Letter Concerning the Trinity Number 7, Letter 2
To the Reverend W. J.
SIR,
I Am obliged to you for the Kind and Respectful Character, which you are pleased to afford me in Both your Letters. I am not at all displeased (but thank you for it) with a like Moderation in Yours (to what you commend in my Letters) as to the Mysterious Truths concerning the Sacred Trinity: And do fully close with what you say in the Conclusion, That the Angels may think us as Foolish and Ridiculous, for pursuing these Notions further than they are Revealed, as we think our selves Wise and Learned in such pursuits: Like as You or I should Laugh at a Blind man (who had never seen) that should undertake to Conceive in his Mind, and Express to us in word,) a Distinct and Perfect Notion or Idea of Sight, Light, and Colours.
He may Hear the Noise or Sound of those three Words (supposing him, though Blind, not to be Deaf also,) and may Believe that they signifie Somewhat. But, what that Somewhat is, he cannot Tell; having never had an Idea thereof in his Mind, nor a Perception thereof by his Senses.
And if You or I (from that Notion which our selves have of it) would Explain it to him: We could do it no otherwise than by the Use of such Words (in a sense Analogical) as do properly belong to somewhat of which he hath (from Experience) some Idea.
Sight, we might say, is a certain kind of Sense or Feeling in our Eyes (which we have not in our Hand, Feet, or other parts of our Body,) whereby we can (as it were) Feel with our Eyes, the Shape, Figure, Bigness and Proportion of a Body at a Distance; as we might, with our Hands if within our Reach. Whereby he might Apprehend, that there is some kind of Resemblance between Seeing and Feeling; but, what indeed it is to See, he cannot comprehend.
Light, we might tell him, is a Necessary Requisite to such a Feeling with our Eyes, as that for want of it (which Want we call Darkness) we can no more so Feel, or Discover, by our Eyes, such Shape, Figure, or Bigness; than we could, with our Hands, that (suppose) of a Piece of Money locked up in a Box which we could not open; but, by the Admission of such Requisite, we are inabled so to Feel it with our Eyes, as we might with our Hands, if the Box were opened whereby we might come to Handle it.
Colour, we might tell him, is somewhat of such a Nature, as that, on a Plain Board (or the like) on which by our Hand we can Feel nothing but Smooth and Uniform; by it may be Represented (to be so Felt with our Eyes) as great variety of Shapes and Figures, (suppose, of a Horse, a Bird, a Ship, a House, or any Shape whatever) as by our Hand we might, if we had such Shapes formed in Wood or Stone; and the different Motions of such.
But, after all this, it is not possible for this Blind man, to have that Idea or Notion in his Fancy, of Sight, Light, and Colour, which we have who See.
And it is much more Impossible for Us (who have no Notions in our Mind, other than what we derive, Mediately or Immediately, from Sensible Impressions of Finite Corporeal Beings) to have a Clear and Perfect Notion, of the Nature, Unity, Distinctions or Attributes of an Infinite Spiritual Being; or otherwise to express them than by some Imperfect Analogies or Resemblances with things we are conversant with; and by words in a borrowed sense from such.
I do therefore fully agree with you in your Two Conclusions; namely, That it is Safe and Prudent to keep close to Scripture in these Mysterious Doctrines; (since we know nothing of them otherwise than as there Revealed:) And, not to impose Consequences of Humane Deduction, with the like Rigour as Divinely-revealed Truths. For, even in common affairs, when things are represented onelyonly by the Analogy or Resemblance which they bear to some other things; it is seldom that the Similitude is so Absolute between them, but that there is some Dissimilitude likewise. Much more when the Distance is so great as between Finite Corporeal Beings, and what is Infinite and Incorporeal. So that we cannot always argue cogently from one to the other.
And therefore the words Nature, Essence, Vnity, Distinction, Father, Son, Person, Beget, Proceed, (and the like,) when applied to God in a borrowed sense from what they properly signifie as applied to Creatures, must not be supposed to signifie just the same, but somewhat Analogous to that of their Primary signification; nor Consequences thence to be deduced with the same Rigour.
It would be mere Cavilling for any to argue, that, Because Knowledge and Strength are separable in Man; Therefore, what in God we call by those names, are so in God; and that, consequently, it may be Possible for the All-wise God, not to be Almighty; or the Almighty God, not to be All-wise.
So, if we should argue from the manner of our Locality or Duration, to God's Vbiquity without Extension, and his Eternity without Succession; the Inferences must needs be Lame and Inconsequent. With other Inferences of like nature.
And, (even without proceeding to Infinites) if we suppose a Spirit, or the Soul of Man, to be void of Parts and Local Extension, and therefore (as the Phrase is) tota in toto & tota in qualibet parte of that Space or Matter to which it is compresent: And should yet argue (as you do in a like case) If one single Spirit be compresent with three or more really-distinct Parts of Space or Matter; we must Divide or Multiply it: Either each of these extensive Parts must have a Piece of that Spirit; and then you Divide it: Or, each must have the Whole, and (there being but one Whole) you cannot give it to each, without Multiplying it: Such Inference upon such a Supposition (which Supposition I am loth to think Impossible,) must needs be Lame.
Yet such are commonly the Cavils of those who study to pick Quarrels with the Doctrine of the Trinity as delivered in Scripture. And (in particular) though, amongst Men, Three Persons are sometimes (not always) so used as to import three Men; we may not thence conclude, that the three Divine Persons, must needs imply three Gods. Or, if the word Persons do not please, (though I think it a fit word in the case; we can spare the word, without prejudice to the Cause, (for 'tis the Notion, rather than the Name, that we contend for,) and content our selves to say, They be three Somewhats which are but One God. Or, we may so explain our selves, That, by three Persons we mean three such Somewhats as are not inconsistent with being One God.
And hitherto, I suppose, that You and I do well enough agree.
Now, as to what you observe concerning the Learned Author (Dr. Sherlock;) I shall begin where you end: And agree with you, that the Treatise (to which you refer) contains many Excellent things. The Strength and Weight of his Arguments, as to those to whom he undertakes Answer, doth not depend upon those Expressions against which you object: But his Arguments against those, are of equal Force, though these Expressions were spared.
As to those Expressions of his, by you noted, That the three Divine Persons are Three Beings (three Intelligent Beings, three Substantial Beings, three Holy Spirits,) Really Distinct, even as distinct as Peter, Iames, and Iohn; and One God onelyonly as they are mutually Conscious: I was (I confess) Unsatisfied therein (as You are) from the first; Looking upon them as Expressions too Hardy for one to venture upon, (and so I find are most others with whom I have discoursed about them:) and wish he had declined them.
Yet I did not think it necessary for me to write against them (though I did not like them) but chose rather to wave them, and express my self otherwise. (For it would be Endless if I should make it my business to write Books against every one who hath some Expressions which I cannot approve, amongst many others wherein I think he doth well.) Nor shall I Aggravate the Objections which you have Urged against them; But leave them as they are.
I might perhaps mollifie some of his Expressions, by putting a softer sense upon them than at first view they seem to bear; (for I find some Men, in such matters, do use words at a very different rate from what others do:) But I have not (where now I am) the Book at hand; and have read it but once (a good while since) when it first came out: and therefore am not willing to say much without Book, least I should miss his sense, or not perform it to his mind.
That learned Author may, if he think fit, so Vindicate or Explain those Expressions as he shall judge convenient: Or he may (which I had rather he should) Decline them, without prejudice to his main Cause; (which, in my opinion, he may as well defend without them:) and thereby less expose himself to the Cavils of the Anti-trinitarians; who are catching at every colourable pretence of Objecting, though not against the main Cause concerning the Trinity, if but against some Expressions of those who maintain it.
Thus far, I think, He and both of Us do agree; namely, That there is a Distinction between the Three, more than meerly Notional, and even more than that, between (what we commonly call) the Divine Attributes; yet not so as to be Three Gods, or more Gods than One: (which is as much as we need maintain against the Anti-Trinitarians:) And, that the word Person is no unfit Name to denote that Distinction. And thus far we may close with him, notwithstanding some other Inconvenient Expressions.
And if it be agreed that these Three (thus distinguished) are but One God (each Communicating in one and the same Numerical Essence,) then they are all Equal (as to that common Internal Essence, and the common Attributes thereof:) and then an External Subordination, as to Oeconomy (you grant) signifies nothing in this case.
Now, Sir, if you look back upon your own Discourse: You will find, that the whole Edge of your Arguments is directed against those Expressions, Three Beings, Three Substances, Three Spirits; (and I do acknowledge, that, as to these, the Arguments seem to me sharp enough, and to do their work.) But if, instead of these, he say (as I think he should) that The Three Persons are One Being, One Substance, One Spirit, (like as he says they are One God) that Edge will be taken off*Augustin. Epist. 174. Spiritus est Deus; & Pater Spiritus est, & Filius, & ipse Spiritus Sanctus; nec tamen Tres Spiritus, sed Vnus Spiritus; sicut non Tres Dii, sed Vnus Deus..
That (I conceive) which did impose upon him in this Point, is the forced sense, which, in our Language, we sometimes put upon the word Person, for want of another English Word (answering to Homo) which might indifferently respect Man, Woman, and Child: and a like forced sense put by the School-men upon the word Persona, for want of a Latin word which might equally relate to Men and Angels; as signifying an Intelligent Being. Whence he was induced to think, that Three Persons must needs be Three Intelligent Beings. Whereas Persona, in its true and ancient sense (before the School-men put this forced sense upon it) did not signify a Man simply; but, one under such, and such, and such Circumstances, or Qualifications. So that the same Man (if capable of being qualified thus, and thus, and thus,) might sustain three Persons, and these three Persons, be the same Man.
Now if (as he says of himself elsewhere in a like case) he have not been taken to be a Fool: Yet a wise Man may sometimes, upon second thoughts, see Reason to change his Opinion (as in that case he did) or rectify his Expressions. And if then he consider, how much easier it will be (and less obnoxious to Exceptions) to maintain his Hypothesis thus Rectified: He may think I have done him no ill Offices thus to suggest.
Having thus given you my thoughts of this Hypothesis: If you press me further (as between our selves) to tell you, What Degree of Distinction (as in our Metaphysicks they are wont to be Reckoned up) I take this to be, between the Three Divine Persons: I think we need not much trouble our selves with such niceties. And if I do tell you; it is only ex abundanti, as what doth not much concern the main question in hand; (which is safe enough without it:) Nor that I so prescribe therein, as to require others to express their Sentiments just as I do.
The Degrees of Distinction commonly mentioned in our Metaphysicks, are such as these: Distinctio rationis ratiocinantis, (which is purely Notional, and depends meerly on our Imagination:) Destinatio rationis ratiocinatae (which is otherwise said to be secundum inadaequatos conceptus ejusdem rei:) Distinctio Modalis, (either ut res & modus, or ut modus & modus,) which is otherwise said to be ex parte rei sed non ut res & res: And Distinctio realis, or ut res & res. Though, in the Names of these several Degrees, all Writers do not always speak alike. One perhaps by a distinction ex parte rei, may mean the same which another means by Distinctio Realis: And so of the rest. And these thus marshalled are but a contrivance of our own. They might, for ought I know, have been made more or fewer if the Contriver had so thought fit.
But these Degrees of Distinction, I take to be primarily fitted to our Notions of Created Beings. And are not intended as applicable to God, otherwise than by Analogy; as other Words properly fitted to created Beings are wont to be so applied. And therefore I should choose to say, that (in strictness of speech) our Metaphysicks have not yet given a Name to these Distinctions: Nor do I know any need of it.
The Divine Attributes, we use to say, are distinguished ratione ratiocinata, or as inadaequati conceptus ejusdem rei. And it is well enough so to say, to those that have not a mind to be captious; but are willing to understand Figurative Words in a Figurative sense. But, to those that have a mind to Cavil, I would speak more cautiously, and say, It is, in God, somewhat Analogous to what we so call in Created Beings. And, That of the Divine Persons, somewhat Analogous, in the Deity, to what, in Created Beings, is called Distinctio Modalis, or Distinctio à parte rei, sed non ut res & res.
If it be asked, What that Distinction is which is thus Analogous: I say, that I cannot tell. You must first tell me (and enable me to comprehend) what is the full and adaequate import of the words Father, Son, Beget, Proceed, &c. when applied to God, in a sense Analogous to what they signify as to Created Beings. If you cannot tell me, precisely, what they are: How should I tell you, How they Differ?
But what need we trouble our selves with these Niceties, or Names of these Degrees of Distinction? (Which, when we have all done, will by divers Men be diversly expressed.) I think it is enough to say, The Distinction is Greater than that of (what we call) the Divine Attributes; but not so as to make them Three Gods. Or, That they be so Three, as yet to be but One God. And I am content to rest there.
I am, Sir, Yours to serve you,I. Wallis. Apr. 11. 1691.
End of the text · John Wallis, Letter Concerning the Trinity Number 7 (1691)