Natural and Moral Impotency, Discourse (1 of 2)

Natural and Moral Impotency · Discourse (1 of 2)

p. 1A DISCOURSE OF Natural and Moral IMPOTENCY.

You will not come to me that you might have Life, John 5.40.

No man can come to me except the Father, which ſent me, draw him, John 6.44.

IT is ſo apparent, that a proper Impotency (in the common ſtrict ſenſe) doth excuſe from all obedience, to commands before God and man, and maketh all Conditional Promiſes on ſuch a condition, ſo far from being of Grace and kindneſs, that they are Nullities, p. 2that all††The Law conſtructions of our Common, and, in caſes Teſtamentary, of the Civil Law, in making ſuch conditional promiſes abſolute; do not contradict but confirm this, becauſe made upon this reaſon: elſe they would be Nullities. Lawyers and Caſuiſts generally acknowledg it. And ſuch as deny Man's having any ability to Good, do it not willingly, but for fear of inconveniences on the other hand; and though they do deny it, yet at other times grant it implicitly, yea and flie to it as the only refuge from extreams on their own hand.

And again; That there is an Impotency in men to Good is apparent, not only from Scripture, as, No man can come to me, exceept &c. and can the Blackmore change his skin, &c. but from the woful Experience of all; yea the Heathens††Plato. acknowledged it, and were puzled how to give an account of its original:Perprrie alſo exhorts all to lament it as the Antients dil, propounding the ancient Heathens for a pattern, lib. de Abſtin. ſo that he is a Monſter of men that doth not acknowledg and lament it.

Yet it is ſo apparent. That we are too blame in not doing the things we have an Impotency to, and that Promiſes of mercy to returning Sinners are of Grace; that a man ſhould contradict his own knowledg and the ſentiments of all the world, beſide the Scripture, to ſay otherwiſe: All which notions, taken together, ſeem irreconcilable: and p. 3are indeed irreconcilable (ſay men what they will) without ſome Diſtinction about Impotency.

Now it is a deſirable thing, if poſſible, to come to a ſtaiedneſs and conſiſtency, that we may not as in the dark ſay and unſay, as the preſent difficulties preſs us on either hand, not knowing what we ſay, or whereof we affirm.

That Diſtinction well underſtood, which is much inſiſted on by the French Proteſtant Divines, would much conduce herein, namely, the diſtinction of Natural and Moral Impotency.

And though many of Dr. Twiſſes Judgment in other things, oppoſe it,Rurſus, impotentia faciendi (it is miſprinted facience) quod Deo gratum eſt & acceptum. non eſt impotentia Naturae ſed morum: nulla enim nobis deeſt facultas naturae, per pecatum originale; juxta illud Auguſtini, Nulli agnoſcendae veritatis abſtulit facultatem. Adhuc remainet potentia quâ facere poſſumus quaecun que volumus. And, Pag. 212. Amplius advertas, Impotentia, ex amputatione manitum orta, eſt impotentia naturae; at imp…teutia ad … eſt duntaxat impotentia Morum, quâ nihil obſtante poterit homomorale aliquod officium praeſtare ſi velit. So in his Anſwer to Hord. pag. 115. Obſerve (ſaith he) how this Author confounds Impotency Moral, which conſiſteth in the corruption of mens powers natural; and Impotency Natural, which conſiſteth in bereaving him of power natural. yet he himſelf in many places, when preſſed with difficulties, fled to it as his chief Sanctuary, Vindic. grat. lib. 2. Errat. 9. Sect. 6. pag. (mihi) 211.

p. 4This diſtinction of Natural and Moral power, or Impotency, is not uſed to affirm or deny the coming or ariſing of one or either of them from nature: for I am not now ſpeaking de origine, whence they ariſe; but to denote the ſpecies or kinds, and the eſſential difference of their Natures,**Non refert ſcelus unde cadat, ſcelus eſſe farendum eſt. Manil come they which way they will.

That is a Phyſical or Natural habit or action, that is neither foreign nor foreign laudable nor vituperable in genere morum, that a man can neither be counted good and honeſt, or bad and diſhoneſt, for his agility or lameneſs, dulneſs, blockiſhneſs, or acuteneſs; but may be (having ſuch power, and doing accordingly) admired though not praiſed? and for the defect of ſuch power may be pittied, but not blamed or puniſhed: and this Impotency may be a puniſhment, but cannot be a ſin.

The Moral and Ethical act or habit is juſt contrary, It is that which is laudable or vituperable, and that which a man may be looked on as honeſt or diſhoneſt for.

Now Natural Impotency is always, in this ſenſe, of ſomthing that a man cannot do if he would never ſo much; or hath not the very faculty of willing it.

The Moral Impotency is of ſomthing that a man hath the natural faculty to will, or can do it if he would; but is hindered only by moral vitious habits, from willing or doing it.

p. 5The Stoick Philoſophers uſe to expreſs this difference well, by foreign, and foreign.

Every man (though he know not how to expreſs this to others, nor poſſibly clear it to himſelf) hath a notion of theſe things differing; and which belong to one ſort, and which to the other; and that one is capable of a juſt command or prohibition, the other not.

If any one hear of a man that abhorrs ſuch a particular meat, which is Gods good creature appointed for food, he pities him, but doth not blame him; and ſo, when he hears of the man that ſo abhorred Wine, that he could not receive it in the Sacrament: But if he hear of a man that hates and abhorrs God and good men, and that cannot endure to hear any good inſtructions, he blames him; and is ſure, this is not blameleſs as the other is. But I will ſpeak more plainly, if poſſible.

That Man hath, and wanteth not, a natural power of doing any duty, who hath, firſt an objective Evidence, that is intelligible, fitted and ſuited objectively to produce the Act, that he either knows, or may know what is required of him, if he make that uſe of his underſtanding, that he hath power to do.

Secondly: That hath the natural faculties of underſtanding and willing the thing commanded, and that not only in actu primo, as, we ſay Natural Fools have; but actu ſecundo. p. 6i.e. without natural impediments hindering their exerciſe: Here now is enough named already for all elicit Acts. viz. meer acts of the will and underſtanding.

Thirdly: Then he hath the natural power for performing the imperate acts, when there is no external or internal force, no man or thing hindering him; and hath a body rightly diſpoſed, is not deaf or blind, &c. and hath the outward helps neceſſary for ſome imperate acts, as, a ſufficient eſtate to give, &c. So that he can do the imperate act if he would.

This is it, Then a man hath the natural power to do any thing, when he hath the natural faculties, and no hinderance but that he can do the thing if he would; And then he hath a Natural Impotency when he hath not theſe faculties, or cannot do the thing commanded, if he would never ſo much. Now I will name the Proprieties of it.

Firſt; The want of this natural power, their Natural Impotency, doth excuſe, as is commonly granted; and they that deny it are not conſiſtent with themſelves, but unawares grant it. Total Natural Impotency doth excuſe before God and Man: Yea all Natural Impotency doth excuſe according to the meaſure and degree of it. Some little Natural Impotency doth in ſome meaſure, though not wholly; à tanto, though not à tot. It is ſome excuſe if a Servant be commanded a foot journey and go not, if ſomthing p. 7lame. ſo that he could not go it but with great difficulty, but if quite lame (could not at all) a full excuſe. If a man be hebetior, blockiſh, ſomthing dull, it is ſome excuſe for is not underſtanding difficulties in Religion, which he might yet poſſibly, with great difficulty, underſtand; but if quite a Fool, ſo as to have no more uſe of Reaſon than a Beaſt; it is a total excuſe from any command to learn or underſtand. Without doubt aman of dull Intellectuals, is not bound to underſtand ſuch things in Divinity, as require great acuteneſs of parts to underſtand; for, he cannot if he would. And doubtleſs a command for a man to will his own miſery formally, or to nill his own happineſs formally (which all agree, No man can do) would not oblige; ſo as that a man ſhould be too blame in not doing it: ſince a man hath not the natural faculty or power to do ſuch things.

If a man that is not much inclined to it, give himſelf over to ſleep in times of Religious worſhip, it is a great fault: If a man be very ſleepy, and ſleep at ſuch a time, it is ſome excuſe, even ſo far as it aroſe from a natural cauſe; but yet it is a fault ſo far, as it was from careleſneſs to ſtir up himſelf, from want of the awe of Gods preſence, ſo far as he might, if he would, do otherwiſe; but if it ſo ſeized on him, that his greateſt deſires and endeavours could not preſerve him from it, no fault: Need I prove this? The very mention ſeems enough.

p. 8All thoſe Divines, conſulted about it, took it for granted that it was not the duty of that good man, to drink wine in the Euchariſt, that could not, if he would, and that the genoral command did not oblige him.

And all generally grant it as apparent, That the Heathens (that never had, nor could obtain the Revelation of it) ſhall never be condemned for not Believing Chriſt and his death, becauſe they had not the means that were naturally neceſſary; And by the ſame Reaſon they muſt affirm (elſe they muſt ſay That is no reaſon, and find ſome other) that they ſhall not be condemned for not doing the things they could not do, and alſo that we ſhall not be condemned for not knowing or doing the things that we cannot know or do: elſe they muſt ſay, God had greater reſpect for the Heathen, than for us. There are only three Exceptions that I can call to mind, that are made by any to this general Aſſertion, with any ſhew of reaſon.

Firſt, ſome make this Exception, That if a man's natural Impotency proceed from his own fault, or his Anceſtors, ſo as to be his own fault, in Law, or reputatively; then it doth not excuſe him from obedience to the command.

I think it apparent, that yet it doth excuſe; and I wil bring their own ſtrongeſt Inſtances; If a man have, by his own lewd courſes, run himſelf into debt, ſo that now he cannot pay his debts if he would; his not paying in this p. 9caſe after his diſability, ceaſeth to be a fault. He ought indeed to lament that former wickedneſs, that brought this Natural Impotency upon him (and to aggravate it in his Confeſſions with theſe afflictive conſequents, that, He cannot now pay, and, His Creditors are provoked, and God diſhonoured) for he could then have done otherwiſe; And he ought to deſire to pay, & for the future reſolve to uſe ſuch probably means diligently, as that he may hereafter be inabled to pay part or all, for this he can do.

But he cannot truly, when the Creditour bids him pay, and he would, but cannot, in his Confeſſions of his faults to God that day, ſay I have, to all my other ſins, added this ſin, that I did not this day pay the man when he required it. Now, ſuppoſe the Creditor had demanded it ten times in a day, there would have been ten ſeveral ſins of injuſtice in not paying him his own, if he had been able to pay it; but he cannot, when unable, lament that, over and beſides the committing thoſe ſins that diſenabled him from paying, he is guilty before God of ten new faults that day in not praying. It cannot be ſaid that a man overwhelmed in debt, through his own former defauls, and would pay but cannot, lives in known preſent omiſſion of that which is his duty: And ſo if a man have, by ſome ſinful ways broken his legs, or brought ſome Natural Impotency on himſelf, that he can not go to hear a Sermon, he may lament his p. 10former wickedneſs that brought that Impotency on him, but cannot lament it as his fault that day that he did not go to hear the Sermon: that is, he ought to lament that as his fault which he could have not done when he did it, and that is not to be lamented as his fault, which he could not do, when he did it not.

If you ſhall object, But God may puniſh theſe men? I anſwer, There can be no juſt puniſhment but for a fault; but this is no fault.

God may for ever puniſh them for thoſe their faults that cauſed this Impotency: for they might have done otherwiſe, but not at all for the not doing that which they could not do.

If you object. But men may puniſh the Debtor above-mentioned? Will you ſay, Laws are unjuſt that do ſo? This Objection hath greateſt ſtrength to ſilence Antagoniſts, to run them upon the prejudice of ſpeaking againſt wiſe Laws, and Senatus-conſulta, and Reſponſa prudentum, which are to be reverenced. I Anſwer, the Law-makers, in allowing ſuch men to lie in priſon at the will of the Creditors, do juſtly and wiſely: For, how could any be reſtrained from luxuriouſly laviſhing all away with fear of Law, if when they had rendred themſelves unreſponſible, they were to be acquitted from puniſhment. Yea, they do not unwiſely or unjuſtly (becauſe humane laws muſt be general p. 11and finite, and not infinite, and taking notice of all particulars, unleſs they will make this only Law, which would be virtually infinite. To leave all to the diſcretion of Judges, which Legiſtators that have care of the Common-Weal muſt not do,) I ſay they do not unjuſtly to ſuffer men to lie in Priſon at the wil of the Creditor, where there was no fault, but the man's poverty came ſome way unexpected, and unavoidable by humane prudence; becauſe greater inconveniences would enſue in having a Law to free men from puniſhment from the Creditors, if poverty came on them without any fault. Becauſe it is an eaſie thing to conceal Eſtates, and this would unavoidably ſubject Creditors to the Will and Conſcience of their Debtors: whereas there is far greater reaſon that the Borrower (as Solomon ſpeaks) ſhould be Servant to the Lender, and in his power; than that the Lender ſhould be Servant to the Borrower and in his power: and it is more agreeable to natural equity, and Reaſons of Government; and the contrary would be deſtructive to the Community. Legiſlators ſuppoſe, or will and deſire, that Creditors will not keep Debtors in Priſon when unable to pay, and this diſability came on them without any former fault, as in riotous miſ-pending, but if Creditors do otherwiſe, they judg it would be more inconvenient to the Community, to hinder them by a Law, than to leave it to their own Conſcience. p. 12But if there was a fault, whereby they came to their want, the Creditors do juſtly in keeping them in priſon (provided the puniſhment exceed not the offence) if they have reſpect to their former fault and wickedneſs in miſpending, and alſo do it to make them warnings to others that they do not ſinfully laviſh. But if any ſhould know he is unable, and yet keep his Debtor in Priſon, not with reſpect to his former fault, or to warn others; but merely in wrath and vexation, becauſe he doth not pay him when he knoweth he cannot, it would be ſinful and irrational, becauſe, ſo far, it is for no fault. But now, God will not do ſuch a thing (as humane Laws muſt ſuffer, and ſome irrational ſinful men may do) in his immediate Government; He can infallibly diſtinguiſh where a fault is, and where none; And as he will not puniſh a man for not paying his debts, when his Poverty came on him by the hand of God, and not by his own default; ſo where his diſability to pay did come by his own ſin, he will not puniſh him for that which was no fault, as his then not paying when he could not; but for that which was his fault, his ſinful making himſelf unable when he could have done otherwiſe.

The inſtance of Drunkenneſs ſeems difficult to be anſwered. I may here be overwhelmed with the Authority of thoſe that grant, All Natural Impotency doth excuſe, except that Impotency of underſtanding and p. 13will, that ariſeth from drunkenneſs; and that this is ſo far from excuſing, that it**foreign. Ariſt. ad Nicom. increaſeth the fault, I ſhall, before I directly anſwer, premiſe this, (which I perceive is the greateſt Objection againſt what I ſhall ſay, and cauſeth the Miſtake of Caſuiſts in determining otherwiſe;) Juſt and prudent, and neceſſary Laws that men ought to make, are not to over-rule our judgements here. I like well that ſaying of our Engliſh Lawyers, that, The Law will rather ſuffer a miſchief, than an Inconvenience; meaning by a Miſchief, that which may fall too heavy on a particular man accidentally; and by Inconvenience that which would be a general Inconvenience to the whole Community; it being incumbent on them Ne quid decrimenti reſpublica caperet. It would be a miſs, could it be helped without a greater Inconvenience, to allow an injured man's teſtimony to take away another's life; yet I think it a good Law that a man's Oath againſt him that robbed him, is Evidence enough to a Jury; becauſe otherwiſe, whereas not one in many is apprehended, they might ſo order their Robberies, as not one in a multitude would be puniſhed So the Law of concealing a dead Baſtard-Child ſeems hard, but is neceſſary on this account. God himſelf, if he make Laws, poſſibly fit for humane Judicatures; they muſt ſubject ſome to miſchiefe in the Lawyer's ſenſe, as that of the Oath of two Witneſſes being irrefragable, which ſome innocent man might ſuffer by.

p. 14I think, Legiſlators do wiſely and juſtly in inflicting a penalty on men for doing the thing when drunk, that they would inflict if he had done it when ſober; For

Firſt, for the moſt part, Men drunk have the uſe of their will and underſtanding in ſome meaſure, and ſo may at that time be reſtrained by conſideration of the penalty; and they have alſo at that time the greateſt need for the moſt part to be reſtrained by the greatneſs of the penalty; And if they then knew there was no danger, or no great danger of the penalty, the puniſhment being to be mitigated; it would ſubject the Innocent to the Luſts and rage of Drunken men.

Secondly: Suppoſe, ſome may be quite mad with drink, and utterly deprived of the uſe of Reaſon, and conſequently of Will, and yet are capable of committing ſuch wicked acts (I mean materially wicked): It would be an imprudent particular Law that ſhould be made to ſpare ſuch; becauſe the moſt that commit enormities in their drink, would eſcape upon this pretence; and many would deſignedly drink to exceſs, that they might without danger, or with little danger, be revenged, or fulfil ſome other Luſt; and they would know that the more horrid their fact was (as killing a Father) the more likely they would be to eſcape upon pretence of madneſs, as if none, but one mad, would do it

Thirdly: There would yet be ſomething p. 15of juſtice, though wholly deprived of the uſe of reaſon, becauſe the puniſhment is for the offence of Drunkenneſs, which was voluntary; and to make other dread Drunkenneſs, eſpecially they that have in this reſpect the moſt need, that are apt to be in a rage by it, as that which may bring on them, by the conſequence, Capital puniſhment. And alſo when the Law gives a man as much power to hold his neighbour to his Bargain which he made when Drunk as when Sober; partly it may be for penalty; and partly it may be for inconveniencies, that otherwiſe would follow, were the Law otherwiſe. And yet no Conſcientious man (however in ordinary caſes) would hold a man to his bargain if quite, or but almoſt, deprived of the uſe of his reaſon by his drink. But to ſpeak to the Caſe.

If a man ſhould, through Drunkenneſs, proceed to ſuch madneſs, as to be totally deprived of the uſe of his reaſon, and ſhould then kill a man; he ought, when in his right mind, lament the ſin of making himſelf Drunk; and ought to aggravate it with ſuch Circumſtances: but he might rather look on his killing the man, as a puniſhment God ſuffered him to incur for his ſin, and as his ſorrow, rather then any diſtinct ſin; for it would not be properly and formally Murder, nor any other ſin; becauſe not at all voluntary: for if there be no Underſtanding, it is impoſſible there ſhould be any thing of p. 16will, univocally & properly ſo called; & proportionably it leſſens that particular fault, if almoſt deprived of Reaſon. Yet I dare not ſay with Auguſtine, lib. 22. Contr. Fauſt. Manic. cap. 44. Culpandus eſt Lot, non quantum ille Inceſtus in ebrietate admiſſus, ſed quantum illa ebrietas, meretur, That this, that Lot was to be blamed for his Drunkeneſs, but not for his Inceſt. Becauſe Expoſitors are not agreed of the meaning of the place; And I durſt leſs ſay it of his ſecond Inceſt: for he might be guilty of Inceſt interpretatively, it not being enough againſt his will, while he had the uſe of it, if he, before his ſecond Drunkeneſs, knew what had fallen out in the firſt, and might not improbably ſuppoſe the like might follow again. But I ſhould be tireſome, if I ſhould endeavour too great exactneſs. You ſee the thing, in theſi, made plain, and that is enough here. Suppoſe a Maſter find his Servant Drunk to a total ſenſeleſneſs, and then ſhould utter ſuch words as theſe, I command thee now to go immediately ſuch a Journey, would it not be irrational in the Maſter to be angry at his Servant, not only (which he may be) for making himſelf Drunk, and unfit for hearing and obeying his commands, both which he could not have done when he did them; But alſo for his not going the journey at that time when he knew he could not?

Secondly; Others make this Exception, that all Natural Impotence doth excuſe, except p. 17the man think he is able, and that he hath the Natural power to do the thing he is commanded, and then it doth not excuſe; then it is his fault not to do the thing commanded, though he cannot. The inſtance they uſe to bring is this, If a Servant be bound in his bed, that he cannot riſe, he knowing nothing of it, and his Maſter calls him, and bids him riſe; but he reſolvedly lies ſtill and will not.

This is eaſily anſwered: For any one may ſee that the fault here, is not, That he did not riſe, which he could not; but that he did not will, deſire, or endeavour to riſe, which he could do.

This Inſtance rather confirms what I ſay. And again, this Inſtance is very improper for the thing it is commonly brought, and as it is commonly applied; for this ſeems to take for granted, that the wicked are in no fault, in that they do not Repent and Believe; and ſo that the commands of Repenting and Believing do not oblige them, but only it is their fault they do not deſire, will, and endeavour to do theſe: and it is to grant they may will, deſire, and endeavour to obey the Goſpel, as having no Impotency to theſe, but only cannot do the thing deſired. Whereas I muſt deny this as pelagianiſm, and muſt ſay, that, in the ſenſe they cannot believe and obey, they cannot deſire, will, and endeavour it; and I can ſhew you that to will ſo far as to come to the prevailing choice, p. 18would be Saving. Yet theſe mean the prevailing degree: For when they tell men they cannot believe the Goſpel, but wiſh them do what they can, viz: Will it; they do not mean that they exhort them by this to will, to obey the Goſpel in ſuch a low degree, and ſo remiſly, as yet to will prevailingly to reject the Goſpel. This again implies to make it ſenſe, That, if wicked men did know (as the Objectors ſuppoſe themſelves do) that they have no Power, then it would be no fault for them to reject the Goſpel. And then it would be Miniſters duty indeed (or they are very cruel to Souls) to tell them, they have no Natural power to Repent and Believe, to free them from this ſuppoſed errour, that they might be free from fault, and know they are not bound to comply with the Goſpel.

Object. But is it no aggravation of the very not doing any thing, when a man thinks he can do it, and cannot?

I Anſwer. Not in the leaſt: For Natural Impotency cometh not in the leaſt within Morality. You may as well ſay, it would leſſen a mans fault before God, that thinketh he hath no greater an eſtate then will meerly ſerve his Family-neceſſities, and ſpends it on a great Feaſt, to have a ſuperfluous Eſtate before that's faln to him that he knew not of.

Thirdly, Others make this Exception to the general rule, That mans Natural Impotency p. 19to obey, doth excuſe from obedience, except the reaſon why men obey not, be, not becauſe they cannot, though they cannot, but becauſe they will not; and this, ſay they, is the common cauſe of mens not Believing and Repenting; they cannot with this proper cannot, diſtinct from will-not; and yet that is not the reaſon why they do not Repent and Believe, but becauſe they will not, now though ſuch deſign the ſame (I believe) that I do in this diſcourſe, yet to bring theſe dark words into the light, is enough to ſhame them. Either they that make uſe of this evaſion mean by cannot, the Natural Impotency of doing the very ſame thing that he cannot do; or elſe only deny the power of doing the thing he hath an Impotency to; but grant a power, notwithſtanding of doing another thing required of him different from that he wants the Natural power of doing.

1. If they mean it in the firſt ſenſe, ad idem, that a man cannot do the ſame thing required, but the reaſon why he doth it not, is not becauſe he cannot.

Firſt: It is a Contradiction, as you may ſee in any inſtance keeping to the ſame, If a man have not the Natural power of Willing, this cannot but be a cauſe, yea a ſufficient cauſe, yea the only cauſe of his not Willing. It would be a ſtrange idle kind of hindrance that hinders not; a ſtrange kind of Impotency to doing, that hinders not that doing, p. 20that is no reaſon of the not doing. This is to ſay, A mans blindneſs is no reaſon or cauſe of his not ſeeing, or, not the only cauſe.

Secondly: It is contrary to expreſs Scriptures, to ſay, their cannot is no reaſon of their not Believing. We muſt ſay, that a mans Impotency of Believing, in what ſenſe ſoever we take his Impotency, is the cauſe and reaſon of his not Believing: For that Impotency that Chriſt ſpeaks of, is given as the reaſon why men Believe not on him, John 6.64, 65. There are ſome of you that Believe not: For Jeſus knew from the begining who they were that Believed not, and he ſaid, Therefore ſaid I unto you, that no man can come unto me, except it be given him of my Father. So John 843. Why do you not underſtand my ſpeech? Even becauſe you cannot hear my Word; you are of your Father the Devil; that is, You are ſo wicked, you are of ſuch Deviliſh qualities.

II. If they mean by theſe words, that the fault is, notwithſtanding their Impotency, that they do not ſome other thing than that they have the Impotency to; and ſo the meaning is, He hath an Impotency to ſomthing; but his fault is, that he doth not that which he hath a power to do, and hath no Impotency at all to. Firſt: This rather confirms what I am ſaying, yea overgoe's me quite, as you will after ſee. Secondly: This is no more to the purpoſe, than to ſay, p. 21A blind man is too blame for not hearing, becauſe his Impotency to ſeeing, doth not hinder his hearing; yet this is apparently the chief Part of the meaning of this ſaying, as it is applyed by thoſe that uſe it.

Thirdly: This Saying leaneth upon an aiery, nice, falſe implyed difference or diſtinction; or it would have no colour of reaſon, which is this, between Willing, deſiring, endeavouring to Repent and Believe, and Actual Believing and Repenting. But any that looks upon theſe actions as elicit acts of the Will (with the heart man Believeth and Repenteth) may know, this is a Contradiction. Imperate acts require another power diſtinct from the Will to execute them, and ſo may be hindered by the want of that other Power, as want of Eſtate to give; but it is otherwiſe where they are not Imperated, but only Elicited. What ſhould hinder, if a man Willed it to the prevailing degree? nay it is the thing it ſelf, and if one could ſuppoſe ſuch a thing poſſible, God would accept it without the diſtinct thing from it you ſuppoſe, called Repenting and Believing, while he would do it, and it is no fault of his, no want of Will, they do not follow; and to think otherwiſe, would be to have hard thoughts of God.

Fourthly: This leaneth upon another falſe foundation, that men have no Impotency at all to Willing, deſiring, or endeavouring that which is good; which to p. 22affirm, as I ſaid before, is Pelagianiſm. Yet, you muſt not charge men with that doctrine that follows from their unwary obſcure ſpeeches by remote conſequence, when it may be ſaid of them, That if they ſaw it followed, they would not uſe thoſe ſpeeches, and do diſown the conſequence as not ſeeing it follow.

Thus I have, I think, ſatisfactorily made out, that Natural Impotency doth excuſe from fault. This is the firſt property of Natural Impotency, wherein it differs from Moral; I have been large in this, but will recompence it with brevity in the following.

Secondly: A ſecond property of this Natural Impotency is this, Natural Impotency (viz. when a man hath not the faculty of willing, or cannot do the thing if he would) would make all conditional promiſes made upon condition of doing that that men have this Impotency to do, nullities. Suppoſe the promiſe made to faln man that hath no wings, If you fly you ſhall be ſaved, would not this have been ſo far from gracious, as to be a Nullity? Yea though Adam had had wings, and loſt them by his ſin, from himſelf and us; as indeed I grant the caſe to be much ſo, in reſpect of original ſin between Adam and us: Could any man ſetiouſly give thanks for ſuch a promiſe, or ſay, It was a kind and gracious promiſe?

The ſticking to this opinion of mans Natural p. 23Impotency to perform the Goſpel-condition, hath driven ſome, otherwiſe learned and worthy men, to deny, Such are promiſes, viz. If men Believe and Repent, they ſhall be ſaved; and to uſe this argument for their opinion, that if they be, they are no more gracious than the Law. I muſt ſay, their argument is unanſwerable, if a man now have no more power to fulfil the Goſpel-condition, than to make all his ſins undone. Nay, there are no degrees in Impoſſibilities or total Cannots. It is no more of grace to ſay to a man, If thou wilt run a mile I will give, &c. if he cannot, than if thou wilt run a thouſand. To ſay, men have not the Natural power to perform the Goſpel-condition, is to ſet forth God as one that mocketh; and to ſay, He will encreaſt their miſery if they do not, is to ſet him forth as doing (horreſco refer…ns) worſe than mocking. What fearful things are extreams?

Thirdly: While there is this Natural Impotency of obedience to a command, or performing the condition of a promiſe, men that obey not, or fall ſhort of the thing promiſed, will never repent of, or befool themſelves for it; for that which they could not help if they would never ſo much. I forbear aggravating this opinion, as having load enough on its back already to make any conſiderate man ſtand off leſt it fall on him.

Now I come to ſpeak of the Moral or Ethical Impotency. It is a thing as quite p. 24different from Natural Impotency as can be almoſt ſuppoſed, as I ſhall ſhew you. They agree in nothing, but only in the thing that is the reaſon of the Metaphor borrowed from Natural Impotency, to expreſs this by which is this, That as a lame man cannot walk, a blind man ſee, or dead ariſe without a Miracle; ſo neither can theſe ever Repent and believe without ſome wonderful help from Heaven, though upon another account it cannot be done, and not becauſe they want the Natural power of doing it.

Moral Impotency is when a man hath the Natural power, can do the thing in reſpect of his Natural powers, but will not; and not only ſo, but cannot obtain of himſelf to will it, though yet he hath the Natural power of obtaining this of himſelf, elſe it would be a Natural Impotency; as, a Fool hath not the Natural power to obtain of himſelf to will a thing, hath not the right Natural uſe of his faculties; So (as all agree) a man hath not the Natural power of willing his own miſery, as his miſery; or of nilling his own happineſs: his ſoul is not framed capable of theſe things; and therefore theſe things come not within Morality; neither are, nor poſſibly can be matter of a ſerious command or ſerious prohibition.

Theſe expreſſions, à ſe impetrare non poteſt ut velit; he cannot find in his heart to chuſe it, cannot obtain of himſelf to will it, ſeem he fitteſt to repreſent it to you by.

p. 25And it is not from any Natural defect that he cannot find in his heart, cannot obtain of himſelf to will it, but from his Wickedneſs, his pride, Covetouſneſs, Malice, Voluptuouſneſs, and ſuch things as prevail with his will in a Moral way, to keep it faſt to them, John 5 44 How can you Believe, that ſeek honour one of another, and ſeek not the honour that cometh from God only: That is (as you may ſee, comparing cap 12. v. 43) This hinders you from giving your ſelves up to me and my obedience, your Pride, your affectation of applauſe, your care to keep up your Repute amongſt your Friends and Acquaintants. This Impotency is the ſame with that which a man means when he ſaith, I cannot break my own Legs; not but that he can do it if he would, but he is ſo reſolved to the contrary upon ſome arguments that prevail with him, that all that you can ſay, cannot Perſwade him to do it.

This Impotency is a rational thing, ſo far as that may be called rational which is done upon reaſons, but inconſiderable and ſlight reaſons, and upon fallacious arguments and grounds, and ſuch as he doth, or might know to be fallacious, did he make due uſe of his reaſon: Elſe it would be a Natural Impotency, and a man could be no more blamed for it, than you can blame a man for his antipathy to Cheeſe, that is not choſen upon any arguments. Now in this ſenſe a Cannot and Will not are all one; they do p. 26not differ ſpecie, in kind; only, in degree: It is a higher degree of volition or chuſing; you may call it Wilfulneſs, ſtubbornneſs, Obſtinacy, Moral Impotency, all theſe ſignifie the ſame. Deut. 21.18. If a man have a ſtubborn Son that will not obey the voyce of his Father, Stubborneſs is only a Will not obey, not a Cannot in the propereſt ſenſe as oppoſed to Will not; only a higher degree of will not, but of the ſame ſpecies. In this ſenſe are apparently theſe and ſuch Scriptures to be underſtood; Can the blackmore change his skin? ſo, He that is accuſtomed to evil cannot do well. The firſt Cannot here is Natural, and ſo without fault; he cannot change his skin if he would never ſo fain, and therefore a command to change it would not oblige: But the ſecond is the Moral Cannot, Gen. 37.4. Joſephs Brethren hated him, and could not ſpeak peaceably to him; that is, through envy, not but that they could if they would. Luke 11.7. Trouble me not, my door is ſhut, and my children in bed, I cannot riſe to give thee. This cannot is a will-not upon ſuch reaſons, and is ſo explained in the words following; Though he will not riſe; yet becauſe of his Importunity he will riſe and give him whatſoever he needeth. In this ſenſe the Carnal mind is Enmity againſt God, and is not ſubject to the Law of God; neither in deed can be, in this Moral ſenſe, And God giveth us power in this ſenſe (obſerve, I do not ſay only in this ſenſe, but moſtly p. 27as the chief meaning, for ſomthing I could ſay, but I muſt not intermix things aliene) not by giving new faculties; but by cauſing us to will, and do of his own good pleaſure. Phil. 3.13. And in this ſenſe we pray, Create in us a clean heart, and renew a right Spirit within us. No man can come to me except the Father draw him, meaneth no more than that, Ye will not come to me that ye might have life, only it may denote a more ſtrong overflowing ſtream of the will, and a reſolved refuſal of him: or, to ſpeak more exactly, it denotes the Will-not with a modus; and modes do not differ really from the things modified; It denotes the Will not with this wicked modification, that this willnot will always continue, unleſs God do by ſome ſuper-effluence of his grace make them willing of unwilling; not but that they had the Natural power or faculty of willing it, or could if they would without that adventitious drawing; but they were ſo reſolved againſt ſubmitting to him, that they could not obtain to will the contrary; yea this Cannot was through their own choice upon ſome reaſons like that, Luke 14.20. He had Married a Wife and could not come: The deſign of the parable is to ſhew what hinders men from coming to Chriſt, and how inexcuable they are in refuſing ſuch offers; the meaning therefore is not, that his new Wife did cling about him, or tye his legs that he could not, (for this would have excuſed;) but that he choſe to ſtay and entertain himſelf with p. 28his new Married Wife, as more deſirable to him than the Feaſt. And ſo, one muſt go ſee his Oxen, and another his Farme. The meaning is, it is ſo far from being an indifferent thing to me, whether I leave my Wife to go or not, that I ſo quite praeponderate the other way, that I cannot ſo much as obtain of my ſelf to parley about it, to debate upon it; my reaſon is ſo great, that you may well excuſe me; have me excuſed. Dut this will admit of no excuſe, there is no ſufficient reaſon can be given for forſaking the Fountain of Living Waters, to go to broken Ciſterns; and this they did, or might have known.

I could here, if there was need, demonſtrate further to you, that it is impoſſible there ſhould be any thing but Will in this Impotency; for if there was, it would excuſe ſo far. But this will appear more fully in going on, and I ſuppoſe I may ſpare my ſelf that labour: For to make this fully intelligible to you, is I think enough to prove it. And therefore I will repreſent it further to you. The Angels in Heaven have an Impotency of Sinning (if I may call the Moral perfection an Impotency, which is moſt properly to be called the Moral power, being a holy rectitude of Will, and the power oppoſite to the Moral Impotency, in eodem genere morale; and ſo is of the ſame general nature, and fit to explain this by; for it is a Moral Cannot ſin, not a Natural, for they have the Natural power of ſinning, can ſin if they would; elſe it would p. 29not be laudable Morally; no more than it is, that a Beaſt cannot ſin) they have ſuch a Moral rectitude and goodneſs, they cannot obtain of themſelves to Will it; but you may as well go and perſwade a man in his right mind to put his hand into the fire: they neither will nor (in the ſenſe explained) can Will it, nor dare, (the Angel durſt not bring a railing accuſation) and that for ſubſtantial and weighty reaſons. This calls to mind thoſe expreſſions, How can I do this evil. And Rev. 2.2. Thou can'ſt not bear thoſe that are evil. And 1. John 3.9. He cannot ſin, becauſe he is born of God; and, Gods people are dead and Crucified unto the World and to ſin. Which laſt words ſhew, that if you will have dead in Scripture alwayes to ſignifie a want of Natural power, you muſt ſay that Gods people have not a Natural power to ſin, cannot ſin if they would.

I dare ſay farther, you have ſuch apprehenſions of God, as of Angels, and of good men (I mean Analogically) though you ſhould in anger ſay, you have not; However I am ſure, you ought to have ſuch apprehenſions; for otherwiſe you have unworthy and ſinful apprehenſions, and contrary to Scripture, which ſpeaketh in ſuch a way as God muſt ſpeak, or elſe could not be underſtood by us, in ſpeaking of Himſelf. I ſay, you have ſuch apprehenſions of God, as you borrow from theſe things amongſt men, when you thank God for keeping Covenant and Promiſe; you apprehend, He hath the p. 30Natural power of deſtroying you when he will, notwithſtanding-his promiſe; elſe you cannot poſſibly thank him for keeping Covenant. You might indeed admire him under a contrary Conception; but not thank him; for Thanks, in the very formal Conception of it, is for doing ſome thing that one had a Natural power to do otherwiſe.

If any ſhould conceive that his Promiſe, like ſome kind of Charm, did take away his Natural power of being provoked to will or do otherwiſe; it would be a very finful apprehenſion; for, during ſuch a Conception, a man could not give thanks for his keeping promiſe, unleſs in jeſt. You have apprehenſions of his keeping promiſe, as not coming from not having Natural power to do otherwiſe; but you conceive of him as being hindered from deſtroying his people, notwithſtanding their great provocations, and from dealing falſly in his Covenant, upon the account of ſomthing in him, that you conceive of Analogically to Moral Virtue and goodneſs, even Juſtice, and Faithfulneſs and Truth, Gen. 9.16. I will look upon the Bow in the Cloud, that I may remember my Covenant; Implying, he hath power to deſtroy the Earth again with a Flood, notwithſtanding his Covenant.

Now I will, according as I promiſed, ſhew you the different properties of this Moral Impotency from Natural; and it is contrary in every thing to Natural, which ſhews they are contrary indeed.

p. 31Firſt: this Moral Impotency doth not excuſe from fault, or make threatnings unjuſt. Nay it is alſo in this contrary to Natural (which I would have you obſerve and conſider well, to convince you of their great difference); That the Natural Impotency, the greater it is, by ſo much the more it doth leſſen the fault in not obeying the command; and the leſs it is, by ſo much the more it doth greaten the fault: But the greater it is the greater is the fault, and more blameworthy, and further from excuſe; and the leſs it is, the leſs faulty. For any to ſay, I cannot-but hate the Miniſter that reproves me; and any that live holy lives, I cannot but wiſh ſome great fall or miſchief to them; for they call my ſins to my remembrance, and admoniſh me to leave my wicked ways; and I am reſolved not to leave them; I have ſo firmly choſen this way, that I am reſolved not to change: This is the meaning of [I cannot obtain of my ſelf to leave this way] will any ſay, this is not a greater fault? If a Thief ſhould ſay, Once I was almoſt willing to have left my courſe of life; but now I am reſolved to ſtick to it, notwithſtanding all Laws and dangers; and he ſay true, Is he not now more too blame than formerly, and leſs excuſeable? Would not all humane Judicatures look upon that man as mad, that ſhould ſay, This doth excuſe, or not aggravate his fault?

Secondly: This Moral Impotency doth p. 32not hinder promiſes from being of Grace. This is not to mock men, to promiſe a reward, if they will do that which they have this Moral Impotency to do. Nay ſuch a promiſe is not a jot leſs gracious, than if there was all readineſs and willingneſs of mind in us to embrace it, by performing the condition; when only, choſen, wicked willfulneſs hinders. He is bound nevertheleſs to thank him; and, as the Apoſtle ſaith, Mans unbelief cannot make the Faith (meaning the Faithfulneſs) of God of none effect; ſo our wickedneſs and unthankfulneſs doth not make the Grace of God ceaſe to be Grace, and his kindneſs ceaſe to be kindneſs.

If an Act of Oblivion be made by the Prince (when the Rebels are in his power, and Juſtice ſaying, Shall I ſmite them, ſhall I ſmite them?) provided they will acknowledg their offence in ſome humble manner and ſubmit; if ſome, yea if all ſhould ſay, and that truly, We ſo hate him, notwithſtanding this kindneſs; and we ſhall be ſo ſcoffed at by thoſe we have made great boaſts of our reſolvedneſs unto, and they will ſay, Where is that mouth wherewith thou ſaid'ſt, Who is **Judg 9.38.Judg 9:38Abimeleck? that we cannot through theſe reaſons obtain of our own wilful and proud hearts to ſubmit; yet it was a great favour and kindneſs, as long as the condition was ſo eaſie to them, that they had the Natural power ſo eaſily to do it. Yea, and though they had no benefit by it, but their Condemnation p. 33was increaſed. So though it may truly be ſaid of ſome, It was good for them if they had never been born, and Chriſt never been born, or dyed, and no Law of Grace ever made; yet all this hinders it not from being of Grace, while this falling-ſhort, was through their own wickedneſs.

Thirdly: They that through this Moral Impotency, this inſuperable obſtinacy, refuſe to yield, will befool themſelves, Was I mad! I was told and knew: What hindred me, but my own wickedneſs?

I will now ſet before you one Inſtance to make all plain, and to call the ſumme of what hath been ſaid to your mind. Suppoſe a Father hath a Son, both Vicious and Debauch't, and alſo Lame; which Lameneſs (becauſe I will foreſtall all poſſibility of exception) proceeded from ſome former wickedneſs, as, in endeavouring to kill his Father: Suppoſe his Father ſhould ſay, Thou haſt long deſerved to be diſ-inherited, and I am now about to diſ-inherit thee irrecoverably in ſelling my Land; But now Run, and I will receive the into favour. He may reply, Father, I thank you for nothing, this is to mock, I cannot. And again, here is no fault in not-running, and he will never afterwards befool himſelf for, and repent of not-running, though diſ-inherited upon it: This is Natural Impotency. But now, ſuppoſe the Father ſay, Son, thou art Vicicus and Debauch't, living looſely abroad; but now live at p. 34home with me, and leave theſe Vicious courſes, and I will receive thee; He hath the Moral Impotency to this, Can the Blackmore change his skin? ſo he accuſtomed to evil, cannot do well; and ſo the Son goes on in his old courſe, and cannot obtain of himſelf to do otherwiſe. Here notwithſtanding, he ought to ſay, Father, I thank you, this is a kindneſs to condeſcend to ſuch eaſie terms, after ſuch great provocations; and this will not excuſe him; and he will be-fool himſelf after, and ſay, Oh that I had hearkened!

Obj. But, Is not the whole of your diſcourſe notoriouſly againſt the knowledg and experience of men? Cannot we ſay of wicked men, They would forſake their ſins but cannot? and do not the beſt complain with Paul, when they would do good, evil is preſent, and they have a will, when yet to do good they find not? they are ſure they would do more good than they do. And do you ſay, They do not ſin in not doing thoſe things they would, but cannot?

Anſ. Firſt: There is a willingneſs in wicked men to eſcape Condemnation, and attain Salvation: this is ſuppoſed, elſe God would never promiſe theſe upon a condition. Though yet they may be ſaid indirectly, and interpretatively, to will and chuſe death, in chuſing thoſe courſes that lead to it, and ſo have their choice, all things conſidered, in periſhing: for they chuſe rather to undergo his wrath, than to accept him on p. 35the tearms and conditions of his love and favour.

Secondly: They would, if it could be (and wiſh it might be ſo) have Chriſt, and Heaven, and their Luſts too.

Thirdly: They, or many of them, are willing to do many things for Salvation, would part with ſome ſins they can beſt ſpare, and do ſome duties they have no great averſneſs to, and ſo either do leave ſuch ſins, or would actually if they really thought, Going ſo far would ſerve the turn.

Fourthly: They, or ſome of them, have a remiſs Will to perform the whole Goſpel-condition, to give up themſelves to the obedience of Faith; but the actual choice, the prevailing part of their will, is againſt it. Ariſtotle's Inſtance is pertinent to explain this by, ad Nicom. lib. 3. A Mariner caſts his goods over-board in a Storm, to ſave his Life and Ship. He puts the queſtion, Whether ſuch actions ſhould be called voluntary or involuntary; he calls them foreign, mixt actions, for (ſaith he) No man would caſt away his goods, altogether willingly; foreign but they are (ſaith he) rather voluntary actions; for they are choſen and preferred by them as the wiſeſt actions in ſuch Circumſtances. Such a man would fain have his riches preſerved, and yet rather than loſe his life, chuſes not to keep them; reſolved, though repining, to caſt them away, with the prevailing choice. p. 36And though the other weaker inclination be a will, a remiſs will, or volition naturally ſo called, and really, being a deſire upon ſome reaſons, foreign as Ariſtotle defines foreign rightly, yet Morally it may be ſaid to be no-Will: For it is not to denominate, not being the prevailing choice, Qui mavult, vult, only in this ſenſe: ſo that you may ſay They will not, in ordinary cuſtom of ſpeaking: For where this chuſing-Will is, the imperate acts eſſentially follow, and are performed in ſome meaſure; or, where they do not follow, it is as much accepted by God as if they did, e. g. If a mans prevailing choyce be to go to the Church, he goes; If to ſtay at home, he ſtays; if to pray, he prays; to give, he gives: except there be ſuch a hindrance as will ſo far excuſe, as if he had done it; as, ſuppoſe the foreign ſhould be ſtiff or ſtubborn, when the Will is not.

You ſee wicked men would have Chriſt and Heaven, and would therefore remiſly (what they are convinced is the only means) Holineſs of heart and life; yet the prevailing will is rather to loſe happineſs, than to forgoe all their luſts; to let go the offered happineſs, rather than live a Spiritual, Heavenly life; ſomthing unwilling, thus to loſe all; yet, with the prevailing bent of their will, prefer this ſinful courſe.

Fiftly: In the regenerate, the prevailing choice of their will, is for the beſt Intereſt, p. 37and this will Denominate, they are willing in the propereſt ſenſe: there is no ſin but they habitually would have ſtrength againſt it, and no duty, but they would have ſtrength to perform it; And this will be accepted of God unto Salvation.

But yet their Will is renewed but in part, and they have much unwillingneſs to it, and will to the contrary; they do not will in ſuch a degree as they ought; and this is their ſin. They would do ſuch and ſuch difficult duties, and yet they would not; and this is a Lamentation, and ſhould be for a Lamentation. When I ſay, they Would in a prevailing degree, I know this cannot always be affirmed particularly pro Hic & Nunc, elſe they would never omit any known duty, or commit any known ſin; for, the Imperate acts would follow the Elicit.

I am ſomthing at a loſs here, how to expreſs my Conceptions, which are not very clear. But you may conceive, a Child may ſome-time diſobey, provoke his Parents, though his general and habitual bent of heart and will be, to pleaſe him. And ſo, Gods people's willingneſs to the whole, and in general, is greater than their unwillingneſs, though not in the particular Act of known ſin; elſe I could not tell how to maintain, that a Regenerate man hath the Goſpel-condition in the main, during a wilful ſin, and ſo is not unjuſtified; whereas I cannot think, ſuch a one hath quite changed p. 38his ultimate end, and is become unſanctified, like another man for a time. Me-thinks thoſe words of the Apoſtle ſerve beſt of any I can think of, to expreſs my meaning by, which if it be not the meaning of the words, I only allude to them, viz. So then, with the mind I my ſelf ſerve the Law of God, but with the fleſh the Law of Sin. I my ſelf, which part do I my ſelf wiſh moſt may prevail? which ſide do I take? which intereſt do I frown at and wiſh might go down? That is I my ſelf, my will in the propereſt ſenſe, which I prevailingly, habitually chooſe, ſo as to be moſt diſpleaſed with my unwillingneſſe; and I find, I am not diſpleaſed, or not much, at my unwillingneſs to ſin.

I know it is difficult, when a mans choice but-juſt turns the ſcale, and is not vehement to diſcern which part he prevailingly takes; And people though of great and ſtrong affections to things above, and in whom things below have very little Intereſt; yet if their Reaſon be clouded with Melancholy or otherwiſe, it is hard for them to know which is I, I my ſelf, and which ſide they mainly take; yet this is the way to enquire: For come to a wicked man, and he may ſay, I my ſelf ſerve the fleſh and world, and that intereſt I am moſt careful to ſecure and maintain, whatever become of the Spirit's Intereſt; though my mind and Conſcience is for the Law of God, and ſerving of that; p. 39and ſo I have a will to do ſomthing; but the ſide I my ſelf take, and am moſt careful it go not down, is the Fleſh-intereſt. And to anſwer to Rom. 7. I grant that Paul ſpeaks in the perſon of a Regenerate man, though ſome worthy men oppoſe it, and as for what they object, that he ſpeaks of it as Ariſtotle repreſents his foreign, his Incontinent man who is foreign, below a Moral man; it is eaſily made apparently unlike, if one by ſin mean not groſs ſins, but thoſe of daily infirmity which Ariſtotle accounted no ſins; and by Fleſh, mean the moſt ſubjugated, hated part of his will and affections; and by his Mind, the prevailing intereſt which he ſided with. However there is as much ſaid, Gal. 5 17. For the Fleſh Luſteth againſt the Spirit, and the Spirit againſt the fleſh, ſo that you cannot do the things which you would; which words are confeſſed to ſpeak of the Regenerate. But to Anſwer, Firſt, I doubt not but the Apoſtle deſired to be freed from many Natural Imperfections that were his ſorrows and puniſhments for ſin, and not his ſins. Secondly, We muſt ſay, the reaſon why the Apoſtle or any other do not do any duty they would, is, becauſe they do not will it enough; and what he did will in the prevailing degree he did it in ſome imperfect meaſure. But he would fain have been freed from all unwillingneſs, and have gotten on his Will further, but could not obtain it. And whereas, he p. 40ſaith, It is no more I; that is in the vulgar ſenſe, as to denominate, not proceeding to the choice; for his countenanced, loved, prevailing choice was the contrary. It was againſt his will, which was moſt ſtrictly his will; (though too much his will); and ſo God would accept it to Salvation.

Sixthly: I add this as an overplus: Was there as full a willingneſs, as our frail and naturally defective humane Nature is capable of, there could be no actual ſin; I mean ſo full a willingneſs only, as to exclude every degree of unwillingneſs. For, where the reaſon why men do not, is not at all, Becauſe in part they will not; there it muſt neceſſarily be only, Becauſe they cannot, and therefore no fault.

This is the ſum of what is here ſaid: If there be a willing mind as to the prevailing degree, to obey every command, God will in mercy accept it to Salvation. But, was there a willing mind to any thing, ſo willing as to have nothing of unwillingneſs; God would not in this caſe account ſin at all, nay though it was not done through ſome other hindrance. Thoſe that would freely give if they had it without any unwillingneſs, it will not be ſin they did not give.

You may ſee alſo by this (farther than I thought to have ſpoken) that we have the Natural power, though not of undoing the ſins we have done: yet of unſinning actual obedience for the future; elſe we ſhould p. 41not ſin in not performing perfect actual obedience; we onelyonly want will: Which may much humble us, would we well conſider it.

I ſhall Tranſcribe to you a paſſage out of Mr. Fenner's Willfull Impenitency, which ſpeaks as high as the moſt ingrateful expreſſion I have uſed, page 25. Rom. 7.18. I quote this place the rather (ſaith he) becauſe many wreſt it to their own deſtruction. O, ſayes a wicked man, I have a good will, I would, as Paul ſayes, but I cannot perform; Thus men miſ-interpret this place, for look how far Paul would, he could perform: for the will hath potentiam executricem, and an Imperative force over the man; what he did will, he did perform; he performed it in his heart, and tongue, and hand, &c. But he would draw his will forwarder than it was, but could not; his very will was partly unwilling: he could not indeed perform ſo much as he would; that is, he could not draw on his will ſo ſtrongly as he would. His will was not perfectly ſanctified; no Saint in this world hath any compleatneſs of will; and therefore his performance is not perfect, becauſe his will is not perfect.

I ſay, If thy will be converted to God, thou art Converted, obedience ever goes as far as the will: And therefore if thou art willing, it is certain thou art obedient, p. 42Iſa. 1.19. whoſoever is willing to obey, that man does obey in ſome meaſure, becauſe the Will hath power of Execution, and the whole man at command. This is the reaſon why Divines ſay that, The ſincerity of the will is the condition of the Goſſpel. Thus he, verbatim; and page 86. We never ſin againſt the Goſpel, but only upon Will-nots; indeed we ſin againſt the Law in every of our Cannots. This laſt paſſage I confeſs I do contradict, and ſo I think he doth himſelf in the paſſage beforecited, and alſo in the following page 87. Conſcience can never condemn us, but only upon Will-nots.

If any ſhould yet be dubious and unſatiſfied, or contentious and quarrelſome, as indeed one may eaſily take occaſions, the ſaculties of the Soul being ſuch abſtruſe things;

I ſhall appeal to them though they object either on one hand, or on the other.

Firſt, To thoſe that ſhould affirm a Natural Impotency. Firſt; Dare you think that God hath promiſed to men Salvation if they do, and will puniſh them if they do not, things they cannot do, if they would never ſo fain? (etiamſi maxime velint.) If ſo, Can you think that an Act of Mercy, and this of Juſtice? would not this be a puniſhment for no fault? Do you not ſay that the reaſon why a Deaf man is not bound by the command of hearing, or a Poor man of giving, p. 43or the Fool by the command of underſtanding the Goſpel, is, becauſe they cannot do it, or elſe they would be bound by theſe general commands as others? Is not this to grant that Gods Laws oblige to obedience, only quoad poſſe & noſſe, as Lawyers ſpeak?foreign None can poſſibly evade here but by ſaying, as ſome do, It is true, ſuch Impotent people are not obliged, and the conſequence (that all are by the ſame reaſon exempted from doing what they cannot do) would be good, if this was the cauſe or reaſon why men are not obliged by ſuch general Laws; but this is not the reaſon, but the reaſon is, Becauſe God doth not require it of them, elſe the blind would be as much obliged to read, and the deaf to hear, &c. But I would ask one thus replying, ſuch queſtions, How doth he know ſince the Law is general, that God doth not require the deaf to hear, &c. but by knowing this, that God doth not require men to do what they cannot do? Again, Do you think that if God or man ſhould require things which we cannot do, that the Law would be as equal, as a Law requiring what man can do? and would the man be as much to blame in not doing, as if he could? And why doth not God require the deaf man to hear the Miniſter? is there no reaſon of it in the Nature of things? Suppoſe you ſhould have read a Command in Scripture, requiring you to forget all injuries, Would not Natural reaſon, and the notion you have p. 44of the injuſtice of requiring things impoſſible, dictate to you to interpret ſuch a Scripture Metaphorically, To forgive all injuries? And would you not have given this as your reaſon of ſo interpreting the words, Becauſe a man cannot forget a great injury if he would, hath not the Natural power of ſo doing, the Memory not being totally ſubject to the Will? A man may forgive, but cannot forget, who it was that injuriouſly lam'd him, or put out his eye. So alſo if a promiſe had been of a great reward, If we forget all injuries, would you not give this as your reaſon why you cannot interpret the words according to the firſt and propereſt ſenſe of the word [Forget], becauſe if you do, no thanks could be due for ſuch a promiſe, it would not be gracious but luſorious.

Secondly: Did your hearts ever rereproach you, as ſinning in not doing that which you could not do, or omitting that you could not but omit? Tell me, or rather your ſelves, When and where, and for what, (I except Melancholy people out of this Appeal, for ſome of thoſe I have known to have had great trouble of mind for things they could not help) yea though your Natural Impotency came from ſin, as I think all Natural dulneſs of underſtanding, and blindneſs, and lameneſs of Body, do. Suppoſe you had lived in a place where you never heard of Chriſt and the Goſpel, till you came to great years; And if as ſoon as you did p. 45you had yielded to the Goſpel, Do you think your hearts would have reproached you that you received Chriſt no ſooner? I know you will anſwer, No. If I ask you why, I know you can give no anſwer but this, Becauſe you could not; you wanted ſomthing that was Naturally neceſſary to enable you to that act, viz. an objective evidence. But do not your hearts reproach you for refuſing him ſo long? you will ſay, Yea. Now you are very ignorant of right reaſoning, if you cannot draw the concluſion.

Secondly, I appeal to thoſe on the other Extream that ſhould object againſt this Moral Impotency, as either that there is no ſuch thing, or if there be that it would excuſe.

Firſt: Art thou as inclinable to good as evil, to pleaſe God as to pleaſe thy Fleſh and Senſes? Canſt thou in this Moral ſenſe obtain of thy ſelf to chuſe good and refuſe evil? why then doſt thou not? Why doſt thou pray††See Anſtin well urging this, Ep. 107. ad Vitalem. him, to incline thy heart to his Teſtimonies? what need haſt thou or any elſe of the Spirit's help? doſt thou not ſee multitudes going on reſolvedly in wicked ways, notwithſtanding all rebukes, engageing themſelves more deeply againſt God and holineſs, that thou thinkeſt, unleſs God work ſome wonderful way by his Spirit, they can never obtain of themſelves to leave thoſe ways they are wedded to, though nothing hinders but their own choyce? Again, Will you not grant that it may in ſome true p. 46ſenſe be ſaid, That no man can live ſo innocently as not to need Chriſt's death for pardon of his Omiſſions and Commiſſions? Now conſider, and you will find, that, while you allow, that no man ſinneth in not doing the things he hath a Natural Impotency to, you can in no ſenſe grant it true, while you deny this Moral Impotency, or deny it to be one kind or ſort of Impotency.

Secondly: Thou goeſt on, or haſt gone on, in ſuch ſins, as thy heart is privy unto, and couldſt not of a long time obtain of thy ſelf to leave ſuch courſes; Doth not thy Conſcience tell thee, it would be juſt with God to Condemn thee; and with men (if great crimes) to puniſh thee for them? If a Thief, Robber, or Murtherer ſhould ſay (and ſay true) I was ſo reſolved, I could not obtain of my ſelf for all the Laws of God and man to leave my wicked wayes, is this an excuſe? Is he not juſtly yet puniſhable? would'ſt not thou puniſh him if Judg? would'ſt thou not do unworthily to let him eſcape upon this pretence, though true? whatever thou mayſt ſay againſt this in words to confound; yet it appears plain, though againſt thy will; It is to diſpute againſt the Sun's light, when we know it is ſo, though we cannot tell how. One may as well diſpute againſt motion, as that Antient did, becauſe ſo difficult to tell what it is. If he ſhould puzle you in ſaying, It was from my Pride and Covetouſneſs, or Enmity and Hatred, that I p. 47could not obtain of my ſelf to leave thoſe courſes; how could I help it but obey my Luſts? you are yet ſure, this doth not excuſe, and ſo are all Lawyers, yea and all men in the world; but this Impotency is of a different ſort from that which doth excuſe. The Will's hinderance by wicked habits, and the habits themſelves, ſo far as ſinful, are voluntary things. Covetouſneſs cannot be an unwilling thing, or Pride, or Enmity; no man is an Enemy to another againſt his Will. Do not miſ-interpret theſe words, I mean his whole will; elſe I know he may be an Enemy to a man, and Covetuous againſt his will; when his will is divided, and partly for it, and partly againſt it upon contrary Reaſons, as it is often even ſenſible in the beſt, though their darling, countenanced will and choice, is againſt it.

Let any man tell me (and I will impartially conſider it, yea, I deſire help here) what a Vertuous or Vitious habit is, as different or diſtinct from an inclination of the will, which is appetitus totius ſuppoſiti, the Appetite of the man, as other meerly ſenſitive inclinations are not, that do not foreign, that are not choſen upon reaſons, as other appetitions or averſations are not.

If any man ſhould have ſome ſenſitive Appetite altogether againſt his will, it would not be Covetouſneſs, or Pride, or Intemperance; and if it ſhould in ſome little degree draw his will to it, yet ſo far as it is againſt p. 48his will, it is without blame; and only ſo much as it hath the conſent of the will, or the will doth not diſſent enough, he is culpable; ſo Enmity, if a man ſhould have any particular averſation to another man or woman (like that, Non amo te, Sabidi) that is not choſen upon any reaſon, and ſo is not voluntary at all, it would not be called Enmity univocally and properly. Vertuous and Vitious habits, are I think (I would not be over-confident where, for any thing I know, I go alone) only a continued confirmed inveterate inclination of the Will.

A man that hath choſen Riches to purſue them by all means direct or indirect as his end, wherein he places his felicity, is a Covetous man, and, continuing this choice, is habitually Covetous. Did he now chuſe God for his ultimate end, and conſtantly and reſolvedly will holineſs and the pleaſing of God, he would be habitually holy. If any ſhould have a Conception of ſuch habits, as things that are not volitions, or, which is all one, inclination of the will, but diſtinct from them ſpecie, and things that men could not put off if they would, it would be an erroneous Conception; for they would not then be Vertuous or Vitious; and God would not require the putting them off, and it would not be the duty of ſuch men to will what is good, if they could not, had not the Natural power, to will good, notwithſtanding ſuch habits. Therefore Ariſtotle, who p. 49was a man acute to admiration in ſuch things, ſeems to ſleep, and forget what he had proved, That all Virtue and Vice is voluntary, Ad Nicom. Lib. 3. when he ſaith, foreign, that is in effect, Vitious habits are not to be called voluntary in the ordinary ſenſe; for, ſaith he, A Vicious man cannot if he would, foreign, do well, or otherwiſe than according to theſe habits.

I have told you the meaning of the Scripture; he accuſtomed to do evil, cannot do well: he can if he would; but he cannot Morally obtain of himſelf to Will it. But Ariſtotle ſaith, he cannot if he would: but he ſaith, Such habits are yet to be called foreign, or voluntary, becauſe thoſe Acts were voluntary, whereby they brought them on themſelves; and he brings this Inſtance to ſhew in what ſenſe they are voluntary, When a man hath brought a Diſeaſe on himſelf by Intemperance, he may be ſaid to be ſick of a voluntary Diſeaſe, though he would fain be freed from it and cannot. Any one may ſee that, if the caſe was ſo, you could not call them vitious habits formaliter, and voluntary formaliter and properly: but only ſinful and voluntary figuratively, originally, effectivè, as every puniſhment of ſin is, becauſe voluntary ſins were the cauſe of them. If a man ſhould ſay, I would not at all be Covetous, and chuſe the world for my chief good, but I do chuſe it; Would it not be a p. 50Contradiction? And if ſuch a thing was poſſible, would it not be far from being ſin and puniſhable? You may ſee by this, that ſuch habits are only this Moral Impotency, the wilfulneſs it ſelf under another conſideration.

If any ſhould yet be unſatisfied, and think Vitious habits are not Elicited, but Imperated; Let him reduce them to what notion he will, and it will come all to one for Argument: for he muſt then ſay of them, as of all other Imperate things, that they are ſubject to the will wholly, or ſo far as they are not, they are ſinleſs, and that God doth not require us to put them off.

If you will have them foreign, and meerly ſenſitive inclinations, then they are not Vitious any more than they are conſented to, or not enough diſliked; As ſuppoſe you ſhould call a great Thirſt (brought upon a man by exceſſive drinking) Drunkenneſs. And again, either they take away the Natural power of Willing (i.e. make him no Rational Creature) and then they would excuſe; or they cauſe that a man cannot Will good if he would (pardon this Contradiction, for I ſpeak it docendi cauſa) and this would excuſe indeed. A thing impoſſible cannot be a Moral fault. Or they only hinder the effects of the Will, the Imperate acts; and then they ſo excuſe, that God would accept his Will without thoſe Imperate acts. But theſe would be irrational notions of Moral p. 51habits: for let any man conſider, and he may eaſily ſee (I think) that they are not different ſpecie from volitions, that is, inclinations of the Will, but comprehend in their notion, ſome kind of radication and continuance of volition, that we cannot well underſtand. Doubtleſs they are not a kin to other habits, which only enable the ſubject facily and dextrouſly to do the act; for a good man could as facily and dextrouſly commit a ſin as another man, but will not.

Now to let you ſee further a neceſſity of thus diſtinguiſhing, conſider how the Ancients were, for want of this diſtinguiſhing, puzled to anſwer the fallacious arguments for the Pelagian foreign, or perfection in this life, (while yet the Orthodox Fathers held in the main as we ordinarily do, as may be made fully apparent). Pelagius maintained amongſt his other errours, this, That a man in this life can keep the Law perfectly, and meant it Morally in the ſenſe wherein I oppoſe it: his Arguments were theſe**Epiſtle Pelag. ad Demetriadem: Duplici ignorantia accuſamus Deum, &c. Tom 4. Hieron. It is Pelagius his Epiſtle, though through the Ignorance of former times, placed with, and read amongſt Jerom's, as B. Ʋſher and others obſerve. which prove it only Naturally poſſible, viz. To deny a mans power to keep the Law perfectly is to accuſe God of a double Ignorance, in not knowing our weakneſs, or in not knowing what he commands us; or it is to accuſe him of Injuſtice in commanding what man cannot do. p. 52Or thus, as**Hierom lib. 1. adverſ. Pelag. Aut poſſibilia mandata D us dedit aut impoſſibilia Si poſſibilia, in noſtra poteſtate eſt, ea facere: Si impoſſibilia, nec in hoc r…i ſumus ſi non facimus quod non poſſumus. Ac per hoc, ſive poſſibilia ſive impoſſibilia D…us dedit mandata, poteſt homo ſine peccato eſſe. Critobulus (by which feign'd name, Jerom repreſents Pelagius, as by Atticus himſelf) formes the Argument; Either God hath given poſſible or unpoſſible commands: If poſſible, it is in our power to keep them: if unpoſſible, we ſin not in not-doing them ſince we cannot: And ſo it follows that, whether God have given commands poſſible or impoſſible, a man can live without ſin.

Auguſtin (Lib. 2. de peccat. merit. & remiſs. cap. 6.) endeavours to anſwer this difficulty, and affirmed it as undoubted, that God commandeth no man any thing which he cannot do. Therefore he ſaith in Anſwer, that a man can live without ſin through Grace and by Gods help. But this doth not anſwer the difficulty at all, unleſs he will affirm, that no man doth ſin except God give him this Grace; that is, except God by his Grace make him that he doth not tranſgreſs the Law; which is in effect to ſay, Man doth not ſin; except God make him actually not to ſin, which would be to come to Pelagius, at the back-door, and to go beyond Pelagius, and hold, That it is impoſſible any man ſhould ſin at all.

Jerom endeavours to anſwer this, but more palpably ſpoyls all for want of diſtinguiſhing, p. 53He alſo maintains as undoubted amongſt all Chriſtians, That God commandeth nothing but what man can do, and yet maintaineth that no man can perfectly keep all the Commandements, which is good ſenſe if we diſtinguiſh, but, without diſtinguiſhing, an expreſs contradiction. But he truſts to this weak Evaſion to ſalve it (Lib. 1. adverſus Pelag: Vides quod Deus poſſibilia juſſerit, & tamen nullum poſſe, &c.) His commands are poſſible (ſaith he going on) becauſe ſome men can keep one part and ſome another of the commands, but yet none can keep all; and adds, therefore it is not the duty of ſingle men to keep them all: and ſo God commands nothing but what we can do; But Auguſtine is expreſs againſt this of Jerom, Serm. 191. de Tempore ††Execramur eliaw blaſphemiam eorum, qui dicunt Impoſſibile aliquid homini a Deo eſſe praeceptum, & mandata Dei non a ſingulis, ſed ab omnibus in comuni poſſe ſervari.and calls it Blaſphemy, to ſay, that God commands any thing that men in particular cannot do, but only men in general.

Neither is there, I think, to be found one of the Ancients, accounted Orthodox, that doth maintain in the ſtrict ſenſe oppoſed, that God commandeth men what they cannot do, but all abhorred it as an opinion laying an high Accuſation on God, till many hundred years after this age of Auguſtin: p. 54But at laſt**Who lived 700 years after this. Serm. 2. in vigil. Rom. Bernard being preſſed with this difficulty, doth (yet any one may ſee unwillingly) fly to this, that God may command what man cannot do, and doth mean it of a Natural power. But he doth it in theſe words, God may command nimis, too much. And in giving his reaſon for it, he doth not fly to that, that men once had power, or that men think they have power, which it is likely he would have done, had he not thought them invalid; But he gives this reaſon for it, that God may command too much, even that which men cannot do, To humble them. But this is but a very defective humiliation that this can cauſe: for though it can cauſe grief and ſorrow, and anger, that God ſhould be ſo ſevere to require what we cannot do; yet it cannot cauſe Repentance; for it is eſſentially neceſſary to Repentance, that the man could have done otherwiſe. And yet for all this**Super Cant. Serm 10. Bernard would fain compound the matter, and not ſay that God requires what men cannot do, and offers to deny it on this condition, that they will grant that men cannot do all that God requires, and ſaith he, Who dare arrogate to himſelf that which Paul had not attained? which is no Contradiction, though it be virtually to ſay, No man can do all that he can do, but good ſenſe with the diſtinction I have explained. Yea, it is ſo obviouſly apparent, that a man's culpable Impotency only lyeth in his diſability p. 55to do that which he hath the Natural power to do, that I wonder it is no more taken notice of.

Councils are called againſt Pelagius, Council, Milevit. Paleſtine.and make many worthy, pious determinations, but any one may ſee are perplexed what to ſay againſt Pelagius in this caſe; and all that was determined about this particular, was againſt affirming (which Pelagius had done) that any man lives ſo Innocently as to have no need to ſay, forgive us our debts. Yet they determine, that a man can,Arauſicum. by the Grace of God, live without ſin. And the Orange Council againſt Pelagius determines, that all Baptized ones, Chriſt helping and co-operating**Depent & poſſunt. can, and ought to fulfil all things neceſſary to Salvation, if they would labour faithfully. But any one may ſee, though theſe Councils meant well and Orthodoxly, as will appear to any peruſing their determinations; yet the difficulty remains unanſwered, and will do ſo for ever, without this Diſtinction. For they rightly maintained, as all the Ancient Fathers before them, that no man ought to do more than he can do; And therefore, without diſtinguiſhing, it cometh to all one for the anſwering the difficulty, whether the Grace they ſpeak of be given, or not given. For ſuppoſe it be affirmed that this Grace is given to men, Then either they can obey perfectly, ſo as to need no pardon; and this they abhorred the affirming of: or if they cannot with this p. 56Grace given, obey perfectly, ſo as to have no need of pardon, or Chriſts ſatisfaction; then they are Innocent, and ſin not, in not living perfectly, and ſo need no pardon in not obeying perfectly, it being no fault not to obey perfectly, ſince they Cannot obey perfectly. Again, ſuppoſe it be affirmed, that this grace is not given to men to obey perfectly, but only their meaning was, That God could, if he had ſo pleaſed, have given men ſuch Grace as might inable them to live without ſin, but did not. Then they were not bound to live without ſin, and ſo were, or might be perfect ſtill; As a man that is tyed by Sickneſs to his Bed, can by the help and aſſiſtance of God, go to the Church, viz. When God ſhall ſo raiſe him up; yet till God do ſo firſt raiſe him up, he is not bound to go, needs no pardon for not going.

Therefore, when all is ſaid, we muſt diſtinguiſh of man's Power and Impotency, ſo as we may truly ſay, A man can in one ſenſe without Grace, obey perfectly, hath the Natural faculty and power to do it, or he could not be obliged to it by the Law; (the Law would be no law to him, no more than the general command of hearing the Word is a Law, or Obligatory to a man Deaf; and the effect of Grace, is not the giving this power, elſe we might ſay, A man could not ſin unleſs God gave him Grace:) And alſo, that we may ſay truly; A man p. 57cannot in another ſenſe obey perfectly, nor do any good thing without Grace, viz. Morally; his Wickedneſs, his Unwillingneſs, which is Moral Impotency hindering. And every man underſtands this, though he know not how to expreſs it, as you will perceive by asking any man, lamenting his Omiſſions or Commiſſions, whether he could not have avoided thoſe ſins, though God did not give him that Grace to avoid them eventually. When any man is lamenting his long refuſal of Chriſt, he knoweth in ſome ſenſe he could have done otherwiſe; God gave him help and power enough naturally-neceſſary (yea, few or rather none that enjoy the Goſpel, but they can ſay more than enough, elſe he could not befool himſelf for thus refuſing mercy; Though God did not give him Grace ſooner to take away his reſiſtance, and unwillingneſs, and ſo to cauſe him actually and eventually to turn from ſin to God; and yet in ſome ſenſe he could not do otherwiſe; God not giving him Grace ſooner, that would eventually take away his unwillingneſs, and cauſe him actually to chuſe Mercy on the terms of it.

I may add here, How this diſtinction doth wonderfully ſerve to reconcile the Doctrine of the Ancients to themſelves, p. 58and one another,**They maintained not only that the will was free from co-action, and force; but that it had a freedom from any Natural neceſſity of chuſing or refuſing. And it is apparent that where the will hath only a freedom from co-action; but not a Natural liberty of both chuſing and refuſing, e. g. As in willing the ultimate end, happineſs; or Nilling it; It is not in ſuch things capable of command or prohibition, and ſo not capable of Virtue or Vice, whatever ſome late School-men and others ſay. All men verſed in their writings, know and confeſs; that all the Fathers, and the whole Church (nemine contradicente) of the pureſt age, next after the Apoſtles, after a Controverſie was moved concerning it, as in the ſecond and third Century, did maintain free Will, as a foundation-principle of all Religion againſt the Manichees and other Hereticks, that denyed it, (and indeed the††Ipſa ratio quemlibet noſt um quaerentem vehementer anguſtat, ne ſic defendamus gratiam ut liberum arbitrium auferre videmur; rurſus nec liberum arbitrium ſic aſſeramus, ut ſuperbâ impietate ingrati Dei gratiae judicemur. Aug. lib. 2. de peccat, Merit. c. 18. Si non eſt Dei gratia quomodo ſalvat mundum? Et, ſi non eſt liberum arbitrium; quomodo judicat mund…m? Ep. 46. ad Valemin. Nihil tam in n…ſt…â poteſtate quam ipſa voluntas eſt. Voluntas noſtra nec voluntas eſſ…t, niſi eſſet in noſtrâ poteſtate; porro quia eſt in noſtra poteſtate, libera eſt. Aug. de. lib. arb. lib. 3. c. 2. Hieron. Ep. ad Creſiphont. Fruſt…a Blaſphemas, & ignorantium auribus ingeris, Nos liperum arbitrium cond…mnare, damnetur ille qui damnat. Autor lib. Hypognoſticôn (which was not Auſtin, but an Ancient writer againſt the Pelagians a little after Auſtin) ſaith, Quisquis negaverit liberum arbitrium, Catholicus non eſt Aug. lib. de Fid. cont. Manic. Quis non clamet. Stultum eſſe prae cepta dare ei, cui liberum non eſt quod praecipitur facere? Et Inquium eſſe eum damnare cui non fuit poteſtas juſſa complere. But you ſhall find none of the Ancients ſaying, that it is unjuſt for God to require of men what their ſtubborn or morally inflexible wickedneſs of their Wills only hinders them from deing; or what they cannot find in their hearts to do; or what they are ſo wickedly bent not to do, that except God take away this reſiſtency of Will by his Grace, they will never do; which is the Moral or Wicked Impotency, I have explained. following ages did alſo maintain it, whatever any ſay to the contrary.)

p. 59Now it is a common anſwer of‖‖Centur, Magdeburg. Scultet. Medul. Pat. learned men, that it is true, They did ſo, but yet their judgments herein are not much to be regarded, becauſe they (ſay they) contradict themſelves: For thoſe very Authors that lived before Pelagius, had not that occaſion to ſpeak largely and exactly of the neceſſity of Grace, none being ſo boldly wicked as to deny it, till he, (as Vincentius Lirinenſis obſerves,) yet when they have occaſion, they ſpeak as high as any for the neceſſity of Grace, and of mens inſuperable wickedneſs, and how that without Chriſt, and his Spirit, and Grace, we can do nothing good; and of Gods working in us to will and to do of his good pleaſure.

I grant it is apparent, that thoſe more Ancient Fathers, do generally, as is ſaid, p. 60thus**You may find many occaſional ſhort expreſſions demonſtrably to argue their judgments in this particular, againſt the Pelagian way, in theſe Authors following, though cenſured, as ſpeaking too high for Free Will, and in almoſt any other of the Ancients before Pelagius, viz. Juſt. Mart. Jerenaeus. Tertul. Arnob. Cypr. Lact. Athanaſ. Baſil. Ambr. ſpeak, viz. of our Impotency to God, and for the neceſſity of Grace; But am confident they do not in ſenſe contradict themſelves, no more than I, but meant generally the ſame that I do, (and could eaſily make it appear) viz. That men have the Natural power of Free-will, but were far from denying the Morally inſuperable wicked wilfulneſs of it without Grace; And now I muſt leave it to your Judgments and Cenſures, Whether I contradict my ſelf or no.

There are many learned men, pretend with great confidence, that this Diſtinguiſhing is to no purpoſe; and that men are not too blame, if there be any preſent Impotency at all on men to the immediate duty, be it what it will, or call it what you will, Wilfulneſs, Wickedneſs, Moral Impotency, for, It will excuſe, ſay they, as well as Natural; and therefore contend, that except God by his Grace give to men, over and beſide their Natural power, ſome kind of aequilibrium, or equal-inclination of their Will to good and bad, they would not be too blame for diſobeying the Goſpel; this they call a ſecond power, and it is the ſame they p. 61mean by their Preventing and Subſequent Grace, as appears when they explain them, and they pretend that this Grace doth work; and that this is all that Grace doth work; for it doth not (ſay they) encline the Will any farther than by giving it a power to encline either way. Now I greatly diſlike this Notion, and this alſo muſt either fall, or the notion of Moral Impotency, and what hath been ſaid of it, falls; as not ſtanding in any ſtead, but excuſing as well as the Natural. I ſhall therefore ſearch more narrowly into it, and alſo into what can be ſaid any way, that I can think of, againſt what is here propounded.

I wiſh any Oppoſer was now here (for I would impartially know the truth) that would ſoberly tell me what he would have God do to wicked men, to make them without excuſe, if he pretend that this is not enough for this end, that they have the Natural faculties, and promiſes, and threatnings, and providences afflicting or proſperous; that is an object intelligible, fitted and ſuited objectively to work this great change of heart and will:

I am confident ſuch a one could only name theſe five things with any ſhew of reaſon; and he that can name a ſixth, erit mihi parvus Apollo, would do more than ever was done yet.

Firſt; I would have God give a man more of the Natural power and faculty of p. 62chuſing good, and refuſing evil, that he may be inexcuſable. But this is irrational; He hath power of willing good, and if a third or fourth power, yea, if ten times as much power of willing good was given him, it would be all one; For this is no reaſon at all of his not willing good, becauſe he hath not the Natural power to will it, elſe it would excuſe; but he will not chuſe it: And they that do chuſe good, and refuſe evil, have not more of this Natural faculty, are not more men, are not in this ſenſe further from Natural fools than other men.

Secondly; Or I would have God give him more of the Goſpel, ſend more Miniſters, and awakening providences; yea, ſend ſome from the Dead. But this was well anſwered, They have Moſes and the Prophets, that was enough to make them inexcuſable, and theſe under the Goſpel have more than ſo, more than the Old Teſtament.

Thirdly; I would have God to make them actually willing, that they may be inexcuſable. But this is a contradiction, and it is to ſay, Wicked men and Devils do not ſin, except God actually make them not to ſin. And yet this is the meaning of ſuch paſſages, or they are not ſenſe; It doth not excuſe for God to give the faculties of willing (which is the power of chuſing it) except he give them alſo preventing Grace; that is, make them willing actually. Indeed when p. 63all is ſaid, you muſt ſay, or ſay worſe, that, That Grace, concerning which the Controverſie is, lyeth, in making men actually willing, as diſtinct from giving power of Willing, call it ſecond or third power, or what you will, and the deſign of what I ſay here, is not to oppoſe this, but to prove it, as you will ſee in going on; but only I am ſhewing here that Gods denying of this, doth not excuſe men, ſo as it can be ſaid, they do not ſin in not obeying the Goſpel.

Or Fourthly: I would have him make them to be without Temptation to ſin, that they may be without excuſe: But will not your Servant be without excuſe in Robbing you, unleſs he had no temptation to it: This is an unreaſonable demand; it is enough that God promiſes a far greater good than that they deprive themſelves of by obedience, and threatens a far greater evil to them ſinning, than that they incur by their obedience. Would you have no ſelf-denyal in the World? Many obey God, that have greater temptations to diſobedience in thoſe things wherein they obey, than thoſe have that diſobey him in ſuch things.

Fifthly; Or I would have God make them leſs actually unwilling to good, and take off from them much of this Moral Impotency, or choſen reſolvedneſs to go on in ſinfull wayes (which is in part to ſanctifie them, and to make them in part actually willing to deny themſelves, as any one may p. 64eaſily underſtand) and then they will be too blame, and be guilty of ſin if they obey not.

Firſt; Suppoſe God do not this (as we are certain he doth not to all) yet are not you and all men in the world ſure, This doth not excuſe? Elſe the moſt incorrigible and wilful offenders would be moſt ſinleſs and excuſable. Can any man in earneſt ſay that a man is not bound to leave his evil wayes, and that he doth not ſin in going on in them, while he is fully and peremptorily reſolved to go on in them? Yet this ſeemeth apparently to be the meaning of many learned men in pleading for an indifferancy of Will.

Secondly; What way is there poſſible to cauſe a man to leave off this wilfulneſs, to put off this Vitious habit, which he hath the Natural power to put off if he would, that is threatned enough, and promiſed enough, but ſome way moving a volition, by ſome way cauſing him to deſire the good, and diſlike the evil?

If you ſhall ſay, I would have him take away the Vitious habits, you hide your meaning in obſcure words, or you mean, I would have him not only give him the power of willing the contrary, which he hath; but alſo ſome way make his Will encline to the other way, that he may be inexcuſable.

Thirdly; Do not you uſe to Object, that this would be to deſtroy the freedom of p. 65mans will, and ſo his humane Nature, to cauſe the volition any other way than by giving the power of Willing? For if God may, by his Spirit, in ſome way to us unknown, diſtinct from meerly propounding the object (which he doth where the Goſpel is preached without difference) without deſtroying mans freedom, take away in part mans great Wilfulneſs or Unwillingneſs to good; why may he not quite and totally (or however to the prevailing degree) take away thus, by his Spirit, his Unwillingneſs to Good, and cauſe a man to Will or chuſe Good, without deſtroying his Freedom?

Do not now put this all off with theſe common words unexplained (which diſtinction may have a good ſenſe, if rightly explained), viz: God giveth all men Preventing Grace, elſe they would be in no fault, and upon their right uſe of that, he giveth them Subſequent Grace. I will ſhew you that theſe words do but hide your meaning; and that by the ſubſequent, you mean no more than by your preventing Grace, and by preventing Grace, no more then the faculty or power of willing and obeying, if one would; you make the ſubſequent Grace to be given only ex hypotheſi, upon the ſuppoſition men uſe the preventing well. Conſider therefore a little, that you call preventing Grace, whether is this the ſame with ſome of thoſe things before-mentioned, or ſome thing p. 66diſtinct? Whether is this preventing Grace any more than Gods general, povidential Act of making men Naturally perfect, giveing men the power or faculty of chuſing Good and Evil, and ſo leaving them to their meer ſelf-determination? If not, it is no more than giving the faculties, which is rather to be called giving**Poſſe habere fidem & Charitatem naturae eſt hominum: habere autem gratiae fidelium. Aug. de praed. Sanct. cap. 5. Nature, than Grace. If you ſay (as ſome do, and then unſay it again) this preventing Grace doth more, for it doth excite and move.

Let me ask, Doth it excite and move potentially only, or actually and really? you will, it may be, ſay, Actually; for to ſay only potentially is a contradiction, and is no more than it doth not, but it would move if it was not hindred (which I ſhall after take notice of) therefore you will ſay, It doth actually move and excite. Now what doth it move and excite but the Will? And what is that but to cauſe actual Willing? If it excite motion, there is no motion of the Will but willing and nilling, conſenting or diſſenting, liking of the thing it is moved to or diſliking; and it doth not move nilling diſſent or diſlike of the good; if it really move and excite, it doth not move nothing, this would be to cauſe a ſtanding motion So that this, if granted, is to grant that God doth not meerly give power by it to the p. 67will to move it ſelf, but doth, over and above this, move the Will, which you ſo much dread. If you ſhall ſay (as I know you will at laſt) movet, ſed nihil promovet, this doth move the Will, make men willing actually, only on condition they conſent, be willing and obey, and uſe it well.

Firſt; This is a weak manner of ſpeaking: It is to ſay it maketh men willing on condition they be willing, or not unwilling; that is, on condition they have no need of it, and that the work be done before it come.

Secondly; This is to run them both into one, and make the preventing Grace the ſame with the ſubſequent. Thirdly; Yea, this is to deny all but the common Grace of giving the faculties (if it be proper to call it Grace) and the Goſpel.

Now to ſpeak of the ſubſequent Grace. If a man uſe this preventing Grace well, will the ſubſequent certainly follow? You ſay, yea. Which of thoſe things above named doth this belong to? Will this ſubſequent grace only give them power of willing Good, or make them actually to will it? If it only give them power to chuſe the good, this is the Natural faculty. Doth it alſo make them actually willing? you will ſay, That cannot be the proper uſe of this, for they are actually willing before; elſe they could not have uſed the preventing Grace well. Therefore you will ſay, this is to make them continue and perſevere, and p. 68grow in actual willingneſs. But, will this keep them actually willing? You will ſay, No; not unleſs they continue uſing this Grace right, and that they do not, except they continue actually willing to uſe it aright: That is, it will make them perſevere in chuſing Good, and refuſing the Evil, on condition they do perſevere chuſing the Good and refuſing the Evil; that is, on condition they have no need of it. And your ſubſequent Grace is alſo no more than giving the faculty and power, and the ſame with your preventing Grace. And ſo the total amounts to no more than this, If they improve that free-Will, without which they cannot be men, they ſhall be men ſtill while they live. You may apply what is here ſpoken to any effect that can be aſſigned to this Grace (while they will maintain only general Grace) as taking away reſiſtance, and unwillingneſs to Good; or cauſing a man to pray and ſeek after God. I am aſhamed thus to repreſent to you that which is the Grace, that ſome other-wiſe Learned and Reverend men will only grant beſide giving the Goſpel.

And by the way let me wiſh ſuch as make this Objection,Nos autem dicimus humanam voluntatem ſic divini…ùs adjuvari ad faciendum juſtitiam, ut praeter quod creatus eſt homo cum libero arbitrio; praeterque doctrinam quâ ei praec pitur quemadmodum vivere debet, accipiat Spiritum Sanctum &c. Aug de Spir. & litt. cap. 3. to take heed for all the ſpecious fair ſhew it hath, viz. This, That it would deſtroy our p. 69humanity for God to move mans Will, any other way than by giving him power to Will. For a man that ſhould keep to this as his opinion, may be eaſily forced, by dint of Argument, againſt his Will, to affirme, that the holy Spirit doth nothing in the firſt Converſion, or carrying on the work of Grace after; beſide barely propound the object, which is done by the meer preaching of the Goſpel; and alſo give the faculties or Natural power.

Now if you ſhould hold this tenent, that God doth no more for any than thus, I do freely grant that ſome of thoſe inconveniences that many have endeavoured to aſcribe to this opinion, would not follow from it; (he that endeavours to confute one errour with another, which is too common, doth ordinarily confirm his Antagoniſt in his error): as for Example, it would not follow, that a man would be the proper cauſe of his own Juſtification and Salvation, and that he was not beholden to God for them; and to ſpeak ingenuouſly, you do well enough anſwer this Accuſation. We cannot ſay properly, a Fellon that readeth, pardoned himſelf, or ſaved himſelf; but the Legiſlators upon his reading, pardoned him; yea adaequately, though the Legiſlators did no ways cauſe him to read. But theſe things will follow unavoidably. p. 70**Per quorum diſputationem ſuadetur ut nec or are debeamus, non quia hoc audent apertè dicere, ſed eorum ſententiam, velint nolint, ſequitur, Aug. Epiſt. 143. ad. Anaſt. Cur petitur, quod ad noſtram pertinet poteſtatem, ſi Deus non adjuvat volunta. tem? Aug. de grat. Chr. Lib. 1. c. 15. Quis optat, quod in poteſtate ſic habet, ut ad facien dum nullo indigeat adjumento? Aug. de peccat. merit. & remiſs. Lib. 2. c. 6.Firſt; It would be impoſſible for a man that ſhould hold this practically to pray for ſuch things as theſe following ſeriouſly. Firſt, For grace and Holineſs, and that God would encline his heart to his Teſtimonies; becauſe he holds that God cannot with Juſtice and Honour, without a culpable reſpecting of Perſons, and without deſtroying mans Nature, do any more than give him the power, and leave it meerly to himſelf to make uſe of it. He can only pray God would give him power to make uſe of it if he will, and give him the Goſpel; but not that God would Act any further to make him willing and to make him to obey. It is to ſay, Give me but power to obey, and let me alone for willing and obeying; Give but Talents, and let me alone for uſing them. I do not beg any more, for it would be to deſtroy my Humanity, and diſhonour thee to give any more.

p. 71Secondly; Neither can he pray for continuance of Grace, or to be kept from Apoſtacy;Quando ergo rogavit Christus ne fides Petri deficeret, Quid aliud rogavit niſi ut haberet in fide liberrimam, invictiſſimam & perſeveratiſſimam voluntatem. Aug. lib. de corrupt. & grat. cap. 8. Eſt quippe in nobis per hanc Dei gratiam in bono recipiendo & perſeveranter tenendo, non ſolum poſſe quod volumus, verum etiam velle quod poſſumus. Subventum eſt igitur infirmitati voluntatis humanae, ut divinâ gratiâ indeclinabiliter, & ut ſuberrabiliter ageretur & ideo quamvis infirma, non tamen̄ deficeret, neque adverſitate aliquâ vinceretur. ibid. cap. 11. he cannot pray as David, Keep this in the thoughts of our hearts for ever, and confirm our hearts unto thee; ſo as to mean any more, than that God would cauſe him to perſevere, only if he do perſevere; that is, if he ſhall remain conſtantly willing; but cannot pray that God would preſerve him from willing to forſake him, and to cleave to the world; that God would ſo irradiate his mind with the danger of looſing all that is dear to him, and ſo confirm his reſolution, and habituate his choice, that he may not be able morally to obtain of himſelf to forſake God, becauſe he holds that this God will by no means do. And he that cannot pray thus, whatever Prayers he may ſay beſide, muſt neceſſarily live very careleſly, or very uncomfortably wanting an humble, fiducial confidence in God, to keep him from degenerating, or, which is worſe, he muſt be very Proud, and have ſuch confident thoughts of his own heart and will's goodneſs and conſtancy, that he dare lay a greater wager on p. 72his own head and heart, that if he have but a Natural power of Willing, be but continued a man, he ſhall do well enough for Willing. As for example, you have ſeen my judgment; Now this being my judgment, I muſt acknowledg that I cannot pray that God would take away my††Whoſoever is born …f God, cannot ſin; not that he hath not a Natural power to ſin, but …e hath not a Will, a mind to ſin. Mr. Caryl on Job. Laſt Volum. pa. 5.4. Natural power of willing Evil, of ſinning, and finally falling away, and conſequently of being undone for ever; for this would be to deſtroy my faculties, and make me no Man, as you ſee by that I have ſaid. But I can pray that he would ſo work in me by his Spirit (in ſuch a way agreeable to my humanity, as he underſtands and I do not) that I may have that Moral rectitude of Will, which is oppoſite to that Moral Impotency I have ſpoken of; that I may not be able to obtain, of my ſelf, to leave off to be Wiſe and to be Good, and to turn from the way of Righteouſneſs; but may ſay with Joſeph, how can I do this Evil? and I am ſure (what ever any ſhould object, of this deſtroying my will, and making me a beaſt, and not a Rational Creature, and that it would be rather God's willing it in me, than my willing it) this would perfect my will; unleſs we can ſay, Saints in p. 73Heaven will be no men, and††Aug. de praed. Sanct. lib: 1. c. 17. Speaking of Chriſt's free Will, An ideo in illo non libera voluntas erat, ac non tanto magis erat, quanto magis peccato ſervire non poterat? Chriſt on Earth was no man, and that it is not the Saints in Heaven love God, but God in them loves God.

Thirdly; He cannot pray that God would make the Goſpel prevail effectually in the world;Deſtruunt orationes quas facit eccleſia, ſive pro infidelibus & Doctrinae Dei reſiſtentibus, ut convertantur ad Deum: Sive pro fidelibus, ut augeatur' eis fides, & preſeverent in ea. Aug. Haereſ. 88. Si fides eſt tantummodo liberi arbitrij, nec daturà Deo, propter quod pro iis qui nolunt credere oramus ut credant? Quod prorſus faceremus inaniter, niſi rectiſſime crederemus etiam perverſas, & fidei contrarias voluntates. Omnipotentem Deum ad credendum poſſe convertere. Aug. lib. de grat. & lib. Arb. or in his Congregation, if a Miniſter; he cannot pray after his Preaching, when he hath Sown, and Planted, and Watered, that God would give the increaſe; nor can he Pray for ſuch things for his Relations, but muſt mean no more than this; that God would give them that free VVill which they have already, and all men beſides, even the Natural powers, and that they may be able to obey the Goſpel if they will.

And by the way, neither can they pray very earneſtly for this power or ability to obey the Goſpel (which it is granted they may pray as earneſtly for, as a man may p. 74pray that God would not deprive him of the right Natural uſe of his faculties of underſtanding and will) to be given, or continued to themſelves or others, ſince they (viz. that maintain this power is al that the Grace of the Holy Ghoſt gives) hold, they cannot ſin, or be guilty, or inexcuſable in not obeying the Goſpel without this power, and ſo could not be condemned for not obeying the Goſpel if God denyed it them; eſpecially alſo conſidering they muſt hold conſequently to this principle, that God is bound in Natural juſtice, ether to give this power, whether they Pray or Pray not for it, or not to condemn them for not obeying the Goſpel, becauſe God will not do unjuſtly, whether men Pray or Pray not. Yea further, ſince it may well be queſtioned, whether it be lawful to Pray God to do that which he is bound by Natural equity and juſtice to do, (though I confeſs it is otherwiſe when only bound by promiſe) or not to do that which he is bound by Natural juſtice not to do; It is therefore queſtionable, whether it can be maintained lawful, according to the principles of thoſe that hold that the only effect of Grace in diſpute, is giving that power, without which men could not ſin, or (which is all one) be inexcuſable in not obeying the Goſpel, to Pray God to give themſelves or others that which they hold is the only effect of this Grace. (viz. this power of obeying the p. 75Goſpel) for this end; viz. for this, That they may not be condemned for diſobeying it; ſince he could not, as they ſay, in juſtice ſo condemn them if he gave them not this power. And further, Such as hold that the only effect of this, comonly called the Grace of the Holy Spirit; or commonly called ſubjective and internal Grace (different from the objective and external Grace, conſiſting in giving and promulgating the Goſpel, and external providences, proſperous or afflictive; objectively fitted and ſuited to cauſe Obedience to the Goſpel, (concerning which objective take notice I do not ſpeak, nor move any Controverſy) is only the giving that power to obey the Goſpel, without which they could not be too blame, or inexcuſable, or condemned for not obeying it; I ſay ſuch as theſe can give but very cold and heartleſs thanks for Grace, cauſing them to obey the Goſpel, comparatively to the thanks they of other apprehenſions can give. But this on the By, for I am now only profeſſedly ſpeaking of theſe things in the ſenſe wherein they cannot, as not pray at all, ſo neither praiſe God at all for them; which now I return to again.