The Riches of Gods Love, Answer 2
An Anſwer to a Diſcourſe of D. H. about predeſtination; By Dr. TWISSE.
1. THe reaſons why our Divines fall upon the corrupt maſſe, as the object of H.predeſtination, is not onelyonly that which you alledge (viz. becauſe commiſeration and dereliction preſuppoſe the corrupt maſſe, &c.) but alſo, and much more rather, as I conceive, becauſe the very laſt end of predeſtination being, as you acknowledg, the manifeſtation of Gods glory per modum miſericordiae parcentis in ſome, per modum juſtitiae punientis in others, could not be intended without preſuppoſition of ſinne. For neither could God poſſibly intend to ſpare any, nor juſtly intend to puniſh any, if he had not conſidered them as in a ſtate of ſinne.
Reſp. The queſtion is, whether Gods intention (that is, his decree) to ſpare or puniſh, T.preſuppoſeth ſinne. You thinke it doth, and that it cannot poſſibly be otherwiſe: I thinke it doth not, nor can poſſibly be ſo, that any thing in man can be prerequired to the decrees of God, yet I propoſed the onelyonly ſpeciall arguments that ever I obſerved in ſixteen yeares ſtudy in theſe points and anſwered them. You perceiving the inconſequence of that argument, as it ſeemes, perſwade your ſelfe there is another argument of more force than that: But marke I pray with what iſſue; In foregoing the proofe I propoſed and anſwered, you inſtead thereof bring no proofe at all, but rely upon this propoſition (God could not poſſibly intend to ſpare any, nor juſtly intend to puniſh any, if he had not conſidered them as in a ſtate of ſinne) without all proofe, as evident of it ſelfe. And if you marke it well, you ſhall find, that this propoſition, is the ſame propoſition in effect, the beſt proofe whereof that I found, I laboured to overthrow, by ſhewing the inconſequence thereof divers wayes. And ſeeing you rely finally hereupon without proofe, you begge the queſtion, and inſtead of giving a new reaſon, you give none at all. And the truth is, I find many apt to be carried away with the plauſible ſhew of this propoſition, and either looke not at all farther for any proofe thereof, or if they doe, they proceed no farther than thus. The manifeſtation of mercy in ſparing, and juſtice in puniſhing, preſuppoſeth ſinne; therefore the decree (or intention) of manifeſting Gods mercy in ſparing, and juſtice in puniſhing, preſuppoſeth ſinne, which was in effect the ſame conſequence or enthymeme, which I propoſed to anſwer, as you may eaſily perceive if you marke it well: for commiſeration and manifeſtation of mercy are all one. Now becauſe this propoſition is ſuch a witch to bewitch mens fancies to entertaine it, I will endeavour to diſcover the vanity of it, and that in the very decrees of men, all which are temporall, whereas Gods decrees were eternall.
The decree of ſhewing mercy in pardoning ſinne doth no more preſuppoſe ſinne, than the decree of ſhewing the power of balme in curing a green wound, doth preſuppoſe the wound, or the decree of ſhewing the power of a cordiall againſt poyſon, doth preſuppoſe the empoyſoning of a mans body; or the decree of advancing a ſubject by way of reward, doth preſuppoſe his ſervice: or the decree of a Patron; to preſent his ſonne to a benefice, doth preſuppoſe his fitneſſe for it, or the decree of Solomon to bring Shimei his gray haires unto the grave in bloud, did preſuppoſe the offence for which this was brought to paſſe; but rather from theſe decrees and intentions, each Author in his kind proceedeth to bring to paſſe every thing that is required to the accompliſhment of that end which he requires; As I prove by inſtance in every particular. 1. I have knowne one, that to ſhew the power of his balme, hath wounded his owne fleſh, and pouring his balme into it, hath cured it in the ſpace of twenty foure houres. Aske wherefore he wounded his fleſh, every one ſeeth, that both he wounded it, and healed it with his balme, to make the vertue of his balme knowne: So that his intention of manifeſting the vertue of his balme, did not preſuppoſe the wound but drew after it, both the making of the wound, and the pouring of balme into it, as the meanes tending to the demonſtration of the power of the balme. 2. So we have knowne another to take poyſon, and afterward his cordiall againſt it, both the one, and the other, joyntly tending to the manifeſtation of the vertue of his cordiall. 3. A King intending to promote a favourite, but withall to doe it without envy of the Nobility, may reſolve to doe it by way of reward, which purpoſe preſuppoſeth not good ſervice, but rather hereupon he will imploy him in ſervice, as in ſome honourable Embaſſage, or in the Warres, to the end that he may have occaſion to advance him upon his ſervice, without envy of the Nobles. 4. A Patron having a young ſonne, may entertaine a reſolution to beſtow a living upon him when time ſerves; This intention doth not preſuppoſe his fitneſſe, (without which he cannot be admitted) but becauſe he hath a purpoſe to preferre him thereunto, therefore he will take order to bring him up like a Schollar, and ſend him to the Univerſity to make him fit. 5. Laſt of all, Solomon you know upon Davids admonition on his death bed, entertained an intention to bring Shimei to his grave in bloud, yet not for his curſing of David, but for a new tranſgreſſion; therefore he takes a courſe to enſnare him, and bids him to build him an houſe in Jeruſalem, and not to paſſe over the Brooke Kidron upon paine of death. Now it was not indeed in Solomons power effectually to enſnare him, and ſo certainely to bring upon him the execution of death: But this is in the power of God; For let him but expoſe any creature unto temptation, and derelinquiſh him therein, without giving him his grace to ſupport him, that creature ſhall certainely fall into ſinne, otherwiſe if any creature can keepe himſelfe from ſinne without Gods grace, then Gods grace ſhall not have the prerogative of being the cauſe of every good action; But this prerogative of Gods grace muſt and by Gods grace ſhall be maintained unto the end. And upon this foundation the prerogative of his ſoveraigne power alſo over his creatures in diſpoſing of them as he thinkes good, and making ſome veſſells of mercy and ſome of wrath, which Arminius himſelfe profeſſeth he dares not deny to be in the power of God, to wit, to make veſſells of mercy and veſſells of wrath, and that ex maſſa nondum condita, in his Analyſis of the ninth to the Romans.
But I proceed to the forme of your Syllogiſme.
1. The reaſon (you ſay) may be laid downe Syllogiſtically thus:H.
1. God could not intend to pardon any without ſuppoſition of that, which is neceſſarily required to make them capable of pardon: But ſinne is neceſſarily required to make them capable of pardon; therefore God could not intend to pardon any without ſuppoſition of ſinne.
2. God could not intend to puniſh any without conſideration of that, which is in juſtice required to make them puniſhable: But ſinne is required in juſtice to make any perſon puniſhable; therefore God could not intend to puniſh any without conſideration of ſinne.
Reſp. 1. In both Syllogiſmes the Minor we grant, the Major we deny, as being in T.effect the very ſame propoſition which is in queſtion; and all the evidence it carryeth with it conſiſteth in the parts which have a ſhew of an Enthymeme thus:
1. Sinne is neceſſarily prerequired to the pardoning of ſinne, therefore it is neceſſarily prerequired to the decree of pardoning ſinne.
2. Sinne in juſtice is prerequired unto puniſhing, Ergo 'tis in juſtice prerequired to the decree of puniſhing.
Now this is the very proofe which formerly I laboured to diſprove, by ſhewing the inconſequence thereof, yet the propoſition whereon you rely, either muſt depend upon this proofe, or upon none at all. But I will proceed with you a little farther upon theſe Syllogiſmes you propoſe.
2. Sinne (you ſay, and that truly) is neceſſarily required to make men capable of pardon. And this generall truth brancheth it ſelfe into two ſpecialls:
1. Sinne originall is neceſſarily required to make men capable of pardon for ſinne originall.
2. Sinne actuall is neceſſarily required to make men capable of pardon for ſinne actuall.
Now becauſe God doth intend to pardon all the ſinnes of his elect, not onelyonly originall but actuall, committed throughout the whole courſe of his life, it followeth that God could not intend to pardon theſe actuall ſinnes without the preſuppoſition of them.
3. By the ſame reaſon of yours I diſpute thus:
1. God could not intend to beſtow ſalvation upon any man by way of reward without ſuppoſition of that which is neceſſarily required to make him capable of reward. But the obedience of faith, repentance, and good workes, is neceſſarily required to make a man capable of reward, Ergo, God could not intend to beſtow ſalvation on any man by way of reward, without ſuppoſition of faith, repentance and good workes.
2. As God cannot intend to puniſh any without conſideration of that, which in juſtice is required to make him puniſhable: ſo God cannot intend to puniſh any in ſuch a degree, without that which is required in juſtice to make him puniſhable in ſuch a degree. Now not onelyonly ſinne originall, but all actuall ſinnes of every Reprobate, together with their finall impenitency therein, is required in juſtice to make every one of them puniſhable in ſuch a degree; Ergo, could not God intend to puniſh any Reprobate in ſuch a degree, without conſideration of all their actuall ſins.
And as mens actuall ſinnes are the meritorious cauſes of their damnation: ſo the conſideration of them ſhall be the meritorious cauſe of their reprobation, or at leaſt, of that decree whereby God doth decree to inflict damnation upon them in ſuch a degree.
And by juſt proportion of reaſon, like as faith, repentance, and good workes are the diſpoſing cauſes unto ſalvation, ſo the conſideration of faith, repentance, and good workes ſhall be the diſpoſing cauſes of their election unto ſalvation: But you proceed, and I am content to go along with you.
3. And this reaſon, eſpecially for the latter part of it, which concernes the manifeſtation H.of Gods glory per m…dum juſtitiae punientis, may be farther confirmed thus: That which tends not to Gods glory ſimply, but onelyonly upon ſuppoſition [if ſinne be] could not be intended by him ſimply, but onelyonly upon that ſuppoſition. For ſo farre and no farther doth God intend any thing, as it makes for his glory: But to puniſh men, or any other creatures, is a thing that tends not to Gods glory ſimply, but onelyonly upon ſuppoſition (if ſinne be) Ergo, it could not be intended by God ſimply but onelyonly upon that ſuppoſition.
Reſp. You need not have mentioned the tending of this to Gods glory: your argument T.is in force, and greater force without it. For I hold, that to puniſh without ſuppoſition of ſinne implyeth contradiction: paena being properly oppoſed to praemium, and as reward formally hath a reſpect to obedience going before, ſo hath puniſhment unto ſinne.
1. Now firſt to follow you in your owne courſe, I reaſon thus; That which tends to Gods glory not ſimply, but onelyonly upon ſuppoſition of obedience in faith, repentance, and good workes, cannot be intended by him ſimply, but upon that ſuppoſition; but to reward with ſalvation, and everlaſting life, tends not to Gods glory ſimply, but onelyonly upon ſuppoſition of faith, repentance and good workes. Ergo, it could ot be intended by God ſimply, but onelyonly upon faith and repentance.
2. But to your Major I anſwer; No man ſaith, that God doth intend to puniſh any man but for ſinne. Now hereupon many (not onelyonly Arminians, but ſome Orthodox alſo) are apt to be deceived, and to thinke, that theſe words, but for ſinne, are to be referred to the Antecedent removed, which is Gods intention. But it is not ſo, thoſe words are onelyonly to be referred to the Antecedent next before, which is to puniſh. And I prove it thus: When any man ſaith, God intends to puniſh man for his ſinne, the meaning can be no other, than if he had ſaid, God doth intend, that puniſhment ſhall be inflicted on man for his ſinne; where it is manifeſt, that ſinne is noted onelyonly as going before the puniſhment, not as going before Gods intention. But as ſoone as this confuſion of ſenſe is opened by diſtinction, then they flye to this kind of argument, ſinne goeth before the execution of puniſhment, therefore the conſideration of ſinne goeth before the intention of puniſhment, which is the argument I formerly propoſed, and the inconſequence whereof I preſume you doe manifeſtly perceive.
Now to that which followeth:
4. Although the reaſon which you alledge on our behalfe be inconſequent, as you H.have framed it: yet I ſuppoſe it may be reduced to a true Syllogiſme thus:
The decree of liberation from ſinne, preſuppoſeth ſinne: election is the decree of liberation from ſinne, Ergo, election preſuppoſeth ſinne. If you deny the Major, I prove it thus:
That which preſuppoſeth ſinners, preſuppoſeth ſinne. The decree of liberation from ſinne, preſuppoſeth ſinners: Ergo, the decree of liberation from ſinne, preſuppoſeth ſinne; you will perhaps yet deny the Minor; but I prove it thus: The decree of liberation from ſinne, preſuppoſeth ſome that have need to be delivered, for elſe it were vaine, and to no purpoſe: OnelyOnly ſinners have need to be delivered from ſinne: Ergo, the decree of liberation from ſinne preſuppoſeth ſinners.
The like argument, and in the like forme, may be framed touching the decree of dereliction in ſinne: Or if you take reprobation for the decree of damnation, it may be ſaid thus:
The decree of damnation, preſuppoſeth ſome perſons juſtly damnable, for otherwiſe it were either an unjuſt, or at leaſt and unwiſean indeliberate decree. But onelyonly ſinners are juſtly damnable. Ergo, the decree of damnation preſuppoſeth ſinners, and conſe quently ſinne. For peccatum is de formali ratione peccatoris qua peccator est, as you know.
Reſp. Every one indeed knowes that peccatum is de formali ratione peccatoris, and hereupon it is manifeſt that the ſecond Syllogiſme gives no mite of proofe unto the T.firſt. For ſeeing formalis ratio of any thing, cannot be ſeparated from the thing it ſelfe, and conſequently neither peccatum from peccator; you may eaſily perceive, that when we deny that the decree of liberation from ſinne preſuppoſeth ſinne, we muſt therewithall neceſſarily deny, that it preſuppoſeth ſinners.
Your third Syllogiſme addeth as little force unto the former, being meerly identica probatio: For every man knoweth, that to be a ſinner, and to have need to be delivered from ſinne is all one, in ſuch ſort as whatſoever is denyed of a ſinner, muſt be denyed of him that hath need to be delivered from ſinne, foraſmuch as every ſinner hath need to be delivered from ſinne. Thus while you decline that proofe, which in my obſervation, alone hath courſe, and the implication whereof in the Major propoſition is all the evidence of it; you fall upon no ſound proofe at all. The truth is, if you obſerve, you may perceive your Major propoſition involves this Enthymeme.
Liberation from ſinne preſuppoſeth ſinne, ſinners ſuch as have need to be delivered from ſinne, Ergo, the decree of liberation from ſinne, preſuppoſeth both ſinne and ſinners, and ſuch as need to be delivered from ſinne.
Of any other force of proofe that you give, I am not conſcious.
2. If the argument formed touching the decree of dereliction in ſinne, be of the like forme, it will admit no doubt the ſame anſwer.
3. The Major of the laſt Syllogiſme, hath a clauſe annexed unto it, as a reaſon of it, thus, elſe it were in vaine and to no purpoſe. If this reaſon pleaſed you, you might have relyed upon it, in the firſt Syllogiſme of the three, whereas now you may perceive, they containe no proofe but identicall. 2. Your courſe of argumentation tends to prove, that it is impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe than you conceive, which is more than to ſay, it were otherwiſe onelyonly vaine, and to no purpoſe. Thirdly I anſwer that which is vaine, and to no purpoſe, is either to no end, or to no good end: But the decree of liberation from ſinne, whether it preſuppoſe ſinne, as you ſay, or not preſuppoſe ſinne, as I ſay, ſtill it tends to the ſame end, and that a good end, to wit, the manifeſtation of Gods mercy.
But I erre, your meaning ſeemeth to be this, it is vaine in reſpect that it cannot obtaine the end it aimes at, unleſſe it preſuppoſe ſinne. But how doe you prove that Gods decree of liberation from ſinne, cannot take effect, except it preſuppoſe ſinne? you have no meanes to prove it but this:
Liberation from ſinne cannot take effect without it preſuppoſe ſinne, Ergo, the decree of liberation from ſinne cannot take effect without it preſuppoſe ſinne. And while you decline this way of proofe, you light upon no proofe at all.
4. Touching your laſt Syllogiſme, I deny your Major, that is, I deny that the decree of damnation preſuppoſeth perſons juſtly damnable. Then you ſay it is unjuſt; but I deny this conſequence, and though you bring no farther reaſon for your affirmation, yet will I prove my negation thus:
The decree of damnation for finall perſeverance in ſin, no man will ſay, to be unjuſt: But God decrees to damne no man but for finall perſeverance in ſinne, Ergo, Gods decree of damnation is not unjuſt. Here I ſuppoſe you will reply, that if God decreeth to damne no man but for finall perſeverance in ſinne, then it followeth, that the decree of damnation preſuppoſeth not onelyonly ſinne in generall, but finall perſeverance; and ſo you may thinke my opinion more diſſolute than yours, and your opinion more rigid than mine. And I doubt not, but ſo it will appeare in the end, eſpecially in the point of election; but yet not for any force in this conſequence.
Wherefore I anſwer, that this conſequence is very unfound, though it hath deceived many, and though the uſuall courſe is, to content themſelves with propoſing it, without all proofe, thinking it needeth no proofe; yet will I eaſily diſprove it, and ſhew the vanity of it, as already I have done the like. Now I pray what is the meaning of this, God doth not decree to damne any man but for finall perſeverance in ſinne? hath it any other meaning than this, God doth not intend, that damnation ſhall be afflicted on any man, but for his finall perſeverance in ſinne goeth before damnation; Ergo, the conſideration of finall perſeverance in ſinne goeth before the decree of damnation. The inconſequence whereof I have formerly ſhewed, neither doe I finde any exception you make againſt my courſe in diſcovering it. And by the way give me leave to tell you, what I ſeeme to have found in the courſe of my ſtudies in theſe points: Arminianiſme and Pelagianiſme is one of the unlearnedſt hereſies that ever was, depending meerly either upon principles, which they eſtabliſh to themſelves at pleaſure without all ground, or upon conſequences, moſt inconſequent; yet both their principles, and their conſequences are very plauſible at firſt ſight to judgement, and the Tenets themſelves, moſt apt to bewitch carnall affections. And if the Trumpets in the Revelation doe containe a prediction of hereſies growing upon the Church, as moſt have thought, (though now adayes it begins otherwiſe to come about) and the ſtarre called wormewood, as a ſtarre ſignifieth ſome plauſible Hereſie, as Piſcator conjectureth; I ſee none ſo fit as the Pelagian Hereſie to be notified hereby, though as bitter as wormewood in oppoſing the grace of God; in maintaining the prerogative whereof, how can it be but he ſhould be zealous, that hath taſted of it, and of Gods goodneſſe in making him a veſſell of mercy, when he might have made him a veſſell of wrath. But you proceed.
5. Whereas you argue, that if election preſuppoſe originall ſinne, it preſuppoſeth H.actuall ſinnes alſo. I anſwer, it followes not: For though God hath decreed to free his elect from all their actuall ſinnes, as well as from their originall, yet he hath not done it by one and the ſame decree: But firſt he hath reſolved to free them from that generall curſe, and malediction, whereto they were obnoxious in Adam, and this is included in their very election; afterward he hath reſolved to purge them alſo from all their actuall ſinnes, which they ſhall commit by the effectuall application of Chriſts merit, and this is by another decree conſequent upon their election, being one of his decrees de mediis.
Reſp. Herein you carry your ſelfe like a right Schollar, in making way out though it be a new way. As if the decree of freeing from Originall ſinne, were a different T.decree from the decree of freeing from ſinnes actuall, and before it. And albeit the actuall ſinnes of Gods elect are many and much different, ſome committed before their calling, and for many yeares, ſome committed after their calling, throughout the whole courſe of their lives, yet you can be content to make the decree of God in freeing from all theſe, to be but one decree; onelyonly the decrees of freeing from actuall, and from originall ſinnes muſt be different decrees.
1. When you ſay, firſt he hath reſolved to free them from originall ſinne, and afterwards he hath reſolved to purge them from actuall ſinnes, I doubt your meaning is no more but this, God hath reſolved firſt to free them from originall ſinne, and afterwards to purge them from actuall ſinnes. And my reaſon is, becauſe many times I have obſerved ſpeeches to ranne thus, when the meaning hath beene but ſo as I have expreſſed. But I will manifeſt, that in the execution, freeing from malediction in Adam, and purging from actuall ſinnes goe together: much leſſe can they differ in intention; which I prove thus: No man is delivered from the malediction, whereto he was obnoxious in Adam, but by faith in Chriſt, he is therewithall freed from all his actuall ſinnes committed before his calling: Therefore ſeeing they are at once freed from malediction in Adam, and from many actuall ſinnes, it followeth that God did intend at once thus to free them; and how could this be done by different decrees, one going before another?
2. Now I will prove, that God did at once intend to free from all ſins, both actuall and originall, though he did not intend, that this ſhould be done at once; Foraſmuch as actuall ſinnes are committed ſucceſſively, one a long time after another.
God intending to give faith and repentance to his elect, did therewithall intend to free them from all their ſinnes, for theſe are the onelyonly meanes whereby we are freed from ſinne. But God did at once intend to give faith and repentance to his elect: Ergo. He did at once intend, to free them from all their ſinnes.
Againſt this argument, the greateſt colour of exception is from the conſideration of actuall ſins, that have their courſe after their calling. But this again is as eaſily removed by conſideration, that as ſins have their courſe, ſo faith and repentance have their courſe; and God intended at once to give his elect faith and repentance, and finall perſeverance in both, though perſeverance cannot be had at once, that being againſt the nature of it.
3. Whereas you ſay onelyonly of actuall ſins, that we are purged from them by the effectuall application of Chriſts merits; I hope your meaning is not, to exclude the purgation of originall ſin, and liberation from malediction in Adam from the effect of Chriſts merits. The blood of Jeſus Chriſt cleanſeth us from all ſin. And David repented of his originall ſin, as well as of his actuall, and ſo doe we. And when in reſpect of the law of his members, leading him captive to the law of ſinne, the Apoſtle cries out, wretched man that I am, who ſhall deliver me, &c. Immediately he comforteth himſelfe in this manner, I thank my God through Jeſus Chriſt.
4. When you ſay, that Gods decree of purging us from actuall ſins, is one of the decrees de mediis, you doe not tell us what you call that other decree, whereby God decreeth to free us from that generall curſe and malediction whereto we were obnoxious in Adam. But by the difference you put, you leave us to interpret it, of Gods decree de fine: Now there is no ſuch proportion, or diſproportion between theſe decrees, that the decree of freeing from originall ſin, or from the malediction in Adam, ſhould be decretum de fine, and the decree of purging from actuall ſins, ſhould be decretum de mediis.
1. For the end of Gods actions is meerely his own glory, according to that, Prov. 16. 4. God made all things for himſelfe, and that Rom. 11. 4. laſt, from him and for him are all things. The freeing from ſin Originall &c. may be a means to this, it cannot be the end which God intends.
2. If ſalvation be conſidered as the end which God intends, as commonly Divines conſider it, (though this courſe of conſideration hath been the mother of great perturbation, in the ordering of Gods decrees) yet freedom from ſin originall, is rather a means to this: Therefore not to be accounted the object of Gods decrees concerning the end. Again, who doubts, but that the freeing from ſin originall, is as well a means of ſalvation, as the purging from ſins actuall. Therefore the decree thereof is to be reckoned amongſt the number of the decrees de mediis.
3. Yet will not this ſuffice, to make the decree of freeing from ſin originall, to be different from the decree of purging from ſins actuall, as this is accounted a decree de mediis: unleſſe the freeing from ſin originall be the end, and the purging from ſins actuall a means tending to that end. For priority and poſteriority in intention, hath no place, but by reaſon of mutuall reſpect between the end and the means tending to that end. But in no congruity can it be ſaid, that the purging us from ſins actuall is a means to free us from ſins originall, or from that malediction, whereto we were obnoxious in Adam.
4. If freeing from originall ſin be firſt in Gods intention, and afterwards the purging of us from ſins actuall; it followeth, that the freeing from originall ſin ſhall be laſt in execution, ſo that God ſhall firſt free us from actuall ſins, and then proceed to free us from originall ſin. I proceed to the next.
6. In like manner we ſay of the Reprobate: It is one decree whereby God reſolves H.to leave them in the State of originall ſin, another whereby he doth reſolve to leave them in their actuall ſins alſo; And although this latter doth follow alwaies upon the former, yet the former is onelyonly properly called reprobation. Wherefore it followeth not, that if the decree of reprobation ſuppoſeth originall ſin, it ſuppoſeth actuall alſo.
Reſp. 1. The anſwer unto the former may in every particular be accommodated unto T.this.
2. Theſe you ſpeak of are not different, but one decree, and the ſame: As I prove thus; Gods decree to leave them in the ſtate of originall ſin, is all one with Gods decree finally to deny them faith and repentance: And Gods decree finally to deny them faith and repentance is all one with Gods decree to leave them in their actuall ſin. Alſo Reprobation, as it ſignifieth Gods decree of leaving in the ſtate of ſin, was never conceived to be other, then the decree of denying them faith and repentance unto the end: which whether it be not a decree of leaving them in actuall ſins as well as originall, let any man judge. For God by this decree of finall d…r…liction, did not onelyonly decree that they ſhould be left in their ſins before they come to the uſe of reaſon, but in their ſins committed after alſo, in their youth, in their middle age, in their old age: otherwiſe it could be no decree of finall dereliction.
7. Although God doth actually damne men as well for their actuall ſins, as for their H.originall: yet the foreſight of originall ſin, being enough to ſalve Gods juſtice in the decree of damnation, we are not compelled to grant any more, as antecedent to that decree, but may take in the reſt, as conſequent rather.
Reſp. As God doth actually damn men aſwel for their actual ſins, as for their originall; T.ſo undoubtedly God did from everlaſting decree to damn them for their actuall ſins as wel as for their originall. For when God doth actually damn them for their actuall ſins, then undoubtedly he doth will to condemne them, otherwiſe he ſhould damne them againſt his will: Now the will of God, being an eternall action, is eternall; therefore from everlaſting he did will to damne them for actuall ſinnes: For his will to damne them, and his decree to damne them is all one. Now I think you doe not make two decrees of damnation of the ſame men, one for their originall, another for their actuall ſins: Therefore in the ſame moment that he decreed to damne for ſin originall, he did decree to damne for actuall alſo.
2. If the foreſight of ſinne be required to ſalve Gods juſtice in the decree of damnation of men of ripe yeeres; the foreſight of originall ſinne will not ſerve the turn: For ſeeing God doth not intend the damnation of man indefinitely, in reſpect of the degrees thereof, but definitely, that is, according to the very degree in which he will inflict damnation; It is manifeſt, that foreſight of originall ſinne cannot ſalve Gods juſtice. For to intend damnation in ſuch a degree as is due onelyonly to ſins actuall, upon foreſight onelyonly of ſinne originall, is as unjuſt, as to intend damnation upon no foreſight of ſinne at all: For even in this caſe you allow, that as ſome degrees intended are due to ſinne originall, upon foreſight whereof alone, they are intended; ſo again ſome degrees intended, are due onelyonly to actuall ſinnes, upon no foreſight whereof in your opinion they are intended.
3. It is very ſtrange, that you ſhould maintaine, Gods courſe is juſtified in decreeing to damne upon foreſight of originall ſinne, and not upon the foreſight of actuall ſins: whereas damnation for originall ſinne onelyonly, is ſo farre from being juſtifiable in the ſight of fleſh and blood, as that it is indeed the ſecond degree of the greateſt abſoluteneſſe of Gods power, that ever was or ſhall be ſhewed in this world, or in the world to come.
1. The firſt degree and greateſt, was the crucifying of the ſame God for others ſins, being without all ſin of his own.
2. The ſecond is the damnation of Infants, for the ſin of Adam; which Adam himſelfe, notwithſtanding, we believe to be ſaved.
4. I pray conſider the difference betwixt your opinion and minde; you maintaine that God decreed to damne all reprobates before the foreſight of any of their actuall ſinnes: I no way like this Tenet, but maintaine, that in the ſame moment, that God decrees to damne any Reprobate, he decrees to damne him for all his actuall ſins, aſwell as originall ſinne, and finall perſeverance in them; And that in the ſame moment he foreſaw all their ſins: not that the foreſight of their ſinnes is antecedent or ſubſequent to, but concomitant or conjunct with his decree of their damnation, in the ſame moment, not of time onelyonly, but of nature alſo.
Undoubtedly actuall ſinnes are more apt to juſtifie God in damning any man, than ſinne originall; yet you maintaine that God decrees to damne a man, without the foreſight of that, which doth more juſtifie God in damning any man; onelyonly you deny, that he can decree to damne any man, without the foreſight of that, which doth leſſe juſtifie God in the actuall damnation of any one.
You will have the foreſight of mans actuall ſins to follow the decree of damnation, which I dare not avouch, not onelyonly becauſe it is harſh to mens affections, but becauſe it is repugnant in my judgement to manifeſt reaſon; onelyonly I deny the foreſight of all ſinnes to be antecedent to this decree: I ſay, tis neither antecedent to it, which is the diſſolute opinion, nor ſubſequent after it, which is the rigid opinion, and each of them equally untrue; but it is conjunct or concomitant to it, in the ſame moment of nature: both theſe degrees being the decrees de mediis, and ſo making up one formall compleat decree de mediis ad eundem finem tendentibus, which is the manifeſtation of Gods glory in the way of juſtice; as I have ſhewed at large in my third digreſſion, amongſt thoſe which I heare are lately brought into your hands. But I wonder not a little what you are fallen upon in the next place.
8. As touching the election and reprobation of Angells I have nothing to ſay, becauſe H.the Scripture ſaith nothing. It is true, that it could not be made ex communi maſſa corrupta, becauſe there was none ſuch; But why it might not be out of the foreſight of their perſonall obedience or diſobedience, I know no great matter to object. Nor will it follow, that if they were elected upon ſuch conſiderations, we muſt be ſo too: for our caſe is wholly different, as the Scripture denyeth that of us.
Reſp. Hitherto you have diſcourſed as it were out of the month of our Divines; who yet as I have ſhewed in my eighth Digreſſion, are for the moſt part nothing for T.this opinion which you propoſe, being rightly underſtood. But in this point not one is for you; nor ever could I obſerve any of our Divines that maintained not the election of Angells, to be of as free grace as the election of men, or the reprobation of Angells, to be of as free Soveraignty and abſoluteneſſe in the denyall of grace, as the reprobation of men.
Arminius never durſt profeſſe this which you doe; but ſtill puts it off as a matter he hath nothing to doe withall, treating onelyonly of the predeſtination of men: which he would never have done, had he any hope to make good that opinion, which you ſeeme more to incline unto, than to the contrary.
But though you ſee no great matter to object againſt it, yet others doe, that hold it abſolutely impoſſible to be otherwiſe; namely impoſſible, that any thing in the creature ſhould be the cauſe of the will of God quoad actum volentis; or of predeſtination, quoad actum praedeſtinantie, Inſomuch that Aquinas profeſſeth, never any man was ſo mad, as to maintaine that there could be any cauſe of the will of God. p. 1. q. 23. Art. 5. in Corp. Cum praedeſtinatio includat voluntatem, ſic inquirenda eſt ratio praedeſtinationis, ſicut inquiritur ratio divinae voluntatis: Dictum eſt autem ſuprà, quod non est aſſignare …iuſam divine voluntatis ex parte actus volendi: ſed poteſt aſſignari ratio ex parte volitorum, &c. Deus vult eſse aliquid propter aliud. Nulius ergo fuit it a inſanae mentis, qui diceret merita eſſe cauſam Divina praedeſtinationis ex parte actus praedestinantis, ſed hoc ſub queſtione vertitur; utrum ex parte effectus praedeſtinatio habeat aliquam cauſam: Et hoc eſt quaerere, utrum Deus praeordinaverit ſe daturum effectum praedeſtinationis alicui propter aliquam cauſam.
And whereas Suarius hath laboured to helpe himſelfe with a ſhifting diſtinction, betweene cauſa and ratio; as if there might be ratio voluntatis divinae from without, though not cauſa: and finding theſe tearmes promiſcuouſly uſed by Aquinas in his ſummes, flyeth out to his booke contra Gentes, and Ferrarienſes thereupon, to get hold of ſomewhat therehence for his advantage; yet I have endeavoured to beat that fox out of his holes, in my third Digreſſion upon election.
2. Are they not called in Scripture the elect Angells? Now marke Auſtins diſcourſe; If upon the foreſight of mans obedience God elect any man, it ſhall not be ſaid, Non vos me elegiſtis, ſed ego vos elegi; but on the contrary rather, vos me elegiſtis non ego elegi vos. For if election of Angells followed upon their obedience, they did firſt chooſe God, that is, chooſe to obey him, before God did chooſe them, that is, chooſe to ſave them.
3. If Angells were elected upon their obedience, then either by neceſſity of nature this came to paſſe, or by the free conſtitution of God; It cannot be ſaid, by neceſſity of nature, Ergo by his free conſtitution, whence it followeth, that God did ordaine, that upon the obedience of Angells he would ordaine them to eternall life. Now judge you whether one decree of God can poſſibly be the object of another decree, all decrees of God being eternall; and the objects of Gods decrees being meerely temporall: as appeares in the decree of creation, preſervation, redemption, vocation, juſtification, ſanctification, ſalvation.
4. No good act can be wrought but by God, and by his grace; it is he that workes in us both the will and the deed of his good pleaſure; Doe you not thinke it is ſo in Angells alſo? otherwiſe what cauſe have they to give God thankes for their election, as namely, if it ſprang from their obedience.
But ſuppoſe you deny this; yet all confeſſe no naturall action can be wrought (much leſſe gratious) without Gods concourſe, as the efficient cauſe thereof. Now conſider, doth God concurre modo nos velimus, which is Suarius his deviſe? conſider I pray you, the contradiction included in this Tenet: God is the cauſe working not onelyonly foreign perficere, but alſo foreign velle, as they confeſſe: Now is it poſſible, that God concurreth ad velle modo nos velimus? can the ſame thing be the condition of it ſelfe? It may as well be before it ſelfe. Againe, ſuppoſing we doe velle, it is not poſſible by the power of God, that we ſhould not velle: for factum infectum reddere me Deus quidem poteſt. But this I have farther proſecuted in a Digreſſion by it ſelfe, proving that God doth determine the will to every act thereof, and ſhewing the great concurrence herein, (and upon what grounds) of ſchoole Divines, from Albertus Magnus his dayes downwards. But I proceed with you.
9. To that which you ſay concerning infants, I thinke I may anſwer, that although H.there were no other thing that made way to their ſalvation, or damnation, but onelyonly the fall of Adam; yet it followeth not, that God decreed to permit Adams fall, as a Medium tending thereunto. For what if he decreed to ſave or damne ſome ſine mediis, ſuppoſing them in a ſtate immediately capable of ſalvation or damnation, as by Adams fall, and their originall ſinne contracted hereupon, they were? yet I adde farther, concerning infants that are ſaved; there is ſomewhat elſe decreed to make way to their ſalvation, beſides Adams fall: namely an application of Chriſts merit to them in baptiſme, or otherwiſe. And for thoſe that are damned; ſince their originall ſinne makes them immediately juſtly damnable, it was enough for God to decree to leave them in the ſtate they were, and ſo to damne them; there being no other remedy to bring to paſſe his end in the matter.
Reſp. In generall obſerve I pray you the diſproportion of your Tenet concerning T.Infants, and others.
God doth not decree to damne Infants (as you ſay) but upon the foreſight of all the ſinne, for which they are damned; but God doth decree to damne all others, not upon the foreſight of all their ſinnes for which they are damned, nor upon the foreſight of thoſe ſinnes for which they are chiefly damned, and which doe juſtifie God moſt in their damnation; but onelyonly upon the foreſight of originall ſinne, for which leaſt of all they are damned, and which doth leaſt of all juſtifie God in their damnation.
But I come to the particular ſcanning of the parts.
1. You utterly miſtake my wordes; I ſaid not, the fall of Adam was the onelyonly way, or any way, for the ſalvation of Infants: But this I ſaid, and ſay; the fall of Adam was the onelyonly way of manifeſtation of Gods mercy in the ſalvation of Infants: For mercy ſuppoſeth miſery, and the miſery of Infants is onelyonly in reſpect of ſinne originall, not at all in reſpect of ſinnes actuall, wherein they are nothing culpable. Now to the manifeſtation of Gods mercy in their ſalvation, the permiſſion of Adams fall, and their fall in Adam, was a Medium: and I prove it thus, if God did permit Adam to ſinne, and theſe Infants in Adam, to this end, namely to the manifeſtation of his mercy in their ſalvation; then this permiſſion of Adams fall, and their fall in Adam, was a Medium tending to the manifeſtation of his mercy in their ſalvation: But God did permit Adam to fall, and theſe Infants in Adam, to this very end. Ergo. I prove the M…r thus; he did permit Adam to fall, and theſe Infants in Adam, to the manifeſtation of his own glory in them: But no glory of God is more conveniently manifeſted in the permiſſion of Adams fall, and theſe Infants in Adam, than the glory of his mercy in the pardoning of their ſinnes, and ſaving their ſoules in deſpight of ſinne: Therefore this is to be accounted the end as much as any.
2. I nothing doubt, but that infants are ſaved ſine mediis; I ſpake not of the Media of their ſalvation, but of the manifeſtation of Gods mercy in their ſalvation: I make no queſtion, but that they are ſaved, by the merits of Chriſt, whether they have the ordinary meanes of applying Chriſt unto them, or no.
3. Touching reprobate Infants, I prove the permiſſion of Adams fall, and their fall in Adam, was a Medium, tending to the manifeſtation or Gods juſtice in their damnation. For if God did permit Adam to fall, and them in Adam, to this end, namely, to the manifeſtation of his juſtice in their damnation, then this permiſſion was a Medium tending thereto. But to this end God did permit Adams fall, and their fall in Adam: which I prove thus; He did permit it for the manifeſtation of his own glory, as to this end he doth all things. But no glory of God is ſo conveniently manifeſted hereby, as the glory of his juſtice in their damnation; unleſſe you will ſay with Alphonſus Mendoza, and Didscus Alvarez, that rather the manifeſtation of Gods glorious grace towards his elect, in conſideration that he could have made them veſſells of wrath as well as others, is the cauſe, why God doth not ſave all, but permits a multitude to ſinne, after much different courſes, and damnes them for ſinne.
4. Since their originall ſinne (you ſay) they are juſtly damnable; But I pray conſider, how came they to be thus juſtly damnable? was it onelyonly by the will of Adam? was it not by the will of God alſo? That the firſt ſinne of Adam alone, and no other, is imputed to his poſterity; how could this come to paſſe but by the will of God. 2. That the ſinne of Adam becomes fatall to all his poſterity, and not ſo the ſinne of any man elſe, to his poſterity, how is this, but by the will of God? 3. Could not God have derived a child from Adam in the ſtate of his innocency, if he had ſo thought good? 4. How come we to be borne in originall ſinne, but by the will of God, who could have deſtroyed Adam after his ſinne, and made another Author of generation of mankind. In all this, appeares the will of God, and forceth us to acknowledge the power of God over his creatures, to diſpoſe of them as he thinkes good. But along to the reſt.
10. Although we ſay, the fall of Adam was conſidered in the decree of Gods election: H.yet we doe not ſay, it was preintended; (neither indeed can God properly be ſaid to intend any thing which he permits onelyonly;) wherefore it followeth not, upon our opinion, that the fall of Adam was the end of mans ſalvation, and damnation, or that it was to be in execution after it: For the reſpect of Media and Finis is, where things are intended onelyonly. But you will ſay, God intended the permiſſion of the fall, though not the fall it ſelfe, and if that were firſt in his intention, the ſame conſequents follow. I anſwer, it was one thing to conſider Adams fall as a thing that would be, if it were not hindered, another thing to reſolve poſitively to permit it. And though perhaps God did both, yet we make the former act onelyonly, to have beene precedent to his election, not the latter.
Reſp. 1. I ſpake nothing of Gods intention that Adam ſhould fall, but onelyonly of Gods intention to permit him to fall; and ſhewed, that if the permiſſion of Adams T.fall, was firſt in intention, and then mans damnation, it will manifeſtly follow, that in execution it ſhall be laſt; that is, God ſhall firſt damne men for ſinne, and afterwards permit Adam to fall into ſinne, and all in Adam. To this you ſay, that it is one thing to conſider Adams fall as a thing that would be, if it were not hindered; another thing to reſolve poſitively to permit it. But this anſwer is to no purpoſe. For my argument doth not depend upon the confuſion of theſe things, which you ſay doe differ, and therein ſay truly my argument depends upon a principle, that is totâ A…ademia notiſſimum, and juſtified alſo by all experience, that what is firſt in intention is laſt in execution.
2. But what ſay you? doe you not make the permiſſion of Adams fall precedent to election and reprobation? why then let us ſhake hands; for the caſe is cleare, that then the foreſight of Adams fall, neither could be precedent to election: For the foreſight of Adams fall in no moment of time before Gods reſolution to permit it: For though God foreſaw that Adam would fall, if God permitted him, yet could he not foreſee, that he would fall abſolutely, untill God were reſolved to permit him.
3. Some things you touch by the way, I may not omit, you ſay nothing can properly be ſaid to be intended, which he permits onelyonly. This is very worthy of conſideration, what think you of Adams eating of the forbidden fruit? did God intend that or no? Perhaps you will ſay, that God may be ſaid to intend that, becauſe he did only permit that as evill, but concurred to the effecting of it, as a naturall action. But then conſider, how was it poſſible, that God ſhould intend that this act ſhould come to paſſe and not the evill of it, whereas the evill, conſidering Gods interdict, was inſeparable from it. I ſhould anſwer it thus; As touching the ſubſtance of the act, God intended it ſhould come to paſſe, and it came to paſſe by Gods effection; for ſo God intended it ſhould come to paſſe, to wit, by his effection: But as touching the evill of the action God intended it ſhould come to paſſe, and it came to paſſe, but onelyonly by Gods permiſſion: for ſo onelyonly he intended it ſhould come to paſſe, to wit, by his permiſſion.
Hereupon you may flye out, and deny that God did intend ſo much as the act it ſelfe of eating the forbidden fruit.
But I pray why might not God intend and determine, that that act ſhould come to paſſe, aſwell as the Jewes crucifying of Chriſt? yet what ſay the Apoſtles with one mouth, both Herod, &c. why not aſwell as the Kings giving their Kingdomes unto the beaſt? yet it is expreſſely ſaid, that God put it into their hearts to doe his …ill even in this, to wit, giving their Kingdomes unto the beaſt.
In a word, I have a Digreſſion to this purpoſe, in the ſecond booke, Digreſ…. The title is this, A… ſanctus Iſraelis, &c. It is the onelyonly point wherein I oppoſe Aquinas, and Aquinas herein oppoſeth himſelfe manifeſtly againſt Auſtin, as there I ſhew.
11. In your laying downe the order of Gods decrees, I would gladly underſtand H.one thing. Whether you make his firſt decree de fine, to have been definite or indefinite? I meane, whether he reſolved at firſt, to declare his mercy upon ſuch and ſuch perſons as Peter, Judas, &c. or indefinitely upon ſome onelyonly? If you make it indefinite, it may be, ſuch a decree might paſſe upon Maſſa nondum condita. But that is not the decree of election. If you make it definite, me thinkes your arguments before alleadged are ſtrong—againſt it.
Reſp. Your diſtinction is good of a decree definite and indefinite; in the ſame tearms you ſhall finde it diſputed of, in the third Digreſſion of thoſe that are come to your T.hands: and ſound labouring to hold up a decree indefinite, but all in vaine. The truth is Maſſa nondum condita is not to be taken poſitively, but privately rather as it denies creation and corruption precedent to Gods predeſtination, foraſmuch as all theſe decrees of creation, of permiſſion of Adams fall, of liberation finall from ſins by faith and repentance, and laſtly of ſalvation, are but one formall complete decree de mediis, tending to one compleate end, which is the manifeſtation of Gods glory in the way of mercy mixt with juſtice: On the other ſide, all theſe decrees, to wit, of creation, of permiſſion of Adams fall, of finall dereliction in ſin, and laſtly of condemnation for ſin, doe make up but one compleat decree de medijs, tending to one end, which is the manifeſtation of Gods glory in the way of juſtice. As for the ſtrength of your arguments, alleadged againſt this opinion, I remit to every indifferent mans judgement to conſider thereof.
As touching the firſt arguments you propoſe, I could gratifie you thus farre, that the decrees you ſpeake of, doe conſuppoſe ſin, but not preſuppoſe ſinne. Foraſmuch as my Tenet is, that in the ſame moment with thoſe decrees, God doth conſider their ſin, but not in any moment before it. This I ſay my Tenet alloweth me to grant, but I cannot acknowledge that any of your arguments prove thus much.
But then againe, I maintaine that theſe decrees conſuppoſe other ſinnes, aſwell as originall; yea the decree of damnation conſuppoſeth in the ſame moment all their actuall ſins, yea even finall impenitency; foraſmuch as God decreeth to damne no man of ripe yeares, but for all the ſins that ever he ſhall commit, and finall impenitency in them: whereas you maintaine that God firſt decrees to damne them, and then foreſeeth the actuall ſins of theirs, for which they ſhall be damned.
FINIS.