Natural and Moral Impotency, Discourse (2 of 2)

Natural and Moral Impotency · Discourse (2 of 2)

p. 75Secondly; He cannot praiſe God for ſuch things named before, as being done by God, if he hold they are not; he cannot ſay Cordially what the Phariſſe is p. 76repreſented ſpeaking with his lips; God I thank thee, I am not as other men are, Extortioners, Ʋnjuſt, Adulterers, or even as this Publican. I would not wrong any, I mean he cannot ſay this**Prorſus non gratias Deo agimus, ſed nos agere fingimus, ſi unde alli gratias agimus, ipſum facere non puta…us, Aug. Epiſt. 107. adlem. heartily, except he mean no more than this; I thank thee thou didſt as much for me as for theſe men; but that I differ from them in theſe reſpects, I had the power indeed from thee as they had; but, that I uſed it better than they, I owe to my ſelf free Will. Whereas uſing this common Grace is ſurely the chief, prime matter. Oh but he received this power from God to uſe it? It is true; but yet a man that knoweth he hath done ſome good thing, or avoided Evil more than others; if he be of this opinion, he accounts it was not therefore done by him; as, becauſe he received more from God than others, in the ſame circumſtances with him; but holds that he owes nothing here for any ſpecial Grace or help from God; for though that which God did for him was the cauſe, according to his Hypotheſis, of his goodneſs, & differing, taken abſolutely, yet not at all taken comparatively in the ſenſe now in hand; it was no cauſe of the difference taken as a difference: take this inſtance, Two men had equal great ſtocks given them, one increaſeth his eſtate, the other prodigallizeth all away, if the p. 77reaſon be asked abſolutely, How one of them cometh to ſuch a great Eſtate, far greater than the other, the Stock given was a cauſe, and ſo thanks are due to him that gave it; but if the reaſon be asked comparatively, why he differeth from the other, he ows that to himſelf, and his good Husbandry, and not to him that gave him the Stock, no thanks is due here at all in this ſenſe; for this was no cauſe of, and ſo no thanks due for his differing taken comparatively, and not abſolutely, in which ſence I am now ſpeaking. And then if God did afterward do great things for a man, give him ſubſequent Grace (be it what it will) it was not from any peculiar favour or good pleaſure without reſpect to any thing in him, but becauſe he uſed the preventing general Grace (be it what it will) rightly, which others had in as great a meaſure as he, and did not. So if a man have fearfully declined from his wonted integrity, and is after recovered; he cannot thank God for this, as coming from any ſpecial Grace (if he hold that God doth not, becauſe he cannot, without unjuſt foreign give imparia paribus) but holds, God did no more to recover him, than to others, going yet on in ſuch degeneracy; whereas others can ſay, if they were more noble, like p. 78the Beraeans, Acts 17.11. better tempered and more ingenuous than thoſe of Theſſalonica, ſo as to receive the Goſpel when others refuſed it,Solet dici, Ideo credere ineruit, quia vir bonus erat antequam crederet: Quod de Cornelio dici poteſt, cujus acceptaeſunt Elcemoſynae & auditae orationes antequam credidiſſet in Chriſtum; nec tamen ſine aliquâ fide donebat & orabat: nam quomodo invocabat in quem non crediderat? &c. Quicquid igitur, & antequam in Chriſtium crederet, & cum crederet, & cum credidiſſet, bene operatus eſt Cornelius, totum Deo dandum eſt, ne forte quis extollatur, Aug. lib. de praed. Sanct. cap. 7. that this readineſs of mind to comply with the Goſpel, was from ſome ſpecial Grace of God vouchſafed to them, that was not to others, like that Grace that opened Lydia's heart. And theſe can alſo ſay, that though they have the Natural power of willing and doing good, or God would not require it of them; yet ſuch is the wicked wilfulneſs of their hearts, they could not morally obtain of themſelves to will and do any good, or avoid any evil, but for this Grace and help of the Spirit; which yet helpeth them (they are ſure, though they know not how, it may be, to anſwer all difficulties) in a way ſuitable to keep up their greateſt care and diligence, and ordinarily only gradually, and in the ſerious and diligent uſe of means, And whatever God may do, or hath done more arbitrarily in being found ſo far of ſome that ſeek him; not as to make them ſeek him; (elſe the worſer ſort of men would always continue the worſt, or if recovered, might aſcribe it ſo to themſelves, p. 79as not to any ſpecial Grace, which might juſtly have been denyed them, and was denyed others of like equal demerits) yet they do not, yea, account it would be their hainous ſin, and a deſerved forfeiture of this Grace, to expect it any other way. Let intellegent men reflect back & conſider, whether all theſe ill Conſequences will not equally follow from the opinion of Aequilibrium, which it is pretended Grace giveth, diſtinct from liberum Arbitrium; while it is ſaid to be given to all alike, and that God will do no more; yea, whether it be poſſible any way to avoid theſe inconveniences while men deny the whole deſign and ſubſtance, (though ſome may expreſs ſuch things leſs conveniently) of thoſe paſſages in the reformed Churches Confeſſions, concerning Election and ſpecial Grace. I had rather that you gathered it of your ſelves, than that I ſhould ſhew it more plain. I could ſhew you many other fearful Conſequences from this Opinion: but I, deſigning brevity, forbeare it as needleſs, conſidering all formes of Prayer Ancient and Modern, and the whole current of Scripture concerning mans diſability, and need of the Spirit's help, laugh this Opinion to ſcorn; and conſidering this Opinion was abhorred and ſpewed out as Poyſon by the ancient Church, as ſoon as ſet abroach by Pelagius, and offered to, and taſted by her; and it is alſo profeſſed to be abhorred; and is, I p. 80hope, however practically, by thoſe that yet oppoſe the motion of the Will by this Grace any other way, than by giving to all men a power of ſelf-determination upon this evaſion and pretence, that ſuch a power of ſelf-determination is given by Grace, diſtinct from, and over and above, that which is eſſentially neceſſary to a ſound man, and therefore, ſay they, in this we differ from Pelagius, and upon this account they deny it, becauſe to do any more than to give ſuch a power would be (ſay they) to deſtroy our humanity. Both which are meer aſſertions without any cogent ſhew of proof that ever I could ſee, and the contrary is eaſily proved.

Let us Remember we are but men, and God's actings are above our reach, yea, our own Souls-acts are ſo too. But God well underſtands his own actings and ours alſo; and what well conſiſts withour freedom and faculties, and what not, which may content us. Surely that man never ſtudied ſuch things, that ſhall pretend he can ſatisfactorily decide all thoſe School-difficulties about our Underſtanding and Will, wherein there ſeems to be demonſtrative proof on both ſides. God hath given us knowledg enough of our Souls for uſe, but not to ſatisfie our curioſity. I confeſs I cannot comprehend the holy Spirit's way of making men willing of unwilling in the firſt, or after, or continued Converſion. And I think it folly for p. 81me to attempt it that underſtand my own Soul's action ſo little. Yet, I think I can prove (ſo, as it cannot be anſwered by man) that this working on the Will is only mediante intellectu (or, which is all one, and yet avoids the diſputes of faculties differing, mediante ratione) i. e. only by ſetting faſt upon men the apprehenſions of the good of the one way, and evil of the other; by ſo irradiating the Underſtanding with reaſons, as to cauſe this choyce: and the**Jo. 6.44, 45. 1 Theſ. 4.9. Ephe. 1.17, 18, 19. 2 Cor. 4.4. 1 Cor. 2.4, 6.John 6:44John 6:451 Thess 4:9Eph 1:17Eph 1:18Eph 1:192 Cor 4:41 Cor 2:41 Cor 2:6 Scripture ſeems to run much this way. But I dare not yet ſay, I am ſure it is only this way, though I ſtrongly incline to it, and think I could anſwer what can be oppoſed. But then how he ſetteth home truth thus in Evidence, how he thus irradiateth the underſtanding; by what act diſtinct from the naked propounding the Truth and Goſpel; what this demonſtration of the Spirit is, I do not underſtand, and dare not ſo much as pray to God to tell me; I know it is too high for me, yea, or any man in this lower world. But yet,See this more fully ſpoken to in my Book. called the Great Propuiation. ſure I am, Firſt, ſomething he doth, yea, a noble operative, ſomthing in thoſe gratious effects on the Soul, beſide giving us our Natural faculties, and the Goſpel to make us willing. And Secondly, that it is ſomthing well conſiſtent with mans humanity, and the freedom of mans will.

p. 82And Thirdly, That it ſhall not**God in converting men, taketh not from them the Natural created power of Nilling, purum foreign poſſe nolle, Chriſto contrahente; but he taketh away the Moral, Wicked & Godleſs power, & Vitious and Corrupt diſpoſitions of reſiſting. Rutherford, Chriſt dying, p. 314. actually be prevailingly reſiſted to the end, by ſuch and ſuch particular perſons, known only to God; and ſo they ſhall not be able Morally to obtain of themſelves finally to reſiſt it; that is, they will not, though they can in the ordinary Senſe. And Fourthly, What he doth in time, he intended to do from Eternity. And Fifthly, That it is ſomthing God needed not, was not bound in juſtice to have done, to make men inexcuſable in not obeying the Goſpel; whereas it is neceſſary, in juſtice, to make men inexcuſable in not obeying, That they be endowed with the Natural faculties and power of underſtanding and willing; i. e. that they be not Fools and Children that have not power and knowledg to choſe the Good and refuſe the Evil. And alſo that they have a ſuitable objective evidence propounded, which they could underſtand if they would; that is, that they could obey it if they would, though this diſtinct help of the Spirit that actually cauſeth to will, be not given them; elſe they would be excuſable and without blame if it had not been given them. And Sixthly, That p. 83this ſomthing, and all that is here ſpoken is well conſiſtent (whether we can underſtand it is ſo††Say with St. Auſtin. Quaeras tu rationem, ego expav ſcam altitudinem; tu ratiocinare, ego credam. Nunquid ideo negandum eſt quod apertum eſt, quia comprehendi non poteſt quod occultum eſt? Aug. lib. de perſev. bon cap. 14. Illi dicunt, Ʋt quid rogamus Deum ne vincamur tentatione, quod in noſtra poteſtate eſt? Iſti dicunt, Ʋt quid conamur bene vivere, quod in Dei eſt poteſtate? O Domine, O Pater, qui es incoelis, ne nos inferas in quamlibet iſtarum tentatiorum, ſed libera nos a malo. Aug. Hom. 53. in Johan., or not) with the greateſt hopeful encouragement of certainty of Salvation to all mens ſincere deſires and diligent endeavours, & with the greateſt diſcouraging danger to all negligence; And that it would be as really deſtructive to true Religion, and conſequently damnable to hold an opinion of ſuch endeavours not being neceſſary to, & not certainly attaining Salvation, or the neglect of them not undoing; (I mean to hold it finally & practically) as the groſſeſt Pelagianiſm held thus practically would be. And Objections here are very inconſiderable. It may be made plain to men of competent rational parts for ſuch things, that Gods knowing from Eternity what men will do in the variety of Circumſtances, is no more inconſiſtent with mans freedom, and no more difficult to be anſwered and reconciled, than Gods knowing the week or day before, what a free agent will do, would be inconſiſtent with his freedom and liberty: and it is no more difficult to anſwer any p. 84objection made from Gods fore-knowledg, than it is to anſwer the ſame argument againſt mans freedom, drawn from that undoubted maxim, Quicquid eſt, quando eſt, neceſſe eſt eſſe, the ſame anſwer equally ſerving both. As for example: If one ſhould object thus againſt mans liberty to act and not act, to will and not will; He hath power both to will and not will ſuch good, either before he actually wills it, or when he actually wills it; not before he actually wills it, for then he doth not will it; and when he doth not will it, it is impoſſible he ſhould will it: not when he actually wills it; for then he doth actually will it; and when he doth not will it, it is impoſſible but he ſhould actually will it; and therefore no man can have freedom of will, to will and not will at any time.

This fallacious Argument may be ſo urged, that it is impoſſible to give any anſwer but this, That this impoſſibility ex hippotheſi, is not at all inconſiſtent with mans liberty, becauſe it is an impoſſibility poſteriour to, or after the acting or not acting, in order of Nature. So the ſame may be here truly anſwered, that, The infallible fore-knowledg of future free Agents actions, is no way inconſiſtent with the freedom and liberty of ſuch actions; this foreknowledg being after the ſaid actions in p. 85order of Nature, and exiſtendi conſequentiâ. He fore-knew it**foreign. Origen Philocal cap. 23. Quo circa nulla negotio cogimur; aut, retentâ praeſcientia Dei, r…llere volunta is arbitrium aut, retento voluntatis arbitrio, Deum quod nefas eſt, negare praeſcium futurorum, ſed utrumque amplectimur, &c. Aug. de Civit. Dei. lib. 5. cap. 10. becauſe the free Agent would do it, and not on the contrary the free Agent would do it, becauſe he foreknew it.

And if any ſhould take occaſion hence, to harden their hearts in the neglect of Gods means of Salvation, and ſo periſh, how eaſily will God hereafter confute a man making ſuch an objection; Is it not fit that a heartſearcher, and one that knows what men will do, one that knoweth our thoughts long before, ſhould rule the world?

And the only, poſſible, ſeemingly-unanſwerable difficulty that I can call to mind, that is urged with colour of reaſon, and that it concerns us to anſwer to juſtifie God, is this, of ſuch particular mens obedience, being not commendable and rewardable. But how can we make ſuch an objection, when we know not certainly what it is that God doth, no more then Eliſha did what Elijah had done to him, beſide the caſting the Mantle over him, 1 King. 19.19, 20. when he ſaid, What have I done to thee? to hinder p. 86thee from going home? And yet ſomthing God hath done to ſome, that they muſt follow him, and cannot (in a right ſenſe) refuſe or leave off as others do, to follow him, though they cannot tell what he hath done.

And ſuppoſe a man make ſuch††Quid opus eſt, ut affirmentur, vel negentur, vel definiantur cum diſcrimine, quae ſine diſcrimine neſciuntur. Aug. Enchir. ad Laux. Hypotheſes as theſe following, to maintain Election and ſpecial Grace; how will ſuch Objections vaniſh, as having no colour or appearance before them? Suppoſe that one ſhould maintain, that Gods Spirit doth only uſe in converſion the ſame Grace and operation ſpecie, the ſame in kind, and only ſo much more of it in degree, as he by his omniſcience knoweth will prevail actually; I ſay, ſo much††Vocatio alta & ſecretà qua fit ut legi at que doctrinae accomoden us aſſ…nſum, Aug. Ep. 107. higher than that whereby he reſtraineth wicked men from ſome particular ſins, and whereby he ſomtimes keepeth their greater concernments on their minds againſt their wills, and almoſt overcometh them to the obedience of Faith.Quid no. bis eſt in veſtiga…e ea quae neque ſcire compendium, neque ignorare detrimentum eſt ullum? Remitre haec Deo, at que ipſum ſcire concedire. Veſtris non eſt liberum rationibus implicare vos talibus, & tam remotas inutiliter curare res: veſtra in ancipiti ſita eſt ſalus animarum veſtrarum, & niſi vos applicetis, &c. Arnob. adv. Gentes. Why is not this commendable and rewardable p. 87in theſe that turn, as well as it would have been in the other to have turned? The degree cannot alter the ſpecies; ſo that at moſt you can but ſay, It would be leſs commendable, and yet I could ſay ſomthing to oppoſe this, but will not, for I am not careful to keep up their over-great honour. Yea, ſuppoſe he doth ſomthing leſs in degree than he doth to ſome continuing wicked, that are made to tremble like Felix, & only continueth this ſtriving with them longer, even ſo long as he certainly knows by his omniſcience will prevail with them; yea, ſuppoſe he have ſo reſtrained ſome by his gratious operations, that they have not ſo much as others, made it their intereſt to oppoſe the work of Grace; or begins with ſome betimes, before they are ſo reſolved to go on in their ſinful ways, as ſome hardned ſinners; and then uſeth leſs of that, we know not what of the gratious operation of his Spirit, even ſo much as would not prevail with more hardned cuſtomary ſinners, but yet more than he doth to others in equal degree of tenderneſs with them, and ſo much as he knows will prevail with theſe. Why is not the Turning of ſuch commendable and rewardable? why doth this deſtroy their humanity and freedome? what, becauſe God knew that in the Moral ſenſe explained, they could not obtain of themſelves to refuſe to yeild to ſuch drawing? Suppoſe p. 88God had not known it, it would then (you will grant if this be the reaſon) have been commendable, and his knowledg doth not alter the nature of things. Why may we not as well ſay, it would hinder it from being culpable and puniſhable; for a man to ſin, when he cannot find in his heart to do otherwiſe, though he hath the Natural power of doing otherwiſe (which I have ſhewed is apparently falſe) as ſay it would hinder an act from being commendable and rewardable, for God ſo to work by his Spirit, that a man cannot find in his heart, cannot Morally obtain of himſelf, to reject Chriſt and Mercy offered on ſuch eaſie and reaſonable terms, while he hath the Natural power of rejecting them, and ſo of eternally undoing himſelf. Suppoſe again, another ſhould maintain that God doth ſomething for the Converſion of all the Elect, different ſpecie from what he doth to any others, repreſenting in an extraordinary way for kind, ſomthing to their mind like the Angel with the drawn ſword to Balaam, to turn them when ſet forward in an evil way; or ſomething like the ſhining light about, and the voyce unto, Paul. How will you prove that it would not be commondable or rewardable in them to be moved by it? Do you think that Pauls turning from perſecuting Chriſtianity to it, was not commendable? Paul mentions it as well p. 89done of him, that he conſulted not with fleſh and blood, but obeyed. And what wrong would this be to others; whil'ſt God doth enough for them; yea more then enough, did they not wilfully reſiſt it and oppoſe it? Suppoſe God had not done more for any, would they then have been inexcuſable in not turning from ſin to God? How then can this be poſſibly conceived to detract from their inexcuſeableneſs?

And for any other difficulties whatſoever, it may be made apparent to any intelligent oppoſer, that they will no more encumber a man here, than they will in that difficult providence of giving and denying the Goſpel. And to make this out, conſider theſe things. Firſt, You uſe to urge theſe Scriptures following, ſo as ſome think you build too much upon them, being not improbably hyperbolical, Ezek. 3.4, 5, 6, 7. Get thee to the Houſe of Iſrael, and ſpeak my words unto them, for thou art not ſent unto a people of a hard language (i. e. to the Gentiles): Surely had I ſent thee to them, they would have hearkned, but the Houſe of Iſrael will not hearken. Mat. 11.21. If the mighty works which were done among you, had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have Repented. So Mat. 12.14.

Secondly, Conſider, this was denyed ſome places, that it is ſaid, had it been given them, they would have Repented.

p. 90Thirdly, You grant that multitudes are ordinarily ſaved, where the Scripture-light of the Goſpel cometh, that would have periſhed had it not come: and that God dealt, and dealeth not with every Nation for their Salvation in ſo high a degree as with the former Jews, and them that enjoy the Goſpel.

Fourthly, You conſtantly grant, and it is expreſs from Scripture, that God knew they would not Repent to whom he ſent ſuch high means.

Fifthly, You affirm, God did not, ſomtimes, ſend the Goſpel to ſuch places where he knew, had he done for them, as thoſe others that Repented not, they would have Repented. This is neceſſary as a foundation-truth of your Fabrick. And I for my part, freely grant that a man may ſay, If God had not given me ſuch clear means as he denyed others, I had periſhed. And I dare not deny but that that height of means internal and external, which he uſeth with ſome, and yet it prevaileth not, would have prevailed with others, that more common Grace hath reſtrained and prepared.

Sixthly, God fore-knoweth it will prevail with all ſuch, with whom it will actually prevail; this you readily grant.

Now there is as much granted in theſe your conſtant Confeſſions as I have ſaid, viz. that God doth that in order to their Salvation, p. 91for ſome, yea for multitudes, which he knoweth will prevail with them, that he doth not for others. Only I add this, And that without reſpect to any good thing in them. Now a man muſt be either very weak, not to ſee it, or very wilfull, not to grant it, That all the odious conſequences that can be pretended to be ſaſtned on the Doctrine of ſpecial Grace delivered by me, may as truly be charged on that which you grant and maintain, except this be true, That this denying of the Goſpel is only to thoſe that are worſe then any that enjoy it. Which now cometh to be tryed.

That learned worthy man anſwered Mr. Perkins thus, about this thing (and others of his mind generally follow him in it) Thus, ad praedeſtinationis & gratiae ſingul ritatem adſtruendam, non magnopere ſervit Iſthoc, eo quod illi contra quos diſputas, etiam ſuppoſitâ illius veritate, duplici tibi occunrent ratione, &c. that is, There may two things be anſwered here to avoid ſpecial Grace, and conſequently ſpecial Election, which follow thus,

Firſt, ſaith he, the Reaſon why any are deprived of the Revelation of the Goſpel, is becauſe their parents, or Anceſtors rejected it (he means more than any other that enjoy it, or elſe it would be, as any one may perceive, weak Impertinency;) Now, to ſay nothing of the inconſiſtency of this, with p. 92other his principles, and how this would not avoid the force, if true, I anſwer, This is apparently not true. I will bring but one inſtance inſtead of many; How many Infants have been ſecretly ſtolen away, or by force and Armes taken away from Chriſtian Parents, and carried away, and Educated in dark Countries, though their Parents were far from rejecting the Goſpel, or however far from rejecting it more than others, whoſe Children enjoyed it? And leſt you ſhould reply yet, Some of their atavi or tritavi, their higher Anceſtors, were greatly guilty this way, I will ſuppoſe theſe very Parents had more Infant Children not carryed away, and ſo all the ſame Anceſtors.

Secondly; Or ſaith he, they made themſelves unworthy (he meaneth more unworthy of it than any that enjoy the Goſpel, as they confeſs that defend theſe words, and this opinion, elſe it would be Impertinent) of this great favour by miſ-improving Natural light. But many were deprived of the Goſpel before they could miſ-improve their Natural Light, as in the caſe above-named, and the cauſe muſt be before the effect: And God giveth the Goſpel to many, not improving their Natural Light well. How contrary is this to Scripture, to ſay that the Jews had Gods Statutes and Judgments, becauſe better than all other Nations? The Jews indeed were deprived of ſuch privileges, p. 93becauſe of their ſin and unbelief; but the Apoſtle ſignifies to us, that the Gentiles were not taken in, becauſe better than they; elſe they might boaſt againſt them in the ſenſe he oppoſeth their boaſting. The Apoſtles were forbidden to preach to ſome where they found no oppoſition in the people, and were commanded to preach to other places where they ſhewed themſelves unworthy. And to ſay, that yet they not long after preached in thoſe then prohibited places, avails nothing; for you will grant that many dyed in the mean time: yet while you ſay, that Gods denying the Goſpel to any, or denying the gracious help of his Spirit to any, is for their ſin and ill deſerts, I am far from oppoſing it: I heartily grant it, and it doth not in the leaſt oppoſe what I ſay, or help you, while you mean it only abſolutè, abſolutely; But if you ſhould mean it comparatè, comparatively, you ſee, or may ſee by what I have ſaid, it is not true. If a Prince take away the priviledges & immunities of one City for their Rebellion, and yet continueth the immunities to another City, equal in the Rebellion; If the Reaſon be asked abſolutely, why he took away the immunities of the City, and would by no means ſpare it, the Reaſon is, their Rebellion, their ill deſerts: But if the Reaſon be asked why he took away their immunities any more than he did from the other p. 94City, it muſt be anſwered, It was his pleaſure, and ſome ſpecial Grace or Favour to the other City was the cauſe of this difference, i. e. not for any deſerts, or leſs ill deſerts of that City ſpared.

It is here commonly replied, Though it be granted that God doth give to ſome this way, a ſpecial benefit, without any deſerts that others have not equally that want the Goſpel; yet we deny that God doth it out of any ſpecial or greater Love to them, than he hath to others that enjoy it not. And ſo they ſuppoſe they maintain yet by this ſaying (but it would not help if true) that God doth for the Salvation of all alike; but only wherein mans free Will (or which is all one as to the argument in hand, mans free Will equally aſſiſted by Grace) occaſioneth the difference; And they cite a ſaying of Aquinas, to ſhew they are not ſingular in this Opinion. But this evaſion is very harſh, and very offenſive to my Ears: for if benefits be not conferred out of love and kindneſs they would be only benefits materially, but not formally, and ſo no thanks would be due for them, no more than for benefits done to a man by another, without, or againſt the Dono'rs intention. And ſo if ſpecial benefits in order to a mans Salvation, ought to be apprehended to come, not from ſpecial Love and good Will; no ſpecial thanks could poſſibly be accounted due for p. 95them: and conſequently we are to account our ſelves no more bound to gratitude for the Goſpel, nor no more guilty of ingratitude in not improving it (what ever elſe we may be guilty of) than they are that want it.

What ſtraits doth this Opinion of denying ſpecial Grace and kindneſs bring men into? If the Goſpel ſhould by the Providence of God be ſent into one of the American Countries, they muſt unavoidably according to theſe principles, think with themſelves, We are either better than other Americans, and God is bound to do ſo, or he would be culpably partial, and ſo would do the ſame to every Country as good as we: and ſo they cannot thank him for any ſpecial love or favour that he denyed to others as good as they; or they muſt think with themſelves, If we be as bad as others that want the Goſpel, we need not thank him for the Goſpel, as coming from any love or good will that he hath to us, more than to others that enjoy it not. So alſo the Jews anciently might have ſaid; and ſo proportionably any Town that hath gotten a more powerful Miniſtry than formerly, Either we are better than we were, or than other Towns; or, if not, we are no more beholden to him than they are that he takes not this pains with, and ſo no more thanks due from us than them. They ſay, Where the p. 96great Sultan's Horſe treads, no graſs will grow: I may ſay with truth, Where this opinion is held practically, no Grace will grow; and yet ſome maintain this with great confidence, as ſeeing there is no way elſe to avoid ſpecial Grace, and conſequently Election. And yet this evaſion, if true and not abſurd, doth not at all take off thoſe difficulties that are pretended to follow from Election and ſpecial Grace, but they as much encumber your Conceſſions ſtill; and a wicked heart would ſay, I care not whether it be out of love or no, ſo that God do but that more for me, than others as bad as I, that he knows will ſave me: for if it be not out of love, I ſhall be freed from the obligation of thankfulneſs.

Let ſuch Scriptures as theſe be well conſidered to prove ſpecial benefits, and to prove them to be from ſpecial love, Deut. 7.8. The Lord thy God hath choſen thee to be a ſpecial people unto himſelf, above all people that are upon the face of the earth. The Lord did not ſet his love on you, nor chooſe you, becauſe you were more in number, but becauſe he loved you, cap. 9.4. Speak not thou in thy heart after the Lord caſteth out the people of the Land, ſaying, for my Righteouſneſs the Lord hath brought me to this Land. For the wickedneſs (obſerve it) of theſe Nations did the Lord drive them out; but not for the Righteouſneſs, p. 97or uprightneſs of thy heart, doeſt thou go into their Land. Ʋnderſtand therefore (how he urgeth it as a matter of great concernment in Religion, to make them thankful!) that the Lord giveth thee not this good Land for thy Righteouſneſs.

The Learned Grotius hath this obſervation on this place, as ſeeing it apparent hence. Prima Dei beneficia ſine meritis contingunt; illis, in troductio interram; nobis, ipſa fides. Which I cannot Engliſh better than thus, "God giveth the firſt benefits without conditions, and ſo giveth Faith or the Goſpel-condition without Conditions, though other conſequent benefits upon conditions. Now I doubt not, but when God thus urged this upon the people [Speak not in thy heart, and Ʋnderſtand therefore] as of great concernment in Religion, he would have been very angry if one ſhould have ſtood up and ſaid, as many now; God's love & kindneſs is to every one alike, but only where Virtue or Vice makes the difference; and ſo God either doth not love you better than other people, or, if theſe benefits have love in them, then it is true, God doth not love us ſo as to give us theſe priviledges and ordinances which he denyeth to other people, becauſe we were more than others, for we are fewer; yet (however for any thing we know) becauſe we are better; and not meerly from his good pleaſure, without reſpect, p. 98to any good or leſs-hurt in us: and it is true, It is not for our Righteouſneſs in a ſtrict ſence; but it was for ſome occult quality in us a kin to Righteouſneſs: For this would have been to have ſaid to God, I either know better than Thou or Moſes, or, if you know as well as I, you conceal your meaning to engage us more to thankfulneſs: For though you ſeem to ſpeak largely, yet you have not made a ſufficient ennumeration; for it was not merely from ſome ſpecial love and favour not granted to others as good as we; but ſomething God had reſpect to, in us, better than in others.

Again, when God ſaid, Mal. 1.2, 3. I have loved you ſaith the Lord, yet you ſay, Wherein haſt thou loved us? was not Eſau Jacob's Brother, ſaith the Lord? yet I loved Jacob, and hated Eſau: that is, I preferred Jacob before Eſau. God ſpake this to upbraid the Jews with unthankfulneſs, and to move them to gratitude, to love and honour Him as a Father. But one might have replyed here according to ſome, This giving to him and us his poſterity greater mercies than to Eſau, was not to love him and us, his poſterity, more than Eſau and his poſterity, though you call it ſo; and ſo we can ſay for all this, Wherein haſt thou loved us, more than Eſau and his poſterity? or elſe, this was not from any ſpecial love to him and us, without reſpect to any ſpecial thing p. 66in him or us, that would not have been to Eſau and his poſterity, if as good as he or we; and therefore it doth not oblige us to any ſpecial obedience and thankfulneſs, more than them.

They might have defended themſelves, That their ingratitude was no more culpable than that of the Edomites, had they been of ſome mens opinion, thus; There is only a twofold love or good-will, antecedent Love, and conſequent Love, or good-will (which is a diſtinction,††Chryſoſt. in Epiſt. ad Epheſ. cap. 1. hom. 1. foreign. And Damaſcenus after him, explain's more ſully this Diſtinction.Eph 1 Ancient and of good uſe, and ought to be taken notice of, to keep our notions clear; though I diſlike their ſaying, that the Antecedent love is equal to all,) The Antecedent love is that which hath no reſpect to any good in men, but doth good to all men, without reſpect to any good in them; now this, ſay they, is equal to all men alike. I grant it, to all men; but am proving, it is not equal to all men.

Secondly, the Conſequent Love, called alſo††If we conſeſs our ſins, he is faithful and juſt to forgive. Amor juſtitiae, being according to a Rule and Law; which Conſequent Love, or Love of Juſtification, is Conditional, and hath eſſentially a reſpect to ſome good thing in men, being by, and according to a Law, the Goſpel Rule. Now this, ſay they is equal to all men alike, but where their goodneſs p. 100or wickedneſs occaſion's the difference. And I readily grant this as apparent, That this Conſequent Love is to all men alike, as to the main and ſubſtance of it, and the effects of it, as they perform the condition or not; which is no more but this, He that is Holy, and ſo continues, ſhall not periſh, but have everlaſting Life, be he who he will, without any reſpect of Perſons; and, He that is more Holy ſhall be more Happy; even as he that is wicked, and ſo continues, ſhall be miſcrable; and he that is more wicked, more miſerable, without any exception of Perſons whatſoever, as it is ſaid Act. 10.34. Of a truth I perceive that God is no reſpecter of perſons, but in every Nation, he that feareth him, and worketh Righteouſneſs, is accepted of him.

Now, how eaſily might they have defended themſelves, if the Antecedent-love was alike to all, you have ſeen already: And if this was to be underſtood, as Oppoſers generally would have it, of the Conſequent conditional love that hath reſpect to mans goodneſs or wickedneſs, they might have replyed, What though Eſau was Jacobs Brother, and ſo equal in that reſpect? Yet this is ſaid to no purpoſe; for they were of no equal good qualities, one was a good man, the other a bad; You would have been guilty of at leaſt not fair dealing, if you had not done for him more than Eſau; p. 101What an inconſequent manner of ſpeaking would this have been, to move them to ſpecial thankfulneſs, to greater thankfulneſs than was due from Edomites, if he mean by Love, the rectoral and conditional Love, that hath reſpect to ſomthing in men.

If a Prince ſhould ſay, when one Brother of many was Executed for Treaſon going on in his Rebellion, and the other Brethren ceaſed their Rebellion, and became Loyal, when there was an inviolable Act of Oblivion made to all, on condition they would ceaſe their Rebellion, If he ſhould ſay, Was not he your Brother? And yet I have not hanged you all, what cauſe have you to be thankful in an eſpecial manner, that I dealt not with you, as with your Brother? They might reply, This of his being our Brother is nothing to us; we are indeed much ingaged to You for your general Love and favour, in making ſuch an Act of Oblivion upon ſuch an eaſie condition; but, that you did not Execute us as well as our Brother, is no ſpecial favour; for though he was our Brother, we performed the condition, and he did not; and, had we done as he, you would have Executed us alſo. You urge a fallacious argument to impoſe upon us ſpecial thankfulneſs, which is not due; It would indeed be right arguing if you meant by his being our Brother, our being and doing like him in every thing; but then it is not true; but if you mean by it p. 102only his being our Brother, it will not enforce on us any ſpecial thankfulneſs.

So if two Brethren have equal Stocks given them to trade with, and one hath improved well by his induſtry, and the other is undone by negligence, what a looſe ſpeech would this be of the donor, Is not he your Brother? what cauſe have you to be obſervant of me more than your Brother? and how far more great, would your ingratitude be than your Brother's?

What do theſe words here, Was not Eſau Jacob's Brother? but ſtand in the place of a ſufficient ennumeration, to fignifie that they were equal every way, but only where his love and eſpecial Grace made the difference? And how**I think it an eaſie matter to Vindicate that Chapter, Rom. 9. that it doth ſpeak of the Antecedent Love, viz. Vocation, and not of the Conſequent or Juſtification, from v. 9. to 30. though yet I think ſome on the other hand, build that height upon it, that they have no foundation there, for; But I chuſe to reaſon from places & things more obvious, as requiring fewer words.Rom 9 Impertinently elſe doth the Apoſtle Paul alledg them, Rom. 9.13?

Now if it be once granted, that God doth any ſpecial Act of Grace for any without reſpect to any good in them, which he doth not for others; I ſee, you conſtantly and readily will grant, that he willed and decreed to do it from Eternity: For the p. 301Vorſtian Hypotheſes do not take with rational men. So that I think, inſtead of proving this**While a man holds ſpecial Grace, and the neceſſity of it, he holds all virtualy that I am moſt ſolicitous to maintain againſt oppoſers; And I could favourably paſs by any errours in a man's notions about Election, that lightly he can hold, while he holds this. And I like well the moderation of thoſe Ancient Councils held againſt Pelagianiſm, & wiſh others would imitate ſo reverend a pattern, who all of them determined for Grace, and its neceſſity, but none of them determined any thing about Election, though then much controverted, as not holding that fundamental, but left that to be defended & taught by the Orthodox Doctors of the Church, by ſtrength of argument drawn from Scripture and Reaſon, according to their beſt apprehenſions. Conſequence; which is agreed on both ſides, I have more need, if this was a place for it, to tell people that, ſo they do but grant this Conſequence, it would be their ſin ordinarily to think of it in their ordinary duties, except in ſome few caſes, and it is their duty ordinarily to think of ſuch things as preſent, or as if they were to begin now, but this would require too many words to explain.

And further, to put the thing I have ſpoken of, quite out of doubt. Let any intelligent man conſider, and he will perceive, that he that ſhould hold this opinion practically, that the giving and continuing of the Goſpel, is conditional in that proper ſenſe that Juſtification and Salvation are; will unavoidably run into ſuch miſchiefs, as I have p. 104before at large mentioned. He could not pray ſeriouſly, that God would ſend the Goſpel to places where their Parents rejected it, or where they improve not well their Naturals; but can only pray in ſuch words, viz. that, God would ſend the Goſſpel to the dark places of the world if they have not, or do not abuſe their Naturals; that is, if they be good; but not ſend it to make them good, while bad; And alſo cannot pray that God would continue the Goſpel where it is, but only that God would continue it to him and his, and the Nation or Nations, if they ſhall carry ſuitably to it. For a man cannot cordially pray, yea, it would be his ſin to pray, for that he holds God will by no means do, becauſe he cannot in juſtice, becauſe it would be an unworthy reſpecting of Perſons, or becauſe God hath made ſuch a rule as he doctrinally holds he will not break; no more than he can pray that God would ſend the Goſpel to men departed this life in their Impenitency and Unbelief. And alſo he cannot Praiſe God heartily for the Goſpel, as coming from any love to us that was denyed to others as good as he or we.

I am ſenſible, it may poſſibly be in your thoughts to object that this difficulty may truly lie upon me, thus, Do not I pray that God would forgive great incorrigible ſinners, and yet I have affirmed pardon to be properly & ſtrictly Conditional.

p. 105Therefore I will anſwer this, though it require many words, and alſo becauſe in ſo doing, I hope I ſhall make plain ſome things that confound ſome men; And I dare ſay, that they that do not keep ſuch Notions as theſe following, diſtinct, ſhall contradict themſelves almoſt in every word they ſhall ſpeak about ſuch things.

God's Love, and Grace, and Mercy, is uſed in ſeveral ſenſes in Scripture. Firſt, ſomtimes by it is meant, that Love in giving Chriſt a Ranſome for the world, that whoſoever of ſinful men turned, ſhould Live. This Love, take it preciſely ſo far and no further, it is to all alike common (though I have ſhewed, in another place, it is in ſome other ſenſe ſpecial) this Love is great Love indeed, and the greateſt in a ſenſe; for it is greater than any of the reſt taken ſingly and abſtractly, 1 Joh. 4.9, 10. Herein is Love, &c. This Love is abſolute and not conditiona; he abſolutely gave him, that if men believed, they ſhould not periſh, and whether any believe or no, it no way leſſens this, being alien to it; though yet the great actual benefit of it, is conditional. Again, notwithſtanding this Love to all, in thus bringing them from under a neceſſity of periſhing by their ſins, yet they may be under his rectoral Wrath and diſpleaſure, under condemnation; yea, and all are ſo, till they Repent and Believe.

p. 106Secondly, Sometimes by it, is meant the Love or Mercy of giving his Ordinances, as to the Jews in the Scriptures before mentioned; and the giving the Revelation of Chriſt in the Goſpel. Now, this Love is not common to all alike. And this Love is not conditional ſtrictly and properly; God being not tyed in juſtice and honour, neither having tyed himſelf to any certain rule or condition; though yet the deprivation of it, is granted, to be for mens ſins abſolutely (as I have explained it) and none can expect the continuance of it, that carry not ſuitablely to it. This Love alſo is conſiſtent with Rectoral hatred, and being under condemnation. We may alſo pray that God would give this to people unworthy and wicked even while they are ſo, that it may turn their hearts; and may pray for the continuance of it to people neglecting and ſlighting it; becauſe, as I ſaid, is is left arbitrary to God.

Thirdly, That, called the Love, or††Illud neſcio quo modo dieatur, Fruſtra Deum miſereri niſi nos velmus: Si enim deus miſeretur etiam volumus. Aug ad Simpli. Lib. 1. qu. 2. Mercy of Election, whereby God maketh people to differ, the Fruit of it being working the Goſpel-condition, turning men from ſin unto God. Now a man is under the Rectoral hatred of God, that is, is unjuſtified under condemnation, notwithſtandinging this Love, while you mean by it only Gods intention to convert him, yea, and till this effect be wrought, I mean, till after p. 107in order of Nature though not of time: for a man is firſt Converted in order of Nature, before he be juſtified, or have right to Heaven, which is the Rectoral Love.

Again, This Love of Election is not conditional, neither in the intention, nor effect, or Execution, in a proper ſenſe; though none can expect this effect, but in the uſe of the meanes, and God doth work this effect by means, and men deſervingly provoke God to deny it by their ſin and neglect of means, Yet God having tyed himſelf to no uninterruptible rule, nor being tyed in juſtice, we may pray for it, for thoſe that neglect means, and ſeek him not, and have highly deſerved his denial of it. We may pray, that God would turn and change their hearts, before they be turned and changed, yea or have any deſire of this Grace.

Again; But now that which is moſt properly called Rectoral Love, or conſequent Love, or juſtifying Love, pardoning ſaving Love, is properly conditional in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, is tyed to a Rule or Law, and is a reſultancy from a Law, upon ſomething done by men; to wit, upon their performing the Condition of the ſaid Goſpel-Law or Promiſe, Jo. 16.27. The Father Himſelf Loveth you, becauſe you have Loved me, and believed p. 108and believed that, &c. So Cap. 14.21, 23. 1 Cor. 3.8. If any man love God, the ſame is known; that is, loved of him. But you ſee this Rectoral Love, or Love of Complacency is after our loving of him in order of Nature.

This Love and Mercy of Election, the effect whereof is, ſoftening the Heart, or working the firſt Grace of Converſion, is not of him that willeth and runneth, but of God that ſheweth Mercy,††Haec gratia quae occultè humanis còrdibus divinâ largitate tribuitur, à nullo duro corde reſpuitur. Ideò quippe tribuitur, ut cordis duritia primitus auferatur. Aug. de praed. Sanct. Cap. 8. namely this Mercy; that is, It is not to be aſcribed to mans chooſing Good of himſelf; but to this ſpecial Mercy that cauſed him to chooſe, will and run. But the Rectoral Love, the Love or Mercy of Juſtification & Salvation, is of him that willeth, runneth, ſeeketh, ſtriveth; yea, and is of mans willing and running, formally; I mean only as oppoſed to it's being formally, as of Gods working it in us. Becauſe if a man did it without this ſpecial help of God that maketh, willing he would have right to Heaven, be juſtified. (It would here be great weakneſs for any to ſay, You muſt not make ſuch Suppoſitions; for ſurely we may ſuppoſe, ſuch things as a man hath a natural power to do, and that his heart reproaches him, for not ſo doing: I will only ask a man, making this Objection, this ſilly Queſtion; p. 109Did your Hearts never reproach you for not being willing to omit that Sin which God did not make you actually willingly to omit?) Alſo, becauſe elſe you muſt ſay, there are no rewards; or, that God rewardeth himſelf and his own Act; which would not be ſenſe, no more than to ſay, Gods putting man into Paradice after he had created him, was the reward of his creating him: And alſo, becauſe the Promiſe is not made to God but to us, and not to God's Act but to ours: The Promiſe is not, If God work the condition in us, we ſhall be Saved; but if we repent and believe; this Law or Promiſe, and ſo this Rectoral Love, taking no notice which way it cometh, ſo it be but performed.

We are not Loved with the Love of Election becauſe we choſe him, or (which comes all to one) becauſe foreſeen to chuſe him; No, in this ſenſe it is ſaid, You have not choſen me, but I have choſen you, and ordained, that you ſhall bring forth Fruit, and that your Fruit ſhould remain; that is, He choſe us firſt in this ſenſe. But yet we chuſe him firſt, chuſe the better part firſt, the way of Obedience and Life firſt (when he ſetteth before us Life, and Death in Good and Evil; and biddeth us chuſe his ways that we may live) I ſay, firſt in order of Nature before he chuſeth, loveth us, with this Rectoral Love of complacency, Pardon Juſtification.

p. 110Now to anſwer the difficulty urged; having thus cleared my way. This Rectoral Goſpel-Law Love of Juſtification and Pardon is properly conditional, I mean as to the main ſubſtantial and great part of it, which is this; He that believeth ſhall not periſh, but ſhall have Eternal Life: For there is ſome leſſer part of this that is not ſtrictly conditional, wherein God hath ſo kept himſelf uningaged, that he may with ſafety to his Truth and Juſtice uſe a Liberty arbitrarily, and doth; as in Temporal Puniſhment, and Temporal Proſperity. And concerning this inferiour part, wherein God is left at Liberty, we may pray, God would pardon ſuch a wicked man though he continue wicked, as to temporal Deſtruction, e. g. Relations may lawfully pray that God would not deſtroy his Eſtate, or take away ſuddenly his Life, though he continue wicked, they having ſome dependance on him; though yet they cannot pray that God would juſtifie him in the great things of Salvation though he continue wicked. And true Believers may praiſe God, for it is a ſpecial Favour, and coming from ſpecial Love denied to many as good or better than themſelves, that he doth not many ways make their Lives dreadful uncomfortable, for thoſe ſins they were guilty of before and after Converſion: For this he might arbitrarily have done, and doth ſo by ſome ſincere Ones, But we cannot p. 111rationally, or properly pray that God would give to a man continuing wicked, the full and moſt properly and uſually called Pardon of his ſins; for this is properly conditional, and this God will not, yea cannot do, with keeping to his inviolable Rule; but it would be as irrational and unlawful as praying for the Dead, To pray he would do it immediately before he hath made a Change in him. Though yet we may pray God, that he would do ſomething in order to his Pardon, and we may pray that God would pardon ſuch in the ſence that Scripture ſometimes uſed the Word, as when Chriſt ſaid, Father forgive them, they know not what they do, he meant, They have highly deſerved to be deſtroyed immediately, and deprived of all Hope and Means; but do thou, even as they are, immediately pardon them ſo far, as to continue Meanes and Patience to them, and ſtrive with them, and Convert them; and it may more remotely connote, after thou haſt done ſo, fully pardon them (leſt, they ſhould ſee with their Eye and be converted, and their ſins be forgiven them. Mark 4.12.)

But he did not mean by Forgive them, the full pardon immediately: For this would have been to pray for the breach of the Goſpel-Law founded in his Blood. Again, a ſincere Chriſtian can praiſe God for ſpecial grace and favour in turning his Heart, and converting him while he was unconverted, p. 112and when he did not convert others as good, or better than he: And ſo, for his juſtification and Salvation, as more remotely and fundamentally coming from ſpecial grace, (becauſe the working the condition was ſo); but not formally. But he cannot in praiſing God, ſay, that God gave him his juſtification, pardon, right to Salvation by ſuch ſpecial grace, as that they were denied to others that were as good, or better than he was (I mean as truly converted as he) when they were conferred upon him. They can ſay, God converted them, before they were converted in order of Nature; but they cannot truly ſay, Juſtification and right to Heaven were conferred on them in order of Nature, before they were converted.

You can only now reply upon me thus; But though God do ſomthing ſpecial for the Salvation of ſome, which he doth not for the Salvation of others, as good as they, and ſo without reſpect to any good thing in them; yet he doth enough for the Salvation of all. I heartily grant it, for I know you cannot in Reaſon mean any more than this, that nothing hinders any mens Salvation, but their own wicked willfulneſs: For you cannot mean by it, God takes away every mans unwillingneſs, maketh every man actually willing, and chooſing the better part.

I am ſo far from denying this, that I have p. 113endeavoured to prove it. You ſee it is my judgment, that none ought to do more than they can do; (taking Can in the ordinary ſenſe.) And if any amongſt**That ſaying of Claudian would pleaſe me, had I aſſurance he meant Deus, natura naturans,— Natura beatis Omnibus eſſe dedit ſi quis cognoverit uti. Heathens had done what he could, in ſeeking and ſerving God, he ſhould either for Chriſt's ſake have been accepted with that little knowledg he could attain; or elſe, as Calvin ſaith, Comment Act. 8.13. Rather then he ſhould have periſhed, God would have ſent an Angel to Reveal further things to him.

If you ſhall yet reply, and ſay, But God doth Love and Will the Converſion of every one? I hold this as much at leaſt as you do: for you do not maintain that he is reſolved actually to convert every man, elſe every man (you ſay your ſelves) would be converted; But you hold that God giveth ſuch means through love to all, that if they did what they ought to do, and therefore could do, they would be Converted and ſo ſaved; and that their Converſion is commanded by him, and is amiable and deſirable to him; and that this is enough to denominate it a willing and deſiring the Converſion of all. If any deny there is any ſuch thing as underſtanding and willing in God properly and univocally ſo called, but only ſomething that we men cannot conceive of better than under p. 114the notion of underſtanding and willing, and therefore ought ſo to conceive of it. I ſhould be far from oppoſing him. And I grant that this ſpoken of, is, to be conceived of by us, as a Willing the Converſion of all: and they that ſay, this is not to be conceived by us as a Will properly, do contradict expreſs Scripture, which is to be a rule of our Conceptions; and I dare ſay they do not conſider that what ever objections they do, or can poſſibly, bring againſt mens apprehending this as a Volition or Will, the ſame lye as much againſt what they do hold, (as any man may find by trying a little) that God approveth of the Converſion of them that will never turn, and their Converſion is amiable, and their refuſal offenſive and diſpleaſing to him. And I cannot ſee that you do thus far differ from your moderate oppoſers, except ſomtimes in words: for you diſtinguiſh thus (when you are to give the meaning of ſuch Scriptures, viz. Who hath reſiſted his Will? He doth whatſoever he will. God will have all Salvos fieri with an approving Will, but will not with an efficacious Will omnes Salvos facere.

But here only is the difference, you ſay**Certum eſt nullius Converſionem praeiſe intendi. God doth not with a preciſe Will, intend the Converſion of any man. And you mean by it, he intendeth not the Converſion of one man more than another, no further p. 115than by giving to all men, through love, power and means enough, and ſo leave it to themſelves, which is that you call the Approving Will. Now I and your moderate oppoſers differ from you in this: we hold that he not only willeth ſo far as you hold it, the converſion of all; but that he preciſely intendeth the Converſion of ſome; which we uſe to call a decretive Will, or the Will of Purpoſe, as we call that you agree with us in, the will of Precept; the object of one being Event, and of the other Duty. So that here is the difference, I do not hold that God doth leſs will the converſion of, or doth leſs for, or is leſs gratious to all, than you do, I abhor ſuch a thought; but only that God doth more will the Converſion; and doth more, and is more gratious to ſome in order to their Salvation than you do. Yea, I could (if it were worth while) ſhew, that I hold he doth more for, and is more gratious to all that live to years of diſcretion, in order to their Converſion and Salvation, than is conſiſtent with your Principles.

And take notice once for all, that I exclude the caſe of Infants and Ideots out of this diſcourſe, as being alien, and of leſs concernment in Religion, and alſo difficult; and ſo either not to be ſpoken of here, or ſpoken more largely to, than can ſtand with my deſigned brevity.

p. 116If you ſhould yet urge that I hold ſomthing irrational: for, what though he be beforehand with all, do enough and more than enough for the Salvation of all, nothing hindering their Salvation, but their own willfulneſs, and he**D…us, prius quam deſeratur, neminem deſerit; & multos deſertores ſaepe converit. Proſp. Reſp ad object. Vincent. forſakes none but thoſe that forſake him, ſo that if he did no more for any, we ſhould be ſatisfied of his juſtice.

Yet why doth he not forſake all equally, that equally forſake him? Why doth he give the Goſpel to ſome that are as bad as others that want it? And give Grace to ſome that have as highly as others provoked him? And why to ſuch places and perſons in particular? Some pretend to go ſuch away as to deny theſe things, or where they cannot deny, give Reaſons.

I anſwer, I could give you ſomthing like reaſon in general, why he would not forſake all that forſake him, and ſo deſerve his forſaking them, but that would not anſwer the doubt. But why he gives the Goſpel and Grace to ſuch in particular more than others, I confeſs I can give no Reaſon, but muſt with the Scripture, reſolve it into his free love and pleaſure, and into his unſearchable judgments, though I doubt not but God hath wiſe Reaſons that no man in this fleſh can underſtand. The Univerſity of Heaven will reſolve many ſuch doubts. And it troubles me to ſee learned men attempt p. 117to find out thoſe wayes that we are told are paſt finding out, and it pleaſeth me to ſee their attempts as weak as bold. And I ſhould think it no incivility to bid him Go look, that asketh me reaſons of theſe things. But if any urge me as they did Eliſha, that they might go and ſeek, I will only ſay, let them go ſeek in the words of St. Auſtin, de Spir. & lit. cap. 34. Si ad illam profunditatem ſcrutandum quiſquam nos coarctet, cur illi ita ſuadetur ut perſuadeatur; illi autem, non item; duo ſola occurrunt interim quae reſpondere mihi placet; O Altitudo divitiarum! &, Nunquid in iquitas apud Deum? Cui reſponſio iſta diſplicet, quaerat Doctiores, ſed cavcat ne inveniat …reſumtores. That is, If any be not ſatisfied with this anſwer, let him go ſeek him a more learned Teacher; but take heed he meet not with a more preſumptuous Teacher. If you ſhall reply, You ſeem to grant you hold ſomething unaccountable to men, and ſo what ſeems irrational to men:

I Anſwer, I ſhall not altogether deny this, but only will ſay theſe two things.

Firſt; Remember you are but men; and ſo no more competent judges of the rationality of Gods actings, when he doth not reveal the reaſons of them unto us, (and that it may be, becauſe humane Nature cannot apprehend p. 118them) than the Beaſts are of ours, the diſtance being without compariſon greater.Movet me quod ille perit, ille non: Si verum vis audire, & me movet quia homo ſum: Sed ſi tu homo es, & ego homo ſum, ambo audiamus dicentem. O homo! ipſam naturam infirmam ac debilem alloquitur Apoſtolus dicens, O homo, tu quis es qui reſponſes Deo? Si poſſet pecus loqui & dicere Deo. Quare iſtum hominem feciſti, & me pecudem: nonne juſte ſuccenſeres & diceres? O pecus, tu quis es, &c. Et tu homo es, ſed ad Deum pecus es. Aug. de verb. Apoſt. Serm 10.

Secondly; Though a Rational man in his firſt undeliberate thoughts would be apt to ſay, It is fit that all things ſhould be done alike to all, and that God ſhould make no difference, but where free Will makes it; yet theſe very thoughts do dictate equally, Let Gods government of ſinful men be in ſuch a way, as there may be no ſuch Prayers or Praiſes for our ſelves and others, for grace and holineſs, as I have before inſtanced in, to ſhew this opinion would deſtroy them. But if all men being ſo wicked, as it is apparent they are, we judg it rational as right reaſon doth (yea the reaſon of ſome Heathens hath) that we ſhould be ſuch depending creatures, as to pray ſuch Prayers, and to give ſuch thanks and praiſe for our ſelves and others, then it is moſt rational, yea, and eſſential to conſiſtency with our reaſon, that God ſhould diſpoſe p. 119of things in ſuch a way for ſubſtance, as they have been imperfectly deſcribed, viz. that doing enough for all, there ſhould be ſuch an arbitrarineſs in God, in uſing ſpecial Grace to ſome.

And if any man of competent abilities, have any temptation to think otherwiſe, would he but be at the pains deliberately to form any Hypotheſes which are not apparently inconſiſtent with Prayers and Praiſes, he will find himſelf, I am confident, wonderfully ſtill'd and calm'd, and far from ſaying with Alfonſas, Si ego adfuiſſem, melius ordinâſſem.

If any ſhould object and ſay, You yet bring in the Stoick fate, or ſomthing like it. This was an objection againſt Auſtin, and you may ſee it well anſwered by him, Lib. 2. ad Bonifac. cont duas Epiſt. Pelag. cap. 5, 6, 7.

I muſt acknowledg, I cannot well underſtand what that Fate ordinarily charged on the Stoicks by the Ancients, was, nor how it was conſiſtent with their principles of morality, except they excluded free-will from that ſeries implexa cauſarum, all of them that we have any remains of (worth the name of remains) being Seneca, Epictetus and Antoninus Pius, who are commonly charged (and Seneca truly) with being over great defenders of Free-Will. p. 120But it ſeems clear that they of them, and other Ancients, Poets and others that maintained it, held it upon this ground; that they might clear God of all things that ſeemed irreconcilable to Humane Wiſdom and juſtice in the Government of the World; So that when any thing ſeemed amiſs, they could ſay, He was, alas, bound by Fate and could not help it, and ſo was Innocent.

I would wiſh thoſe that charge others with holding Fate, to conſider if this following Principle be not like it, viz. That God doth as much as he may for the Converſion of every one, and that God could not in Juſtice have made Judas a Convert as well as Peter; elſe he would have done it. I grant, He is bound in Juſtice not to condemn any for not doing what they had not power and means to do; And he hath bound himſelf to ſave all Repenting and Returning Sinners, and none elſe; and ſo is here bound.

But to ſay, He may not do good, more good in order to ſome mens Converſion, who, if he did it not for them would periſh as well as others; or may not give the Goſpel to any, unleſs better than others that have it not; is to tye him where Juſtice doth not tye him, nor his Revealed Word; and wherein we grant every King, yea, and Man a Liberty; and would think it a miſs to bind them; & is virtually to ſay, We may not p. 121pray for ſuch things for our ſelves or others, for he is bound: And it is ſuch away of clearing God as he would not be cleared by, but he would rather have us confeſs we cannot anſwer ſuch Difficulties, as this Opinion is maintained to anſwer.

As for Seneca, Ʋnum Bonum eſt, quod beatae vitae cauſa & firmamentum eſt, Sibi fidere. And a little after, Turpe eſt, De…s fatigare. Quid vo…u opus eſt? facte ipſe felicem. Sen. Ep. 31. Quàm ſtultum eſt …ptare, cum poſſi, à te impetrare: non ſunt ad coelum elevandae manus. Ep. 41. And which is wo ſe Ep. 53. …otam Philoſophiae canverte mentem, omnes mortales multo anteced…s, non multo to Dii antecedent. Quid inter te & illos imerfuturum quaeris? Diutius erunt. Atm hercule, magni Artificus …ſt clauſiſſe torum in exiguo. Tantum ſapienti ſua, quantum Deo omnis aetas paret. Eſt aliquid quid Sapierce antecedat Deum: ille naturae beneficio, non ſue, ſapience eſt. Ep. 53.the moſt Ancient Stoick Writer that we have, this puts me out of conceit with him, he was a Pelagian Stoick and hel God did alike for all to make them Vertuous, Wiſe, or Happy (he uſeth theſe words for the ſame); and Free-will only cauſed the difference: And therefore (as it would have been inconſiſtent with that Principle to hold otherwiſe) he hath much againſt Prayer for vertue and praiſing God for it, and not a word, that I remember for Prayer or Praiſe, for theſe or any other benefits, notwithſtanding his many other good Inſtructions.

p. 122But Antoninus in theſe particulars, viz. In maintaining Free-will, and yet ſpecial grace, pleaſeth me better than many I have better thoughts of. Toward the end of the firſt book, he giveth thanks for many ſpecial reſtraints, and particular kindneſſes in order to Religion, much like Plato before him that gave thanks to God for it as a ſpecial favour (as Plutarch in Mario tells us) that he was born a Graecian, and not a Barbarian, and in the time of Socrates; things which he knew were not common to all, and he thought were given him out of Love, or he could not have given thanks for them. And eſpecially Antoninus giveth thanks to God for inclining him to Religion; and then juſtifieth God, and ſaith, God hath done much for him by ſecret helps and ſuggeſtions; ſo that, ſaith he, I have been only wanting to my ſelf in the 9th. book; § 40. He proveth the Duty of Prayer to God to make us better, and anſwereth the difficulty that the Opinion of Free-Will makes againſt it. He thus argues from their common cuſtome of praying for other things, but not for Holineſs and Religion.††foreign; &c. Either, ſaith he, God can do nothing, or he p. 123can; if he cannot, Why do you pray for other things; if he can, Why do not you pray rather for piety; as that you may not inordinately deſire any of theſe worldly things, or not be anxious about them, rather than that you may have theſe things? But perhaps you will ſay††foreign, &c. Theſe things are things in my own power, things of my own free-will, to chooſe good or evil; he grants they are ſo, and therefore, ſaith he, they are more excellent and deſirable then external things, and conſequently more to be prayed for; and then addeth,††foreign, &c. Who hath told you that God will not help in things that belong to your own free-will? do but begin to pray for theſe things, and thou ſhalt ſee what God will do.

And Epictetus ſpeaketh ſome-where to the ſame purpoſe. It muſt be from a ſhortneſs of diſcourſe for any not to ſee, eſpecially if he read that place, that Antoninus is againſt the opinion of them that hold, God will only give men a power of Willing Good & Evil, but will not keep any men from willing Evil, or which p. 124is all one, not except they continue not willing it; nor will cauſe any to Will good any further, how-ever, not except they continue Willing it, which is in ſenſe, if ſenſe, He will not do it at all.

As for that which is ordinarily meant by Fate in this angry Charge, you may as truly be charged with it (though untruly) as your moderate Oppoſers: For you hold (whatſoever ſome little Retainers that know not your mind, or their own, ſay) that it is a known certainty to God from Eternity, who ſhall be Converted and Perſevere, and who not; and alſo that he hath decreed in particular, and in individuo, ſuch to Salvation, and ſuch to Condemnation upon this fore-fight, and that it will certainly and eventually be ſo; not one Perſon more or leſs, eventually doing otherwiſe, and being otherwiſe in the end dealt with. You well††Origen clearly anſwereth that cavil of Celſus, viz. [That muſt be and canno: be otherwiſe, which God hath fore-known or fore-told] by diſtinguiſhing and ſhewing how it can, and cannot be otherwiſe. Cont. Celſ. Lib. 2. Philecal. Cap. 25. underſtand how this Decree is conſiſtent with Mans Freedom. And yet theſe are Difficulties, and require a long and operous intention of mind to underſtand their conſiſtency. And ſome of ſhort heads will be offended at this your Opinion, p. 125not underſtanding the Conſiſtency of it with mans natural Freedom of Will, and the Goſpel-Promiſes; or will make it like Fate to themſelves. It would yet be a falſe Charge for any to ſay, that according to your Opinion and Principle, what God hath decreed concerning mens future Eſtate muſt be, and cannot be otherwiſe, taking ſuch words in the ordinary Senſe; for though there be a Truth in this Charge, in a Senſe remote from the vulgar uſe of ſuch Words; yet according to the ordinary and moſt obvious Senſe of ſuch words, this Accuſation is falſe; which is, that men have not Free-will to do good or not do it; or elſe; if they have, that they are concluded antecedently to the uſe of it, that, do what they can, turn to God, or not turn, their final Eſtate ſhall not be ordered according to their thus turning or not, which is falſe. And ſome it may be will undo, or have undone themſelves for ever, upon miſ-apprehenſions of your meaning, and their falſe Concluſions drawn from it.

So here, I know it doth follow from what I ſay, that though God do enough (yea, and more than enough) for all, or will not condemn them for not doing what they had not Power and Means enough to do; yet if He do arbitrarily more for ſome, I mean arbitrarily as not being any way bound to do it, as having made no ſuch promiſe to p. 126them or others properly ſo called, though there are ſuch Intimations, commonly called half-Promiſes, that it is probable he may (though he may refuſe) make ſuch a man willing of unwilling, upon others praying to him in particular for ſuch as bad or worſe than others; and alſo ſometimes without any ſuch particular Prayers of others for them; I ſay, it doth follow from this, that where he doth ſuch arbitrary things, he willed or decreed to do ſo from Eternity upon ſuch Prayers of others, or without them as the caſe is, he being Immutable and Omnipreſcient.

Yet people in going ſo high in their ordinary Conceptions, would be very apt to make this like Fate to themſelves, as it is apparent they do that apprehend, as if ſuch volitions were not now as arbitrary to God as ever: For this is to deſtroy the right and true Conceptions of ſuch things, as are meerly done by him prolibitu, to think that he is by Decree bound, ſo as they are not now arbitrary.

And therefore, as a man that is deliberating, and thinking upon a return to God, muſt not go and conceive, It is a meer arbitrary thing to God, whether he will receive me to Happineſs or no; this would be an Errour: For God is bound, hath bound himſelf to receive him; and would have us conceive of him as bound by his Promiſe; p. 127and he muſt not go and think (though confeſſed true by both Parties) it is in a true Senſe determined by God, whether I ſhall be ſaved or not, he knowing whether I would return to him or no; but he ought to conſider, God is not at liberty upon my turning to accept or reject me; For he is bound by his promiſe, if I turn I ſhall live; and this Decree, or Will of God is well conſiſtent with this Promiſe, and I muſt make my Notions of the Decrees of God to give way to this Promiſe, and by no means make this Promiſe give way to them; For ſo far as my Notions of his Decrees contradict this promiſe really, ſo far they are falſe: And that Notion about Gods determination which men, verſed in ſuch things, can conceive conſiſtent with this, is built upon his high infinite unſearchable underſtanding and fore-knowledge, what I would do through my free-will only, or through Grace aſſiſting it.

So when a man is Praying, or deſigning to Pray for a thing that is arbitrary to God, e. g. for the Converſion of ſuch a Relation (as Monica for her Son Auſtin) he ought not to riſe ſo high as to think God hath decreed, whether he will convert him or no, in hearing my Prayer or no; and ſo though God be a gracious God hearing Prayers, and hath commanded me to Pray thus for him, and is apt to be moved with Prayers, p. 128yet this Decree may hinder the ſucceſs of this Petition

For this would be an erroneous Conception, and to conceive his degree to be as Ill, and much like the Stoick Fate: For it is to conceive it is not now arbitrary to God to be moved with my Prayers; but it is to conceive though it was at firſt arbitrary to him, yet it is not ſo now, but he is precluded and bound, and ſo it is to conceive ſuch a Decree as is ſomthing diſtinct from his preſent Will. This is, I ſay, to hold Fate, as††Alſo Homer maketh Fate to be foreign, Jupiters ancient determination, and yet I…ad 16. brings in Jupiter weeping and lamenting, that his Da…ling Sarpedon muſt be ſlain by Patroclus, for Jupiter could not help it, becauſe it was fatal to him. Seneca doth: for he maketh Fate (which is well ſpoken thus far) to be nothing elſe but an Eternal Determination of God concerning future things: But then (which is a very ſinful Conception of him) he looks upon it as though it was free to God to determine things at firſt, yet now he is bound by it and cannot help it, ſo that things are not now arbitrary to him being thus bound, Eâdem neceſſitate (ſaith he ſpeaking of Fate) Deos alligat. Ille ipſe omnium conditor & Rector ſcripſit quidem fata, ſed ſequitur: Semper paret, ſemel Juſſit. Sen de provid. Lib. 5. Which is a very irrational Conception, leaning upon his Heatheniſh Apprehenſion, that things may now fall out to move p. 129his Will that were not in his Eternal Willing foreſeen, or particularly apprehended, elſe they might move it now if at Liberty. And every one of our ſhort and finite underſtandings at the firſt notion, as ſoon as we hear or think of an Eternal Decree, are apt to have the like Apprehenſions, till our Reaſons pry a little more into it; as if His Eternal Thoughts and Willing, did not graſp and comprehend all theſe Prayers to be made, as being objected as clearly to him as preſent from all Eternity, to move his Will in the ſenſe wherein we muſt underſtand them to move his Will now.

Let me adviſe all to take heed of ſpeaking or thinking of ſuch things as theſe I am now ſpeaking of; as if they were not free to Him now; as if they were not now to be done pro libitu; as if his Decree was once his Will, but is now ſomething we are to have a notion of beſides his preſent Will; as if the doing of ſuch arbitrary things was not now arbitrary; as if there was ſomething tyed him beſides his Juſtice and Promiſe, beſides his own preſent moſt-free will. Take heed of that Notion, as if he was as much bound by Decrees, or as really, as by Juſtice and Promiſe.

But do you conceive of theſe things meerly of his Will, as being at preſent the free things imaginable, even altogether as free to him as if they were to begin now?

p. 130I mean things of this Nature, that he is no way bound to do, unleſs you will ſay, bound by his Will and Decree, (which we cannot call binding, but in ſuch a contradictious ſenſe; as we ſhould ſay, a man that hath free Choice given him, is bound to do what he Will;) as in giving, or continuing the Goſpel to a People, wherein you are to conceive him ſo free as that he may, or may not be moved with your Prayers for them, even as free as if to begin to determine now. And ſo when you Pray for a good Nights ſleep, which God may or may not give you upon Prayer; you muſt not think, It may be in vain for me to Pray, for he hath decreed I ſhall not have it: this is to hold**Deſine fata Deûm flecti ſperare precando. Virg. Aen. 2. Fate, and to think there is ſomething may hinder him from hearing your Prayers, beſides his preſent Will, and it is to have unworthy Thoughts of God and to hold an Opinion, overthrowing all Religion, if held practically; and it is vertually to deny, this Prayer was objected before him in his Willing or Decreeing this Nights Sleep. Yet it is very hard when we go ſo high in our Thoughts, to get this Fate out of our minds.

And therefore, take a man of the vaſteſt Comprehenſions in this World, and p. 131cleareſt in his Notions about theſe things, and their Conſiſtency with Gods preſent Freedom; yet they are ſo intricate, and require ſuch Intention of the mind to underſtand them conſiſtent, that it is his duty in Prayer for theſe arbitrary things, to apprehend and conceive as if God was now to begin to Will them: and ſuch Apprehenſions are not falſe Apprehenſions, but only inadequate Apprehenſions; and that which the contrary Apprehenſion would immediately ſuggeſt into his mind, would be falſe, viz. That it is not now as arbitrary to him to be moved with Prayer, as if he was to begin to be moved with Prayer now.

If any ſhould object; What, may we pray to God as apprehending, as if he was to decree ſuch things de novo, to begin to Decree now? May we pray that he would change his Decree?

I anſwer, You may, and you may not. Do but conſider, that by the Decree of God, you mean no more than the Will of God, and this may immediately call to mind, that you often pray to God, that he would do things which you fear he will do not, or doubt he will not do; and that he would not do things to the Perſon, Family, or Nation, you fear he is in Anger bent to do; p. 132this you do frequently, and yet do well.

I grant you may not pray that God would alter his Decree, or begin to decree, in the notion that the Word Decree, is uſed by the cuſtome of ſpeaking on both ſides to ſignifie; for it is uſed by almoſt conſtant cuſtom, to denote the Will of God under the very Notion of Eternal, and ſo ſignifieth by common uſe the ſame that theſe very words [To will from Eternity] would do. Now if a man ſhould pray God to will in this ſenſe, or begin to will or change his decree in this ſenſe, it would be in effect, to pray in expreſs Words, and Formally under that very Notion, that he would not Will that now, he Willed from Eternity; which would not be only to pray, not conſidering his Immutability, but to pray him to put off his Attribute of Immutability, which would be fooliſh and ſinful, and contrary to the reſult of our deliberate Conceptions, concerning his Eſſence.

But take the Will of God as we are bound to do in ordinary duties**Abſtractione praeciſionis, ſive abſtractione Simplici; non abſtractione negationis, ſive compoſitâ. abſtractly from that Conſideration, that whatſoever he can will he alwayes Willed; and we may have, yea ought (or we ſhould otherwiſe ſin) to have ſuch Apprehenſions as if he was now to begin to Will it: yea, we ought to pray that p. 133he will do ſuch arbitrary things, as we have ſome reaſon to fear he will not do, as when we pray for ſuch a wilful Sinner's Converſion; we ought to conſider God in this Duty (or we could not be ſerious and ſervent) as one that may, if he pleaſe, be moved with the preſent Duty; and we are not in our Addreſſes to conſider him, as one whoſe Will was to be moved, or the Requeſt to be arbitrarily denied with this preſent Prayer foreſeen from Eternity.

It would be a weak pretence for any to reply; We pray only in Obedience, and not to attain the things prayed for; or to ſay, We do not pray to incline, or to move Gods will; or to ſay, We pray for the thing, but not to encline Gods will: If ſo, you pray only with your Lips, but not with your Hearts; it is to ſay, We pray for the thing, but not, ut velit, that God would do it; which is in effect to ſay, We pray it may be done without, or againſt his Will, or, We do not pray he would do it out of Love or good Will.

As you are to conceive God hath a Will, or you would have ſinful Conceptions; ſo you are to conceive of God as being moved with his Peoples Prayers; and the contrary Conception to this would be falſe: For it would be this, That it is all one to God in giving benefits, whether they pray or pray not, for the attaining of thoſe benefits: And p. 134then if you conceive of God, as moved with prayer, you can conceive nothing moved by prayers, but his Will.

I expect that ſome will yet ſay, You make God the Author of Sin and mens miſery; for if you hold that God doth more for the Converſion of ſome, than others, then you hold he doth leſs for the Converſion of ſome than others, and that he did not Will to do ſo much for them as others as bad as they. I would ſtop mens mouths, if poſſible. You muſt be ſo ignorant as not to underſtand what I have ſaid, or you muſt grant, that ſince I do not make him the Author of ſin, in turning ſome men actually from ſin, which is a contradiction, that therefore I make him the Author of ſin and mens miſery in thoſe Aſſertions wherein I comply with you, for I hold: He doth for all men, as much as you do toward their Converſion; I mean, ſetting a ſide the ſecond power which (becauſe I have a greater diſlike of, than I can expreſs) I will ſhew you it is nothing, but what I grant every man hath, viz. meer humane Nature, or it is worſe than nothing.

And I will, if I can, make it very plain, that all may take heed leſt, upon any fair pretence whatſoever, they ſhould aſcribe no more to Grace than p. 135**Non dicit Chriſtus, Omni qui audivit à patre & aidicit, venire poteſt ad me, ſed venit. Venire poſſe in naturâ ponit, Pelagius vel etiam, ut modo dicere capit in gratiâ. Aug. lib. 1. de grat. adverſ. Pelag & Celeſt. cap. 10. Sub ambiguâ generalitate quid ſentiret abſcondens; gratiae tamen vocabulo frangens invidiam, oſſenſionem que declinans, ibid. cap. 37.Pelagius did, that at laſt found out a way to uſe the word Grace, and God's giving men Grace to obey, but meant by it, meerly God's giving the Natural power of free-will, which a man cannot be a man without, or ſin without, confounding Natrue and Grace, as Auſtin complains.

It is a Firſt-born of wonders to me, that ſo many learned men ſhould with confidence maintain that a man is not to blame, or not inexcuſable in not chuſing Good, or not refuſing Evil, except he be made by Grace, through Chriſt, foreign, and foreign, that is, having a Will as equally enclined to Good as Evil; which is, at leaſt, to ſay, No man ſins, or is to blame, except he be a better man than ordinary. And it is the like wonder to me that they ſhould not ſee, The effect of the Grace ſpoken of in Scripture, and prayed ſo much for, and diſputed ſo much concerning theſe Controverſies, is ſomthing that men can poſſibly ſin without, can ſin though God deny it them: for we need not, yea, cannot rationally pray for it, p. 136to keep us from ſin, if we cannot ſin without it.

And now I am ſpeaking of wonders, take this alſo into the number, that thoſe learned men on the other ſide, that hold, that men can, and do ſin, and are to blame, though God do deny them that Grace ſpoken of, to keep them from ſin; that yet they ſhould deny that men in ſome true ſenſe can do otherwiſe without it: For this is to ſay, that all our Repentance is only for doing ſomthing that we could in no ſenſe have done otherwiſe.

Now, leſt you ſhould ſuſpect that I ſpeak thus vehemently without reaſon, againſt this aequilibrium, that it is pretended Grace only gives; let me obtain leave to digreſs a little farther, to put you out of this ſuſpition. Tully de nat. Deorum, tells us of One arguing thus, As giving Wine to ſick perſons often doth hurt, and ſeldome good; and therefore it is better never to give Wine to ſick people: So it had been better that Man had not been indued with Reaſon, becauſe it doth more men hurt than good. Now we can well anſwer this Objection; The compalint is unreaſonable, becauſe we had not been men without Reaſon; and, what hurt cometh to men by their Reaſon, is through their own default; and, much good might come by it, did they uſe it aright. But me thinks it may be made apparent, that that called Grace, p. 137which ſome will only admit, would, as they explain it, be really unlucky and miſchievous, and no benefit can poſſibly be aſſigned to come to men by it. And becauſe I would not be over-large, ſo as to weary you in making this out, let me beg I may take theſe things for granted, and not be put to prove them; and I think I am not immodeſt in my begging. Firſt; That multitudes of men will periſh. Secondly, That all would have been ſaved eternally in Heaven, that ſhould not ſin, or diſobey God in any thing; I mean, that there is no middle ſtate between Heaven and Hell for men. Thirdly; That I may have leave to take their explications of this general Grace, that maintain and plead for it, without naming the Authors, who are many, and deſervedly much eſteemed in other things; and I will not mention by way of diſparagement any needleſly. Any one may ſoon ſee whether I ſet down their explications of it bonâ fide or no; yea, any one may underſtand that every one of theſe things following, are eſſential to it, to ſupport it, that it be not either needleſs to the making men culpable, and inexcuſable, that have the Natural faculty; or meerly giving the ſaculties; or no way ſubſerving their deſigne, to avoid eſpecial Grace; that is, Gods doing ſomthing for one, in order to his Salvation, that he doth not for another, and that without p. 138reſpect to any good in him. Now their Affirmations concerning it are theſe. Firſt, This Grace is given to all men alike. Secondly, The Effect of this Grace is a thing, that men would be found men without; I mean, men in their right Wits, having the right Natural uſe of their Faculties without it. For they affirm that to ſay, Grace only, giveth the Natural Faculties, would be Pelagianiſm; and deny they mean by Gods grace, this giving the Natural Power. Thirdly, They call this, which I call the Natural Power & the Faculties, the remote Power of Willing and Obeying, but they call that which grace giveth to all men Proximam potentiam, a next, Proximate Power; which is not given to make men††Take notice I do grant, that they do ſay, this Grace is given to make men Actually willing, and they uſe to complain that they miſ-repreſent them that ſhould ſay, they hold that God doth not make thoſe Actually willing that are ſo: For he that giveth the Talent, doth in a true ſenſe cauſe the Improvement of it. But they tell us, They mean Grace giveth men Actually to Will no further than this common way, by giving a power of Chooſing or Refuſing: And if I have any Expreſſions that may ſeem contrary to this, I ſo far wrong them. Actually willing, and Actually to Believe and Obey, but to give men a Proximam potentiam, a ſecond next Power of Believing and Obeying if they would. The Effect of Grace is ſay they, to give a man ſuch Power as putteth him in bivio, in an Equipoize: giveth him a more full ſecond Power of chooſing p. 139Good and Evil; by this he is enabled more proximately to obey the Goſpel if he would. Fourthly, They ſay, a man would have been in no fault in not believing and obeying the Goſpel, if God had not in Grace given him this proximate Power; he could not have ſinned in not repenting, or believing without this Power which Grace giveth, and that for this Reaſon; becauſe he could not but diſobey the Goſpel without it, and could not but**They mean without doubt materially; do that Act which is materially Sin without it. Sin without it: And to ſay that he could do otherwiſe than ſin without it, ſay they, would be Pelagianiſm. Fifthly, They ſay, it is no ſin for a man to do a thing a man could not but do, or omit a thing he could not but omit.

Now let any man, if theſe things be ſo, tell me, what this Grace (paſſively taken) this proximate Power, that Grace (Actively taken) giveth, is good for:

Firſt, you cannot ſay to make them Men; for they would have been as perfect men without it.

Secondly, You cannot ſay, That they might be enabled to Obey the Goſpel: For what Loſs would there have been to men if they had not Obeyed the Goſpel? There would have been, according to theſe Principles, no need of Obeying of it, if this proximate Power had not been given: Becauſe they could not have Obeyed the Goſpel p. 140without it; and ſo becauſe they could not, it would have been no Sin in them, no Diſobedience not to obey the Goſpel, though they had been ſound men. And to deny this would be to grant what I have proved; and what they oppoſe, That men are to blame in not doing what they have the Natural Faculties to do, though they have not this proximate Power of Grace: And alſo would make it needleſs for this end, viz To make them inexcuſable.

Thirdly, You cannot ſay that this Grace was needful that men might be ſaved; For they would be ſaved if they did not Sin, and they could not Sin without this Grace, giving the proximate Power; becauſe they could not but Sin without it; could not but Diſobey the Goſpel without it And therefore it would have been no Diſobedience, or Culpableneſs, becauſe they could not do otherwiſe; and therefore all men would have been ſaved if this Grace had not been given, for they could not have been Condemned for no fault, and therefore muſt have been ſaved.

Fourthly; You cannot ſay, But though they would not if this Grace had been denyed, have been Condemned for Diſobeying the Goſpel; yet they would have been Condemned for breaking the Law: For according to theſe Principles, they could not but Diſobey the Law without this Grace; and p. 141therefore it would have been no ſin in them to Diſobey the Law, and they could not be Condemned, becauſe they could not do otherwiſe than do it, and ſo they would have been ſaved.

Obj. But you will ſay, Your Accuſation is too high; for if this Grace be granted to do no good to men, yet ſurely it doth them no hurt.

Anſ. Yea, according to theſe Principles if it be but granted, That ſome men will periſh; for none would have periſhed had not this proximate Power been given; becauſe, as they ſay, they could not have done otherwiſe, and ſo, as they ſay, it would have been no Fault, and God could not have Condemned men for it; and ſo there being no middle ſtate, all would have been without this Grace, ſound and perfect men here, and might have lived jolly and jovial Lives, and have been ſaved at laſt in Heaven.

You cannot tell me, I cannot anſwer theſe Difficulties: For you have ſeen or may ſee, how this diſtinction of Natural and Moral Impotency, if admitted, doth unty, or rather cut all theſe Knots, by ſhewing; This Grace of theirs is needeleſs, for the end aſſigned by them to it, viz. To make men inexcuſable by giving them Tower of Willing, and Power to Obey if they would; p. 142and that Grace which they deny, is neceſſary (in a right ſenſe) to a greater end, to make men actually willing.

I could further ſhew you the Inconſiſtency with it ſelf, and the Contradiction to Scripture, and the**It might truly be ſaid, if this Opinion of theirs was true; That men can for any Impotency whatſoever on them to the contrary, ſo live all their Lives, as not to need Pardon, or Chriſt's Satisfaction for any of their Omiſſions or Commiſſions. danger of this Tenent, which yet is a Foundation-Principle of ſome Diſcourſes, viz. That the Impotency that the Scripture ſpeaks of upon men to any good, is not (to the immediate Duty to be performed) either upon good or bad men now, nor was then, elſe they had been blamleſs (ſay they) in not doing that Duty: but only it ſignifieth what would have been upon men, if that Grace through Chriſt had not taken it off from all. But I have ſpoken enough for them that will conſider words of Sobriety and truth, and too much for them that will not.

Obj. But whence came this Moral Impotency?

I will not ſay, What is that to you? (becauſe it is ſomething to you): but I will ſay, What have you to do to ask this here? For I am not now ſpeaking about it, and you have no need to ask it for the Underſtanding of what

p. 143I have ſpoken; It can ſtand on it's own legs, without flying to that forrein, or more remote help; however I am reſolved to try it for a time, for ſome Reaſons. I anſwer, Firſt, It came not from God, he made man upright.

Secondly; The Scripture teacheth you how ſin came into the World, and much is ſaid, and may be ſaid of that, to juſtifie God againſt mens accuſations; and much may be ſaid for our encreaſing it on our ſelves; But my buſineſs is deſignedly not to intereſt this diſcourſe in it.

Thirdly; Let it come which way it**Non refert ſcelus unde, &c. will, you ſee it doth not excuſe, and ſo do all men, whatſoever they ſay to the contrary.

Fourthly; You ſee, or may ſee (I ſpeak adviſedly) that there is no Impotency can hinder your Salvation, but what you may prevail againſt, if you would: for I have ſhewed you it differs not from the Will, not in ſpecie.

Take notice I have not at all denyed Natural Impotency on us (for I ſhould then contradict my own judgment) but only ſay, it excuſes ſo far as it hinders.

There is much of Natural Impotency to many deſireable things, yea, in the beſt in this life, as a puniſhment, or product of Adams Fall, and much as a puniſhment, or effect of our (in a ſtricter ſenſe) own ſins, p. 144e. g. many ignorances, and roving extravagancies of the mind, melancholly, yea, and natural deſires or inclinations in the ſenſitive part of the affections, which are not at all ſubject to the Will and underſtanding. And God may and doth heal ſuch things by degrees, by way of reward, upon prayer and endeavours of his people, for their comfort, help, and encouragement in their Chriſtian courſe; And alſo it may be, that repeated contrary-acts, and repeated denials, do in a natural way leſſen ſome altogether involuntary ſenſitive deſires. But theſe things, though done by God and his Spirit, may be matter of the promiſſory part of his promiſes, but not of the mandatory or conditional part of them; however not immediately, that is till thoſe impediments be removed, and in the mean time, we are to uſe thoſe means that we are to expect the removal of them in. I do believe, that not only the rational part of the affections, and that part which is now ſubject to the Will, but the moſt ſenſitive part of them, was ſubject to the Will in Adam, before his Fall, and that he could not ſay, as we, I would not be troubled, or affraid, or put into a trembling, but cannot help it; I would have the more affecting and ſenſible part of joy, but cannot.

But now alaſs, if a man would as much as he can, without any unwillingneſs, many p. 145ſuch paſſions cannot be cauſed, or prevened; and ſome deſireable paſſions are cauſed, when our deſires and volitions of them, are leſs vehement; and conſequently, when we leſs pleaſe God in our duties, being more wanting in our duty and obedience.

There is ſuch a thing as Obligation and Duty growing upon us; that becomes duty, that was not ſo before, upon ſome Natural inward impediment removed by God's Spirit or otherwiſe; ſo that after, it would be ones ſin not to do, or not to do to ſuch a meaſure, things which before were not a duty, (however immediately) and yet things greatly deſirable, and their want to be lamented.

But there is a preſent Obligation, and it is the preſent duty of every man that hath his faculties and an objective evidence, this day to perform the Goſpel condition, to conſent heartily to the obedience of Faith, and reſolve to hold on; and if he did this which he hath the Natural power to do, and ſhould dye, he ſhould be ſaved; elſe he might ſay, I would, and thou would not; and not only his duty to do ſomthing that may mediately and remotely tend to this, elſe we muſt ſay, It is not his duty this day to Repent and Believe, and he doth not ſin in not doing it; but only in not doing ſomthing elſe that may remotely tend to it. e. g. It is not this day a mans duty to read the p. 146Scriptures that cannot, and ſo not his ſin he doth not, though he had opportunities to learn and ſinfully loſt them; but only it is his ſin, that he doth not lament ſuch loſs of opportunities, and that he doth not reſolve and endeavour to uſe ſuch means whereby he may learn; and when he can read, it will be his duty to read. So if a man complain of diſtractions, and a ſhattered head and thoughts in duty, and that theſe came on him by his own former negligence, we muſt ſay he is to lament theſe as an affliction and chaſtiſement for his ſin; but they are formally ſins only, ſo far as they do not diſpleaſe him enough, ſo far as his Will is not enough ſet againſt them; and it is not his duty to have his duties free from them, if his greateſt deſire cannot attain it; But it is his preſent duty to pray againſt them, and to uſe Gods means to be freed; and when they are once ſubjected by God, more or leſs to his Will, then it would be his ſin to have his duties torn, or ſo partly torne proportionably, becauſe then it cometh for want of preſent due care and watchfulneſs.

As for the Affections or Paſſions, I judg as**Intereſt autem qualis ſit volunt as hominis, quia ſi perver ſa eſt, perverſos habebit hos motus: Si autem recta eſt, non ſolum inculpabi les verum etiamlaudabiles erant-Volantas eſt quippe in omnibus; imo omnes nihil aliud quam viluntates ſunt. Nam quid eſt cupiditas, & laetitia, niſi volm…as in eorum conſenſionem quae volumus? Et, quid eſts me…us at que triſtitia, niſi volunt as in diſſ…nſionem ab his quae nolumus: Aug. de Giv. Dei. Cap. 6. lib. 14. many others, that the chief rational p. 147part of what we call the affections both concupiſcible and iraſcible, is but the very motion, the inclination or averſation of the Will, reſpectively differing according to the variety of the objects apprehended as Good or Evil, preſent or abſent, eaſily or difficultly attainable or avoidable, e. g. Love is a complacency of the Will, deſire a volition of a thing abſent, and this very deſire, were the thing preſent, or preſent in the imagination, would be joy; and if ſo, the chief part of the affections is elicited and not imperated. And as for the more paſſionate and ſenſitive part of them which is imperated by the Will this may be ſaid, that in ſome the more ſenſitive part is more ſubject to the Will than in others; and only ſo far as they are ſubject to the Will, they are capable of ſin; and ſo far only as they are not willed enough, or not nilled enough, they are ſinful.

And that Diſtinction of the School-men may be applyed unto them all, and be of much uſe to us. Amor, dolor, timor; affectivus and appretiativus; affective love and appretiative love. By the appretiative, they mean the more rational and leſs ſenſitive part of the affections. Take this inſtance, ſuppoſe the Husbands of two Women are dead; one Wife, it may be none of the moſt loving, is exceſſive in ſenſible ſorrow, the other a more loving p. 148Wife is more compoſed, and cannot obtain of her ſelf that paſſionate ſtirring of grief. Now this is a ſure rule to go by, to judg who loved moſt; ſhe doth the more truely love, and more truly grieve that would give moſt of what is dear to her, to redeem his life. It may be one would give much, the other that hath overflowing paſſions but a little. If a man do Will and deſire God and things above, above all the world, ſo as to put him on all endeavours, this is the true rational Love, and would be accepted, though he ſhould not have the more ſenſible paſſionate affective part: So if he have ſuch a real diſplicency and diſlike of ſin, ſo as he would give all the world to be freed from offending God; this would be accepted without the more paſſionate and ſenſible grief.

But yet the more ſenſible part of the affections is greatly deſireable, and the want ordinarily to be lamented, and God giveth it as a reward & ſenſible encouragement to his people. And it is without doubt wonderful difficult, and it rquires a great meaſure of Grace to keep the Will conſtant and reſolved, with full purpoſe of heart cleaving to the Lord, when affections have not theſe ſenſible taſts in paſſionate complacencies and meltings, which are ſenſible encourageing ſmiles from above; I mean (for there may be great deceit here) p. 149when in Conjunction with the integrity of the heart and Will. But the main thing we are to enquire after, and judg our ſelves by, is the appretiative part, the more voluntary and rational part.

Pardon ſuch expreſſions as theſe, which I have uſed, (partly careleſly, and partly for explication ſake, that I might the better be underſtood.) He can Will it if he would, or he cannot Will it if he would, which hypothetical ſpeeches are not proper. You may indeed ſay of imperate acts that a man can do them if he would, or cannot if he would; But of the elicite acts that are no way imperated, you muſt only ſay, he can Will, or he cannot Will a thing ſimply: or he hath, or hath not the Natural power or foreign, or faculty of Willing the thing; or he hath or hath not the Moral power, of Willing it. And I confeſs alſo, it is not proper to ſay, A man can believe; perform the Goſpel condition if he would, but ſimply he can perform it: for it is in effect to ſay he can conſent if he would. But the impropriety here is competently well hidden, by the variety of expreſſion, and the vulgar takeing of it as differing from volition, as if it was rather imperated than elicited by the Will. Yet I have uſed ſome expreſſions (and I doubt not, properly) that ſeem to contradict this; as when I ſay, A good man would fain p. 150draw on his Will further to Good, and further from Evil; that is, he would Will good more. But ſuch paſſages if well conſidered, do not, I think, contradict this really. Let this be weighed a little; Any one that ſpeculatively conſiders his own Souls actings may perceive that there is not only a direct act of the Will, a direct volition that is carried ſtraight forward, to its external object; but a reflex act of the Will, that hath an act of the will for its object; elſe a man could not pray for the willing of Good. A man may not only Will that which is Good, which is the direct act, but may will and deſire, that he did Will and deſire ſuch a thing more; and this ſecond or reflect act is really a Will, a volition, being upon reaſons, and alſo diſtinct from the other direct volition, having a quite differing object, and whether it be poſſible to go further with another reflex act terminated on this reflect act is a queſtion, but I ſuppoſe one may. But then (which keeps truth in what I have ſpoken) It ſeems the direct act of Willing is eſſentially before the reflex; and that a man cannot Will he did Will ſuch a thing, till firſt he do Will it really, or (which comes all to one) he cannot, Will he did not Will ſuch a thing till firſt we have a direct averſation of his Will to it. A wicked man cannot remiſsly Will he did Will that which is p. 151Good (as it is granted he may) till firſt he have a direct remiſs Will to it: and if this was not ſo, it would object before us a moſt perplexing difficulty. Though yet to come to a meer ſenſitive appetite, a man may deſire he had it, though he have it not; or that he had it not, though he have it. So that this doth not contradict what was ſaid: for in propriety a man cannot Will a thing if he would, except he do Will it.

And alſo I ſaid, an act of the Will, which is meerly elicited; But here (which is ſtrange) we muſt grant ſuch a thing as the Will imperating a volition, or quaſi imperating a volition, diſtinct from eliciting one. And yet this reflex volition cannot, I think, poſſibly have any imperated effect of its imperating a volotion immediately to increaſe the direct volition immediately; but only can encreaſe it by putting a man on the uſe of ſuch means as may encreaſe the direct volition. As for example, A man doth by this reflex Will for ſome good reaſons, will and deſire he did will and deſire, and love God and holineſs more; This reflex will though in its own Nature, and formally it comprehendeth more of volition, yet it doth not cauſe a man to love, deſire or Will God and Goodneſs more, with the direct act immediatly; but only it cauſeth a man to pray for it, and read and meditate on ſuch things as may encreaſe the p. 152direct volition; ſo that the direct act is not ſubject to the imperation of the reflex act at all immediately; but yet it is remotely; for the reflex act puts him on uſeing means to get a more clear, or more abiding apprehenſion of the worth and goodneſs of the object, to cauſe a higher and more practical dictate of the underſtanding, that the direct act of the Will may be thereby encreaſed; it excites and ſets that on work that can prevail.

Let any one try if any uſe may be made of this, either to diſcover the prevailing intereſt and bent of the Soul more fully, or any other way. Any attempt of mine, I ſee, will be in vain here; ſuch things are too wonderful for me. What boldneſs is it for men that know their own Souls nature and acts ſo little, to pretend to know more of God and his actings, who curiouſly wrought this Soul, than he hath revealed to us?

I ſhall account what I have here written loſt in part, if it have not ſome good effect upon the Readers in reference to their Morals, as well as intellectuals; And therefore will add ſomthing by way of practical application, and hope therein to anſwer ſome objections that may yet be in your thoughts.