The Riches of Gods Love, Part 8 – Part 15
IEANES.
UNto this I oppoſe theſe following arguments. Firſt, God withholds many bloody minded men from actuall murder, as well as he did Abimelech from committing adultery, and unto him cannot be permitted the doing of a thing, who is reſtrayned therefrom; for permiſſion and reſtraint are oppoſed privatively, and therefore cannot be found in the ſame ſubject at once, in regard of the ſame action.
Secondly, permiſsion of the ſin of murder eſſentially implyeth, a withholding of grace effectuall and neceſſary, for the avoydance of the ſinne of murder: but God doth not withhold from every man that grace, which is effectuall and neceſſary for avoydance of the ſinne of murder; And therefore he doth not permit every man to commit it.
Thirdly, permiſsion of outward and imperate acts (aſwell as reſtraint, unto which it is privatively oppoſed) ſuppoſeth a propenſion or inclination unto them, a purpoſe or deſire of them in the agents unto whom they are permitted: but there is not in every man a propenſion or inclination, a purpoſe or deſire to murder every one that commeth in his way; Therfore God doth not permit every mā to murther every one that cometh in his way. The Major is a principle with Arminius in his Tractate de permiſſione; in perſonâ cui permittitur, duo ponenda, actus istius reſpectu, Primo, vires ſufficientes ad actum praestandum, intellige, niſi impediatur: Secundo, propenſio ad actum producendum, citra hanc enim fruſtrà permittitur actus, citra illas omnino non permittitur; nam neceſſario ad actus praeſtationem requiruntur: utut adſint illae, niſi propendeat perſona, cui permittitur actus, ad actum ipſum, nullo fine & in vagum permittitur. Imo nec recte dici potest, quod alicui actus permittatur, qui actus illius praeſtandi affectu nullo tenetur.
But this Teſtimony perhaps may be of ſmall authority with you, however his reaſon deſerves your conſideration. D. Twiſſe indeed diſſents from him, as touching the permiſſion of the elicite acts of the will, but fully agreeth with him, as concerning the outward and imperate acts thereof, Heare his owne words. Circa irrationalia agentia ſi verſetur permiſſio, praeſupponit, fateor, ejuſmodi propenſionem &c. Agentia vero rationalia quoties concernit permiſſio, eadem ratio erit quoad actus ipſorum imperatos: Ne que enim proprie dicitur quis aut permitti, aut impediri, ne faciat aliquid exterius, niſi praeſupponatur hoc ipſum velle, & intendere actu interno aut elicito: ex quo commode dicitur vel permitti facere quod intendebat, vel ne faciat quod volebat impediri, hactenus it aque agnoſco propenſionem quandam ad agendum praecedaneam eſſe permiſſioni.
Unto what Arminius and D. Twiſſe ſay, I ſhall adde this reaſon of mine own. Permiſsion and reſtraint are oppoſed privatively, and therefore as Ariſtotle hath taught us: l. Categ. Cap. 10. S. 11. Sunt circa idem, Nulli rei competit privatio, cui non poſſit etiam competere habitus: And therefore we call not any thing deafe, blind, or dumbe, but what is capable of hearing, ſight and ſpeech. In like manner no outward action can properly be permitted unto a man, but what he may be hindered and reſtrayned from: but now a man cannot be hindered, or reſtrayned from the performance of an outward action, unto which he hath no propenſion or inclination, of which he hath no purpoſe or deſire, no more than he can be conſtrayned unto that, from which he is not averſe, therefore neither can ſuch an action be permitted unto him, if we take permiſsion properly, (as Bannes ſaith) as it is not nuda negatio, ſed privatio.
By this time the Reader, I ſuppoſe, is ſatisfied, that God doth not permit every man to murther or deſtroy the life of every one that cometh in his way; and therefore conſequently, he hath not decreed or intended any ſuch permiſſion. As for the limitation which you bring to qualify your aſſertion, it nothing mends the matter: for I have prooved the aſſertion to be falſe in it ſelfe, by arguments, that feare not the light of your tryall or examination: and falſe aſſertions cannot be made good by any limitations whatſoever; ſo much I learned when I was a Boy from Keckerm. Syſtem. Log. lib. 2. cap. 4. Quicquid ſubjecto limitativè tribuitur, id verè tribuitur. But ſuppoſe this aſſertion were juſtifiable, by ſome limitation or other, yet not by this, which you bring; becauſe this naturall power to doe the execution, (as you ſpeake) is inſufficient to denominate the permiſſion of murther; becauſe 'tis conſistent with the oppoſite of ſuch a permiſſion, reſtraint from murther, &c.
Firſt, becauſe 'tis inſufficient to denominate the permiſſion of murther: A naturall power to performe an action is eſſentially requiſite unto the permiſſion thereof, but it is not only the eſſentiall requiſite thereunto, and therefore an inſufficient ground for the affirmation of it. If it be lawfull to affirme a predicate of a ſubject in reſpect of the preſence of one eſſentiall requiſite unto the ſaid predicate, when there are wanting any other things eſſentially required thereunto alſo, as abſurd propoſitions as are imagineable, will be hence juſtified: As that beaſts and plants are men, and Men beaſts; for of beaſts and plants there are affirmed diverſe things, which doe agree unto man eſſentially; and ſo on the other ſide, diverſe things are predicated of men eſſentially, which are alſo eſſentiall unto beaſts and plants.
Secondly, a naturall power to deſtroy the life of another, is conſistent with the oppoſite of ſuch a permiſſion, to wit, reſtraint from the murther of him: a power to produce an act may be hindered majoris aut aequalis ſaltem potentiae oppoſitione, ſaith your Arminius, by oppoſall of a greater, or at leaſt an equall power: though a man have not only a power, but a will, a deſire, and purpoſe to take away the life of another, yet he may be reſtrained, not only by feare of puniſhment, dictates of a naturall conſcience within, but alſo by oppoſition of a greater or equall power without. Now permiſſion and reſtraint are privatively oppoſed, and therefore we cannot ſay, that an action is permitted in regard of that which is common unto both permiſsion and reſtraint, and may be found, as well when an action is reſtrained, as when it is permitted. If I ſhould ſay that a blind man ſees, in reſpect of the firſt naturall power of ſeeing; that a deafe man hears, in reſpect of the firſt naturall power of hearing; you would ſay that my limitation were abſurd and ridiculous: becauſe this naturall firſt power of ſeeing is found both in the blind and the ſeeing; and we may ſay the ſame of the firſt power of hearing. Yet this limitation is as juſtifiable as yours; for the naturall power you ſpeake of, to doe the execution, is found as well in the reſtraint, as in the permiſſion of murther
MR GOODWIN.
GOD permitted Adam to eate of every tree in the Garden of Eden (the tree of knowledge of Good and evill only excepted, Gen. 2. 16, 17.) and therefore certainly had decreed, or intended, this permiſſion: yet was not Adam any waies neceſſitated by any vertue, or influence of this decree upon him, to eate of every one of theſe trees; nor is it in the leaſt degree credible, that ever he did eate of every of them, nor yet of any one of them, but only that which was prohibited unto him, his ejection out of this Garden following ſo ſuddainly after this patent, or permiſſion granted unto him.
IEANES.
THE permiſſion ſpoken of, Gen. 2. 16. was Morall or Legall, in genere officii, not naturall or Phyſicall, in genere facti, and therefore nothing at all to the purpoſe.
Mr GOODWIN.
NEither doth any ſuch decree in God, ſuppoſe a futurity of ſuch a concurrence of cauſes, ſimply requiſite and neceſſary, for the bringing of things, ſo decreed, to paſſe, which will actually bring them to paſſe: though God hath decreed that a ſparke, or coale of fire, falling i. e. in caſe it ſhall fall, into a barrell of Gunpowder, ſhall fire it, yet it doth not follow from hence, that he hath decreed, that any ſuch ſparke, or coale ſhall fall into it; without which notwithstanding the effect decreed, viz. the firing of this Powder will not come to paſſe.
IEANES.
FIrſt, Arminius tells you, that the abſence of one neceſſary cauſe is ſufficient to denominate a reſtraint. Ad productionem effecti requiritur cauſa integra, ſufficiente ad ejus impedimentum unius cauſae neceſſariae abſentiâ. And if this be true, then permiſſion doth imply a concurrence of cauſes ſimply requiſite and neceſſary, for the bringing of things ſo permitted to paſſe, which will actually bring them to paſſe if they be not hindered; and conſequently a permiſſive decree doth, though not ſuppoſe (that's not our language) yet, inferre the futurity of ſuch a preſence of all requiſite and neceſſary cauſes.
Beſides Secondly, Scheibler Met. lib. 1. c. 14. t. 2. p. 2. n. 44. out of Zabarell acquaints us, how reſtraint is ſometimes taken privatively, pro privatione actionis inferendae, and abſence not only of one requiſite and neceſſary cauſe, but alſo of one neceſſary condition is ſufficient to denominate ſuch a reſtraint: Sic diſtantia loci (ſaith he) impedit ne ignis calefaciat aliquod corpus, non quaſi diſtantia illa habeat efficientiam, vel influxum aliquem, ſed ſolum distantia illa dicit privationem actionis in igne, & paſſionis in calefactibili. In regard of this acception of reſtraint, fire cannot be ſaid to be permitted to burne combuſtible matter, unleſſe there be an approximation of the fire unto the ſaid combuſtible matter, for diſtance of place hinders the fire from burning: diſtance of place between fire and a barrell of Gunpowder, doth hinder the fire from firing or blowing up that barrell of Gunpowder, if you take hinderance or reſtraint in ſuch a ſence as Scheibler ſpeakes of: Anſwerably unto which fire cannot be ſaid to be permitted to fire or blow up ſuch a barrell of Gunpowder, between which, and it, there is ſuch a diſtance.
Mr GOODWIN.
OR if it be ſaid, that God hath decreed, that ſuch a ſparke or coale, ſhall fall into the ſaid barrell of Gunpowder, now is not the decree barely permiſſive, but operative and aſſertive, and ſuch which ingageth the decreer to interpoſe effectually, for the bringing of the thing decreed to paſſe. But ſuch decrees as this, in matters of that nature, we deny to be in God.
IEANES.
IF By matters of that nature you meane, in ſuch contingent things as the falling of a Sparke or Coale into a Barrell of Gunpowder; why, Doctor Twiſse hath an argument which he takes to be unanſwerable, clearly evincing, that whatſoever thing comes to paſſe, that is good with a tranſcendentall goodneſſe, or Metaphyſicall, God hath decreed it by an operative or effective decree. You have it in his examination of M. Cottons Treatiſe &c. p. 68, 69. As alſo in his Conſideration of that Scoffing Pamphlet of Tilenus, viz. the Doctrine of the Synod of Dort and Arles reduced to the practiſe. p. 18, 19. Nay I ſay more, (ſaith he) that every thing, which cometh to paſſe, in the revolution of times, was decreed by God; which I proove by ſuch an argument, for anſwer whereunto, I challeng the whole nations of both Arminans and Ieſuites. It cannot be denied, but God foreſaw from everlasting, whatſoever in time ſhould come to paſſe, therefore every thing was future from everlasting, otherwiſe God could not foreſee it as future. Now let us ſoberly enquire, how theſe things which we call future, came to be future, being in their own nature meerely poſſible, and indifferent, as well not at all to be future, as to be future. Of this tranſmigration of things, out of the condition of things meerely poſsible (ſuch as they were of themſelves) into the condition of things future, there must needs be ſome outward cauſe. Now I demand, what was the cauſe of this tranſmigration? And ſeeing nothing, without the nature of God, could be the cauſe hereof (for this tranſmigration was from everlaſting, but nothing without God was everlaſting) therefore ſomething within the nature of God must be found fit to be the cauſe hereof.
And what may that be? Not the knowledge of God, for that rather preſuppoſeth things future, and ſo knowable in the kind of things future, then makes them future: therefore it remaines, that the meere decree and will of God, is that which makes them future. If to ſhift off this, it be ſaid, that the eſſence of God is the cauſe hereof; I farther demand, whether the eſſence of God be the cauſe hereof, as working neceſſarily, or as working freely; If as working neceſſarily, then the most contingent things became future by neceſſity of the Divine nature, and conſequently he produceth whatſoever he produceth by neceſſity of nature, which is Atheisticall: therefore it remaines, that the Eſſence of God hath made them future, by working freely, and conſequently, the meere will and decree of God is the cauſe of the futurition of all things.
He ſpeakes indeed of Gods will and decree indefinitely, but that thereunder he comprehends an operative or effective decree, is undeniable. But the force of this reaſon, you may think eaſily to evade, by your deniall of Gods fore-knowledge: your reaſons for which denyall, I ſhall in the next place proceed to examine.
Mr GOODWIN, pag. 29. cap. 3. Sect. 2.
THat Preſcience or fore-knowledge are not formally or properly in Quid eſt praeſcientia niſi ſcientia futurorum? Quid autem futurum eſt Deo, qui omnia ſuper graditur tempora? Si enim in ſcientia res ipſas habet, non ſunt ei futurae, ſed praeſentes; ac per hoc non jam praeſcientia, ſed rantum ſcientia dici poteſt. Aug. lib. 2. ad Simpl. vide plura, ib.God, is the conſtant aſſertion, both of ancient and moderne Divinity The learned Aſſertours of the Proteſtant cauſe are at perfect agreement with their Adverſaries the Schoolemen, and Papiſts, in this. Nor is it any wonder at all, that there ſhould be peace, and a concurrence of Judgement about ſuch a poynt as this; even between thoſe, who have many Irons of contention otherwiſe in the fire, conſidering how obvious, and neere at hand, the truth herein is. For 1. If foreknowledge were Properly and formally in God, then might Predestination, Election, Reprobation, and many other Nec zelus, nec ira, nec paenitentia, nec proprie miſericordia, nec praeſcientia eſſe poteſt in Deo. Greg. Moral. l. 2. c. 23.things be properly and formally in him alſo; in as much as theſe are, in the letter and propriety of them, as competible unto him as foreknowledge. Nor can there be any reaſon given for a difference. But unpoſsible it is that there ſhould be any Plurality of things whatſoever, in their distinct and proper natures, and formalities, in God, the infinite ſimplicity of his nature and being, with open mouth gainſaying it. 2ly If foreknowledge were properly, or formally in God, there ſhould be ſomewhat in him corruptible, or changeable. For that Quid eſt praeſcientia niſi ſcientia futurorum? Aug. l. 2. ad Simpl. q. 2.which is ſuppoſed to be ſuch a fore-knowledge in him to day, by the morrow, ſuppoſe the thing, or event fore-known, ſhould in the interim actually come to paſſe, must needs ceaſe, and be changed; in as much as there can be no foreknowledge of things that are preſent, the adequate and appropriate object of this knowledge (in the Propriety of it) being res futura ſomewhat that is to come. Thirdly (and lastly) there is nothing in the Creature univocally and formally the ſame, with any thing which is in God. The reaſon is; becauſe then, there must either be ſomewhat finite in God, or ſomewhat infinite in the Creature: both which are unpoſſible. But if Praeſcience or fore-knowledge, being properly and formally in the Creature, ſhould be properly and formally alſo in God, there ſhould be ſomewhat in the Creature, univocally and formally the ſame, with ſomewhat, which is in God. Therefore certainly there is no fore-knowledge, properly ſo called, in God.