Of Saving Faith, Section 2
SECT. 2.
Page 1. HE tells us, 1. That he believes the difference to be more then gradual, and so said I. [2. And that my discourse doth not concludingly evince the contrary;] nor did it ever pretend it: Thus far we are agreed.
Pag 2. (i. e. 332.) He saith that [To prove that common and special Grace do differ only gradually, I reason,] as followeth. But I never asserted such a thing, and therefore never reasoned for it. It was but overlooking the terms [Materially,] and [Physical specifications;] and some such like, that caused this mistake.
Here is culled out those words of mine, that were easiliest mistaken, and several considerations added. As to the first, we are agreed that the Question is not of Grace, as it is in God, but in us, or of gracious acts as of us. But my weakness was such, That, 1. I thought, as a presupposed, thing to meet with some that insisted on the name, I might have mentioned exclusively this Grace which this Reverend Brother excludeth, as I did. 2. I thought that Amor Complacentiae vel acceptatio divina, had denominatione extrinseca been capable of a gradation; and that as truly, as we say, God loveth one man, and hateth another, and that he loveth him converted, whom he (so) loved not unconverted, (amore complacentiae, & acceptationis) as truly might we say, that he loveth (with that love) a holier & more heavenly upright man, above a scandalous weak Believer, that hath the least goodness, and the most sin that is consistent with sincerity. But I am resolved so far to stope to the learning of this Reverend man, as not to maintain this opinion against him (though I may not be cured of such conceits so soon as he desireth.)
As to his second Consid. pag. 323. We are fully agreed, that Grace is foreign, and that if ever Titius and Sempronius had Grace, it was not in order of Nature, till after they were men. But I confess I think still, that Grace to Adam was not aliquid naturae superadditum, unless you confine the word Nature to his meer faculties, as distinct from, those right Dispositions, which were natural to them, though separable.
In his third Conclusion, he receits some of my words [Our Ʋnderstandings and Wils are physcially the same, &c. and faith that, [This Assertion as 'tis here expressed, is evidently untrue; for our Ʋnderstandings and Wils, are so far from being the some in specie, &c.] Still we are agreed whether he will or no. But did I write this false Assertion? yes, all saving one word, yea a sillable, which is easily overlookt. And 2. The false meaning which the adjoined words do justifie it from; being speaking of the Matter of saving and common Grace, I thought it not impertinent to mention it as a common Concession, that all of us agree in; [That common knowledge and special common belief; and specially agree in this general Nature, that both are real knowledge and belief; and that our Understandings and Wills are all Physically the same, and that they agree in the general nature of an Act, yea such as (substantially at least) have the same Object.] These are the haynous words, or the fruits of my greatest weakness it seems, that it is manifested in that discourse now here. 1. This most learned Author did both. Pag. 322. and pag. 324. still leave out the word [All,] (that's but a sillable.) And 2. The more easily feigneth that I speak of the understanding and Will, of the same person, contrary to the drift and plain expressions of the discourse which treats of the difference between the Grace of the regenerate and unregenerate: Because I saw this exact Disputant leave out the word [All] more then once or twice, I was willing to have found that in some one Impression the Printer had omitted it: but I am frustrated of that conciliatory excuse, finding it in the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh Impressions (which were all: For that discourse was not in the first.) But yet I have one excuse: Perhaps the Reverend Confuter never reads the Book, but received these passages transcribed by his Scholar, that may be more prone and willing to mistake. And if I had said, that the said faculties are but formaliter, vel denominatione extrinseca, distinct from the soul, and from each other, he very well knows what great store of company I had had, and that of the highest foorms in the scools which might have put some honor on a person so inconsiderable as I: and every man of the third form, that calls the difference reall, is not in love with the notion of a specificke difference, though commonly they agree: But this is nothing to our Debate.
Page 325. He saith, That [this makes nothing to the present purpose, nor any way proves that common and saving Grace differ not specifically.]
Answ. …ill we are agreed, whether he will or no: Though it make not to the purpose, it may be mentioned exclusively, or as a common concession, presupposed to the purpose as himself here innocently mentioneth it: and if it will not prove that there is no Difference, it will shew here that the Difference is not.
But he saith, It is wholly impertinent, &c.]
Answ. 1. See all you that are adversaries to the honor of our Unity, that we are so far from disagreeing in Articles of faith, that we will not suffer so much as an Impertinency in one another without a reprehension. 2. I am sorry for an Impertinency, but I am glad that it is not false. 3. Its imperpertinent to your purpose, but not to mine.
Once for all, this was my reason of these passages. 1. I knew by long experience, abundance of people that credibly and confidently professed to have some real undisembled desires to be sober, and yet lived in drunkenness; and to be godly, and yet had little of it in their practise, and to have a Love to the godly, (and truly would do and suffer somewhat for them, but yet loved the world and themselves so much better, that they would be at no great cost or danger for them: such a Love they profest to Christ himself, and a credible profession they made of a true dogmatical belief. And these men were many of them deeply possessed by mistaking our Divines, that the least true (or real) desire after Christ or Grace, was saving Grace it self, and would certainly prove that the person should be saved, so that some of them that lived in ordinary drunkenness for many years, would after they had been drunk cry out of their sin, and be ready to rear their hair, and profess themselves unworthy to come among Christians; and yet still would profess that they were confident of pardon by the blood of Christ, because they were as certain as that they lived, that they hated their sin as sin, and desired to be godly, and could wish themselves in the state of the best, and did believe all the word of God to be true, because it is God's that cannot lie, and had felt experimentally the sweetness and power of it on their hearts, and did trust on Christ alone for Salvation. I do not feign this, but have found it in old and common Drunkards, and such like, for many & many years together. Now the work that I had to do with these persons was to convince them that such good desires as are habitually, and in ordinary practice conquered by fleshly, worldly desires, will never prove the soul to be sanctified: and such a Belief as is conquered by unbelief or sensuality, will never prove a man to be justified; and such a love to God and the godly, as is conquered by a greater love to carnal felf, and the world, may stand with a state of condemnation. O but say they, we are certain that we dissemble not; These desires, Belief, Love, &c. we have. Should I say, that they lie, and have none such, they would never believe me, nor should I believe my self, because I believe the Scripture, and the credible Professions of men. I conclude therefore they have that such acts as they affirm, and that they are Analogically good (in moral sense,) and come from the common Grace of Christ: but that besides the Reality of these acts, they must have them in such a predominant degree, as is suited in its Essentials to the Object, and will overcome their contraries in the main bent of heart and life, and prove predominant habits in the soul, before they can hence conclude that they are sanctified: Where note, that the men that I speak of, trie not their acts by a sutableness to the object in its relative perfections, nor do they once know, or at lest consider of the moral respective formality of these Graces; but look all at the Act as it is exercised on God, Christ, Scripture, Saints, substantially considered, or if considered as Good, True, &c. yet not effectually apprehended as the chief good, most certain necessary Truth, &c. So that it is the substance or matter (as its commonly called) of their Belief, Love, Desire, &c. That our question with such men is about: And therefore my business with them was to shew them what it is in the Matter and Substance of these Acts that is necessary to prove them formally, specifically saving, viz. that besides the right conceptions of the object, the act must be in such a prevalent Degree, as will prove a predominant Habit in the soul; and that such uneffectual Actsas are before described, may stand with a state of condemnation. Hereupon it is, that though Grace is specified and to be denominated from its moral form; yet my business led me to prove that this moral form was inconsistent with any degree of the physical Act, but what was ordinarily thus prevalent or predominant: And therefore to asert that this moral form did lie in a physical degree of the matter, and that a lower subdued degree of the Act, was matter uncapable of such a form, though it was capable of the general Nature of (an Analogical at lest) Vertue, Duty or moral Good, denominated from some answerableness to the Precept, (at lest sacundum quid) yet it was not capable of the special form of that Faith, Love, Desire, &c. to which God hath promised Salvation, as the Condition.
Reader, Once more I have as plainly given then my meaning as I can speak: Forgive, me these Repetitions, and consider the occasion. So that you see, this Learned, Reverend man doth build all his opposition on a meer mistake, supposing me to speak of the Form, who spoke only of the Nature of the Act, or the Physical Matter, (as before expressed.) And now I make thee the Judge of my Impertinences.
The same answer serves to his fourth Consid. and his [quid hoc ad Iphicli Boves,] (who have been so long in the yoak that they are ready to lie down:) and to his Question [Will it hence follow that all Belief, &c. are specifically the same?] Answ. No. We are here agreed too: But it is no such new thing to call either our faculties the subject matter of the Acts, or the Acts the Matter of our Grace, but that I might pardonably suppose, that I might meet with some such silly soul as would use such a notion: and if it will but follow, that [In this much, there is no physical specifick d…fference] It serveth my ends.
Page 327. Consid. 5. He again receiteth the same passage, that [The Ʋnderstanding and Will-are physically the same.] And again, The third time leaves out All, when I said, Our Ʋnderstandings and Will are physically all the same: which more perswades me that he never read the Book which he confutes, but took his scholars transcript, and see still our happy Agreement. The charge here is but [impropriety and incongruity.] (And I heard ere now from one of his scholars, that I could scarce speak congruously.) but I would I could have spoken Intelligibly. But I am glad that I spoke not falsely. The first Incongruity or Impropriety is, that I call all our understandings and wills [like substances] when they are but Accidents.] But 1. An Act is but an Accident, and yet what more common phrase, then substantia Actus, when we distinguish it from the Moral Form. Read first his own Exercitation, de malo. and then judge. 2. I ventured long ago to tell him, my Reconcileableness to the Scotists Nominals &c. and that I made it no Article of my faith; that the faculties are Really distinct from the soul, and then they may be substances. For I am of their mind that think the soul is not a meer Accident. And if all the Rabbies of that mind in the Popish schooles have no Authority, I may modestly say with one of our highest Foorm at home [Quod Phylosophantur voluntatem & intellectum, esse duas Potentias reipsâ distinctas, dogma Philosophicum est, ab omnibus haudreceptum, & Theologicis dogmatibus, firmandis aut infirmandis, fundamentum minimè idoneum. Davenant Determ. Q 37. pag. 166.]
My next incongruity is, that I say they are of [like substance] having said that they are Physically the same. Answ. Had I said that they are Numerically the same, and yet [of like natures] I had spoke incongruously. But O that I were as wise or Learned a man as they that ordinarily call a spec…fick un…ty by the name of [a likeness;] if the Latine [similes] fit them not, yet the English [Like] may. For our [Like] in English is most ordinarily extended to express [a species] (But think not that I am teaching you English, but excusing my incongruities as far as is meet.) And if all this will not do, I will try to prevent your n…xt work in this kind, by shewing you what a discourageing task is before you. If you will but write upon all the improprieties of my writings, it may put you to such a voluminous toyl, as may make you repent it before you have done, and make your Reader think me some worthy learned man, whose very improper speeches deserve the observation of so eminent a man.
3. You next grant me that our several Understandings and Will, are not specifically distinct,) so far still we are Agreed. But you say [it follows not but their Acts may.] still we are Agreed. And in N. 5. and 6. you say, that [they do not only gradually differ,] still we are Agreed, even in your instances.
Pag. 329. Your sixth Consid. reciteth my opinion as you thought, but indeed not mine, viz. [that the difference is only gradual, and not specifical.] Again you leave out [materially] and the other limiting expressions: And why did I say, [You thought th…s mine] When pag. 332. You confess the contrary is mine.
Yet here let me tell you once for all, that if my terms of [a Physical spec…fication] on the reason given of that Name, be judged by you improper (which I yet find you not affirm) I am resolved not to defend them against you, but am ready with thankfulness to learn a fitter manner of expression, as verily believing my self to be fitter to be your scholar, then your Antagonist in Philosophy, especially the terms.