A Holy Commonwealth, Chapter 6
CHAP. VI. Of the several sorts of Common-wealths.
HAving spoken of the Universal Kingdom, and next in general of particular subordinate Common-wealths, that God hath by institution made the parts of it; I must First speak of the CONSTITUTION, and next of the ADMINISTRATION of these. And about the Constitution I shall first speak of the MODES (or SPECIES as commonly called) and then of the Individuation.
Thes. 65. God hath not in his Universal Lawes restrained the Nations of the world to any one Mode or Species of Government, but left it as a variable thing to be determined according to the condition of each people, whether one or many shall have the Soveraignty under him.
There is a twofold diversity of Governments: One is in the Persons Ruling; Another is in the Matter of Government: whether the former do deserve the name of Specification or not, it hath by Custome obtained that name: And so Monarchy, Aristocracie, and Democracie are called the distinct Species of Governments or Common-wealths. In the Matter of Government there is difference, in that some have greater power, and some have less: some Soveraigns are limited to certain things, and degrees of power; and some are unlimited: and some limited more, and some less. And one would think this difference were as great as the former.
I know some pretend to a Divine Institution for Monarchy, but they mean onelyonly that it may from Scripture be proved to be best; but not that no other but it, is Lawfull. Thus Michael Hudson and others assert it to be Jure Divino: As for their pretences, that would make Democracie the onelyonly Government that hath the stamp of God, I think them not worth the writing against.
Thes. 66. The true formal nature of a Common-weal is in every one of the Modes or Species now in question; so that it is absurd to appropriate the Title of a Common-wealth to any one of them alone.
Yet so do the new Popularists among us, calling Democracie only [a Common-wealth] which they should rather call [a Common-government] if it imply no contradiction. The Constituting Matter of every Common-wealth is the Pars Imperans, and Pars subdita: the Governours and Subjects: and the forme is their Mutual Relation as respecting the End: the neerest End is Order, and the next the peoples safety and welfare hereby maintained and promoted; together with the Honour of the Governor: the more principal End is our present pleasing of God and honouring him, and the ultimate end is our more perfect everlasting pleasing him in our fruition of him in glory. It is named Respublica a Common-weal, partly from the matter, because it is the publick Affaires that it is exercised about: and partly from the end, because it is the Common good that it is instituted for, and is to be intended. A Vicinity or Community, City or Society may be where there is no Common-wealth. Any Number of men in capacity are the remote subject of it. A City or Community drawn neerer by contract, are usually or oft the more neer subject of it. For usually some Contract disposeth them, and makes them a Community, or City, before they become a Common-wealth, or so it may do at least. Though some call it not a City till it be headed with a Governour, and so it is a Common-wealth. Its not the Attaining but the Intention or Tendencie of the Government to the Common-good that is essential to a Common-wealth. An accidentally unhappy Common-wealth hath yet the forme, and must have the name.
Thes. 67. The reason why God did not Universally by his Law tye all the World to One forme of Government, is because the difference of persons, times, places, neighbours, &c. may make one forme best to one people, and at one time, and place, that is worst to another Monarchy is best for some, Aristocracie to others, and Democracie to others.
Some places may have fewer persons fit, and some more: some places may lie under the advantages of one man, or of many, or of the multitude, so as that they cannot live prosperously without pleasing them, and so submitting to them. In some places the people are much addicted to One way, and in some to another: some Common-wealths do most intend Preservation, and other Increase of Riches, or of Possessions by enlargement of their Territories. And Custom may do much.
Thes. 68. That is the best form of Government to this or that People, that all things considered, doth most powerfully tend to their spiritual and everlasting welfare, and their Holiness, Obedience, and pleasing of God.
Nothing more sure or clear, then that the ultimate end doth most put the due estimate on all the means. If Government be no means to this end, it is not good, desirable, nor of God: for if it be not to and for God, it is not from him. There is nothing in all the world that can be the Object of a humane Act, but the ultimate end, and the meanes thereto. If Government be neither, we have nothing to do with it: But if it be one (as certainly it is) it cannot be the end, and therefore must be a means: and if so, that is the best means which most tendeth to the attainment of the end.
Object. But the Common corporal Prosperity is the near and proper end, and therefore that must estimate the meanes.
Answ. Even that nearer end is it self but a means to our ultimate end; nor to be any further valued or regarded by a rational Creature, then it hath a tendency thereto; and therefore that which hath no value it self, but what it hath as a means to the ultimate end, can convey no other to its subordinate means. Nothing more sure then that our ultimate end must turn the scales of our estimation of all means. A horse may be stronger then a man, and a dog sounder, and a Tree live longer here. The Turkish Dominion may have more riches, and Power, and larger Command then the English Common-wealth: But it is not therefore the happier: That which most advanceth the people to salvation, and keeps out sin, and keeps our holiness and pleaseth God, is the best Government. He that beleveth not this, is at the heart an Infidel. A prison with holiness and the favour of God, is better then all the Riches and Glory of the world without it: The comon cause of the Damnation of all that perish is the preferring of Riches, Honor, Pleasure, Liberty, and such fleshly accommodation before God and Glory. No men on earth therefore can more promote the Devils work, and the perdition of souls, then these that plead for corporall advantages in the framing of their Common-wealths against Gods interest, and the well-fare of mens souls! They too grosly play over again the game that the Devil playd with Christ that foiled him, Mat. 4. when he offered him all the Kingdoms and glory of the world, if he would worship him. None but those that have forsaken God shall be so far forsaken by him as to follow these impious Principles. We will not contrive our own adversity, nor refuse Prosperity when God affordeth it: But we must estimate all with respect to our ultimate end, and prefer the flames before a Crown when it is against this end.
Thes. 69. That is the best form of Government that most conduceth to the common safety of the interest of God, and the well-fare of his Universall Kingdom.
The good of the world, and the whole body of Gods faithful Subjects is more to be lookt at, then the good of a particular Common-wealth. The same Principles that prove it sordid and impious to value our private personal prosperity before that of the Common-wealth, do prove it as bad to value the good of one Common-wealth before the Universal Kingdom of God on earth. If a people could live most prosperously to themselves in the state of some petty Republicks and Free-Cities, but yet are thereby uncapable of doing much for the safety or wel-fare of their brethren abroad, it is not the most desirable Government.
Thes. 70. At that is properly a Domination, or Governing of servants, which is principally for the Rulers benefit, and that is a Common-wealth which is principally for the Common-benefit, so the more any form of Government tendeth to the Common-weal or Good of all, the more desirable it is; (supposing the two fore-mentioned conditions.)
This also is plain, because the end still estimates the means. And as Millions are better then one and Gods interest more concerned in their wel-fare, so their wel-fare is more the end of the Common-wealth then his. The Prince in this respect is for the people, more then they for him.
Thes. 71. Yet is the Honour of the Prince, as he is Gods Officer, and participateth of Authority derived from him, one part of the end of a Common-wealth, and not to be separated from the peoples benefit, in our intentions.
Mr. M. Hudson maintaineth that this Honor of the Soveraign is the nobler end, and to be preferred before the peoples good. I think they are so admirably linckt together, that we cannot fairly bring them into Competition or Dissention. Gods Interest in other respects is most in the people: though it is only the Rulers that participate of his Governing Power and Honor. Gods interest in the Magistrates Honor, is better then the Peoples prosperity as theirs: And Gods Interest in the Peoples Wel-fare, and the Worship and Obedience that he hath from them, is better then the Magistrates Honor as his own: And the peoples Wel-fare as their own, is better then the Magistrates honor as his own: There remains therefore no question to be decided, but this, Whether Gods Interest in the Rulers honor, or in the peoples Wel-fare, must be preferred.] Which needs no further decision, because they are never to be separated, but both to be still regarded. Honor is commanded us to our Superiors in the fifth Commandment, and if any sin of theirs do make them uncaple of their own part in the honor, still Gods part must be secured, that is, when they are bad Rulers they must have the Honor of Rulers, though not of good Rulers, and that resulteth unto God: and if they cease to be Rulers, Magistracy ceaseth not, and therefore it must still be honoured, and God in it.
Thes. 72. That form of Government is not to be judged most for the common good; which giveth the greatest Power to the multitude, but that which provideth them with the greatest advantages to serve and please God, and help their Brethren.
Let Satans slaves think the Highest are the Happiest, who are animated with Pride, and take the admiration, applause and submission of men to be their felicity: but none will think so that are not blinded with ambition: The befooled Admirers of the glittering vain Glory, and pomp of worldly dignity and greatnesse, do think a trouble and grievous burden a desirable thing, and part of their felicity. And therefore as every wicked, proud and sensual man would fain be highest, and the Ruler of all, so when such proud and wicked men write Politicks, no wonder if they animate their Writings from their own spirits and principles, and make that the happiest state to the people in which they may have most of Governing Dignity and Power which is far from Truth.
Thes. 73. The great burden and work of the Ruler, is the Principal thing to be lookt at in his office; and the Honor is but for the work sake, and for God that giveth him his Power? The people therefore are more beholden to a faithful Governor, then the Governor is to the people, and receive more from him, then he from them.
Most men believe not this, though it be most evident, because Ambition and carnal Admiration of secular pomp doth bind their minds. But consider, 1. It is but one man, or a few that are the Receivers from the people, and it is the whole Community that receiveth from the Prince. 2. His cares and labors are far greater for them, then theirs for him or for the most part for themselves. He that never, was at Court, may easily know, what a miserable life it is (as to private pleasure) to have the care of a Common-wealth, and to have so many Expectants and Petitioners to satisfie, and of so contrary dispositions, interests & expectations, where it is impossible for the wisest or richest Prince to satisfie or gratifie all, and unavoidably necessary to displease many, & then to incur the passionate censures of those that are displeased: To have scarce time through multitude of businesse to look to the health of their own bodies; nor do so much for their souls as they that are out of the crowd, and have opportunity of Retirements. 3. And their lives are more in danger by the Plots and Passions of enemies and discontented men, then the Subjects are. 4. And worst of all, they stand in the most incommodious, dangerous station as to their own salvation: The Pomp of the world is potent to deceive, and the gteatness and multitude of Business to divert; and the words of flatterers to pervert, and their applause to puffe up; and carnal Interest to engage them against the mortifying Doctrine and flesh displeasing ways of Christ: so that few great, noble and mighty are saved, and its wondrous heard for the rich and great to enter into heaven. So that I conclude, that for wicked men that believe not a life to come, and intend not the common good, but their own advancement, to scramble for a Crown, and clamber into honor, is no wonder, and accordingly they are like to use it. But if any good man, that knoweth what he doth, do accept of a station of so great work, and suffering, and danger, the people are more beholden to him, then he to them. Wise men know the weights of Crowns.
Thes. 74. Of all the three ordinary sorts of Government, Democracy is to most people, and usually the worst.
Let us first know what the sorts are that we speak of, and then prove the Assertion. And first I will not meddle with Domination, which looketh principally to the Princes ends, & but consequently at the common good, but only at the Monarchy thats called] A Kingdom.]
Thes. 75. 1. A Kingdom is a Common-wealth that hath one person only for its Soveraign, the end of whose Constitution and Administration is the common good.
The very Title of Rex, a King, is the most modest and convenient that a Soveraign can have: for it signifieth but one that ruleth, directeth or guideth, whereas Imperator, an Emperour, signifying a Commander, is fitted to the General of an Army, and of too high importance for him that Ruleth by Laws. And Dominus a Lord, in its proper signification, is, higher then that, and signifieth one that hath a Propriety and Power of Disposing of, as well as Rulling the persons and things that are under his Government, and ordereth them for himself as his own. A Protector is a name that I may not now descant on; but I may boldly say, that a King, and a Prince, Rex, & Princeps are lower as to pretension, and have in them the least appearance of Arrogancy, or sound of Arbitrary Power, and are most suited to a moderate Government.
Thes. 76. The Corruption of Monarchy is commonly called Tyranny which is when the One that is appointed to rule for the Common-good, doth destroy the Common good, or subject it to his private interest.
Some call him also a Tyrant that wants a just Title; and so distinguish the Tyrant that wanteth Title from him that abuseth it. But, 1. No man hath a Right to proper Tyranny, or to destroy the common good. 2. The other is more usually and fitly called an Invader, Intruder, or Usurper; and so let him keep his name.
Thes. 77. Aristo acy is a Common-wealth that's Governed by some of the best for the Common-good.
The Corruption of it is called Oligarchie, which is the confusion of the Community, when some of the strongest or richest, but not the best to get possession of the supream Government, and manage it for their private Interests, and not for the common good. If they be chosen by full Suffrage, yet it may be an Oligarchie, as well as by Invasion: the persons and abuse may corrupt the form.
Thes. 78. Democracy is a Common-wealth where the Soveraign Power is in all, or the Major Vote of the people to be exercised for the Common-good.
Some popular forms admit all the multitude to vote in Government without distinction: Most are wiser, and admit only persons thus and thus qualified, that have such Estates, or of such Ranks and Orders: some give equal power to all that have Votes: some limit the inferior sort, and give more power to those of greater riches, The Corruption of this is called Ochlocratie, which is the confusion of the Community, when the Rabble rout or multitude have the Rule, which they exercise to satisfie their giddy humors, or some private Interest against the Common-well-fare: Scarce any Democracy escapes this.
Thes. 79. A mixt Common-wealth is that, in which either two, or all three of these forms are so conjunct, that the Supremacy is divided among them, sometime equally, sometime unequally.
It hath been a Controversie, to which of these forms our English Common-wealth was, and is to be reckoned: the uncertainty of this was one cause of our Wars: Many thought it was a pure Kingdom or Monarchy, where the whole Soveraignty is in the King. The Parliaments have affirmed it to be a mixt Common-wealth, yet denominated a Monarchy or Kingdom from some eminent Prerogatives of the King: The Reasons given by them I shall not stand on, save only this One. The Legislative Power is a part, if not the highest part of the Soveraignty; but much of the Legislative Power is, and hath been in the Parliaments hands: therefore much of the Soveraignty is in their hands.
But to put all out of Controversie, the King himself in his Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of the Parliament, averres the same himself. As to them that argue from the Oath of Supremacy, and the Title given to the King, I refer them to Mr. Lawsons Answer to Hobbs Politicks, where he shews that the Title is oft given to the single person for the honour of the Common-wealth and his encouragement, because he hath an eminent interest, but will not prove the whole Soveraignty to be in him: and the Oath excludeth all others from without, and not them whose interest is implyed as conjunct with his. The Laws and Customs of the Nation must expound such Names. The eminent Dignity and Interest of the King above others, allowed the name of a Monarchy or Kingdom to the Common-wealth though indeed the Soveraignty was mixt in the hands of Lords and Commons. If in the mixture the interest of the Prince had been least considerable, it should not have been called a Monarchie or Kingdom, but an Aristocracy or Democracy from the Party that had the most eminent ininterest.
Thes. 80. Whether the natural persons that have the Soveraignty be One, or ten, or ten thousand, yet they are all but one Civil person, called the Soveraign.
The Majestas is in one Civil person called the Head of the Common-wealth: and the Common-wealth is individuated by the Head or Soveraign: and therefore if there were more Soveraigns or Heads then one, there would be more Common-wealths.
Thes. 81. That Democracy or Popular Government is ordinarily the worst, is proved by all these Arguments; 1. Because it comes nearest to the utter confounding of the Governors and Governed: the Ranks that God hath separated by his Institution.
It is certain that God himself hath appointed that some be Rulers, and some be Subjects: Now to make the Rulers and the Subjects the same, and so to make the people rule themselves, is next to the utter confounding of the common-wealth, and nullifying Government. And therefore it is said four times over in the Judges. 17. 18, 19, and 21. That [In those days their was no King in Israel:] and twice its added; [But every man did that which was right in his own eyes,] as if there had been no Government at all. And all because the temporary Monarch was interrupted, and the Aristocracy which continued began to grow weak, and savour too much of Democracy by the usurpation or tumults of the people
Thes. 82. 2. Nothing more incident to corrupted nature then for self-love: to blind men, and every man to be partial in his own cause: Now it is the people that are to be Governed, judged, punished, &c. and therefore how likely are they by partiality to themselves to make the Government next, to none.
Why else is every man excepted against, according to all Laws of God and Man, from being a witness or Judge in his own cause? And shall we have the greater part of the people be the highest Judges in their own cause?
Thes. 83. 3. Government requireth natural strength of reason, that the Governors may be prudent men: They are things oft-times of exceeding difficulty, and usually of very great weight that they have to judge of: But the multitude of the people are vsually of lamentable understandings, utterly unfit for such weighty things.
Multitudes in England, and more in Wales, Cornwall, Ireland, the High-lands, are scarce able to talk reason about common things! And are these fit to have the Soveraign Power to Rule the Common-wealth? I have been very sensible of this at an Assize, when I have heard the Judge and Counsellers industriously opening the case to the Jury, who stood by them as innocently as if they had heard nothing but Hebrew or Arabick all the while, and go their way, and bring in their Verdict, either as some one cunninger then the rest, perswades them, or else at random or hap hazzard, speaking that which was next the tongues end, so that I thought it much at one, as to throw the dice upon it, who should have the day. But O! if our people came to the work of Law-making, and our Senate must Rogare & Abrogare, & obrogare & subrogare, and the people resolve all as having the highest Power, what work should we have? and what a Herd would Govern us.
Thes. 84. 4. The great and weighty work of Government requireth an answerable Education to prepare them for it: But the Major part of our people have no such Education: therefore &c.
If we could possess them with the Holy Ghost, as Christ did his Apostles, we would call them from their fishing and tent-making to be Preachers or Rulers, and from their Plows, and Carts, and Dunghills to make Laws: But till then, let us have the common Reason to conceive, that as a man that hath studied Physick, Divinity, or any Art, or Science, or Doctrine, is liker to be skilled in it, then he that was never bred up to it: so is it about the Government of Common-wealths also.
Thes. 85. 5. They that are the chief Governors of a Common-wealth, have need to be wholly or mostly vacant from all Aversions for so great a work: But common people must follow their Plows and Trades, and cannot be vacant for it: therefore they are unfit to Govern a Common-wealth.
If any say that their bare Election of Governors may serve turn, I shall shew you anon that that is not Governing, nor any part of it. The wisest men on earth will find that the Government of a common-wealth will take up the whole man, and that they need no other Trade besides. We find in the Ministry how intolerable another Calling is; and why not here also?
Thes. 66. 6. They that shall Govern a Common-wealth should be good as well as wise, that they may resist temptations to partiality, and not prefer their private interest. But the Major part are not onelyonly likely but certain to be bad, yea Enemies to the very principal ends of Government, in most places of the world: therefore they are utterly unfit for Soveraignty.
It is the badness of men that causeth the corruption of all the forms of Government before mentioned, and subjecteth the publick good to private; and certainly (however some dream that their Laws and Engines can hamper any men) the Devil would never Govern well by any Laws. And Scripture and all experience tells us that the most are selfish, sensual, Worldlings haters of Godlinesse: An enmity being put from the beginning between the seed of the woman and of the Serpent, all this stir of the Republicans is but to make the seed of the Serpent to be the Soveraign Rulers of the earth: when God hath promised that the Kingdoms of the world shall become Christs Kingdoms, these men would have them the Babels of Satan, the seat of confusion, and the enemies of Christ to raign through the earth. When Christ told his Apostles that he sent out them as Lambs among Wolves, these men would have these Wolves to be the Governors of the world: even those that Christ threatneth to slay: because they would not have him to raign over them, must be the men that must every where raign themselves, even those that he threatneth to bruise for their Rebellion with Rod of Iron, and dash them in pieces as a Potters vessell, Psalm. 2. Luke 19. 27. Were not this multitude restrained, they would presently have the blood of the godly. Late experience hath told us somewhat. Their hatred to piety is so wonderfull and unreasonable, that I confess it confirms me in my belief of that Word of God, that doth affirm it of them. And if these men had once the Soveraignty, what a case were the World in.
But Infidels that take evil for good, may flatter these persons, and make them believe that I unjustly reproach them, and may tell them, that they are all honest men, and it is but some self-conceited persons that censure them: But this will not cure their sin, nor prevent their misery, nor make them fit to govern us: Nor can they make us believe that Wolves are sheep in the open day light.
Nor can they pretend that their Laws shall keep them from doing harm. For, 1 The Soveraign Power is the Law-giver, and therefore can change them at his pleasure: Our brutish impious rout may at any time make Laws for the banishing of piety and Christanity: and for the worshipping of Bacchus; and if they but hoot, that [Great is Diana,] it is a Law. They have not the Soveraignty, if they cannot make and abrogate Laws. 2. And were they only inferior Governors, he is a fungus, and not a man that knoweth not by experience how easily bad men can make good Laws to be a nose of wax, and knock down their Adversaries with the very Manicles that we put upon their hands. It was a Proverb at Rome, that Vices had nailed the Laws to the Walls. Living Officers can easily a buse dead Laws. But of this more anon.
Thes. 87. 7. Though no contrivance of man can ascertain a Nation of a succession of good and righteous Governors, yet that is the best Government that giveth the strongest Probability of it; and that the worst, that maketh it impossible, or next to an impossibility: But that the Major Vote of the people shold ordinarily be just and good, is next to an impossibility: therefore, &c.
We have some Hopes of just and honest Governors if we have Monarchy or Aristocracy: but we have so little hopes, as is next to none, if the Popular Vote must have the Soveraignty. For it is the whole humane nature that is corrupted, and is fallen into Rebellion against God the absolute Soveraign; every man is by nature a Rebel against Heaven, and at enmity with God, and the matters of his own and others happiness, which the true common good consisteth in. And Scripture and experience assures us that it is in almost all places, the smalle… number that are converted to Loyalty and subjection to God, and by sanctification reconciled to him, and laid down their enmity: so that ordinarily to plead for a Democracy, is to plead that the Soveraignty may be put into the hands of Rebels, and our welfare may be desperate, and the common good may be in the hands of the enemies of it, and that by a certain succession.
Thes. 88. 8. Democracy is furthest from Unity, and therefore furthest from perfection: and therefore the most imperfect sort of Government.
That Unity is the companion of perfection, and Division departeth from it as it doth from Vnity, is commonly acknowledged: which caused the Pythagorans to Curse the number of [Two,] because it was the first that presumed to depart from Unity.
Thes. 89. 9. That is the most imperfect Government which departeth furthest from the Divine Universal form: But so doth popular Government, therefore, &c.
The Universal Kingdom hath one King: The Government of the world is Monarchial. I know that man is uncapable of a full imitation of God: And to pretend to imitate him Politically where his naturall incapacity prohibits, it is foolish Arrogancy. But yet we must not willfully depart from him beyond necessity: The similitude of God that man was made in, is judged to consist partly in this Dominion over other Creatures. Surely the further from God, and the more unlike him we are, the more imperfect.
Thes. 90. 10. It is ordinarily the most imperfect form of Government which is furthest from the Angelical order: But such is popular Government. therefore, &c.
By the mention that we find of Princes among the Devils, and of Angels that were princes of the Kingdoms of the earth [Dan. 10. 13, 20, 21. &c.] we may conclude that their order is Monarchical or at least not this Major Vote: therefore &c.
Thes. 91. 11. That Government is the worst which departeth furthest from the frame of nature in the Government of individvall men: But so doth Popularity.
Art must imitate Nature. Man hath not many Intellects, nor many wills to guide and Command within him, but One onelyonly. Nor doth the Intellect submit to the five senses because they are the Major Vote. Nor doth the will referre the management of our actions to the consultation or Command of all the inferiour faculties, Nor doth the eye or eare forsake its office and resigne it to the Major Vote of the members.
Thes. 92. 12. That is the worst Government of a Commonwealth that is the worst in all other-Governed societies: But such is Popular Government, therefore it is worst.
It would make mad worke in a ship, if the Pilots or Captains power were committed to the Major Vote. And as mad worke would it make in an Army, if the souldiers by Vote should have the cheif Command and mannage all the designes of the Army, and rule their Commanders: And if Schollars rule their Masters and themselves by Vote, it would not do well: And too many of our Country consist of Children in State affaires. And if a family be ruled by the Vote of the servants and Children it will not do wel; How then should this do well in the Common-wealth.
Thes. 93. 13. The Government that recedeth furthest from that which Christ hath settled in the Church is the most imperfect and the worst. But such is popular Government: therefore,
I know this age hath produced (even good men) pretenders to a Popular Church forme as of Divine Institution; running point blank against the Scriptures. As Christ himself is the Monarch of King of his Church, and the One Head of his Body, so did he settle in every particular Church those Bishops, Presbiters, or Pastors whom he hath commanded the people to obey as their Rulers, [Heb. 13. 7, 17, 24. Act. 20. 28. 1 Tim. 5. 17. 1. Thes. 5. 12, &c.] And its strange if he should set Rulers over the people and Command them to obey them, and at the same time make the people Rulers, and Consequently Command the Pastors to obey the Major Vote. Let them think on't againe that owne such absurdities.
Thes. 94. 14. A safe Government must have secrecy that the Enemie may not be acquainted with their Counsels unseasonably: But a Popular Government is most uncapable of such secrecy in their designs: therefore, &c.
What great advantage the Enemy hath by knowing the secrets of a state before hand both in the times of Peace and Warre; and also that Popular Government is least able to keep their Counsels secret, are both things so evident as need no more words.
Thes. 95. 15. Thats the worst Government (caeteris paribus) that giveth the Enemy the greatest advantage to raise tumults, and mutinies, or get a faction for himself to work his own designs among them: But such is the Popular Government: therefore.
Its a most easie matter for masked Enemies to be members of a Democratical Body, and there in every case to make a party and trouble all things, and at least hinder others and tye their hands, we have no Popular Government in England, and yet it is so ea…ie for masked Papists, and Infidels, &c. to get into our Parliaments and there make disturbance that we feel the evill of it, but feare much more, if not prevented.
Thes. 96. 16. A safe and good Government must be able speedily to determine and execute in cases of great weight, that require haste: But the Popular Government is delatory, and will let the Common-wealth be lost, while they are debating.
Armies know, and wise Governours know the difference between expedition and delays: while we delay, our Counsels are opened: the enemy hath time to prepare & prevent us. And among a Crowd where multitudes have to doe, and that perhaps by long winded speeches; no wonder if Church and State be lost while we are consulting, and if Reformations be yet in the birth that many years ago were ready to be brought forth. There is scarce any such societies but have secret enemies among them that at least can finde them bones to picke on, and ingeniously divert them and frustrate their Consultations. If Rom… could say that [Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem;] yet one Swallow makes no summer, and extraordinary accidents are not the Rule of ordinary Government, The…e are times to delay: But there are also times for haste.
Thes. 97. 17. That is the worst Government (caeteris paribus) that is least agree…, or most subject to Division in it selfe, and to factions and tumults in the Common-wealth: But such is Popular Government therefore, &c.
Any man may know that thousands are hardlyer agreed, then a few or one. And long experience hath told the world that the Ocean is not more lyable to tempests, and waves, then the people to tumults, factions, and seditions. The reading of those Romane histories, that draw some into love with popular Government, doth make my stomack rise against it.
O what a mad and raging beast is this that some would commit the Soveraignty to. It Judgeth much by opinion, but little by truth, saith Cicero pro Roscio. [Nullum fretum; nullus Euripus tot motus tantas ac tam varias habet agitationes fluctuum, quantas perturbationes & quantos aestus habet ratio commitiorum,] saith he Pro Murae. Non Commitiis judicat semper populus, sed movetur plerun{que} gratia, cedit precibus, facit eos a quibus est maxime ambitus: deni{que} si judicat, non delectu aliquo, aut sapientia ducitur ad judicandum; sed impetu nonnunquam, & quadam etiam temeritate: Non est enim consilium in Vulgo, non ratio, non discrimen, non diligentia: semper{que} sapientes ea quae populus fecisser, ferenda, non semper laudanda duxerunt: Cicero pro Plauco. Shall we not believe the wisest man that had the experience of the most glorious, limited, regulated Democracy?
Is Seneca more to be believed? Hear his Judgement of the people. Epist. 39. [Nunquam volui populo placere. Nam quae ego scio, non probat populus: quae probat populus, ego nescio. Quis placere potest populo cui placet virtus? (N. B. This is not only the Puritans Censure, nor only the Christians.) Malis artibus popularis favor quaeritur: similem te illis facias oportet: Non probabunt nisi ag noverint;—Conciliari nisi ratione, amor turpium non potest: Quid ergo illa laudata & amnibus praeferenda actibus rebus{que} Philosophia praestabit? scilicet, ut malis tibi placere quam populo: ut aestimes judicia, non numeres: ut sine metu Deorum, hominum{que} vivas: ut aut vineas mala, aut finias. Caeterum si te videro celebrem secundis vocibus vulgi: si intrante te clamor, plausus & platonimica Ornamenta obstrepuerint si tota civitate te faeminae pueri{que} laudaverint, quidni ego tui miserear cum sciam quae via ad istum favorem ferat.]
Populus saepe magis voluntatem quam rationem dueem sequitur,] saith Guicciard. li. 9.
Populus rerum graviorum plane rudis & imperitus, at{que} ubi minus est opus saepenumero profusus; ubi autem res ipsa largitatem poscit, ut{que} adeo tenax ut dum minimis parcere vult, in maximos sumptus gravissima{que} pericula incurrat.] Idem li. 2.
Qui multitudini placeat, is sapientibus displiceat necesse est; inquit Plutar. de Educ. lib.
Talis est quaelibet plebs & turba, ut facile fallatur, & ad quodvis adducater: unde illa frequenter idem quod mari accidit: Quemmadmodum enim mare natura sua innoxium est recte utentibus, & tutum, si vero violenti flatus in illud irruerint, tale redditur utentibus, quales sunt venti a quibus circumqua{que} impellitur: ita vulgus, &c. Polyb. lib. 11.
A Hundred such Descriptions of the people are given us by such Writers. Go but to the Election of Knights for a shire, or any such Concourse, and compare it with a Governed Army, and see the difference, and the worth of a Government over the multitude.
Thes. 98. 18. That's the worst Government (caeteris paribus) which is exercised by unconstant fickle men: But such is popular Government: therefore it is the worst.
The Instability and Mutability of the people is known to the world: It hath been their Epithet in all ages, to be mutable and unstable. They may be in a good mood this year, and make good Laws, and destroy all the next; saith Cicero, pro domo sua, [In imperita multitudine est varietas & inconstantia, & crebra tanquam tempestatum, sio sententiarum commutatio.]
Dies intermissus unus, aut nox interposita saepe perturbat omnia, & t…tam opinionem parva nonnunquam commutat aura rumoris: saepe etiam sine ulla aperta causa fit aliud, at{que} existimamus; ut nonnunquam ita factum esse etiam populus admiretur, quasi vero non ipse fecerit;] Idem pro Muraena.
Nihil est sacilius quam in quem libet affectum movere populum, inquit Quintil. De. 11.
Snapte naturaest ingratus rerum{que} novarum cupidus populus, inquit Guicciard. Et in populi auxilio in rebus inopinatis ac periculosis ob multitudinis naturam firmum fundamentum jaci non potest. Idem lib. 15. This is the Vote of the Learned world concerning the world or multitude. And he never tryed them that knoweth it not by experience: how they will wheel about like the weather-Cock with the change of wind.
Thes. 99. 19. That is the worst Government that will exercise the greatest Cruelties, especially against the best: But such is popular Government, therefore.
I know Monarchy or Aristocracy, makes not bad men good, (of themselves) and therefore among them have been Cruelties: but nothing so many as have been exercised by the multitude when they do rise up, no cruelty seems too great to them in their tumults; When the Roman souldiery did but know their strength, how few of their Emperours died in their beds: what abundance, both Heathen and Christian have been murdered by them? Populari multitudine nihil est insipientius ne{que} insolentius. Ita{que} eos qui Tyranni insolentam fugiunt, in plebis effrenae insolentiam incidere; nequ aquam tolerandum est. Nam Tyrannus si quid facit intelligens facit, at plebi nulla inest intelligentia: Unde enim ei intelligentia adsit, qui nec edoctus est, nec novit honestum quicquam, ne in sua quidem familia, & qui ad res agendas sin consilio praeceps ruit torrenti similis,] inquit Herodotus, lib. 3. And Pausanias applauds one speech that said, [Hominem nimis Reipublicae administrationi deditum, & populari aura fidentem, haud nunquam feliciter diem extremum claudere.]
If God and our Governors did not bridle them the sober godly people in England would soone taste of the Cruelty of the vulgar, before they come to the Supremacy.
Thes. 100. 20. That Government where the Rulers have all the foresaid Incapacity, Ignorance, Levity, Naughtiness, &c. and yet have the greatest strength to do evill, and are least restrainable or reformable when they do miscarry, is, ceteris paribus, the worst of Governments: But such is the Popular Government: therefore it is the worst.
If one man turn Tyrant, or a few be corrupt, they are easilyer restrained then the heady multitude. For if the greater part or main body of the people do miscarry, there is none but God that is ordinarily able to correct them, or save the Common-wealth from their rage: for the strength is theirs. A horse may be mastered by a man, but not by mee… strength: Let him know his strength, and its hard to rule him: Nothing so unfit for Governing, as that which hath most strength with the smallest wisdom and vertue. The Block was not so bad a King to the frogs as the Storck. A few may fear the strength of the multitude, and be more wary in their Government, because of a possibility of suffering: but the multitude are out of danger of any, but God and their own folly; and therefore when they know their impunity, they will fear none, but be the more encouraged to injustice and impiety.
I conclude therefore that this ignorant, impious, mutable cruel, violent rout, shall never have my consent for the Soveraignty. Plebi non judicium, non Veritas, saith Tacitus, lib. 1. Hist. Vulgus & est mutabile subitis, & tam pronum in Miserecordiam quam immodicum saevitia fuerat. Idem. 16. [Multitudo ex incertissimo sumit animos, saith Livy De…ad 1. lib. 6. Defensores suos in praecipitem semper locum favore tollit; deinde in ipso discrimine periculi destituit. Idem 16. Haec natura multitudinis est, aut servit humiliter, aut superbe dominatur libertatem, quae media est, nec spernere modice, nec habere sciunt: & non firme desunt irarum indulgentes ministri qui avidos atq intemperantes plebeiorum animos ad sanguinem & caedes irritent.] Liv. Dec. 3. lib. 4. Multitudo omnis, sic natura maris, per se immobilis. est, ut venti & aurae cient aut tranquilli aut procellosi.] Idem, Dec. 3. lib. 8. Nihil tam incertum, nil tam inestimabile est quam animi multitudinis. Idem Dec. 4. lib. 1. Vulgus est ad deteriora promptum. Tacit. Anal. lib. 15.
Christians and Heathens have thought thus of the vulgar. Polycarp being required to defend himself before the people, refused, because [Principibus & Magistratibus honos debetur, modo Deo non sit contrarius: populo autem furenti satisfacere nemo potest: Euseb. Hist. lib. 4. c. 15. Phocion feared not to tell the Athenians that he was the singularist that their Oracle told them of, [Mihi enim ea omnia displicent quae vulgus ait] And Demades told him, [Laniabit te plebs si paululum insanierit.] Plut. which made him ask, Quid? Num mali dixi imprudens? What hurt have I spoken? When he perceived all applauded his speech. And Var. Hist. lib. 4. tells us of a Piper that beat his boy for piping naught, because the people applauded him. But I have said enough in so plaine a case.
Of the Objective or Material Differences of Government.
THes. 101. Governors are some limited, some de facto unlimited: The unlimited are Tyrants, and have no right to that unlimited Government.
For they are all Subjects themselves, and under the Soveraignty and Laws of God.
Thes. 102. Limited Governours are either limited from exercising so much power as God himselfe hath appointed the supreme Magistrate to use, or else limited only in things that God hath left undetermined, as to any universall determination. The former limitation is sinfull in the Limiters, and yet may be submitted to in some cases by the Soveraign innocently: the latter may be lawfull in both.
Inferior Magistrates may be limited according to the prudence of the Supreme; and more Power may be trusted to one, and less to another. But the Supreame Ruler may not limited contrary to Gods Description or Institution of his Power; yet he may be limited de facto, though not de jure primario; and consequetly de jure as to hmselfe, that is, so far. as that he shall be justifiable against any accusation of Omission: but the people still are guilty for restraining him.
Thes. 103. God himself by enacting his own Universall Laws, and instituting Magistracy for the Execution of them in subordination to him, doth thereby plainly tell us, that the Soveraign Powers in each Common-wealth are not to be restrained by the people from the Execution of any of his Laws, which belong to them as Magistrates to execute.
For Rulers are but Gods Officers for the subordinate Government of men by his Laws, and such subservient Laws of their own as are meet to promote the execution of his: For instance, If the people shall restrain the Soveraign Power form punishing Idolatry, or Adultery, or Theft, or false witness, &c. they hereby sin against God, who hath appointed a Magistracy under him for the punishing of these sins in the world.
Thes. 104. If the peoples limitations would frustrate the end of Government, the Prince ought not to consent, but rather to be no Governour: But if they only hinder the melius esse, or higher perfection of the Common-wealth, he may receive a sinfully limitted power.
As if he be forbidden or disabled from encouraging Honesty and Piety in the main, or suppressing, or punishing wickedness in the main, or promoting the to accept of such a Power; For this is not that Office that God hath instituted, but another of mens devising, and set up by his enemies. But if the limitation be only in some point that's integral, but not essential to Honesty, Piety, or Common good, (as the punishment of Theft, or Fornication only, or with such a degree of punishment) then he may assume it; but with a Protestation that it is not his own doing, nor doth he own the action of their restraint.
Thes. 105. The people can restraine a Prince de facto, because they have the strength, and he cannot govern them without their own consent, either in whole, or in part: and therefore their dissent doth make the exercise of a further Power impossible to the Prince (or other Soveraign) and consequently justifie him.
If all the Army stand up for the life of a Traitor or Mutineer, the General is not able to punish him. If they refuse to go upon a particular design, the General cannot force them. If the body of the people resolve that they will have no Law (or not severe enough) against drunkenness or fornication, the Prince cannot help it. So if he Govern Papists, and they will not suffer him to restrain them, (or any the like unlawfull Sect) it is their fault, and not his. He is not bound to an impossibility, nor bound to cast off all the Government and do no good, because he cannot do what he would: It is the people, and not he that gives liberty to the sin, (unless he consent to their fact, or his not resigning keep out one that could do more.) Their consent is Conditio sine qua non of his execution.
Thes. 106. Yet is this no act of Governing Authority in the people, nor doth it prove them to have the least measure thereof: but it is only an exercise of their natural Resolution upon the advantage of their strength, and in unlawfull cases; it is only a mutinous disobedience against God, which is far from Authority.
And therefore the Dissent of one or two, or of so few that can be well mastered, no nor of the Major part when they can be mastered, is no restraint to the supream Power from executing all the will of God committed to him as his Rule; nor will excuse him for his omissions, or his toleration of iniquity. If my horse will go no further then his list, it followeth not that he is a sharer in the right of Ruling himself and me, because he is unruly. Limiting by dissent is not Governing.
Thes. 107. Though the Prince may omit some good by reason of the peoples Dissent and Limitations, yet he may not commit any evill on any such pretence.
Duty is not at all times Duty. Affirmatives bind not ad semper: but sin is never to be commitmited. If the people will have a Toleration of unlawfull Sects, the Magistrate may yeild when he cannot help it, or if it were to attain a greater good for the Church of God: because indeed it is but the Negation of a Duty, (punishing Offenders) or making Laws against them) which at such a time and case is to him no duty. But if the people would force him to profess any false-opinion himself, or perform any false worship, he may not do it: Evil may not be done, when good may be omitted.
Thes. 108. Though God have not in his Universall Laws determined of the Degree of Princes Power in all Circumstantials or variable matters, yet he hath given general Laws for regulating of such determinations as there shall be cause.
The Material species (as some call it of Power is not fully, but yet thus far determined of by God, and instituted in his Law. 1. He requireth that the supream Power be as his Authorized Officer, the Preserver of his own Universal Laws, and see them executed. 2. He restraineth him from doing any thing against those his Laws. 3. He giveth him general Rules, according to which all humane Laws must be made in undetdrmined cases. 4. He restraineth him from crossing these Rules in his Government.
Thes. 109. The Principal fundamental Rules for the Magistrates Government, are 1. That he doe all in a due subordination to God the fountaine of Authority: 2. That he frame all his Laws and execution so as that they may be a means to the ends of Government! viz. both the neerest end, the Order, peace, and happiness, Corporall, and spirituall of the Common-wealth; and the ultimate end, the Pleasing of God in our salvation for ever.
If any of the Laws of men be totally Cross to the fountaine and the end, or make against them in the maine, they are Nullities and private prohibited acts, of no authority: No forces, no advantages, no power, no engagement of men, can authorize any man against God, or against the salvation of our soules, and the Common safety of the people. And this upon a twofold account: 1. Because they are without Authority: 2. Because they are against the Chief Authority.
Thes. 110. Another Divine limitation of the Soveraign is, that he fit all his Laws to a due subserviency unto Gods universall Laws, and do nothing against any of them.
Thes. 111. Yet as Gods Laws are not all of absolute necessity to the being of a loyal subject of his Kingdom, though all are obligatory, so the Magistrate that in point of Duty is bound to subserve and observe all Gods Lawes, yet nullifieth not his office or power by sinning against those that are not of absolute necessity as aforesaid.
Every thing that is a sin destroyeth not Christianity in a Christian, or Magistracy in a Magistrate: as some Laws and Duties, are but for the bene vel melius esse of our Christianity, and Magistracy: so some sins may tend effectually but to the diseasing of both.
Thes. 112. The people ought not to restraine the soveraign Power from a usefull Determination of things in themselves indifferent, according to the Generall Rules of God, for the ends of Government.
Under pretence of Liberty, they should not limit the Rulers from any Lawes or executions that are really for their own good (which is the main Generall Rule next Gods will and honour.) And if they doe, the Ruler may innocently be restrained but the people sinfully restraine him. They cannot be innocent in hindring their owne good and the ends of Governments.
Thes. 113. But in case that Rulers would. 1. Have a power to trouble the Common-wealth with needless Lawes. 2. Or wo…ld determine Circumstances dangerously, so that it may as probably, or more, doe hurt as good: 3. Or would have such a power to do a lesser good which he cannot have without the power of doing much more hurt: 4. Or would actually do hurt to the Common-wealth, the restraint of the people (in the Constitution) is here innocent and prudent.
For it is but self-preservation, that nature teacheth man as man: but still it argueth not any measure of Governing power in them; but a strength exercised honestly for self-preservation, by refusing to be under such Laws or executions as would hazard, trouble or destroy them.
Thes. 114. The People may have a true Propriety in their estates, though they have no Right of Governing: and therefore here they may more Capitulate with the soveraign and restraine him from taking their Moneys, Goods, Lands, &c. Without their consent, or but on contracted termes.
If the Laws of the land or Custome restraine the Prince from taking any mans money or goods without his consent, this is no proofe of any Governing authority in the people, for Propriety is not Government: Nor limiting a Ruler by holding my own, is not Ruling.
Dominion is in order of nature antecedent to Government, & may be out of a Common-wealth as truly as in it. The distribution of Dominion or Propriety may be done by the ordinary Law of Nature conjunct with disposing Providence. Ocupation if it be agreeable to the Law of Nature [when men are under no other Law] that is, if it be not of another mans, nor of an undue proportion, &c. may occasion a true Propriety. But if the occupant would seize upon a whole Country or more then Nature alloweth as a proportion for one man, and tendeth to the Common hurt of the Community, or mankind, here he hath no Title and may be dispossest. But in Common-wealths: Propriety is partly made subject to the ends of the Common-wealth; and therefore Governing Lawes may give propriety, though there be a propriety in order of nature before any Lawes, but those of Nature.
Thes. 115. It is not safe or Lawfull for the people to limit or restrain the soveraign Power from disposing so farre of the estates of all, as is necessary to the safety of all, which is the end of Government.
It is not the whole of mens Propriety that is to be subject to the Governour but part? and that Part is subject for the preservation of the whole remainder. Men have the primary Propriety in themselves, and the secondary in their estates: and as no Governor may take away the lives of all the people on pretence of justice or necessity, but only some on just occasions, and that for the good of the rest, so no Governor may take away all the estates of the peoples, but only part to preserve the rest: Nor may he justly take from them the Propriety, leaving the possession. The King of Egypt could not take the peoples Lands and Cattle, as Governor, but as Contracter, by Purchase, when Joseph sold them corn, and they parted with a great part of their propriety to save their lives. But to make Propriety dependant, and limited as a Tenants, may be lawfull, if not by injustice nor unmercifulness accomplished.
If the Ruler have not Power to preserve the Common-wealth, he is not capable of the ends, and so not of the work of Government. It is for the peoples good that part be used to save the whole and themselves. But yet it is just and wisdom for the people in the constitution to limit the Ruler by convenient cautions that he may not under pretence of Preserving them have advantage to oppress them: and therefore it is unfit for the ordinary stated Revenews necessary to his personal or annual-publick use, should depend upon their after-Consent; (for so Princes would be brought into the case as those Ministers that live on the peoples voluntary contribution, and would find both murmuring and mutable Pay-masters) yet in extraordinary Taxes it is fit the people should restrain the Rulers from arbitrary seizures. And yet it is unfit that this restraint should be exercised by the people themselves, but rather by lome prudent chosen persons, as it is in our Parliaments. For the multitude are covetous, tenacious, injudicious, and incompetent judges of the necessities or commodity of the Common-wealth: and will make a small matter of their dangers, and publick commodities, and a great matter of their payments, till they are undone, and wise too late: And almost all Contributions will occasion seditions, tumults, or unsettledness in the Common-wealth
If the people, or any as chosen by them to that end, have only such a limiting self-preserving Power to themselves reserved, or a meer judicium discretionis about the necessities of the Common-wealth; this proveth not that they have any power in the Government, but if they have also a deliberating power about the common dangers or diseases, and a directing or disposing Power about the Remedy (whether money arms, &c) as a Remedy, then it is a part in the Government that is reserved to them.
Thes. 116. The propriety of particular men is subjected to the Governor as a Governor, so far as that he may judge in cases of difference, and administer Justice in giving every man his own, and may deprive men of part, or all that they possess by way of punishment for their crimes.
A Governor hath nothing to do in Government, if he had nothing at all to do with mens propriety: for as he decideth differences about it as Judge, and maketh Laws which shall be the Rule of such decisions, so he may take away all that a man hath as a penalty, and make Laws which shal be the Rule of that Penaltie. What do penal Laws but deprive men (for the most part) of their propriety, when they forfeit it by their crimes? The Magistrate may take away mens lives for their crimes; therefore he may take away their money or Lands: for their lives are as much their own, and are more precious to them. And if he may not punish Offenders, he is no Governor.
Thes. 117. Yet here also it is fit that the Constitution limit the Soveraign de modo, as God by his Universal Laws hath limited him in the substantials of Justice.
For if under pretence of Justice every mans Life and Estate should be meerly at the mercy of of an Arbitrary unlimited Prince, it were as bad as to have all left to his will, when he will pretend a necessity for the publick safety or commodity directly. They may see in the constitution that vertues be not punished as vices, nor the innocent (by a Law) as if they were guilty: and that none but well chosen able men be Judges, and that they be responsible to the Supream: and that the penalties exceed not the crimes, nor the matter of fact judged without sufficient witness; and such like restrictions they may put to escape Injustice; but such disable not the Governor to do Justice ordinarily.
Thes. 118. If the Soveraign be not limited in the constitution, or by his own consent, but only in geral terms entrusted with the Soveraignty, he may by vertue of his Soveraignty dispose of the Estates of the Subjects in order to the ends of Government: But though there be no express restraint upon him in the constitution, yet can he do nothing against the Laws of God, or the ends of Government.
It is implyed in the constitution of every Government, that it cannot be used against its superior Power, or its end. This God hath obliged them to already, and therefore it is firm, though men say nothing. And therefore a Governor as he is a subordinate Officer of God, is restrained from Injustice, and so from seising on the Estates of others, for himself or his Favorites, or without the demand of Justice, or the publick good. But in these cases his office alloweth, yea, and bindeth him to do it, if not restrained notoriously by the constitution. And he would be an enemy to the Common-wealth, if he suffer it to perish in tenderness of mens private good.
Thes. 119. It seems to many a very difficult Question, Whether a Soveraign should save the Common-wealth when the limitations in the constitution disable him? But the Answer is easie. If the danger be not certain or very great, he is to keep his bounds and Covenant: and if mischief fall on the common-wealth, the people by their foolish limitations were guilty, and its they that must bear the main loss. But if the danger be great, and the people express not their dissent, the Soveraign may trangress his limits to save the Common-wealth, because the constitution being for the common safety, it is to be supposed that the Authors of it did intend the end, before they chose the means, and therefore did mean, that if the limitations should fall out to be inconsistent with the end, they should be nul.
Nature alloweth us to suppose that no man would destroy himself, till we are able to prove the contrary. And when we can prove it, we thereby prove him a mad-man, or of so depraved an Intellect, as that he is not fit to be covenanted with: much less then, may we suppose that a Nation or Society of men intend their own destruction: Nor that they intended rather to perish, then their limitations should be observed. But if a Soveraign break his bounds without such danger as is either notorious before hand, or he can afterward make notorious to the people for …s Justification, he will incur censures and hazards …o himselfe and the Common-wealth.
Thes. 120. But it seems a harder Question what the Soveraign should do in case the people not only limit him by Covenants, but actually desire the way that destroy them, and dissent from his preserving them, whither may he save the common-wealth against the peoples wills? The Answer is easie, that he may do it, both as he is a Governor, and so an Officer of God for the ends of Government, and therefore cannot lawfully be restrained by the people from preserving them, because they have no Power above God: and also as a private man ex charitate, he is bound to save a Nation if he can, though without Authority; as we must save a man from drowning or hanging himself, or quench the fire which he kindleth in his own thatch. And because it is still to be supposed that the people desire their own preservation, and therefore mistakingly resist the means, which else they would consent to.
This cause may fall out, though to some it ma seem impossible, especially in times of War; and especially in the Army it self, when the souldiers by their ignorance and remerity may presently cast themselves away, if they be not hindred. And the people by the power of deceits, or fear, may subjugate themselves to barbarous destroyers. But yet it is no ordinary case as to the temporal good of the people: and when it doth fall out, it rarely falls out, that the Soveraign is able to deliver them. It ofter falls out, about the peoples spiritual and eternal good, and Gods honour: and how far the Governor may here preserve them (by a minor part, or by forreign strength) against the wills of the Major part, I shall shew anon.
Many things that are commonly debated by Politicians about the Jura Regalia, vel Majestatis, I shall pass by both, because I intend but some Aphorisms suited to the demands and doubts of these times, & because the Generals sufficiently declare them as to my ends: and because I shall have fitter occasion to speak of the chief of them, among the Works of Soveraignty towards the end, I shall next (before I compare the sorts of Government, and shew which is the best) speak of the efficient causes or foundation of Power.