The Riches of Gods Love, Part 4 – Part 7
IEANES.
IF you ſupply the propoſitions that are wanting, and make this a compleate Syllogiſme, it will be in ſecundo modo Syllogiſmi connexi, qui tollit conſequens, ut tollat antecedens. And then your concluſion, if your Syllogiſme be true for forme, will be, Therefore whatſoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to paſſe in any caſe, upon any termes, or any ſuppoſition whatſoever, ſhall not by vertue of ſuch an intention or decree neceſſarily come to paſſe. And then if in your Syllogiſme there be not committed that fallacy, which is called Ignoratio elenchi, never Syllogiſme framed in this world, was ſicke of this diſeaſe; for the concluſion you inferre, is no-wiſe oppoſite unto any thing in D. Twiſſe. Can you (dare you) ſay, that D. Twiſſe any where affirmeth, that whatſoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to paſſe, in any caſe upon any termes, or any ſuppoſition whatſoever, ſhall by vertue of ſuch an intention or decree, neceſſarily come to paſſe? Conſult all his bookes that are extant, whether in Latine or Engliſh; and if you can prove any ſuch paſſage to be in them, either in expreſſe termes, or by juſt conſequence, I will acknowledge that I have wronged you, in as ſhamefull and publicke a manner as you will preſcribe: and if you cannot make good, that D. Twiſſe hath ſaid any ſuch thing, it will be very agreeable unto juſtice, that you make a retraction of your miſtake.
The palpable groſſeneſſe of the injury that you doe D. Twiſſe, will the better appeare, if you compare the concluſion which you father upon him, with the example you bring a little after. God intendeth, and hath decreed to permit, that fire ſhall burne what combustible matter ſoever it ſhall take hold off, or that ſhall be cast into it, that one ſparke of it, falling into a barrell of dry Gun-powder, ſhould ſuddainly fire it; but it doth not follow from hence, that therefore every thing that is combustible in the World, ſhall be burnt with fire, or that every barrell of dryed Gun-powder, ſhall be blown up with ſparkes of fire falling into them. Here you make as if the permiſſive decree D. Twiſſe ſpeakes of, were concerning Gods permiſsion of things to come to paſſe, not abſolutely but conditionally, in ſuch a caſe, upon ſuch termes, upon ſuch a ſuppoſition; and as if he affirmed, that whatſoever God hath decreed to permit to come to paſſe, only conditionally, ſhould by vertue of ſuch a decree come to paſſe abſolutely, and neceſſarily. This is one of the abſurdeſt aſſertions that ever dropt from the pen of a rationall man, and in D. Twiſſe there is nothing ſounding like it: you doe very ill therefore (that I ſay no more) to aſperſe him with it. Nay D. Twiſſe is ſo farre from making a bare, permiſſive * conditionall decree, to be illative of the abſolute exiſtence So called in regard of its object.of whatſoever God hath decreed to permit to come to paſſe conditionally, as that he denyeth any ſuch inference to be made from an effective conditionall decree. Though it were very ſtrange (ſaith he againſt Cotton pag. 97.) that any thing ſhould not be accompliſhed which God doth will abſolutely, yet ſurely, it is nothing ſtrange, that that ſhould not be accompliſhed, which God doth will to come to paſſe only upon a condition, for the condition failing, there is no reaſon why we ſhould expect the accompliſhment thereof: How often doth he tell you, that for God to decree the ſalvation of all men, only conditionally, in caſe they believe and repent, is no more to decree their ſalvation, than their damnation; for as he hath purpoſed ſalvation to men upon condition of faith, and repentance; ſo on the other ſide, it is as undoubtedly true, that God hath ordained, that whoſoever, coming to ripe yeares, ſhall not believe and repent, ſhall be damned: and as to decree the ſalvation of all men only conditionally, is no more to decree their ſalvation than their damnation; ſo to decree to permit a thing to come to paſſe only conditionally, in ſuch a caſe, upon ſuch termes, upon ſuch a ſuppoſition, is no more to decree the permiſſion of it, than the not permiſſion of it to come to paſſe: what is ſaid of conditionall propoſitions, is true of conditionall purpoſes, both effective and permiſsive, Nihil ponunt in eſſe, ſc. abſolute & ſimpliciter, & foreign.
To goe one ſtep farther, D. Twiſſe is very unlikely to conclude from Gods decree, barely to permit a thing to come to paſſe conditionally, in ſuch a caſe, upon ſuch termes, or upon ſuch a ſuppoſition, that therefore the thing ſo decreed, ſhall abſolutely come to paſſe, becauſe if we ſpeake of poſitive things, he is clearely and conſtantly of the opinion, that we cannot ſay truly, that they ſhall come to paſſe, ſo much as conditionally in ſuch a caſe, upon ſuch termes, &c. Unleſſe God decree not barely to permit, but to worke and effect the thing conditionated, upon ſuppoſall of ſuch conditions, De Scientià Medià. p. 430. Ad eundem modum concedimus omnem enunciationem conditionatam de futuris conditionatis eſſe neceſſariam, modo Deus decreverit, poſità tali conditione, rem ipſam conditionatam effectam dare: quod niſi ponamus Deum decreviſſe, prorſus praeter omnem Analogiam diſſerit Suarez; dum prophetiarum comminantium & promittentium eandem rationem eſſe vult, at que propoſitionum de futuris contingentibus conditionatarum qualiumcun que , quas etiam prophetias appellat Suarez. Now if he will not allow us to make any inference of the conditionall futurition of poſitive things, from a decree that is barely permiſſive, and conditionall, it would be very ſtrange, if he himſelfe ſhould make ſuch a permiſſive conditionall decree, to be illative of the abſolute futurition of whatſoever is ſo decreed.
And thus have I done with your concluſion, which I affirme not to be oppoſite unto any propoſition in D. Twiſſe his Bookes, and I hope you will pardon me, if I preſume ſo farre, as to challenge you to prove the contrary.
In the next place, I ſhall make bold, to queſtion the truth of the conſequence of your Major propoſition, which is this, If whatſoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to paſſe, in any caſe, upon any termes, or any ſuppoſition whatſoever, ſhould by vertue of ſuch an intention or deeree neceſſarily come to paſſe, then all things poſſible to be, &c. must be, yea, and this neceſſarily. And the reaſon why I queſtion it, is becauſe I much doubt, whether God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to paſſe conditionally, in ſome caſe, upon ſome termes, or upon ſome ſuppoſition or other, all things whatſoever, that are poſſible, all things (I ſay) that are poſsible, (whether unto all naturall or neceſſary, or elſe all free and rationall agents) that is not only ſuch as doe exiſt, have exiſted, or ſhall exiſt for the future, but alſo all that are in any poſsibility of exiſtence, whoſe exiſtence implyeth no contradiction.
And that your ſatisfaction unto this, may be the fuller and diſtincter, I ſhall branch it into ſome particulars, which I ſhall entreat you to cleare up unto me.
Firſt, there are many things that are meerely poſsible, numberleſſe millions of men and Angells, which have not, never had, never ſhall have actuall exiſtence: and unto theſe there is poſsible, as great a variety of both actions and ſufferings, which that God hath decreed to permit to come to paſſe conditionally, in ſome caſe, upon ſome termes, upon ſome ſuppoſition or other, is not (I confeſſe) within the compaſſe of my Creed; but yet I ſhall be willing to be inſtructed by you, provided that you prove what you undertake to teach me.
Now that I am not much to be blamed for making a doubt of this, will (I hope) be confeſſed by you, if you pleaſe to conſider.
Firſt, that Didacus Alvarez (a very learned man) holds it to be the Reſp. &c. pag. 63. & 143.more probable opinion that there are not in God conditionall decrees, concerning all future conditionall contingents, which may be framed by our underſtandings in infinite combinations, as well concerning things actually exiſtent, as alſo things poſsible, but only in compariſon of thoſe future conditionalls, which are revealed by God, Chriſt, or the Prophets, &c. And he inſinuates this reaſon out of Ledeſma, becauſe other conditionall decrees would be in vaine, impertinent, and no waies conducing unto Gods providence, and government of the World: which reaſon is as well applyable unto conditionall permiſsive, as conditionall effective decrees.
M. Rutherford (I know) argueth ſomewhat againſt this, but I believe you will not plow with his Heifer.
Secondly, that D. Twiſſe not only affirmeth but proveth, that things meerely poſsible, are not the object of Gods decree, in his Book againſt Iackſon p. 283. 333. & 394. Looke we (ſaith he) upon the decrees of men, the wiſest of men, were they ever known to decree that a thing may be done? But rather ſuppoſing many things may be done, they make choyce to decree the doing of ſuch courſes, as ſeeme most convenient: things are poſſible without any reference to the decrees of God, but only in reference to his power. That is poſſible unto God, which he can doe, or which he hath power to cauſe, that it be brought to paſſe; As for example, before the World was made, it was poſsible that the World ſhould be made; was this by vertue of Gods decree? Did God decree it to be poſſible? If he did, ſeeing his decrees are free, it followeth that he might have choſen whether the World ſhould have been poſſible or no. His arguments are applyable unto Gods permiſsive as well as effective decrees, unto his conditionall, as well as abſolute decrees. From agents meerely poſſible, paſſe we on unto ſuch as doe exiſt in ſome difference of time or other, and unto them ſome things are poſsible only in regard of an obedientiall power, ſome things are poſsible in regard of a naturall power.
Firſt ſome things are poſſible, and that unto all ſorts of ſecond agents, only in regard of an obedientiall power; thus 'tis poſsible for ten thouſand Aſſes beſides Balaam's to ſpeake, for ten thouſand peices of iron (beſides that mentioned 2 Kings 6.) to ſwimme; 'tis poſsible for wine to be made of ten thouſand pots of water &c. Beſides thoſe ſixe we read of Iohn. 2. It is poſsible of ſtones to have children raiſed up unto Abraham: Now that God hath decreed to permit all things thus poſsible to come to paſſe conditionally, in ſome caſe, is as I take it falſe, and I ſhall give you my reaſon out of D. Twiſſe his Digreſſion, De naturà permiſsionis. lib. 2. part. 2. pag. 16. col. 2. Irrationalia dicuntur permitti, quoties ſinuntur ferri ſecundùm naturam ſuam, quemadmodum cum lapis ſinitur ferri deorſum; ignis ſinitur graſſari in domas hominum: ita que circa agentia naturalia dum verſatur permiſsio, palam est praeſupponi, non modo propenſionem, ſed & determinationem ad agendum; non ſic, quoties verſatur circa agentia rationalia; nam & rationales ſubſtantiae, quando permittuntur agere, ſinuntur etiam ferri ſecundum naturam ſuam; aut alia eſſet ratio permiſsionis rerum rationalium, quam irrationalium, quod minime videtur. Irrationall agents are ſaid to be permitted as often as they are ſuffered to be carryed according to their natures; as when a ſtone is ſuffered to move downeward, fire to rage upon the howſes of men: So alſo rationall ſubſtances when they are permitted to act, they are ſuffered to be moved, or carryed agreeably unto their natures, quoties permittuntur ſibi pro domeſticae inclinationis ratione quà libet feruntur, ib. pag. 11. c. 1. or otherwiſe the nature of the permiſsion of things rationall and irrationall, would differ in regard of forme, where as the difference between them is only in reſpect of the matter about which each is converſant, as he ſheweth preſently after the words quoted.
Againe of thoſe things which are poſsible unto all ſorts and kinds of agents, there are ſome which God hath abſolutely decreed to effect, or bring to paſſe by his operation, ſome which he hath abſolutely decreed to hinder or reſtraine. Now whatſoever God worketh or effecteth, he doth not permit, as permiſſion is oppoſed unto effection, and therefore it cannot be the object of a bare permiſsive decree, but of an operative or effective. Secondly, what he hindereth or reſtraineth either immediately by himſelfe, or mediately by ſecond cauſes, he cannot be at all ſaid to permit, and therefore he never decreed to permit it; more briefely, God cannot be ſaid to decree the bare and naked permiſsion of that whoſe effection or working he hath decreed; he cannot be ſaid to decree the permiſsion of that, whoſe hinderance or reſtraint he hath intended, but of things poſsible, he hath decreed the effection of ſome, the reſtraint and hinderance of others: and therefore there are many things poſſible, which he hath not decreed barely to permit.
I but perhaps you will ſay, that though whatſoever God hath abſolutely decreed to effect or hinder, he hath not decreed to permit to come to paſſe abſolutely, yet he hath decreed it ſhall come to paſſe conditionally, in ſuch caſes, upon ſuch termes, and upon ſuch a ſuppoſition. But this is ſpoken gratis, and therefore I doe beſeech you to evidence it by dint of argument, unto which if convincing, I hope I ſhall ſubmit.
But I imagine I ſee a back-doore, at which you intend to runne away, and ſave your ſelfe the labour of medling with that worke, which I have here cut out for you, and that is the clauſe which you have added by way of Parentheſis in your conſequent (or at leaſt ten thouſand things more than ever ſhall be (Here your conſequent hath two propoſitions in it, one univerſall, then all things poſſible must be, yea and this neceſſarily; another particular, at leaſt ten thouſand things more than ever ſhall be, muſt be, and this neceſſarily. And theſe two propoſitions are propounded in a disjunctive manner, ſo that if the firſt be routed and miſcarry, the other may ſerve as a reſerve to fly unto, this is the ſhift of a diffident and fearfull diſputant, that knowes not well what to ſay or hold: and therefore beneath that acumen, which I may juſtly expect from a man of your great Wit and Learning: how commendable it is, will appeare, if you take your conſequent by it ſelfe, and ſever it from the antecedent, and then parralell it with others of the like nature which no man can deny to be abſurd and ridiculous; as all men are white, or at leaſt ten thouſand times more then are blacke: all men are unregenerate, or at leaſt more then are regenerate: all men are healthy and ſound, or at leaſt more then are ſick.
But you pretend unto a proofe of the conſequence of your Major, we will heare what you ſay.
Mr GOODWIN.
FOr doubtleſſe God hath decreed, and intendeth to leave naturall cauſes generally, to their naturall and proper operations and productions, yea and voluntary cauſes alſo, under a power, and at liberty to act ten thouſand things more, than ever they will doe or ſhall doe.
IEANES.
YOur Major is, If whatſoever God hath decreed or intendeth to permit to come to paſſe, in any caſe, upon any termes, or any ſuppoſition whatſoever, ſhould by vertue of ſuch an intention or decree, neceſſarily come to paſſe, then all things poſsible to be, or at leaſt ten thouſand things more than ever ſhall be, muſt be, yea and this neceſſarily. Now how the conſequence hereof is proved by this your propoſition (I confeſſe) paſſeth my skill. The readieſt way to examine the conſequence in a connexe Syllogiſme, is to reduce it unto a Categoricall, and the way of that, every ordinary Logick will informe you is, by giving a reaſon of the conſequence by a Categoricall propoſition, and placing it in the roome of the Major in your Categoricall Syllogiſme. Now take the proofe that you bring of the conſequence, or ſequell of your major propoſition, (for doubtleſſe God hath decreed, and intendeth to leave naturall cauſes generally, to their naturall, and proper operations, and productions, yea and voluntary cauſes alſo, under a power, and at liberty, to act ten thouſand times more then ever they will doe or ſhall doe) and let it be placed in the roome of your major, and then in what Moode and Figure will you inferre your concluſion, viz. Whatſoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to come to paſſe, in any caſe, upon any termes, or any ſuppoſition whatſoever, ſhall not by vertue of ſuch an intention or decree neceſſarily come to paſſe.
And thus you ſee how weakely you impugne that propoſition which is only of your owne ſetting up.
But let us look upon this paſſage in it ſelfe, ſetting aſide the reference it carryeth of a proofe unto the foregoing words, if you underſtand Gods leaving of naturall cauſes unto their naturall and proper operations, &c. And ſo alſo his leaving voluntary cauſes under a power, and at liberty to act ten thouſand things more then ever they will doe or ſhall doe, ſo as to make it excluſive of that influence which is by way of previous motion of ſecond cauſes themſelves, whether naturall or voluntary unto all their operations, why your doubtleſſe will not carry it, as long as the arguments, by which D. Twiſſe lib. 2. Digreſ. 7. proves, that God moves all ſecond cauſes unto their operations, remaine unanſwered by you, and you bring no proofe to the contrary, but your bare word.
MR GOODWIN.
SO likewiſe God hath decreed, to permit any man to deſtroy the life of another whom he meets with (I meane in reſpect of a naturall power, to doe the execution) but it followeth not from hence, that therefore every man muſt neceſſarily murder or deſtroy the life of his brother that cometh in his way.