A Holy Commonwealth, Chapter 7

A Holy Commonwealth · Chapter 7

p. 121CHAP. VII. Of the Foundation efficient and conveying causes of Power.

THes. 121. There is no Governing Power but what is from God the Absolute Universal Lord and Soveraign.

1. All Beings besides the first, must have a fountain and beginning: and therefore so must Power. But it can have no Beginning but from God; nor can any other be the fountain, or first cause, therefore it is from God. Man is not the first cause of his own being: therefore not of his Power.

2. Moreover we have no natural Power, called Strength, but from God; therefore we can have no Civil Power, called Authority, or Right of Governing, but from God: Eor we can no more have one without him, then the other.

3. To ascribe Power to any other as the first efficient cause, then God, is to make more Gods then one; for that which hath a independent underived Power, and is the first cause, is God. And if this be ascribed to any creature, it is an Idolatrous deifying of that Creature.

4. It belongeth to the absolute Lord and Soveraign to be the fountain of all inferiour Power: But God is the absolute Universal Lord and Soveraign, therefore, &c,

p. 1225. The Holy Scripture seconds the Light and Law of nature in this and tells us, that [There is no Power but of God, the Powers that be, are ordained of God: whosoever therefore resisteth the Power, resisteth the Ordinance of God, Rom. 13. 1, 2. And verse 4. [He is the Minister of God to thee for good,—He is the Minister of God, a Revenger, to execute wrath upon him that doth evil.] It is Authority, that foreign which is Jus regendi, that the Apostle here speaketh of, and not meer strength.

It is therefore Treason against the God of heaven, for any man or Angel to pretend to a Power that is not derived from him, who is the Cause of Causes, and Original of Power.

Thes. 122. Every earthly Soveraign therefore is an Officer of God, receiving his power from him as his highest Soveraign, and being obliged to use it for him, being himself but a subordinate Soveraign of a part of the Universal Kingdom.

In the fore-cited Text, the Roman Emperors (as its commonly judged by Commentators) are called [The Ministers of God.] All higher Powers are so called, I am sure▪ And he that is foreign, and a…ointed to attend on this very work, is doubtless an Officer of God, and as such to be esteemed.

2. They that deny the prince to be Gods Officer, rob him of that Beam of divine Excellency, which is the highest part of all his Dignity, from whence Princes have been called Metaphorically p. 123Gods. The least beam of Majesty derived from God, hath greater splendor then all the world as from it self is able to communicate. To make a Free-man a slave, is not so great an abatement, as to make a Prince that is an Officer of God, to be meerly a terrestrial Animal.

3. They that deny Princes to be Gods Officers, do tempt them to be Traitors, both in denying the derivation of their Power from their Soveraign, and in denying to use it to his service and honour. The end must be no higher then the beginning: If God be not the efficient, he need not be made the end of Magistrates Power: By which you may see, that there cannot be a more unreasonable, impious, and traiterous Opinion divulged among the sons of men, then that Magistrates have not their Power from God, as his Officers: for it is to deny God to be God.

4. Moreover, if this Opinion were true, then people need not obey their Magistrates as Gods Officers, and so would abate the cheif part of their Reverence to them, and their Obedience would be but meerly humane, and not participatively divine.

5. And thence it would follow, that no punishment is due from God to the Disobeyers of Magistrates: For if God appoint them not, he will not punish us for not obeying them: for his Sanction is affixed to his own Laws. But we are commanded to obey them, not onelyonly for wrath, but for conscience sake, Rom. 13. 5, 6, 7.

Thes. 123. The fifth Commandment is therefore placed as between the first and second Table, as being partly a Command of our Duty to God in his Officers, and p. 124partly the first Command of our Duty to men, even to the men that are most highly dignified by the Communication of that beam of Authority from God.

We commonly place the fifth Commandment in the second Table: but some of the antient Doctors of the Church did place it in the first, as commanding our Duty to Rulers, not as men, but as the Officers of God: and so each Table had five Commandments. Me thinks it is according to the infinite Wisdom of God, placed so between both, as that it should be left dubious to us, which of them it belongs to, as participating of both in its nature. And some think, that part of it was written on the first Table of stone, and part on the second. But certainly Power is a Ray from God.

Thes. 124. Our principal search then must be to find out the line of Derivation, how, and by what means this Power is conveyed from God. And to that end, we must enquire what he hath done himself as part of his Universal standing Law, and what he hath left to be done, with variations according to the difference of times, and places, and persons.

Thes. 125. And first, It is most certain that God hath himself determined in the Law of nature, & of Scripture, that there shall be Governors and subjects, Rule and Obedience in the world; and hath not left the world to liberty, whether they will have Governors or not

This is proved before. If all …e world agreed to p. 125depose their Rulers, or live without, it would not become lawful by the agreement, but an act of disobedience against God. This therefore is not left to mans decision, but they are prevented by Gods Law.

Thes 126. Secondly, God hath been pleased in his Universal Laws of nature and Scripture to determine of the ends of Government; that his Pleasure, and Honor, and the common-good, and order as necessary thereto, shall be the end: this therefore is not left to the decision of man.

So that if all men should agree that Magistrates shall not respect the honor or pleasing of God, or the common good, it were but treachery and folly, and an agreement of no validity at all. The end being essentiall to the Relation here, it followeth, that whoever is a Magistrate, must use his power to these ends, though all men should gain say it.

Thes. 127. Thirdly, God hath himself made certain Universal stated Laws, which all Princes and States must promote and execute as his Officers; and no man on earth have Power to null them, or dispense with them: It is not therefore left to mans decision whether they will observe these Laws of God, or not.

All the Laws of men are in two respects different from these of God. First, Gods Laws are Universal for all the world; but mans are patticular, or limited for their several Common-wealths. As the Soveraign Powers make Universal Laws for the Common-wealth, but may give a Corporation power to make by Laws for that Corporation about inferior things.

p. 126And secondly, Gods Laws are superior fixed Laws, above the highest Prince on earth, which bind them as Subjects to God, & they cannot dispense with; & therefore they are limited by them in their own Legislations and Jurisdiction, yea all that they do must subserve them, whereas Princes, or others that have Soveraign Power are above their own Laws as such. He that is bound by a Law, is so far subject: He that is a Subject, is a Subject to some Superior: Soveraigns have no earthly Superiors; but they are as much subject to God as others. As no Justice of Peace hath any power against the Laws of the Common-wealth, so neither have Kings against the Laws of God.

Thes. 128. God hath described in his word (and much in the Law of nature) the Rulers, that shall receive Authority from him as his Officers: so that it is not left to the liberty of any people whom they will choose: but this description containeth some qualifications necessary to the being of an Officer of God, and some that are necessary but to the well-being: therefore if the latter be violated by the Choosers, it is a sin, but not a Nullity: if the former be violated, it is a Nullity as well as a sin.

The King or State may give Power to a Corporation to choose their Major or Bayliffe, but the Charter expresly or implicitely limiteth them what men to chuse. If they chuse a Drunkard or a Swearer, it is not a Nullity, though a fault: but if they chose an open out-lawd Rebel, it is a Nullity: or if their Governor after he is chosen, renounce the Soveraign Power, he nullifieth his own Authority. What are a p. 127Rulers necessary qualifications, I shall touch anon.

Thes. 129. All these things being determined already by God himself, it is certain that neither Peoples Election, nor conquest can be the fountaine or proper cause of any of these: but it must be somewhat lower that they have to do.

That which is done already by the great Law-giver of the world, cannot be left to the will of men, nor become their works: but its their work to obey the Lord.

Thes. 130. That which God hath left undetermined in his Universal Laws, is 1. Whether it shall be one, or two, fewer or more that shall have the Soveraign Power under him in particular Common-wealths. 2. And who shall be the individual persons. And 3. Much of the matter of their Laws, which is to be varied agreeably to times and persons.

Though Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy are commonly called the distinct species of Common-wealths and Governments, yet it is indeed no more then to determine who shall be the persons Governing: The Election of individuals doth it as to the individual persons, and the constitution doth it simul & semel as to Successors, determining also of the number. So that the substance of the Office is all predetermined of by God in his own Laws; and this specificat… and choice of individuals do but determine of the persons. The Reason why God hath not himself in his standing Universal Laws determined of either of these, is, because they were not capaof p. 128such a dettermination: For the Individuals were not existent, when God made his Laws: the names of Caesar, Alexander, Alphonsus, &c. were not to be inserted into those Laws, they being unborn when the Law of nature was made, and are of short continuance, and must presently resign their Crown to their Successors: & if all that ever should Govern in the world had been forenamed by God in his Laws, it would have brought as great inconveniences on the world, as if every man before hand should be told how long he shall live and whether he shall be rich or poor. God is not to be taught by man how to govern the world.

The. 131. The essentiall Qualifications of a Governour, or that Dispositio materiae that is of necessity ad receptionem & retentionem formae, (and not only ad melius esse) are those without which the perons are not capable of performing the essential workes of Governmont

Government in the exercise hath somewhat essential, or of absolute necessity, and somewhat that is but for the melius esse, and therefore Governing Power hath so too; and what the latter is must be known, by knowing what the former (the necessary exercise is) for the Power is for the use & exercise.

Thes. 132. The end of Government will best determine What is essentiall to Government in exercise. In a proper Common-wealth that is subject to God the Universal soveraign, it is essentially necessary that the Government be so exercised, 1, As that the Being of the Common-wealth may be preserved, 2. And so much of p. 129the well being or Common-good as that the estate of the Common-wealth be better then the estate of the people would be if they had no Government, 3. That justice be more p…valent in the bent of Government then injustice, and the Rulers in the maine be not a terror to good works but to evill, 4. And that the Universall Soveraign be acknowledged and honoured.

1. If the Being of the Common-wealth be not preserved, the Government it self will cease. 2. As it is essential to the Relation, that the Common-good be the end professedly intended by the Constitutors, and which the Administrators are obliged to intend, so in the exercise that it be actually sought in the degree here mentioned is necessary; For if the end be wholly overthrown, the means is no means, and the Relation ceaseth. They that are in a worse condition, or as bad as if they had no Government, indeed, have none: only here note, to avoid mistakes, 1. That this is spoken of the body of the people, and not of a few particular persons: for if unjustly they be so used as to be worse then without Government, yet that dissolveth not the Common-wealth. 2. That this is spoken of the stated case of a people, and not what case they may be in, in some sudden or short strait, which as Physick may tend to a state of health, 3. That therefore as the …onis publicum hath many degrees, it doth not dissolve the Government, if only such and such higher Degrees of the Common-good be crossed or overthrown; for no Prince is perfect, and therefore none can perfectly seek the Common-good, & while men have sin they will do some hurt, or neglect some good. But when they do more Hurt p. 130then good, they are no true means to the common good: And there is no such thing as Government of Gods allowance, which is not a means to the common good.

3. If Injustice be predominant in the stated exercise of Government, it is but a Combination of Robbers or Deceivers: But if in the main course of Government justice be carried on, it is not Injustice to a few that will null the Government.

4. If the Vniversal Soveraign be denyed, or statedly opposed, the body dyeth as being cut off from the head, & the power ceaseth in man, because the conveyance ceaseth from God. A Traitor that openly renounceth his Soveraign, doth thereby renounce his own Authority effectively. But because many objections lie against this last, I desire the Reader to suspend them, till I come anon to open it more fully.

As a man cannot be a Physitian that is unable wholly, or in the main for a Physitians work, nor a Lawyer that knoweth not the Law, nor a Preacher that cannot preach, nor a Pastor that cannot do the essential works of a Pastors office, nor a Pilot that cannot guide the ship, nor an Artificer that cannot (as to skill) do the works of his art at all: so he cannot be at that time a Ruler, that cannot do the essential parts of a Rulers work.

Thes. 133. The three qualifications of necessity to the Being of the power in that subject, are, 1. So much Understanding. 2. And Will or Goodness in himself. 3. And so much strength or executive Power by his Interest in the people, or others, as are necessary to he said ends of Government.

p. 131As Vnderstanding, Will, and executive Power are the grand Primalities, (as Campanella calls them) in nature, which are transcendently, eminently, necessarily, originally in God, and derivatively in the rational creature in his kind and measure; and as Wisdom and Goodness are the perfections of the Intellect and Will, and in God are the transcendent supereminent fountain of all the Wisdom and moral goodness in the Creatures; so are these three the Primalities of Government, and of necessity in the degree aforesaid to its being in that subject. As it is no currant coin that is made of lead, though it have the Soveraigns Image, when he hath made the matter necessary as well as form; so here, Ex quovis ligno non fit Mercurius.

1. Without the foresaid degree of Reason and Wisdom, there is not materia disposita & capax, because the persons are uncapable of the worke, and so of the end, and so of the Power: And therefore Ideots, Fools and Infants cannot be the actual Soveraigns, that is, in statu & relatione, be the present Governors. Indeed they may have the name of Soveraignty, while others have the Ezercise and Power of that Exercise, and they may be in a distant capacity, or the way to a capacity, and may have some foundations laid by the constitution, that the actual Government shall be by them, when they are actually capable: which some call a Jus ad rem, but is but an Hypothetical Right to a future actual Right: if they live to the use of Reason, and to be of capacity; they shall have actual Right to Govern: or if you will call p. 132the one [A right to govern when they are capable.] and the other, [A Right to present Government.] For the peace and safety of the Common-wealth, the constitution may determine, that all Government shall be exercised in the name of an Infant and Ideot Prince, and so they may, if they please, decree, that after the death of an elective King, till another be elected, the Admjnistration shall be in the name of him that's dead: But neither will make the name to be the Thing. We speak of the total Soveraignty. If in a mixt Common-wealth a Prince be an Infant, the Senate or whoever hath the other part of the Soveraignty, may have the exercise of the whole during his Infancy: But if Senate, and all be Infants, they are no actual Governors: When a Counsell, or other Administrators appointed by the constitution, do exercise the whole Soveraign Power or part, they have Power so to exercise it: And if they have Power and Exercise. they are really pro tempore the Soveraign, though the right of present, nominal, and future real Soveraignty may be in an Infant Prince.

2. If the persons be wise, and yet not good so far as is necessary to the foresaid degree of the ends of Government, they are uncapable of the Form or Being: for he that is so wicked as to profess or practise the common ruin, cannot be the common Father and Preserver: And he that hath not will or goodness enough to make him seek the common good in the main, cannot be in that office or power, which essentially is for the seeking of it. An open enemy of the people may be their Oppressor, p. 133but not their Governour. He may be a Tyrant that ruleth for himself, but not a lawful Ruler, if he Rule not for them.

3. Another necessary Dispositio materiae is executive Power, For he that hath not Power (by which I here mean that called foreign, or natural strength) is not capable of Protecting the innocent, or the Common-wealth, or of executing Justice on Offenders, but his own Laws will be ridiculous Scarcrows, without Execution, and a company of thieves will combine, and forbid Judgement: yea, as long as there is in depraved nature a desire of Superiority and Ruling those that are stronger then he, will put him, and keep him out of possession, and rule themselves, and decide the Controversie: so that it is most evident, that he that is utterly impotent, is uncapable of Government. But then note, that though the Skill and Will must in a tolerable measure be in himself, yet it is the people or his Armies that are his Executive Power: for these have the natural strength, and are as the inferior faculties, that are to obey and execute the Commands of the Will; But as the natural Powers that obey the Will must be our own, that they may be under its Command, so there must be an Interest of the Soveraign in those others that are his strength, which may tie them to himself so far that the may subserve him. And thus it is evident ex natura rei, that whosoever hath not (the foresaid measure of Wisdom, Goodness, (in himself) and Strength, or Executive Power, by his Interest in others) as is necessary to p. 134the ends of Government, is Materia indisposita & in capax formae, and therefore no Soveraign, (if statedly as aforesaid, and as we shall further open.)

Thes. 134. As Gods Universal Law hath instituted, limited and regulated the Office, and described the Officers, so his effective Providence doth qualifie or dispose the particular Subjects and make them capable, and partly make, and partly permit an incapacity in others: and thus it doth fit or unfit men as to the form.

Great Disputes there are, whether Dominium fundatur in Gratia, vel in providentia, or in what? Thin…s that are co-ordinate or subordinate, are faigned to be contraries, or inconsistent in casality or interest: and in that way ment may quarrel as long as they live about any thing, where they would have wise men see their weakness. As the earth and the Creatures in it are rescued by Christ from that higher measure of curse then is executed, and our penalty abated, and we and the Creatures reprieved be the Interposition of the Mediator, so far Common Grace doth found the common dominion: And as the Providence that layeth the foundation or rather the occasion of Propriety, is an Act of Common mercy in God, so Grace (even such a Common Grace) is the Cause or Occasion of Propriety, (For by Dominion I still mean Propriety) And as Speciall Grace bestoweth Propriety, (though in it self a common Mercy) with an intention p. 135to use it for some special good, so Propriety is caused or occasio…d by that Speciall Grace (I take Grace here actively, and not passively, or for the Gratia operans, not the operata.) But the immediate proper Foundation of Propriety is the Law, or Gift of God, that giveth all the Creatures on such and such terms, directing men to the just meanes of acquiring and possessing: And the Causa sine qua non of Propriety is various: sometime Occupancy, and somtime Contract, or other just Alienation from others, and Conveyance unto us. Where no one hath a Right before the Occupant, the Generall Donation, by which God gives the earth to the sons of men, is enough to make it ours: and there the gift is the Fundamentum, and the Occupancy is the Copula, or Causa sine qua non, or appropriating meanes: But were another hath Right before us, there the Gift of God stil is the proper Fundamentum Juris: But another man quitting of his Right, or some just alienation is prerequisite, and then the meanes of conveying it rather to us then to another, is the Causa sine qua non of our Right; and in foro humano may be called our Title or Fundamentum Juris it self; many have a Title, which is, 1. Good in foro humano. 2. And which in foro divino, will disable another from dispossessing them 3. And yet in foro divino will not warrant their own possession. 4. And some that are warranted as to the bare Possession, have yet no Right coram Deo to the benefits which the p. 136things possessed in the…selves have a tendency to: This is the true decision of the case, ubi fundatur Dominium? (which is directly in Gods Gift, or Law, and occasionally in gracious Providence, common or speciall, and sometime in judicial Providence) and Whether wicked men have Propriety or are Usurpers (who have Right in foro humano, and if lawfully got, coram Deo, as to bare Possession, but not as to the final good or benefit accruing from the thing possessed) But all this is but briefly touched, because it is but on the by.

But I have mentioned the interest of Providence in Dominion, because it tendeth to illustrate the point of the interest of Providence in Authority, (or Right to Government) which is the case in hand. Many hot Disputes there have been, Whether Providence convey Right of Government or not: and some say, it doth, and some say, that it doth not; and some have the wit to distinguish, and shew how far it may conduce to it, and yet doth not effect it. I think not that wisdom▪ or necessity, or any thing else oblige me, to take all, or any of these men to task, and confute their Reasonings: it is more suitable to my ends to content my self with a naked delivery of what I take to be the truth, and a sufficient proof of it.

Thes. 135. When Providence depriveth a man of his Understanding and intellectual Capacity, and that statedly, or as to his ordinary temper, p. 137it maketh him materiam indispositam, and uncapable of Government, though not of the name.

This is the first way by which Providence dispossesseth. Nebuchadnezzar was thus dispossessed: but retaining his remote conditional Right was restored when his understanding was restored. But the Soveraign Power and Exercise was the mean while in others. And thus Providence working upon nature can dethrone men.

Thes. 136. If God permit Princes to turn so wicked as to be incapable of Governing, so as is consistent with the ends of Government, he permits them to depose themselves.

As I before shewed that so much Moral and Civill Goodness is necessary to Government, so now I shew you, how men are dispossest, and become uncapable. Though all vice or wickedness make not a Prince uncapable, yet to say that none doth, is to flatter them against God, and Reason, and the common Wel-fare of the world. He that turneth enemy to the people, and seeks their ruine, is uncapable of Governing them. But the great cases I will reserve till I come to speak of Resistance.

Thes. 137. If Providence statedly disable him that was the Soveraign from the executing of Laws, Protecting the just, and other p. 138ends of Government, it maketh him an uncapable Subject of the Power, and so disposeth him.

For a Governor so impotent, is none. A Capacity for the work and end is necessary in the person: and when that ceaseth, the Power Iceaseth. Not by such a Cessation alwayes as eaveth the people innocent; for its possible, and likely that the guilt is, or may be theirs, who have disabled their Ruler by deserting him: But, 1. If they do it sinfully, yet he is dissmissed and disobliged from the charge of Government. 2. And particular innocent Members are disobliged from being Governed by him, though through the sin of others. But it is not every actual temporary dispossession that disobligeth statedly, as I shall shew more anon.

Thes. 138. When Providence thus maketh any uncapable or indisposed, it destroyeth the Power as in such: but yet when it disposeth any for the Government, it doth not thereby immediately give him possession or Title to the Government.

For Bonum est ex Causis integris: There must be matter and form to constitute the Being: and after the matter is in it self existent, there must be somewhat more to introduce the form (in most cases.) But the destruction of either of them destroyes the Being. p. 139And therefore Death is the stroak of Providence, extinguishing with the life the Power of the Prince, and so is Infatuation habitual (with the exceptions abovesaid) and so is the Permission of the fore-mentioned Impiety, or Enmity, and Impotency of …he Prince. If a Prince be statedly made a Beggar, or forsaken, or ejected by a Conqueror, and so uncapable of Governing, if it be but pro tempore, the Subjects for that time (that have no oportunity to restore him) are disobliged from his actual Government (except such as can go with him) But if it be his fixed stated case the Subjects are statedly disobliged: for he cannot be obeyed that governeth not.

Thes. 139. It is the work of Providence to give men, 1. An Eminency of Wisdom. 2. And of Goodness. 3. And by Interest in others, sufficient strength for Magistracy.

And so as the Law describeth the Subject of Power, so Providence giveth the described qualifications. So that by Law and Providence conjunct, God taketh down one, and setteth up another, Psalm 75. 7. And the Alteration proceeds from Providence: the Law changeth not, but according to its first sense hath a various aspect upon various persons, places, times, as Providence doth diversifie them. And doubtless it is notably the works of Providence that are meant in those Scriptures which foretell p. 140of the Changes in Kingdoms and Powers, that God will make in the world. Dan 2. 44. The God of Heaven shall set up a Kingdom that shall never be destroyed.] And how if, not by Providence, (though here withall is intended the New Law) Dan 4. 17. [To the intent that the living may know that the most high ruleth in the Kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and setteth up over it the bese…t of men,] And verse 25. [They shall drive thee from men, and thy dwelling shall be with the beasts, till thou know that the most High ruleth in the Kingdom of men: and giveth it to whomsoever he will.] And how? but by disposing Providence? so again, Dan. 5. 20, 21. [But when his heart was lifted up, and his minde hardened in pride, he was deposed from his Kingly Throne, and they tooke his Glory from him,—till he know that the most High …uled in the kingdom of men, and that he appointeth over it whomsoever he will. Dan. 2. 37. [Thou O King, art a King of Kings: for the God of Heaven gave thee a Kingdom, Power, Strength and Glory.] that is, by disposing Providence. verse 38. He hath given them into thy hand, and made th…e Ruler over them all.] Jer. 27. 5. [I have made the earth, the man and the beast,—and have given it unto whom it seemed meet unto me.] And how? but by over-ruling disposing Providence. Dan. 5. 28. Thy Kingdom is divided, and given to the Medes and Persians.] which proveth not that they justly seized on it, nor that God gave it otherwise then by disposing p. 141Providence. Dan. 7. 6. [The beast had four heads, and Dominion was given to it.] Many such places shew that Providence giveth Kingdoms, and is the changing cause.

Thes. 140. It is not the giving of either Wisdome, or Goodness, or strength alone that maketh men capable of governing Authority, but it must be All, (in the fore-described measure.)

The subtilest Politician may be uncapable through wickedness, and the wisest and best man may be uncapable (of full Right and exercise) through weakness: and if a man have all three, (Wisdom, Goodness, and strength) he hath not therefore Authority, but only an Aptitude therto.

Thes. 141. Though it be a duty for a very weak (though tolerable) Governor for the common good to resign his place to one that is every way more fit and liker (consideratis considerandis) to attain the ends of Government in a more excellent degree, yet is it not lawfull for any other to depose him, and usurpe the place, because he is more wise, or good, or powerfull: nor for the people to do it, contrary to the constitution.

Where another hath Right already, it is not an higher degree of Aptitude that can warrant any to aspire to the Throne. If I know a man, that is fitter then my self for my Pastoral charge all things considered, it is my duty to resign it …o him, or procure his joynt power and assistance, p. 142(because the good of souls requireth it) But no man may upon the presumption of such a difference seek to dispossess me against my Will.

Thes. 142. Meer Possession of the seat of Power in it self considered, is not a Title, nor will justifie the Possessor, nor warrant the people to consent and submit.

A man may have Possession of the seat and land, and not of the Government: for he Posesseth not that till he exercise it, and he cannot exercise it, but upon a consenting people. The people may choose to live in slavery, or be destroyed in a state of Hostility, if they please, rather then to submit to the Usurper. And in these cases it is meet that they should do so. The first is, if he would force them else to violate their Covenants to God or man, or to commit any sin against God: so that consenting to his Government must contain a consent to sin: The second is, if his Government will do more hurt then our refusing him or perishing would do, to that nation. Or thirdly, if consenting might be better to that Nation, yet if it be more injurious to the common good of the world, or the common Interest of God, then our dissent.

But I will say no more of this, because Mr. Edward Gee hath in two books said so much, whose Arguments against the meet Possessors claim are thus far good.

Thes. 143. Conquest in it self is no sound Title to the Government of a people.

p. 143If the war was unjust, then the conquest is but the success of Robbery and murder, and therefore can give no Title. If the war were just against the Prince only, and not against the people, there is no appearance of a Title to Rule them from the success. If the war was just against Prince and people, yet as is said, they may in some cases choose to die, or be used as the Conqueror please, and continue their hostility with unconquered minds. And if so, till they yield to be his Subjects, he is not their Soveraign, though Conqueror.

Thes. 144. If the person dispossest be one that we are by Covenant obliged, not onelyonly to submit to, & obey, but also to defend, & be not made uncapable of the Government, we ought to defend him, and endeavor his restitution according to the tenor of our Covenants, as far as may stand with the common good, the end of Government. Yea, though we make no such Promise, our Relation, and the Law of God obligeth us to defend our Governors

This was the case of David and the people, when Absolon had got possession of the City, and his houses, and many of the people, it was the duty still of the people to restore him: For, 1. The Possession of Abs…lon was but of the Place, and a party, and so but … military state: David having an Army and a Party too, 2. David was the person to whom they were by Gods Election and their Covenants obliged: and therefore while there was hope, they were to prosecute it for his restitution. And if half prove false to him, it disobligeth not the rest.

p. 144Thes. 145. But if the person dispossest be justly dispossest, as by a lawfull War, in which he loseth his Right, especially if he violate the Constitution, and enter into a military state against the people themselves, and by them be conquered, they are not obliged to restore him, unless there be some other special obligation upon them, beside their Allegiance.

This shall be anon more fully manifested when we speak of the Dissolution of Government.

Thes. 146. If the person dispossest, though it were unjustly, do afterward become uncapable of Government, it is not the duty of his Subjects to seek his Restitution.

I have before intimated by what wayes men become incapable: As by loss of Understanding, by becoming an Enemy to the common good, or to God, and by loss of Power for the ends of Government, which they are unable to restore him to. An Incapacity al… may be accidental, as if he cannot be restored but by the Arms of the enemies of God, or the Common-wealth, who will afterwards have the Power of disposing of him & the Government so that the Common-wealth hath no securety but the word of enemies: or if a faction of enemies within must needs be (or appar…ntly will be) the Masters of all when he is restored. He that is incapable of promoting of the Common good, is uncapable of Governing, (which way ever it come to pass:) and he that is become uncapable of Governing, ought not to be restored, unless we can restore his capacity.

p. 161Thes. 147. If an Army (of Neighbours, or inhabitants, or whoever) do (though injuriously) expel the Soveraign, and resolve to ruine the Common-wealth, rather then he shall be restored, and if the Common-wealth may prosper without his restauration, it is the duty of such an injured Prince, for the common good to resign his Government; and if he will not, the people ought to judge him as made uncapable by providence, and not to seek his restitution, to the apparent ruine of the Common-wealth.

The reason is, because it is essential to Government to be for the common good; and he is for the people finally, rather then they for him: And Government ceaseth to be just Government, when it ceaseth to be a means to its end: much more when it is destructive to it. The jus regendi is not like meer Dominion (I mean Propriety,) which is but a power or right to use and dispose of things as our own, and for our selves. But it is like the office of a Physitian, School-master, Pilot, &c. who are principally for the good of others, and but secondarily for their own reward and honour. And therefore no man on earth can pretend propriety in his Kingdom, or Government, against the common good, and ends of that Government. For that is to change the nature of the thing, and then plead an interest in it, as Government, when they have made it no (just) Government at all.

Thes. 148. That Man that will rather see the blood of many thousands spilt, and the Common-wealth hazarded, then he will give up that Government which he received for the common good, when he may know that his resignation would be for the common good, and his war p. 162against it, doth thereby declare that he seeks not the common good, but himself.

These five or six last propositions I have taken in on the by, but to prepare for those that follow, by removing objections that stand in the way.

Thes. 149. It is not lawful for a people to chuse, rather to have no Governour, then not to have him that is their rightful Prince: for that there shall be Government and subjection, is the stated Law of God, to which the right choise of persons is but subordinate: If therefore the rightful Governour be so long dispossest that the Common-wealth can no longer be without Government, but to the apparent hazard of its ruine, we ought to judge that providence hath dispossest the former, and presently to consent to another.

1. The right of persons is in subserviency to the Government it self and the ends of it: and therefore if any man will set the means against the end, or a circumstance of humane determination against a Law of God, and say, Because we cannot have such a man, we will have none, but be ungoverned; this is to break an express commandment, and to cast off the order and ordinance of God, for a persons sake.

2. If people have no Government, vice will reign, and every mans estate and life will be at the mercy of his enemy, or him that hath a mind to it, and is the stronger: And therefore no people can long subsist without Government.

Thes. 150. When a people are without a Governor, it may be the duty of such as have most strength, ex charitate, to protect the rest from injury.

p. 163This is a truth known by the light of nature: no man that is assaulted by a robber, but would have his neighbour help him: And he that will pass by him, and not succour him if he can, doth not do a neighbours part: He that seeth his brother in need, danger, or distress, and shutteth up the bowels of his compassions from him, how dwelleth the Love of God in him? Duties of charity, especially to a Nation, are indispensable.

Thes. 151. Providence by conquest and other means doth use so to qualifie some persons above others for the Government when the place is void, that no other persons shall be capable competitors, and the persons shall be as good as named by Providence, whom the people are bound by God to choose or consent to; so that they are usually brought under a Divine obligation to submit to such or such, and take them for their Governours, before th…se persons have an actual right to govern.

A people without a particular Soveraign, are still parts of Gods universal Kingdom, and from him they are to receive their officers, if he appoint them; for still they are under the obligation of his Laws. Though the peoples consent (explicite or implicite) be necessary to the Soveraigns actual Government, and consequently to his right of governing them, by which he must himself be warranted and justified; yet are the people usually under a previous obligation from the Lord, whom they shall consent to, and whom not. And Conquest is the most usual means of the determination: not by giving Right to govern, but by making the Conquerour materiam dispositam, p. 164the only capable subject of that right, and object of the peoples choice. The same may be said of any other possession of such power as the Conquerour hath. Ordinarily did the Roman Emperours (formerly at Rome, and since at Constantinople) die or suffer deposition, by an Usurper; and yet the subjects obeyed the Usurper, and the Christian Bishops took it to be their duty so to do. If his Conquest or Occupation be sinful, yet if he thereby become the only capable person to Govern, the people are to consent (supposing no special impediment to forbid it.) If they be (though through anothers sin.) disobliged from their former Governour, (by his death, incapacity, &c.) they are bound by God to consent to such as are most capable.

Thes. 152. But if men have by Conquest or other means become the strongest, that yet are uncapable, for want of Necessary wisdom, or Goodness, the people may submit to suffering, but not consent that such should govern them.

Because being supposed uncapable of Governing them, their Government would be as hurtful as to be without a Government. And if Gods honour and soveraignty must be traiterously despised, and the common good destroyed, it is better that it be done without the peoples consent, then with it.

Thes. 153. Any thing that is a sufficient sign of the will of God, that this is the person, by whom we must be Governed, is enough (as joyned to Gods Laws) to oblige us to consent, and obey him as our Governour.

p. 165God being the chooser of his own Officers, and the universal King, who bindeth us to obey his choice, doth make known his will to man by signs: For we cannot immediately see his essence, and therefore not his will. All his Laws that oblige us, are but so many signs of his will: and he may choose his sign.

Thes. 154. It being already signified in the Law of God, that a people that are without a Ruler shall consent to such as are fittest for them, and the qualifications of such being there exprest, the rest of Gods will to be signified to the people, to bring them under the particular obligation, is but for the discovery of the persons thus qualified: so that Law and providence concurring, are Gods nomination of his Officers, whom the people by him are bound first to consent to be subject to, and then to obey.

Here are several acts of Gods Law, and several acts of Providence, necessary in concurrence, to constitute a Soveraign. 1. There is presupposed the general Law, for Government and obedience, distributing the subjects of Gods Kingdom, into particular subordinate Soveraigns, and their Subjects. 2. There is supposed Gods Laws, that cut them out their principal work, and describe the substance of the office, and limit them. 3. The Law of God describeth the persons, in the points necessary to the Being, and the well being of their Government. 4. The same Law obligeth the people to consent to such, (in case they are called to such a work, as choosing or consenting.) Thus far the Law goeth.

And then Providence, 1. Doth qualifie the person, p. 1661. With tolerable wisdom. 2. And Goodness (so far as to be a capable Instrument for the Ends of Government.) 3. And with Power to defend the people and execute Laws. And many acts of Providence may concur to this: especially it is by giving a man such Interest in the Affections of the stronger part, that by them he may be put into a capacity. 2. And when he is qualified, to bring him upon the stage to the peoples observation, that they may observe his Qualifications, is an Act of Providence for the discovery of Gods Will; and so to bring the people under an Obligation to consent. 3. And when they are so obliged, the bringing of their hearts to consent and accept him, is another Act of Providence antecedent to his Possession, and ordinarily to such a Title as will justifie his Government.

So that the peoples Obligation is thus inferred and induced by God.

Whomsoever I thus and thus Qualifie, and declare to be the fittest person, you shall consent to.

But this man (or these men) I have so qualified and declared: therefore to them you shall consent.

The Major is in Gods Law (of Nature and Scripture, most express.) The Minor is the voice of Providence (taking the word for Actual disposal of Events) and both together infer the conclusion, and induce the Obligation, but with the difference following.

Thes. 155. Hence it is plain that this Disposal of Providence, is not instead of a Law, or speaketh not de debito, but de facto, and therefore doth not it self efficiently oblige: but it only designeth the person and nominateth p. 167him, to whom we shall by the Law be obliged to consent.

For Providence saith but [This is the qualified person] which words have not the nature of a Law, nor do themselves oblige; but of a Nomination: so that it is the universal Law that doth oblige, though not without the Nomination of Providence.

Thes. 156. When the Nomination is referred to a Lot, that Lot determineth but in this way of Providence, nominating the person, leaving the Obligation still to the Law.

What a Lot may do, another Providence may do; but the lot may determine of the persons: therefore so may other Providence. God hath many wayes of signifying his mind to us, and nominating the persons, and hath not tyed himself to any one; nor must we limit him.

Thes. 157. Where God dooh not notably declare any person qualified above others, nor one, two, or any certain Number to be most fit for the Soveraignty of that people, so that the case is not Notorious, but Controvertible, there the people must judge as well as they are able, according to Gods General Rules, or else refer it to a Lot.

This is counted the freest Choyce, when people are not plainly pre-obliged: but indeed there is no more desirable freedom, but oft-times less, in this Case then the other. If God do for our good so plainly p. 168qualifie and declare our Governours as to leave it out of doubt to us, and so to pre-oblige us, it is a mercy, and not a depriving us of any desirable liberty: And if there be none of such Eminency, but that we are left to a choyce out of many equals, it doth but make us the more work.

Thes. 158. A free people should have a free Consent, as from men, though they may be pre-obliged to consent by God.

Co…querours or men of strength may not obtrude themselves on a free people, how fit soever they are, but must leave them as free-men, to a free consent.

Thes. 159. All people have not right to such freedom; sometime whole Nations, but commonly a part of every Nation, should be denyed the liberty of choosing their Governours, and be compelled to consent: and to make all Choosers is injurious and destructive to the Common wealth.

The first branch (which denyeth freedom of choice to some whole Nations) is all that is lyable to controversie, which yet is so plain, that it needs not many words.

1. Sometimes divers Nations may constitute One Common-wealth. And then there is as much reason why a whole Nation, as a mixed part, should be thought Capable of forfeiting their liberties.

2. Sometimes divers Nations may be under the same Princes Government. And then if he can forfeit his Crown as to them, by any Covenant-breaking p. 169on his part, no doubt but part of them may forfeit their Liberty, by Treason and Covenant-breaking on theirs, and he may Rule them by the power of his other Kingdoms; As the Romans did many of the Nations that they Conquered.

3. Sometime the Neighbourhood of unjust, implacable enemies, is not to be tolerated, without the ruine of the Righteous Nations round about them, unless they be kept under by meer force; and so self-preservation may warrant it. Men that choose to live as enemies in war with us, must be used upon military terms. Till they shew themselves worthy of Trust, they are not to be used as free Subjects.

4. Sometimes men may forfeit their Liberties to God and men so notoriously, that the Law of Nature and Nations warranteth Neighbour Princes to subdue them, and govern them by force. As 1. In Case they should turn Atheists, and defie the universal King, and seek to poyson the Neighbour Nations with this Treason against God. 2. In Case they live as Canibals, that eat mans flesh, and are as wild beasts, that hunt for men to devour them, whether it be their fellow-natives, or the Neighbour Nations. 3. In Case they professedly design the Conquest of all others about them, and will live upon no other terms in peace, but as Conquerers or Conquered. 4. Specially in Case they claim a right to the Kingdoms about them, and specially a Divine Right; that all Princes should obey them, and make it their unalterable Religion, as the Pope doth. He that thus claims a Right to dispose of Crowns and Kingdoms, though but in ordine ad Spiritualia, proclaimeth war with all the World; and warranteth any Prince that p. 170is within his danger to make war against him.

5. The Law of Nature may bind a Christian Nation in Charity to Rule some Nations by force. If a poor barbarous Indian-Nation, like the Canibals, would not consent to hear the Gospel, or suffer Preachers to come among them, and speak to a minor part that would hear, I am sure it hath an apparent tendency to their salvation to master them, and force them to admit the Preachers, and to restrain them from murdering the Christians among them that had received the Gospel: And as long as we did them no hurt, but govern them, and did not deprive them of their Possessions, I know not what should exempt us from the Obligation to this as a work of Charity. Doubtless a meer Neighbour, by the Law of Charity, is bound to hold a mans hands that would kill himself, or pull him out of the water that would drown himself, and to quench his house though against his will, which he sets on fire, and to save his Children, or Neighbours persons or houses from his fury, in case of the like attempts: And why then a work of ten thousand times greater benefit, should not on the same grounds be done, I know not. If the Prince and major part of the people, in a neighbour petty Common-wealth would put to death the minor part, because they are Christians, and a Potent neighbour Prince were easily able to restrain them, I doubt not but he would be guilty of the murder and extirpation of Christianity, if he do not: And if he cannot continue their preservation, without a continued restraint, or subduing the malignant party, the Laws of Neighbourhood, and Charity, and the Common good of mankind, and the Ends of the p. 171Universal Government require him to do it.

If any say that upon such pretences Atheists and Heathens that are the stronger part, may invade a weaker Christian State to force them to deny God, or Christ, or acknowledge Idols, &c. I answer, 1. Confound not the Jus and the factum: the natural and the legal Power. They may do it de facto per potentiam Naturalem, which is nothing to the case, but they may not do so de jure per potentiam Legalem, because God hath given them no such Power.

Object. But you will give them occasion to pretend Authority; and if they are the stronger party, they will be the Judges. Answ. No duty can be done, from whence the wicked cannot fetch pretences for their sin. If a righteous Judge shall hang Murderers or Thieves, he is not therefore to be blamed, because an unrighteous Judge may take occasion by it to hang the innocent as guilty of their crimes. If our Armies may destroy the plundering Enemies, and rescue the oppressed Countrey men, and the Enemies Armies may thence fetch a pretence to destroy ours as guilty of that crime, though they be innocent, we must not therefore neglect the defence of the oppressed. Malignant enemies will not be reduced to reason, if we should neglect our duty for it; but the wicked will do wickedly: some inconveniences will still attend the imperfections of humane Administrations. But the final Judgement will set all strait. Let us do our Duty, and stay till God do Justice upon those that by Power are out of the reach of Justice, from the hand of man.

But that which nearlier concerneth us (and as near as any thing in our frame of Government) is the p. 172latter part of the Thesis; that all the people in the same Common-wealth should not have the freedom of choosing Governours, which I shall therefore more distinctly handle.

Thes. 160. It is commonly granted that nature and want of competent wealth may deprive the most innocent of a capacity of this freedom. Much more will a mans wilful crimes deprive him of it.

I grant that all these may be Subjects: and further then by course of Justice they are deprived of them, let them enjoy their Possessions as much as any other Subjects, allowing for the securing of them, the same Tributes and Taxes as all others. But it is a Burgeship, or freedom of Governing, or choosing any Governours, Parliament-men, Justices, &c. that we speak of.

Nature maketh Infants and Ideots uncapable: and women choose not members of Parliament.

Servants are commonly judged uncapable, and so are the poor: not only because they have not those faculties necessary to support the Government, but principally because necessity maketh them dependant upon others; and therefore it is supposed that they are not free in their Elections. How far the reason reacheth to Tenants, the Law-givers, though they are Land-Lords, seem not to be insensible, when all that have not Leases for life are excluded from the number of free-holders.

But that multitudes of wicked criminous persons, how rich soever, should much rather be excluded then honest beggars, and that this, this, this, is the great point that the welfare of most Common-wealths p. 173doth depend upon, I shall now make manifest.

Argum. 1. If many Vices make persons less fit to govern or choose Gnvernours, then poverty doth, conjoyned with honesty, then should such vicious persons, rather be excluded from both: But the Antecedent is most certain: E…go.

Argum. 2. If men should lose their lives or estates by way of Punishment for some crime, then should they lose their liberty of Governing and choosing Governours by way of punishment for those or other crimes to which such punishment is proportionable (for there is a parity of Reason.) But the Antecedent is practically confest: Ergo, &c.

Argum. 3. If confessedly crimes should deprive men of a capacity to Govern, so also they must do of a capacity of choosing Governours: (for there is a parity of Reason in ordinary cases, though not in all) But the Antecedent is granted by our Parliaments, who sentence some as disabled to be members any more: Ergo, &c.

Argum. 4. That course which equalleth the worst with the best in the Priviledges of freemen, is not just: But so doth the equal admitting the innocent and the criminous to govern and choose Governours: Ergo &c. Vertue is better then wealth, & Vice worse then Poverty.

Argum. 5. That course that tendeth to the dishonour of Princes, Parliaments, or other Magistrates under them that are Elective, is not to be maintained. But such is the liberty of the criminous to Elect them: For nothing more natural then for freemen to choose such as are agreeable to their wills and wayes: and if they be not free, they should not choose. It will therefore raise suspitions on our Parliaments and Magistrates, that they are friends at least to wicked men and p. 174wayes, when they are ordinarily and freely chosen by such men: especially if it be by their own Laws and desires, that such shall be the Choosers.

Argum. 6. Those that are known enemies to the common good in the cheifest parts of it, are unmeet to Govern or choose Governours: (else give us up to our enemies, or to Satan:) But such are multitudes of ungodly vicious men. Ergo.

He that thinketh that wealth is the only common good, or a greater part of it then Vertue, Piety, and mens salvation; and that Rulers have nothing to do with the latter, but with mens Bodily prosperity only, is fitter to be a member of a Herd then a Republike, and to be dimitted with Nebuchadnezzar into a company suitable to his judgement: yea and to be used as a Traytor of the highest and most odious strain, that destroyeth and brutifieth the very office of every Prince and Magistrate, and casteth them into the dirt.

And that ungodly vicious men are Enemies to the greatest part of the common good directly, and to the rest indirectly, is known to every wise and sober honest man. 1. They hate Godliness, which is the truest Honesty; and Holiness, without which none shall see God: and therefore if they can, will choose such as hate it. 2. They hate good Laws, which would encourage the Piety and Vertue which they hate, and punish the Vices which they love. 3. They hate Good Magistrates, and therefore are unlike, if they be free, to choose them. 4. And they are all men of Private spirits, and value their private Interests before the Publike Good, and would sell the chief felicity of the Common-wealth for a little money, if p. 175they can scape themselves. 5. They are ready to betray the Common-wealth to a forraign enemy, in meer malignity, to have their wills: As the Papists that joyned with Stanley in 88. and the Powder-plotters after, and so in many Countries else. Are the Irish fit to govern or choose Governours? If not, and if experience forceth us to exclude the man body of the Natives there, we have reason to exclude such here as forfeit their Liberties. We do them neither wrong nor hurt, but preserve our selves from ruine, and them from greater guilt. To govern us, does them no good.

Arg. 7. Such as God commanded to be put to death, or cut off from the Common-wealth of Israel, should not be Governours or Choosers of such, in any Christian Common-wealth (supposing an equality in guilt.) But such are many vicious ungodly persons among us. Therefore—

I speak not of them that broke some ceremonial abrogated Law, further then the Reason of the Law remaining may direct us to judge of crimes among our selves. But I speak of such as for the like facts are now as culpable as they. And in general I may lay this ground, that the more abundant light of the Gospel, and the greater helps and grace, and the greater Holiness now required, do all shew that the same sins (caeteris paribus) are much more haynous now …hen they were then. But because the point is fundamental, and all our peace lyeth much upon, I shall proceed to Instances.

Thes. 161. A Blasphemer was to be put to death by the Law of God, and therefore should not Govern, or p. 176choose any Parliament men or Governours with us.

Levit. 24. 11, 15, 16, 23. The son of an Israelitish woman and a man of Israel strove together in the camp: and the Israelitish womans Son Blasphemed the Name of the Lord and cursed—And the Lord spake unto Moses saying, Bring forth him that hath cursed without the camp, and let all that heard him lay their hands on his head, and let all the Congregation stone him. And thou shalt speak unto the Ch…ldren of Israel, saying; whosoever curseth his God, shall bear his sin: and he that Blasphemeth the Name of the Lord, he shall surely be put to death, and all the Congregation shall certainly stone him; as well the stranger, as he that is born in the Land, when he blasphemeth the Name of the Lord, shall be put to death.

Thes. 162. If any one, though a Prophet, or a Brother, or Son, or Daughter, or Wife, or deerest friend entised them to go after other Gods, and serve them, they were to be put to death, yea and a whole City, if they yeilded to such seducers: Therefore such should not Govern or choose Governours with us.

Deut. 13. Wholly proves the point expresly.

Thes. 163. He that sacrificed unto any God but the Lord only, was utterly to be destroyed, as is exprest, Exod. 22. 20. Therefore such should be no free men among Christians.

Thes. 164. The worshippers of such Images, as the mo…ten Calf, Baal, &c. were to be put to death, p. 177Exod. 32. 26, 27, 28. 1 King. 18. 40. 2 King. 10. 21, 22. to 29. and 23. 15. 19, 20.

Thes. 165. They that would not seek the Lord God of Israel, were put to death, whether great or small, man or woman.

So that Godliness it self in Profession was here exacted of all, by a solemn oath and covenant, between the Lord, the King and the people, as you may read at large. 2 Chron. 15. 11, 12. 13, 14, 15. Therefore those that will not seek the Lord, should not be free men in a Christian state: which Law must be executed, before we shall be well.

Thes. 166. He that smote or cursed his Father or Mother, should be put to death, Exod 21. 15.

Thes. 167. He that forsaketh God, breaketh his Covenant, and worshippeth Sun, or Moon, or any of the host of Heaven which God hath not commanded, was to be stoned to death, Deut. 17. 2, 3, &c.

Thes. 168. Murderers, Manstealers, Incestuous persons, Sodomites, Adulterers, and in some cases Fornicatours, Wizzards, false Prophets, &c. were to be put to death, Exod. 21. Levit. 20. Deut. 13. 20. Yea and those that turn after Wizzards, Lev. 20. 6. None such therefore should be freemen here.

Thes. 169. If a man had a stubborn and rebellious Son, that was a Glutton, Drunkard, or the like, and would not obey the voyce of his Father, or of his Mother, p. 178and that when they have chastened him, would not hearken to them, he was to be put to death. Read Deut. 21. 18, 19▪ 20, 21. Therefore such should not choose Parliament men, nor be Burgesses with us.

Thes. 170. The man that would do presumptuously, and would not hearken to the Priest, that standeth to Minister there before the Lord, or to the Judge, was to be put to death, Deut. 17. 12. Therefore presumptuous transgressours against the publike warning of Magistrates and Pastours should not be freemen of our Common-wealths. See also Deut. 29. 19, 20.

Thes. 171. Every one that defiled the Sabbath, and doth any work thereon, was to be put to death, and cut off from amongst his people, Exod. 31. 14, 15. Therefore though the Sabbath as Jewish be taken down; yet by parity of Reason, he that despiseth the publick worship of the Gospel, and the Lords Day, should be no Chooser of Rulers for the Common-wealth.

Thes. 172, Whether the utter cutting off the soul that did ought presumptuously, as a reproacher of the Lord, and a despiser of his word, (Numb. 15. 30, 31.) do not import that presumptuous reproachers of the Lord, and despisers of his word, should be no Burgesses with us; and whether the cutting off then threatned for Ceremonial uncleannesses (as Exod. 12. 15, 19. and 31. 14. and 30. 33, 38. Lev. 7. 20, 21, 25, 27. and 17. 49. and 19 13. Num. 9. 13. and 19. 20.) import not, that notorious ungodly persons should not be freemen, where it can be avoided, I leave to prudent consideration.

p. 179In all these Collections I mention so great an inequality of punishment, that no adversary can modestly quarrel with my cons…quence. Cu…ting off, and putting to death is another kind of punishment then depriving men of the liberty of governing or choosing Governours, which addeth to their case, and diminisheth not their wealth, but is a necessary means to the common peace and welfare. Those that Gods Law put to death, should be no Choosers of Maiors, Bayliffs, Parliament, &c. with u…, especially when the sin is greater now. Those that would fetch the form of Government from the Israelites, above all men, can have no reason to contradict any of this.

I conclude therefore, that all that are fit to be subjects, are not fit to be Burgesses, and to govern or choose Governours, though they may keep their possessions, and be secured in them.

Thes. 173. If a people consent to his Government that procured his capacity, in point of strength, by wicked means, it followeth not that they consent to those means, or are guilty of his sin.

If Phocas e. g. kill his Soveraign, and become Emperour, it followeth not that its a sin in all the people that afterward consent; nor in Gregory Mag. that speaketh so respectfully to him. A people that detest and are innocent of the Treason, perfidiousness, hypocrisie, &c. of an usurper, may after become obliged to obey him, and take him for the Governour whom the people of the Common-wealth are bound to obey.

p. 180Thes. 174. If the Progenitors Consent to an established form of Government; and the way of succession, whether Hereditary, or by Elections of each Governour, their Consent obligeth their Progeny, so long, till either a mutual Consent of Governours and people again disoblige them, or the Rulers disoblige them by destroying the Form or End of the Government, or God by Providence disoblige them.

If Posterity were not obliged by their Progenitors Acts, all Common-wealths would be short-lived. And frequent mutations would keep up continual distractions and confusions. And though the Maxime of some is, that Parents can oblige their Posterity, when the Covenant is for their good only, and not to their loss and hurt; yet these considerations must be here admitted for the due application of it. 1. In a mutual Covenant or Contract, it is supposed that the welfare of both Parties is taken in. And as the people receive more from the Soveraign then he from them, and therefore are more beholden to him; so his Contract supposeth something on his own side to be thereby secured, as well as on theirs. 2. And it is not every tolerable incommodity that disobligeth Posterity from the Covenants of their Ancestors; but such as makes them worse then to be without the Governour, and that over weigheth the Benefits that by his Government they receive. No wise man would be the Ruler of such a people that are able and willing to cast him off, whenever they conceive they incurr any incommodity by his Government.

p. 181Thes. 175. Though a forced Consent be usually from the great sin of him that forceth it (yet not alwaies) it nevertheless obligeth the Consenters.

Deny this, and you overthrow all humane converse. For if men may go from their Covenants on this pretence, then on many the like, and the pretence will be common. Man is a free Agent, and his Will cannot properly be compelled: If you threaten him with death, he may suffer it: It is supposed therefore that whatever he promiseth, he freely promiseth. We use to say, a man is forced, when fear moveth him to consent: But this is not a proper force: It taketh not away the Liberty of the Will. He that consenteth, doth it to avoid some greater evil, which he thinks would else have befaln him; and it is his own Good that moveth him to it; [He that sweareth to his own hurt, and changeth not] is the person that is accepted of God, Psalm. 15. 4. It every incommodity would warrant men to break Covenants, no man would trust each other, and Covenants would lose their force.

Object. But Divines determine it, that if a Thief compel me to conceal him, I am not therefore to conceal him; therefore they think a forced Oath bindeth not.

Answ. 1. They truly judge that if you promise a Thief to bring him so much money such a day, to save your life, you are bound to perform it. I add, unless the case be such (which is possible) that to publick use the money is of more worth then my life; and then as it was unlawful to promise, so is it to perform: But what you may lawfully promise, you may p. 182and must perform. 2. If the concealing of the Thief will do more hurt to the Common wealth, and wrong to God, then the yeilding up of my life, I may not promise it: and if I promise it, I may not perform it, because it is evil, and not in my power; But if it be otherwise, I may promise or perform it. So that it is not force that disobligeth a man from his Covenants.

Thes. 176. The commonest way of Constituting forms of Government is by a forced consent, (as it is commonly called); when a Conquerour, or a person of greatest strength doth constrain the weaker to consent, to escape a greater mischief.

Thus war useth to prepare for change of Governments. And if all such contracts should be null, most Common-wealths on earth were null, and the subjects disobliged, and warranted to rebel.

Thes. 177. The true Fundamental Laws of every Common-wealth, are the Laws of God the Ʋniversal King.

For, 1. These are they that lay the foundation of Government, as is before more fully opened. 2. These are they that Princes are bound by, and none can change. 3. These are they that limit all the Laws of men, and nullifie such as contradict them. Properly therefore these are the true (if not only) Fundamental laws of Common-wealths.

Thes. 178. The Constitution of Common-wealths by p. 183man, as to that modal difference of Governments, which is in their Power, is the effect of Contract, Explicite or Implicite, and not of Law. So that there are no Humane Constitutive, Fundamental Laws.

Proved. 1. All Laws properly so called, are the acts of such as have Governing power, obliging the subjects: But no such Acts do constitute a Common-wealth (besides Gods Laws:) therefore no Laws constitute a Common-wealth (but Gods Laws.)

The Major Proposition is past doubt. Lycurgus or any that are commonly called Legislators, may call their Models and Proposals by the name of Laws, before they are enacted: But they are indeed no more so, then my words are Laws, till they shall become the acts of Authority. Those Models commonly have two parts; the first for constituting the Soveraignty; and the second fixing some immutable determinations for regulating his Government, which he may not change. But first, the constituting of the Soveraign is an act of Contract, and not of Law: And secondly so are the limitations of his Power and Rule, which are part of the Constitution, and the terms on which he doth receive it. It is no Law, till it become the Rulers act, as such.

The Minor is plain. For before the Soveraignty is constituted, there is no Soveraign: For what need we make that which is already made? And where there is no Soveraign, there is no Acts of Soveraignty: that is, no Laws.

Argu. 2. Legislation is a proper part of Government: therefore it supposeth the Governour constituted.

p. 184Note, 1. That we take Laws here in the strict and proper sense, as distinct from Covenants: For improperly, as a mans Covenants oblige himself, he may be said to impose a Law upon himself.

2. That we still here separate the Divine Government from mans. Gods Authority is before and without mans consent; and he maketh by his Laws subordinate Governours over men when he pleases, obliging them to consent beforehand, being himself the Universal Soveraign, neither by Law nor Contract. But it is only so much of the Constitution as is left to man, that I speak of.

Thes. 179. An Implicit Consent of the people may be obligatory, and prove the power to be such as is to be owned and obeyed.

If they that have the strength, do not resist and cast off their pretender, it is to be supposed to be because they do consent: For being not from disability to reject him, it is to be judged to be from unwillingness. And if there were some hazard of a battle in the way, yet they that consent to scape a danger, do yet consent: But it is not all silence and non-resistance that may be called [an implicit consent.] A non-resistance forced by a Colonie or forreign Power, is no signification of consent. A non-resistance forced by Mercenary Natives that are souldiers, is no signification of consent. A non-resistance forced by Servants or others that are not Burgesses or Cives in the Common-wealth, is no signification of consent. A non-resistance forced by a Kindred or Faction, inconsiderable comparatively for interest or number, but that's p. 185strong by an accidental advantage, is no signification of consent. But yet it is not the consent of the whole people that is necessary; nor alwaies of a major part: Common wealths are not alwaies to follow a Major Popular Vote. Otherwise in most cases there would be much uncertainty, which way the Major Vote inclineth. And when most are worst, and of the weaker sort, the wiser and the better will think there is no Law that subjecteth them to a Vote that's carried by an inconsiderable part. If a people were without a Prince, and a Major Vote choose a person tolerable, but yet so weak and bad as might much hazzard the Common-wealth; and the wiser, stronger, but Minor part, do choose a wiser, better man, there appeareth no reason why the choice of the first only should be valid. (We are speaking all this while of the Constitution of a Common-wealth, where the way of Election is not yet Constituted by Agreement.) 1. The smaller number are oft of greater Interest and Possession. An hundred Lords may have more to save or lose then a thousand Peasants. 2. Nature, saith the Philosopher, made the wise to Govern the unwise; that is, They are most apt: But the smaller number are oft the wiser. 3. And the smaller number is oft the better, and true to the common good. 4. And also they are oft the stronger. Ten thousand prudent valiant men, especially that are animated by the greatest interest, are usually too hard for twenty thousand silly Peasants. And I see no Reason but the Part that is both Wisest, Best, and Strongest, should be accounted the People of that Nation. Nature valueth not parts by bulk or number, but by Worth and Use: One Heart, one Stomake, one Liver, is p. 186more to be regarded then ten toes or fingers.

Object. But who shall be Judge which part is Best if once you forsake a Major Vote, when every part think themselves the best?

Answ. The Question is either of the Jus or Factum: Who Ought to Judge, or who will Judge? In a company that hath no Legal Judge, the Wisest, though the Weakest, ought to Judge: For Natural Aptitude is there instead of Office, and the ignorant are obliged by God to regard his gifts in others, and to hearken to the Wise: And if the people refuse, that proveth not that they justly do refuse. But the strongest usually will Judge, though the wisest should Judge; and therefore Voting oft determineth it, because the most are supposed to be strongest, and to have most wit and Interest among them. But when it is not so, (as oft it is not) the Reason of the Voting Prevalency ceaseth (except in such cases where it is meerly for Unity and Concord) and no such stress is laid upon the Vote, but that the wise for Peace may safely yield to the unwise. When the Best by Prudence and advantage have the greatest strength, and by Valour over-top a greater number of the bad and foolish, I know not why they should give up their welfare to their Elections. In a Ship full of Mariners and Passengers that have lost their Pilot and Commanders, the valiant and skilful will be loth to commit their lives to the major vote of ignorant and cowardly men, that would deliver the Vessel to the enemy, or the Rocks, or Sands.

If in such a case (when there is no preobligation by Law or Contract) a Prince be chosen by the Minor Better part, (net Mercenary Souldiers, not a Faction p. 187animated by a private Interest, nor as before excepted) and that Part be strong enough by the advantage of their nobler Education, Prudence and Valour to enable him to Defend the Nation, and execute his Laws, against any opposition that the Rabble or rude Majority can make, I know not, (caeteris paribus) but that he hath a better Call, then if he had been called by the rest that were more in number.

When we speak of an Implicit Consent, complying with custom, we use an improper phrase, it being a Less-express Consent that is meant by it: For if it be in no degree expressed, it falls not under humane cognizance.

As we constantly determine against the Separatists, that such an Implicit Consent of the people, as is signified only by actual submission to Ministerial Offices, is all that is necessary (herein) to prove the Being of a Church: So the Reason will do as much and more as to the Common-wealth; the peoples Consent being more necessary in Church matters, then in the other, because Church-Government is exercised only on Consenters. And as he may be a Pastor that hath but such an Implicit Consent; so may he be a Prince that hath no more. When the Body of the people submit to the Government in its exercise, seeking for Justice to the Officers of him that is in Possession, and actually obeying his administrations, it importeth in foro exteriore a Consent; at least for the avoiding of greater evil; and if this be stated or in the ordinary Current as Governours are obeyed, it sufficeth to satisfie particular persons that they are obliged to obey.

p. 188Thes. 180. But if the Representative Body of a Nation, enabled thereto, shall expresly consent, and covenant with a Soveraign, the real Body submitting to the Government; and not by any common protestation disowning it; it is the fullest, most regular, obliging acknowledgement, to satisfie the particular Subjects of their duty, that ordinarily can be expected.

For it cannot be expected that all the Real Body should be called to Vote, and the Major Vote be well discerned, unless the disproportion be very great. Their Number, their dispersedness, and their incapacities shew them very unfit to manage such a business by themselves: Their welfare requireth that it be rather managed by Prudent Representers chosen to such Ends. And then as All are Represented, so All are obliged by the consent of their Representers.

Thes. 181. If a people that by Oath and Duty are obliged to a Soveraign, shall sinfully dispossess him, and contrary to their Covenants, choose and covenant with another; they may be obliged by their latter covenants, notwithstanding the former; and particular Subjects that consented not with them in the breaking of their former Covenants, may yet be obliged by occasion of their latter choice, to the person whom they choose.

1. As to themselves, if former violated Promises excuse men from latter, then might men by one sin be free from the incommodities of an hundred after; for such a man that hath broke a former promise, might make an hundred inconsistent ones p. 189afterward without being obliged by them: But no man is to have benefit by his crimes. The first Covenant and the second may be impossible to be both Performed. But yet its possible they may both oblige. A man by contrary Covenants and Vows may oblige himself to Impossibilities, though he cannot perform them. He that makes an hundred covenants inconsistent with one another in the performance, sinneth as a Covenant-breaker in not performing all: though he should sin in other respects if he did perform many of them that are possible: Promises oblige whether just or unjust; But if they be unjust, they frequently cast men into a necessity of sinning; e. g. he that promiseth to give away an Orphans Portion committed to his Tutelage, sinneth if he do it, against the Law of fidelity and mercy; and he sinneth if he do it not as a Covenant-breaker. But when men have by contrary Covenants, cast themselves into such a Necessity of sinning, it may be a duty to choose the lesser sin, or rather to avoid the greater: And which that is, the circumstances of the Case must determine.

2. And as to others, it is most evident, that if I be innocent of the violation of a Covenant to a former Governour; then the peoples Engagement to a latter, may make him the just Governour, and so I may be obliged to obey him. Otherwise, 1. Few Princes on earth should be acknowledged, or people obliged to them. For the original of the succession of most or very many, was a consent that was forced from them by Power, when they were engaged to another by a former Consent. And if this obliged not the Consenters to obey the present Prince, it could not p. 190oblige their progeny, nor convey any Title to successive Princes. 2. If the latter Covenant bind the guilty, it may draw an obligation on the innocent, that have a necessity of abiding in the same Common-wealth. He that cannot quit the Common-wealth, must obey the Powers that are sinfully chosen by others, as well as if they were lawfully chosen, it being not his sin.

That man that will conclude that the Peoples consent is necessary to the Princes Title, and that no consent of a people pre-engaged is valid, shall null the Title of most successive Governours (at least) on earth, and ravel the state of most Common-wealths to their confusion, contrary to all Reason.

Nero and other Roman Emperours, that the Apostles and other ancient Teachers of the Church obeyed, and commanded others to obey (with that strictness as we find in Rom. 13.) were some of them chosen but after possession by a party, some but implicitely by that party; none of them more fully then such as I have here described; and few of them by a people that were not pre-engaged.

Thes. 182. When the freest people choose a Prince, they do not properly and efficiently give him his Power, as conveying it from them to him, but are only a causa sine qua non, and denominate or design the person that shall from God, and not from them receive it.

It is the groundless confounding principle of Levellers in the State, and (as Mr. Cawdrey notes) of the Church-Levellers or Separatists, that Power of Government is originally in the people, and from p. 191and by them must be conveyed to the Rulers. An opinion against Nature and Scripture; against the very essence of a Republike, that distinctly containeth Soveraign and Subjects. I have sufficiently confuted this before by many Arguments; and shewed that the people as such, have no Power of Government. And even now I shewed you, that we discern our Ruler by such a syllogism; That person who is most agreeable to the description, and so to the will of God, must be consented to as Soveraign: But this is that person. Ergo, &c.—

So that the Law leaveth nothing but the determining of the person here undone. And therefore the people certainly doing no more but to determine of the person, do convey no power, but only do that without which it will not be conveyed; some call them Instruments; properly they are not so much, though we need not contend about the Notion; when this Corporation choose their Bayliff, they give him not a jot of Power: They are but the Causa sine qua non: the Charter is the Instrumental cause; and the Soveraign is the principal efficient cause (under God.)

The people cannot give what they never received, nor had: But they never received nor had a power of Governing a Common-wealth, therefore they cannot give it. That it is not contained in each mans self-governing power, I have before shewed. As when a man is chosen in marriage by a woman, she giveth him not the Power of an Husband, but only chooseth the person who shall from the Law of God receive it; so is it between Prince and people. God hath said in his Law, The Husband shall Rule the Wife; The woman p. 192only adds the Minor, This man shall be my Husband. So that she gives him not the Rule, but by choosing him to be the man, is à Causa sine qua non. And if she should agree with him not to Rule her, it were ipso facto null, as being against the Law that specifieth the Relations: which sheweth that she giveth him not the power; otherwise she might restrain it or limit it. Yet here is this difference from our present case; that a woman may choose whether she will have a Husband or none: but so cannot a man choose whether he will be a member of a Common-wealth or not, except in some rare extraordinary case, that befalleth not a man among many millions.

Object. But a servant may give his Master power over him, and what degree he please; therefore a people may give a Prince power over them: And any man may oblige himself, and thereby give another power over him.

Answ. 1. The cases are much different. Government is founded in the Law of Nature. Angels have such Order, that have no sin: But servitude is a penal fruit of sin: and no man is to choose a punishment to himself that may well avoid it: He that may be free, should choose and keep his freedom. So that the Relation of a servant is such, that a man may avoid if he can and will; and when he is necessitated to submit to it, he may limit his Master in the governing of him as far as he can and will in the matter of servitude: And therefore here is a greater appearance (at least) of mans giving another the power over him, then in Political Relations constituted by God himself: And yet indeed, the matter here must more distinctly be considered. A servant is considered partly p. 193as one obliged to Work for another, and partly as the inferiour or subject in a family to be Governed by another in order to the ends of Family Government, which is the good order of the Family, for its own, and specially the Governors welfare, and the Pleasing of God that hath appointed that Order. These two are oft separated, and ever distinct: Some servants are but day-Labourers, and no members of the Family, and some are members of it. Every man having a certain Power of himself and his own Labours, may alienate what he hath to another, and so by Contract sell his labour to his Master. But as he is a member of a Family subject to a Master in point of Morality, bound to obey him in points of duty to God and man, of the first Table and second, and the due circumstantiating of these duties, so the servants consent is no proper efficient cause or giver of the Masters power, but only maketh himself the object of it: So that it comes [immediately] from God, as [immediately] excludeth an intervening second efficient cause, but not [immediately] as the word excludeth all kind of Means for determination of the Object, without which the Power would not be in that person over that other person.

So in point of Political Government, if there be a Domination conjunct, and the subjects submit themselves to a servitude, that indeed may be their own self-resignation, disposal or selling themselves so far to another, which is when the Governours Benefit is the principal end: (For we are not born for him.) And therefore Tyrannie and Domination of Princes are penal to the subjects, and they may escape them if they can. But proper Political Government, that p. 194is exercised over meer subjects for the publick order and Good; and the pleasing of God by Governing Justice, is Gods own Ordinance, and the Power wholly flows from him as the universal Soveraign.

So that if it would hold true that from the self-interest and self-governing power that each individual hath by resigning all to one, he may efficiently be made a Prince or Ruler over them (which yet would be false, as I have shewed, if God were not supposed that way to convey the power, which he hath not done; Political Power being totâ specie distinct from that of self-interest, and self-Government) yet God hath left no room for this imagination and dispute, because he hath as universal King, himself instituted the Offices that shall be under him, leaving only the modifying and limiting of Circumstantials, and the determination of the persons to the will of man. And as it would be but a foolish or Trayterous arguing for a Corporation to say, [Every man hath a self-propriety or interest, and a self Governing Power, which resigned to another maketh him a Governour by conveying the Power from us to him: therefore our Major or Bayliff whom we elect, doth thus receive his Authority from our gift or authorizing Act] (they having nothing left to them but the nomination of the man that shall receive the Authority from the Princes Law or Charter;) Even so it would be no better in any that should argue thus in the other case. If no superiour Power had gone before them by his Laws, but a City were all free from Soveraignty, then indeed they might make to themselves a Prince, without the offending of any higher. And so if there were no God, (and yet man could be p. 195man) and if the world had no universal King, that had instituted offices under him by Law, and distinguished the world into Rulers and Subjects, then indeed the people might pretend to give the power as far as they have it to give, and be the Original of it: But when God hath given it already by a stated Law, to those that shall be lawfully nominated, the peoples claim comes in too late.

Thes. 183. As the Constitution of Common-wealths is only by Gods Laws, and mens fundamental Contracts, and not by any Fundamental Laws of men: So it followeth that it is only God by way of Authority, and the parties contracting by way of Consent, that can alter the Constitutioner any part of it; and there is no Authority of man that can alter it.

1. That the Constitution is not by humane Fundamental Laws, but by Contracts between Prince and People (explicit or implicit) I shewed before; and its plain in the nature of the thing. If a meer Conquerour should say, [I claim the Empire, and Command you as Subjects to acknowledge me] yet this were no Law, because proceeding from no Authority; and the peoples Acknowledgment, though forced by such words, would be but a forced Contract. So on the other side, if a people should make a pretended Law, that such a man or company of men shall Govern them, it were indeed no Law, because from no Authority: For before the Constitution there is no Legislative Power; either in Prince or People: Not in the Prince; for he is then no Prince; not in the People, for they are then no Governours, and therefore no Legislators: What have they to do to command any man to command p. 196them, or Govern them against his will? He is as free by nature as they, and cannot justly be compelled; (much less by a Law when there are no Lawgivers.)

2. It is a known Rule, that Obligations are dissolved as they are Contracted: And therefore from the way of Constitution the Thesis is plain, that nothing but Gods Authority, and mens Consent, can alter it. If it be altered by proper Law, then either by the Soveraign (whether Prince or Senate) or the Subjects: But neither by the Soveraign nor Subjects; therefore by no man. Not by the Soveraign; for 1. He is bound up by Covenant to the Constitution, and cannot by pretended Authority break his Covenants, but must stay till God or the people Contracted with, release him. 2. And his Legislation is a part of his Government, consequential to his Power, and so to the constitution in which he received it; and therefore hath nothing to do with that constitution, to destroy or alter it that is the cause of his power, and gives it life, or is the means thereto. Else Princes when by the Constitution they are limited, might remove their bounds at pleasure. And if a Senate do it, it must be either as Rulers, or as Subjects. As Rulers they cannot alter the Constitution: For if they be Inferiour Rulers, they have no Power but from the Soveraign: If they be the Soveraign, or (as in England) have part of the Soveraignty, then they have as was proved before, no power as such to do it, any more then a Soveraign King. And as subjects they have no Power to do it: For subjects have none such. 1. They had not Power by Law to Constitute the Government, nor by any force, but by Consent of him or them p. 197whom they chose to Rule them; therefore they have no other Power to dissolve it. 2. Subjects are bound to obey, and have as such no Legislative Power; therefore much less have they any to alter the Constitution by.

Thes. 184. If Prince, Senate, or People alone (before God by certain providence have disobliged them, and dissolved the Government) shall of themselves without the Consent of the other part, dissolve or change the Constitution, they perfidiously destroy the Foundation, (if it be in the substantial points) and put themselves into a state of enmity with the other part.

But of this more, when we come to speak of the Dissolution of Common-wealths.

Thes. 185. Yet may the first Constitution of a Common wealth be in many particulars changed by degrees, when Prince and People do Consent: But if those Consents shall be called by the name of Laws, thus far they are none indeed, but Contracts.

1. That Constitutions may be gradually and annually changed (possibly, but not fitly) is evident: Because as Consent of the chief Governour and people sufficed to the Constitution, so doth it suffice to the alteration. The same cause may produce the like effect; for here is no impediment. And therefore we need not in this Land go to the Original of the Common-wealth to know the Constitution: For whereever it is to be found that Prince and people have thus p. 198or thus Consented, so much of the Constitution is there found.

2. In a Law this change of the Constitution may be found: but it is not it self any part of a Law. A Parliament may have a double capacity: To be Soveraign (in whole, or part) and to be the Representatives of the people: They Represent the people, either simply as people, to preserve their Rights according to the Constitution; or else as subjects. A Representative of subjects, as such, have no Power of making Laws, nor by Contract altering the Constitution: A Representative of People, or a Community, as such, may have power to preserve their Rights, and by Contract to change the Constitution, but none to make Laws: A Parliament as Soveraign, have Power to make Laws, but none by a Law to alter the Constitution. But when the Parliament hath several capacities, their Instrument may accordingly have a various nature and use, and in part it may be a Contract with the Prince, themselves Representing the people, and so it may Gradually alter the Constitution; and in part it may be a Law imposed by the whole Soveraignty. And in the Instrument called a Law, alterations of the Government may be made by Consent of both parties.

Thes. 186. If by later Consent between Prince and People, the antient Constitution be changed, or any part of it, it is the last Consent alone that bindeth the Prince and Subjects as nulling the contrary former Contract; and it is perfidiousness to violate the last Consent, upon pretence of recurring to the first constitution.

p. 199If Lycurgus by the peoples consent shall settle a form of Government; and say in it, that it shall be unchangeable, this will not disable successive Princes and people by Consent to change it; seeing they have as much power to change it, as he and the people then had to establish it. But if the next age change it, it will be Treason in them that will go about to violate the new establisht Government, under pretence of sticking to the old.

Thes. 187. The Constitution gives life to the Species of Government, when the individual Prince is dead, till that Constitution it self be altered.

Else there must be a new Common-wealth at the death of every Prince: and posterity should not be obliged by ancestors for their good.

Thes. 188. Every man that is obliged to obey, is not obliged by his Obedience to Justifie the Title of the Ruler against all others, as the best; not alwaies to defend it by arms.

For there are many (if not most Princes on earth) that seeking Crowns by unjust means, or receiving them as so acquired, or being themselves unfit, &c. do want such a Title as may justifie them before God; and yet have such a Title as is valid among men, and will require obedience from all the subjects.

Thes. 189. In doubtful cases, or where the subjects are not called to Judge, the possessor is to be obeyed.

p. 200Paul took not all he wrote to for obedience, to be c…pable of Judging Nero's Title. If Consent of the Romans were proved, the Senate and City were a small part of the Roman world; Who made them Representatives of the whole?