Of Peace and Contentment of Mind, Book 3 · Chapter 2
CHAP. II. Entry into the diſcourſe of Paſſions.
MY end is to bring Paſſions under the obedience of right reaſon, not to deſcribe exactly their nature. A task where Naturaliſts come ſhort of performance; And no wonder, ſince they take a ſubject in hand where reaſon ſeeth nothing, as if one would make an Anatomie in the darke; for in nothing is our ſoul ſo blind as in the compoſure of herſelfe: Yea the trueſt natural contemplation of Paſſions is of no great uſe to governe them: What doth it concern him that ſtudyeth the moderation and the right uſe of Paſſions to know that Joy comes by dilatation of the ſpirits, Sadneſſe by contraction of the ſame, Love by diffuſion, Hope by elevation? For my part becauſe I ſeeke utility, I will be more carefull to finde the morall counſels by which Paſſions are moderated, then the natural wayes by which they are moved. And if in the following diſcourſe of Paſſions I keepe not exactly the order and number received in the Schooles, or treate of ſome mixt Paſſion among the ſimple, it will not be out of ſingularity, but becauſe I underſtand not perfectly thoſe diſtinctions.
The firſt thing to be conſidered about Paſſion is whether we muſt have any, or utterly deſtroy it, as the Stoicians and Epicureans would do. This queſtion, whether we may have Paſſion with vertue, is as if one asked whether there may be wooll with cloth, for Paſſion is the ſtuffe of Vertue, and Vertue is but a paſſion wiſely moderated: If there were no Paſſion there would be no vertue. If then the Paſſion be ſick, it muſt be healed, not ſlaine, and much leſſe muſt it be ſlaine when it is in health leſt it fall ſick.
It may be ſayd for the Philoſophers that would cut off or rather root out Paſſion, that it is an errour that doth little harme: for man being naturally too paſſionate we muſt pull to the contrary extreme to bring him to a vertuous moderation; for after we have rooted it out as much as may be, there will remaine ſtill too much of it.
Beaſts have alſo their Paſſions, and by them men are allyed with beaſts. But the Appetite of the beaſt is meerly ſenſual, the appetite of man is partly ſenſual partly intellectual. Paſſions may be marſhalled into three orders, according to the three principall faculties of the ſoul; The inferiour order is of them that are onelyonly in the ſenſitive Appetite, and have their motions for the body onelyonly, as hunger and thirſt; Over theſe reaſon hath leſſe power, for ſhe cannot perſwade him that is hungry not to be ſo, but ſhe may retard the ſatisfaction of the appetite.
Other Paſſions are lodged in a higher ſtorie, and ſeeme to be ſeated in the Imagination, as the Paſſion that one hath for curioſities and images of perfection increaſed by the deſire. Theſe are more capable to be ruled by reaſon.
The third and higheſt order is of intellectual paſſions, as the love of learning and contemplation. Theſe are more immediately in the power of reaſon. It is the part of reaſon to forme and moderate thoſe paſſions which are meerely under her juriſdiction, and keepe a ſhort bridle to thoſe paſſions that are moved without her leave, by nature, chance, or fancy.
As in a well governed kingdome all is done by the King, the faculties of the ſoul muſt be kept in ſuch order that within us all be done by Reaſon: When that Soveraine is wiſe and well obeyed, peace is in the inward State of man. But when the Soveraine is made ſubject to his natural Subjects, the ſenſual Paſſions; then the ſoule is like a body with the heeles upward, and the whole policy of the mind is turned upſide downe.
Being to ſpeake of the Paſſions as the winds that ſtirre and toſſe that inward ſea of the ſoule, I muſt alſo ſpeake of the Vertues that ſerve to repreſſe them. Not to treate of each ſeverally and prolixely, but to bring them to action, and to miniſter to every Paſſion its proper remedy.