Letter Concerning the Trinity Number 7, Letter 1
For the Reverend Dr. Wallis, Professor of Geometry, at Oxford.
London, March 24. 1690-91. SIR,
YOur Repeated Letters, give me a just occasion of Repeating my hearty Thanks to you. And I hope you will give me leave to join both my good Wishes and Endeavours to promote that Moderation which you seem to Aim at, in stating the Mysterious Truths concerning the Trinity. Methinks we might be easily perswaded to this; by the Difficulties which all men find in conceiving those Mysteries: Especially the Consequences which some make from them; and impose upon us as Certain and Sacred Truths.
Sir, Because I would have you lose as little of your Time as may be in reading my Letters; I will enter immediately upon the Subject proposed; and consider, not some lesser Niceties, but the Two Main Points in the Doctrine of the Trinity; and the Difficulties which our Vnderstandings represent to us in the Conception of them.
The Two Main Points are these: The Unity of the Godhead, notwithstanding the Distinction of Three Persons: And the Equality of those Three Persons, notwithstanding their Derivation one from another.
Concerning the Divine Persons; The Hypothesis which we referred to formerly (and shall still follow) asserts these Three Things. First, That they are Three Beings (or Three Intelligent Beings) Really Distinct. Secondly, That they are Three Substantial Beings, Really Distinct. Thirdly, That they are Three Infinite Minds, or Three Holy Spirits, Really Distinct. And to these, I think, we may of course add a Fourth Character, That they are Three Compleat Beings, really Distinct.
They are not Inadequate or Partial Beings. For a Spirit infinite in Perfection, as each of these is represented, can want nothing to compleat its Being or Perfection.
Let us now, if you please, run over these Characters; and observe the most obvious Difficulties, that occurr to our Minds in the Conception of them.
For the first, Three Beings really distinct. According to the plain Tract of humane Reason, Every real Being hath its Essence; (that is the Basis it stands upon, as distinguished from Non-Entity, or a Fictitious Being). And every Distinct Being hath its Distinct Essence: I mean, Numerically distinct. And therefore, according to this Principle, there ought to be Three distinct Essences in the Godhead, seeing there are Three Beings, there, really distinct.
Furthermore; If you give one single Essence to Three Beings really distinct, you must either Divide it, or Multiply it. Either each of these Beings must have a Piece of this Essence; and then you Divide it: or each must have the Whole; and then, being but one Whole, you cannot give it to Three without Multiplying of it.
This is still made more difficult to conceive, when the Author allows these Three to be as Distinct as Peter, James, and John. For if they be as Distinct as Peter, James and John; they are One but as Peter, James and John. For every degree of Distinction takes away a degree of Vnity: As every degree of Heat, takes away a degree of Cold.
We proceed to the second Character. The Three Divine Persons, are Three Substantial Beings, Really distinct. That is, in plain English, are Three Substances Really distinct. As a Spiritual Being is a Spirit; a Corporeal Being, a Body: so a Substantial Being is a Substance; (putting onelyonly Two Words for One.) And the Author must understand it so; because he makes them Three Spirits afterwards: and therefore they must be Three Substances.
Besides, what are they, 'pray, if not Substances? they cannot be Modes, or bare Relations. I know some Platonists call them Super-Substances. Or, if you will think them lower, and call them Semi-Substances, (as some Philosophers do their Substantial Forms:) All this is but playing with Words. For there is nothing represented to our Faculties, but as Substances, Modes, or Relations; excepting what is meerly Notional.
And the Learned Author must not debar us the use of the Word Substance, under pretence that it sounds Corporeally. For two Creeds make use of it: and the Scripture it self, upon a fair interpretation, Heb. 1. 3.
To proceed therefore. Here are Three Substances Really Distinct, whereof each is a God (pag. 47. l. 13. p. 98. l. 23.) and yet there is but One God. This is very hard to conceive, as contrary to all our Idea's of Number and Numeration.
'Tis true, we may conceive these Three Substances, in strict Vnion one with another, notwithstanding their real Distinction. But Union is one thing, and Unity is another. For Vnity excludes all Plurality and Multiplicity; which Vnion doth not, but rather supposes it. Vnity also, in simple Natures, excludes all Compositions: which Vnion, on the contrary, always Implies, in one kind or other.
Accordingly; Substances, upon Vnion, are not Confounded or Identified, or brought to Vnity of Substance: But, continuing numerically distinct Substances, acquire some Community or Communication of Operations: namely, of such Actions and Passions as they are respectively capable of.
Let us consider Instances of these things, in the chief unions that are known to us. Our Soul and Body are two Substances really distinct, and in close Vnion with one another: But, notwithstanding this, they continue distinct Substances under that Vnion. In like manner, the Humane Soul of Christ is in Vnion with the Logos, or second Person of the Trinity, which we call an Hypostatical Union: But neither doth this Vnion make any Vnity of Substance; for the two substances of the Divine and Humane Natures, continue Distinct under that Vnion. Which must not be allowed in the Vnity of the Godhead, where there can be no Plurality or Multiplicity of Substances.
The Learned Author does acknowledge (p. 87, 97.) that these three Substances, if they were separate, would be three Gods: but being Inseparate and Inseparable, they make but One. This is again uneasy to conceive, that Substances Really Distinct, should not be separable. For the notion of a Substance, is, of that which may subsist by it self: And what mark have we of separability but Real Distinction? Things that are only Modally or Notionally distinct, we allow cannot subsist separate: But if they be Really distinct, as Substances, why may they not be separated Really? When we have proved, the Real Distinction of the Soul and the Body, as two Substances; we think we have sufficient ground to assert the Separability of the Soul from the Body. And from the same Reason, we assert the Parts of Matter to be Separable, as being Really distinct Substances, let their Vnion be otherwise what it will. For, if our Faculties be true, what things we clearly conceive Really distinct (ut res & res) may (possibly) be separated. Clear and Distinct Conception being to us the rule of Partibility.
But however! Suppose, if you please, this Vnion Indissoluble; this does not change it into Vnity. If the Soul of Man was made to be in Perpetual Conjunction with Matter, as some Platonists affirm: that doth not make Matter and the Soul, One and the same substance; nor Matter cease to be Matter, or the Soul a Spirit. So, if you suppose these three Divine Substances to be under an Indissoluble Vnion; that doth not make them cease to be three Substances, but, it makes them, Three Substances in an Indissoluble Vnion.
What the learned Authour says concerning Matter and Extension, may be returned upon him in reference to the Godhead. (p. 80. l. 9, 10.) He supposes Extension to consist of Parts, if they be only Assignable parts, whether they can be divided or not: so, say we, (according to this opinion) The Godhead may consist of several Substances, if they be only Assignable Substances, whether they can be Divided or not: And you may as Distinctly Assign, by your Vnderstanding, Three Substances in the Godhead, that of the Father, that of the Son, and that of the Holy Ghost; as you may Assign Three Parts in a Physical Atome, by A. B. C.
Lastly, There is no Substance lost or destroyed in this or any other Vnion, Dissoluble, or Indissoluble: Therefore, as to Substances, they are the same, whether in Conjunction or Separation.
We come unto the Third Character. (pag. 50. 166. 258. see also p. 93.) The Three Divine Persons are Three Infinite Minds, or Three Holy Spirits: And yet but One God. This rises still higher than the former as to its Vnconceivableness. It seems to say and unsay the same thing, with the same breath. An Infinite Spirit is compleatly a God, as to Essence and Attributes: Therefore three such are three Gods. Omnis mens infinitè perfecta est Deus; Tres sunt mentes infinitè perfectae; Ergo Tres sunt Dii. Where is the fourth of this Syllogism?
This Character seems to assert Three Infinites: Whereas the Athanasian Creed, which stands at the highest pitch of any, is yet very tender and cautious in giving the number Three to any thing but the Persons. It will not allow three Eternals, nor three Incomprehensibles, nor three Almighties: But, three Infinites include all these.
An Infinite Spirit (as I said before) is a God, (I mean, Infinite in Perfection, as our Authour doth,) And three Spirits, whereof each is Infinite in Perfection, are Three Gods: As, three Creatures, whereof each is a Rational Animal, are three Men. Both these Propositions go upon the same ground, namely, That the Definition, and the thing Defined, are reciprocal and of the same extent. Now as we have no better Definition of a Man, than that he is a Rational Animal; so neither have we a better Definition of a God, than that he is a Spirit infinitely Perfect. And as so many Animals Rational, so many Men; so likewise, so many Spirits infinitely perfect, so many Gods.
I speak this according to the use of our Faculties. For, what the true and precise state of things is, in themselves, when the question is concerning Infinite Natures, I do not presume to determine.
But thus much, I think, we may safely determine, That in such cases where our Faculties are at a loss, the safest way is to keep close to Revelation and the words of Scripture. And that's the Conclusion I drive at.
Lastly, To put a plain question, which will come into every one's mind: Here are Three Spirits infinitely Perfect; either they are Gods, or they are Creatures? They must be one of the Two. When we speak of a Spirit infinitely perfect, we describe an absolute, compleat, entire Being. Which must be of some Denomination, either a God, or a Creature; for we know nothing of a middle nature betwixt these.
Possibly they will Answer this by a Distinction; namely, that they are three Gods considered Separately; but considered collectively and in Vnion, they are but One God: And seeing they cannot be really separate, it would be improper to call them Three Gods. But, pray, Why not as properly three Gods, as three Infinite Spirits? seeing these terms, A Spirit infinitely perfect, and A God, are terms equivalent or identical. What partiality is it then to allow the one, and not the other? And if these Infinite Spirits be Inseparable, why do you grant the number Three to that name, and not to the name of Gods? seeing they are both the same Thing, and equally Inseparable.
We observed before, that this Learned Authour is liberal in his Threes; three Intelligent Beings, three Infinite Minds, three Holy Spirits, three Divine Glories, three Majesties; but not three Kings. 'Tis the Name, it seems, is scrupled, rather than the Thing.
Sir, I will add no more upon these Heads. But will consider now the grand Principle which is designed to take off all these Difficulties; And that is, mutual Consciousness; whereby all these Threes are made One; and reduced to a perfect Numerical Unity.
I need not spend time in telling you what the Author means by mutual Consciousness, nor how he applies it to the present case: You know them both sufficiently. But methinks this Vnitive Principle is defectively expressed, by the word Consciousness. For bare Consciousness, without Consent, is no more than bare Omnisciency. As God is Conscious of all our Thoughts, good or bad; and of all the Devils thoughts; without Vnion, as without Consent. If a good and bad Angel were made mutually Conscious of one anothers mind, they would not thereupon become One, being still of different Wills and Inclinations.
It may be the Author will say, Consciousness involves Consent, as he says, Knowledge involves Power, or is the same with it. But, besides, that I cannot well reconcile the Author to himself in this point, (See P. 9. l. 3, 4. compared with p. 72.) I have given you Instances in a former Letter to the contrary. To which you may add, if you please, this further consideration: If Knowledge be the same thing with Power, then actual Conception is the same thing with actual Execution. And if so, then You and I may sit quietly in our studies, and, with our Thought and Pen, build Palaces, and take Towns and Cities. For we know the Methods of both, and can distinctly conceive them and delineate them. And as these are not the same thing in us, so neither can we conceive them, in all respects, the same in God. For, from all Eternity, God had a clear Idea of the frame of the World, and of the manner of producing it: therefore, if Gods Conception or Knowledge had been the same with his Power, the World had been produced from Eternity.
But to proceed, Let us give this Principle its full strength, Consciousness and Consent: they would not together make a perfect Vnity of Operations in the Deity, much less of Substance. We noted before, that Vnity and Vnion are different things. And this is more apparent now, when Three Spirits are to be united into One. For how that can be done without some sort of Composition, is an unconceivable Mystery. You may indeed conceive these Three Spirits, singly and separately, as simple Beings: But if you conceive these three simple Beings united into One (without Annihilation of any one) that One must be a Compound Being, according to our Conceptions.
Then, as to Vnity of Operations: Besides the Energies peculiar to the Father and the Son, this Author allows (p. 67.) that every one of these three Minds, notwithstanding their Vnion, hath some Distinct Consciousness, not common to the other Two: therefore the Godhead, which consists of these Three Minds, cannot be One as a single Mind is One; where there is an intire Community and Sameness of Consciousness, in all Operations.
In my opinion, if this Hypothesis were prest to speak out, the plain language of it would be this; There are Three Divine Substances, three Holy Spirits, infinitely Perfect, and, in truth and reality, three Gods: But, for some Reasons, not fit to be called so. These three Beings, by Similitude of Nature, mutual Consciousness, Consent, Cooperation, are under the greatest Vnion possible; and, in that state of Vnion, do constitute the foreign, the Intire All, comprehensive Godhead. This, I confess, books something like a conceivable thing: But the Christian Trinity does not use to be represented thus. For this amounts to no more than a kind of Hypostatical Vnion of Three Divine Spirits.
Sir, I will trouble you no further upon the first general Head, The Distinction of the Persons. I proceed now to consider the Equality of the Persons. Which I will dispatch in a few Words.
The first Argument against their Equality may be this (pag. 99. l. 29. &c.) The Father is foreign, self-existen…, self-originated: whereas the other Two are foreign, existent and originated from another. Now this cannot but make, according to our Faculties, not only some Difference, but also some Inequality. For 'tis a fundamental Perfection to be self-originated: and what is not so, is not Equal to that which is so.
You will say possibly, Though the Son and Holy-Ghost are produced of the Father, yet 'tis not in such a way as Creatures are produced. That is, by a voluntary External Act; but This, by an Internal, Necessary, and Emanative Act.
We will allow your Distinction; and admit that the Son and Holy-Ghost have a different Origin from that of common Creatures. But this does not remove the Difficulty. It shews indeed a great Difference and Inequality betwixt any of the Divine Persons, and bare Creatures: But it does not shew any Equality amongst the Divine Persons themselves. 'Tis true, the Dependance which a Creature hath upon the Creator for its Being, is of another kind and degree from that of the Son or Holy-Ghost. But however, they are Derivative Beings, in some way or other, and dependent upon the Father. And we cannot but conceive some Inequality betwixt an Original and a Derivative, a Dependent and Independent Being.
Secondly, That Act whereby the Son is Generated by the Father, is some Energy and Perfection: Nay, 'tis an Energy of the Highest Perfection; Because the Result of it is the most Perfect Being that can any way be produced; or the Noblest and Greatest Product in Things. Creation, or that Energy that produceth a Creature, hath not a Term or Effect so Noble or so Great, as that Energy whereby the Son is generated: And consequently it is not so great a Perfection to Create a World, as to Generate the Divine Logos. This being so; there is, you see, not only Self-Origination in the Father, which is not in the Son: but also an Active Perfection of the highest Degree possible, in the One, which is not in the other. And therefore we cannot in either respect, conceive these two Beings equal.
Besides, if you make them all three Equal, and all Infinite; they will be Co-ordinate, (I mean internally, & as to perfection of Nature: For, External Subordination, as to Oeconomy, signifies nothing in this case.) And are no more One, than three Individuals of the same Species are One; that is, than Peter, James and John are or may be One. And this, I think, was the Doctrine of the Tritheites, or very near it.
Lastly, You may please to reflect upon the various Sentiments and Expressions of the Ancients, concerning the Dignity and Preheminence of the Fathers, (which you know are noted by Petavius (de Trin. lib. 2. c. 2. & l. 8. c. 9. §. 15.) and consider their Consistency or Inconsistency with perfect Equality.
Sir, As I do not write this with any Disrespect to that Treatise, (which contains many Excellent things:) so neither to represent absolute Truth or Vntruth: But the Difficulty of our conceiving things of an Infinite Nature. From which Consideration I would willingly infer Two Conclusions.
First, That we ought to keep close to Scripture in these Mysterious Doctrines.
Secondly, That we should not impose Consequences humanely made, with the same Rigour as divinely revealed Truths.
The Anti-trinitarian System is not at all suited to my Genius. Yet I would not stretch our Trinitarian Doctrine so far, as to set it at a distance from Scripture as well as from Reason. Secret things belong unto the Lord: but those things that are Revealed, belong to us and our Children. Deut. 29. 29. And the Angels, it may be, think us as foolish and ridiculous, for pursuing these Notions, as we think our selves wise and learned in such pursuits.
I am, Sir, with all Sincerity, Your most humble Servant, W. I.
To this Letter, I reply as followeth.