The Riches of Gods Love, Part 2 · Section 5

The Riches of Gods Love · Part 2 · Section 5

p. 83Sect. 5.

That God is the Authour of men's ſalvation and converſion, all ſides grant; and yet he doth noe more in the procuring them then theſe men report him to doe in the Reprobates impenitency and damnation The M. Maſon's Addit. 3. p. 30. 31.ſalvation and converſion of the Elect, ſay they, he hath abſolutely and antecedently, without the foreſight of any deſerving of theirs, reſelved upon, and by irreſiſtable meanes in their ſeverall generations, draweth them to believe, repent, and indure to the end, that ſo they might be ſaved, and his abſolute decree accompliſhed. On the other ſide, the damnation, the ſinnes, and the finall impenitency of Reprobates, he hath of his alone will and pleaſure peremptorily decreed; this his decree he executeth in time drawing them on by his unconquerable power and providence from ſinne to ſin, till they have made up their meaſure, and in the end have inflicted on them that eternall vengeance, which he had provided for them. What difference is here in the courſe which God taketh for the converſion and ſalvation of the Elect, and the obduration and damnation of the Reprobates? And therefore what hindereth but that God (by their grounds) may as truely be ſtiled the prime cauſe and Authour of the ſinnes of the one, as of the converſion of the other?

The Fathers thought it a plaine caſe; and therefore they did make ſinne an Object of preſcience, and not predeſtination and bent the moſt of thoſe arguments by wich they refuted this foule aſſertion, againſt an abſolute, irreſiſtable and neceſſitating decree. as I could eaſily ſhew, but that I feare to be over long. Only I will cite ſome few of thoſe Authour's words whom the learned & reverend Biſhop hath alleadged in favour and for the defence of the Predeſtinarians, and the maintainers of Gotteſchalk's opinion The Church of Lyous in their anſwer to the poſitions of Johannes Scotus, which he framed againſt Gotteſchalke hath theſe words, Whoſoever ſaith, tthat God hath laid a conſtraint, or neceſſity of ſinning upon any man, he doth manifeſtly and fearefully blaſpheme God, in as much as he maketh him, by affirming that of him to be the very Authour of ſinne. Remigius Arch. Biſhop of that Church explaining the Churches opinion in that point of preſcience and predeſtination in ſeven ſeverall rules; in the fift of thoſe rules, he hath theſe words to the ſame purpoſe. God, ſaith he by his preſcience and predeſtination, hath laid a neceſſitie of being wicked upon noe man. For if he had done this, he had been the Authour of ſinnes. And thus in my iudgment doth it plainly appeare that by abſolute Reprobation, as it is taught the upper way, God is made to be the true cauſe of men's ſinnes.

Obſerve the falſe carriage of this Authour, That God is the Authour of men's ſalvation Anſwer.and converſion, he ſaith, all ſides grant; as if there were noe difference between Arminians, p. 84and the Orthodox; between him and us in this. We ſay God workes faith and regeneration in us, and that for Chriſt's ſake. The Remonſtrants in their Cenſura cenſurae, in expreſſe termes deny that Chriſt merited faith and regeneration for us; and judge by this indifferently, whether they make faith and regeneration to be the guift of God. Or when they doe in termes profeſſe this (as Epicurus, verbis Deos poſuit, re ſuſtulit) whether they doe not equivocate. Aske this Authour in what ſenſe he makes God to be the Authour of man's converſiō, whether any otherwiſe thē, 1. In giving men power to believe if they will to repent if they will. 2. In perſwading unto faith & repentance. 3. In concurring with man to the act of faith & repentance. Now as touching the firſt, that mere nature & not grace, Deo credere & ab amore rerum temporalium ad divina praecepta ſervanda ſe convertere omnes poſſint ſi velint, ſaith Auſtin, All men can, if they will, believe God, and from the love of temporall De Gen: cont. Manich. l. 1. cap. 3.things convert themſelves to the keeping of God's commandements. Now this is noe more, then, poſſe fidem habere, poſſe charitatem habere, to be capable of faith of charity, and this is, naturae hominum, of the nature of man; As Auſtin teſtifies in another place, where he ſaith poſſe fidem habere, poſſe charitatem habere, naturae eſt hominum, fidem habere, charitatem habere, De praedeſt. Sanct: 1. c. 5.gratiae eſt fidelium. To be capable of faith and charity, is the nature of man, but to have faith and to have charity is the grace of the faithfull. Conſider in reaſon; ſupernaturall grace is not in reaſon to be accounted inferiour to a morall vertue; but ſo it will prove, if it be but a power to be good if we will. For morall vertue doth not give a man a power only to doe good if he will, but it inclines and diſpoſeth the will unto vertuous actions. So juſtice is not an indifferency of condition leaving it to man whether he will be juſt or noe; but it makes him juſt, and ſo diſpoſoth him to juſt courſes. Againe if grace ſupernaturall doth only give power to believe if one will; this being a free power, it is indifferent as well not to believe, as to beleive; as well not to repēt, as to repent. For liberty is alwaies to act oppoſite; whence it will follow that by vertue of ſupernaturall grace a man is diſpoſed not more to faith, then to infidelitie, not more to repentance then to hardneſſe of heart and Impenitency. 4. Conſider, a man hath noe need of ſupernaturall grace to inable him to refuſe to repent, ſeing naturally he is ſufficiently diſpoſed hereunto; & neceſſarily by reaſon of that naturall corruption which is hereditary unto him. By all this it is apparent, that a power to believe wrought in a man by ſupernaturall grace, is not a free power working freely; but rather a neceſſary power working neceſſarily; like unto the condition of a morall vertue, which reſtraines man's naturall indifferency to good or evill, and diſpoſeth him only to good. And conſequently as many as maintaine no other power to be given unto man by grace, then to believe, if a man will; they deale like Pelagians, who called that which was meerly naturall, prevenient grace. Laſtly if God be the Authour of man's converſion, becauſe he gives him power to convert, if he will; he may as well be called the Authour of non converſion, and perſeverance in ſinne, becauſe God gives power not to convert, and to perſevere in ſinne, if he will. 2. As touching the ſecond, If God be the Authour of man's converſion, becauſe he perſwades thereunto, then certainly he is not the Authour of ſinne, becauſe he perſwades not thereunto. 3. If God be the Authour of converſion, becauſe he cooperates thereunto, then certainly he may be as well ſaid to be the Authour of every ſinfull act. For that he doth cooperate thereunto, I am very confident this Authour will not deny. Now I could earneſtly entreate the Judicious Reader to examine well this Authour's opinion in theſe particulars, and compare them with his former diſcourſe, that he may have a cleare way opened unto him to judge with what conſcience he carried himſelfe in his former diſcourſe, imputing unto us that we make God the Authour of ſin; albeit in treating of God's providence in evill, we generally have the expreſſe word of God before our eyes; and in our explication thereof doe rather qualify the ſeeming harſhneſſe thereof, then aggravate it. For undoubtedly by the tenour of his diſcourſe, looke upon what grounds he denies God to be the Authour of ſinne, he muſt withall deny God to be the Authour of faith, of repentance, of converſion; And look upon what grounds he makes God the Authour of converſion; upon the ſame grounds he muſt make God the Authour of ſinne: As in caſe to give power to believe, if we will; and to cooperate with us in the act of faith, be to make him the Authour: Or if only upon perſwading us to believe, God is ſaid to be the Authour of faith; then it followes as a ſufficient Apologie for us, that we make not God to be the Authour of ſinne; ſeing none of us conceive him to be a perſwader of any ſinfull act; but rather a diſſwader and forbidder thereof and that upon paine of eternall damnation. But on the contrary we make a vaſt difference between God's operations in ſinfull actions, and God's operations in actions gracious. As firſt, every ſinfull act is alwaies within the compaſſe of acts naturall; noe ſupernaturall p. 85act is or can be a ſinne. Now to the producing of any act of morality, every man notwithſtanding his corruption hath in him a naturall power. But there is noe naturall power in man to the performing of an act ſupernaturall. God muſt inſpire him with a new life called in Scripture, the life of God; and make him after a ſort partaker of the divine nature; and give his own Spirit to dwell in him, in ſuch ſort, that, being crucified with Chriſt, Eph: 4. 18. 2 Pet: 1. 4. Gal: 2. 20. Rom: 8. 11.we hence forth live no more, but Chriſt liveth in us. Theſe ſupernaturall acts are but few according to the three Theologicall vertues, Faith, Hope, & Charity, whoſe offsprings they are; the love of God to the contempt of our ſelves hope in God to the contempt of the world, as touching the worſt it can doe unto us: and faith in God, to the quenching of the fiery darts of the devill. As for all other good acts, in the producing of them, God hath a double influence; one common as they are acts naturall, touching the ſubſtance of them; another ſpeciall as touching the gracious nature of them, proceeding from faith and love. But as touching evill acts, he hath noe influence in the producing of them, but that which is common, and to the ſubſtance of the acts; none at all as touching the evilneſſe of them, the reaſon whereof is that which was delivered by Auſtin long agoe. Malū non habet cauſam efficientem ſed deficientem, Evill hath no cauſe efficient, but deficient only. And it is impoſſible that God ſhould be defective in a culpable manner. The creature may, the Creatour cannot: And the ground of the creatures defective condition is accounted to be this, that he was brought out of nothing, & conſequently of a fraile condition. And it is received generall as a rule in Schooles, that a creature cannot be made, impeccabilis per naturam, that is ſuch a one, as by nature cannot ſinne. This was delivered long agoe by Anſelme one of the firſt of School-divines; In evill things God doth worke, quod ſunt, that they are; non quod mala ſunt, not that they are evill; But in good things God doth worke, Et quod ſunt, & quod bona ſunt, both that they are and that they are good. Here this Authour ſets down our opinion concerning Election and Reprobation at his pleaſure. We ſay with Auſtin that, predeſtination is the preparation of grace, that is the Divine decree of conferring grace; And both he and all confeſſe, it is alſo the decree of conferring glory. And becauſe in making of this decree, God had reſpect unto ſome only, not to all, both men and Angells, therefore in this conſideration it is called the decree of Election, in diſtinction from the decree of reprobation. Now this grace is of a double nature; for either it is grace cuſtodient from ſinne, and the decree of granting this was the election of Angells, called in holy Scripture, The elect Angells; or grace healing, after men have ſinned, and the decreee of granting this is the election of men, commonly in Scripture called God's Elect, in reference unto this. It is farther to be obſerved that Auſtin grounds the Orthodoxe doctrine of predeſtination and election upon the Orthodoxe doctrine concerning grace. And the abſoluteneſſe of the one he built upon the freenes of the other, in not being given according unto men's merits. As it appeares, de bono perſeverantiae cap. 15. Where having propoſed ſome exceptions of the Maſſilienſes made againſt his doctrine of predeſtination, comming to make anſwer thereunto, he begins thus, Iſta cum dicuntur, ſaith he. ita nos à confitenda Dei gratia, id eſt, quae non ſecundum merita noſtra datur, & a confitenda ſecundum eam predeſtinatione ſanctorum deterrere non debent When theſe things are objected, they muſt not deterre us from confeſſing God's grace, I meane ſuch a grace as is not given accordiog unto works; nor from confeſſing the predeſtination of Saints according thereunto. Now if the abſoluteneſſe of predeſtination be grounded upon this, that, grace is not given according unto merits, (the ſcripture phraſe denies it to be given according unto workes. But Bellarmine acknowledgeth that in this Argument, merits and workes are taken by the Ancients in one and the 2 Tim: 1. 9. Tit: 3. 5.ſame ſenſe.) it followeth that as many as deny the abſoluteneſſe of predeſtination muſt therewithall maintaine, that, Grace is given according to men's merits or works. And the reaſon is evident: For if God doth not give grace according unto men's works, but of his mere pleaſure decreed to give grace unto ſome, and not upon conſideration of their works. And this is to elect abſolutely, and antecedently without the foreſight of any deſerving, yea of any works; though by that expreſſion which this Authour uſeth he doth ſufficienty manifeſt, that his opinion is, that God elects not only upō the foreſight of men's, workes but upon the foreſight of men's deſervings. It is farther conſiderable to prevent the reaches of ſuch crafty foxes as we have to deale with, whoſe courſe is in joyning the decree of converſion and ſalvation together, to tranſlate that which belongs unto one, unto the other moſt unreaſonably: For albeit God proceeds according to the mere pleaſure, and without all reſpect to workes, in conferring grace, and decreeth accordingly to conferre it: Yet he proceeds not merely according unto pleaſure, and without all reſpect of works in conferring glory; but according unto a Covenant which is this, whoſoever beleiveth p. 86ſhall be ſaved, and accordingly he beſtowes the kingdome of heaven by way of reward for faith, repentance, and good workes. This hath Chriſt deſerved at the hands of 1 Pet: 1. 9. Mat: 25.his Father that our weake performances ſhould be thus rewarded. Laſtly, it is farther to be conſidered that God, as he thus beſtoweth ſalvation by way of reward of our faith, repentance ſo from everlaſting he did decree to beſtowe ſalvation, namely, by way of reward. Not that either faith, or repentance, or good workes, any or all of theſe were the cauſe (leaſt of all the deſerving cauſe) of God's decree, or antecedaneous to his decree; but of his mere pleaſure decreed both to give the grace of faith and repentance, and to beſtow eternall life by way of a reward thereof, as may farther be proved and that clearly divers waies. 1. By the Apoſtl's diſcourſe; where he diſcourſeth after this manner, Before Eſau and Iacob were borne, or had done good or evill, it was ſaid that the Elder ſhall Rom: 9. 11.ſerve the younger; therefore election is not of workes: But if election did proceeed upon the foreſight of faith, repentance, and good workes, or any of them, then it might juſtly be ſaid, that it were of faith, repentance, or good workes or of all of them; And the force of the Apoſtles argument extends to conclude, that election is noe more of faith or of repentance, then of workes; not only becauſe faith and repentance are workes, and ſo accounted in Scripture phraſe, as it appeares. Io: 6. 29. But cheifely becauſe before men are borne, they are uncapable of faith and repentance, as of good workes. 2. If faith were a motive cauſe unto election, then either it were ſo of it's own nature, or by conſtitution Divine: not of it's own nature as it is apparent. If by conſtitution divine, mark what ſtrange abſurdities follow; namely this, that God did ordaine, that upon the fore ſight of faith, he would ordaine men unto ſalvation, whereby God's eternall ordination is made the object of his ordination, whereas the Objects of God's decrees are alwaies things temporall, never any thing that is eternall. 3. It cannot be ſaid that God giveth ſalvation to the end he may give them faith, but it may farre more congruouſly be ſaid, that God gives faith to the end that he may ſave them; therefore the intention of ſalvation is rather before the intention of giving faith, then the intention of giving faith is before the intention of giving ſalvation. Or better thus, if God foreſee faith before he decrees ſalvation, then the intention of giving faith (without which God cannot foreſee faith) is before the intention of giving ſalvation; and conſequently the giving of faith ſhould be the laſt in execution; that is men ſhall firſt be ſaved, and aferwards have faith beſtowed upon them, to wit, in another world where they live by ſight and not by faith. I come to the decree of reprobation; the Objects whereof are two, proportionable to the two objects of election or predeſtination. The firſt is permiſſion of ſin, the ſecond is, Damnation for ſinne, according to that of Aquinas, Reprobatio includit voluntatem permitendi culpam & damnationem inferendi pro culpâ. Reprobation includes a will to permit ſinne, and to inflict damnation for ſinne. The firſt object of reprobation I ſay is, permiſſion of ſinne; not Sin as this Authour would have it, but permiſſion of ſinne: Becauſe theſe decrees, to wit, of permitting ſinne, and inferring damnation for ſinne, are decrees of meanes conducing to a certaine end. For like as in election God decreeth to beſtowe faith, repentance, and obedience on ſome, and to reward it with everlaſting life for the manifeſtation of his glory in the way of mercy mixt with juſtice: So in Reprobation he decrees to permit others to ſinne, and finally to perſevere therein, and to damne them for their ſinne to manifeſt his glory in the way of vindicative juſtice. Now whoſoever intends an end muſt alſo be the Auhour of the meanes conducing to that end. Now God, though well he may be the Authour of permiſſion of ſinne, yet he cannot be the Author of ſinne: Albeit upon God's permiſſion of ſinne it followeth that ſinne ſhall exiſt. Now to permit ſinne is all one with denying grace, whether it be grace Cuſtodient to preſerve from it, or grace healing to pardon and cure it after it is committed. Now like as the Lord hath mercy on whom he will in pardoning their ſinne, and healing it by faith and repentance: So he hardeneth whom he will by denying faith and repentance. So that as God of his mere pleaſure grants the grace of faith and repentance unto ſome; ſo of his mere pleaſure he denies it unto others. And ſo in Reprobation he decreeth of his mere pleaſure to deny it. But albeit the Lord of mere pleaſure proceeds in the denying of faith and repentance, whereby alone ſinne is cured, and ſo of mere pleaſure ſuffers ſome finally to perſevere in ſinne, yet in inflicting damnation he doth not carry himſelfe of mere pleaſure without all reſpect to men's workes; but herein he proceeds according to a law which is this, whoſoever believeth not, and repenteth not, ſhall be damned. And like as God damnes noe man but for his finall perſeverance in ſinne. So from everlaſting he did decree to damne noe man, but for his finall perſeverance in ſinne. So that by vertue of the Divine decree of p. 87reprobation, ſinne and finall perſeverance therein is conſtituted the cauſe of damnation; but by noe meanes is it conſtituted the cauſe of the decree of reprobation; neither doth the foreſight of ſinne precede it. For firſt, like as upon this doctrine, that, Grace is not given according unto workes, the abſoluteneſſe of predeſtination is grounded in the judgment of Auſtine as by neceſſary conſequence iſſuing there from: In like ſort upon this, that grace is not denied according unto men's workes, as neceſſarily followeth the abſoluteneſſe of Reprobation. Secondly, looke by what reaſon the Apoſtle proves, that Election is not of good workes, namely becauſe, before the children were borne or had done any good, it was ſaid the Elder ſhall ſerve the Yonger; by the ſame reaſon it evidently followeth that reprobation is not of evill workes, becauſe, before they were borne or had done good or evill, it was ſaid the Elder ſhall ſerve the Younger, Eſau's reprobation being as emphatically ſignified under his ſubjection to Iacob his younger, as Iacob's election was deſigned by his dominion over Eſau his Elder brother. 3. If ſinne be the cauſe of the decree of Reprobation, then either of 'its own nature, or by conſtitution divine. Not by neceſſity of nature; for undoubtedly God could annihilate men for ſinne, had it pleaſed him. If by conſtitution Divine, mark what abſurdity followeth, namely this, that, God did ordaine that upon foreſight of ſinne, he would ordaine men unto damnation. 4. If foreſight of ſinne precedes the decree of damning them for ſin, then the decree to permit ſin much more precedes the decree to damne them for it, as without which there can be noe foreſight of ſin; and conſequently permiſſion of ſin is firſt in intention, and then damnation; and therefore it ſhould be laſt in execution; that is, men ſhould firſt be damned, and afterwards permitted to ſin, to wit, in an other world. 5. And laſtly Reprobation is the will of God; but there can be noe cauſe of God's will, as Aquinas hath proved; much leſſe can a temporall thing be the cauſe of God's will, which is eternall. Upon this ground it is that Aquinas profeſſeth, Never any man was ſo mad, as to ſay that any thing might be the cauſe of predeſtination, as touching the act of God predeſtinating. So may I ſay, it were a mad thing to maintaine that any thing can be the cauſe of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. For the caſe is altogether alike; the will of God being alike uncapable of a cauſe in both, whereas this Authour ſaith, that, God by our opinion doth draw men on by his unconquerable power from ſin to ſin; 'tis mere bumbaſt. All men being borne in ſin muſt needs perſevere in ſin, unleſſe God gives grace to regenerate them. For whether they doe that which is morally good, they doe it not in a gracious manner; or whether they abſtaine from evill, they doe it not in a gracious manner. He that is of God heareth Io: 8. Corvin. defenſ. Armin. pag: 39.God's wordes, ye therefore heare them not ſaith our Saviour, becauſe ye are not of God. Arminius acknowledgeth and Corvinus after him, that all men by reaſon of Adam's ſin are caſt upon a neceſſitie of ſinning. He askes what difference is there in the courſe which God taketh for the converſion of the Elect and obduration of Reprobates; and I have already ſhewed a vaſt difference; and here in breife I ſhew a difference; He hath mercy on the one in the regenerating them, & curing the corruption he finds in them, he ſhewes not the like grace to others, but leaves them unto themſelves; as touching the evill acts committed by the one, he concurreth as a cauſe efficient to the act which for the ſubſtance of it is naturally good. For ens & bonum convertuntur, every thing that is an entity ſo farre is good, but he hath no efficiency as touching the evill, as which indeed can admit no efficiencie, as Auſtin hath delivered of old, Man himſelfe is only a deficient cauſe of ſin, as ſin, and that in a culpable manner, which kind of deficiency is not incident to God. But to every good act he concurres two manner of waies & that in the nature of a poſitive efficient cauſe in both, namely, to the ſubſtance of the act by influence generall, and to the goodneſſe of it by influence ſpeciall and ſupernaturall.

It is true the Fathers made ſin the object of preſcience, not of predeſtination; the reaſon was becauſe they took predeſtination to be only of ſuch things which God did effect in time; Now ſin is none of thoſe things that come to paſſe by God's effection, but only by God's permiſſion. And that ſuch was the notion of predeſtination with the Fathers, I prove firſt out of Auſtin. In ſua quae falli mutari que non poteſt praeſcientiâ opera ſua futura diſponere, De bono perſeveran: c. 17illud omnino nec aliud quidquam eſt praedeſtinare In his foreknowledge, which can neither be deceived nor changed to diſpoſe his own workes, that is to predeſtinate and nothing elſe. And ſin, not being the worke of God, no marvaile if it come not under predeſtination. Secondly, out of the Synod of Valens, Praedeſtinatione autem Deum ea tantum ſtatuiſſe Con: 3.dicimus quae ipſe vel gratuita miſericordiâ, vel juſto judicio facturus erat. We ſay that God by predeſtination ordained only ſuch things as himſelfe would work, either of his free mercy, or in juſt judgment. Againe it is as true that they made even ſin it ſelfe the Object of God's will, witneſſe that of Auſtin. Non aliquid fit niſi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel ſinendo p. 88ut fiat, vel ipſe faciendo. Not any thing comes to paſſe but God Allmighty willing it, either by permitting it or working it. So the eleaventh article of the Church of Ireland; So Arminius Enchirid. 95.Deus voluit Achabum menſuram ſcelerum implere, God would have Ahab to fulfill the meaſure of his ſins. So ſcripture often mentioned. And Auſtin gives the reaſon of it, malum fieri bonū eſt, it is good that evill ſhould be. Bellarmine confeſſeth as much, namely that, Mala fieri Act: 4. 28. Rev: 17. 17.Deo permittente bonum eſt, It is good that evills ſhould come to paſſe by God's permiſſion. And ſhall not God have liberty to will that which is good? When he ſaith of the Ancients, that, They refuted this foule aſſertion of an abſolute, irreſiſtable and neceſſitating decree as he could eaſily ſhew, but that he feares to be overlong. It is nothing but froth; It is not the firſt time I have had experience of ſuch like Pyrgopolinices eloquence of his. Bradwardin hath demonſtrated that the will of God is abſolute throughout ſpeaking of his decree, and none conditionall and his demonſtration is this, If there be any will of God conditionall, then the condition whereupon it proceds muſt be willed by God or no; to ſay it is not, is to acknowledge ſome things to exiſt in the world, in the producing whereof, God hath noe hand, which is generally diſclaimed; And Durand, who affirmes ſome ſuch thing, is oppoſed generally, and indeed his arguments are very ſleight. But if God doth will that condition; then either he wills it abſolutely or conditionally; If abſolutely, then the cauſe is gained. For then that which was firſt willed, was willed alſo abſolutely not conditionally. As for example, if God wills a man's ſalvation upon condition of faith, if withall God's will be, and that abſolutely to give him faith, it followeth that God wills that man's ſalvation, and that abſolutely. If it be anſwered that the condition is willed not abſolutely, but upon another condition; of that other condition I enquire whether God willed it or noe. If noe, then ſomething is produced in the world, in the production whereof God, hath no hand, which is very inconvenient; If you grant that he willed that alſo, I farther demand whether he willed it abſolutely or conditionally? If abſolutely then all that depended thereupon were abſolutely willed, and ſo the cauſe is obtained. If you ſay this condition was willed alſo conditionally, ſo a way is made to a progreſſion in infinitum, which is a thing unſufferable by the conſent of all. And as many as are put to give inſtance will forthwith manifeſt the nakednes of their cauſe. This demonſtration of Bradwardine I ſometimes repreſented to this very Authour in our private walking and communication, and he profeſſed it was a very ingenious argument. As for the other terme Irreſiſtable this manifeſts this Authour's meaning, that ſome will of God, ſpeaking of his decree, is of a reſiſtable nature. Whereas St. Paul to the contrary plainly gives us to underſtand that God's will is irreſiſtable; & the Pſalmiſt ſaith, that the counſell of the Lord ſhall ſtand. And my counſell ſhall ſtand, and I will doe whatſoever I will. And therefore his decrees are reſembled to mountaines of braſſe. As for the loſt terme neceſſitating. For the Gentleman paies us in words, for want of better coine, not conſidering that words are Eſ. 46. 10. Zach: 6.Isa 46:10but winde, he would cheat his Reader by this, preſuming he would be ſo ſimple, as to believe that God by this decree of his takes away the liberty of the creature, but it doth not; nor any contingency, as the eleaventh article of Ireland doth particulate: and Bradwardine who peculiarly uſeth this phraſe, underſtands hereby noe other neceſſitie then upon ſuppoſition, which Alvarez ſhewes by generall concurrence of School-Divines, that it may well ſtand with abſolute contingency and liberty, it being noe other neceſſity, then that which is called, ſecundum quid, in ſome reſpect; And ſuch a neceſſitie Arminius maketh conſequent to permiſſion: & Bradwardine is expreſs that God neceſſitates the will to produce a free act. And he nothing differs from Aquinas his doctrine, where he maintaines that God's will impoſeth noe neceſſitie upon the creatures will; becauſe he ordaines both neceſſary things come to paſſe, neceſſarily, and contingent things, contingently, that is with a poſſibility to the contrary; & likewiſe free actions freely, that is with a free active power in the Agent to doe otherwiſe. But come we to the conſideration of the paſſages produced out of the Ancients. For I preſume they are the choiceſt. For though he feared to be overlong, and therefore could not exhibit all; yet therefore it behooved him to repreſent the beſt. And I believe he could produce more of this nature. For I have been an eye witnes of it under his hand now foure yeares agoe. And though he produce them not, I hope to doe it for him ere we part, to ſhew how little I feare his concealements, and ſomewhat of the Predeſtinarians alſo, being glad of ſuch an opportunity to diſcover the wildneſſe and precipitation of his judgment touching that which is called the predeſtinarian hereſy here touched by him.

The firſt is a paſſage taken out of the Church of Lyons, denying that God hath layed a neceſſitie of ſinning on any man. Another out of Remigius; both repreſented (yea & many p. 89more of this nature) by that moſt reverend and moſt learned Arch-Biſhop of Armagh Doctor Uſher in his hiſtory of Goteſchalk, 138. and 173. To theſe I anſwer. Firſt theſe Ancients are about 850 yeares after Chriſt; yet marvailous orthodoxe conſidering thoſe times in the point of predeſtination. And let no man think that they deny a neceſſity of ſinning laid upon all by originall corruption, the conſequent of Adam's prevarication. If they were of any other opinion, ſhould it become us to follow them in this? Doctor Potter acknowledgeth it as the doctrine of the Church of England, that libertas à peccato, liberty from ſinne, is not incident to a naturall man; it is true he deſires to quaſh it by ſaying there is yet in man, Libertas à neceſſitate, à liberty from neceſſitie; but from what neceſſity? From the neceſſity of ſinning? If ſo, why ſhould he then deny a liberty from ſin; yet he never taketh any paines to cleare this from contradiction, but blindfoldly followes Bernard, without caring much to underſtand him. And he looks to be pardoned becauſe Voſſius did ſo before him. M. Fulke, in his anſwer to the Rhemiſh Teſtament, uſually diſtinguiſheth between libertas à peccato, & libertas à coactione, liberty from ſinne, and liberty from conſtraint; and denying all liberty from ſinne to a naturall man, yet grants unto him a liberty from coaction. I have taken ſome paines to ſhew Doctor Potter's ſuperficiary carriage in this, and to cleare Bernard; which it may be I will adde to this by the reaſon of the homogeneous nature of it. In the meane time liberty from ſinne is utterly denied to a naturall man, and that by the doctrine of our Church. And noe marvaile ſeeing Arminius himſelfe, and Corvinus, thoſe great patrons of natures power, doe acknowledg this, as before I mentioned; only they ſay God is ready to remove this neceſſitie of ſinning from all, and every one.

2. But the meaning of Remigius and the Church of Lyons is the ſame with that of Proſper formerly mentioned, in his anſwer to the objection of Vincentius, where he confeſſeth, Hominem non redemptum Diabolo eſſe captivum, a man not redeemed is captivated by Satan; and that, creatura peccatrix poenalem dominationem Diaboli merito patitur, cui (relicto vero domino) ſponte ſe vendidit. The creature ſinning deſervedly ſuffers the dominion of Satan by way of puniſhment, as to whom he ſould him ſelfe voluntarily. Haec quippe ſervitus non inſtitutio eſt Dei ſed judicium. This ſlavery of man to Satan is not God's inſtitution but judgment; that is God brought it upon him not of his mere pleaſure, but in the way of judgment. Like as Aug. cont. Iulian: Pela: l. 5. c. 3.Auſtin in like manner acknowledgeth, concupiſcenſe to be, not ſinne only, but the puniſhment of ſinne alſo. So Remigius and the Chuch of Lyons ſay; that God impoſed it not on Adam but man falling from God brought a neceſſitie of ſinning upon him, & upon all his race; God hereupon juſtly withdrawing his holy Spirit from him.

2. Why he ſhould alleadge the firſt paſſage under the name of the Church of Lyons, I know not; The reverend Biſhop acknowledgeth Florus to be the Authour thereof, a Deacon of Lyons pag. 126. Although the ſame Reverend Biſhop acknowledgeth that other book alſo that goes under the name of the Church of Lyons now extant in the Bibliothecâ Sanctorum Patrum; and wherehence Voſſius communicateth unto us his excerpta, was written by the ſame Florus pag. 115. He had more reaſon to father his next paſſage, which he produceth out of Remigius upon the Church of Lyons. For albeit Maldonat cites the booke intituled Liber de tribus Epiſcoporum epiſtolis (whence this paſſage is taken under the name of Remigius) yet he who ſet it forth aſcribes it to the Church of Lyons, and that by the direction of the Copy, which was in the hands of Nicholas Faber, as appeares Goteſchalc: hiſt: 170. But none doe I find to aſcribe this worke of Florus to the Church of Lyons, though the Authour of another booke under that title, the Biſhop acknowledgeth to be Florus.

3. Florus acknowledgeth that the very Saints of God are under a neceſſity of ſin in a ſort, p. 149. In Sanctis licet ſit liberum arbitrium jam Chriſti gratiâ liberatum at que Sanctum; tamen tanta eſt illa ſanitas, ut quamdiu mortaliter vivunt ſine peccato eſſe non poſſint, & cum velint at que deſiderent non peccare non poſſūt tamen non peccare. In the Saints of God though there be freedome of will, as freed by the grace of Chriſt, and made holy, yet this health is ſuch, that as long as they carry this mortall body about thē they cannot be without ſin: and though they would and deſire to be without ſin, yet they cannot be without ſin. This I conceive is ſpoken in reſpect of the fleſh luſting againſt the Spirit; & of the law in our members rebelling againſt the law of our mind, & leading us captive to the law of ſin. How much more are the wicked in bondage Rom: 7.to ſinne and Satan, as the ſame Florus ſheweth pag. 142? For whereas Scotus taught, that a man had not loſt his liberty, but only the power and vigour of his liberty. Florus oppoſeth him thus, Non rectè dicit, quia nec ſentit, he ſaith not well, becauſe he thinks not well; ſed ſicut vigorem & poteſtatem libertatis, ita ipſam perdidit libertatem, ut jam ipſe ad verum bonum p. 90unde cecidit liber eſſe non poſſit. As he hath loſt the vigour and power of his libertie; ſo he hath loſt libertie it ſelfe, inſomuch that unto true good, from whence he is fallen, he cannot be free; to wit, untill he be freed by the grace of Chriſt. In like māner Remigius diſcourſeth alſo, grā ting free will only to evill, p. 36. In infidelibus id ipſum liberū arbitriū ita per Adam damnatum & perditum, in operibus mortuis liberum eſſe poteſt, in vivis non poteſt. In infidells free will it ſelfe, ſo damned and loſt in Adam, may be free in dead workes, cannot be free in living works that is, is not free to produce works belonging to a ſpirituall life. So that they unanimouſly confeſſe that in reſpect of originall ſin, there is a neceſſity of ſinning, but this is rightly to be underſtood; namely thus, that true good they cannot doe, ſo that whatſoever they doe is evill, only that it is free unto them to doe this or that evill, which is moſt true. Secondly, thus farre they qualifie this neceſſitie of ſinning, that never any man is carried by the Divine providence, ſo as to ſinne whether they will or no. For albeit Rabanus charged them, whom he oppoſed herewith, pag. 53. Si enim ſecundum ipſos qui talia ſentiunt, Dei praedeſtinatio invitum hominem facit peccare, quomodo Deus juſto judicio, damnat peccantem, cum ille non voluntate, ſed neceſſitate peccaverit. For if, according to them who thinke ſuch things, God's predeſtination makes a man to ſinne againſt his will; how doth God in his juſt judgmēt damne him that ſinneth, when he ſinned not voluntarily but neceſſarily? Thus they criminated their adverſaries: but Remigius anſwers on their behalfe, who were thus falſly accuſed Nemo ita ſentit aut dicit quod Dei predeſtinatio aliquem invitum faciat peccare, ut jam non propriae voluntatis perverſitate, ſed divinae praedeſtinationis neceſſitate peccare videatur. No man ſo thinks or ſpeakes, that God's predeſtination makes a man to ſinne againſt his will; ſo that a man ſhould ſeeme to ſinne, not by the perverſitie of his own will, but by the neceſſitie of divine predeſtination. But this is the worke of Divine predeſtination, that he who ſins willingly, & perſeveres willingly in his ſins, ſhall againſt his will be puniſhed. And the truth is taking predeſtination as it ſignifies preparation of Grace, or God's decree to conferre this, rather God's not predeſtinating a man, or not giving grace, and not making him to be of God, is the cauſe why a man ſinneth, according to that of our Saviour. He that is of God heareth God's Jo: 8.words▪ ye therefore heare them not, becauſe ye are not of God. Yet this is rightly to be underſtood. for God's not conferring regenerating grace is rather the cauſe why their naturall corruption is not cured, thē that they goe on in their ſinfull courſes: for naturally carnall men are prone enough to ſin, and in this courſe they neceſſarily continue, untill God changeth their hearts; neceſſarily I ſay, but not againſt their wills. For ſinne is as a ſweet morſell, which they roule under their tongue. This may ſuffice for anſwer unto theſe paſſages, and withall to repreſent the vanitie of this Authour's diſcourſe, endeavouring to brand our doctrine with making God the Authour of ſinne; more of this hereafter; For I am acquainted with that which he here conceales, and with certaine adjuncts thereunto, both touching the opinion of the Church of Lyons concerning falling from grace; as alſo this Authours bold adventure in two particulars in juſtifying Voſſius, citing the cōfeſſion of Pelagius as one of Auſtin's ſermons; as alſo defending him in the point of the predeſtinarian hereſie, which Doctor Uſher maintaines to be a mere fiction of the Semipelagians to bring Auſtin's doctrin thereby into diſgrace. But Voſſius conceives that there was indeed ſuch an hereſie, and that the Monks of Adrumetum were the Authours of it. And this Interpolatour takes Voſſius his part, and labours by certaine arguments to make it good againſt he judicious obſervations of that moſt reverend and learned Arch-Biſhop of Armagh. It may be I ſhall repreſent my anſwer thereunto by wa… … digreſſion; but firſt I muſt diſpatch my anſwer to this I have in hand.