The Riches of Gods Love, Part 1 · Section 2
Sect. 2. Containing the firſt Objection with the anſwer thereunto deviſed, and my reply thereupon and an anſwer thereunto.
M. Maſon's Additons p. 16. 17.But God ſay ſome is ſoveraigne Lord of all creatures, they are truly and properly his owne. Cannot he therefore diſpoſe of them as he pleaſeth and doe with his own what he will?Object.
The queſtion is not what an almighty ſoveraigne power can doe to poore vaſſalls, but what a power that is juſt and good may doe. By the power of a Lord his abſolute and naked power he can caſt away the whole Anſwer.maſſe of mankind; for it is not repugnant to Omnipotencie or ſoveraingty, but by the power of a Judge, to wit, that actuall power of his, which is alwaies cloathed with goodneſſe and juſtice, he cannot. For it is not compatible with theſe properties in God to appoint men to hell of his mere will and pleaſure; no fault at all of theirs preexiſting in his eternall mind.
It is not compatible with juſtice which is a conſtant will of rendring to every one his due; and that is vengeance to whom vengeance belongeth, namely to the obſtinate and impenitent. God is good, ſaith Saint Auſtine, and God is juſt, he may without any deſert free men from puniſhment, becauſe he is good; But he cannot without evill deſerving condemne any man, becauſe he is juſt. In an other place alſo he ſaith, If God be beleived to condemne any man that by ſinne deſerves it not, he is not to be believed to be free from injuſtice. 2. Nor is it compatible with goodneſſe which is an inclination in God of communicating that good which is in himſelfe unto his creatures, as farre as he can without wronging his juſtice. And therefore if God be (as the Scripture reporteth him) good to all; it cannot be that he ſhould of himſelfe without any motive in the reaſonable creature, provide for it from everlaſting the greateſt of all miſeries, and that before he thought of making it or beſtowing any good upon it.
As touching the Objection I hope this Authour will ſay ſo too. As touching the firſt, Reply.namely, that he is the ſoveraigne Lord of all creatures; and our Saviour Chriſt will ſay it for him, if he will not; as touching the laſt, namely, that it is lawfull for him to doe what he will with his owne. But I find noe need at all of this conſideration, to make anſwer to his former vaine diſcourſe: for he may ſee plainly that I have made noe uſe of theſe principles: but they have their place to juſtifie God in other courſes; namely, 1. In puniſhing children for the ſinne of their fathers in great variety of judgments temporall; as in the conflagration of Sodome, and in drowning of the old world. 2. In damning many Infant children of heathen men dying in originall ſinne unremitted; as M. Maſon in his lectures at Magdalen Hall maintained, that, the puniſhment of originall ſinne unremitted was eternall damnation. And M. Hord confeſſeth as much in his preface, Sect: 4. 3. Yea and in making the Soule of Chriſt the holy Sonne of God an offering for the ſinnes of others. But conſider we his anſwer.
To appoint to hell, what is it but to appoint to the ſufferings of the torments of hell? Now doth any of our Divines maintaine that God appoints any man to the ſuffering of hell torments of his mere pleaſure, and not for ſinne? They doe not, and therefore this Authours diſcourſe depends upon a mere fiction deviſed in his own brain. 2. The diſtinction which here he makes is the diſtinction of Arminius, who maintained that God can doe that per potentiam, by power, which he cannot doe per juſtitiam, by juſtice, which I have diſproved at large in a peculiar digreſſion on this argument in my Vindiciae; and not one of my reaſons there brought doth this Authour once offer to anſwer. And Lib. 1 p. 2. digreſ. 4.this opinion of his doth manifeſtly imply that God hath a power to doe that which is unjuſt. 3. He ſuppoſeth very judiciouſly to his own advantage, that there is a juſtice in God towards his creature ſecluding the ordinance of his will; whereas both Suarez and Vaſquez oppoſite in other particulars concerning God's juſtice, doe yet agree in this, that there is no juſtice in God towards his creature, but upon ſuppoſition of his will and Vindic. l. 1. p: 3. digreſ. 1.ordinance as I have ſhewed. 4. He may as well ſay that it is not compatible with the juſtice of God to puniſh (as it ſignifies to inflict paineon) him who is holy. For juſtice is as well oppoſite to the puniſhing of an Inocent, as to the puniſhing of him in ſuch a degree. And conſequently God cannot in juſtice put an holy man to death, much leſſe annihilate him; which if he ſaith, he ſhall contradict Arminius. 5. If it be not compatible with God's juſtice to inflict hell paines on any man, no fault of his preexiſting in the eternall mind, then either Chriſt ſuffered not the paines of hell, or was not without fault; or laſtly God was unjuſt in inflicting thoſe paines upon him. 6. In the laſt place obſerve, for all this he gives us nothing but his bare word. So that if we give him leave he is like enough to dictate unto us Articles of beleife at his pleaſure.
1 By what right is vengeance due to the obſtinate and impenitent? Is it due by any other right then by the ordinance of God? Cannot God pardon it if it pleaſe him, yea and cure it too? And if he be pleaſed to puniſh it, cannot he puniſh it as well by annihilation of the obſtinate (ſo to ſet an end unto his ſin as to himſelfe) as by condemnation of him? That of Auſtine is ſpoken in reference to God's law, whereby he hath ordained that without evill deſervings he ſhall not be condēned (yet Chriſt ſuffered hell paines without any evill deſervings) In reſpect of the like law, he ſhall be unjuſt, if he he ſhould not reward them, who dye in faith and repentance, with everlaſting life. This is only in reſpect of potentia ordinata, ſuch a power as is ordained by his will. But as for potentia ahſoluta, power abſolute, all confeſſe that God can annihilate the holy Angels.
2 How doth God communicate grace unto his creatures? is it not by neceſſity of nature, or freedome of will? Philoſophers were wont to argue the eternity of the world by this, that Bonum eſt ſui communicativum, That which is good is apt to communicate it ſelfe, yea naturally and neceſſarily: And therefore God being optimus the beſt, as well as maximus the greateſt, was moſt communicative, and that naturally and neceſſarily. If the ſame be this Authours opinion, he is as Atheiſticall as they: But if by freedome of will he communicates his goodneſſe, then he communicates his goodneſſe, as when he will, ſo likewiſe how he will, and to whom he will. As Saint Paul expreſlely profeſſeth ſaying, God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, of ſuch places as theſe this Authour Rom: 9. 18.takes no notice, but ſo much the more Atheologically. Yet I am willing to take notice of what he brings, namely, that God is good to all; And ſo he is in doeing them good, many and ſundry waies; in maintaining their being, But he is not in ſuch ſort good to all as he is ſaid to be good to Iſrael. For he hath not dealt ſo with any nation, as with them. 2. 'Tis untrue that God communicates unto his creatures that good which is in himſelfe: for the Pſ: 73. 1good which is in himſelfe is of a more tranſcendent nature, then to be communicable unto creatures; ſuch conceits are Manichaicall. God is eſſentally whatſoever he is: But the Pſ: 147. 20.goodneſſe this Authour ſpeakes of, is of an accidentall nature unto us; And is it decent and not rather abominable to transforme the eſſence of God into an accident, that ſo it might be communicated to the creature.
3. If Gods goodneſſe incline him to communicate goodneſſe unto the creature, as farre as he can without wronging juſtice, then it inclines him to communicate holineſſe unto all to preſerve all from ſinne, to bring all to faith and to repentance, and ſo to ſave all. For how could his juſtice be wronged in this?
4. When he ſaith, tha God of himſelfe cannot without any motive in the reaſonable creature provide for it from everlaſting the greateſt of all miſeries; obſerve what an hungry propoſition this is; for will he ſay tht God can provide for any creature the greateſt miſery ſave one, though not the greateſt of all without any motive in the creature? But if he can ſo provide the greateſt ſave one, why not the greateſt of all? What colour of reaſon to put any difference in this! And if the greateſt ſave two, why not the greateſt ſave one? And ſo we may goe on till we come to the leaſt miſery, thereby to convince the unreaſonableneſſe of this aſſertion. For in cleare evidence of truth, reaſon cannot diſcover where to make a ſtand.
5. And what is the motive he meanes, but the motive of ſinne? And what ſinne did God the Father ſee in Chriſt the Sonne, that moved him to ordaine his deare Sonne to the ſuffering of hell paines?
6. And as he alledgeth Auſtine to little purpoſe, ſo to the contrary what he writes de predeſtinatione & gratia is well known. Si humanum genus quod creatum primitùs conſtat ex nihilo; ſine debito mortis naſceretur, & tamen ex iis Creator Omnipotens in aeternum nonnullos damnare vellet interitum, quis Omnipotenti Creatori diceret, quare feciſti ſic. If mankind which is well known, at firſt to be made of nothing, were born without the debt of death and ſinne; Yet if the Almighty Creatour, would damne ſome of them to eternall deſtruction, who would ſay to the Almighty Creatour, why haſt thou done ſo? And obſerve his reaſon, Qui enim cum non eſſent, eſſe donaverat, quo fine eſſent habuit poteſtatem For he that gave them being when formerly they had no being had power to diſpoſe to what end they ſhould be. There is nothing more evident by the light of nature then this. I willingly confeſſe that that this book though it goe under Auſtin's name, yet it is thought to be none of Auſtin's, and that amongſt other Raynaud: in adit. ad lib. Intitul. Valerianus Integer doctrinae labiſ que purus.conſiderations, by reaſon of this very ſentence in particular, which ſeemes unto me very harſh, and contrary to Auſtin's doctrine in other places. But Raynaudus hath diſcovered at large the vanity of this reaſon, and ſhewes by variety of teſtimonies the concurrence of Antiquitie in bearing witneſſe to the ſame truth. And albeit he confeſſeth the book not to be Auſtin's, yet he proves that Fulgentius was the Authour of it, alwaies accounted to be an Orthodox Father and well known to be a follower of Auſtin's.