A Treatise of Justifying Righteousness, Book 2 · Aphorism 1
Aphor. as cited by Mr. C.
THe distinction of God's Will, into Page 2.his Will of Purpose, and his Will of Precept, &c. It is near of Kin to the common distinction of Voluntas signi & Beneplaciti, but not the same.
Mr. C's Animadversions.
I think it is the same as Praeceptum is called Voluntas signi, though some do not so clearly and fully explain this Distinction as others do.
R. B's Reply.
I am glad you begin with this Distinction, that I may have my apprehensions of it more fully cleared; where they are right, confirmed; and if unsound, that they may be changed. For I confess, I make use of this Distinction, as a Key to my understanding of very many points in Divinity, to which it is not commonly applied. The confounding of our Ethicks and Physicks, and so of their distinct Fountains, doth introduce confusion into the main Body of Theology, with those that are guilty of it: And it is easie to conceive, that it is necessary to the understanding of Theological Controversies, to avoid that confusion, and know to which of these the Question doth belong. It is easie to conceive what work it would make in Philosophical Discourses, to confound our Physicks and Ethicks; and it will have no better effect in Theological. Therefore, as I take Debitum to be the direct proper Object of our Ethicks; and Ens Reale, of our Physicks (for I take not the term [Physicks] in the common restrained sense, as its Object is only Corpus Naturale; but as it is foreign, as some call Metaphysicks, and containeth much of Metaphysicks, (for I conceive that which treateth de Eute Reali should be one entire Doctrine) Pneumaticks, and common Physicks all: So I take [Ethicks] in so large a sence, as to comprehend Oeconomicks, Politicks, and all Morality:) So I do distinguish of God's Will here, according to these different Objects. As Ens Reale, is the Object, or Product of his Will, for want of a better name, I call it, his Decretive Will, or Will of Purpose: And because in most of our Theological Discourses, we are fain to speak of God's Will, according to the imperfect manner of mans will, as if it respected its Object as present, past, future; therefore Res futurae, & Rerum futuritio are usually made the Objects, or Products of God's Decree or Purpose (for man purposeth only de futuro:) (And indeed quoad hominem, the thing being truly future, so God may be said to Decree that quoad hominem it shall be future; though quoad ipsum Deum non est futurum.) But I sometime say, Eventus is the Object of this Will; meaning thereby Res eveniens, and so connecting the Thing with its Emanation from its first Cause; and intending the Comprehension of all Beings, past, present, and future. And also, that I may comprehend Privations, which as they are Reductively belonging to the Doctrine of Beings; so may they also to the Object of God's Will de Eventu. For as mans Will may be de Agere vel non Agere, de esse vel non esse; so we may conceive of God's Will: (Though Scotus hath shewed the truth of this Conception to be very disputable.) Therefore when I say that Ens Reale is the Object, or Product of this Will of God, I mean both the Esse & non Esse, Beings and Privations; but one directly and properly, the other but consequenter & reductivè: As in saying Debitum is the Object, or rather Product of God's Ethical, or Legislative Will, I mean both the Debere & non Debere; but the former only directly, the latter but indirectly, consequenter & reductivè; as proceeding only from God's non-commanding or prohibiting, and properly being Nothing, and having no Cause in Morality: I mean, the [Non-d…be… agere;] for in the [Debeo non agere] which is caused by Prohibitions, the Debitum is Positive formaliter, though the quasi subjecta materia, vel res debita, be but nominal, and really nothing.
1. So that by God's Decretive Will, I mean only his Will de Eventu, vel de Ente qua tali; and by his Legislative Will, I mean only his Will de Debito: So that I primarily distinguish of the Objects, or Products of God's Will; and thence of his Will it self. This I expressed fully in my Aphorisms: So that my main scope is, but to keep open the difference between Naturality, and Morality in all our Discourses.
2. And I have there also manifested, that therefore I take the Act of Willing in God to be the same in both. Velle Debitum, is as properly Velle, as is Velle Eventum.
3. And that I distinguish of the Objects here, but formaliter: For Debitum is Ens quoddam (according to the common Doctrine: Though I think, as God's Will is, 1. De Ente in genere. 2. In specie, 1. De Ente Naturali. 2. De Ente Morali; i. e. De Jure vel debito.Burgersdic. Metaph. Relations are inter entia & Nihil:) But I mean therefore Debitum qua Debitum, & Eventum qua Eventum, vel Ens qua Ens.
4. And therefore as the Doctrine de Eventu vel de Ente, is far more Comprehensive than the Doctrine de Jure (Jus vel Debitum being but an inferior Species of Ens; taking Ens so largely as to comprehend Modalities and Relations:) so God's Will de Ente vel Eventu, comprehendeth his Will de Debito: But yet his Will de Debito, qua Debitum, may well be distinguished from his Will de Ente qua tali; as the Specifick nature from the Generieal.
5. I also (and principally) shewed you, that I comprehend two things in my phrase of [God's Legislative Will,] or [his Will de Debito:] 1. The Immanent Will of God de Debito; which is as true, and as Eternal an Act, as his Velle Eventum. 2. The signal Will of God, which is his Law: This I told you, I call his Will but Metonymically.
6. Both these together, and neither alone, do Constituere Debitum; 1. Not God's Immanent act alone, or directly; for it is not properly Lex, till it be signified; much less Lex promulgata. 2. Nor the Law, or signum considered in it self, abstracted from the Will signified; but only considered Formaliter ut signum, and so with its correlate; viz. The Immanent Will signified.
7. My full meaning therefore is, but to distinguish God's Law, from his other Acts and Works. But I choose to call it [his Legislative Will,] rather than [his Law:] 1. Lest it should be thought I include only the Law materially, and exclude the Immanent Will, which was from Eternity de Debito. 2. Because if I should distinguish between [God's Will,] and [his Law] it would plainly sound as if I contradistinguished his whole Will from his Law, and so even his Will de Debito, which is the Soul of his Law, the Signum being but the Body.
8. And I fully told you, that therefore I call it his [Legislative Will,] rather than (as others hitherto) his [Will of Precept;] because the Law hath several parts, which constitute a several Debitum: Precept is but one of these parts, but I speak of all. The false Definitions of Law have long wronged the World; while men reduced it all to Precept, or to be Regula actionum moralium. The Law determineth (in the large, and yet proper sence, as I will take Law) de omni Debito, Moraliter & propriè sic dicto: 1. What shall be due from us; that is, in the Precept and Prohibition. 2. What shall be due to us; that is, in, 1. The Promise. 2. The Threat: Besides Fundamental Distributions.
So that the Product of God's Legislative Will, is, 1. Debitum rei libere & absolutè Donatae. 2. Debitum officii nostri (in agendo & non-agendo.) 3. Debitum praemii. 4. Debitum poenae.
Thus I have all close together, and once again told you my meaning (as plain as I can with brevity) in this Distinction. And understand, that I undertake not to shew you how far other mens sence of it is the same with mine: But our Question is, Whether this that I have opened, be the Schoolmens sence of their Distinction of [Voluntas signi & Beneplaciti?] I conclude, that it is not, and that for these Reasons.
1. Implere & permittere naturaliter (ut à permissione morali distinguitur) which are some of their signa, are utterly unreducible to this Legislative Will.
2. Both the terms of their Distinction, and their Explication, shew that they intend not to distinguish God's Will ab objectis; Event and Right: But as it is in it self, and as it is manifested to us: And therefore Voluntas signi with them, is Voluntas significata, or signum Voluntatis: But not one act of that Will signified as distinct from another (as to our apprehension;) but the same that is before termed Veluntas Beneplaciti, is it as signified. And therefore some of them do again subdistinguish their five signs, noting, that some of them (Praeceptum, prohibitio, Consilium) do determine Duty; and the other signifie Event. So Lombard himself more fully and Dist 45. l. 1. So Dorbellis in Sent. ibid. & Viguerius Lastitut c. 3. §. 1. pag. 22. Aquin. 1. q. 19. a. 12. 3.plainly than almost any of his followers; And so Aquinas and many more also do. And so they may as well subdistinguish the Voluntas Beneplaciti, into Beneplacitum de Eventu, & de Debito. I could by multitudes of their sayings, manifest this that I say, of the plain importance of their words, were it not a vain loss of time and labour, specially to you that I know have so frequently read it.
3. And therefore they use the Distinction of Voluntas secreta & revelata, as the same in sence with Beneplaciti & signi: But it is not the same with mine; for Voluntas de Eventu est partim secreta partim (in prophetiis & Causis secundis) revelata.
4. And they plainly exclude the Immanent Act of God's Will de Debito, from their Vol. signi, by the very name. For the Immanent Act is not sui ipsius signum nec alterius.
5. And as plainly do they exclude it by saying, that Volunt. signi is but Metaphoricè God's Will, Whereas the Immanent Act is properly his Will, and the signum is more Metonymice than Metaphoricè his Will. I think I needed no more proof; but if these convince you not, the matter is of very small moment what they mean. Divers of our own more clear Divines indeed, do come near my meaning in their Distinction of Vol. Praecepti & Propositi: As Judicious Davenant Dissertat. de Redempt. Ʋnivers. pag. 126. Rivet. Exercit. in Gen. 107. pag. (mihi) 524. Vossius Hist. Pelag. l. 7. part. 1. Thes. 1. & 2. per tot. & in Thes. de Pelagianismo D. Chamier Panstrat. Tom. 3. l. 7. c 6. ad loc. 1 Tim. 2. & 2 Pet. 3. Conrad. Bergius Prax. Cathol. diss. 6. p. 888. Zanchius sometimes expresseth it one way, and sometimes near as I; as, Tom. operum ult. p. (mihi) 679. & de Natura Dei, l. 3. c. 4. p. 257, 258. per tot. & 254. Especially Rutherford (cited by you, who followeth Twiss) and Camero pag. 642. Oper. in fol. Gen. cont. Tilen. most plainly: And Twiss most frequently, Vindic. Grat. l. 2. part. 1. Crim. 3. §. 1. & §. 11. And Discovery of Dr. Jackson's Vanity, ad §. 2. pag. 535, & p. 536, & 550. And Consider. of Tilenus against Synod. Dort. pag. 166. & Vindic. Grat. l. 2. part. 1. p. (Volum. minoris) 173, 174. Amyraldus Specim. Animadv. Special. p. 71. Learned Rob. Baronius in Philosoph. Theolog. Ancill. Exercit. 3. Art. 14. pag. 211. And indeed the first that made me sensible that this Distinction differed from the School-distinction of [Benepl. & signi,] was Twiss and Camero: Yet it must be acknowledged, that Twiss himself (who makes more use of it than all others that I have read) overlooked (at least usually) the Immanent Will of God de Debito, and spake only of the Precept it self; and therefore calleth it God's Will Metaphorically. If I may prefer Truth before Modesty, I must say, that Dr. Twiss saw further into the nature and use of this Distinction than others before him had done; but yet his Notions were very imperfect of it, and his Improvement very short, in respect to its desert and use. And therefore he called it but Voluntas Praecepti, and applied it only to matter of Precept and Prohibition; but saw not that it belonged also to Promise and Commination, even to the whole Law. And though he makes Praecipere & Vetare to be the Objects of of this Will (which clearly implies, that he took in the Immanent Act of which they were the Objects) Lib. 2. part. 1. Crim. 3. §. 11. yet he so often contradicteth it by speaking otherwise, that I doubt it fell from him ex improviso. One more let me name you, whom you must oppose with me, and that is Molinaeus Anato. Armin. c. 4. where he speaks against them that call the Decree God's Secret Will, and the Commandment his Revealed Will, as speaking inconsiderately. §. 8. & §. 9. he saith, Thomas and the Schoolmen do distinguish God's Will into Volun. Beneplaciti & Volunt. signi: The members of which Distinction fall one into another: For many things of his Vol. Beneplaciti, are signified too: Neither is the word Beneplaciti, which is in Gr. foreign, sufficiently applied here; For foreign doth for the most part include Love and Good-will, &c. And §. 3, 4, 5. he well explains the Legislative Will in part. And he saw, §. 6, 7. that even Promises and Threatnings were reducible to it. But yet he thought it was improperly; and so §. 6, & 7. it is plain that he did not fully yet understand the due extent of this Will: Else; 1. He would have acknowledged the Immanent Act, as well as the Signal. 2. And have seen, that the pars Legis praemians & puniens (i. e. Comminatio) do as properly Constituere Debitum praemii & poenae, as the Praeceptum doth the Debitum officii: and consequently are most proper signs of God's Will de Debito. 3. And he would not have turned here to dispute against Conditional Will in God; but would have seen, that God hath doubtless a Conditional Law, and so a Conditional Will de Debito, whatever he hath de Eventu. But enough of mens Opinions. To proceed.