The Riches of Gods Love, Part 1 · Section 3
Sect: 3. Containing a Reply to the ſecond Objection, and Anſwere thereunto.
M. Maſon's Addit. p. 17. 18. Object. 2. Perkins lib. de predeſtin: p. 25.It is further objected, that we doe and may ſlaughter our beaſts for our dayly uſe, without any cruelty and iniquity, And therefore God may as well and much more appoynt as many of us as he pleaſeth to the torment of hell, for his glory, and yet be juſt and good to notwithſtanding. For there is a greater diſproportion between God and us, then there is between us and beaſts.
1 For anſwering hereunto we are firſt to premiſe thus much, namely that our ſlaughtering of Beaſts Anſwer.for our dayly uſe is by Gods ordinance, and appoyntment. We had not the authority of our ſelves, but God of his bounty towards us, gave it us, as we may ſee Gen: 9. 2, 3. Where we may obſerve, 1 That God delivereth up all creatures, Beaſts, Birds, and Fiſhes into the hands of men. 2 That the end why he doth ſo, is that they might be meat for men, and conſequently they might be ſlaine. Which being ſo, our ſlaughtering of Oxen, Sheep and other creatures for our dayly uſe is to be accounted Gods doing, rather then ours. And therefore the objection ſhould be made this. God may without any breach of goodneſſe or juſtice appoint bruite creatures to be ſlaine for mans uſe, therefore he may ordaine men to be caſt into hell torments for his owne uſe, that is for the declaration of his ſoveraingty.
2 This being premiſed I anſwer further that this compariſon holds not, For there is little proportion between the Objects compared, and leſſe between the acts.
1 There is but ſmall proportion between the Objects Beaſts and Men creatures of a different nature and made for a different end Beaſts are voyd of reaſon and liberty in their actions; creatures whoſe being ſvaniſh with their breath, made only for the uſe and ſervice of men upon earth But men are reaſonable and underſtanding creatures, able through the Creators bounty to diſcerne between good and evill, they are the very Image of Gods purity and eternity and were made for the ſervice of God alone upon earth, and his bleſſed and everlaſting ſociety in heaven So that albeit there be a very great diſtance between God and man, yet nothing ſo great as between God and Beaſts It followeth not therefore that if God may appoynt beaſts to be killed of his owne free pleaſure for mans uſe. he may with like equity and reaſon appoynt men of his owne will to deſtruction, for his owne uſe We read that God required of his people many thouſand beaſts for ſacrifice, but not one man The firſt borne of other creatures he chalenged for burnt offerings (except they were uncleane beaſts) but the firſt borne of men were to be redeemed. Which ſheweth that he put a wide difference between the blood of men and beaſt. Beſides in the 9 of Geneſis he gives men power to kill and feed uppon all living creatures; but he ſtraightly forbids them to ſhed mans blood, and gives this reaſon of the prohibition, Man is the Image of God; ſo that we may well conclude, that there is but ſmall proportion betweene the Ob…ects compared-men, and Beaſts in reſpect of this Act of killing and ſlaughrering. 2 There is farr leſſe or rather no proportion at all between the Acts compared Killing and eternall tormenting. A man may kill, but he cannot without barbarous, injuſtice and cruelty torment his beaſt, and prolong the life of it, that he may dayly vexe and torture it, to ſhew what power and ſoverainty he hath over it: ſo I doubt not (though there be ſome that will not grant it, but charge the Arminians with contumely againſt God for affirming it) I doubt not, I ſay, but God may kill a man of his owne free pleaſure; yea and reſolve him into nothing without any cruelty and injuſtice; becauſe in ſo doing he doth but take away what he hath given him. But he cannot without both theſe antecedently decree to keepe him alive for ever in Hell, that he may there torment him without end, to ſhew his ſoveraingty. For this is to inflict an infinite evill upon a guiltleſſe creature, to whom he had given but a finite good: And ſo is the compariſon moſt unequall too, in the acts compared, and therefore proveth juſt nothing.
Belike as many as have not the word of God, to read this Authours acute obſervations out of Gen: 9. 2. 3. (For he would not ſeeme to be any of the blunter ſort) doe Repl.ſin as often as they kill a chicke to feed upon, though beaſts of prey doe as much as this comes to, and more without all ſin. 2 Yet M Perkins thought it enough to take notice that commonly it is received as lawfull, without enquiring whence this authority proceeds And noe Chriſtian doubts, but our very bodyes, and ſoules and all, we have from our maker. 3 Are all beaſts for meat? Or hath not man power to ſlaughter any but for meat? Where doth the Authour find this in Gen: May we not kill Lyons, Beares, wolves, unleſſe we eat them forthwith, or pouder them up, that by degrees we may make meat of them? ſo of ſnakes, and Adders and all the Serpents that Lybia brings forth? 4 I deny that our ſlaughtering of oxen is in this reſpect, or in any reſpect to be accounted Gods doing rather then ours. For Gods appoyntment in this, is but of the nature of a permiſſion, not of a command. We may live by fruits and hearbs and Marmalads and ſucketts, or butter, milke and cheeſe, if we think good. Were it a Commandement, yet would it not follow that it is Gods worke rather then ours. For he cōmands good workes and forbids evill workes. Now will this Author herehence conclude, that our good workes are rather Gods workes then ours. I trow he will not 5 Therefore wee keepe to our owne argument, and not regard his infatuation of it, and we were in a pretty caſe, if we ſhould ſuffer our adverſaries to ſhape our Arguments If they once have the grinding of our Tooles, no marvaile if they ſoone grind out all the edge of them. We ſay it is lawfull for man to doe all this that is ſpoken of, upon our fellow creatures, and ſhall not God have as much power over us? Doth not the Apoſtle himſelfe diſpute after this manner, and make the power which God hath over us, equall to the power which the Potter hath over the worke of his own hands and over the clay alſo. Shall the thing formed ſay to it that formed it why haſt thou made me thus? hath not the Potter power over the clay of the ſame lump to make one veſſell unto honour and another unto diſhonour? We cannot take life from a creature without pain, deadly pain: if we have lawfull power to inflict pain upon another creature, hath not God greater power to inflict pain, yea the greateſt pain upon us, and that without all reſpect to ſinne? And that this God can doe as Lord of life and death, both Vaſquez the Jeſuite acknowledgeth, and Medina pronounceth ex concordi Theologorum ſententiâ, by the unanimous conſent of all Divines, as elſewhere I have ſhewed and proved by variety of demonſtration; like as Raynaudus confirmes it by the concurrant teſtimony of the Antients in the places formerly mentioned. 2. In the next place he comes to his anſwer, and ſaith that the compariſon holdes not. And I commend this Authours wiſdome in troubling himſelfe with no more objections, then he thought himſelfe able to Maſter. For who would not keep his ſhinns whole the beſt he can? But I wounder he comes off no better, even then, when he makes choice of ſuch adverſaries, as he thinks he can well grapple with.
1. Little proportion will ſerve turne; it is enough for us that they are all God's creatures; and ſurely there is leſſe proportion between the Creatour and the creature, then between one creature and another. Yet ſure I am, every creature that hath life is more noble then a creature without life, ſuch as a Potters veſſell is; yet look what power the Potter hath over his veſſell; the Apoſtle tells us that God hath the ſame power over his creature man. Secondly, the Authour was ſenſible of the weaknes of this bowſtring, and ſeeing it would Rom: 9. 21.not hold, therefore he relyes upon another, and thats his owne deforming and disfiguring our argument, drawing it from the compariſon of man's power over his fellow creatures, with God's power over us; to conclude therehence that God the Creatour hath as great power over his creature; as man by God's graunt hath power over his fellow creatures. From this due courſe of compariſon which we propoſe, this Authour drawes us to a wild compariſon of the power of God over beaſts, with the power of God over man; which is not ours, but an immodeſt and unſhamefaſt fiction of this Authour; and that grounded upon immodeſt foundations as before hath been ſhewed. Thirdly, yet why not ſo great a difference between God and man, as between God and beaſts? Is not the diſtance infinite? Is it poſſible to be leſſe, ſeeing man is but finite, and God infiinte? For ſtill the perfection of man is but in the way of perfection create. But God's perfection is of a tranſcendant nature it being uncreat: which when School-men have conſidered, they have affirmed that the perfection of creatures is to be meaſured not by approximation to God who is, ens primum, the firſt being, but by their remotion rather à non eſſe, from not being; As I remember to have read long agoe in Paulus Venetus, and which then ſeemed to me moſt congruous, nither to this day doe I ſee any juſt cauſe to oppoſe it. 2. I come to the ſecond anſwer; And here I find this diſcourſe to breath the ſpirit of Arminius, as truly as if it were ſpit out of his own mouth. Now Arminius on this point I have anſwered at larg, as this Authour well knowes: he is content to paſſe that by, and keep himſelfe ſtill like a Sow in beanes, without raiſing any noiſe of ſolving ought hath been Exam: praedeſt. Perkin: p. 41.delivered in proofe hereof. But though he lets paſſe that wich I have delivered without anſwer, renewing only Arminius his objection; yet I will not let this his anſwer to his own objection paſſe without a reply.
1. Therefore whereas he ſaith there is no proportion between killing and eternall tormenting. Imarke his cunning carriage, he doth not ſay there is no proportion between killing and tormenting wich are two acts; and acts are ſomewhat capable of proportion. And ſurely if he had, killing would appeare to be the worſt of the two; ſince to kill is to torment and ſomewhat more, even to deſtroy the being of a man. Therefore the compariſon which he ſhapes is between killing and eternall tormenting; that is not between two acts, as he pretends to from the compariſon, but between one act, and the eternall duration of an other act, which is the quantity thereof in reference to time, ſuch is this Authours jugling. Yet notwithſtanding the diſproportion of theſe things, hence it followes not, that killing is the more deſirable of the two; conſidering that many apain there is which man would be content to endure, rather then to looſe his life? So farre is it from being worſe, and that beyond all proportion. Auſtine ſomewhere profeſſing of infants pain in hell, that is poena mitiſſima, the mildeſt pain, & ſuch as they had rather endure then to have no being at all. 2. But take it for an intollerable tormenting; if there be no proportion between killing and eternall tormenting; whereas there is ſome proportion between man and beaſt, then it were reaſonable for any man to deſire to be turned into a beaſt rather then to be eternally tormented: now let every reaſonable creature conſider, the ſobriety of ſuch a choice. 3. If only the eternity of it makes killing to be preferred before tormenting, then it is not to be denyed, but tormenting a creature in hell fire a thouſand or ten thouſand yeares may be performed by God upon an innocent man, only eternall torment cannot. Yea and ſo ten thouſand to an hundred thouſand yeares, and ſo forwards untill it comes to be eternall, which indeed can never be; it being a thing utterly impoſſible to attaine from a beginning unto eternity by degrees. A finite added to a finite being never able to make it infinite. And therefore to maintain a thing infinite in quantitie, Ariſtole hath taught us that it is to maintain a multitude of infinites (and indeed an infinite of infinites.) For if the parts be but finite, it is impoſſible that the whole conſiſting of finite parts can be infinite. 4. Though man cannot without barbarous cruelty torment his beaſt, and prolong the life of it; Yet I hope this Authour will not deny this to be in the power of God, and that for the leaſt ſinne committed by man. And this was it that I propoſed in my anſwer to M. Hord, to ſhew the power of God in ſuch a kind, wherein it were abominable crueltie in man to exerciſe his power: like as the barbarous cruelty of Tiberius is ſet forth by them that write the hiſtory of his life. And the truth is, it is a very difficult point to reſolve how it can ſtand with juſtice divine thus to deale with a creature, though a ſinner. Yet I know many courſes are taken to ſolve this difficultie, and the beſt that I have met with is this in my judgment; That a man dying in ſinne, his ſinne continueth eternall (never broke off by repentance) as well as the pain, yet this upon examination is found to have its flawes, and will not ſatisfie. So that the beſt and finall reſolution is to have recourſe to God's abſolute power, as a Creatour over his creatures. And that abſolute power will make it good even over an innocent creature as over a creature nocent. And it were very ſtrange to affirme that God hath not as much power over us as we have over our beaſts, namely to put them to pain, to doe us ſervice. Now if it be lawfull to inflict but one degree of pain upon an innocent creature, what reaſon can be given why he cannot inflict two degrees, and if ſo why not three, and ſo aſcending to the higheſt degree? Then as touching the duration of it, if he can inflict ſuch a pain for an houre, he may as well for two houres; and for a whole day: And if for a day he may as well for two daies, yea for a week▪ 1 for a week he may as well for a monethmonth, and if for a monethmonth, he may as well for two or three; if for three, as well for ſix; and if for ſix, as well for twelve; and if for a yeare, as well for two; and as well for foure, and ſo in infinitum; from tenns to hundreds, and from hundreds to thouſands For no reaſon can poſſibly make evidence where we ought to make a ſtand; in ſuch ſort as that an afliction in ſuch a degree is lawfull, and immediatly after increaſing becomes unlawfull. 2. Yet conſider we ſpeak not now of decreeing, but of executing (whereas the objection proceeded concerning God's decreeing) Now between the decree and the execution, ſinne may intercede by God's permiſſion, and that neceſſarily thereupon as Arminius himſelfe confeſſeth. But now to the point whereon we are in preſent, we ſuppoſe the perſon to be moſt holy, even as holy as the Sonne of God; on whom notwithſtanding were inflicted, as all confeſſe, either hell paines, or that which was equivalent to hell paines. 3. Yet this evill thus inflicted will never come to be infinite, ſtill it continueth finite, though in infinitum; it being utterly impoſſible by addition to make that which is finite become infinite. 4. But were it infinite, yet this Authours caution would help us againſt the Authour himſelfe. For the good which God hath given ſuch a creature, is alſo infinite, to wit his being. How much more if God preſerve that creature from ſinne, which by Arminius his cofeſſion, makes a man more miſerable, then hell paines it ſelfe. Laſtly that there is ſuch an abſolute power in God Raynaudus juſtifies both out of the twelvth of wiſdoome. Cum ſis juſtus, juſte omnia diſponis. Ipſum quoque qui non debet punire Auſtinecondemnare externum exiſtimas à tuâ virtute. This reading he profeſſeth to be corrupt and nothing coherent with the text; And the true reading ought to be this, Ipſum quoque qui non debet puniri condemnas. And ſhewes that this reading is followed by Auſtin, q. 53. and Saint Grigory. 3. Morall: cap. 11. This alſo he juſtifies to be Orthodox by the teſtimony of the Antients. Macarius homil. 15. Deus ſui juris eſt, quod vult facit. Si velit pro poteſtate & jure ſuo mittit juſtos in Gehennam, ac peccatores in regnum. Out of Chryſoſtomt l. 2. De compunctione cordis ſub finem. Si te agentem quod tibi preceptum eſt conjicii jubeat Dominus tuus in Gehennam, aliqua tibi datur contradicendi poteſtas. Out of Auſtine in Pſal. 70. in the beginning Multum movet Dei amor & timor, Timor Dei quia juſtus eſt; Amor quia miſericors eſt. Quis enim diceret ei quid feciſti, ſi damnaret juſtum? quanta ergo miſericordia ejus eſt, ut juſtificet injuſtum? Then he repreſents the School-men maintaining the ſame. Ariminenſes, Camariacenſes, Medina, Secarius in cap. 7. Ioſuae à 39. and Lorinus in cap. 12. Sap: v. 12. Yet is not Raynaudus of their opinion who maintaines reprobation to be before the foreſight of evill workes; nevertheleſſe he is peremptory in juſtifying this; And Fulgentius whom he conceives to be the Authour of that book de praedeſt. & gratia, which goes under Auſtin's name, in a little treatiſe of his intituled Cenſura inofficioſae cenſurae, which is added to his Valerianus integrae vitae labiſ que purus.