A Treatise of Justifying Righteousness, Book 2 · Aphorism 2 – Aphorism 4
Aphor.
ANd indeed the Schoolmen do intend no other Pag. 3.Will, but the same which they call Beneplaciti; whose Object is Event, as it is uncertainly represented to us by these signs; (viz. contained in that Verse, Praecipit ac prohibet, permittit, consulit, implet.) And because they are such uncertain signs (the contrary to what they seem to import being oft certain) therefore they tell us that this is but Metaphorically called God's Will, &c.
Animadvers.
1. I do not see how Impletto, fulfilling; or Operatio, working, as Aquin. hath it, Part. 1. q. 19. a. 12. can be called an uncertain sign: For if God fulfil, or work a thing, it is a sure and undoubted sign that he doth will it. For he doth not work either against or besides his Will; so it is also in respect of Permission. For if God permit a thing to be done, it is certain that his Will is to have it done. Non fit aliquid nisi omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciends. Aug. Enchir. c. 95.
2. Aquin. indeed (ibid.) a. 11. makes Volunt. signi to he Metaphorically called God's Will; and so doth Dr. Twiss, yet he understood (and so I suppose did Aquinas) the Distinction so, as to be in effect all one with yours. Voluntas signs propriè praeceptum dicitur, impropriè licet usitatè dicitur Voluntas. At Voluntas Beneplaciti Voluntas propriè dicta. Praecepta enim judicant quid Deus velit esse nostri officii ut à nobis fiat; non autem judicant quid sit decreti sui, ut ipse faciat, vel fieri permittat. Dr. Twiss. Vind. l. 2. digr. 2. c. 13. Voluntas signs Impropriè dicitur Voluntas: Significat enim tantum quid ab homine fieri Debeat, aut quid placitum sit Deo, si fiat. At Voluntas Beneplaciti, propriè & simpliciter est Voluntas, q… nempe decre…it, quid futurum sit, Deo aut efficiente, aut permittente. Ibid. l. 1. part. 1. sect. 12. §. 2. Observe, that he speaks of Voluntas signi, so far forth as this Signum is Fraeceptum; and in that respect I take Voluntas signs, to be the same with the Will of Precept, as you call it. And so (it seems) did Dr. Twiss take it; for you see he makes mans duty to be the Object of Voluntas signi, even as you do of God's Will of Precept. When therefore he saith, That Volunt. signi is improperly called God's Will; he means only, that God's Precept is improperly called his Will, it being properly the sign, or signification of his Will: Not but that God truly, and properly willeth that which the Precept containeth; Not always that it shall be done, but always▪ that it shall be be mans duty to do it, as the Doctor expresly speaketh, and (I suppose the Schoolmen meant no otherwise.) But, Rhet…rsortis doth yet more plainly describe Vol. signi, so as you do God's Preceptive Will. Voluntas approbans (seu signi) non revel…t nobis Intentionem seu decretum Dei. Haec enim & similia, [Cain, Saul, Jud…, obedi…e & Credite] non habent hoc pro re signific. itâ, aut volitâ à Deo, [Mea haec est Intentio, & Decretum est apud me ab aeterno, ut obediretis, &c.] Sed tantum dicit Deus; Hoc praecepto Caino, & Saulo, &c. proposito, igo indico & revelo, mihi gratam & acceptam esse obedientiam, ad quam ex lege & debito obligati estis Creatori Vestro, siquidem et accepti esse velitis, sive actu obediatis, sive non. Rhetorf. E…er. 2. c. 1. §. 5. quando Deus Jussit Abrahamum Immolare silium, non tenebatur Abrahamus credere Immolationem Isaaci esse Decretam & Intentam à Deo, sed sui esse officii ut Immolaret Isaacum. ibid.
Reply.
1. I never intended when I wrote that, to assert, That Impletion was an uncertain sign of God's Will: But the other four signs are uncertain, as to the Event. But I see I should have so cautelously expressed my self, that my speech might not have been so liable to misinterpretation. Yet if I mistake not the usual meaning of the Schoolmen, that under the Will Beneplaciti & signi, even under each branch, they comprehended God's Will about whatsoever Object; then Impletio Voluntatis Beneplaciti de Eventu non est signum Voluntatis Beneplaciti de Jure. The killing of Christ was no sign, that it was God's Pleasure that it should be the Jews duty to kill him. Your yielding the three first to be uncertain signs, shews that the Schoolmens Distinction is not the same with mine: For they are not uncertain signs of God's Immanent Will de Debito.
2. I perceive no proof of your Assertion, That Permission is a certain sign of God's Will de Eventu: [If God permit a thing (say you) to be done, it is a certain sign it is his Will to have it done.] I believe not this. Indeed, if a thing be done on God's Permission, it is a certain sign he would permit it to be done: But not, if he permit it, therefore would he have it done; that is, the event (that it is done) whether by Permission, or Efficiency, is a certain sign that he Willed that Event, or to permit that Event. But the Permission is no such sign that he Willed the Event, but only it is a sign that he Willed that Permission. For God permitteth that which never cometh to pass. Doth he not permit the wicked to amend? the Drunkard to be sober? &c. I think he doth permit Pennotus interpreteth the Schoolmen thus: Voluntas signi est illa secundum quam Deus denominatur Volens non secundum rei veritatem, sed per quandam Metaphoram & Similitudinem, quia Causindo aliquos effectus se gerit per modum volentis in quantum aliquid vel praecipit, vel consulit, vel facit: ut docet D. Thom. in 1. dist. 45. q. 1. a. 4. & 1. q. 19. a. 11. & 12. Ob quam causam divinum consilium vel praeceptum dicuntur etiam Voluntas signi per Metonymiam; quia sunt effectus & signa ejusdem divinae voluntatis, ad eum modum quo ultimum testamentum, quod quis moriens condit, appellare solemn. ultimani illius Voluntatem, &c. Pennot. Propugn. l. 4. c. 20. p. 224.it, and more than permit it. Indeed, where the Creature hath a natural, or adventitious inclination to the Act (as a stone to fall downward, a sinner to do wickedly, &c.) and there are the mediums at hand which are necessary thereto, there Gods bare Permission is certainly connexed to the following Event; and consequently, is a sign, that (in some sort) he willeth it. But where the Creature needs God's actual help, yea, his special Grace to perform any act, I think his bare Permission is no such sign that he willeth the Event. If it be, sure God willeth the Sanctification, or Repentance of Reprobates, when he doth so much more than permit it; (except we take up Dr. Twisse's poor conceit, that Actus elicitus volendi videtur propriè dici non posse impediri. Quia tum dici solet aliquis impediri, cum non sinitur facere quod vult. Vind. Grat. l. 2. part. 2. Digres. 6. p. 360. As if the not-hindering of an Active Power to move, according to the inclination of its Habits, and the drawing of its Object, were not properly Permission.) If you take permittere, either properly for non-impedire, as it respecteth Acts; or improperly, for non-alteration, as it respecteth Qualities: In both senses, Permission is no sign that God willeth the Event. I believe you judg, that Twiss in his Digression hath justly questioned Perkin's saying, Quicquid non impedit Deus, ideo evenit quia Deus non impedit.
All this I speak of Permission-Natural; for as for Moral-Permission, either per Legem, vel in Moribus, it is beyond all doubt, that it is no sign infallible of God's willing the Event of the thing permitted. And for Austin's saying (cited so commonly) what is it to your purpose? If it be true, that Non fit aliquid nisi omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo, &c. (the [fit] is the signum;) doth it therefore follow, that Non permittitur aliquid nisi quod Deus fieri velit? But if Permission be a sign of God's Will, what shall we think of that Doctrine, that denieth that there is any such thing as God's Permission of any Action that ever was done in the World? I think the Doctrine of [The Necessity of Physical efficient Predetermination to every act of the Creature,] is guilty of this, as its direct Consequence (if I may so far excur) which yet some Divines, especially Twiss, do lay so great weight on; when it is not from Christ, or Paul, but the Dominicans. For how can God be said to permit that act, which he is the principal determining efficient Cause of.
As for your Allegation out of Aqu. Twiss, and Rutherford, that they mean as I: I answer, 1. Their making Voluntas signi but Metaphorically Voluntas, shews the contrary. 2. You confess that it is but [so far forth as this Signum is Praeceptum:] But then sure the Distinction, 1. Speaking de signo ut signo, & de praecepto ut signo; and 2. Of four more signs, cannot be the same with mine. 3. Twisse's is above half the same as mine; for indeed I received it from him: But, 1. He saw further into it than the Schoolmen (or than most of our own) and Rutherford follows him. 2. Yet he seems to take no notice of the Immanent Will de Debito, whereof the Precept is signum: Nor yet doth he extend it to the whole Law, but only to Precept: Nor do I find him speaking, as you friendly interpret him, that [It is properly the sign, or signification of his Will, &c.] I make God's Will de Debito (which I shall take leave to call, his Legislative, or Ethical Will) to stand at the top in the Series of our Ethicks, indeed the Fountain of all Due: And his Will de Ente, vel Eventu, to stand at the top of our Philosophy de Ente. Lastly, I will not contend any more about this, seeing I am glad if you be in the right: For as it confirmeth me, to have you of my Judgment; so will it do more, to have so many such as those named.
Aphor.
THese Absolute Promises, are but mere Page 9.gracious Predictions what God will do for his Elect.
Animadvers.
I dislike not this: but your self elsewhere seems to dislike it; viz. Append. p. 49. For it being objected, [But all these are rather Prophecies, than Promises.] You answer, If that which expresseth the engaging of the Word, or Truth of God, be not a Promise, I would you would tell me what is.
Reply.
In the last you perswade me, that others agree with me more than I was aware of: And here you agree with me, but I agree not with my self. If I can but so well accord with you, and others all along, I hope to be fairly reconciled to my self, and then we are all agreed.
1. How far this Promise belongeth to God's Legislative Will, and how far to his Will de Eventu, I fully told you my thoughts, Append. p. 43, 44. To which I need not add much more.
2. You know the chief part of my words there, are those which you leave out: I say, [If that which expresseth the engagement of the Word, and Truth of God, to bestow good upon a man, &c.] Mere Prophecies may discover God's mind to do good; and thence we may collect, that they shall certainly be fulfilled, because the Speaker is true. But they are not an engaging of God's Word and Truth, to bestow good on any man, or Society: For if they so engage, it is to some body, and to them it is a Promise.
3. These Absolute Promises are directly Predictions, and so belong to the Will of Purpose, or de Eventu: But, as is explained Append. p. 44. they are also Promises, and therefore called by the Apostle, a Covenant; and so belong to the Legislative Will. There is nothing written in Scripture, but what belongs to God's Law, and respecteth Due one way or other: But then some parts are essentially and directly God's Law, and do directly determine of Due. Others do directly speak de Eventu, and do but indirectly speak de Debito; or it may be are but subservient to those parts which do speak de Debito, and so belong Reductivè to the Law; or are Adjuncts of it: And so are all Scripture-Prophecies and Histories; as in mens Laws, the Preamble and Historical Narratives of the Occasion of the Law, is an Adjunct, and in some sense a part of the Law.
4. There are Promises that properly belong not to the Legislative Will, nor do speak de Debito: The English word Promise, comprizeth all those three, or is applicable to them all; which Grotius mentioneth de Jure Belli, l. 2. c. 11. p. 210. 1. Assertio explicans de futuro animum qui nunc est. 2. Pollicitatio, cum Voluntas seipsam pro futuro tempore determinat, cum signo sufficiente ad indicandam perseverandi necessitatem. Neither of these, as such, belong to Law, or speak de Debito Constitutivè. But the last doth, which is, 3. Promissio perfecta: ubi ad determinationem talem accedit signum Volendi Jus proprium alteri conferre, similem habens effectum qualem alienatio dominii. Est enim aut via ad alienationem rei, aut alienatio particulae cujusdam nostrae libertatis. Illuc pertinent promissa dandi: huc promissa faciendi.
Aphorism.
THose Promises fall under the Will of Purpose, Ibid.not of Precept.
Animadvers.
It seems you take the word [Precept] very largely, and improperly. For otherwise it might seem superfluous to add this. For how should a mere absolute Promise fall under the Will of Precept? This were to make a Precept of a Promise.
Reply.
Did I not tell you, that I chuse to call it the Legislative Will, as extending it ad Debitum praemii & poenae as well as ad Officium, rather than by any other term? If I make any use of other mens terms, must I therefore be tied to their sense, contrary to that which I have fully expressed to be my own? But if you think that the Authors of that Distinction, or the uses, do so restrain it to Precept, how can you then think that they mean the same that I do?