Logic in Two Books, Book 2
THE SECOND BOOKE OF PETER RAMVS HIS Dialectica of Iudgement.
Cap. 1. What Iudgement is.
Q. Hitherto the firſt part of Dialectica in Invention hath bin expounded, the other part followeth, in Iudgement, what then is Iudgement?
A. Iudgement is the ſecond part of Logicke of diſpoſing arguments to bee iudged well.
Q. How are they iudged?
A. Every thing is iudged by a certaine rule of diſpoſition.
Q. It may be thought then that this part of Logicke is called both judgement and diſpoſition from hence?
A. So it is.
CAP. 2. An affirmative or negative Axioma.
Q. What are the kindes of Iudgement?
A. Iudgement is Axiomaticall, or Dianocticall.
Q. What is an Axioma?
A. An Axioma is the diſpoſition of an argument, with an argument, wherein ſomewhat is iudged to bee, or not to be.
Q. What is it called, and whence receiveth it the name?
A. In the Lattin of Enuntiatum, it is called Enuntiation; of Pronuntiatum, Pronuntiation.
Q. What are the affections of an Axioma?
A. An Axioma is affirmative or negatiue.
Q. What is affirmative?
A. Affirmative is when the force of it is affirmd.
Q. And what negative.
A. When it is denied. From hence ſpringeth the contradiction of Axiomas, when the ſame argument is affirmed or denied.
Cap. 3. True and Falſe.
Q. What may be a ſecond kinde of the affections of an Axioma?
A. An Axioma ſecondly is true or falſe.
Q. How true?
A. When it pronounceth as the thing is.
Q. How falſe?
A. Contrary.
Q. What are the affections of a true Axioma?
A. A true Axioma is contingent or neceſſary.
Q. How contingent?
A. When it is ſo true that it may ſometimes be falſe.
Q. Give example?
A. Fortune helpeth the bold; for it may be that which is true to day, to morrow may bee falſe: and therefore the iudgement of this contingent verity, is called opinion: thoſe things of the time paſt or preſent, may be certaine to a man, but of time to come they cannot by nature, although with God all things are preſent. Therefore Martiall doth worthily mocke Priſcus
Priſcus thou often askſts what I ſhall be,
If now moſt rich, hereafter what truely?
Things for to come canst thou not tell them mee,
If thou a Lion art, what wilt thou thou be?
Q. How neceſſary?
A. When it is alwayes true, neither can be falſe.
Q. What is this affirmative called?
A. This affirmative is called Katapantòs of every thing.
Q. How impoſible?
A. Contrarily where it can bee true of nothing.
Q. What belongeth to an Axioma of the artes?
A. An axioma of the artes ought to bee Kantapantòs as alſo Homogene & Catholique
Q. What is an homogene axioma?
A. An homogene axioma is when the parts are eſſentiall among themſelves: as the forme to the thing formed , the ſubiect to its proper adiunct.
Q. what is this called?
A This Genus of the Species is called Kath' autò by it ſelfe.
Q. What it a Catholique axioma.
A. A Catholique axioma is when the conſequent is alwayes true of the anticedent; not onelyonly in every thing and by it ſelfe, but alſo reciprocally.
Q. Give example?
A. A man is a living creature, reaſonable, number is equall or unequall.
Q. What is this called?
A. This is called Katholon prôton vniverſally firſt.
Q. What then are the lawes of the proper documents of the artes.
A. Theſe three: the firſt, Catàpantòs the law of verity: the ſecond Kath' autò the law of iuſtice: the third Kathòlou prôton called the law of wiſedome, and ſuch is the iudgement of Catholique axiomas, the moſt true & cheife knowledge.
CAP. 4. The ſimple Axioma.
Q. You have expounded the common affections of axiomas, the kindes follow, what are then the kindes of an axioma?
A. An axioma is ſimple or compound.
Q. What is ſimple?
A. Simple is that which is contained in the force of one word; and therefore by an affirmative or negative word it affirmeth or denieth.
Q. Give example?
A. Fire burneth, fire is hot, fire is not water.
Q. Shew the force of theſe examples?
A. Here fire is the anticedent, burneth, the conſequent: and this is the firſt diſpoſition of invented things; of che cauſe with the effect, as in the firſt example; the ſubiect with the adiunct as in the ſecond; the diſagreeing with the diſagreeing, in the third: after a certaine manner, any argument may be enuntiated (except thoſe full of compariſon and diſtribution) agreeings truely by affirming, diſagreeings by denying.
Q. What are the kindes of a ſimple axioma?
A. A ſimple axioma is generall or ſpeciall.
Q. What is generall?
A. Generall is when the common conſequent is attributed generally to the common antecedent. and this contradiction, doth not alwayes devide the true & falſe, but both parts of the contingent, as alſo not of contingents may be falſe.
Q. Give example of the firſt?
A. Eaeh place delighted is, with Baijs pleaſant
No place delighted is with Baijs pleaſant roomes.
Q. Give example of the ſecond?
A Every creature is reaſonable, no creature is reaſonable.
Q. What is a speciall axioma?
A. A ſpeciall axioma is when the conſequent is not attributed to every antecedent, and here the contradiction ever divideth the true from the falſe.
Q. What are the kindes of ſpeciall?
A. Speciall is particular or proper.
Q. What is particular?
A. Particular is when the common conſequent is attributed particularly to the antecedent: but to this axioma it is generally contradicted.
Q. Give examples.
A. Somewhat is to be pardoned: Nothing is to be pardoned. Some clemency is not to be prayſed. All clemency is to be prayſed.
Q. What is a proper axioma?
A. A proper axioma is when the cōſequent is attributed to a proper antecedent.
Q. Give example?
A. Fabulla is faire, whoſe negative & contradiction is Fabulla, is not faire.
CAP. 5. The copulative axioma.
Q. What is the compound axioma?
The compound axioma is that which is contained in the force of a coniuction. Therefore from an affirmative or negative coniunction it is affirmed or denyed. And a part of the contradiction is true, a part falſe.
Q. VVhat are the kindes?
A. A compound Enunciate is for his coniunction congregative, or ſegregative.
Q. VVhat is congregatiue?
A. Congregative is that which enuntiateth all agreeings by affirmings and diſagreeings by denying.
Q. What are the kindes.
A. Copulative or connexed.
Q. VVhat is copulative?
A. Copulative is that whoſe coniunction is copulatiue.
Q. Give example?
A. Eneid: 1.
The eaſt and ſouth windes on the ſeas do blow,
They ruſh through deepe till on the top they ſhow,
The affricke oft with theſe his blaſts conioynes.
This therefore ſhall be the negatiue and contradiction.
The eaſt and ſouth windes not on ſeas doe blow,
They ruſh not through the deepe, ne on top ſhow,
The affricke doth not oft his blaſts conioyne.
Q. But whereupon dependeth the judgement of the copulative enunciate?
A. The iudgement of the coplative Enunciate being true dependeth of the truth of all parts: falſe, at the leaſt of one part falſe.
Q. VVhat may further bee compriſed under this head?
A. The enunciate of a relative quallity is of this kinde, whoſe coniunction is the relation it ſelfe.
Q. Give example?
A. Eglog. 3.
So me thy ſong as ſleepe on graſſe doth queme
The travailer his weary lims to drench.
Q. Shew the force of this example?
A. Here the coplative iudgement is as if he ſhould ſay, ſleepe is gratefull to the weary, and ſo thy ſong is pleaſing to me.
Q. VVhat is the Negative hereof?
A. Not me thy ſong as ſleep on graſſ doth queme The travailer his weary lims to drench.
CAP. 6. The Connexed Axioma.
Q. VVhat is a connexed Axioma.
A. A connexed axioma is congregatiue, whoſe coniection is connexiue.
Q. Give example?
A. Eneid. 2. If fortune doth feigne Simon miſerable, it diſhoneſly feigneth him to bee vaine and a lyer, whoſe negative is if fortune doth not feigne Simon miſerable it diſhoneſly feigneth him to be vaine and a liar:
Q. Is not this coniunction alſo denyed more manifeſtly, by denying the conſequent?
A. Yes.
Q. Give example?
A. Pro Amer. I am not a murtherer though in their company. De fato: Neither if every Enunciation be true or falſe, doth it follow therefore that the cauſes are immutable; For affirmation ſignifieth, if the antecedent be, that the conſequent is alſo. Negation therfore and contradiction determineth if the antecedent be that therefore the conſequent is not. Wherefore, when thou ſhalt iudge the connexiue to be abſolutely true, thou ſhalt iudge it alſo neceſſary, and thou ſhalt underſtand this neceſſity to ſpring from the neceſſary connexion of partes, the which may alſo bee even in falſe partes.
Q. Give example of this?
A. If a man be a Lyon, he is alſo a foure footed, this is a neceſſary connexion.
Q. But if the connexion be contingent, and only put for his probability, how ſhall it bee iudged then?
A. Its iudgment then ſhall be only opinion.
Q. Give example?
A. Ter: and Phamphilus if thou doſt this, this day is the laſt thou ſhalt ſee mee.
Q. What may be further under this head?
A. This relation connexive of conſequence is like to the connexed axioma, as when Tullius is ſaid to be an orrator, hee hath alſo ſkill in pleading well, and thus much of the congregative axioma.
CAP. 7. The diſcreet Axioma.
Q. VVhat is a ſegregative axioma?
A. A ſegregatiue axioma is that whoſe coniunction is ſegregative, and therefore enunciateth diſagreeing arguments.
Q. What are the kindes?
A. A ſegregatiue enunciation is diſcreet or diſiunct.
Q. VVhat is diſcreete?
A. Diſcreet is that whoſe coniunction is diſcretiue, and therefore of diſagreeings it cheifly enunciateth diuerſes.
Q. Give example?
A. Tuſc. 5. Although they may be iudged by the force of the body, yet they are referred to the minde: whoſe negatiue and contradiction is, although they may be iudged by the ſence of the body, yet they are referred to the mind, or, although they may be iudged by the ſence of the body, yet they are not referred to the mind. For yet is here a cheife coniunction.
Q. How is the diſcreet Enunciat iudged to be true?
A. The diſcreete enunciation is iudged to be true & lawfull, if the parts be not only true but may be alſo diſcreet.
Q. How is the falſe or ridiculous iudged?
A. Contrarily.
CAP. 8. The diſiunct Axioma.
Q. VVhat is a diſiunct axioma?
A. A diſiunct axioma is a ſegregative axioma whoſe coniunction is diſiunct.
Q. Give example?
A. Georg. 1.
There as they ſay is either ſilent night
Alwayes moſt darke and voide of any light,
Or elſe the morning from us here doth goe
And brings the day unto them there alſo.
Q. Shew another example?
A. Do fato every enunciation is true or falſe
Q. Here it ſeemeth is ſignified from the diſiunct, that one onelyonly is true?
A. So it is.
Q. What ſhall the negative and contradiction bee.
A. Not every enunciation is true or falſe.
Q. And what doth the contradiction ſignifie?
A. That one of them is not true by neceſſity, for if the diſiunction be abſolutely true, it is alſo neceſſary: and the parts of the diſiunct are oppoſite without any meanes.
Q But although the diſiunction bee abſolutely and alſo neceſſary may there not be a neceſſity, that the parts ſhould be ſeperately neceſſary?
A. No.
Q. Give example?
A. A man is good or not good, here the diſjunction is neceſſary, and yet a man is good is not a neceſſary enunciation, alſo a man is not good, is not a neceſſary enunciation.
Q. Whereupon then dependeth the neceſſity of the diſjunction.
A. The neceſſity of the diſiunction dependeth on the neceſſary oppoſition, and diſiunction of the partes, not as their neceſſary verity.
Q. But is not the diſiunction of tentimes from condition.
A. Yes.
Q. Give example.
A. As if it be though whether Cleon will come, or Socrates, becauſe it was ſo agreed that one of them onelyonly ſhould come.
Q. It ſeemeth by this that if the diſjunction be contingent, it is not abſolutely true, but is onelyonly opinionable?
A. So it is, and that more frequently in the uſe of man.
Q. Give example?
A. Ovid: Epiſt: Lean.
Either good hap ſhall now unto me fall,
Or elſe feirce death the end of loving thrall.
CAP. 9. The Syllogiſme and its parts.
Q. You have manifeſted in its ſelfe the axiomaticall judgement, by axiomas: the dianoeticall followeth, what therefore is dianoia?
A. Dianoia is when one axioma is derived from another.
Q. VVhat are the kindes of dianoyia?
A. Syllogiſme or methode?
Q. VVhat is a Syllogiſme?
A. A Syllogiſme is a dianoia whereby the queſtion is ſo diſpoſed with the argument, as the antecedent put, it is neceſſarity concluded.
Q. Make this plainer?
A. When the axioma is doubtfull the queſtion is effected, and there is neede of a third argument to bee placed with the queſtion, for its truſt.
Q. How many parts hath the antecedent?
A. The antecedent of a Syllogiſme hath two partes, a propoſition, and an aſſumption.
Q. VVhat is a propoſition?
A. A propoſition is the firſt part of the antecedent, whereby the conſequent of the queſtion, is at leaſt diſpoſed with the argument.
Q. VVhat is the aſſumption?
A. The aſſumption is the ſecond part of the antecedent, which is affirmed from the propoſition.
Q. But what is the conſequent part of the ſyllogiſme?
A. The conſequent part of the ſyllogiſme, is that which imbraceth the part of the queſtion and concludeth it.
Q. What is it called?
A. It is called from the nature of it complexion and concluſion.
Q. If any part of the ſyllogiſme want, what is ſaid to be?
A. It is called Enthymema.
Q. But what if any part happen to be beſides its partes?
A. Then it is called a Porſyllogiſme.
Q. Is not the order of the partes oftentimes confounded?
A. Yes.
Q. What then if any doubt ſhall ariſe from it?
A. Then that ſhall be filled up which wanteth, thoſe cut of which abound: and every part digeſted into his place.
CAP. 10. The ſimple contracted ſyllogiſme.
Q. What are the kindes of a ſyllogiſme?
A. A ſyllogiſme is ſimple or compound.
Q. What is ſimple?
A. Simple is where the conſequent part of the queſtion is placed in the proportion, the antecedent part in the aſſumption.
Q. What are the affections of it?
A. It is affirmed, denyed, generall, ſpeciall, and proper.
Q. How is it affirmed?
A. From all the affirmative parts.
Q. How is it denyed?
A. From one negative of the antecedent parts, with complexion.
Q. How is it generall?
A. From the generall propoſition and aſſumption.
Q. How is it speciall?
A. From one of the generalls onelyonly.
Q. And how is it proper?
A. From both propers.
Q. VVhat are the kindes of the ſimple ſyllogiſme?
A. The ſimple ſyllogiſme is contracted by partes, or explicated.
Q. What is contract?
A. Contract is when the argument for the example is ſo ſubjected to a particular queſtion, that the antecedent may bee underſtood to affirme each part; and in the aſſumption.
Q. Give an example?
A. Certaine confidence is vertue, as conſtancy, certaine confidence is not vertue, as boldnes.
Q. Shew the force of this example?
A. This argument is underſtood to goe before each part of the queſtion, as if it were expreſſed, conſtancy is a vertue, and confidence, and therefore certaine confidence is a vertue: alſo boldnes is not a vertue, and yet it is confidence; and therefore ſome confidence is not a vertue. So in the uſe of diſputing the maſter of the Syllogiſme draweth the judgement, neither is it ſet forth otherwiſe. And this expoſition the beginning of the Syllogiſme is expounded by Ariſtotle, ſo that the Syllogiſme in its full judgement is more cleare and manifeſt.
CAP. 11. The firſt kinde of the ſimple explicated Syllogiſme.
Q. VVhat is the explicated Syllogiſme?
A. The explicated Syllogiſme whoſe partes are explicated.
Q. VVhat are the proprieties in this explicated Syllogiſme?
A. Two, firſt the propoſition is generall or proper, ſecondly the concluſion is like to the antecedent or the weaker part.
Q. What are the kindes of it?
A. The kindes are twofold.
Q. What is the firſt?
A. The firſt is where the argument alwaies followeth the negative in the other part.
Q. Shew ſome Syllogiſme of this kinde?
A. GEN. 1.
Ceſare. A troubled man uſeth not his reaſon well:
But a wife man uſeth his reaſon well,
A wife man is not therefore troubled.
Q. Produce, the example of ſome Orator for this Syllogiſme?
A. This judgement is ſo brought forth of Cicero Tuſc: 3. And when (ſaith hee) the eye is troubled, it is not honeſtly affected to the fulfilling of its duty: and the reſt of the partes, as alſo the whole body, when it is moved from its ſtate, wanteth its office and function, ſo a troubled minde is not honeſtly affected to fulfill his duty. But the duty of the minde is to uſe reaſon, and a wiſe man is alwayes ſo affected, that hee uſeth reaſon moſt excellently; he is therefore never troubled.
Q. Give example of another generall Syllogiſme?
A. GEN. 2.
Cameſtres. A mortall thing is compound.
A ſoule is not compound.
A ſoule therefore is not mortall.
Q. Produce the authority of ſome ancient, avouching this Syllogiſme?
A. Cicero judgeth the ſoule to be immortall by this Syllogiſme. Tuſc: 1. For wee cannot doubt ſaith hee in our mindes, unleſſe wee bee perchance ignorant in phyſicall things, but that there is nothing knit to ſoules, nothing connexed, nothing copulate, nothing joyned, nothing double; which when it is ſo, can ſurely never be parted, nor divided, nor ſevered, nor drawne aſunder, neither periſh therefore: for periſhing is as it were a departure and ſeparation or breach of thoſe parts, which before the periſhing were joyned together.
Q. Give an example of a speciall ſyllogiſme?
A. SPEC. 1.
Feſtino. A pale man is not couragious.
Maximus is couragious.
Maximus therefore is not pale.
Q. Produce authority for this ſyllogiſme?
A. By this judgement Ovid: concludeth. De Pont: 3. El: 3.
Palenes and ſloth are not in the high minde,
Rather with vipers them on ground we finde▪
In higheſt things thy minde excels we ſee,
No name I finde t'expreſſe the wit of thee.
Some miſeries doe taſte, hurt and out worne,
Are made to feele ſharpe pricking of the thorne:
Yet thou art wont to helpe complaning men,
Amongſt which number pray let me be then.
Q. Shew another example of the ſpecial ſyllogiſme.
A. SPEC. 2.
Baioco. A dauncer is Lecherous.
Murena is not Lecherous.
Murena therefore is no dauncer.
Q. Produce ſome Orator for this ſyllogiſme?
A. Cic: pro Mur: For no man almoſt being ſober daunceth, unleſſe perchance hee bee mad, neither alone, nor at a moderate and honeſt banquet; for dauncing is the companion of untimely banquets, pleaſant places, and many delights, thou ſnatcheſt that from me that it is neceſſary that vices ſhould be: thou leaveſt that whereby this removed, this vice ought not to be at all: no filthy banquet, no love, no glotteny is ſhewed, and when we finde not all theſe things which have the name of pleaſure, and are vices; there thou canſt not finde lechery, nay thinkeſt thou to finde a ſhadow of luſt in ſuch.
Q. Avouch ſome other authority after the like manner?
A. After this manner of judgement Ovid: de Triſt: 1. concludeth triply, whil'ſt hee ſets forth the excuſe of his verſes.
They that make verſes ſhould not merry be,
Our time is clouded with adverſity:
They that write verſes ſhould enjoy their eaſe,
The ſeas, the windes, with winter fierce me preſſe.
Good poets ſhould not feare, but I feare death,
I dread leaſt ſwordes doe take away my breath:
Then what is here, a right judge will admire,
If reading them they ſatisfi's deſire.
Q. Give example of proper ſyllogiſmes?
A. PRO. 1.
Ageſilaus is not painted by Apelles.
Alexander is painted by Apelles.
Alexander therefore is not Ageſelaus.
Q. Give another example of a proper Syllogiſme?
A. PRO. 2.
Ceſar oppreſſed his contrey.
Tullius opreſſed not his countrey.
Tullius therefore is not Ceſar.
CAP. 12. The ſecond kinde of the ſimple explicate Syllogiſme.
Q. What is the ſecond kinde of the explicate Syllogiſme?
A. The ſecond kinde of the explicate Syllogiſme is, when the argument goeth before in the propoſition, the affirmative followeth in the aſſumption.
Q. Give an example of an affirmative generall after this kinde.
A. AFF Gen.
Barbara. Every juſt thing is profitable.
Every honeſt thing is juſt.
Every honeſt thing therefore is profitable
Q. Produce ſome Orator avouching this Syllogiſme?
A. Thus Cicero concludeth, Offic: 2. The Philoſophers truely with great authority, ſeverely, ſoundly and honeſtly, doe diſtinguiſh theſe three confuſed kindes by cogitation. For whatſoever is juſt, that alſo they thinke to be profitable: alſo, whatſoever is honeſt, that is juſt; from whence ariſeth, that whatſoever is honeſt, that is alſo profitable.
Q. Give an example of a negative generall Syllogiſme?
A. NEG. GEN.
Celarent. A fearefull man is not free.
A covetous man is fearefull.
A covetous man therefore is not free.
Q. Prove this by ſome Poet?
A. It is thus concluded and judged by Horrace: Epiſt: 1.
Who freer is he that as ſervant dwelleth,
Or he that in his monies love excelleth:
I doe not ſee, he that deſires doth feare,
And he that feares his freedome doth not beare.
Q. Give another example of this kinde of Syllogiſme?
A. Ten: in Eu▪ concludeth and judgeth this, That which is voyd of counſell, cannot be governed by counſell.
Love is voyd of counſell.
It cannot therefore be governed by counſell.
A. Produce the wordes of Terrence?
A. The former Syllogiſme followeth in theſe words: maſter, that thing which hath in it neither counſell nor meanes, that thou canſt not governe by counſell. In love are all theſe vices, injuries, ſuſpitions, enmities, flatteries, warre, peace againe: theſe uncertaine things if thou wouldeſt guide by certaine reaſon, thou doſt no more then if thou ſhouldeſt labour to to be mad with reaſon.
Q. Give an example of the affirmative speciall ſyllogiſme?
A. AFF. SPE.
Darii. Conſuls made by vertue ought ſtudiouſly to defend the common wealth.
Cicero is made Conſul by vertue.
Cicero therefore ought ſtudiouſly to defend the common wealth.
Q. Produce Tullies words avouching this ſyllogiſme?
A. The Orator doth both conclude and judge his owne diligence. Agr: 2. For the great care and diligence aſwell of all the Conſuls, ought to be placed in defending the common wealth, as of thoſe who not in the cradle; but in the campe were made Conſuls: none of our ancients promiſed to the people of Rome for mee that I ought to bee truſted: to aske of mee that I ought, even when I did aske, none of our anceſtours commended mee to you, therefore if I neglect any thing, there is none who ſhall intreat mee for you. Yet while my life laſts (I being hee who am able to defend it from their wickedneſſe) I promiſe this to you O Quirites, that you have committed the common wealth to the providence of a good truſt: to a watchfull man, not a coward; to a diligent man, not a ſluggard.
Q. Shew another ſyllogiſme of this kinde?
A. That which comes wiſhed for is gratefull.
Lesbia comes wiſhed for to Catullus.
She is therefore gratefull.
Q. Set forth Catullus his wordes wherein he thus concludeth?
A. That which we long for with deſires great,
Is acceptable to us when we heate:
Wherefore this gratefull is, more deare then gold,
That Lesbia is come our friend of old.
Thou doſt our wiſhes grant, our hope reſtore;
O light moſt cleare! who is there that is more
Happy then I, who have what I deſire;
Even what I wiſh ther's nought I can require.
Q. Give an example of an negative ſpeciall?
A. NEG. SPE.
Ferio. The deceiver of a loving maid is not to be prayſed.
Demophoon is the deceiver of a loving maide, to wit Phyllis.
Demophoon therefore is not to bee prayſed.
Q. Set forth the words of Phillis in Ovid ſo judgeing.
A. It is no glory virgins to deceive,
Who love a man and wiſh him for to have;
Simplicity ſhould rather favrur gaine,
But I that love and al's a woman am.
Deceived am by thee with flattering stile,
The gods thy prayſes make it all the while.
Q. Give an example of an affirmative proper?
A. AFF. PRO.
Octavius is Ceſars heire.
I am Octavius.
I am therefore Ceſars heire.
Q. Give an example of a negative proper?
A. NEG. PRO.
Anthony is not Ceſars ſonne.
Thou art Anthony.
Thou art not therefore Ceſars ſonne.
CAP. 13. The firſt connexed Syllogiſme.
Q. You have expounded hitherto the ſimple Syllogiſme, what now is the compound Syllogiſme?
A. The compound Syllogiſme is a Syllogiſme where the whole queſtion is another part of the affirmed and compound propoſition, the argument is another part.
Q. But what if any thing were taken away in the compound Syllogiſme?
A. That were to put a ſpeciall contradiction.
Q. What are the kindes of a compound Syllogiſme?
A. A compound Syllogiſme is connexed or disjunct.
Q. What is a connexed ſyllogiſme?
A. A connexed ſyllogiſme, is a compound ſyllogiſme, of a connexed propoſition.
Q. How many are the manners of diſtinction?
A. It is of two manners.
Q. What is the firſt?
A. The firſt manner of the connexed ſyllogiſme is that which aſſumeth the antecedent, and the conſequent concludeth.
Q. Give an example of this?
A. After this manner Cicero concludeth. lib. 2. De Divinatione.
If they be gods it is divination.
But they are gods.
It is divination therefore.
Q. Give another example?
A. Offic: 3. And if alſo nature preſcribeth this, that a man to a man, whatſoever he bee for that ſame cauſe that hee is a man, will uſe conſultation it is neceſſary according to the ſame nature, that the profit of all ſhould bee common. Which if it bee ſo all of us are contained in one, and the ſame law of nature; and this if it be ſo indeed we are certainely forbidden by the law of nature to violate one another: but the firſt is true, the laſt therefore i… alſo true.
Q. Give another example?
A. Aeneid: 4. Dido judgeth Aeneas to … maine with her.
Doſt thou me fly by theſe teares I thee pray,
By thy right hand I thee beſeech to ſtay:
Elſe thou wilt leave me wretched here alone,
By our deare marriage, our deare love like none.
If I doe ought deſerve if thou haſt beene
Sweet unto me, have pitty on me then:
Looke on thy ſlippery houſe, and now I pray,
If any place for prayers be I ſay:
For Libians ſake, for Nomades his kings,
Who hated me and for all other things.
Which I for thee did beare, my credits loſt,
I am alone, for thee thus am I croſt:
Beſides all this, my fame is quite decayed,
Rather I had my fleſh in duſt were laid.
Q. Doth it alwayes aſſume the ſame?
A. Oftentimes not the ſame but a greater.
Q. Give example?
A. Cat: 1. If thy parents feared and hated thee, neither couldeſt thou pleaſe them by any reaſon, in my opinion thou wert to abſtaine a little from their ſight: now the countrey (which is our common parent) hateth and feareth thee, and of a long time judgeth nothing of thee, except it be touching thy death, canſt thou neither avoyd its authority, neither follow its judgement, neither feareſt thou its force.
Q. What may farther be under this head?
A. This manner of concluding is the very ſame when the propoſition is a relate of time.
Q. Give example?
A. After this kinde the nymph O Enon in Ovid, concludeth the error of her fooliſhnes.
When Paris O Enon hoped to forſake,
It would to Xanthus with all ſpeede betake:
Xanthus make haſte returne thou back againe,
That ſo this Paris O Enon may ſuſtaine.
CAP. 14. The ſecond connexive ſyllogiſme.
Q. What is the ſecond manner of the connexed ſyllogiſme?
A. The ſecond manner of the connexed ſyllogiſme taketh away the conſequent that it may take away the antecedent.
Q. Give example?
A. If a wiſe man aſſent to any thing, ſometimes alſo he ſhall be opinated.
Therefore he ſhall aſſent to nothing.
Q. Give another example?
A. By the like ſyllogiſme Ovid: Triſt: 12. judgeth his fooliſhnes.
If I were wiſe thoſe ſiſters I ſhould hate,
Deities hurtfull to whom on them waite:
But now ſo great my fooliſhneſſe is ſeene,
I build them alters whom my hurt have beene.
Theſe two kindes of the ſyllogiſme are moſt uſuall of all.
CAP 15. The first disjunct ſyllogiſme.
Q. What is the disjunct ſyllogiſme?
A. The disjunct ſyllogiſme is the ſyllogiſme compoſed of a disjunct propoſition.
Q. What are the manners of diſtinction?
A. Two.
Q. What is the firſt?
A. The firſt taketh away one and concludeth the reſt,
Q. Give example?
A. Either it is day, or it is night.
But it is not day?
It is therefore night.
Q. Give another example?
A. The judgement of Cicero in defence of Cluventius is ſuch: But when as this condition was propoſed to him, that either he ſhould accuſe juſtly and piouſly, or die ſharpely or unworthily: … would rather accuſe after that manner then … after this.
Q. Make the disjunction appeare clearer?
A. Either he muſt accuſe or die.
He muſt not die,
He muſt accuſe therefore.
Q. Give another example like to this?
A. There is the like reaſoning Phil. 2. doſt thou not underſtand it is determined, that either, thoſe who have done this thing are homicides or revengers of liberty? But attend a little and take the thoughts of a ſober man for a little time, and I who am of them, as my ſelfe doth confeſſe, will familiarly argue with thee as a fellow: I deny that there is any meane: I grant that they are, except they be deliverers and conſerveres of the Roman common wealth more then villany, more then homicides, more parricides: if truely it be cruelty, rather to bee a father to the country, then a murtherer of ones ſelfe: Thou art a wiſe and conſiderate man what ſayſt thou: if they be particides, why were they honored of thee, and called to this order by the Roman people why was Marcus Brutus by thy meanes freed from the law, if he were abſent more then tenne dayes from the citty? why did Apolinares receive Marcus Brutus with incredible honour? why was the prouinces given to Caſſius and Brutus, why were their queſtors added? why were the number of Legates increaſed and this done by thee? they are not therefore homicides. It followeth then that by thine owne iudgement they are deliverers, when as truely there can be no third admitted.
Q. If the parts of the diſiunct propoſition ſhall be more then two, how ſhall they be iudged then?
A. The art of iudging them and concluding them ſhall be the ſame.
Q. Give example?
A. So Cicero iudgeth Rabitious to bee among the conſulls: And wee ſee (ſaith hee) theſe three to be in the nature of things, to wit that either he ſhould bee with Saturninus, or with the good, or that he ſhould lie hid. But to lie hid is proper to the dead and rotten: to be with Saturninus of ſury & wickedneſſe: vertue and honeſty and ſhamefaſtneſſe conſtrained him to be with the conſulls.
CAP. 16. The ſecond diſiunct?
Q. What is the ſecond diſiunct?
A. The ſecond diſiunct, from the propoſition the affirmative aſſumeth one, and taketh away, the reſt.
Q Give example?
A. It is day or it is night.
But it is day,
It is not therefore night.
Q. Give another example after this manner?
A. Thus Iuno concludeth with Iove touching Turnus, Aeneid. 10.
What if thou ſayeſt the thing thou doſt not meane?
And ſhould to Turnus give life againe,
Now I remaine in miſery and woe,
And hope for that which will not happen ſo:
But rather than this ill ſhould come to paſſe,
I'le mocke my ſelfe and hope paſt hope alas.
Q. Shew another ſyllogiſme of this kind?
A. There is the like Syllogiſme effected from a propoſition copulative negative, which is called negative complexion, and which obtaineth the force of an affirmative diſjunction.
Q. Give example?
A. It is not both day and night,
But it is day,
It is not therefore night.
CAP. 17. The onelyonly method according to Ariſtotle.
Q. What is method?
A. Method is a dianoia of diverſe homogene axioma, prepoſed for the clearenes of their nature, from whence the agreeing amongſt themſelves of them are iudged and comprehended in memory.
Q. What is to be conſidered in method?
A. As verity and falſity is beheld in the axioma conſequence and inconſequence in the ſyllogiſme, ſo in method it is to be conſidered that by it the more cleare may precede, the more obſcure may follow, and that altogether order and confuſion be iudged.
Q. Make this plainer?
A. After this manner is diſpoſed from homogene axiomas in the firſt place by an abſolute notion, the firſt; in the ſecond place the ſecond, in the the third place the third, and ſo forward.
Q. It ſeemeth by this that method doth continually paſſe from vniverſalls to ſingulars?
A. So it is, for by this ſole and onelyonly way it proceedeth from antecedents altogether, and abſolute notions, to the declaring of unknowne conſequences, and this is the only method that Ariſtotle taught.
CAP. 18. The firſt illuſtration of methods by illuſtration of artes.
Q. But doe not examples ſet forth this head more clearely?
A. Yes, the examples of doctrines and artes doe cheifly demonſtrate and ſet forth the vnity of method, in the which although all the rules are generall & vniverſall, yet the degrees of them are diſtinguiſhed: and by how much every thing ſhall be more generall, by ſo much it ſhal more precede.
Q. Why ſhall the firſt be in the moſt generall place and order?
A. Becauſe in light and knowledge it is firſt.
Q. Why ſhall the ſubalternates follow?
A. Becauſe in their clearenes they are next.
Q It ſeemeth by this that thoſe things which by nature are more knowne ſhall precede, thoſe which are leſſe known are ſubiſttute, and at length the moſt ſpeciall follow?
A. So it is.
Q. What then ſhall precede and be firſt?
A. The moſt general definition ſhal be firſt.
Q. What ſhall follow?
A. The diſtribution.
Q. But how if their be many.
A. Then the partition in perfect partes ſhal precede.
Q. What ſhall follow?
A. The diviſion into kindes.
Q. What then?
A. The partes themſelves and the kindes are in the ſame order to be handled and defined againe in which they were diſtributed.
Q. What further is required?
A. If there ſhal be a long explication of them they are to be chained together by the chaines of tranſcition.
Q. What benefit redowndeth from hence?
A. It refreſheth and recreateth the Auditor.
Q. But may not example be under this head?
A Yes as a more familiar thing is taken, ſo a more familiar example muſt bee uſed.
Q. Give example of what you have here ſhewed out of the art of grammer?
A. All definitions, diſtributions, are found in the rules of grammer, and every one of them ſeverally judged, and all theſe documents inſcribed in diverſe tables, are confounded and mingled together as it were in a certaine port.
Q. What part of dialectica teacheth us to compoſe theſe confuſed rules and digeſt them into order: firſt there is no need of the places of invention, when as they are all found: neither in the firſt iudgement of axiomas, when as every axioma is proved and valued: neither of the ſecond iudgement of the filogiſme, when as all of them are disputed and concluded controverſies of ſeveral things by theſe onelyonly ſyllogiſmes: it ſeemeth therefore to bee onelyonly method, is it not?
A. Yes it is onelyonly method.
Q. How is it done?
A. The Logitian by this light of artificiall method ſelecteth out of this pott the definition of grammer (for that is moſt generall) and placeth it in the firſt place: grammer is the doctrine of ſpeaking well. Then hee taketh out of the ſame Oven the particion of grammer, and placeth it in the ſecond place: the partes of grammer are two: Etymology and Syntaxis. Then out of the ſame veſſel hee ſeperateth the definition of Etymology of worde, and joyneth it in the third place to thoſe that goe before: then hee ſeeketh out the partes of wordes in letters and ſyllables, and the kindes in wordes of number, and without number, and placeth them with their tranſcitions in their ſeverall places. And ſo the definitions of all the partes of Etymology, together with their diſtributions, colligations, and moſt ſpeciall examples hee placeth in their ſeverall places, and ſo likewiſe in the Syntax. This way all the artes have propoſed to themſelves.
CAP. 19. The ſecond example of methode by example of Poets, Orators, Hiſtriographers.
Q. But is methode onelyonly ſet forth in matter of the artes and doctrines?
A. No, it is alſo declared in all things which we would teach eaſily and plainely: therefore Poets, Orators, and all manner of writers as often as they propoſe any thing to teach to their auditors, doe follow this way, although they doe not enter and inſiſt upon it all alike.
Q. Give an example out of ſome Poet?
A. Virgil in his Georgicks diſtributeth as I ſaid before the propoſed matter into foure parts, and in the firſt booke followeth common thinges, as Aſtrology, Meteorology, and of corne and tillage; this was the firſt part of his worke: then the tranſcition is adhibited in the beginning of the ſecond book.
Thus far of tillage and of ſtarres were we,
Now of the Bacchus we'l ſing preſently.
Then hee writeth generally of trees, as alſo ſpecially of plants; the ſecond tranſcition is adhibited to the third part, but more imperfect and without an Epilogue. In the beginning of the third booke of Oxen, Horſes, Sheepe, Goates, Dogges.
We'l ſing of goddes Pales, al's of him,
Who by Amphryſo kept his ſheepe moſt trim.
At length in the beginning of the fourth book there is the third tranſcition of the fourth part, but alſo imperfect from the onelyonly prepoſition of their Bees.
Now of the eyre hony Bee I'le ſpeake.
So therefore the Poet ſtuddieth to place the moſt generall firſt, the ſubalternate middle, the moſt ſpeciall in the laſt place.
Q. Give another poeticall example?
A. Ovid: in Faſt: uſeth this kinde of diſpoſition, propoſing in the beginning the ſumme of his worke.
I'le ſing of times that paſſe throughout the yeare, Fall of the ſtarres and riſing I'le declare.
By and by having made imploration hee determineth the partition of the yeare made firſt by Tumulus into ten monethes, which hee reprehendeth.
When as Romes builder did the yeare devide, In it he made five moneths and five beſide.
And a little after hee adjoyneth Numa his more full deviſor.
But Numa neither Ianus did omit,
Nor yet the ancient ſhadowes out did put:
But to th'old monethes two more appointed he.
Here the Poet having interpreted the common differences of holy-dayes, working-dayes, banquet-dayes, kalends, nones, ides, at the laſt hee followeth every monethmonth in his place, and with a preface after this order he paſſeth from generalls to the ſtudy of ſpecialls.
Ith what I have you ſhewed what theſe things be,
It now remaines, we part them preſantly.
At length after the expoſition of every part the tranſcition is joyned as in the end of the firſt and beginning of the ſecond booke.
The firſt part of my taske is ended now,
The monethmonth is done, my little booke alſo:
Ianus is done, another monethmonth beginneth,
Another booke now with that monethmonth reneweth.
And in every one of his bookes afterward the tranſcitions are adhibited, but leſſe accurately
Q. How doe the Orators follow this methode?
A. The Orators in poems, narrations, confirmations, perorations doe follow this order as the nature both of the art and the order of the thing doe require, and ſometimes more ſtudiouſly too.
Q. Give example?
A. Cicero in an accuſation firſt by propounding, then by parting, followeth this order. Queſtor Cn: Paxeris ſaith he, thou haſt beene Confull unto this time fourteene yeares, and from that day unto this day in which thou haſt made me, I call thee into judgement; there was no voyd houre found in robbery, wickedneſſe, cruelty, iniquity. This is the propoſition & definitiō of the chief matter, as in this judgement moſt generall. The partition followeth: theſe are the yeares conſume in the queſtorſhip, end a Sciatican embaſſage, and the Vrban pretorſhip, and in the Sicilian pretorſhip: wherefore this ſhall bee the fourefold diſpoſition of my accuſation, which foure partes with their particular partitions hee hath alſo handled in th…ir ſeverall order and place, and coupled them with tranſcitions; the three firſt in the third booke. Wherefore (ſaith he) his queſtorſhip being ſhewed, & his firſt magiſtracy, together with his theft and wickedneſſe looked unto, let us attend to the reſt. Then having expounded the faults of his embaſſadorſhip, the tranſcition to his pretorſhip followeth. But let us now come to that famous pretorſhip, and thoſe faults which were more knowne to thoſe which were preſent, then to us who come meditated and prepared to pleading. This tranſcition is more imperfect without an epilogue: at length in the beginning of the fourth oration there is the like tranſcition to the fourth part of the Sicilian pretorſhip. Many neceſſary things O Iudges I muſt pretermit, that I may in ſome manner ſpeake of thoſ… things which are committed to my truſt, for I have received the cauſe of Sicilia, that province hath drawne me unto this buſineſſe.
Q. Give an example out of ſome Hiſtoriographer?
A. Livy doth ſo imbrace the ſumme of ſeventy yeares in the beginning, then divideth them by tennes.
CAP. 20. The ſecrets of method.
Q. It ſeemeth that in the diverſe axiomaticall homogens, as alſo in the judgement of the ſyllogiſme, the notes of methode ſhall be as often as any thing is taught clearely: but is there no other kinde of methode?
A. Yes, when as the auditor ſhall be deceived in a certaine part with, delectation and a greater motion, then certaine homogens are rejected, as the lights of definition, partition and tranſcition: and certaine heterogens are aſſumed, as digreſſions from the matter, and commorations upon the thing; but chiefly the order of thinges in the beginning is turned over, and certaine antecedents are put after conſequents. Therefore to that rule of perfect method this may ſeeme ſomewhat more imperfect; the forme is not onelyonly lame, things being detracted; or abounding, things being added; but alſo the order of it being inverted by certaine degrees is prepoſterous.
Q. Give an example of it?
A. The like the Poet maketh with a certaine greater kinde of artificialnes, while hee propoundeth to himſelfe to leade the people. viz. the beaſt like heads of the multitude, and therefore hee deceiveth diverſe wayes, hee beginneth in the middle, and there oftentimes he comprehendeth the firſt, to conclude the laſt, he placeth in an uncerca ne and an unthought of chance. So as (Horace ſaith) Homer diſpoſeth his Iliads.
Ne doth this man Troyes warres divide ſo well,
He alwayes maketh haſte the vent to tell:
Even in the midſt reader he doth catch,
Leaves off his tract, with haſte frō it doth ſnatch,
And thus he lies, thus mingles falſe with true,
So that ne first nor midſt in it I view.
Q. Proceed to further examples.
A. So Virgil taketh Aeneas from Sicilia, and makes a narration of him in the banquet of Carthage; and at laſt bringeth in his diverſe troubles. So the commedian Poets, although with great judgement they have diſtinguiſhed their Comedies by acts and ſeenes yet doe ſo effect, that all thinges ſeeme to be done by chance. The Orators attribute all to victory. Therefore this ſeemeth to be placed chiefly by them not ſo much to teach as to perſwade, when as alſo thoſe things which doe equally excell, are kept even unto the laſt, and the meanes are conferred into the middle, according to Homers diſpoſition.
FINIS.
End of the text · Petrus Ramus, Logic in Two Books (1636)