Sermons and Discourses Volume 1, Frontispiece – Table of contents
His Grace John Lord Arch-Biſhop of Canterbury.
SERMONS PREACH'D Upon ſeveral Occaſions.
By His Grace JOHN Lord Arch-Biſhop of Canterbury.
The Firſt Volume.
The Eighth Edition Corrected.
LONDON, Printed for Brabazon Aylmer, at the Three Pigeons againſt the Royal Exchange in Cornhil; and William Rogers, at the Sun againſt St. Dunſtans Church in Fleet-ſtreet. 1694.
To the Worſhipfull the Maſters of the Bench, and the reſt of the Members of the Honourable Society of Lincolns-Inn.
Gentlemen.
WHen I reſolv'd to publiſh theſe Sermons, there could be no diſpute to whom I ſhould dedicate them. They do of right belong to you, being moſt of them firſt preach'd among you; beſides my great obligation to you for your conſtant reſpects to me, both in the favourable acceptance and in the generous encouragement of my labours, ever ſince I had the honour and happineſs to be related to you. In a thankfull acknowledgment whereof I humbly preſent this ſmall part of them to you, hoping that by the bleſſing of God they may be of ſome uſe for the promoting of true piety and vertue, which is the ſincere wiſh and aim of
Your moſt obliged and faithfull Servant, John Cant.
The Preface.
I Shall neither trouble the Reader, nor my ſelf, with any apology for the publiſhing of theſe Sermons. For if they be in any meaſure truly ſerviceable to the end for which they are deſign'd, to eſtabliſh men in the Principles of Religion and to recommend to them the practice of it with any conſiderable advantage, I do not ſee what Apology is neceſſary, and if they be not ſo, I am ſure none can be ſufficient. However if there need any, the common heads of excuſe in theſe caſes are very well known; and I hope I have an equal right to them with other men.
I ſhall chuſe rather in this Preface, to give a ſhort account of the following Diſcourſes; and as briefly as I can to vindicate a ſingle paſſage in the firſt of them from the Exceptions of a Gentleman who hath been pleas'd to honour it ſo far as to write a whole Book againſt it.
The Deſign of theſe Diſcourſes is fourfold.
Firſt, To ſhew the unreaſonableneſs of Atheiſm, and of ſcoffing at Religion; which I am ſorry is ſo neceſſary to be done in this Age. This I have endeavour'd in the two firſt of theſe Diſcourſes.
Secondly, To recommend Religion to men from the great and manifold advantages which it brings both to publick Society and to particular perſons. And this is the argument of the third and fourth.
Thirdly, To repreſent the excellency, more particularly, of the Chriſtian Religion; and to vindicate the practiſe of it from the ſuſpicion of thoſe grievous troubles and difficulties which many imagine it to be attended withall. And this is the ſubject of the fifth and ſixth.
Fourthly, To perſwade men to the practice of this holy Religion, from the great obligation which the profeſſion of Chriſtianity lays upon men to that purpoſe; and more particularly, from the glorious rewards of another life; which is the deſign of the two laſt Diſcourſes.
Having given this ſhort account of the following Diſcourſes, I crave leave of the Reader to detain him a little longer, whilſt I vindicate a paſſage in the firſt of theſe Sermons, from the aſſaults of a whole Book purpoſely writ againſt it. The Title of the Book is Faith vindicated from the poſſibility of Falſhood. The Author Mr. J. S. the famous Author of Sure footing. He hath indeed in this laſt Book of his, to my great amazement, quitted that glorious. Title. Not that I dare aſſume to my ſelf to have put him out of conceit with it, by having convinc'd him of the phantaſticalneſs of it. No, I deſpair to convince that man of any thing, who after ſo fair an admonition does ſtill perſiſt to maintain,*Letter of Thanks p. 24, &c. that firſt and ſelf-evident Principles not onelyonly may, but are fit to be demonſtrated; and†Ibid. p. 11. that thoſe ridiculous identical Propoſitions, that Faith is Faith, and a Rule is a Rule, are firſt Principle, in this Controverſie… of the Rule of Faith, without which nothing can be ſolidly concluded either about Rule or Faith. But there was another reaſon for his quitting of that Title, and a prudent one indeed: He had forſaken the defence of Sure footing, and then it became convenient to lay aſide that Title, for fear of putting people any more in mind of that Book.
I expected indeed after his Letter of Thanks, in which he*P. 14. tells us, he intended to throw aſide the rubbiſh of my Book, that in his Anſwer he might the better lay open the Fabrick of my Diſcourſe, and have nothing there to doe, but to ſpeak to ſolid Points; I ſay, after this, I expected a full Anſwer to the ſolid Points (as he is pleaſed to call them) of my Book; and that, (according to his excellent method of removing the rubbiſh, in order to the pulling down of a building) the Fabrick of my Book would long ſince have been demoliſh'd and laid even with the ground. But eſpecially, when in the concluſion of that moſt civil and obliging Letter, he threatn'd never to leave following on his blow, till he had either brought Dr. Still. and me to lay Principles that would bear the teſt, or it was made evident to all the world that we had none: I began (as I had reaſon) to be in a terrible fear of him, and to look upon my ſelf as a dead man. And indeed who can think himſelf ſo conſiderable as not to dread this mighty man of Demonſtration, this Prince of Controvertiſts, this great Lord and Poſſeſſour of Firſt Principles? But I perceive that great minds are mercifull, and do ſometimes content themſelves to threaten when they could deſtroy.
For inſtead of returning a full Anſwer to my Book, he (according to their new mode of confuting Books) manfully falls a nibbling at one ſingle paſſage in it, pag. 118. wherein he makes me to ſay (for I ſay no ſuch thing) that the Rule of Chriſtian Faith, and conſequently Faith it ſelf, is poſſible to be falſe, Nay in his Letter of Thanks, *P. 13.he ſays it is an avow'd Poſition, in that place, that Faith is poſſible to be falſe. And to give the more countenance to this calumny, he chargeth the ſame Poſition (in equivalent terms) of the poſſible falſhood of Faith, and that as to the chiefeſt and moſt fundamental Point, the Tenet of a Deity, upon the forementioned Sermon. But becauſe he knew in his conſcience, that I had avow'd no ſuch Poſition, he durſt not cite the words either of my Book or Sermon leſt the Reader ſhould have diſcover'd the notorious falſhood and groundleſneſs of this Calumny: Nay he durſt not ſo much as refer to any particular place in my Sermon, where ſuch a paſſage might be found. And yet this is the Man that has the face to charge others with falſe citations, to which charge, before I have done, I ſhall ſay ſomething, which (what effect ſoever it may have upon him) would make any other man ſufficiently aſham'd.
But yet I muſt acknowledge, that in this Poſition which he faſtens upon me, he honours me with excellent company, my Lord Faulkland, Mr. Chillingworth, and Dr. Stillingfleet; Perſons of that admirable ſtrength and clearneſs in their Writings, that Mr. S. when he reflects upon his own ſtyle and way of reaſoning, may bluſh to acknowledge that ever he has read them. And as to this Poſition which he charges them withall, I do not know (nor have the leaſt reaſon upon Mr. S's word to believe) any ſuch thing is maintained by them.
As for my ſelf, whom I am now onelyonly concern'd to vindicate, I ſhall ſet down the two Paſſages to which I ſuppoſe he refers.
In my Sermon, I endeavour (among other things) to ſhew the unreaſonableneſs of Atheiſm upon this account: Becauſe it requires more evidence for things than they are capable of. To make this good, I diſcourſe thus: Ariſtotle hath long ſince obſerved, how unreaſonable it is to expect the ſame kind of Proof for every thing, which we have for ſome things. Mathematical things being of an abſtracted nature, are onelyonly capable of clear Demonſtration. But Concluſions in Natural Philoſophy, are to be prov'd by a ſufficient Induction of experiments; things of a Moral nature, by Moral Arguments, and Matters of Fact by credible Teſtimony. And though none of theſe be ſtrict Demonſtration, yet have we an undoubted aſſurance of them, when they are prov'd by the beſt Arguments that the nature and quality of the thing will bear. None can demonſtrate to me, that there is ſuch an Iſland in America as Jamaica; yet upon the Teſtimony of credible perſons, and Authours who have written of it, I am as free from all doubt concerning it, as from doubting of the cleareſt Mathematical Demonſtration. So that this is to be entertained as a firm Principle, by all thoſe who pretend to be certain of any thing at all, that when any thing is prov'd by as good Arguments as that thing is capable of, and we have as great aſſurance that it is, as we could poſſibly have ſuppoſing it were, we ought not in reaſon to make any doubt of the exiſtence of that thing. Now to apply this to the preſent caſe. The being of God is not Mathematically demonſtrable, nor can it be expected it ſhould; becauſe onelyonly Mathematical matters admit of this kind of evidence. Nor can it be prov'd immediately by ſenſe, beauſe God being ſuppos'd to be a pure Spirit, cannot be the object of any corporeal ſenſe. But yet we have as great aſſurance that there is a God, as the nature of the thing to be prov'd is capable of, and as we could in reaſon expect to have, ſuppoſing that he were.
Ʋpon this paſſage it muſt be (if any thing in the Sermon) that Mr. S. chargeth this Poſition (in equivalent terms) of the poſſible falſhood of Faith, and that as to the chiefeſt and moſt fundamental Point, the Tenet of a Deity. And now I appeal to the Reader's Eyes and Judgment, whether the ſum of what I have ſaid, be not this, That though the exiſtence of God be not capable of that ſtrict kind of Demonſtration which Mathematical matters are, yet, that we have an undoubted aſſurance of it. One would think that no man could be ſo ridiculous as from hence to infer, that I believe it poſſible, notwithſtanding this aſſurance; that there ſhould be no God. For however in many other caſes an undoubted aſſurance that a thing is, may not exclude all ſuſpicion of a poſſibility of its being otherwiſe; yet in this Tenet of a Deity it moſt certainly does. Becauſe whoever is aſſur'd that there is a God, is aſſur'd there is a Being whoſe exiſtence is and always was neceſſary, and conſequently is aſſured that it is impoſſible he ſhould not be, and involves in it a contradiction. So that my Diſcourſe is ſo far from being equivalent to the Poſition he mentions, that it is a perfect contradiction to it. And he might with as much truth have affirm'd, that I had expreſly, and in ſo many words ſaid that there is no God.
The other paſſage is in pag. 118. of my Book, concerning the Rule of Faith. I was diſcourſing that no man can ſhew by any neceſſary argument, that it is naturally impoſſible that all the Relations concerning America ſhould be falſe. But yet (ſay I) I ſuppoſe that notwithſtanding this, no man in his wits is now poſſeſt with ſo incredible a folly, as to doubt whether there be ſuch a place. The caſe is the very ſame as to the certainty of an ancient Book, and of the ſenſe of plain expreſſions: We have no demonſtration for theſe things, and we expect none; becauſe we know the things are not capable of it. We are not infallibly certain, that any Book is ſo ancient as it pretends to be; or that it was written by him whoſe Name it bears; or that this is the ſenſe of ſuch and ſuch paſſages in it; it is poſſible all this may be otherwiſe: But we are very well aſſur'd that it is not, nor hath any prudent man any juſt cauſe to make the leaſt doubt of it; For a bare poſſibility that a thing may be, or not be, is no juſt cauſe of doubting whether a thing be or not. It is poſſible all the people in France may dye this night, but I hope the poſſiblity of this doth not incline any man in the leaſt to think it will be ſo. It is poſſible that the Sun may not riſe to morrow morning; yet for all this I ſuppoſe that no man hath the leaſt doubt but that it will.
To avoid the cavils of this impertinent Man, I have tranſcrib'd the whole Page to which he refers. And now where is this avow'd Poſition of the poſſible falſhood of Faith? All that I ſay is this, That we are not infallible either in judging of the antiquity of a Book, or of the ſenſe of it; by which I mean (as any man of ſenſe and ingenuity would eaſily perceive I do) that we cannot demonſtrate theſe things of, as to ſhew that the contrary neceſſarily involves a contradiction; but yet that we may have a firm aſſurance concerning theſe matters, ſo as not to make the leaſt doubt of them.
And is this to avow the poſſible falſhood of Faith? And yet this Poſition Mr. S. charges upon theſe words; how juſtly I ſhall now examine.
Either by Faith Mr. S. means the Doctrine reveal'd by God, and then the meaning of the Poſition muſt be, that what God ſays, is poſſible to be falſe; which is ſo abſurd a Poſition as can hardly enter into any man's mind; and yet Mr. S. hath the modeſty all along in his Book to inſinuate that in the forecited Paſſage I ſay as much as this comes to.
Or elſe Mr. S. means by Faith, the aſſent which we give to Doctrines as reveal'd by God; and then his ſenſe of infallibility muſt be either that whoever aſſents to any thing as reveal'd by God, cannot be deceiv'd, upon ſuppoſition that it is ſo reveal'd; or elſe abſolutely, that whoever aſſents to any thing as reveal'd by God, cannot be deceiv'd. Now although I do not, in the Paſſage forecited, ſpeak one ſyllable concerning Doctrines reveal'd by God, yet I affirm (and ſo will any man elſe) that an aſſent to any Doctrine as revealed by God, if it be reveal'd by him, is impoſſible to be falſe. But this is onelyonly an infallibility upon ſuppoſition, which amounts to no more than this, That if a thing be true, it is impoſſible to be falſe. And yet the principal deſign of Mr. S's Book is to prove this, which I believe no man in the world was ever ſo ſenſeleſs as to deny. But if he mean abſolutely, that whoever aſſents to any Doctrine as reveal'd by God, cannot be deceiv'd, that is, that no man can be miſtaken about matters of Faith (as he muſt mean, if he pretend to have any adverſary, and do not fight onelyonly with his own ſhadow,) this I confeſs is a very comfortable aſſertion, but I am much afraid it is not true.
Or elſe laſtly, By Faith he underſtands the Means and Motives of Faith. And then the plain ſtate of the controverſie between us is this, Whether it be neceſſary to a Chriſtian belief to be infallibly ſecur'd of the means whereby the Chriſtian Doctrine is convey'd to us, and of the firmneſs of the Motives upon which our belief of it is grounded. This indeed is ſomething to the purpoſe; for though in the paſſage before-cited, I ſay not one word concerning the Motives of our Belief of the Chriſtian Doctrine, yet my diſcourſe there was intended to be apply'd to the means whereby the knowledge of this Doctrine is convey'd to us. However, I am contented to joyn iſſue with Mr. S. upon both theſe Points.
1. That it is not neceſſary to the true nature of Faith, that the Motives upon which any man believes the Chriſtian Doctrine ſhould be abſolutely concluſive, and impoſſible to be falſe. That it is neceſſary, Mr. S. ſeveral times affirms in his Book; but how unreaſonably, appears from certain and daily experience. Very many Chriſtians (ſuch as St. Auſtin ſpeaks of, as ſav'd not by the quickneſs of their underſtandings, but the ſimplicity of their belief) do believe the Chriſtian Doctrine upon incompetent grounds, and their belief is true, though the argument upon which they ground it be not (as Mr. S. ſays) abſolutely concluſive of the thing: And he that thus believes the Chriſtian Doctrine, if he adhere to it, and live accordingly, ſhall undoubtedly be ſav'd; and yet I hope Mr. S. will not ſay that any man ſhall be ſaved without true Faith. I might add, that in this Aſſertion Mr. S. is plainly contradicted by thoſe of his own Church.
For they generally grant, that General Councils, though they be infallible in their Definitions and Concluſions, yet are not always ſo in their Arguments and reaſonings about them. And the Guide of Controverſies *P. 35.expreſly ſays, that it is not neceſſary that a Divine Faith ſhould always have an external rationally infallible ground or motive thereto (whether Church Authority, or any other) on his part, that ſo believes. Here is a man of their own Church avowing this Poſition, that Faith is poſſible to be falſe. I deſire Mr. S. who is the very Rule of Controverſie, to do juſtice upon this falſe Guide.
I muſt acknowledge that Mr. S. attempts to prove this Aſſertion, and that by a very pleaſant and ſurprizing Argument, which is this. The profound Myſteries o… Faith (he tells us†Faith▪ vind. p. 9….) muſt needs ſeem to ſome, (viz. thoſe who have no light but their pure natural Reaſon, †P. 89.as he ſaid before) impoſſible to be true; which therefore not…ing but a Motive of its own nature ſeemingly impoſſible to be falſe can conquer ſo as to make them conceit them really true. What Mr. S. here means by a Motive of its own nature ſeeming impoſſible to be falſe I cannot divine, unleſs he means a real ſeeming impoſſibility. But be that as it will; does Mr. S. in good earneſt believe that a Motive of its own nature ſeeming impoſſible to be falſe, is ſufficient to convince any man, that has and uſes the light of natural Reaſon, of the truth of a thing which muſt needs ſeem to him impoſſible to be true? In my opinion theſe two ſeeming impoſſibilities are ſo equally matched that it muſt needs be a drawn Battle between them. Suppoſe the thing to be believed be Tranſubſtantiation; this indeed is a very profound Myſtery, and is (to ſpeak in Mr. S's. phraſe) of its own nature ſo ſeemingly impoſſible, that I know no argument in the world ſtrong enough to cope with it. And I challenge Mr. S. to inſtance in any Motive of Faith which is, both to our underſtanding and our ſenſes, more plainly impoſſible to be falſe than their Doctrine of Tranſubſtantiation is evidently impoſſible to be true. And if he cannot, how can he reaſonably expect that any man in the World ſhould believe it?
2. That it is not neceſſary to the true nature of Faith, that we ſhould be infallibly ſecur'd of the means whereby the Chriſtian Doctrine is convey'd to us; particularly of the Antiquity and Authority of the Books of Scripture, and that the expreſſions in it cannot poſſibly bear any other ſenſe. And theſe are the very things I inſtance in, in the paſſage ſo often mention'd. And to theſe Mr. S. ought to have ſpoken, if he intended to have confuted that paſſage. But he was reſolv'd not to ſpeak diſtinctly, knowing his beſt play to be in the dark, and that all his ſafety lay in the confuſion and obſcurity of his talk.
Now that to have an infallible ſecurity in theſe particulars is not neceſſary to the true nature of Faith is evident upon theſe two accounts; becauſe Faith may be without this infallible ſecurity, and becauſe in the particulars mention'd it is impoſſible to be had.
1. Becauſe Faith may be without this infallible ſecurity. He that is ſo aſſur'd of the Antiquity and Authority of the Books of Scripture, and of the ſenſe of thoſe Texts wherein the Doctrines of Chriſtianity are plainly delivered, as to ſee no juſt cauſe to doubt thereof, may really aſſent to thoſe Doctrines trines though he have no infallible ſecurity. And an aſſent ſo grounded I affirm to have the true nature of Faith. For what degree of aſſent, and what ſecurity of the Means, which convey to us the knowledge of Chriſtianity are neceſſary to the true nature of Faith is to be eſtimated from the end of Faith, which is the ſalvation of mens ſouls. And whoever is ſo aſſur'd of the authority and ſenſe of Scripture, as to believe the Doctrine of it, and to live accordingly, ſhall be ſaved. And ſurely ſuch a belief as will ſave a man hath the true nature of Faith, though it be not infallible. And if God have ſufficiently provided for the ſalvation of men of all capacities, it is no ſuch reflection upon the goodneſs and wiſedom of providence, as Mr. S. imagines, that he hath not taken care that every man's Faith ſhould arrive to the degree of infallibility; nor does our bleſſed Saviour, for not having made this proviſion, deſerve to be eſteem'd by all the world not a wiſe Lawgiver, but a mere Ignoramus and Impoſtor, as*Labyvinthus Cantuarienſis P. 77. one of his fellow Controvertiſts ſpeaks with reverence.
Beſides, this aſſertion that infallibility is neceſſary to the true nature of that aſſent which we call Faith, is plainly falſe upon another account alſo; becauſe Faith admits of degrees. But Infallibility has none. The Scripture ſpeaks of a weak and a ſtrong Faith and of the increaſe of Faith; but I never heard of a weak and ſtrong Infallibility. Infallibility is the higheſt perfection of the knowing faculty, and conſequently the firmeſt degree of aſſent upon the firmeſt grounds, and which are known to be ſo. But will Mr. S. ſay, that the higheſt degree of aſſent admits of degrees, and is capable of increaſe? Infallibility is an abſolute impoſſibility of being deceived; now I deſire Mr. S. to ſhew me the degrees of abſolute impoſſibility; and if he could doe that, and conſequently there might be degrees of Infallibility, yet I cannot believe that Mr. S. would think fit to call any degree of Infallibility a weak Faith or aſſent.
2. Becauſe an infallible ſecurity in the particulars mention'd is impoſſible to be had; I mean in an ordinary way, and without miracle and particular revelation; becauſe the nature of the thing is incapable of it. The utmoſt ſecurity we have of the antiquity of any Book is humane Teſtimony, and all humane Teſtimony is fallible for this plain reaſon becauſe all men are fallible. And though Mr. S. in defence of his beloved Tradition is pleas'd to ſay that humane Teſtimony in ſome caſes is infallible, yet I think no man before him was ever ſo hardy as to maintain that the Teſtimony of fallible men is infallible. I grant it to be in many caſes certain; that is, ſuch as a conſiderate man may prudently rely and proceed upon, and hath no juſt cauſe to doubt of; and ſuch as none but an obſtinate man or a fool can deny. And that thus the learned men of his own Church deſine certainty Mr. S. (if he would but vouchſafe to read ſuch Books) might have learnt from*De lo. Theol. lib. 11. c. 4. Certa apud homines ea ſunt, quae negari ſine pervicacia, & ſtultitia non poſſunt. Melchior Canus, who ſpeaking of the firmneſs of humane Teſtimony in ſome caſes (which yet he did not believe to be infallible) defines it thus, thoſe things are certain among men, which cannot be deny'd without obſtinacy and folly. I know Mr. S. is pleas'd to ſay, that certainty and infallibility are all one. And he is the firſt man that I know of that ever ſaid it. And yet perhaps ſome body may have been before him in it, for I remember Tully ſays, that there is nothing ſo fooliſh but ſome Philoſopher or other has ſaid it. I am ſure Mr. S's own Philoſopher Mr. Wh. contradicts him in this moſt clearly, in his Preface to Ruſhworth's Dialogues; where explicating the term Moral certainty he tells us, that ſome underſtood by it ſuch a certainty as makes the cauſe always work the ſame effect, though it take not away the abſolute poſſibility of working other ways; and this preſently after he tells us, ought abſolutely to be reckon'd in the degree of true certainty, and the Authors conſider'd as miſtaken in undervaluing it. So that accordi…g to Mr. Wh. true certainty may conſiſt with a poſſibility of the contrary, and conſequently Mr. S. is miſtaken in thinking certainty and infallibility to be all one. Nay, I do not ſind any two of them agreeing among themſelves, about the notions of infallibility and certainty. Mr. Wh. ſays, that what ſome call moral certainty, is true certainty, though it do not take away a poſſibility, of the contrary. Mr. S. aſſerts the direct contrary, that Moral certainty is only probability becauſe it does not take away the poſſibility of the contrary. The Guide in Controverſies *P. 135.differs from them both, and makes moral, certain and infallible all one. I deſire that they would agree theſe matters among themſelves before they quarrel with us about them.
In brief then, though moral certainty be ſometimes taken for a high degree of probability which can onelyonly produce a doubt full aſſent; yet it is alſo frequently us'd for a firm and undoubted aſſent to a thing upon ſuch grounds as are fit fully to ſatisfie a prudent man; and in this ſenſe I have always us'd this Term. But now inſallibility is an abſolute ſecurity of the underſtanding from all poſſibility of miſtake in what it believes. And there are but two ways for the underſtanding to be thus ſecur'd; either by the perfection of its own nature, or by ſupernatural aſſiſtance. But no humane underſtanding being abſolutely ſecur'd from poſſibility of miſtake by the perfection of its own nature (which I think all mankind except Mr. S. have hitherto granted) it follows, that no man can be infallible in any thing, but by ſupernatural aſſiſtance. Nor did ever the Church of Rome pretend to infallibility upon any other account, as every one knows that hath been converſant in the Writings of their Learned men. And Mr. Creſſy in his*P. 88, 89. Anſwer to Dr. Pierce hath not the face to contend for any other infallibility but this, that the immutable God can actually preſerve a mutable creature from actual mutation: But I can by no means agr…e with him in what immediately follows, concerning the Omniſcience of a creature; that God, who is abſolutely omniſcient, can teach a rational Creature all truths neceſſary or expedient to be known; ſo that though a man may have much ignorance, yet he may be in a ſort omniſcient within a determinate ſphere. Omniſcient within a determinate ſphere, is an infinite within a finite ſphere; and is not that a very pretty ſort of knowing all things, which may conſiſt with a ignorance of many things? Of all the Controvertiſts I have met with (except Mr. S.) Mr. Creſſy is the happieſt at theſe ſmart and ingenious kind of reaſonings.
As to the other Particular of the ſenſe of Books, it is likewiſe plainly impoſſible, that any thing ſhould be deliver'd in ſuch clear and certain words as are abſolutely incapable of any other ſenſe; and yet notwithſtanding this, the meaning of them may be ſo plain as that any unprejudic'd and reaſonable man may certainly underſtand them. How many Definitions and Axioms, &c. are there in Euclid, in the ſenſe of which men are univerſally agreed, and think themſelves undoubtedly certain of it? and yet the words in which they are expreſs'd, may poſſibly bear another ſenſe. The ſame may be ſaid concerning the Doctrines and Precepts of the H. Scriptures; and one great reaſon why men do not ſo generally agree in the ſenſe of theſe as of the other is becauſe the intereſts, and luſts, and paſſions of men are more concern'd in the one than the other. But whatever uncertainty there may be in the ſenſe of any Texts of Scripture, Oral Tradition is ſo far from affording us any help in this caſe that it is a thouſand times more uncertain and leſs to be truſted to; eſpecially if we may take that to be the Traditionary ſenſe of Texts of Scripture, which we meet with in the Decretals of their Popes, and the Acts of ſome of their Councils; than which never was any thing in the whole world more abſurd and ridiculous: And whence may we expect to have the infallible Traditional ſenſe of Scripture, if not from the Heads and Repreſentatives of their Church?
This may abundantly ſuffice for the vindication of that Paſſage which Mr. S. makes ſuch a rude clamor about, as if I had therein deny'd the truth and certainty of all Religion; but durſt never truſt the Reader with a view of thoſe words of mine upon which he pretended to ground this Calumny. But the world underſtands well enough, that all this was but a ſhift of Mr. S' s for the ſatiſfaction of his own Party, and a pitifull Art to avoid the vindication of Sure-footing, a Task he had no mind to undertake.
And yet the main deſign of this Book which he calls Faith vindicated, &c. is to prove that which I do not believe any man living ever denyed, viz. That what is true is not poſſible to be falſe: Which, though it be one of the plaineſt Truths in the world, yet he proves it ſo fooliſhly, as would make any man (if it were not evident of it ſelf) to doubt of it. He proves it from Logick, and Nature, and Metaphyſicks, and Ethicks, &c. I wonder he did not do it likewiſe from Arithmetick and Geometry, the Principles whereof, he *Sure-footing, p. 93.tells us are concerned in demonſtrating the certainty of Oral Tradition. He might alſo have proceeded to Aſtrology, and Palmiſtry, and Chymiſtry, and have ſhewn how each of theſe lend their aſſiſtance to the evidencing of this Truth. For that could not have been more ridiculous, than his†Faith. vindic. p. 6.7, &c. Argument from the nature of Subject, and Praedicate, and Copula in Faith-Propoſitions; becauſe forſooth whoever affirms any Propoſition of Faith to be true, affirms it impoſſible to be falſe. Very true. But would any man argue, that what is true is impoſſible to be falſe, from the nature of Subject, Praedicate and Copula? for be the Propoſition true or falſe, theſe are of the ſame nature in both, that is, they are Subject, Praedicate and Copula.
But that the Reader may have a taſte of his clear ſtyle and way of reaſoning, I ſhall for his ſatisfaction tranſcribe Mr. S's whole Argument from the nature of the Praedicate. His words are theſe. Our Argument from the Copula is particularly ſtrengthned from the nature of the Praedicate in the Propoſitions we ſpeak of; I mean in ſuch ſpeeches as affirm ſuch and ſuch points of Faith to be true. P. 9, 10, 11, 12.For True means Exiſtent in Propoſitions which expreſs onelyonly the An eſt of a thing, as moſt points of Faith do; which ſpeak abſtractedly, and tell not wherein the nature of the ſubject it ſpeaks of conſiſts, or the Quid eſt. So that moſt of the Propoſitions Chriſtians are bound to profeſs are fully expreſt thus, A Trinity is exiſtent, &c. and the like may be ſaid of thoſe Points which belong to a Thing or Action paſt; as, Creation was, &c. For, Exiſtent is the Praedicate in theſe two, onelyonly affixt to another difference of time; and 'tis equally impoſſible ſuch Subjects ſhould neither have been nor not have been, or have been and have not been at once, as it is that a thing ſhould neither be nor not be at preſent, or both be and not be at preſent. Regarding then ſtedfaſtly the nature of our Praedicate [Exiſtent] we ſhall find that it expreſſes the utmoſt Actuality of a Thing; and as taken in the poſture it bears in thoſe Propoſitions, that Actually exercis'd, that is, the utmoſt Actuality in its moſt actual ſtate; that is, as abſolutely excluding all manner or leaſt degree of Potentiality, and conſequently all poſſibility of being otherwiſe; which is radically deſtroyed when all Potentiality is taken away. This Diſcourſe holding, which in right to truth I ſhall not fear to affirm (unconcern'd in the drollery of any Oppoſer) to be more than Mathematically demonſtrative, it follows inevitably that whoſo is bound to profeſs a Trinity, Incarnation, &c. is or was exiſtent, is alſo bound to profeſs that 'tis impoſſible they ſhould be not Exiſtent; or which is all one, that 'tis impoſſible theſe points of Faith ſhould be falſe.
The ſame appears out of the nature of diſtinction or diviſion applyed to our Praedicate Exiſtent, as found in theſe Propoſitions: For could that Praedicate bear a pertinent diſtinction expreſſing this and the other reſpect, or thus and thus, it might poſſibly be according to one of theſe reſpects, or thus conſidered, and not be according to another, that is another way conſidered: But this evaſion is here impoſſible; for either thoſe diſtinguiſhing Notions muſt be more Potential or Antecedent to the Notion of Exiſtent, and then they neither reach Exiſtent, nor ſupervene to it as its Determinations or Actuations, which differences ought to doe; nor can any Notion be more Actual or Determinative in the line of Subſtance or Being, than Exiſtent is; and, ſo fit to diſtinguiſh it in that line; nor, laſtly, can any determination in the line of Accidents ſerve the turn; for, thoſe ſuppoſe Exiſtence already …, and ſo the whole Truth of the Propoſition entire and complete antecedently to them: 'Tis impoſſible therefore that what is thus affirmed to be True, ſhould in any regard be affirmed poſſible to be falſe: the impoſſibility of diſtinguiſhing the Praedicate pertinently, excluding here all poſſibility of divers reſpects.
The ſame is demonſtrated from the impoſſibility of diſtinguiſhing the Subjects of thoſe Faith-propoſitions; for thoſe Subjects being Propoſitions themſelves; and accepted for Truths, as is ſuppoſed, they are incapable of Diſtinction, as ſhall be particularly ſhewn hereafter. Beſides, thoſe Subjects being points of Faith, and ſo ſtanding in the Abſtract, that is, not deſcending to ſubſuming reſpects, even in that regard too they are freed from all pertinent diſtinguiſhableneſs.
The ſame is demonſtrated from the nature of Truth, which conſiſts in an Indiviſible; whence there is nothing of Truth had, how great ſoever the conceived approaches towards it may be, till all may-not-bees, or Potentiality to be otherwiſe, be utterly excluded by the Actuality of Is or Exiſtence; which put or diſcover'd, the light of Truth breaks forth, and the dim twilights of may-not-bees vaniſh and diſappear.
I have here (Reader) preſented thee with a Diſcourſe which (if we may believe Mr. S.) is more than Mathematically demonſtrative. A rare Sight indeed! And is not this a pleaſant Man, and of good aſſurance? I now find it true, which he*Letter of Thanks P. 1. ſays elſewhere, that Principles are of an inflexible genius, and ſelf-confident too, and that they love naturally to expreſs themſelves with an aſſuredneſs. But certainly the ſacred names of Principles and Demonſtration were never ſo profan'd by any Man before. Might not any one write a Book of ſuch Jargon, and call it Demonſtration? And would it not equally ſerve to prove or confute? If he intended this ſtuff for the ſatisfaction of the People, he might as well have writ in the Coptick or Sclavonian Language: yet I cannot deny, but that it is very ſuitable to the Principles of the Roman Church; for why ſhould not their Science as well as their Service be in an unknown Tongue? that the one may be as ſit to improve their knowledge, as the other is to raiſe their devotion. But if he deſigned this for the Learned, nothing could be more improper; for they are far leſs apt to admire non-ſenſe than the common People: And I deſire that no man (how learned ſoever he may think himſelf) would be overconfident, that this is ſenſe. I do verily believe, that neither Harphius, nor Ruſbrochius, nor the profound Mother Juliana, have any thing in their writings more ſenſeleſs and obſcure than this Diſcourſe of his, which he affirms to be more than Mathematically Demonſtrative. So that if I were worthy to adviſe Mr. S. he ſhould give over this pretence to Science; for whatever he may think, his Talent certainly does not lie that way; but he ſeems to be as well made for a Myſtical Divine, as any man I know; and methinks his Superiours ſhould be ſenſible of this, and employ him to write about the Deiform fund of the Soul, the ſuper-eſſential life, the method of ſelf-annihilation, and the paſſive unions of nothing with nothing: Theſe are profound Subjects, and he hath a Style peculiarly fitted for them. For even in this parcel of ſtuff which I have now cited, there are five or ſix words, ſuch as may-not-bees, potentiality, actuality, actuation, determinative, ſupervene and ſubſume, which if they were but well mingled and diſcreetly ordered, and brought in now and then with a that is, to explain one another) would half ſet up a man in that way, and enable him to write as Myſtical a Diſcourſe as a man would wiſh. But enough of this. And I have treſpaſs'd not a little upon mine own diſpoſition in ſaying thus much, though out of a juſt indignation as confident Non-ſenſe.
It is time now to draw toward a concluſion of this debate. I ſhall onelyonly▪ leave with the Reader a few obſervations concerning this Book of Mr. S's and his Doctrine of Infallibility.
Firſt, That the main drift of his Book being to prove that what is true is impoſſible to be falſe, he oppoſes no body that I know of in this matter.
Secondly, That in aſſerting Infallibility to be neceſſary to the true nature of Faith he hath the generality of his own Church his profeſſed Adverſaries. The Church of Rome never arrogated to her ſelf any other Infallibility but what ſhe pretends to be ſounded upon Chriſt's promiſe to ſecure his Church always from Errour by a ſupernatural aſſiſtance, which is widely different from M…. S's rational infallibility of Oral Tradition. Mr. S. ſurely cannot be ignorant, that the Divines of their Church (till Mr. Ruſhworth and Mr. White found out this new way) did generally reſolve Faith into the infallible Teſtimony of the Church, and the infallibility of their Church, into our Saviour's Promiſe; and the evidence of the true Church into the Markes of the Church, or the Motives of credibility; which Motives are acknowledg'd to be only prudential, and not demonſtrative. *I. 4. de Eccleſ.Bellarmine ſays, that the Marks of the Church do not make it evidently true, which is the true Church, but onelyonly evidently credible; and that (ſays he) is ſaid to be evidently credible which is neither ſeen in it ſelf, nor in its principles; but yet hath ſo many and ſo weighty Teſtimonies, that every wiſe man hath reaſon to believe it. Becanus*Sum. Tom. 2. partic. de tide c. 1. to the ſame purpoſe, that the Motives of credibility are onelyonly the foundation of a prudent, but not of an infallible aſſent, I know very well that Mr. Knott and ſome others would fain perſwade us, that an aſſent in ſome ſort infallible may be built upon prudential Motives, which is as abſurd as it's poſſible; but if it were true, yet Mr. S. would not accept of this ſort of infallibility; nothing leſs will ſerve him than demonſtrative Motives, and ſuch as are abſolutely concluſive of the thing. Stapleton (as Mr. Creſſy tells us) expreſly ſays, that ſuch an infallible certitude of Means is not now neceſſary to the Paſtors of the Church, as was neceſſary to the Apoſtles, who were the firſt founders of the Church. So that, according to theſe Authors, there may be true Faith where neither the means nor the Motives of it are ſuch as to raiſe our aſſent to the degree of infallibility. And this is as much to the full as any Proteſtant (that I know of) ever ſaid. Nay, even his Friends of the Tradition, Mr. Ruſhworth, Mr. White and Mr. Creſſy, are guilty of the ſame damnable and fundamental Errour, as Mr. S. calls it†Letter to his Anſwerer, p. 5.. For they grant leſs aſſurance than that which is infallible to be ſufficient to Chriſtian Faith, and that we are juſtly condemn'd if we refuſe to believe upon ſuch evidence as does ordinarily ſatisfie prudent men in humane affairs. And particularly, Mr. Wh. makes a queſtion whether humane nature be capable of infallibility; as I have ſhewn at large by clear and full Teſtimonies out of each of theſe Authors, in the Anſwer to Sure-footing †P…c, &c.. Of which Teſtimonies though Mr. S. hath not though fit to take the leaſt notice throughout his Book; yet I cannot but think it a reaſonable requeſt, to deſire him to vindicate the Divines of his own Church (eſpecially thoſe of his own way) from theſe things, before he charge us any farther with them.
Thirdly, That Mr. S. by this Principle, that infallibility is neceſſary to the true nature of Faith, makes every true believer infallible in matters of Faith; which is ſuch a Paradox, as I doubt whether ever it enter'd into any other man's mind. But if it be true, what need then of any infallibility in Pope or Council? And if this infallibility be grounded upon the nature of Oral Tradition, what need of ſupernatural aſſiſtance? I doubt Mr. S. would be loth to preach this Doctrine at Rome; I have often heard, that there is an old teaſty Gentleman lives there, who would take it very ill that any one beſides himſelf ſhould pretend to be infallible.
Fourthly, That Mr. S. by his Principles does plainly exclude from ſalvation the generality of his own Church, that is, all that do not believe upon his Grounds. And this is the neceſſary conſequence of his reaſoning in a late Treatiſe, intituled, The method to arrive at ſatisfaction in Religion: The principles whereof are theſe; That the Church is a Congregation of Faithfull; The Faithfull are thoſe who have true Faith; That, till it be known which is the true Faith, it cannot be known which is the true Church; That which is the true Faith, can onelyonly be known by the true Rule of Faith, which is Oral Tradition; And that the infallibility of this Rule is evident to common ſenſe. And from theſe principles he concludes*Sec. 21. that thoſe who follow not this Rule, and ſo are out of this Church, can have no true Faith; And that though many of the Points to which they aſſent are true, yet their aſſent is not Faith; for Faith (ſpeaking of Chriſtian Faith) is an aſſent which cannot poſſibly be falſe. So that the Foundation of this Method is the ſelf-evident infallibility of Oral Tradition, which hath been ſufficiently conſider'd in the Anſwer to Sure footing, which yet remains unanſwer'd. That which I am now concern'd to take notice of, is the conſequence of this Method, which does at one blow excommunicate and un-Chriſtian the far greateſt part of his own Church. For if all who do not follow Oral Tradition as their onelyonly Rule of Faith are out of the Church, and can have no true Faith, then all who follow the Council of Trent are ipſo facto no Chriſtians. For nothing is plainer, than that that Council did not make Oral Tradition the ſole Rule of their Faith, nor rely upon it as ſuch; which hath been prov'd at large in the Anſwer to Sure footing,
But why is Mr. S. ſo zealous in this matter of infallibility? There is a plain reaſon for it. He finds that confidence, how weakly ſoever it be grounde, hath ſome effect upon the common and ignorant People; who are apt to think there is ſomething more than ordinary in a ſwaggering man, that talks of nothing but Principles and Demonſtration. And ſo we ſee it in ſome other Profeſſions. There are a ſort of People very well known, who find that the moſt effectual way to cheat the People is always to pretend to infallible Cures.
I have now done with his Infallibility. But I muſt not forget this Letter of Thanks. I ſhall wholly paſs by the paſſion and ill language of it, which a man may plainly ſee to have proceeded from a gall'd and uneaſie mind. He would fain put on ſome pleaſantneſs, but was not able to conceal his vexation. Nor ſhall I inſiſt upon his palpable ſhuſſling about the explication of the Terms, Rule and Faith. He was convinc'd that he had explain'd them very untowardly, and therefore would gladly come off by ſaying that he did not intend explication, p. 7.but onelyonly to praedicate or affirm ſomething of them. And yet the whole deſign of the firſt page of Sure-footing is to ſhew the neceſſity of beginning with the meaning of thoſe words which expreſs the thing under debate: And this method he tells us he will apply to his preſent purpoſe, and will examine well what is meant by thoſe words which expreſs the thing he was to diſcuſs, namely, The RƲLE of FAITH. Now if to examine well what is meant by words, be not to go about to explain them, I muſt confeſs my ſelf to be in a great errour. Of the ſame kind in his Apology for his Teſtimonies, as if they were*P. 105. not intended againſt the Proteſtants; whereas his Book was writ againſt the Proteſtants, and when he comes to his Teſtimonies, he†Surefooting. P. 126. declares the deſign of them to be, to ſecond by Authority what he had before eſtabliſh'd by Reaſon. So that if the Rational part of his Book was intended againſt the Proteſtants, and the Teſtimonies were deſign'd to ſecond it, I cannot underſtand why he ſhould ſay one was leſs intended againſt them than the other. But it ſeems he is ſo conſcious of the weakneſs of thoſe Teſtimonies, that he does not think them ſit to ſatisfie any but thoſe who believe him already.
As to his charge of falſe citations, it is but the common artifice of the Roman Controvertiſts when they have nothing elſe to ſay. However that the world may ſee how little he is to be truſted, I ſhall inſtance in two or three about which he makes the loudeſt clamour, and leave it to the Reader to judge by theſe of his ſincerity in the reſt.
He ſays,P. 62. I notoriouſly abuſe the Preface to Ruſhworths Dialogues in citing the Author of it to ſay that ſuch certainty as makes the cauſe always to work the ſame effect though it take not away the abſolute poſſibility of working otherwiſe, ought abſolutely to be reckon'd in the degree of true certainty; whereas (ſays Mr. S.) he onelyonly tells us there, p. 7. that by moral certainty [ſome underſtood] ſuch a certainty as makes the cauſe, &c. To vindicate my ſelf in this, I ſhall onelyonly ſet the Author's words before the Reader's eyes. They are theſe. This term Moral certainty, every one explicated not like; but ſome underſtood by it ſuch a certainty as makes the cauſe always work the ſame effect, though it take not away the abſolute poſſibility of working other ways. Others call'd that a moral certainty which proceeds from, &c. A third explication of this word is, &c. Of theſe three the firſt ought abſolutely to be reckon'd in the degree of true certainty, and the Authors conſider'd as miſtaken in undervaluing it. Is this onelyonly to tell us that by moral certainty ſome underſtood, &c. Does not the Prefacer alſo expreſly affirm, that what theſe ſome underſtood by moral certainty, ought abſolutely to be reckon'd in the degree of true certainty? which is the very thing I cited him for.
Another heavy charge is,P. 65. that according to my uſual ſincerity, I quote Ruſhworth's Nephew to ſay, that a few good words are to be caſt in concerning Scripture, [for the ſatisfaction of indifferent men who have been brought up in this verbal and apparent reſpect of the Scripture,] whereas (ſays Mr. S.) in the place you cite, he onelyonly expreſſes, it would be a ſatisfaction to indifferent men to ſee the poſitions one would induce them to embrace maintainable by Scripture. Does he onelyonly ſay ſo? let the Reader judge. The words in Mr. Ruſhworth are theſe: Yet this I muſt tell ye, that it were a great ſatisfaction for indifferent men, that have been brought up in this verbal and apparent reſpect of the Scripture, to ſee that the Poſitions you would induce them unto, can be and are maintain'd by Scripture, and that they are grounded therein. Certainly one would think that either this man has no eyes or no forehead.
But the greateſt out-cry of all, is,p. 57, 77. that I abuſe his firſt Demonſtration by vertue of a direct falſification both of his words and ſenſe, by cogging in the word. [all,] making his principle run thus, that the greateſt hopes and fears are applied to the minds of [all] Chriſtians. This indeed I make to be his Principle grounded upon his words which I had cited a little before; and they are theſe, Firſt; That Chriſtian Doctrine was at firſt unanimouſly ſettled by the Apoſtles in the hearts of the faithfull diſpers'd in great multitudes over ſeveral parts of the world. 2ly, That this Doctrine was firmly believed by [all] thoſe faithfull to be the way to Heaven, and the contradicting or deſerting of it to be the way to damnation; ſo that the greateſt hopes and fears imaginable were, by engaging the divine Authority, ſtrongly apply'd to the minds of the firſt Believers, &c. Now if theſe firſt believers, to whom he ſays, theſe hopes and fears were ſtrongly apply'd, be all thoſe faithfull he ſpoke of before which were diſpers'd over ſeveral parts of the world, (as the tenor of his words plainly ſhews) what are theſe leſs than all the Chriſtians of that Age? and he himſelf a little after tells us, there is the ſame reaſon of the following Ages. So that I made his Principle run no otherwiſe than he himſelf had laid it. And if it contradict what he ſays elſewhere, it is no new or ſtrange thing. I wonder more at his confidence in charging ſuch falſifications upon me as every man's eyes will preſently confute him in. Methinks though a man had all Science, and all Principles, yet it might not be amiſs to have ſome Conſcience.
I ſhall only ſpeak a few words to the two ſolid Points, (as I may call them) of his Letter, and I have done.
I had charg'd him that he makes Traditions certainty a firſt and ſelf-evident Principle, and yet that he goes about to demonſtrate it; which I ſaid was impoſſible to be done, and if it could be done was needleſs. To avoid this inconvenience which he found himſelf ſorely preſs'd with all, he diſtinguiſhes between Speculative and Practical ſelf-evidence, and ſays that things which are practically ſelf-evident may be demonſtrated, but thoſe that are ſpeculatively ſo, cannot. But he muſt not think to ſhelter himſelf from ſo palpable an abſurdity by this impertinent diſtinction. For let things be evident how they will, ſpeculatively or practically, 'tis plain that if they be Principles evident of themſelves they need nothing to evidence them; and if they be firſt Principles there can be nothing to make them more evident, becauſe there is nothing before them to demonſtrate them by. Now if Mr. S. had in truth believed that the certainty of Tradition was a firſt and ſelf-evident Principle, he ſhould by all means have let it alone, for it was in a very good condition to ſhift for it ſelf; but his blind way of Demonſtration is enough to caſt a miſt about the cleareſt Truth in the world. But perhaps by the ſelf-evident certainty of Tradition, Mr. S. onelyonly means that it is evident to himſelf, for I dare ſay it is ſo to no body elſe. And if that be his meaning he did well enough to endeavour to demonſtrate it; it was no more than needed.
The other Point is about his Firſt Principles, ſuch as theſe, a Rule is a Rule, Faith is Faith, &c. which he ſays†P. 11. muſt principle all that can be ſolidly concluded either about Rule or Faith. Of theſe he hath mighty ſtore, and bleſſeth himſelf in it, as the Rich man in the Goſpel did in his full Barns, Soul take thine eaſe, thou haſt Principles laid up for many years; and out of an exceſs of good nature pities my caſe, who did undertake to write a Diſcourſe about the Ground of Faith, P. 74.without ſo much as one Principle to bleſs my ſelf with. But the miſchief is, that after all this ſtir about them they are good for nothing, and of the very ſame ſtamp with that frivolous one Ariſtotle ſpeaks of [if a thing be, it is, Analyt. Poſter. l. 1] which he rejects as a vain and ridiculous Propoſition. Such are Mr. S's firſt Principles, ſurfeited of too much truth (as an ingenious Writer of his own Church ſays of them) and ready to burſt with ſelf-evidence, and yet by ten thouſand of them a man ſhall not be able to advance one ſtep in knowledge, becauſe they produce no concluſion but themſelves; whereas it is of the nature of Principles to yeild a Concluſion different from themſelves. And to convince Mr. S. fully of the foolery of theſe Principles, I will try what can be done with them, either in a Categorical or Hypothetical Syllogiſm, e. g. A Rule is a Rule, Tradition is a Rule, Ergo Tradition is a Rule. Again, If a Rule be a Rule, then a Rule is a Rule; But a Rule is a Rule, Ergo. How is any man the wiſer for all this? But it may be Mr. S. can make better work with them, and manage them more dextrouſly, ſo as to principle any thing that can be ſolidly concluded in any Controverſie.
And now I hope at laſt to have given Mr. S. full ſatisfaction; ſince he has brought me to the very point he deſir'd, to acknowledge that I have no Principles. And indeed if there be no other to be had but ſuch as theſe, I do declare to all the world, that I neither have any Principles, nor will have any.
The Texts of each Sermon.
JOB 28.28. And unto man he ſaid; Behold! the fear of the Lord that is wiſedom; and to depart from evil is underſtanding. page 1
2 Pet. 3.3. Knowing this firſt, that there ſhall come in the laſt days Scoffers walking after their own luſts. p. 101
Prov. 14.34. Righteouſneſs exalteth a Nation; but ſin is the reproach of any people. p. 129
Pſalm 19.11. And in keeping of them there is great reward. p. 151
Phil. 3.8. Yea doubtleſs, and I count all things but loſs for the excellency of the knowledge of Chriſt Jeſus my Lord. p. 179
1 Joh. 5.3. And his Commandments are not grievous. p. 213
2 Tim. 2.19. Let every one that nameth the name of Chriſt depart from iniquity. p. 243
Phil. 3.20. For our converſation is in Heaven. p. 273