The Riches of Gods Love, Part 2 · Section 6
Sect: 6.
Many diſtinctions are brought to free the Supralapſarian way from this crimination all which (me thinks) M. Maſon's Addit. p. 31. 32, 33, 34.are no… better then mere deluſions of the ſimple and inconſiderate, and give noe true ſatisfaction to the underſtanding. There is ſay they a twofold decree.
1. Firſt an operative, by which God poſitively and efficaciouſly worketh allthings. 2. A permiſſive, by which he decreeth only to let it come to paſſe. If God ſhould worke ſinne by an operative decree, then he ſhould be the Authour of ſinne, but not if he decree by a permiſſive decree to let it come to paſſe, and this only they ſay they maintaine. It is true that God hath decreed to ſuffer ſinne; for otherwiſe there would be none. Who can bring forth that which God will abſolutely hinder? He ſuffered Adam to ſinne, leaving him in the hand of his own counſell, Eccluſ. 15. 14. He ſuffered the nations in time paſt to walke in their own waies Act: 14. 16. And dayly doth he ſuffer both good and bad to fall into many ſins; And this he doth, not becauſe he ſtands in need of ſinne for the ſetting forth of his glory; for he hath noe need of the ſinfull man. Eccluſ. 15. But partly becauſe he is (ſummus proviſor) ſupreme moderatour of the world, and knoweth how to uſe that well which is ill done, and to bring good out of evill; and eſpecially for that reaſon which Tertullian prelleth, namely, becauſe man is made by God's own gracious conſtitution, a free creature undetermined in his actions, untill he determine himſelfe; And therefore may not be hindred from ſinning by omnipotency, becauſe God uſeth not to repeale his own ordinances.
2. It is true alſo that a permiſſive decree is noe cauſe of ſinne, becauſe it is merely extrinſecall to the ſinner, and hath noe influence at all upon the ſinne. It is an antecedent only, and ſuch a one too, as being put, ſinne followeth not of neceſſitie. And therefore it is fitly contradiſtinguiſht to an operative decree. And if that ſide would in good earneſt, impute noe more in ſinfull events to divine power, then the word Permiſſion, imports, their maine concluſion would fall, and the controverſy between, us end. But firſt, many of them reject this diſtinction utterly, and will have God to decree ſinne (efficaciter) with an Energeticall and working will. Witneſſe that diſcourſe of Beza wherein he a verreth and laboureth to prove, that God doth not only permit ſinne but will it alſo: And witneſſe Calvin too, who hath a whole ſection againſt it, calling it a carnall Colloq Mompel: 2 part. p. 177. Cal: inſtit. lib. 14. c 18. Sect: 1. verſ. 2.diſtinction invented by the fleſh, and (effugium) a mere evaſion to ſhift off this ſeeming abſurdity, that that man is made blind (Deo volente & jubente) by Gods will and command; who muſt ſhortly after be puniſhed for his blindnes; He calleth it alſo (figmentum) a fiction, and ſaith they doe (ineptire) play the fooles that uſe it. By many reaſons alſo doth he indeavour to lay open the weaknes of it, taxing thoſe who underſtand ſuch Scriptures as ſpeaks of God's ſmiting men with a Spirit of ſlumber and giddineſſe, of blinding their minds, infatuating and hardening their hearts &c. Of a permiſſion and ſuffering of men to be blinded, and hardned, Nimis frivola eſt iſta ſolutio, ſaith he, it is too frivilous a gloſſe. In another place he blameth thoſe that referre ſin to God's preſcience only, calling their ſpeeches (argutiae) tricks and quirks which Scripture Id: ibid. lib. 2, c. 4. Sect. 3.will not beare; and thoſe likewiſe that aſcribe it to God's permiſſion, and ſaith, what they bring touching the Divine permiſſion in this buſineſſe will not hold water. They that admit the word permiſſive, doe willingly miſtake it, and while, to keep of this blow, they uſe the word, they corrupt the meaning. For
1. Permiſſion is an act of God's conſequent and judiciary will, by which he puniſheth men for abuſing their freedome, and committing ſuch ſins day by day, as they might have avoided; and to which he proceedeth (lento gradu) ſlowly and unwillingly, as we may ſee, Pſal: 81. 11. 12. Iſrael would none of me, ſo I gave them up &c. Ezeh: 18. 39. Goe and ſerve every one his Idoll, ſeeing ye will not obey me &c. Rom: 1. 21. 24. Becauſe when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, therefore God gave them up unto their hearts luſts, to vile affections and to a Reprobate mind. Rev. 22. 11. He that is unjuſt let him be unjuſt ſtill. In theſe places and many more we may ſee, that perſons left to themſelves are ſinners only; and not all ſinners, but the obſtinate and willfull, which will by noe meanes be reclaimed. But the permiſſion which they meane, is an act of God's antecedent will, exerciſed about innocent men lying under no guilt at all in God's eternall conſideration.
2. Permiſſion about whomſoever it is exerciſed, obſtinate ſinners, or men conſidered without ſinne, is no more then a not hindring of them from falling, that are able to ſtand, & ſuppoſeth a poſſibility of ſinning or not ſinning, in the parties permitted; but with them it is a withdrawing or withholding of grace needfull for the avoiding of ſin, and ſo includeth an abſolute neceſſitie of ſinning. For from the withdrawing of ſuch grace ſin muſt needs follow; as the fall of Dagon's houſe followed Sampſon's plucking away the Pillars that were neceſſary for the upholding of it. Maccovius in two diſputations, expounding this word (Permiſſion) circumſcribes it within two acts. The firſt of which is a Subſtraction of Divine aſſiſtance, neceſſary to the preventing Colloq: Theol. diſp: 9. pag. 10.of ſinne; And having proved it by two arguments, that none may thinke he is alone in this, he ſaith, that he is compaſſed about with a cloud of witneſſes, and produceth two. The firſt of them is our reverend and learned Whitaker, ſome of whoſe words alleadged by him are theſe, Permiſſion of ſinne is a privation of the aid, which being preſent, ſinne would have been hindred. The ſecond is Pareus, for ſaying that that helpe (which God withdrew from Adam) being withdrawen, Adam could not ſoe uſe his endowments, as to perſevere. And this doctrine, ſaith he, is defended by our men, as it appeareth out of Pareus lib, de grat primi hominis c. 4 p. 46. Their permiſſion therefore of ſinne being a ſubſtraction of neceſſary grace, is equivalent to an actuall effectuall procuring and working of it▪ For (Cauſa deficiens in neceſſariis eſt eficiens) a deficient cauſe in things neceſſary is truely efficient) and ſo is but a mere fig-leafe to cover the fouleneſſe of their opinion.
Here we have a very demure diſcourſe proceeding in a poſitive manner, proceeding from Anſwer.one that takes upon him to be a Maſter and dictator of ſentences; wherein there is little or nothing ſound that he delivers of his own; or to purpoſe that he delivers of others. Nothing of any colour of pertinency, beſides what he delivers in the laſt place touching our opinion of the nature of permiſſion of ſin. And I willingly confeſſe, The divine permiſſion of ſin is a very obſcure point, and in my judgment moſt come ſhort in the explication thereof Arminius hath a large digreſſion upon this place of Permiſſion in generall, and of permiſſion of ſin in ſpeciall: It was the firſt peece of Arminius, the examination whereof I undertook only with a mind to ſearch after ſatisfaction therein. And finding noe content therein, I gave my ſelfe to enquire thereof in a poſitive manner; wherein I proceeded very farre, ſetting downe in foule papers, as they came to hand, whatſoever came into my mind thereabout, which grew into a large proportion, and then ſet my ſelfe upon preconceived grounds reaſonably well diſſcurſſed by me, to deale with Arminius ſome five Sections after the beginning of his diſcourſe on this argument, which five firſt Sections I took not into examination, untill I had diſpatched the whole. And having an occaſion to deale upon this argument when I came to the defence of M. Perkins his anſwer to the third crimination, whereupon I deale in the ſecond book of my Vindiciae, I thought good to digreſſe after the ſecond Section, & to call a certaine propoſition of M. Perkins to account, which was this, Quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenit, quia Deus non impedit. It is the third Digreſſion of the ſecond book, the title whereof is this, Propoſitio illa Perkinſii (quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenit, quia Deus non impedit) ſub examen revocatur. There is noe digreſſion throughout that book of mine that affords more variety of Philoſophicall and Theologicall contemplations, then that; and all about the nature of permiſſion. Firſt, in things naturall. Secondly, in things morall. And theſe firſt in good things. Secondly, in evill things. In the courſe whereof many obſcurities and difficulties doe offer themſelves to be cleared, & ſolved by diſtinction; where comming to an end, I deliver my ſelfe in this manner. I perceive in how ſlippery an argument I exerciſe my ſelfe, too much expoſed to the calumny of adverſaries, and too apt to incurre the diſlike of good men; whereas in all my labour I aime at nothing elſe, then according to my power to explicate the myſtery of Divine providence governing all things after a wonderfull manner; And to diſſemble nothing, but repreſent all difficulties that doe occurre, that both my adverſaries may have at hand what to impugne; Our Divines wherein to take paines, either by way of explication of what yet remaines obſcure; or by confirmation of what they ſhall find to be ſound yet unſufficiently proved. Now that Digreſſion of mine being ſo large, I wonder not a little that no one particular thereof is here called to an account by this Divine. And ſo may others too when they ſhall conſider againſt whom this man's ſtomach workes moſt. For he cannot be ignorant of my anſwer to M. Hoord his proſelyte, if not therein to himſelfe. Againe, the exception here in the laſt place taken againſt our doctrine of permiſſion, is exactly the ſame with Arminius his exception againſt Mr. Perkins in dealing upon the third crimination, which there I have anſwered at large, and that in ſuch manner, that I willingly profeſſe, I was utterly to ſeek at this time, of what I had there delivered; ſo that upon my conſulting the place, the things I there met with, ſeemed new unto me, in diſcovering many waies the inconſequence of Arminius his diſcourſe, which yet is the very ſame with this of Mr. Maſon's. Yet he hath not replied upon any one line of all that I delivered there, though they are above 600 in the ſecond Edition of that book. But it may be he takes that for noe better then an idle diſcourſe (yet an anſwer it is to this very exception of his) & 'tis enough for him to convince the juſtneſſe of that exception made by Arminius, by ſound argument. And what is that but a rule given by him, upon his own credit, without indication of the leaſt authority to confirme it; And though on the contrary I have divers and ſundry waies manifeſted the falſenes thereof: well I am not reſolved to ſuffer him to paſſe unanſwered, how idle ſoever his diſcourſe may appeare to be. Foure diſtinctions of ours he propoſeth to invade; not one of them is pretermitted by Arminius in his anſwer unto Perkins, nor any part of that his anſwer pretermitted by me. But this is written in Engliſh for the indoctrinating of the people, as I remember what was ſaid of M. Hoord's diſcourſe; namely, that it was fit to be coppied out, and communicated unto the Country. He ſaith theſe diſtinctions are, deluſions of the ſimple; when he proves it, then it will be time enough to believe it. But whereas, he ſaith, they give noe true ſatisfaction to the underſtanding, this is rightly to be underſtood, to wit, in reference to an Arminian underſtanding corrupted with the leaven of Pelagidniſme. Yet is he not privy to the underſtanding of all, ſo much as of all that are of his own Tenet. But ſuppoſe they doe not. The diſtinctions uſed by School-Divines to accommodate God's predeſtination with man's free will, are many and learned, but Caietan profeſſeth of them all that they doe not, quietare intellectum, ſatisfie the underſtanding; but what followes; Therefore ſaith he, Ego captivo meum in obſequium fidei; I captivate mine unto the obedience of faith to wit, becauſe Scripture is evident for both: And why ſhould it seeme ſtrange that God's providence in governing the world ſhould be of a myſterious nature. And however this Authour may cenſure Caietane in this, yet Alvarez profeſſeth that herein, doctiſſimè, & piiſſimè loquitur; he ſpeakes moſt learnedly and moſt piouſly. Yet permiſſion, in the judgment of Suarez, is not merely a negation of prohibition, but conjunct with a poſitive operation in concurring to the act of ſinne; which Aquinas hath proved to be à Deo, from God, though the obliquity of the act be not. And the truth is, man himſelfe is not operative in ſinne, otherwiſe then as touching the ſubſtance of the act. For ſinne, as ſinne hath noe cauſe efficient, but deficient only, as Auſtin hath long agoe delivered; neither hath he been oppoſed herein by any that I know. Obſerve how with him to hinder, and abſolutely to hinder is made all one; yet to will, and abſolutely to will in God, is not all one in his opinion. I doe not find that God left Adam in the hand of his counſell. For he forbade him to eate of the forbidden fruit, which is ſomewhat more then to diſſwade from it. And yet to perſwade or diſſwade another, is not to leave him in the hands of his own counſells. For it is to impart unto him another counſell. Yet though we diſſwade a brother, and ſo not leave him in the hand of his own counſell; yet we ſtill leave him to his own free will. Both theſe I have inſiſted upon more at large in the ſecond book in my Vindiciae, Sect: 2. Digreſ. 3. It is true God hath noe need of ſetting forth his own glory, noe more then he hath need of making the world; but the exiſtence of ſin may be and is neceſſarily required to the ſetting forth of God's glory in ſome attributes of his. For neither can the glory of God's mercy appeare in pardoning ſinne, nor the glory of his vindicative juſtice, (called in Scripture his wrath, Rom: 9. 23.) in puniſhing ſinne, unleſſe there be ſinne to be pardoned, and ſinne to be puniſhed: Nor the glory of his power and wiſedome in working good out of evill, unleſſe God give way to the committing of Evill. And if upon God's permiſſion of ſinne, it be not neceſſary that ſinne exiſt, then it is not in the Allmighty power of God infallibly to procure the manifeſtation of his glory, either in the way of mercy pardoning it, or in the way of juſtice puniſhing it. But ſeeing theſe reaſons are not conſiderable with this ſupercilious Theologue, it ſhould ſeeme likely, that looke what he ſubſtitutes in the place thereof, will prove ſubſtantiall, and ſatisfie ſuch underſtandings as his own: And that he repreſents out of Tertullian, namely, becauſe man is made by God a free creature. This reaſon was repreſented by Arminius before him, and that out of Tertullian, Arminius his huskes are pleaſing Lib: 1. cont: Marcion.to him. Such was the condition of the prodigall child when he forſooke his Father; the provender of Swine was acceptable to him. Yet he could not have enough of that. Is not man a free creature to performe naturall acts as well as morall; and morall good as well as evill? Nay are not the Children of God made free by Chriſt to the performance of actions ſpirituall? What therefore muſt God only permit them to performe them, and by noe meanes worke them to the performance of faith, and repentance, and all manner of obedience; yea and keep them from ſinning againſt him, as he kept Abimelech, Gen: 20? See how this Authour diſplaies himſelfe ere he was aware; and withall what the reaſon is why he affects to deale upon reprobation only, not upon election or grace leaſt his vile opinion miſerably defacing the glory of God's grace might appeare with open face in 'its proper colours. Yet it breakes forth more then he could wiſh, in ſetting down the end why God permits ſinne, to wit, becauſe men are free creatures, therefore it becomes not God to worke their wills to this or that, but only to permit them to doe what they will; if they will ſinne to permit them; if they would doe any good worke whether it be faith or repentance, or any other good worke, or to abſtaine from ſinne, to permit that alſo; whereby it is apparent that God by his opinion hath noe more hand in working a man to any good worke (excepting the act of commanding and perſwading the one, and not the other) then in working them unto evill. For becauſe they are free creatures, therefore it becomes God to leave them unto themſelves, and permit them to doe what they will, whether it be good or evill: otherwiſe God ſhould nullifie his own inſtitution in making them free Agents. Yet conſider farther how herein he contradicts the very principles of his own ſide, both Arminians and Ieſuites. For Arminius maintaines that God can hinder a man effectually from the committing of ſinne without any prejudice to the liberty of their wills. The like doe the Ieſuites maintaine in their doctrine of grace effectuall in the way of congruity, namely, that God can bring any man to faith, to obedience, to any good worke, and accordingly preſerve him from any ſinne by vertue of grace effectuall, which is ſhaped by them in ſuch a manner, as to be noe way prejudiciall to the liberty of their wills. But Tertullians authority hath abuſed his fancy, and expoſed him to lay open himſelfe in ſo ſhamefull a manner. Yet Tertullian will not ſerve his turn any more, then it doth ſerve Arminius his turne, as I have ſhewed in my anſwer to Arminius lib. 1. part. prima de praedeſt. Sect: 7, and that at large. Secondly, the reaſons he brings for the contradiſtinction of decree permiſſive, from decree operative, are very vaine. For 1, the decree operative is extrinſecall to the ſinner, as well as the decree permiſſive. Secondly, neither hath it any influence at all upon the ſinne (as which admits noe efficient cauſe thereof being of a mere privative nature) but upon the ſubſtance of the act, which I preſume this Authour will not deny. Thirdly, the decree permiſſive is not an antecedent only, but ſuch as being put, ſinne followes of neceſſitie, as well as upon the poſition of the decree operative; that is of neceſſitie, by ſuppoſition, not neceſſity abſolute. For as Aquinas hath delivered and proved, not only the things themſelves come to paſſe by vertue of God's decree, but, modi rerum, ſeverall conditions of them. As for example, neceſſary things, neceſſarily; contingent things, contingently; free actions, freely; And that thus the things permitted do alwaies come to paſſe, not only Piſcator with our Divines, as Mr. Perkins, Doctor Whitaker and Pareus doe avouch, but Vorſtius alſo and Arminius, as I have ſhewed in my Vindiciae, lib. 2. digreſ. 3. Arminius his words are theſe, if God permits a man to will this or that, neceſſe eſt, it muſt needs be, ut nullo argumentorum genere perſuadeatur ad nolendum, that no kind of argument move him to will it. Navarettus the Dominican profeſſeth the ſame, in quaeſt. 19. pag. prima art. 6. pag. 65. col: 1.
1. That this deſtinction is rejected by our Divines this Authour brings no tollerable evidence. As for Beza here it is confeſſed, that he acknowledgeth God to permit ſinne, and whereas he addes that he wills it too, it is nothing contradictory to the former. For to permit ſinne (ſpeaking of permiſſion divine) is to will that ſinne ſhall come to paſſe by God's permiſſion. And Auſtin hath profeſſed of thoſe things that come to paſſe by God's Enchirid. 9. 5permiſſion, that they come to paſſe, Deo volente, God willing them. And the Scripture acknowledgeth as much, that the Kings in proſtituting their Royall authority, to the executing the pleaſure of the Beaſt, did herein fulfill the will of God. So that God's permiſſive decree is as effectuall in its kind, as the operative decree in 'its kind; thus farre, that like as what God meanes to worke ſhall come to paſſe; ſo look what God meanes to permit, that alſo ſhall come to paſſe. Neither doe I know any Arminian or Jeſuite, that denies God's operative decree, as touching the very act of ſinne, by way of concurrence in the producing of it. When Calvin will have the evill of ſinne come to paſſe, Deo volente, God willing it, he denies not any more then Beza doth, that it comes to paſſe by God's permiſſion of it. But Calvin reſts not in a bare permiſſions and no marvaile. For the Scripture ſaith not, that God permitted Pharaoh to refuſe to let Iſrael goe, but plainly and energetically thus; I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he ſhall not let Iſrael goe, I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he ſhall follow after them, I will rent the Kingdome from Solomon; not I will permit it to be rented; and ſo throughout. Bellarmine himſelfe contents not himſelfe with a bare permiſſion, but farther ſaith, God doth rule and governe the wills of wicked men; yea, torquet & flectit, he wreſts and bends them. And Auſtin often ſaith, he enclines them unto evill. And whereas it is farther added out of Calvin that a man is blind, volente & jubente Deo, God willing and commanding it. Is it not expreſſe Scripture, Eſ. 6. 10. Make the heart of this people fat, make their eares heavy, and ſhut their eyes. So that Calvin doth but accomodate himſelfe to Scripture phraſe. But when we come to the explication of this either in Chriſtian reaſon, or by comparing one place of Scripture with an other, we ſay that to Make their hearts fat, their eares heavy, and to ſhut their eys: And to give them the Eſ. 6. 10. Rom: 11. 8. Dent: 29. 4Spirit of ſlumber, eyes that they ſhould not ſee, and eares that they ſhould not heare; Is no more then, not to give them hearts to perceive, nor eyes to ſee, nor eares to heare. Yet where Calvin ſaith this, I cannot find, the quotation here is ſo diſturbed; but I gueſſe the Authour would referre us to lib. 1. Inſtitut. cap. 18. prima & ſecunda Sect: But I find no ſuch thing there, but ſpeaking of God's providence in blinding Ahab, thus he writes, Vult Deus perfidum Ahab decipi; God will have perfidious Ahab to be deceived. This is plaine out of the Sect: 1.1 Kings 22. 20. Who ſhall entiſe Ahab that he may goe, and fall at Ramoth Gilead; operam ſuam offert Diabolus ad eam rem, The Divell offers his ſervice for this, ſaith Calvin. And doth not the Scripture expreſly teſtifie as much? There came forth a Spirit and ſtood before the Lord, and ſaid I will entiſe him; And the Lord ſaid unto him, wherewith? And he ſaid, I will goe out and be a falſe Spirit in the mouth of all his Prophets. Calvin goes on, Mittitur cum verſ. 21.certo mandato, ut ſit Spiritus mendax in ore omnium Prophetarum; God ſends him with a certaine command to become a lying Spirit in the mouth of all Ahab's Prophets. This alſo the Scripture teſtifies as expreſly, as the former; Then the Lord ſaid, thou ſhalt entiſe him and prevaile alſo; Goe forth and doe ſo. Now let the indifferent judge, whether this Authour verſ. 22.might not as well calumniate the Holy Ghoſt the Inditer of this Scripture, as Calvin who proceeds but according unto Scripture in that which he delivers. Now let every ſober man judge whether hereby it doth not manifeſtly appeare, Excoecari Achabum, that Ahab was blinded by the Devill, Deo volente ac jubente, the Lord willing and commanding it; but this taken apart from the inſtance in reference whereunto it is delivered, a man might ſuſpect his meaning were, that God commands a man to ſhut his own eyes, & blind himſelfe. And judge I pray whether to ſay, that this whole providence of God concerning Ahab, was no more then permiſſion, deſerves not to be called, figmentum, a fiction, as indeed Calvin calleth it. To this he addes the joynt profeſſion of the Apoſtles touching God's providence in crucifying of Chriſt; in Abſalom's inceſt, the Chaldees bloudy execution in the land of Iuda, and the Aſſyrians before them, which in Scripture is called the worke of Act: 4. 28. Act: 2. 23. 2 Sam: 16. 22, & 12. 12.God &c. And concludes it to be manifeſt, Nugari eos & ineptire, qui in locum providentiae Dei nudam permiſſionem ſubſtituunt, that they doe but toy and trifle, who in place of God's providence ſubſtitute a naked permiſſion. And this Authour doth but calumniate Calvin's expreſſion, in rendring the word ineptire, by playing the foole. Ineptire in the proprietie thereof, is in this caſe to faile of fit and congruous interpretation and accommodation. And may he not juſtly taxe thoſe who underſtand ſuch Scriptures, as ſpeake of God's ſmiting men with the Spirit of ſlumber and giddineſſe, of blinding their mindes, infatuating and hardning their hearts of a permiſſion, and ſuffering of men to be blinded and hardned? I had thought common ſenſe might have juſtified him in this; taking Calvin aright, who denies not permiſſion in all this, but nudam permiſſionem, naked permiſſion; as much as to ſay theſe Scripture paſſages doe ſignifie more then permiſſion; And as I have ſaid before Bellarmin himſelfe doth not ſatisfie himſelfe with a naked permiſſion in ſuch like providence divine as here is mentioned. I thinke he may juſtly ſay that to explicate excecation and obduration by permiſſion is ſuch an explication as will ſatisfie no ſober man, and that ſuch a ſolution is too frivolous. And as for God's preſcience, it is apparent that the horrible outrages committed upon the holy Son of God, the Scripture teſtifies not to have been foreknowen only by God, but by the hand and counſell of God predetermined alſo; & more then this, cleare reaſon doth juſtifie that the ground of God's foreknowing ought, is his foredetermining of it, as I have often proved by invincible demonſtration.
2. Who miſtakes the nature of permiſſion moſt, we or this cenſurer, let the indifferent judge. It is apparent that he puts no difference between permiſſion humane, and permiſſion Divine. Sure I am Suarez requires to permiſſion divine a concurrence to the act, the obliquity whereof is permitted. And more then that both Scotus of old without queſtion, and the Dominicans of late, and Bradwardine before them maintaine this concurrence to be by way of determining the will to every act thereof. But all theſe miſtake the nature of permiſſion, if we believe this Authour upon his word wherein he carrieth himſelfe very authoritatively, no Pope like him. Yet he is ready to give his reaſon for it, though with manifeſt contradiction to himſelfe, but let us conſider it.
1. Permiſſion is an act of God's conſequent and judiciary will, by which he puniſheth men for abuſing their freedom &c. Moſt untrue, and manifeſtly convictable of untruth by that which himſelfe delivered but a little before in this very Section, where he ſaid, It is true that God hath decreed to ſuffer ſinne; for otherwiſe there would be none. By this it is manifeſt that whenſoever ſinne is committed, there had place God's permiſſion of ſinne, otherwiſe there would have been no ſinne, therefore permiſſion had place in the very firſt ſinne that was committed by man, and Angells. Judge Reader with what felicity he comes to cenſure and correct the miſtakes of others about permiſſion. As Auſtin ſometimes ſaid of one oppoſing him, noverit ſe eſſe obduratum; ſo mayeſt thou not ſay of this Authour in this diſcourſe of his, noverit ſe eſſe excaecatum, let him take notice how himſelfe is blinded? The Lord giving Iſrael up to their own hearts luſts; he like a reſolute Doctor will have to proceed by way of mere permiſſion. Yet the Lord ſaith not, he permitted Pſ: 81. 11. 12,them to their own luſts; and Rom: 1. 24, 26, 28. Obſerve, firſt looke what he permitted came to paſſe throughout, even to abominable courſes. Secondly, obſerve, the judgment of God is noted herein. They received the recompence of their own errour as was meet. What? And are God's judgments executed only by God's permiſſion, and that by the hands of them that are judged and puniſhed? Such is the accuratenes of this Authours divinity comming to correct the miſtakes of others about permiſſion. And for the proofe of all this we have this Authour's bare word without any reaſon or authority repreſented by him. As for that of Ezechiel not chap: 18. 39, but chap: 20. 39 Goe and ſerve every one his Idels; this hath the forme of a command, rather then of a permiſſion; but the Lord hereby ſignifies, that in ſerving him, while they ſerve other Gods, they doe but profane his holy name in ſerving him, and undoubtedly they provoked God more hereby, then the heathens who ſerved not him at all, but other Gods only. So that the Lord ſeemes to ſignifie, that he had rather, they ſhould not ſerve him at all, as Revelations 3. I would thou wer'ſt either hot or cold, but ſeeing thou art luke-warme, I will ſpue thee out of my mouth; But be it as the Authour would have it, did here God begin to permit them? their former diſobedience was it not a conſequent of God's permiſſion? For if God had not permitted their diſobedience, ſurely it had not been by the Authours diſcourſe in the beginning of this Section. As touching that Revelations 22. 11. I hope by the ſame rule of this poſitive Theologue, not only their continuing to be unjuſt, was by God's permiſſion, but their firſt being and beginning to be unjuſt was by God's permiſſion alſo. And ſurely if this man's word be of any credit, all ſinners were firſt permitted to ſinne, otherwiſe they had never ſinned, and not the obſtinate and willfull only. Were not the Angells innocent before their firſt ſin? was not Adam innocent before his firſt ſin? and did not God permit both Angells and men to ſin their firſt ſin? If not; what truth is in this authour's word, when he ſaid, God hath decreed to ſuffer ſin? for otherwiſe there would be none. And if he be not worthy to be believed, in this his credit is crackt, and deſerves not to be believed in ought.
2. We have been more beholding unto this Authour, ſince he came to meet with our diſtinctions, then throughout all his former diſcourſe; as I have ſhewed already in part, & ſhall diſcover more by God's helpe (not his permiſſion only) ere we part from this. He ſeemes to be conſcious of ſome thing and fearefull of giving too much advantage, as appeares by his expreſſiō, when he ſaith that permiſſion (of ſin; for ſo he ſhould ſay) ſuppoſeth a poſſibility of ſinning or not ſinning. Now this is nothing congruous to his former expreſſions whereby it was made to ſuppoſe that, a man is able to ſtand. For to be able to ſtand, is to have an active power in him whereby he is able to ſtand; but to have a poſſibility of ſtanding, or not ſinning is not ſo. For though a man hath no power in himſelfe to ſtand or to abſtaine from ſinne, yet if there be a power in God to makehim ſtand, and to preſerve him from falling, this is ſufficient to make good, that a man hath a poſſibility of ſtanding and abſtaining from ſinne. And we are willing to confeſſe that God is able not only to preſerve any man that ſtands from falling, but alſo to raiſe any Hiſt: Goteſch: pag. 142.man that is fallen; and to make him ſtand. Thus Florus, Habet homo poſt illam damnationem liberum arbitrium, quo propriâ voluntate inclinari poteſt & inclinatur ad malum, habet liberum arbitrium quo poſſit aſſurgere ad bonum; Ut autem aſſurgat ad bonum, non eſt propriae virtutis, ſed gratiae Dei miſerantis. Nam & qui mortuus eſt dici poteſt poſſe vivere, non tamen ſuâ virtute, ſed Dei. Ita & liberum arbitrium hominis ſemel ſauciatum, ſemel mortuum poteſt ſanari, non tamen ſuâ virtutè, ſed gratiâ miſerantis Dei. Et ideo omnes homines admonentur, omnibus verbum praedicatur, quia habent poſſe credere, poſſe converti ad Deum; ut verbo extrinſecus admonente, & Deo intus ſuſcitante, qui audiunt, reviviſcant. After Adam's fall man hath free will, whereby of his own accord he may be and is inclined unto evill, he hath free will whereby he may ariſe unto that which is good; but to ariſe unto Good is not of his own power, but of Gods grace commiſerating. For of him alſo who is dead, it may be ſaid, that he may live, yet not of his own power, but by the power of God. So the free will of men being once wounded, once dead may be healed not by 'its own power, but by the grace of God ſhewing mercy. And therefore all men are admoniſhed, the word is preached unto all, becauſe this they have that they may believe, they may be converted unto God; to the end that by the word admoniſhing outwardly, and God ſtirring them up inwardly, they which heare may be revived. Obſerve by the way a manifeſt incongruity in ſaying that permiſſion is a not hindring them from falling, who are able to ſtand For they who are permitted to fall, and not hindered from falling, are ſuppoſed to ſtand, and not only to be able to ſtand. It ſeemes this Authour cannot endure that Permiſſion of ſinne, ſhould conſiſt in the withholding of a grace needfull, to abſtaine from ſinne. Whence it followeth evidently that in this Authour's opinion, either God's permiſſion of ſinne is not the withholding of any grace at all; or if it be it is the withholding only of ſuch a grace, without which nevertheleſſe man may keep himſelfe from ſinne; and conſequently, though ſuch a grace be granted, yet it is indifferent for him to ſinne, as well as to abſtaine from ſinne; If it be no withholding of grace at all, it followes that like as when a man ſins it is not for want of grace: So when a man abſtaines from ſinne, it is not by vertue of any grace of God granted him thereunto; Yet the Lord tells Gen: 20. 6.King Abimelech expreſly I kept thee from ſinning againſt me. If he pretends that ſome grace is withheld whenſoever a man ſinneth, but will not ſay that is was neceſſary for the avoiding of ſinne it followeth that when man is permitted to ſinne, he is no more apt to ſinne, then while ſuch grace was denied him, and conſequently no more apt to abſtaine from ſinne when ſuch a grace is granted him, and conſequently in granting ſuch a grace he permits him ſtill to ſinne, as well as in denying it; and in denying he permits him to doe good, as much as in granting it; So that ſtill it is not God that keepeth a man from ſinne, as often as he abſtaineth from it, but merely the power of his own free will. Whereby it is evident that this Authour as well denies, that God is the Authour of any good, as that he is the Authour of any evill: But man is Authour of the one as well as of the other. The power of doing good he will grant is from God, neither can it be denied, but that the power of doing evill is from God. He will grant likewiſe that God is ready to concurre to any good act if man will, and I preſume he will not deny, but that God concurres alſo to the ſubſtance of every evill act. The only difference that remaines is this; God perſwades only to good, and diſſwades only that which is evill. Now this third and laſt aſſertion we grant as well as he. Yet he layes to our charge that we make God the Authour of evill, but cares not at all how he denies God to be the Authour of any good in the actions of men, and makes noe place for any grace ſave ſuch, as is hortatory, which is performed uſually by the miniſtery of men. Yet conſider what Bradwardine ſometimes Arch-Biſhop of Canterbury Elect hath written in this kind before Luther or Calvin were borne. The title of the fourth chapter of his ſecond booke is this. That free will being tempted cannot of his own ſtrength without the helpe of God and his grace overcome any temptation. Of the firſt this, that free will ſtrengthned with what created grace ſoever cannot without another ſpeciall ſuccour of God overcome any temptation. of the ſixth this, that, That ſpeciall ſuccour of God is the unconquerable grace of God. Of the ſeventh this; That no man though not tempted, can by the ſtrength of his free will alone without created grace or with created grace, how great ſoever it be, without the ſpeciall aſiſtance of God avoide any ſin: & all theſe propoſitions he demonſtrates with variety of argument. Behold the ingenuity of this Authour; He flies in the face of Calvin and Beza, and other our Divines, for maintaining that unleſſe God by his grace keep and preſerve a man effectually from ſinning, it cannot be that he ſhould abſtaine from ſinne. Bradwardine maintained the ſame before any of theſe were borne yet he ſaith nothing to him, lets all his arguments alone; but upbraides us for maintaining the ſame doctrine, without giving any reaſon to convict us of our errour. Adde to this, which I have omitted, the Corolary of that ſeventh chapter in Bradwardin formerly mentioned is this, That it is the will of God, which preſerves them that are tempted from falling, and them that are not tempted, both from temptation and from ſinne. Not one of the arguments whereby he confirmes any of theſe poſitions, doth this Authour goe about to anſwer. In like manner Alvarez. Poſitâ permiſſione divinâ infallibiliter Lib. 9. de auxil diſp: 101 p. 803. num. 7 lin: penult:peccat homo; upon ſuppoſition of God's permiſſion, man ſins infallibly. The propoſition he intends to prove in that diſputation is this, Therefore a man is not converted becauſe he is not aided of God. But both he and we deny that hereupon a man ſinneth neceſſarily alwaies, but only in ſome caſes. In ſome caſes it followeth, as namely a man borne in ſinne, and in the ſtate of corruption, the naturall fruits whereof are infidelity and impenitency, untill God affords a man the grace of regeneration, he cannot believe, he cannot repent. They that are in the fleſh cannot pleaſe God. Thou after the hardneſſe of thy heart that cannot repent. Therefore they could not believe. In which caſe God is not the cauſe of infidelity, and Ro: 8. Ro: 2. Io: 12.impenitency; but theſe proceed naturally and neceſſarily from that originall corruption wherein they are conceived and borne. God is only the naturall cauſe why this their naturall corruption continues uncured. For none can cure it but God, it being a work nothing inferior to the raiſing of them from the dead. Yet he is no culpable cauſe of this. For as much as he is not bound to any, but he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. So that neceſſarily without the grace of regeneration, every man continueth in his naturall corruption, devoyd of faith, of hope, and love. Theſe being ſupernaturall, and whereunto no man can attaine with out ſupernaturall grace. In like manner, hence it followeth that no naturall man can performe any morall good act in a gracious & acceptable manner in the ſight of God, becauſe …he fountaines of ſuch performances, are not found in naturall men. But they have a free power as to commit any naturall evill worke; ſo to abſtaine from it; though not in a gracious manner: Free power as to abſtaine from any vertuous act, ſo to performe it alſo, though not in a gracious manner. They may be temperate, chaſt, juſt, and the like; but their vertuous actions are not truly vertues in a Chriſtian account, becauſe they know not God, nor Chriſt, much leſſe doe they believe in him, and performe theſe vertuous actions out of their love unto him. If Maccovius, and Whitaker, and Pareus be of the ſame mind, and the Dominicans with them, and Bradwardine before them all; let the indifferent Reader conſider what an hungry oppoſition is made by this Authour, not offering to anſwer any one of their Arguments, nor of mine neither, in my Vindiciae; Nor ſaith ought by way of reply upon any anſwer to the like argument of Arminius. The reſolution of all that here he delivers, determining in a rule l. 2. digrſ. 3. Criminat. 3. Sect: 2.himſelfe propoſeth, without reaſon or authority to juſtifie it. A rule as here it is applyed conteining a notorious untruth. For cauſa deficiens in no caſe can be efficiens in proper ſpeech, any more, then cauſa efficiens can be accounted deficiens, unleſſe it be underſtood in divers kinds As for example, efficiens naturaliter may be deficiens moraliter, and deficiens moraliter may be efficiens naturaliter. An efficient cauſe naturally, may be deficient morally, and ſo a cauſe deficient morally, may be efficient naturally. Leaſt of all can it have place in the preſent queſtion, which is of the cauſe of ſinne. For ſinne as ſinne, evill as evill, non habet cauſam efficientem, ſed deficientem; hath no cauſe efficient, but deficient only; as Auſtin hath long agoe determined; and it is a rule generally received and never that I know denied of any. Againe cauſa deficiens in neceſſariis may be culpable I confeſſe, and ſo interpretativè (as they ſay) may be interpreted to be as good as an efficient. As in a civill conſideration it is ſaid of the Magiſtrate, that, Qui non vetat peccare cum poſſit, jubet. He that forbiddeth not a man to ſinne when it is in his power, or when he hath authority to forbid, 'tis as if he ſhould command the committing of that ſin. Now this is only in ſuch a caſe, where the neceſſitie reſpects the perſon who is the deficient cauſe, as namely in caſe he be bound in duty to afford help and ſuccour to him that cannot keepe himſelfe from ſinning without the ſuccour of an other, not otherwiſe. And therefore it reacheth not to God, who is not bound to preſerve any man or creature from ſinning; Leaſt of all is he bound to regenerate a man that is borne in ſinne. Adam was created in all ſufficiency that the reaſonable creature was capable of, without any pronenes unto evill, but rather in a morall propenſion to that which was good; And his fall hath brought this corruption upon all mankind, even a neceſſitie of ſinning, as Arminius and Corvinus confeſſe. He wanted no power to doe that which was good, or to abſtaine from ſin, but ever ſince his fall, impotency to that which is good, & proneneſſe unto that which is evill hath been the naturall inheritance of all mankind. And as for the permiſſion of Adam's fall, his ſin was in a thing naturally indifferent, the holines of his nature not inclining him more to abſtain from that fruit any more, then to partake of it. Neither doe we ſay that God did withhold from Adam any grace that theſe our adverſaries maintaine to be neceſſary for the avoiding of that ſinne which was committed by him. How Adam himſelfe was brought by Eve to eate of that fruit is not expreſſed. As for Eve the temptation which Satan uſed with her, & which did prevaile is expreſſed: He allured her with the repreſentation of the powerfull nature of that, to make them as Gods knowing good and evill, & he made this ſeem credible by the very denomination which God gave unto the Tree, the Tree of knowledge of good and evill. It ſeemes not likely that ſhe knew who it was that ſpake unto her in the Serpent, nor that ſhe was acquainted with the fall of Angells. Then againe the deſire of knowledge, is no evill thing it ſelfe, or ſtands in any contradiction to the integrity of a reaſonable creature: Nay nothing more agreeable to the nature of the beſt, it brings ſuch a perfection with it. Only the errour was, in affecting it this way. God did not keep the Devill off; nor reveale unto her who it was that ſpake unto her; much leſſe his apoſtaticall condition; leaſt of all his project to ſupplant them. Neither did he quicken that holy feare which he had inſpired into her to reſiſt it at the firſt, & to goe to her husband to acquaint him with it. She might thinke that the knowledge of good and evill might make her more fit for the ſervice of God, then unfit. All which conſidered, her will being moved to ſeek this perfection by taſting of ſuch a fruit, there was no cauſe or reaſon to hinder her from taſting it, ſave only the conſideration of God's prohibition. For the will of every reaſonable creature is naturally apt to affect that which is good, and though that good may prove evill in ſome circumſtance, yet if that circumſtance be not conſidered, the will proceeds to affect it. How long the Devill was exerciſed in this temptation we know not. Inconſideration is conceived by Durandus to be the originall of that ſinne of theirs; and God was not bound to maintaine this conſideration quick in her, and of the danger of ſuch a tranſgreſſion. In fine ſhe came to a will & reſolution to taſt of it; to the producing of this act, as a naturall thing, the Lord concurred, as all confeſſe, namely to the ſubſtance of the act. The queſtion is whether he concurred to the effecting of it abſolutely or conditionally? It was as true of Adam and Eve, that in him they lived and moved and had their being, as it is of us. We ſay God as a firſt cauſe moves every ſecond cauſe; but agreeably to their natures; Neceſſary agents to worke every thing they worke neceſſarily; Free agents to doe every thing they doe, freely. But to ſay that God made them velle modo vellent, to will in caſe they would will, is ſo abſurd as nothing more; The act of willing being hereby made the condition of it ſelfe, and conſequently both before and after it ſelfe. See what I have delivered concerning this in my Vindiciae lib. 2. Digr: 3. and Digr: 6. of the nature of permiſſion, more at large, where unto this Authour is content to anſwer juſt nothing.