accidentally and contigently, thus any thing almoſt that fals under a political conſideration, and comes under the dehberation of the Law-givers, though lawful in it ſelf, and for the preſent probably, yea, or neceſſarily good for a Common-wealth, may prove in the event ſomewhat incommodious and hurtful. There is a goodneſs of the end, which is one and the ſame in all States and Governments, viz. The happineſs of the Community, and this is intended, not deliberated on, or choſen by the Law-givers: *Ac deliberamus quidem non de finibus ſed de iis quae referuntur ad fines. Ariſtot. Eth. l. 3. c. 3.And there is a goodneſs of the means tending to that end, and this is variable in relation to times and people; that may be good in the nature of a means for one people, or time, that is not ſo for another. ‡Eſt enim genus hominum natura variè comparatum atque affectum, aliud ſervile, aliud colendis regthus accommodatum; aliud Democraticum & Populare; at que horum generum ſuum cuique eſt ac diſtinctum commodum. Ariſtot. Polit. l. 3. c. 12. num. 112. Itaque manifeſtum eſt ejuſdem diſciplinae eſſe conſiderare, non ſolum quae ſit, & qualis optima Reſpublica, cujus ſtatus ſi nulla vis obſtiterit, maximè deſideretur, & optetur; ſed etiam, quae cuique congrua & conſentanea eſt, permulti enim optimam conſequi nequeunt, quare neque Legiſlator, neque is qui verè civilis habeatur, ignorare debet quae reſ…ub tam abſolutè perfecta ſit, tum pro ſtatu rerum preſaentium maximè laudanda, tum denique quae pro conditione aliqua non ſit improbanda. Idem l. 4. c. 1. num. 2. Itaque cognoſcendae erant rerum publicarum ſpecies, ac differentiae, & quot modis u…ter ſe commiſceantur, cumque haec eadem prudentia optimarum legum ſcientia & unicuique Reipub. convenientium conjungenda eſt, ad reſpublicas enim leges ſun… accommodandae non autem ad leges res ipſae publicae. Idem eodem Nu. 6. 27It is the means and its goodneſs which fals under the conſulation of the Legiſlators, and becauſe of the uncertainty thereof, they are occaſioned often to change their adviſements and laws: But by reaſon that in things which approach neer the foundation, or do conſtitute it, changes are very perillous in a State, and in thoſe things it is better to bear an inconvemency, then to run the hazard of an in̄ovation; therefore it hath been the honeſt and neceſſary wiſdome of moſt States, to ſettle them by a firmer Sanction then they uſe in other things, and to ordain a kind of immutability in them, and conſequently to ratifie them by Oaths, fore-ſeeing that no inconvenience in the Conſtitution of a Government, in it ſelf lawful and eligible, can match the miſchief of an-alteration; and therefore that the uncertain danger of that is rather to be choſen, then the inevitable miſeries of this: Such things as may by reaſon of their changeable nature prove in the iſſue ſome what diſadvantagious, may yet, if for the preſent good, and probably hopeful ſo to continue, be ſworn to abſolutly, as in voluntary Promiſes, Leagues, and Contracts, both publike and private, among all Nations hath been the practiſe, and by good Scripture-preſidents it is juſtified, ‡Gen. 47. 31. Exod. 13. 19. Joſh. 9. 15 14 9. Judg. 21. 5. 18. 15. 12. 13. 1 Sam. 14. 24. 19. 6. 20. 12. 17 1 King. 1. 13. 29. 2 Sam. 29. 23.and the reaſon is, Becauſe if any future prejudice do redound, it can be (the Obligation of the Oath remaining) at the worſt, but an outward incommodity, the which is compenſated by the avoiding of a greater evil, which the leaving of the matter free and unſecured would more certainly breed and bring. To apply all this to the caſe in hand: If any impeachment of the Subjects good can be ſuppoſed to reſult out of his ſweating to his Prince abſolutly, whether he Rule well or no, it is but accidental, and ſuch as it is, it is over-ballanced with a greater miſchief which would accrue by leaving the Subjects un-ingaged: for the ſhuning of which, the leſſer evil, to wit, the being bound to a King, though he ſhould prove a bad Governor, is to be choſen; for that, in compariſon of a greater evil, hath the conſideration of good, and is ſo eligible: It is a leſs evil for a people to be bound to a Prince that poſſibly may prove bad, then to be ſo looſe, as to be at liberty to caſt him off when they ſhall judge him to Rule ill, that is, when they pleaſe; the former doth not ſo neerly and probably tend to the ſubjects hurt as doth the latter: For, firſt, The Prince may prove juſt and vertuous. Secondly, If he degenerates, the Subject is bound to obey him actively, but in lawful things. Thirdly, In his lawleſs Acts there may be a remedy (as the puniſhment or reſiſtance of his bad inſtruments by the Parliament, without whom, though he may Will unjuſt things, yet he cannot Execute them) and yet his Government be continued. Fourthly, And ſuppoſe the caſe that there be no remedy, as when he hath got a party ſtronger then can be reſiſted, or ſubjected to puniſhment, then to caſt off his power and depoſe him (ſuppoſe it lawful to do) will be no relief, his ſtrength will command ſubjection. Fifthly, The miſcarriages of a Prince ordinarily (unleſſe it come to publick conteſtation, wherein the Subjects ſworn and unſworn, if their cauſe be juſt, and the Parliameot authorize their ſtanding up, are in the ſame capacity of reſiſtence) extend but to the detriment of ſome particular perſons, rarely doth any Nero-like, ſeek the deſtruction of the whole. But on the other hand, ſet the people free to ſhake off the reins of their preſent Government, when they ſhall think it unequal, and, 1 You deſtroy the nature of Government, as will afterwards be ſhewed. 2 You expoſe the people to an immediate loſſe of the very uſe and enjoyment of any Government, the power of mobility and change being ſure to invite al ill-diſpoſed perſons immediatly to put that power in ure, and hurry all (if they may prevail) into conſuſion. In ſhort, a bad Government is better then none; it is more tolerable for a people that one, or few, then that every man do that which is right in his own eyes. To be bound to Allegiance, may lay the people open to the former; to be looſe, will precipitate them into the latter: The former inconvenience cannot be ſo univerſally extenſive, ſpeedily deſtructive, and remedileſs, or unreſiſtible, as the latter.
2 The latter thing I premiſed, is to give my Reaſons for the contradictory to his Major Propoſition in that firſt part, It muſt be Conditional, not Abſolute: Againſt which I ſay, The oath of allegiance may be abſolute, or unconditional, in the ſenſe before given; and for this Aſſertion, I render theſe Reaſons:
1 Were there no Oath, the limited obedience which is due to Princes and Magiſtrates, is due to them abſolutly; that is, Whether they Ru…e well or no; and that which is abſolutly due, may be obſolutly ſworn; The former Propoſition I ground thus;
1 The Precept of Obedience to Civil Governors, is without any condition or reſerve of a diſingagement of the Subject in caſe of the Governors miſcarriage; reade the Fifth Commandement, and thoſe other Injunctions, Rom. 13. 1, 2, &c. Tit. 3. 1. 1 Pet. 2. 13, &c.
2 God commands his people to be ſubject to Heathen Princes, and the moſt abſolute and oppreſſive Tyrants that likely ever have ben, Jer. 27. 12. Mat. 22. 21. 1 Pet. 2. 13. I ſpeak not here of Tyrants, in regard of Title, or Right; that is, Uſurpers: but of Tyrants whoſe Title is juſt, but their Government unjuſt, and oppreſſive.
3 Servants are to be ſubject to their Maſters, not only that are good and gentle, but thoſe that are froward, and do them wrong, and from whom they ſuffer for wel-doing, 1 Pet. 2. 18, 19, 20. and by Analogy. Subjects are tyed in the ſame terms to their Governors.
4 David would not ſtretch out his hand againſt Saul upon this ground, for that he was his Maſter the King of Iſrael, and the Lords Anointed, though he was then in actual, violent, and unjuſt purſuit of his life, 1 Sam. 24. 5. &c. 26. 9. &c.
5 Otherwiſe you leave no place for paſſive obedience to pray for, and patience towards Magiſtrates in caſe of their wrong doing, and your innocency, which yet is generally acknowledged to be a duty‡Ameſ. Medula Theol. l. 1. c. 17. p. 57. Vrſin. Cat. p. 3. q. 104
6 Els you diſſolve all Magiſtracy, it will be impoſſible in mans corrupt eſtate to retain or continue any, in as much as no man, or men, can in the vaſt multitude, and difficulty of Magiſtratical affairs avoid offending every day, 2 Sam. 23. 3, 5.
7 The Doctrin of orthodox Proteſtant Divines generally is, That obedience is due (in lawful things) to the moſt degenerate, oppreſſing, and tyrannical Princes‡Calvin. Inſt. l 4 c. 20. §. 24, 25, &c. Pet. Mart. loc. C cl. 4. C. 2. §. 12. 18, 19. Alſ. Theol. C. 17. Reg. 8. Perk C. of Conſ. l. 3 c. 6. §. 1… Buc. Inſti. Theol. loc. 49. q. 21. Synop. pu…. Theol. diſ. 50. Theſ. 18. 27. Sharp. ſim. Epoch. 5. Q. 44. 45.
2 We find oaths of Allegiance in Scripture, ſworn to Princes without any Conditions inſerted, Judg. 11. 9, 10. 2 King. 11. 4. 2 Chron. 36. 13. Ezek. 17. 13. & Nehem. 10. 29. Their oath was to obſerve all the Commandements of the Lord, whereof the fifth Commandement, with application to their preſent and future Magiſtrates, was one.
3 It is a thing within our power to ſettle our Allegiance abſolutly, as well as it is within a mans power to diſpoſe of himſelf to ſervice ſo, whether his Maſter prove good, or evil, or as it is in a man or womans power to beſtow themſelves in Marriage, whether the mate be obſervant of duty, or no?
4 A Conditional oath is not conſiſtent with a neceſſary duty; obedience to Magiſtrates is no leſs arbitrary, but commanded, and that though they be bad; but now the duty being neceſſary, if you would have it ſworn with a proviſo of the Rulers performing his duty, you nulliſie the end of an Oath, which is to confirm, put out of doubt, and give ſecurity of what is due. A thing ſworn may become due, either by the rule of Equity, or by a voluntary Covenant: That which is due the latter way, if the Covenant be conditional; the Oath that is to ratifie it, may be alſo ſo far conditional, but what is due in the former kind, to wit, by abſolute and unalterable rule, or precept of Juſtice, cannot be ſworn to conditionally; for that would be no ratification to it, nay it would be a debilitating, and rendering more inſecure of that which was ſimply due without an oath, a condition being put into your oath, being a very probable medium to perſwade the ſwearer that he is no otherwayes bound to the things ſworn, then upon that Condition; which being broken by that party ſworn to, he will eaſily conceive himſelf altogether free: Thus the abſolute Rule will receive impeachment, and not ſtrength in its obligation by the conditional oath: ſuch an oath therefore is in its end inconſiſtent with it.
2 I come to the latter part of his Major which exacteth, That the Oath be mutual, or taken both by Ruler, and Ruled; not ſingle, or taken only by the ruled. Some explanation of his terms, more then is here he might have uſed; for lack whereof I ſhall as I go obſerve ſome difference of ſenſe appliable to his words, and ſo expreſſe how I deny this branch of his Poſition, and why.
1 His words ſound, as if he would have the ſame oath to be taken mutually both by Prince and Subject, which (if he remember that the oath ſpoken of, is the oath of a Subjects Allegiance, obedience, or ſubjection to be yeelded to his Sovereign, and that the King is the perſon ſworn to) he will no…, cannot I ſuppoſe, own to be his ſenſe.
2 But the apter ſenſe, and that which I ſuppoſe was in his intention, is, That the Ruler and Subject ſhould each ſwear to his reſpective duty; the Prince, That he will Command and Govern lawfully: the Subject, That he will perform all lawful homage, and obedience: And to this I ſay, Although it be true, it in fact, in our caſe, that the King hath ſworn his duty on his part, as well as the Subject doth in this oath ſwear his, yet the Propoſition is falſe in this, and it cannot be ſaid, That thus it univerſally ought of neceſſity to be betwixt every Prince & his Subjects, much leſſe can it hold that, unleſſe it be thus mutual, the Subjects oath is not in righteouſneſſe according to Jer. 4. 2. but that for want of this mutuality it is null. For,
1 We read of many undoubtedly righteous Oaths in Scripture, undertaken in Covenant betwix…s man and man, wherein one party only ſweareth, and not both mutually, Gen 24. 2. 47. 31. Exod. 13. 19. Joſh. 2. 12. 9. 15. 14. 9 Judg. 15. 12. 1 Sam. 19. 6. 1 King. 1. 13. 29. 51. 2 Sam. 19. 23. Neh. 5. 12. Jer. 38. 16.
2 We find in Scripture, Oaths of Allegiance taken by Subjects to their Rulers, without the reciprocal ſwearing of the Rulers to them ‡2 King. 11. 4. Judg. 11. 10. Ch. 36. 13 Ez. 17. 3.; ſuch was that engagement, Joſh. 1. 16, 17, 18.
3 Oaths are never to be taken but neceſſarily, that is, When not only the matter is of great weight, but it cannot otherwiſe be ſufficiently confirmed or aſſured then by Oath ‡Doctor Sanderſ. de Juram. ob. prael. 7. §. 12. Thol. ſynt. jur. l. 50. c. 3., but in ſolemn humane Covenants it comes to paſſe that ſometimes the performance lies only on one party, the other is to receive advantage, but not to do any thing: Sometimes the danger of breach lies only, or more on one part then on another: Sometimes th…re is other ſatisfactory aſſurance given beſides ſwearing: and ſometimes there is other remedy, if there ſhould be a breach, then the forfeiture of an Oath: In ſuch, and other caſes, an Oath on the one party may no… need, and conſequently is not to be exacted.
4 But ſuppoſe the caſe, that it be as neceſſary for ſecurity that the King ſwear to the people, as that they take an oath to him, yet if through overmuch credulity, or otherwiſe it be that the people do ſwear, and not the Prince, this cannot be the leaſt colour for the nullifying of the peoples Oath: For whether the King Swear or no, that which makes the Oath obliging, is, That in a juſt and poſſible matter promiſed, God is invocated as a witneſſe of the promiſe.
3 There is another ſenſe of mutual ſwearing more ſtrict then the former, and that is, when not only two parties ſwear to each other their reſpective parts, but they both ſwear with a mutual reſpect; that is, The obligation of the one party, hath a reſpct to, and a dependance on the performance of the other party: as when one man ſwears to another to give him ſo much Money for his Land; that other ſwears to convey to him his Land for ſo much Money; in this kind, the breach of the one is a releaſment to the other. And here that Adage holds good,
Frangenti fidem, fides frangatur eidem; And alſo that Rule of the Law, Fruſtra qu… fidem poſtulat ſibi ſervari ab eo, cui fidem à ſe praeſtitam ſervare recuſat.
But this ſenſe of mutual ſwearing cannot come in to be meant in our caſe: For, 1 Such an oath is plainly conditional; The one party ſwears not to give the other abſolutly, and cleerly ſo much Money, but to give him ſo much for his Land; the having of the Land then is an expreſſe condition of his oath: but the oath of the Subjects Allegiance is granted to be abſolute, and is as ſuch diſputed againſt by him here; and I have abo…e proved an oath of Allegiance cannot be Conditional. 2 The Kings cath is alſo abſolute, and binds without dependence on the Subjects loyalty; no man wil ſay (I think) that the King is diſcharged from ruling juſtly, and may become an abſolute Tyrant, if his Subjects exceed the bounds, or fail of the bonds of their oath, or duty: nay, if the Subject tranſgreſſe his duty, the King is bound by his oath to cauſe Juſtice according to the Law and Tenor of his Oath, to be done; and cannot otherwiſe eſcape violation of his Oath. 3 Such mutual oathes are entred into by both parties at the ſame time, and have their mutual reſpects expreſſed, but neither doth the King and Subjects ſwear to each other at the ſame time; neither is there any ſuch mutual reſpect mentioned, or ſo much as implyed in either of their Oathes. 4 Such mutually reſpective oathes have only place in matters arbitrary, or that are in mens choice to do, or not to do until they bind themſelves by Covenant, but ſuch are not the relative duties of Kings and Subjects, there being a divine Law obliging each to the Duties of their Offices before they ſwear.
We ſee no ſenſe imaginable of Mutual not Single wil fit this mans turn, but it wil make his Propoſition falſe, either if predicated of the oath of Allegiance at al; So doth the Firſt, and Third acception afore mentioned; or if predicated with that modus of a neceſſe eſt, ſo doth the Second. But let us hear his Reaſon for this clauſe of his Major whatever be the ſenſe of it.
It is (ſaith he) againſt Equitie and Reaſon, and the good of the Subject, that he ſhould be further, or longer bound to the Prince to ſubmit to him, then the Prince is bound to the Subject to Rule wel, and adminiſter juſtice rightlie. Grant al this, and it wil no way follow; Therefore the Oath of Allegiance to make it righteous muſt be mutual, in any ſenſe: for the Prince may be bound, and that as long to his part, as the Subject is to his, (and ſo he is, and it is impoſſible to be otherwiſe for Prince and Subject; his tye to Rule in Juſtice, and his to Obey in juſt things are relatives, and do infer neceſſarily each other) to wit, by the tye of Scripture, Conſcience, and poſitive Laws, and yet not be ſworn at al.
His Major being thus (I hope) fully Refuted, I need not to take notice of his Conſequences, as he cals them, but in a word I ſhal touch on them.
The Firſt is nothing but a Hypothetical Repetition of ſome part of the Major Propoſition, which I have been ſo long in diſproving: If the Oath of Allegiance were in judgement and righteouſneſſe, the King was as ſtronglie bound to the Subjects, as any of them to him: This therefore I paſſe by, as the ſame that was ſaid before, and no Conſequence from it.
The Second is, Then if he break his Oath, al the Subjects are abſolved if they wil. This Conſequence I deny: I have I think, fully made it cleer before, That the Oath of Allegiance taken by the Subject is abſolute, not depending upon any thing to be performed by the King, whether ſworn, or not ſworn; and that it could not have been otherwiſe. And though the King and People have each ſworn their duties mutually, yet not withSee Doct. Sanderſ. de Juram. ob. prael. 4. §. 8. a mutual reſpect, by vertue whereof a breach on one ſide might be a diſcharge on the other, and that neither the tenor of their Oaths hold forth any ſuch thing, neither is the matter of them capable thereof, being neceſſary, not arbitrary.
The Third is, Then at what time the King Levied War againſt his Subjects, they were diſcharged by that breach of Oath in him of their Allegiance. This is a Conſequence of the former Conſequence, and ſtands or fals with it: That therefore being Anſwered and Diſproved, this vaniſheth.
The Fourth thing is no Conſequence, but a Reaſon of the two laſt Conſequences, and in method of arguing is therefore an antecedent to prove them, it is thus, Elſe the whole Parliament and their partie were perjured perſons, ſo manie of them as have taken this Oath, and are Rebels in taking up Armes againſt the King.
Firſt, If their taking up of Arms againſt the King (as he terms it) were Rebellion, their abſolution from their Oathes (were it ſo indeed) by the Kings breach of his, could not unmake, or make it no Rebellion; for the debt of Obedience is exiſtent in the Subject before any Oath taking, and it is not founded on ſwearing, but only confirmed by it, and therefore ſurvives after the pretended diſſolution of it; and conſequently makes that taking up of Armes which would have been (if the Oath had not been (as he ſuppoſeth) nullified) Rebellion nevertheleſſe.
Secondly, We muſt therefore ſay, as the Parliamentarian party hath beleeved, declared, and in many Treatiſes in Print, maintained al along the late Wars, That the Armes of the Parliament were not againſt any brance of the Subjects Allegiance, or the Oath for it (which they profeſſed ſtil to perſiſt in, yea, and in the act of their Armes bearing, Covenanted to yeeld and maintain) but concordant with the ſame. In as much as they enterprized not againſt the Kings Perſon, his State, or Government, they went not againſt his Majeſty, his Heirs, or Succeſſors, they joyned not againſt his Crown and Dignity, the Rights whereof, and the Bounds of the Subjects Obedience, are prefixed by the Lawes of the Realm, the ultimate interpretation whereof, is in the Parliament which declared their Arms to be for, and agreeable to the Laws. The King, as King, acts only by his Courts and Laws, what he doth beſides, or againſt theſe, is the mans, not the Kings acting. What is done by Order of the Courts of Juſtice, and by vertue of the Laws, is done (though againſt his perſonal preſence or command, yet) for the King, his Crown, and Dignity.
2 His next Exception againſt the Oath of Allegiance is, That it is an unlawful Oath, in that it is ſworn to the Kings Heirs: His Reaſon for this Exception proceeds thus,
Who knoweth (as Eccleſ. 2. 19.) whether he will be a wiſe man, or a fool; a juſt, or a …ricked man, and Tyrant? Now if no man know this, then to ſwear to an Heir, is not an Oath in judgment, nor is it righteous: for the Subject may bind himſelf to his own hurt, yea ruine.
Conſequence. Then the Oath of Allegiance was in that branch, that reſpected Heirs, an unlawful Oath, &c.
I admit of the Antecedent, but utterly deny the Conſequence.
1 For the whole Conſequence, I Anſwer;
1 This inference is directly contrary to that which Solomon in the place cited, Eccleſ. 2. 19. makes from the words. Solomons is, Yet ſhall he have Rule over all my labours wherein I have laboured, and wherein I have ſhewed my ſelf wiſe under the Sun. This mans inference is (in effect) becauſe no man knows whether he wil be a wiſe man, or a fool; therefore he ſhal not have Rule, &c. that is, We muſt not Engage beforehand that he ſhal Rule, while it is uncertain what he wil prove: though Solomon ſaith, Notwithſtanding that is uncertain, yet he ſhal have Rule.
2 The ſame Reaſon (if it held) would lie againſt any Oath, or Engagement to any Rulers in being whatſoever they are; for ſay they be come to maturity, and for the paſt and preſent time have given proof; yet who knows what they that are now wiſe, and juſt (morally) may hereafter come to be? The Scripture ſuppoſeth, That not only a juſt Father may have a wicked Son, but a righteous man (in profeſſion and external carriage) may turn from his righteouſneſſe, and commit iniquity, Ezek. 18. 24. Neroes Quinqu…nnium of Reigning wel is generally known, the good beginnings of …eaſh, and Vzziah, 2 Chron. 23, 24, and 26. and therefore degeneracies are ſufficient inſtances of the lubricity of men in authority. Yea it is wel known how fearfully Solomon himſelf with Aſa, 1 King. 11. 2 Chron 16. and others, fel in divers particulars of a groſſe nature; if we muſt firſt know, and ſwear afterwards, we muſt never ſwear to any promiſſorily.
3 This Conſequence (were it of force) would equally condemn in general al promiſſory Oathes, and other Covenants, and Engagements, betwixt man, and man; for it cannot be fore-ſeen in any, what the perſons contracted with wil prove; or whether the Covenant wil be beneficial, ot hurtful; and in particular, the Laws and Sanctions of thoſe Nations in al ages, which have ſettled ſucceſſive Regality, or any other Government, …or longer then the preſent poſſeſſors of the power endure, which yet is a way, not only more generally approved, and practiſed, then any other of viciſſitudinary Election, but warranted by the word of God. Iſrael offered a ſucceſſive power to Gideon, Judg. 8. 22. and God himſelf inſtituted, and bound the People to a lineal Government in David and his ſeed, 2 Sam. 12. 15. 2 Chron. 13. 5. The Patriarchal power (which was political) was ſucceſſive, and could not have been caſt off at pleaſure: ſo was the Government of the Jewiſh Nation, f…r about an hundred yeers in the lineage of the Macca…ees.
4 We have Scripture examples (of an uncontroverted integrity) of Oathes, and Engagements to Princes and their Heirs; and to Princes in their yong, unripe, and untryed yeers: Take for inſtance that of Abrahams ſwearing to Abimelech King of Gerar, his Son, and Sons Son, 1 Chr. 23. 29. 22. 29. 1. 22 5. & that of Davids making Solomon King in his own life time, and engaging the people to him when he was yet yong and tender; and that of JEHOJADAHS, and the Peoples making Ioaſh King, and ſwearing to him when he was but ſeven yeers old, 2 King. 11. 4. 22.
2 For the two parts of the CONSEQUENCE in ſeveral.
1 The Oath is not in judgment, becauſe no man knows what the Heir will prove.
I ſay, 1 It may be in Judgment ſo far as a future contigency can be deliberated on: and this may be concluded on adviſedly (as morally certain) that it's better to have the Crown ſettled in a line, whereby ſometimes a vicious perſon may be advanced, then to have it under Election at every perſonal change. This hath been the experimented maxime of the wiſeſt States ‡Minore diſcrimine ſumi princip. m quā quaeri. Tacit. H. lib. 2.. 2 If it were not in Judgment, this defect makes not an oath Unlawful, as to the nullifying of it. A raſh oath, if of a lawful thing binds (Judg. 21. 7. 15. 1 Sam. 14. 24. 37. Joſh. 9. 14. 15. as before was proved.
2 Nor is it a righteous Oath, for the Subject may bind himſelf to his own hurt, yea ruine.
1 Though the Subject may not bind himſelf to what is neceſſarily, or at the time of his ſwearing may appear probably to tend to his hurt, or ruine, yet he may ſwear (intending the publick good) to that which is of a mutual nature, and may in the event turn to his own hurt, and ruine; and might he not ſo ſwear, yet having ſo ſworn, he is bound to ſtand to his Oath, Pſal. 15. 4. Ioſh. 9. 15. Ezek. 17. 13. 1 Sam. 14. 26. 28. 37. Judg. 21. 5. 15. 18. which is contradictory to what this man here ſaith.
2 If the Heir ſhould miſprove, his power is bounded by the Law, and commixed with the Parliaments: If he vary, the power of Parliament, the Laws and Liberties of the Subject are the ſame. The late King confeſſed and declared a remedy againſt Tyranny to reſide in the Parliament; there may be a prevention then of the Subjects ruine (whatever the Heir prove) if the KINGDOME be faithful to it ſelf.
3 His Third Exception againſt the Oath as unlawful, and void, is, That it is to uphold one kind of Government for continuance, and in a conſtant way without changing. His Argument to make good this Exception, proceeds thus,
If of the ſeveral kinds of Government, all are not equally good, nor ſutable to all People: And man may change the Government he is under for his own greateſt good and benefit, and muſt change it when he hath proved any kind of Government inconvenient and hurtful, and muſt not uphold any one kind of Government longer then it continues to be moſt ſafe and profitable; then to ſwear to uphold any one Government continually and conſtantly, and not to change it, is ſinful; and in Righteouſneſs and Judgment may not be done. But of the ſeveral kinds of Government, all are not equally good, nor ſutable to all people, and man may change the Government he is under for his own greateſt good and benefit, and muſt change it, when he hath proved any kind of Government inconvenient and hurtful; and muſt not uphold any one kind of Government longer then it continues to be moſt ſafe and profitable. Ergo,
For Anſwer hereunto,
Firſt, I obſerve there is a fault to be found with the whole Argument, as ſomewhat tranſgreſſing the rules of arguing.
1 In the Conſequence there is ſomething of the error called Ignoratio Elenchi; for we ſwear not in the Oath of Allegiance, indefinitly or indeterminatly as his words import, to uphold one Government continually, and not to change.
Firſt, We ſwear only to His Majeſty, his Heirs, and Succeſſors: ſo that when ever they are al extinct, (which may be ſooner or later, as divine Providence diſpoſeth) the Oath of it ſelf ceaſeth and determines.
Secondly, Notwithſtanding the Allegiance ſworn to the ſaid perſons, their Crown and Dignity, there is power of change in the Government left to the mutual conſent of both parties; to wit, Thoſe ſworn to, and them ſwearing, as it is in al humane Contracts and OathsAlſ. Theol. Caſ. C. 15. Reg. 2. of this nature ‡.
2 In the Minor there is ſomewhat of the fallacy called petitio principii, namely, That any kind of Government, granted to be lawful, can prove inconvenient and hurtful to the Subjects. The Governors indeed may prove bad and noxious, and ſo the Government comes to be abuſed; but a perniciouſneſſe cannot therefore be charged upon the Government it ſelf, nor can that be a neceſſary ground for the change of Government: if ſo, you wil bring in a ground for endleſſe Mutations; a change in the perſons, or a regulating of them, is the apt remedy for that hurt: but the Government, the abſtract or eſſence of the thing, never can prove hurtful, becauſe it is an Ordinance of God for mans good, Rom. 13. 12. 4. and that in ſpecie, as afterwards wil be ſhewed, and as a Go…ernment it hath a political goodneſſe ſeated in its being, by the unchangable Law of Nature.
Secondly, But admit the Argument were not peccant in form, yet the Aſſumption in the main of it, which is, That man may change the Government he is under for his own greateſt good, and muſt change it when he hath proved anie Government inconvenient and hurtful, and muſt not uphold anie one Government longer then it continues moſt ſafe and profitable; I muſt flatly deny. What Poſition more Anarchical could be delivered? For the diſproof, I offer thus,
1 He ſaith, Man may change the Government, &c. but the holy Ghoſt ſaith, Prov. 24. 21. My Son, fear thou the Lord and the King, and meddle not with them that are given to change: He alloweth a change to be for greater good; but the holy Ghoſt tels us in the next words, Verſ. 22. For their Calamitie ſhall riſe ſuddenlie, and who knoweth the Ruine of them …oth?
2 If men may change for the better, and muſt change upon a ſuppoſed hurt, then all Oathes, Engagements, or Promiſes of Obedience, Allegiance, or Fidelity to Magiſtrates, are unlawful to be undertaken; for al ſuch Bonds, are in relation to a preſent, and particular Government, the Engagers are under: And they are not for the time preſent, or for an inſtant, but for a future Continuance. And there is in al ſuch Engagements, a making over of the Right which the Engagers have in the matter Covenanted, to the perſons Engaged to; according to that known Rule, Omne promiſſum cadit in debitum: either then ſuch a change to be made by the perſons under Authority may not, muſt not be; or ſuch Engagements may not, muſt not be by them undertaken: The former imports a power and duty inherent in the Subjects to reſerve in themſelves a liberty to alter, and to practiſe it when they judge it convenient: The latter ſpeaks a binding out from any ſuch deed, and an abandoning of any ſuch Right; but the Scripture is cleer enough for ſuch Engagements, Eccleſ. 8. 2. 2 King. 11. 4. Joſh. 1. 16, 17, 18 Judg. 8. 9, 10. 2 Chron. 36. 13.
Thirdly, This Poſition not only diſalows all ſuch Engagements, but diſſolves the natural, or moral bond it ſelf of duty, and ſubjection to Magiſtrates, for to be free to change when a man judgeth it beſt, is to be free when he wil, and that is not to be tyed at al; by this means any man is diſingaged from ſubjection, both in foro interno, & externo, when he wil ſay, He thinks the preſent Government not ſafe or profitable, or another to be better; and having ſo reſolved, he is abſolved: He may now diſobey the Commands, ſtand our againſt the Judgements, take up Arms againſt the Perſon and Authority, and be exempt from the Sword of the Magiſtrate: yea, although he have ſworn, or ſubſcribed Allegiance: becauſe ſuch an Oath, or Promiſe (ſaith this Doctor) was ſinful, not in righteouſneſſe: But I would fain have him declare, What thing Magiſtracy, and what Subjection is.
Fourthly, This Doctrine wil acquit, and juſtifie al the Conſpiracies, and Treaſons, that ever were enterprized againſt the power of the Magiſtrate ſince the World was. Was not the Conſpiracy of Abſolem, 2 Sam. 1… 1 Kin. 11 2…. 12. 1. &c. Act. 5. 36.and that of Sheba againſt David? Was not the Rebellion of Ieroboam againſt Solomon, and Rehoboam? Were not the Seditions of Thendas and Iudas the Gaulonite againſt Caeſar? Were not al the Treaſons againſt MAGISTRACY that ever have been, attempted for the p…rties (yea for the Publique) greater good, as the Conſpirators judged?
If it be ſaid, That not particular men or a leſſe party are to judge the expediency, and take in hand the change, but the whole people. Beſides that, the people under Authority collectively taken have no ſuch power (as I intend preſently to ſhew) it may be ſaid.
1 Seldome or never doth a whole Nation under a lawful Government of themſelves affect or move to a change, it is the flatterers, and deceivers of the people ‡ ordinarily that deſire and miſlead the people toforeign Ariſt. poli. lib. 5. c. 5. it.
2 How the Judgement and Will of the whole Body of a People ſhould be known and declared unto Execution before particular men act to a change of their own private judgement, to me is a thing unimaginable.
Fifthly, This neceſſity of retaining a power in Subjects to change, and of uſing it for a greater good, or removal of a temporal hurt, in oppoſition to an Oath ſworn againſt that change, is directly againſt the Scriptures, tying men, that ſwear to their own hurt, not to change, Pſal. 15. 4. Joſh. 9. 18, 19. and condemning thoſe that for ſuch ends have receded from their Oathes, Ezek. 17. 13, &c. Joſh. 9. 15. compared with 2 Sam. 21. 2.
Sixthly, That Poſition ſo much now adayes inſiſted on of the Peoples Power to depoſe, aboliſh, and alter the power of their Governors at pleaſure, which is actually ſetled, and both in it ſelf lawful, and lawfully ſet over them, I hold is a groſſe error.
Some of my Reaſons in ſhort are,
Firſt, Such a courſe (ſuppoſing the Governors Diſſent to it al along) is no other then that reſiſtance of the Ordinance of God, condemned, Rom. 13. 2.
Secondly, It is directly oppoſite to that Subjection commanded every Soul that is in the relation of a Subject, Rom. 13. 1. and that 2 Pet. 2. 13.
Thirdly, If the People may do it, then it muſt needs be that they have a Civil power and authority over their Magiſtrates; which is contrary to thoſe Scriptures which make the King Supream, and cal the power which the people are ſubject to, The higher Powers; higher in relation to them, who are below, and put in ſubjection to them, 1 Pet. 2. 13. Rom. 13. 1. And indeed, if the People have a power over their Magiſtrates to judge, or diſplace them, How are the Magiſtrates their Superiors, and Rulers? The ſame perſons cannot be under, and over others in the ſame kind of order or power. If the Magiſtrates be under the People, whom are they over? If the People be above the Magiſtrates, whom are they under?
Fourthly, The holy Ghoſt commands the People to render Tribute, Cuſtome, Fear, Honor▪ (not at random to a Magiſtracy leaving them at liberty to what they pleaſe, but) to whom they are due; they are a debt then, which reſpecteth a determinate object, the preſent Magiſtrate. No Debtor can pay a Debt by transfering it from one to another, or giving what he oweth to another beſides the proprietor.
Fifthly, Magiſtrares are of God, his Ordinance and Miniſters, and they are Judges for him as his Vicegerents, Rom. 13. 1, 2. 4. 2 Chr. 19. 6. and therefore cannot ſtand at the meer wil of the People. God muſt have a hand in their removal, as he hath in their admiſſion; or elſe it is injurious: he removes, and admits now, but not by immediate revelation (as ſometimes in Iſrael) but by the rule of his Word, executed by man, He hath given a Rule for the ſetting up of Magiſtrates, but where hath he given any for their depoſing?
Sixthly. If it were in the Peoples power to change at pleaſure their Magiſtracy, then how could it be ſuch a heinous ſin as it is challenged to be for the people to reject Samuels Government, and deſire and mo…e for a King, 1 Sam. …. 6, 7, 8. 12. 17?
But let us next …ear what he alledgeth for this his Aſſertion of Mutability.
He ſaith, Though Civil Government in general be an Ordin…nce of God tending to mans good, therefore to reject it would be ſinful, yet this or that kind of Government is not an Ordinance of God, but an Ordinance of man, 1 Pet. 2. 13. and if an Ordinance of man, then man may change it, &c.
1 Civil Government in the general cannot be ſaid to be Gods Ordinance, and therefore unrejectable; but this, or that kind of Government, that is a legitimate & true ſpecies of it, muſt neceſſarily be yeelded to be alſo Gods Ordinance, and unrejectable; for it is a ſure rule, whatſoever is directly and per ſe ſaid of the genus, or general nature, muſt be alſo ſaid of the ſpecies, or particular kind: And again, the whole nature of the genus, or general, is conteined in every Species, or kind‡Quicquid predicatur de praedicato praedicetur de ſubjecto, Reg. 1. foreign. Tota natura generis continetur in una quaque ſpecie.
2 The Apoſtle cannot be taken to ſpeak of power in general only, and abſtractly, but muſt be underſto…d diſtributively of al lawful powers in their ſpecial kinds: When he ſaith, There is no power but of God; the powers that be, are ordained of God: whoſoever therefore reſiſteth the power, reſiſteth the Ordinance of God, Rom. 13. 1, 2. He that ſhal ſay of this or that kind of lawful Government, as of Monarchy, it is not of God, it is not the Ordinance of God; ſpeaks direct contradictories to the holy Ghoſt here. No Subjects obedience, to this or that Government he is under, could be urged upon him by vertue of this reaſon, There is no power but of God, &c, if this, or that kind of Government were not of God, and were not his Ordinances.
3 And for his diſcretive, but an Ordinance of man, it is no inference of the former, therefore not the Ordinance of God. For this, or that Government, is both an ordinance of God in Pauls ſtile, and an ordinance of man in Peters; and you cannot ſay theſe two Apoſtles ſpeak of Government in two different wayes; the former in general, the latter in particular: for as I have proved, Paul muſt be taken of particular kinds. So it is cleer, Peter ſpeaks firſt in general, Submit your ſelves to everie Ordinance of man, &c. and then in particular, Whether it be to the King as Supream, or unto Governors, &c. this, or that Government, Paul cals an Ordinance of God.
1 In that it is inſtituted in its ſpecial nature by God, and warranted for any people, but not commanded or impoſed (as Government in the general is) upon every Nation. For it is with Governments in relation to Nations, as with Callings, in relation to Perſons: every man muſt have a Calling, but it is diſtribu…ively this, or that, or the other; al are not neceſſarily to have this one, 1 Cor. 7. 7. 17.
2 In that it is inveſted in the particular perſons by God, when they are called to the Government according to his Rule, though he doth not point them out immediatly by his own finger, but immediatly by men. In like manner as they are the Miniſters of Chriſt in the Church that are Called according to his appointment, though men in the ſame office ordain them And in this regard, the Magiſtrates (not the Government abſtractly) are called Gods Ordinance, Rom. 13. 2. compared with 3, and 4. Peter terms it mans ordinance, either becauſe both the ſpecial form of Government, and the perſons holding it are choſen, and ſo immediatly Conſtituted by men. Or rather becauſe it is converſant about humane affairs, and mans benefit. Not as if it were invented by, and had its original from men, for ſo it is of God. As Expoſitors interpret and compare that place of Peter with the other of Paul ‡Beza. Marlor. Divin…s Annotat. D…odat.And that Peter excludes not, but taketh in the divine authoriration to that Government he treats of, is evident; in that he willeth ſubmiſſion to it, for the Lords ſake. How for his ſake, if it be not his Ordinance?
Having thus anſwered the Premiſes of his Sylogiſm, and what he brings to back the Aſſumption withal. His Conſequence or Concluſion following goes to the ground, and the lawfulneſſe of the oath of Allegiance remains unſhaken. But he, as his manner is, amplifies his Conſequence with matters altogether inconſequential, and independant on the Premiſes.
1 He ſaith, Who knoweth not what a plague this kind of Government (viz. Kinglie) hath been to this Nation? And that the moſt of our Kings have been Tyrants? I am one that knows not theſe things, but judge the contrary, and wil be tryed by the Experience, and Voice of this Nation. And in the mean while, I requeſt him to try theſe his words by the Scriptures following, 2 Pet. 2. 10, 11, 12. Jude 8, 9, 10. And to take heed of the Verdict, and Ju…gement therein given upon Governmentblaſphemers.
2 Who knows not what a Bleſſing the Change of Government hath brought to the Vnited Provinces? I am ſure this man knows not, neither can ſay, If thoſe Provinces excel in Bleſſings, that they are brought by a Change of their lawful Government, conſidering what Solomon obſerved of old, Eccleſ. 8. 14. 9. 1, 2. concerning the diſproportion of Wordly ſucceſs to mens wayes; and the inevidence of the goodneſſe, or badneſſe of perſons, and actions if eſtimated by events. Which every mans experience can ſecond.
Whether thoſe Provinees have changed or recovered their Government; or whether they yet ſtand but as our Parliament did with the late King in the firſt War, defending, and demanding the Security of their juſt Priviledges with the Sword in their hand, I leave him further to conſider: and I aſſure him this, There have been obſervations great ſtore of Gods Judgements upon thoſe that have rebelled againſt, caſt off, or murdered their lawful Governors gathered by worthy men ‡Theatre of Gods judgments by D. Beard and Doct. Taylor, lib. 2. chap. 2, 3, 4, 5.. But I never before met with any, that made obſervations of divine bleſſings upon any of thoſe acts.
Thus far his EXCEPTIONS by way of proof of his firſt Poſition goes.
He in the cloſe makes one Objection againſt himſelf, and gi…es his Anſwer to it thus;
Objection. Suppoſe there was ſome unlawfulneſs in the taking ſuch Oathes, yet is there not a neceſſitie of keeping them being taken?
Anſwer. If Herods Oath againſt the life of one man, being unrighteous and cruel, was ſinfullie taken, and more ſinfullie kept, then theſe of Allegiance which are abſolute, not Conditional, &c. and which are to uphold Monarchie, the woful fruits whereof ſeeing they are dangerous, and may prove, as often they have done, deſtructive to the lives of manie men; they are not onlie unlawful to be taken, but to be kept.
Not granting any unlawfulneſſe in the taking of this Oath, having (I hope) made good its innocency againſt al that hath been ſaid; yet ſuppoſe I had made this Objection, I would not take this Anſwer. My Reaſon is,
He cannot paralel Herods Oath and ours in the matter wherein Herods was unlawful both in the taking and keeping. What was that? to ſhed innocent bloud, to maſſacre a guiltleſſe and holy Perſon. What was ours? To yeeld obedience in lawful things, to a lawful power. Is it any more? and are not the matters of theſe two Oathes as far unlike as light and darkneſſe? That which he heaps np to aggra…a…e our O… to the height of the unrighteouſneſſe of Herods, is nothing but the three exceptions which al this while I ha…e been Anſwering, and therefore ſhal content myſelf with what hath been ſaid to them; only in the cloſe, he tels us,
Monarchy is dangerous, and may, as often it hath, prove deſtructive to the lives of many men, and therefore its unlawful to ſwear, or keep the upholding of it.
This is nothing but what may be as truly ſaid of any kind of Government, how lawful ſoever: none that hath been as much practiſed as it, can be affirmed to have been leſſe deſtructive▪ or to be leſſe dangerous then it. But the poſſiblity of being, or experience of having been abuſed, is no valid Reaſon why a Government may not be upheld; (if it be, down muſt al Governments fal) and if yet it may be upheld, to ſwear to uphold it, may be an Oath lawful for the matter; and if it cannot in that reſpect be made a Crime, it deſerves not to be paraleld with Herods▪ Oath. What paralel in point of unrighteouſnes Herods keeping his oath, and others violating theirs; his execution, and theirs, may have; it is not to my pu…poſe in hand to ſhew.
I have done with his Firſt Poſition, and pr…ceed to his Second, which is this,
Suppoſe the Oath of Allegiance to be Lawful, yet the Subject is now abſolved from it by th…m that have power to abſolve from it.
This Poſition of a power in any to abſolve from a lawful Oath is new (as far as I have read, or heard) among Proteſtants, and hath until now been accounted by Papiſts, the Popes and Prelates Prerogative; by us, their Anti-chriſtian preſumption.
But let us ſee where, and upon what ground he builds ſuch a power:
Reaſon. Becauſe Repreſentatives of the People, which in reaſon are the Supream power, impoſed this Oath by an Act of Parliament, this was the Subjects free Act in their Repreſentatives, no Law of God or Nature obliging them to accept of ſuch a Perſon, and his Heirs, and to ſwear Allegiance to them. If therfore the Repreſentatives take away, and repeal this Act (as this Parliament hath done) they thereby ſet the Subjects at libertie from ſuch Allegiance, and from their Oath binding to it, there remains no more Conſcience of it to ſuch as have taken it: Abraham that impoſed the Oath upon his Servant, might acquit him of it, &c.
Firſt, For the Antecedent, I ſhal only note;
1 He ſets up a Supream power over us by Reaſon, not by Law, or the Peoples Conſtitution: and this Reaſon is not the Nations, but, 1 Either his own private judgement, and if that may create a Supre…m power to him, then every ot…er private mans Reaſon is to ſet up one to him▪ even where there is one already, over the people he is of. 2 Or it is the Common Reaſon that is in all men naturally: and if ſo, how comes it to paſſe, That there is ſo much variety of Kinds of Supream Government, and that Repreſentatives have it not in all times and Nations; yea that ſcarce they ever had it?
2 That in citing the power that Enacted this Oath, he omits the King, and Houſe or Lords, who in the then Parliament concu…ed in this Enacting, and Impoſition.
3 That although the King then was rightſully and actually Enthroned in the Regal power and Dignity, and both the Law, and the Oath of Supremacy obliged the people to him and his Heirs; yet he dares to ſay, No Law of God, or Nature, obliged them to accept of ſuch a Perſon and his Heirs. Is not the Fifth Commandement the Law of God, and Nature? and thoſe Precepts, Rom. 13. 1. Tit. 3. 1. 1 Pet. 2. 13. Repe…ions, and divine Ratifications thereof? And doth not that Law command every people and perſon Allegiance to their particular lawful Governors▪ and was not the King in Being, his Heirs in Capacity, and deſignaton ſuch▪
Secondly, But for the Conſequent there is no Truth in it, nor colour of Reaſon; or inference from the Anteceden… for it. Beſides, That the act cannot (for ought appears to me) be Repealed, but by the ſame power that made it: and the Allegiance ſworn was not founded upon the Act or Oath, but due, and paid before them both. The Oath in its own words terms it ſelf a Recognition and Acknowledgement; and the firſt words of it are,
I A. B. Do trulie and ſincerelie acknowledge, profeſs, teſtifie, and declare in my Conſcience before God and the World, That King James is lawful King of this Realm, &c.
Suppoſe the Repreſentatives to be the Supream power, that the Impoſing of this Oath was their Sole Act, and the Subjects in them, and that they did it voluntarily or unobliged to it: doth it thence follow. The Repreſentatives repealing that Act, the Subjects that upon their Enacting ſwore it, are now abſolved from their Allegiance, and from the Oath▪
1 They that have power to impoſe an Oath were never ſaid (many Divintty extant) to have power eo ipſo to abſolve from it, when the impoſers are alſo the party ſworn to, there it is granted (both by Proteſtant‡ Doct. Sanderſ. de juram. oblig. prael. 7. §. 8. Theoloſ Syntag. juris, l. 50. c. 12. and Papiſts ‡) they have power to releaſe from the Oath, not becauſe they are the impoſers, but becauſe they are the party ſworn to, for omnis qui promittit ſacit jus alteri, cui eſt facta promiſſio, the right of the thing ſworn is theirs to whom the Oath is made, and therefore they may releaſe from it; and this is …e true ground of that power he ſuppoſeth in Abraham to acquit his Servant, not his being the impoſer of his Oath: but where the impoſers are a Third party from the perſons ſwearing, and ſworn to, there they have no claim of power of Relaxation. And thus the caſe is here, The Repreſentatives (as he faith) impoſe the Oath, which is ſworn to the King, and bind in Allegiance to him. If they that impoſe an Oath, may Releaſe from it, then may any Court or Magiſtrate Releaſe a Juror or Examinate from the Oath they have gi…en him; then it a man impoſe an Oath upon himſelf (as in ſome caſes he may) he may abſolve himſelf when he wil from it, though he therein obliged himſelf to God, or another man. And this is truly the caſe here, as he himſelf ſtates it; The Subjects by their own act in their Repreſentatives impoſe this Oath, and by their own perſonal act ſwear i…, and after by their own …ctin their Repreſentatives abſolve themſelves i….
2 The Repeal of the act, is no Repeal or diſſolution of the Oath; the Parliament that framed, and by their act impoſed the Oath, did not thereby make it an Oath, but it was the Subjects ſwearing which made it an Oath, and an Obligation or Religion to him▪ as the Miniſters rehearſing and dictating the words of Marriage to the Couple Marrying each other, makes not the Marriage, but the parties themſelves declaring in thoſe words. And as the Clerk in a Court reciting the words of a Jurors Oath to him makes not the Oath, but the Jurors aſſent to it. The Parliament can conjoyn, or puniſh the refuſal, or manifeſt breach of an Oath. But a promiſſory Oath being the act and Covenant of him that ſwears, and a part of divine Worſhip, the bond of Conſcience upon the ſwearer, and the validity of Gods Ordinance, and the Obligation that is therein entred into unto God, as the invocated witneſſe, and judge, cannot be within the Parliaments authority to nullifie in al Subjects Oathes which may be made with, or without their impoſition. There are caſes indeed, wherein a ſuperior, as a Husband, Maſter, Father, Magiſtrate, may make void the Oath of their reſpective inferior by ANALOGY, or equity of that Rule, Numb. 30. but thoſe are, 1 In matters that are belonging to the Right, or Power of the Superior to diſpoſe of; as the Repreſentatives may acquit from an Oath in point of their owne Right ‡Animadvertendum tamen eſt penes …os non eſſe facultatem reſcindendi quod libet jus jurandum ſubditorum ſed illud duntaxat cujus materia eſt eorum▪ poteſtati ſubjecta. Alſted. Theol. Caſ. Cap. 15. Reg. 2.But the Allegiance in this Oath ſworn is none of theirs, but the Kings, and therefore ſworn to him by the Subjects, and in particular by them. 2 By that Law Numb. 30. the Superior may interpoſe to nullifie his Inferiors Oath made without his knowledge and conſent, and that muſt be done in the day that he hears of it; but there is no further power given by that Law in the matter of Oathes. Now in this our Caſe, the Repreſentatives have been ſo far from being ignorant of the making of this Oath, and diſalowing it as ſoon as it was know to them, that they were the Compoſers and Commanders of it; yea, and have taken it themſelves. Let any the leaſt Warrant, yea or Preſident be brought for Releaſing an Oath in this Caſe, and I ſhal ſit down.
Laſtly, For a Cloſe of my Anſwer unto this Poſition, I ſhal obſerve what the Tenor of this Oath hath in it:
I do beleeve, and in Conſcience am reſolved, That neither the Pope, nor any Perſon whatſoever hath power to abſolve me of this Oath, or any part thereof. And do renounce all Pardons and Diſpenſations to the contrary.
This is not the Swearers Declaration only, but the Parliaments in Compiling, and Impoſing this Oath, and al Repreſentatives have perſonally thus declared in taking it. Shal we beleeve them concerning their power in this matter, or this man?
That which follows is no proof of the Poſition, nor any thing to the validity of the Oath.
FINIS.