Of Saving Faith, Section 3
SECT. III.
YOur first Reason for my Opinion (pretended against it) is long ago agreed to: Nay, see the height of our Agreement: I have over and over expressed my consent to this part of your Reason, in which you know how currantly the schoolmen and our own Divines are against you, viz. [That the Acts of common Grace in the unregenerate, are not so much as Evangelically good.] But yet that I seem not to hold what I do not, I must add, that I mean that they have not that Moral goodness, which in the first and most proper sense deserves that Denomination; but yet that they are, not only less evil, nor only materially good; but also that they are properly good, secundum quid, & in tantum, and that they have such an Analogical goodness, as Accidents have an entity: which is not Nothing: And though they may all be called sin, yet they have somewhat in them that is better then sin: or else you were to blame for calling them common Grace: yea, I doubt not but such Acts as you say are but splendida peccata, have had from God a temporal Reward; yea and have been preparatory to the Reception of saving Grace. Some Duties God requireth of the unregenerate, as a means to their Regeneration, which some of them do perform. And though he Accept them not so far as to esteem them either conditions of Justification, or Properties of the justified, yet so far doth he Accept them, as that ordinarily he judgeth and useth them as fitter for saving Grace then others. If they could do nothing towards their own sanctification, God and his Ministers would have spared many words that are used to them. And if there were no more likelyhood that they should find Grace in Hearing, Reading, consideration, Asking it, &c. then in doing nothing, or plunging themselves in sin, we would say less to them then we do, to put them on such means. I hope you will not differ from me in this.
Page 332. The explication of my mind, you call a Confession, and so confess [that upon evident Reason, I confess that the Acts of common and special Grace, as they are morally considered, differ specifically, and not only gradually.] So that if the Reader believe either you or me, we are agreed in the decision of the Queston it self. And then I can easily excuse the opposition of a profest Consenter, though I understand not the intent of it.
But you say that [When the Question is put, how common and special Graces differ? the Answer must ever be Affirmative, that they differ specie, non gradu solùm.] Answ. 1. I thought that Question [How common and special Graces differ?] Had not been capable of an Affirmation or Negation: But if my thoughts were improper, I submit. 2. I am confident that in sense, I shall here also agree with you, whether you will or no.
1. If the Question be put in your terms, I confess my opinion was, that the Answer should be applied to the comprehensiveness of the Question, and I should say that [They differ formally thus, & quasi materially, thus and thus] and so speak to both. But if 2. the Question had been, [Whether common and special Grace do differ specifically.] I should alwaies affirm it (supposing but such a specifick difference, as between substance and Accident, or an Egg and a Bird, or an Embrio and a Beast, remembring that omne simile est etiam dissimile, least I be misinterpreted.) For when we speak of a moral subject, we must suppose the Question simply put, to be morally meant according to the nature of the subject: which are my very words in several published writings. And I think verily that this is all you mean. 3. But this was nothing to my Question, which was [Whether materially, or by a physical specification, common and special Grace do differ.] And this I did deny, and thought a gradual difference enough, supposing the Acts in both persons to be such as go commonly under the same name, and have at least substantially the same object (as to believe the Promise, Christ, &c.) Now I apprehended that if you had put the Question to me. [How man and beast differ quoad Corpus, or quoad animam sensitivam, &c.] the answer must not be the same as if you had simply askt me, how man and beast differ.] Had I been askt, [Whether the Love of a suiter and of a Husband differ specifically as to the matter?] I should have said, No (nor perhaps gradually;) but yet formally, in a civil moral sence, they differ specifically, (yet I know heres greater difference in the matter in our case). Had I been askt [Whether the reverence and heart-subjection, which I have to a Captain and to the General, to a Justice of Peace, Lieutenant, &c. and to the Soveraign, do differ specifically quoad materiam:] I should have said No, but gradually. But yet quoad formam civilem, they differ specifically? Yet I am ready to let go these expressions when you will; I must profess, a word under your hand would have caused me to disuse them, without this publick work that you are put upon. Do but tell me you dislike the phrases, and you shall never hear (without such Necessity as I expect not) that ever I will publickly use them more. I hate troubling the Church with contending for meer words at least, unless I were better at wording my conceptions then I am.
But stay, I find my self already under the Obligation: Pag. 333. You plainly say, [that if in their moral consideration, they still differ specifically from common Graces, it can never with any congruity be affirmed, that in any other consideration, they differ only gradually?] Strange! Why so? [For instance, when its said that in their Natural and Physical consideration, they differ only in Degree; I Reply, that the Acts of the Will and Ʋnderstanding in that consideration are not saving Graces at all.] You have silenced me, when I have done with this account of my Dissent, though you have not convinced me, (having as great advantage as most men living to have done it, in my esteem of your great abilities.) 1. If this Reason be good, then I must speak of nothing but the form of any Being; nor may I congruously mention any material or Accidental difference. For they are not denominated from matter or Accidents. May I not say that a Crow and an Ousel are of one colour, because that quâ colorati they are not denominated such. May I not say that a Swan and a sheep quoad colorem do differ only gradually, though quoad colorem they are not a Swan or sheep? May not say, that materially a Ship and a Barge do differ but gradually, because ex materia they are not a Ship or Barge? Or that materially a Dagger and a sword do differ but gradually, because that ex materia they are not called a sword or dagger? I am not yet convinced of these things; but for your sake I purpose to say no more of it publickly.
You add, [And therefore if it be granted that in that consideration they differ only Gradually, yet it will not thence follow, that common and special Graces differ only in Degree.] Answ. Very true: because this is an Assertion of them simply considered, and formally, and not limited ad materiam. But if you will grant that materially they differ but in Degree, you grant my Proposition in terminis (as to that much.)
I rather suspect that when the business is well opened, the Difference will be between me and most that are offended with me, [whether indeed they materially differ so much as in degree? And they will say, that a Lower Degree may consist with the true Form: And then men will see that it is their bringing Grace materially lower then I do, and not their advancing it formally higher that is our Difference. Sure that Reverend Doctor that hath already opposed me in this Point, doth harp upon that string. But I could wish they would let this be plainly understood: I think not saving Grace materially so Low a thing as they: and formally I think it as high as they do. But let such understand that it is towards the same object, that the Acts, must be compared, and not as exercised on different objests. A wicked man may have a clearer knowledge of earthly things then a true Christian hath of God and Heaven; but not so intense, and powerful, effectual a knowledge of God and Heaven as a Christian hath: so for Belief, Desire, Love, &c.
You add [This Argument, common and special Belief as they are Physically considered, differ only, gradually: therefore common and special Graces differ only gradually] in plain English, is no more then this, [Things which are no Graces at all differ only gradually; therefore common and special Graces differ only in Degree.]
Answ. But the conclusion is yours and not mine; or equally renounced by you and me: My Proposition was, that [materially they differ but in Degree.] And in plain English, thats no such thing as you make it of your own pleasure; but this much [Those things which in respect to the Precept are called Duties; and in respect to the Promise are called Conditions, do yet materially d…ffer but in Degree.] Or [those gracious Acts which have Analogically the form of Duties, and so of Graces, but not the Form of Conditions, that is, saving Graces do yet materially differ but in Degree from those that have that Form.] This was the true sence of my Proposition. And whereas I put [as saving] into it, it was but to express that it was Grace as saving, (respecting the Promise) and not Grace as meer duty (respecting the bare Precept) whose material Difference I enquired after. Only I think that there is a certain Degree of the Physical Act of Necessity to make it the matter of such a Form. For it will dwell in no other matter. Against this the late Opponents seem to make a lower Degree of matter capable: And those that formerly I was wont to converse with, did think that a higher sort of matter was Necessary, of whom I spoke after that Proposition: of which more anon about infused Grace.