Sermons and Discourses Volume 1, Sermon 1

Sermons and Discourses Volume 1 · Sermon 1

p. 1JOB XXVIII. 28.

And unto man he ſaid; Behold! the fear of the Lord that is wiſdom; and to depart from evil is underſtanding.

IN this Chapter Job diſcourſeth of the ſecrets of nature, and the unſearchable perfections of the works of God. And the reſult of his diſcourſe is this. That a perfect knowledge of Nature is no where to be found but in the Author of it; no leſs wiſdom and underſtanding than that which made the world and contrived this vaſt and regular frame of Nature can throughly underſtand the Philoſophy of it and comprehend ſo vaſt a deſign: But yet there is a knowledge which is very proper to man and lies level to humane underſtanding; and that is the knowledge of our Creator and of the duty we owe to him; the wiſdom of pleaſing God, by doing what he commands and avoiding what he forbids: This Knowledge and Wiſdom may be attained by man, and is ſufficient to make him happy. And unto man he ſaid: p. 2Behold! the fear of the Lord that is Wiſdom, and to depart from evil is underſtanding.

Theſe words conſiſt of two Propoſitions, which are not diſtinct in ſenſe, but one and the ſame thing variouſly expreſs'd; For wiſedom and underſtanding are ſynonymous words here; and though ſometimes they have different notions, yet in the Poetical Books of Scripture they are moſt frequently uſed as words equivalent, and do both of them indifferently ſignifie either a ſpeculative knowledge of things, or a practical skill about them, according to the exigency of the matter or thing ſpoken of. And ſo likewiſe the fear of the Lord, and departure from evil, are phraſes of a very near ſenſe, and like importance; and therefore we find them ſeveral times put together in Scripture:Pro. 3.7. Pr. 16.6.Prov 3:7 Fear the Lord, and depart from evil: By the fear of the Lord men depart from evil. So that they differ onelyonly as cauſe and effect, which by a Metonymie uſual in all ſorts of Authors, are frequently put one for another.

Now, to fear the Lord, and to depart from evil, are phraſes which the Scripture uſeth in a very great latitude, to expreſs to us the ſum of Religion, and the whole of our duty. And becauſe the large uſage of theſe phraſes is to be the foundation of my following p. 3diſcourſe, I ſhall for the farther clearing of this matter endeavour to ſhew theſe two things:

1. That 'tis very uſual in the Language of Scripture to expreſs the whole of Religion by theſe and ſuch like phraſes.

2. The particular fitneſs of theſe two phraſes to deſcribe Religion.

I. It is very uſual in the Language of Scripture to expreſs the whole of Religion by ſome eminent principle or part of Religion.

The great Principles of Religion are knowledge, faith, remembrance, love, and fear; by all which the Scripture uſeth to expreſs the whole duty of man.

In the Old Teſtament, by the knowledge, remembrance and fear of God. Religion is called The knowledge of the holy. Prov. 30.3. Jer. 10.25.Prov 30:3Jer 10:25And wicked men are deſcribed to be ſuch as know not God. So likewiſe, by the fear of the Lord, frequently in this Book of Job, and in the Pſalms and Proverbs. And Then they that feared the Lord ſpake often one to another. And the fear of God is expreſly ſaid to be the ſum of Religion,Eccl. 12.13.Eccl 12:13 Fear God and keep his Commandments, for this is the whole of man: And on the contrary, the wicked are deſcribed to be ſuch as have not the fear of God before their eyes. Pſ. 36.1.Ps 36:1And p. 4ſo likewiſe by the remembrance of God Remember thy Creator in the days of thy youth; Eccl. 12.1.Eccl 12:1that is, enter upon a religious courſe betimes: And on the contrary, the character of the wicked is, that they forget God; The wicked ſhall be turned into Hell; Pſ. 9.17.Ps 9:17and all the Nations that forget God. In the New Teſtament, Religion is uſually expreſſed by faith in God and Chriſt, and the love of them. Hence it is, that true Chriſtians are ſo frequently called believers, and wicked and ungodly men unbelievers, And that good men are deſcribed to be ſuch as love God, all things ſhall work together for good to them that love God; Ro. 8.28. Eph. 6.24.Rom 8:28Eph 6:24and ſuch as love the Lord Ieſus Chriſt. Now the reaſon why theſe are put for the whole of Religion, is, becauſe the belief, and knowledge, and remembrance, and love, and fear of God, are ſuch powerfull principles, and have ſo great an influence upon men to make them Religious, that where any one of theſe really is, all the reſt, together with the true and genuine effects of them, are ſuppoſed to be.

And ſo likewiſe the ſum of all Religion is often expreſſed by ſome eminent part of it; which will explain the ſecond phraſe here in the Text, departing from evil. The worſhip of God is an eminent part of p. 5Religion; and Prayer, which is often in Scripture expreſſed by ſeeking God, and calling upon his Name, is a chief part of Religious worſhip. Hence Religion is deſcribed by ſeeking God, Heb. 11.6Heb 11:6He is a rewarder of them that diligently ſeek, him: and by calling upon his name, Acts 2.21Acts 2:21Whoſoever calleth upon the name of the Lord, ſhall be ſaved. And ſo by coming to God, and by departing from evil. In this fallen ſtate of man Religion begins with repentance and converſion, the two oppoſite terms of which, are God and Sin: Hence it is that Religion is deſcribed ſometimes by coming to God, Heb. 11.6Heb 11:6He that cometh to God, muſt believe that he is, that is, no man can be religious, unleſs he believe there is a God;Iſ. 59.15.Isa 59:15 ſometimes by departing from ſin, And he that departeth from evil, maketh himſelf a prey: that is, ſuch was the bad ſtate of thoſe times of which the Prophet there complains that no man could be religious but he was in danger of being perſecuted.

II. For the fitneſs of theſe two phraſes to deſcribe Religion.

1. For the firſt, [the fear of the Lord] The fitneſs of this phraſe will appear, if we conſider how great an influence the fear of God hath upon men to make them p. 6religious. Fear is a paſſion that is moſt deeply rooted in our natures, and flows immediately from that Principle of ſelf-preſervation which God hath planted in every man. Every one deſires his own preſervation and happineſs, and therefore hath a natural dread and horrour of every thing that can deſtroy his Being, or endanger his happineſs. And the greateſt danger is from the greateſt power, and that is omnipotency. So that the fear of God is an inward acknowledgment of a holy and juſt Being, which is armed with an almighty and irreſiſtible power; God having hid in every Man's Conſcience a ſecret awe and dread of his infinite power, and eternal juſtice. Now fear being ſo intimate to our natures, it is the ſtrongeſt bond of Laws, and the great ſecurity of our duty.

There are two bridles or reſtraints which God hath put upon humane nature, ſhame and fear. Shame is the weaker, and hath place onelyonly in thoſe in whom there are ſome remainders of vertue. Fear is the ſtronger, and works upon all who love themſelves and deſire their own preſervation. Therefore in this degenerate ſtate of mankind, fear is that paſſion which hath the greateſt power p. 7over us, and by which God and his Laws take the ſureſt hold of us: Our deſire and love, and hope, are not ſo apt to be wrought upon by the repreſentation of vertue, and the promiſes of reward and happineſs, as our fear is from the apprehenſions of Divine diſpleaſure. For though we have loſt in a great meaſure the guſt and reliſh of true happineſs, yet we ſtill retain a quick ſenſe of pain and miſery. So that fear relies upon a natural love of our ſelves, and is complicated with a neceſſary deſire of our own preſervation. And therefore Religion uſually makes its firſt entrance into us by this paſſion; hence perhaps it is that Solomon more than once calls the fear of the Lord the beginning of wiſdom.

2. As for the Second phraſe [departing from evil] the fitneſs of it to expreſs the whole duty of man, will appear, if we conſider the neceſſary connexion that is between the negative and poſitive part of our duty. He that is carefull to avoid all ſin will ſincerely endeavour to perform his duty. For the ſoul of man is an active principle, and will be employed one way or other, it will be doing ſomething; if a man abſtain from evil, he will do good. Now there being ſuch a ſtrait connexion p. 8between theſe, the whole of our duty may be expreſſed by either of them; but moſt fitly by departing from evil, becauſe that is the firſt part of our duty. Religion begins in the forſaking of ſin:

Virtus eſt vitium fugere, & ſapientia prima

Stultitia caruiſſe —

Vertue begins in the forſaking of vice; and the firſt part of wiſedom is not to be a fool.

And therefore the Scripture, which mentions theſe parts of our duty, doth conſtantly put departing from evil firſt; Depart from evil and do good. Pſ. 34.14 & 37.27. Iſ. 1.16, 17. & 55.7. Eph. 4.23, 24.Ps 34:14Ps 37:27Isa 1:16Isa 1:17Isa 55:7Eph 4:23Eph 4:24Ceaſe to do evil, learn to do well. Let the wicked forſake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord. We are firſt to put off the old man which is corrupt according to deceitful luſts, and then to be renewed in the ſpirit of our minds, and to put on the new man, 1 Pet. 3.11.1 Pet 3:11&c. Let him eſchew evil and do good. To all which I may add this farther conſideration, that the Law of God contained in the ten Commandments, conſiſting moſtly of prohibitions, (Thou ſhalt not doe ſuch or ſuch a'thing) our obſervance of it is moſt fitly expreſſed by departing from evil, which yet includes obedience likewiſe to the poſitive Precepts implied in thoſe Prohibitions.

Having thus explain'd the Words, I come p. 9now to conſider the Propoſition contain'd in them, which is this:

That Religion is the beſt knowledge and wiſedom.

This I ſhall endeavour to make good theſe three ways.

1. By a direct proof of it.

2. By ſhewing on the contrary the folly and ignorance of irreligion and wickedneſs.

2. By vindicating Religion from thoſe common imputations which ſeem to charge it with ignorance or imprudence.

I begin with the direct proof of this: And becauſe Religion comprehends two things, the knowledge of the Principles of it, and a ſuitable life and practice; (the firſt of which being ſpeculative, may more properly be called knowledge; and the latter, becauſe 'tis practical, may be called wiſedom or prudence) therefore I ſhall endeavour diſtinctly to prove theſe two things.

1. That Religion is the beſt knowledge.

2. That 'tis the trueſt wiſdom.

1. Firſt, That it is the beſt knowledge.

The knowledge of Religion commends its ſelf to us upon theſe two accounts.

1. 'Tis the knowledge of thoſe things which are in themſelves moſt excellent.

Of thoſe things which are moſt uſefull and neceſſary for us to know.

p. 10Firſt, It is the beſt knowledge, becauſe it is the knowledge of thoſe things which are in themſelves moſt excellent and deſirable to be known; and thoſe are God, and our duty. God is the ſum and comprehenſion of all perfection. It is delightfull to know the Creatures, becauſe there are particular excellencies ſcatter'd and diſpers'd among them which are ſome ſhadows of the Divine perfections: But in God all perfections in their higheſt degree and exaltation meet together and are united. How much more delightfull then muſt it needs be to fix our minds upon ſuch an object in which there is nothing but beauty and brightneſs, what is amiable, and what is excellent; what will raviſh our affections and raiſe our wonder, pleaſe us and aſtoniſh us at once; And that the finite meaſure and capacity of our underſtandings is not able to take in and comprehend the infinite perfections of God, this indeed ſhews the excellency of the object, but doth not altogether take away the delightfulneſs of the knowledge. For as it is pleaſant to the Eye to have an endleſs proſpect, ſo is it ſome pleaſure to a finite underſtanding to view unlimited excellencies which have no ſhore or bounds, though it cannot comprehend them. There is a pleaſure p. 11in admiration; and this is that which properly cauſeth admiration, when we diſcover a great deal in an object which we underſtand to be excellent, and yet we ſee we know not how much more beyond that, which our underſtandings cannot fully reach and comprehend.

And as the knowledge of God in his nature and perfections is excellent and deſirable, ſo likewiſe to know him in thoſe glorious manifeſtations of himſelf in the works of Creation and Providence; and above all, in that ſtupendious work of the Redemption of the world by Jeſus Chriſt, which was ſuch a miſtery, and ſo excellent a piece of knowledge that the Angels are ſaid to deſire to pry into it.1 Pet. 1.12.1 Pet 1:12

And as the knowledge of God is excellent, ſo likewiſe of our Duty which is nothing elſe but vertue and goodneſs and holineſs, which are the image of God, a conformity to the nature and will of God, and an imitation of the Divine Excellencies and Perfections, ſo far as we are capable: For to know our duty is to know what it is to be like God in goodneſs, and pity, and patience, and clemency, in pardoning injuries, and paſſing by provocations; in juſtice and righteouſneſs, in truth and faithfulneſs, and in a hatred and deteſtation of the contrary p. 12of theſe: In a word, it is to know what is the good and acceptable will of God, what it is that he loves and delights in and is pleaſed withall, and would have us to do in order to our perfection and our happineſs. It is deſervedly accounted a piece of excellent knowledge to know the laws of the Land, and the cuſtoms of the Countrey we live in, and the will of the Prince we live under: How much more, to know the Statutes of Heaven, and the Laws of eternity, thoſe immutable and eternal rules of juſtice and righteouſneſs; to know the will and pleaſure of the great Monarch and univerſal King of the World, and the Cuſtoms of that Countrey where we muſt live for ever? This made David to admire the Law of God at that ſtrange rate, and to advance the knowledge of it above all other knowledge, I have ſeen an end of all perfection,Pſal. 119.96.Ps 119:96 but thy commandment is exceeding broad.

Secondly, 'Tis the knowledge of thoſe things which are moſt uſefull and neceſſary for us to know. The goodneſs of every thing is meaſured by its end and uſe, and that's the beſt thing which ſerves the beſt end and purpoſe; and the more neceſſary any thing is to ſuch an end, the better it is: So that the beſt knowledge is that p. 13which is of greateſt uſe and neceſſity to us in order to our great end, which is eternal happineſs, and the ſalvation of our Souls. Curious ſpeculations, and the contemplation of things that are impertinent to us, and do not concern us, nor ſerve to promote our happineſs, are but a more ſpecious and ingenious ſort of idleneſs, a more pardonable and creditable kind of Ignorance. That Man that doth not know thoſe things which are of uſe and neceſſity for him to know is but an ignorant man, whatever he may know beſides. Now the knowledge of God, and of Chriſt, and of our duty, is of the greateſt uſefulneſs and neceſſity to us in order to our happineſs. It's of abſolute neceſſity that we ſhould know God and Chriſt, in order to our being happy; This is life eternal (that is,Joh. 17.3John 17:3 the onelyonly way to it) to know thee the onelyonly true God, and him whom thou haſt ſent, Jeſus Chriſt. It is neceſſary alſo in order to our happineſs to know our duty: becauſe 'tis neceſſary for us to do it, and it is impoſſible to do it except we know it.

So that whatſoever other knowledge a man may be endued withall, he is but an ignorant perſon who doth not know God, the Author of his being, the preſerver and protector of his life, his Soveraign, p. 14and his Judge, the giver of every good and perfect gift, his ſureſt refuge in trouble, his beſt friend or worſt enemy, the preſent ſupport of his life, his hopes in death, his future happineſs, and his portion for ever: who does not know his relation to God, the duty that he owes him, and the way to pleaſe him who can make him happy or miſerable for ever: who doth not know the Lord Jeſus Chriſt who is the way, the truth, and the life.

If a man by a vaſt and imperious mind, and a heart large as the ſand upon the Sea-ſhore, (as it is ſaid of Solomon) could command all the knowledge of Nature and Art, of words and things; could attain to a maſtery in all Languages, and ſound the depths of all Arts and Sciences, meaſure the earth and the heavens, and tell the ſtars, and declare their order and motions; could diſcourſe of the intereſts of all States, the intrigues of all Courts, the reaſon of all Civil laws and conſtitutions, and give an account of the Hiſtory of all ages; could ſpeak of trees, from the Cedar-tree that is in Lebanon, even unto the Hyſop that ſprings out of the wall; and of beaſts alſo and of fowls, and of creeping things, and of fiſhes: and yet ſhould in the mean time, be deſtitute of the knowledge of God and Chriſt, p. 15and his duty; all this would be but an impertinent vanity, and a more glittering kind of Ignorance; and ſuch a man (like the Philoſopher, who whilſt he was gazing upon the ſtars, fell into the ditch) would but ſapienter deſcendere in infernum be undone with all this knowledge, and with a great deal of wiſdom go down to Hell.

2. Secondly, That to be religious is the trueſt wiſdom, and that likewiſe upon two accounts.

1. Becauſe it is to be wiſe for our ſelves.

2. It is to be wiſe as to our main intereſt and concernment.

1. 'Tis to be wiſe for our ſelves. There's an expreſſion, Job 22.21. He that is wiſe is profitable to himſelf; and Prov. 9.12. If thou be wiſe, thou ſhalt be wiſe for thy ſelf: intimating that wiſdom regards a man's own intereſt and advantage, and that he is not a wiſe man that doth not take care of himſelf and his own concernments, according to that of Old Ennius, nequicquam ſapere ſapientem, qui ſibi ipſi prodeſſe non quiret, That man hath but an empty title of Wiſdom and is not really vviſe vvho is not wiſe for himſelf. As ſelf-preſervation is the firſt principle of Nature, ſo care of our ſelves and our ovvn intereſt is p. 16the firſt part of wiſdom. He that is wiſe in the affairs and concernments of other men, but careleſs and negligent of his own, that man may be ſaid to be buſie, but he is not wiſe: he is employed indeed, but not ſo as a wiſe man ſhould be: Now this is the Wiſdom of Religion, that it directs a man to a care of his own proper intereſt and concernment.

2. It is to be wiſe as to our main intereſt. Our chief end and higheſt intereſt is happineſs: And this is happineſs to be freed from all (if it may) however from the greateſt evils; and to enjoy (if it may be) all good, however the chiefeſt. To be happy is not onelyonly to be freed from the pains and diſeaſes of the body, but from anxiety and vexation of ſpirit: not onelyonly to enjoy the pleaſures of ſenſe, but peace of Conſcience and tranquillity of mind. To be happy, is not onelyonly to be ſo for a little while, but as long as may be; and if it be poſſible, for ever. Now Religion deſigns our greateſt and longeſt happineſs; it aims at a freedom from the greateſt evils, and to bring us to the poſſeſſion and enjoyment of the greateſt good. For Religion wiſely conſiders that men have immortal ſpirits, which as they are ſpirits are capable of a pleaſure and happineſs diſtinct p. 17from that of our bodies and our ſenſes; and becauſe they are immortal, are capable of an everlaſting happineſs. Now our ſouls being the beſt part of our ſelves, and eternity being infinitely the moſt conſiderable duration, the greateſt wiſdom is to ſecure the intereſt of our ſouls and of eternity though it be with loſs and to the prejudice of our temporal and inferior Intereſts. Therefore Religion directs us rather to ſecure inward peace than outward eaſe, to be more carefull to avoid everlaſting and intolerable torment than ſhort and light afflictions which are but for a moment; to court the favour of God more than the friendſhip of the world, and not ſo much to fear them that can kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do, as him who after he hath kill'd, can deſtroy both body and ſoul in hell: In a word, our main intereſt is to be as happy as we can, and as long as is poſſible; and if we be caſt into ſuch circumſtances, that we muſt be either in part and for a time or elſe wholly and always miſerable, the beſt wiſdom is to chuſe the greateſt and moſt laſting happineſs, but the leaſt and ſhorteſt miſery. Upon this account Religion prefers thoſe pleaſures which flow from the preſence of God for evermore, infinitely before the tranſitory p. 18pleaſures of this world, and is much more carefull to avoid eternal miſery than preſent ſufferings. This is the wiſdom of Religion, that upon conſideration of the whole and caſting up all things together it does adviſe and lead us to our beſt intereſt.

II. The Second way of confirmation ſhall be by endeavouring to ſhew the ignorance and folly of irreligion. Now all that are irreligious are ſo upon one of theſe two accounts: Either, Firſt, becauſe they do not believe the foundations and principles of Religion, as the exiſtence of God, the immortality of the ſoul, and future rewards: or elſe, Secondly, becauſe though they do in ſome ſort believe theſe things, yet they live contrary to this their belief; and of this kind are the far greateſt part of wicked men. The firſt ſort are guilty of that which we call ſpeculative, the other of practicall Atheiſm. I ſhall endeavour to ſhew the Ignorance and Folly of both theſe.

Firſt, Speculative Atheiſm is unreaſonable, and that upon theſe Five accounts. 1. Becauſe it gives no tolerable account of the exiſtence of the world. 2. Nor does it give any reaſonable account of the univerſal conſent of mankind in this apprehenſion, That p. 19there is a God. 3. It requires more evidence for things than they are capable of. 4. The Atheiſt pretends to know that which no man can know. 5. Atheiſm contradicts it ſelf.

I. Becauſe it gives no tolerable account of the exiſtence of the world. One of the greateſt difficulties that lies in the Atheiſt's way is, upon his own ſuppoſition that there is no God, to give a likely account of the exiſtence of the world. We ſee this vaſt frame of the World, and an innumerable multitude of creatures in it, all which we who believe a God attribute to him as the Author of them. For a being ſuppos'd of infinite goodneſs and wiſedom and power is a very likely cauſe of theſe things. What more likely to make this vaſt world, to ſtretch forth the heavens and lay the foundations of the earth, and to form theſe and all things in them of nothing, than infinite power? What more likely to communicate Being and ſo many degrees of happineſs to ſo many ſeveral ſorts of creatures, than infinite goodneſs? What more likely to contrive this admirable frame of the Univerſe and all the creatures in it, each of them ſo perfect in their kind and all of them ſo fitted to each other and to the whole, than infinite p. 20counſel and wiſedom? This ſeems to be no unreaſonable account.

But let us ſee now what account the Atheiſt gives of theſe things. If there be no God there are but theſe two ways imaginable for the world to be. Either it muſt be ſaid, That not onelyonly the Matter but alſo the Frame of this world is eternal; and that as to the main things always were as they are without any firſt cauſe of their being; which is the way of the Ariſtotelian Atheiſt; (thoſe I mean, who proceed upon Ariſtotle's ſuppoſition of the eternity of the world, but yet deny it to be from God, which he expreſly aſſerts:) Or elſe the matter of the world being ſuppoſed to be eternal and of it ſelf, the original of this vaſt and beautifull frame muſt be aſcribed morely to chance, and the caſual concourſe of the parts of matter; which is the way of the Epicurean Atheiſt. But neither of theſe ways gives a tolerable account of the exiſtence of the world.

1. I ſhall firſt conſider the Hypotheſis of thoſe whom for diſtinction ſake I call the Ariſtotelian Atheiſts, which is this; That not only the matter but alſo the frame of the world is eternal, and that as to the main it was always as it is, of it p. 21ſelf; and that there hath been from all eternity a ſucceſſion of men and other creatures without any firſt cauſe of their being.

It ſeems to be very hard, and if that would do any good might be juſt matter of complaint, that we are fallen into ſo prophane and ſceptical an age which takes a pleaſure and a pride in unravilling almoſt all the received principles both of Religion and Reaſon: So that we are put many times to prove thoſe things which can hardly be made plainer than they are of themſelves. And ſuch almoſt are theſe Principles, That God is, and That all things were made by him; which by reaſon of the bold cavils of perverſe and unreaſonable men we are now a-days put to defend.

That ſomething is of it ſelf is evident, becauſe we ſee things are. And the things that we ſee muſt either have had ſome firſt cauſe of their being, or have been always and of themſelves. One of theſe two is unavoidable.

So that the controverſie between us and this ſort of Atheiſt comes to this; Which is the more credible opinion, that the world was never made nor had a beginning but always was as it is, and that there hath been from all eternity a ſucceſſion p. 22of men and other creatures without any firſt cauſe of their being: or, that there was from all eternity ſuch a being as we conceive God to be, infinite in power, goodneſs and wiſedom, which made us and all other things; The firſt of theſe opinions I ſhall ſhew to be altogether incredible, and the latter to have all the credibility and evidence of which a thing of that nature is capable, and ſuch evidence as is ſufficient to convince any impartial and conſiderate man.

Now in comparing the probabilities of things, that we may know on which ſide the advantage lies, theſe two conſiderations are of great moment, What the arguments are on each ſide, and what the difficulties. For if there be fair proofs on the one ſide, and none at all on the other, and if the moſt preſſing difficulties be on that ſide on which there are no proofs: this is ſufficient to render one opinion very credible and the other altogether incredible.

Theſe two things therefore I ſhall endeavour to make good, in the matter that is now under our conſideration. Firſt, That there are fair proofs on our ſide, and as convincing as the nature of the things is capable of; but that there is no pretence p. 23of proof on the other. And Secondly, That the ſide on which there is no proof is incumbred with the greateſt difficulties.

Firſt, That there are fair proofs on our ſide, and as convincing as the nature of the thing is capable of; but that there is no pretence of proof on the other.

This Queſtion, Whether the world was created and had a beginning, or not? is a queſtion concerning an ancient matter of fact, which can onelyonly be decided theſe two ways; by teſtimony, and by probabilities of reaſon. Teſtimony, is the principal argument in a matter of this nature, and if fair probabilities of reaſon concur with it this argument hath all the ſtrength it can have: Now both theſe are clearly on the affirmative ſide of the queſtion, viz. That the world was created, and had a beginning.

1. Teſtimony; of which there be two kinds, Divine and Humane.

Divine teſtimony, as ſuch, is not proper to be us'd in this cauſe conſidering the occaſion of the preſent debate: For that would be to beg the firſt and main queſtion now in controverſie, which is, Whether there be a God or not? which a teſtimony from God does ſuppoſe, and therefore ought not to be brought for the proof p. 24of it. 'Tis true indeed that thoſe effects of Divine Power, I mean miracles which will prove a divine teſtimony to an infidel, will as well prove the being of a God to an Atheiſt; But when we diſpute againſt thoſe who deny a God no teſtimony ought to be preſum'd to be from God, but muſt be prov'd to be ſo. And whatever argument proves that will alſo prove that there is a God.

Humane teſtimonies are of two ſorts; univerſal tradition, and written Hiſtory. Both theſe are plainly and beyond diſpute on our ſide.

Firſt, There is an univerſal tradition concerning the beginning of the world, and that it was made by God. And for the evidence of this we have the concurring Tradition of the moſt ancient Nations, the Egyptians and Phoenicians **Vide G…t. de verit. Chr Relig. L. 1.; and of the moſt barbarous the Indians; who as Strabo ††Geograph. L. 15.tells us, did in many things agree with the Grecians, particularly in this, that the world did begin, and ſhould have an end; and that God the maker and governour of it, is preſent in all parts of it. And Acoſta tells us, that at the firſt diſcovery of America, the inhabitants of Peru did worſhip one chief God, under the name or title of The Maker of the p. 25Ʋniverſe: And yet theſe people had not had any commerce with the other known parts of the world, for God knows how many ages.

To which may be added, that the moſt ancient of the Philoſophers, and thoſe that were the heads of the chief Sects of Philoſophy, as Thales, Anaxagoras and Pythagoras did likewiſe conſent to this Tradition. Particularly concerning Thales, Tully **De Nat. Deorum L. 1.tells us that he was the firſt of all the Philoſophers that enquired into theſe things, and he ſaid, that water was the beginning of all things, and that God was that mind (or intelligent Principle) which faſhion'd all things out of water. So likewiſe Strabo **Georg. L. 15.informs us that the Brachmans, the chief Sect of Philoſophers among the Indians, agreed with the Grecians in this, That the world was made of water. Which agrees exactly with Moſes's account of the Creation, viz. That the Spirie of God moved upon the face of waters; which St. Peter **2 Pet. 3.5.2 Pet 3:5expreſſes thus, That by the word of God the heavens and the earth (for ſo the Hebrews call the world) wert of old foreign conſtituted or made of water; not ſtanding out of the water, as our Tranſlation renders it.

p. 26Nay Ariſtotle **Metaph. L. 1. c. 3.himſelf, who was the great aſſerter of the eternity of the world, gives this account why the Gods were anciently repreſented by the Heathens as ſwearing by the lake Styx, becauſe water was ſuppoſed to be the principle of all things. And this, he tells us, was the moſt ancient opinion concerning the original of the world; and that the very oldeſt Writers of Theology, and thoſe who liv'd at the greateſt diſtance from his time, were of this mind. And in the Book de Mundo **Cap. 6.it is freely acknowledg'd to have been an ancient ſaying, and a general Tradition among all men, That all things are of God, and were made by him. I will conclude this with that full Teſtimony of Maximus Tyrius **Diſſertat. 1.to this purpoſe: However (ſays he) men may differ in other things, yet they all agree in this Law or Principle, that there is one God, King, and Father of all things, &c. This the Greeks ſay, this the Barbarians; this thoſe that live upon the Continent, and thoſe that dwell by the Sea; the wiſe and the unwiſe.

Secondly, We have likewiſe a moſt ancient and credible Hiſtory of the beginning of the world; I mean the Hiſtory of Moſes, with which no Book in the world in point of antiquity can contend. I ſhall p. 27not now go about to ſtrengthen my argument, by pleading the Divine authority of this Book; for which yet I could offer good evidence, if that were proper to the matter hand. It is ſufficient to my preſent purpoſe that Moſes have the ordinary credit of an Hiſtorian given him, which none in reaſon can deny him, he being cited by the moſt ancient of the Heathen Hiſtorians, and the antiquity of his writings never queſtioned by any of them, as Joſephus **L. 1. contra Appion.aſſures us.

Now this Hiſtory of Moſes gives us a particular account of the beginning of the world, and of the creation of it by God. Which aſſertion of his is agreeable to the moſt ancient Writers among the Heathen, whether Poets or Hiſtorians. And ſeveral of the main parts of Moſes's Hiſtory, as concerning the Floud and the firſt Fathers of the ſeveral Nations of the World (of which he gives a particular account, Gen. 10.) do very well accord with the moſt ancient accounts of Prophane Hiſtory. And I do not know, whether any thing ought more to recommend the Writings of Moſes to a humane belief, than the eaſie and credible account which he gives of the original of the World, and of the firſt peopling of it.

p. 28As to the account of ancient times, both the Aegyptian and Chaldean accounts, which are pretended by ſome to be ſo vaſtly different from that of the Scriptures, may for all that be, near the matter, eaſily reconcil'd with it**Vide Dr. Stillingſleet's Orig. Sac. where this is fully made out.; if we do but admit what Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch, very credible perſons and diligent ſearchers into ancient Books, do moſt expreſly aſſure us, viz. that both thoſe Nations did anciently reckon months for years. And the account of the Chineſes is not hard to be reconcil'd with that of the Septuagint. Now in ſo nice and obſcure a matter, as the account of ancient times is, it ought to ſatisfie any fair and reaſonable enquirer if they can be brought any whit near one another.

So that univerſal Tradition and the moſt ancient Hiſtory in the world are clearly on our ſide. And if they be, one can hardly wiſh a more convincing argument. For if the world and conſequently mankind had a beginning, there is all the reaſon in the world to expect theſe two things: Firſt, that there ſhould be an univerſal Tradition, concerning this matter; becauſe it was the moſt memorable thing that could be tranſmitted to poſterity. And this was eaſie to be done, if mankind ſprang from one p. 29common root and original…, from whence this Tradition would naturally be univerſally diffus'd. Secondly, it may with the ſame reaſon be expected, that ſo remarkable a thing ſhould be recorded in the moſt ancient Hiſtory. Now both theſe have accordingly happened. But then on the other hand, if the world was eternal and had no beginning there could be no real ground for ſuch a Tradition or Hiſtory. And if ſuch a Tradition were at any time endeavoured to be ſet on foot, it is not eaſie to imagine how it ſhould at firſt gain entertainment, but much more difficult to conceive how ever it ſhould come to be univerſally propagated. For upon the ſuppoſition of thoſe who hold the eternity of the world, the world was always peopled; and if ſo, there could be no common head or ſpring from whence ſuch a Tradition would naturally derive it ſelf into all parts of the world. So that unleſs all the world was ſometime of one language, and under one Government (which it never was that we know of ſince it was peopled) no endeavour and induſtry could make ſuch a Tradition common.

If it be ſaid, that this Tradition began after ſome univerſal deluge, out of which poſſibly but one family might eſcape, and p. 30that poſſibly too of barbarous people; from whom any fond and groundleſs conceit might ſpring and afterwards ſpread it ſelf as mankind encreas'd. This I ſhall have occaſion to conſider in a more proper place. In the mean time I have ſhewn, even from the acknowledgment of Ariſtotle himſelf, that there was anciently ſuch a Tradition concerning the beginning of the world. Nay, if we may believe him, he himſelf was the very firſt aſſerter of the eternity of the world. For he**De Coelo. l. 1. c. 10. ſays expreſly, That all the Philoſophers that were before him, did hold that the world was made. Thus much for the firſt kind of proof this matter is capable of, namely, teſtimony.

2dly. The probabilities of reaſon do all likewiſe favour the beginning of the world: As,

1. The want of any Hiſtory or Tradition ancienter than what is conſiſtent with the received opinion of the time of the worlds beginning; nay, the moſt ancient Hiſtories were written long after that time. This Lucretius, the famous Epicurean, urgeth as a ſtrong preſumption that the world had a beginning

— Si nulla fuit genitalis origo

Terrarum & Coeli, ſemperque aeterna fuere:

p. 31Cur ſupra bellum Thebanum, & funera Trojae,

Non alias alii quoque res cecinere Poetae?

i. e. If the world had no beginning, how is it that the Greek Poets (the moſt ancient of their Writers) mention nothing higher than the Theban war, and the deſtruction of Troy? Were there from all eternity no memorable actions done till about that time? Or had mankind no way till of late to record them and propagate the memory of them to poſterity? It is much if men were from eternity, that they ſhould not find out the way of writing all that long duration, which had paſt before that Time. Sure he was a fortunate man indeed, who after men had been eternally ſo dull as not to find it out, had the luck at laſt to hit upon it.

But it may be, the famous actions of former times were always recorded, but that the memorials of them have been ſeveral times loſt by univerſal deluges, which have now and then happen'd and ſwept all away, except (it may be) two or three perſons, that have eſcap'd and begun the world again upon a new ſcore. This is the onelyonly refuge that the Atheiſt hath to fly to, when he is preſt with this and the like arguments. But he cannot poſſibly eſcape this way. For theſe univerſal inundations p. 32muſt either be natural or ſupernatural. If they be ſupernatural, (as any man that conſiders well the frame of the world, and how hard it is to give a natural reaſon of them, would be enclin'd to think) then indeed it is eaſie to conceive how a few of mankind, and no more, ſhould eſcape: Becauſe this will depend upon the pleaſure of that ſuperiour Being which is ſuppoſed ſupernaturally to order theſe things. But this is to yield what we have all this while contended for, viz. That there is a God. But if they be natural, which the Atheiſt muſt ſay, then there is nothing to reſtrain them from a total deſtruction, not onelyonly of mankind, but of all the beaſts of the earth. This the Atheiſt cannot deny, not onelyonly to be very poſſible, but exceeding probable; becauſe he grants it to have come ſo near the matter, that but very few eſcap'd, and no doubt with great difficulty. Now it is the greateſt wonder in the world, that a thing (according to their own ſuppoſition) ſo likely to happen, ſhould never have fallen out in an infinite duration. Will any man have the face to ſay that a thing is likely which did never yet happen from all eternity? One would think that not onelyonly whatever is probable, but whatever can poſſibly happen p. 33ſhould be brought about in that ſpace: So that if mankind had been from eternity it had in all probability, I had almoſt ſaid, been deſtroyed from all eternity, but I may confidently ſay, long ſince ruin'd.

2. Another probability of the worlds beginning is, the account which we have of the original of Learning and the moſt uſeful Arts in ſeveral parts of the world. Now if the world had been eternal, theſe in all likelihood would have been found out, and generally ſpread long ago and beyond the memory of all ages. There are ſome Arts indeed that are peculiarly convenient to ſome particular Nations; and others that are onelyonly ſerviceable to the humour and faſhion of one or more ages. Theſe are not likely to ſpread, and they may come in, and go out, and return again as often as there is occaſion. But thoſe which are generally uſefull to mankind in all times and places, if they were once found out (and who would not think they ſhould in an eternal duration?) it is not imaginable but that they ſhould have been ſpread innumerable ages ſince: Nor can any man give a good reaſon how they ſhould ever be loſt, but by ſome ſuch accident as an univerſal deluge, which has been ſpoken to already. But now on the contrary, the beginnings p. 34of Learning and of the moſt uſeful Arts in ſeveral Nations, is very well known. And I add farther, that where-ever Learning and Civil Arts have come this Tradition concerning the beginning of the world hath been moſt vigorous, and aſſerted with the greatneſ… clearneſs and confidence.

3. The ſeveral parts of which the world conſiſts, being (ſo far as by thoſe parts of it which we know, we can poſſibly judge of the reſt) in their nature corruptible; it is more than probable, that in an infinite duration this frame of things would long ſince have been diſſolv'd; eſpecially, if (as the Atheiſt affirms) there be no ſuperior being, no wiſe and intelligent principle to repair and regulate it, and to prevent thoſe innumerable diſorders and calamitous accidents, which muſt in ſo long a ſpace in all probability have happen'd to it. This Lucretius **L. 5.alſo urges as a convincing proof that the world was not eternal,

Quare etiam nativa neceſſe eſt confiteare

Haec eadem; ne que enim mortali corpore quae ſunt

Ex infinito jam tempore adhuc potuiſſent

Immenſi validas aevi contemnere vires.

It muſt neceſſarily (ſays he) be acknowledg'd that the world had a beginning; otherwiſe p. 35wiſe thoſe things which are in their own nature corruptible had never been able, from all eternity to have held out againſt thoſe forcible and violent aſſaults which in an infinite duration muſt have happen'd. Nay, thus much Ariſtotle himſelf every where grants, that if the frame of the world be liable to diſſolution, it muſt of neceſſity be acknowledg'd to have had a beginning.

Theſe are ſome of the chief Probabilities on our ſide; which being taken together, and in their united force, have a great deal of conviction in them. Eſpecially if this be added, that there is no kind of poſitive proof ſo much as pretended on the other ſide. The utmoſt that Ariſtotle pretends to prove, is, That the world proceeded from God by the way of a natural and neceſſary effect, as light does from the Sun. Which if it be true (as there is no tolerable ground for it) the World indeed would be without beginning, but not of it ſelf. And thus I have done with the firſt conſideration I propounded to ſpeak to, viz. That there are fair proofs on our ſide, and as convincing as the nature of the thing is capable of; but that there is no pretence or proof on the other. I proceed therefore to the

p. 36Second Conſideration, That the moſt preſſing difficulties are on that ſide on which there is no proof.

Thoſe who deny a God, and hold the world to have been eternal and of it ſelf, have onelyonly two things to object againſt us: The difficulties that there are in the notion of a God, and in making the world of nothing. To the firſt I anſwer: That we attribute nothing to God that hath any repugnancy or contradiction in it. Power, wiſedom, goodneſs, juſtice and truth, have no repugnancy in them to our reaſon; becauſe we own theſe Perfections to be in ſome degree in our ſelves; and therefore they may be in the higheſt degree that is poſſible in another. The eternity of God and his immenſity, and his being of himſelf, how difficult ſoever they may be to be conceived, yet theſe perfections muſt be granted to be ſomewhere; and therefore they may as well, nay much better, be aſcrib'd to God, in whom we ſuppoſe all other perfections to meet, than to any thing elſe. And as for God's being a ſpirit, whatever difficulty there may be in conceiving the notion of a ſpirit, yet the Atheiſt muſt grant the thing, that there is a being or principle really diſtinct from matter; or elſe ſhew how meer p. 37matter, which is confeſſed by themſelves to be void of ſenſe and underſtanding, and to move neceſſarily, can produce any thing that has ſenſe, underſtanding and liberty. As to the other difficulty, of making the world of nothing, I ſhall onelyonly ſay this: that though it ſignifie an inconceivable exceſs of power, yet there can no contradiction be ſhewn in it. And it is every whit as eaſie to conceive that ſomething ſhould be caus'd to be that was not before, as that any thing ſhould be of it ſelf; which yet muſt be granted on both ſides; and therefore this difficulty ought not to be objected by either.

But then on the other ſide there are theſe two great and real difficulties. Firſt, That men generally have always believed the contrary, viz. That the World had a beginning, and was made by God. Which is a ſtrong evidence that this account of the exiſtence of the world is more natural, and of a more eaſie conception to humane underſtanding. And indeed it is very natural to conceive that every thing which is imperfect (as the world and all the creatures in it muſt be acknowledged in many reſpects to be) had ſome cauſe which produc'd it, ſuch as it is, and determin'd the bounds and p. 38limitss of its perfection: but that which is of it ſelf and without a cauſe, may be any thing, and have any perfection which does not imply a contradiction. Secondly, To aſſert mankind to have been of it ſelf, and without a cauſe, hath this invincible objection againſt it; that we plainly ſee every man to be from another. So that mankind is aſſerted to have no cauſe of its being, and yet every particular man muſt be acknowledged to have a father; which is every whit as abſurd in an infinite ſucceſſion of men, as in any finite number of generations. It is more eaſie indeed to conceive how a conſtant and permanent being, ſuppoſe matter, ſhould always have been of it ſelf; and then that that ſhould be the foundation of infinite ſucceſſive changes and alterations: But an infinite ſucceſſion of the generations of men without any permanent foundation, is utterly unimaginable. If it be ſaid that the earth was always, and in time did produce men, and that they ever ſince have produc'd one another; this is to run into one great abſurdity of the Epicurean way, which ſhall be conſider'd in its proper place.

And thus I have endeavour'd as plainly and briefly as the nature of the Argument p. 39would admit, to prove that the account which the Scripture gives of the exiſtence of the world, is moſt credible, and agreeable to the reaſon of mankind; and that this Firſt account which the Atheiſt gives of it, is altogether incredible. And now I expect after all this the Atheiſt will complain, that all that hath been ſaid does not amount to a ſtrict demonſtration of the thing. It may be ſo. And if the Atheiſt would undertake to demonſtrate the contrary, there might be ſome reaſon for this complaint. In the mean time I deſire to know whether when both ſides are agreed that the world is, and that it muſt either have its original from God, or have been always of it ſelf; and if it have been made evident, that on one ſide there are fair proofs both from teſtimony and reaſon and as convincing as the nature of the thing is capable of, and no pretence of proof on the other; and that the difficulties are moſt preſſing on that ſide which is deſtitute of proof; I ſay, if this have been made evident, I deſire to know whether this be not upon the matter as ſatisfactory to a wiſe man as a demonſtration? For in this caſe there can be no doubt on which ſide the clear advantage of evidence lies, and conſequently p. 40which way a prudent man ought to determine aſſent.

I come now in the Second place, to conſider the other account which another ſort of Atheiſts, thoſe whom I call the Epicurean, do give of the exiſtence of the world. And 'tis this. They ſuppoſe the matter of which the world is conſtituted to be eternal and of it ſelf, and then an infinite empty ſpace for the infinite little parts of this matter (which they call Atomes) to move and play in; and that theſe being always in motion did after infinite trials and encounters, without any counſel or deſign and without the diſpoſal and contrivance of any wiſe and intelligent being, at laſt by a lucky caſualty entangle and ſettle themſelves in this beautifull and regular frame of the world which we now ſee. And that the Earth, being at firſt in its full vigour and fruitfulneſs, did then bring forth men and all other ſorts of living creatures as it does plants now.

This is in ſhort the Epicurean account of the original of the world, which as abſurd as it is Lucretius **L. 5.hath very elegantly expreſſed in theſe verſes.

p. 41Sed quibus ille modis conjectus materiai,

Fundarit coelum ac terram, pontique profunda,

Soliſque & lunae curſus, ex ordine ponam.

Nam certe neque conſilio primordia rerum

Ordine ſe quaeque, atque ſagaci mente locarunt,

Nec quos quae que darent motus pepigere profecto:

Sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum

Ex inſinito jam tempore percita plagis

Ponderibuſque ſuis conſuerunt concita ferri,

Omnimodiſque coire, atque omnia pertentare,

Quaecunque inter ſe poſſent congreſſa creare:

Propterea fit, uti magnum vulgata per aevum

Omnigenos coetus, & motus experiundo,

Tandem ea conveniant, quae ut convenere, repente

Magnarum rerum fiunt exordia ſaepe,

Terrai, maris & caeli, generiſque animantum.

Thus he like a good Poet, but a very bad maker and contriver of the world. For I appeal to any man of reaſon whether any thing can be more unreaſonable, than obſtinately to impute an effect to chance which carries in the very face of it all the arguments and characters of a wiſe deſign, and contrivance? Was ever any conſiderable work, in which there was required a great variety of parts and a regular and orderly diſpoſition of thoſe parts, done by chance? Will chance fit means to ends, and that in ten thouſand inſtances, and p. 42not fail in any one? How often might a man after he had jumbled a ſet of letters in a bag, fling them out upon the ground before they would fall into an exact Poem, yea or ſo much as make a good diſcourſe in Proſe? And may not a little Book be as eaſily made by chance, as this great Volume of the world? How long might a man be in ſprinkling colours upon Canvas with a careleſs hand, before they would happen to make the exact Picture of a man? And is a man eaſier made by chance than his Picture? How long might twenty thouſand blind men, which ſhould be ſent out from the ſeveral remote parts of England, wander up and down before they would all meet upon Salisbury plains and fall into rank and file in the exact order of an Army? And yet this is much more eaſie to be imagined, than how the innumerable blind parts of matter ſhould rendezvous themſelves into a world. A man that ſees Henry the Seventh's Chappel at Weſtminſter might with as good reaſon maintain (yea with much better, conſidering the vaſt difference betwixt that little ſtructure and the huge fabrick of the world) that it was never contrived or built by any man, but that the ſtones did by chance grow into thoſe curious p. 43figures into which they ſeem to have been cut and graven; and that upon a time (as tales uſually begin) the materials of that building, the ſtone, morter, timber, iron, lead, and glaſs, happily met together and very fortunately rang'd themſelves into that delicate order in which we ſee them now ſo cloſe compacted that it muſt be a very great chance that parts them again. What would the world think of a man that ſhould advance ſuch an opinion as this, and write a Book for it? If they would do him right, they ought to look upon him as mad: but yet with a little more reaſon than any man can have to ſay that the world was made by chance: or that the firſt men grew up out of the earth as plants do now. For can any thing be more ridiculous and againſt all reaſon, than to aſcribe the production of men to the firſt fruitfulneſs of the earth, without ſo much as one inſtance and experiment in any Age or Hiſtory to countenance ſo monſtrous a ſuppoſition? The thing is at firſt-ſight ſo groſs and palpable, that no diſcourſe about it can make it more apparent. And yet theſe ſhameful beggars of Principles, who give this precarious account of the original of things, aſſume to themſelves to be the men of reaſon, the p. 44great wits of the world the onelyonly cautious and wary perſons that hate to be impoſed upon, that muſt have convincing evidence for every thing, and can admit of nothing without a clear demonſtration for it.

II. Speculative atheiſm is unreaſonable, becauſe it gives no reaſonable account of the univerſal conſent of mankind in this apprehenſion, that there is a God. That men do generally believe a God, and have done in all Ages, the preſent experience of the world and the records of former times do abundantly teſtify. Now how comes this perſwaſion to have gained ſo univerſal a poſſeſſion of the mind of man, and to have found ſuch general entertainment in all Nations, even thoſe that are moſt barbarous? If there be no ſuch thing as God in the world, how comes it to paſs that this object doth continually encounter our underſtandings? Whence is it that we are ſo perpetually haunted with the apparition of a Deity, and followed with it wherever we go? If it be not natural to the mind of man, but proceeds from ſome accidental diſtemper of our underſtandings, how comes it to be ſo univerſal that no differences of age, or temper, or education can wear it out, and ſet any conſiderable p. 45number of men free from it; Into what can we reſolve this ſtrong inclination of mankind to this error and miſtake? How come all Nations to be thus ſeduced? It is altogether unimaginable but that the reaſon of ſo univerſal a conſent in all places and ages of the world, and among all differences of perſons, ſhould be one and conſtant. But no one and conſtant reaſon of this can be given, but from the nature of man's mind and underſtanding which hath this notion of a Deity born with it and ſtamped upon it; or which is all one, is of ſuch a frame that in the free uſe and exerciſe of it ſelf it will find out God: And what more reaſonable than to think, that if we be God's workmanſhip, he ſhould ſet this mark of himſelf upon all reaſonable creatures, that they may know to whom they belong, and may acknowledge the Author of their beings? This ſeems to be a credible and ſatisfactory account of ſo univerſal a conſent in this matter. But now what doth the Atheiſt reſolve this into? He is not at one with himſelf what account to give of it, nor can it be expected he ſhould. For he that will over-look the true reaſon of a thing which uſually is but one, may eaſily find many falſe ones, error being infinite, But there are three p. 46which he principally relies upon, fear, tradition, and policy of State. I ſhall briefly conſider theſe.

Firſt, He would make us believe that this apprehenſion of a God doth ſpring from an infinite jealouſie in the mind of man, and an endleſs fear of the worſt that may happen; according to that divine ſaying of the Poet, which he can never ſufficiently admire, Primum in orle Deos fecit timor,— Fear firſt made Gods. So that it is granted on both ſides that the fear of a Deity doth univerſally poſſeſs the minds of men. Now the queſtion is, whether it be more likely that the exiſtence of a God ſhould be the cauſe of this fear, or that this fear ſhould be the cauſe why men imagine there is a God? if there be a God, who hath impreſſed this image of himſelf upon the mind of Man, there's great reaſon why all men ſhould ſtand in awe of him: But if there be no God, it is not eaſie to conceive how fear ſhould create an univerſal confidence and aſſurance in men that there is one. For, whence ſhould this fear come? It muſt be either from without, from the ſuggeſtion of others who firſt tell us there is ſuch a being and then our fear believes it, or elſe it muſt ariſe from within, from the nature of man which is apt to fanſie p. 47dreadfull and terrible things. If from the ſuggeſtion of others who tell us ſo, the queſtion returns, who told them ſo? and will never be ſatisfied till the firſt Author of this report be found out. So that this account of fear reſolves it ſelf into tradition, which ſhall ſpoken to in its proper place. But if it be ſaid that this fear ariſeth from within, from the nature of man which is apt to imagine dreadfull things, this likewiſe is liable to inexplicable difficulties. For, Firſt, The proper object of fear, is ſomething that is dreadfull, that is, ſomething that threatens men with harm or danger; and that in God muſt either be power or juſtice; and ſuch an object as this fear indeed may create: But Goodneſs and Mercy are eſſential to the notion of a God as well as power and juſtice: now how ſhould fear put men upon fanſying a being that is infinitely good and merciful? No man hath reaſon to be afraid of ſuch a being, as ſuch. So that the Atheiſt muſt joyn another cauſe to fear, viz. hope, to enable men to create this imagination of a God. And what would the product of theſe two contrary paſſions be? the imagination of a being which we ſhould fear would do us as much harm as we could hope it would do us p. 48good; which would be quid pro quo, and which our reaſon would oblige us to lay aſide ſo ſoon as we have fanſied it, becauſe it would ſignifie juſt nothing. But, Secondly, ſuppoſe fear alone could do it; how comes the mind of man to be ſubject to ſuch groundleſs and unreaſonable fears? The Ariſtotelian Atheiſt will ſay, it always was ſo; But this is to affirm, and not to give any account of a thing. The Epicurean Atheiſt, if he will ſpeak conſonantly to himſelf, muſt ſay that there happened in the original conſtitution of the firſt men ſuch a contexture of Atomes as doth naturally diſpoſe men to theſe panick fears; unleſs he will ſay that the firſt men when they grew out of the earth and afterwards broke looſe from their root, finding themſelves weak and naked and unarmed and meeting with ſeveral fierce Creatures ſtronger than themſelves, they were put into ſuch a fright as did a little diſtemper their underſtandings and let looſe their imaginations to endleſs ſuſpicions and unbounded jealouſies, which did at laſt ſettle in the conceit of an inviſible being infinitely powerful, and able to do them harm; and being fully poſſeſt with this apprehenſion (nothing being more ordinary than for crazed perſons to believe their p. 49own fancies) they became religious; and afterwards when mankind began to be propagated in the way of generation, then Religion obliged them to inſtill theſe Principles into their Children in their tender years that ſo they might make the greater impreſſion upon them; and this courſe having been continued ever ſince the notion of a God hath been kept up in the world. This is very ſuitable to Epicurus his Hypotheſis of the original of men; But if any man think fit to ſay thus I cannot think it fit to confute him. Thirdly, whether men were from all eternity ſuch timorous and fancifull Creatures, or hapned to be made ſo in the firſt conſtitution of things, it ſeems however that this fear of a Deity hath a foundation in nature. And if it be natural, ought we not rather to conclude that there is ſome ground and reaſon for theſe fears, and that nature hath not planted them in us to no purpoſe, than that they are vain and groundleſs? There is no principle that Ariſtotle (the great aſſertor of the eternity of the world) doth more frequently inculcate than this, That nature doeth nothing in vain; and the Atheiſt himſelf is forc'd to acknowledge (and ſo every man muſt who attentively conſiders the frame of the world) That although p. 50things were made by chance, yet they have happen'd as well as if the greateſt wiſedom had the ordering and contriving of them. And ſurely wiſedom would never have planted ſuch a vain principle as the fear of a Deity in the nature of man, if there had not been a God in the world.

Secondly, If fear be not a ſufficient account of this univerſal conſent, the Atheiſt thinks it may very probably be reſolved into univerſal Tradition. But this likewiſe is liable to great exception. For, whence came this Tradition? It muſt begin ſome time, it muſt have its original from ſome body; and it were very well worth our knowing who that man was that firſt raiſed this ſpirit which all the reaſon of mankind could never conjure down ſince. Where did he live, and when? In what Countrey, and in what Age of the world? What was his name, or his ſons name, that we may know him? This the Atheiſt can give no punctual account of: only he imagines it not improbable that ſome body long ago (no body knows when) beyond the memory of all Ages did ſtart ſuch a notion in the world and that it hath paſt for current ever ſince. But if this Tradition be granted ſo very ancient as to have been before all Books p. 51and to be elder than any Hiſtory, it may for any thing any body can tell have been from the beginning; and then it is much more likely to be a notion which was bred in the mind of man and born with him, than a Tradition tranſmitted from hand to hand through all Generations; eſpecially if we conſider how many rude and barbarous Nations there are in the world which conſent in the opinion of a God, and yet have ſcarce any certain Tradition of any thing that was done among them but two or three Ages before.

Thirdly, But if neither of theſe be ſatiſfactory, he hath one way more; which although it ſignifie little to men of ſober and ſevere Reaſon, yet it very unhappily hits the jealous and ſuſpicious humour of the generality of men, who from the experience they have had of themſelves and others are very apt to ſuſpect that every body, but eſpecially their Superiours and Governours, have a deſign to impoſe upon them for their own ends. In ſhort, it is this: that this noiſe about a God is a mere State-Engine and a Politick device, invented at firſt by ſome great Prince or Miniſter of State, to keep People in awe and order. And if ſo, from hence (ſaith the Atheiſt) we may eaſily apprehend how p. 52from ſuch an original it might be generally propagated and become univerſally current, having the ſtamp of publick authority upon it. Beſides, that people have always been found eaſie to comply with the inclinations of their Prince. And from hence likewiſe we may ſee the reaſon why this notion had continued ſo long. For being found by experience to be ſo excellent an inſtrument of government we may be ſure it would always be cheriſhed and kept up.

And now he triumphs, and thinks the buſineſs is very clear: Thus it was, ſome time or other, (moſt probably towards the beginning of the world, if it had a beginning, when all mankind was under one univerſal Monarch) ſome great Nebuchadnezzar ſet up this Image of a Deity, and commanded all people and Nations to fall down and worſhip it: And this being found a ſucceſsful device to awe people into obedience to government it hath been continued to this day, and is like to laſt to the end of the world. To this fine Conjecture I have theſe four things to ſay:

1. That all this is mere conjecture and ſuppoſition; he cannot bring the leaſt ſhadow of proof or evidence for any one tittle of it.

p. 532. This ſuppoſition grants the opinion of a God to conduce very much to the ſupport of government and order in the world; and conſequently to be very beneficial to mankind. So that the Atheiſt cannot but acknowledge that it is great pity that it ſhould not be true, and that it is the common intereſt of mankind, if there were but probable Arguments for it, not to admit of any ſlight reaſons againſt it; and to puniſh all thoſe who would ſeduce men to Atheiſm, as the great diſturbers of the world and peſts of humane Society.

3. This ſuppoſition can have nothing of certainty in it unleſs this be true, that whoever makes a politick advantage of other mens principles ought to be preſumed to contrive thoſe principles into them, Whereas it is much more common (becauſe more eaſie) for men to ſerve their own ends of thoſe principles or opinions which they do not put into men but find there. So that if the queſtion of a God were to be decided by the probability of this conjecture, (which the Atheiſt applauds himſelf moſt in) it would be concluded in the affirmative; It being much more likely, ſince Politicians reap the advantages of obedience and a more ready ſubmiſſion to government from mens believing that there p. 54is a God, that they found the minds of men prepoſſeſſed to their hands with the notion of a God, than that they planted it there.

4. We have as much evidence of the contrary to this ſuppoſition as ſuch a thing is capable of, viz. that it was not an arcanum imperii, a ſecret of government to propagate the belief of a God among the people when the Governours themſelves knew it to be a cheat. For we find in the Hiſtories of all Ages of which we have any records, (and of other Ages we cannot poſſibly judge) that Princes have not been more ſecure from troubles of conſcience and the fears of Religion and the terrors of another world, (nay many of them more ſubject to theſe) than other men, as I could give many inſtances, and thoſe no mean ones: What made Caligula creep under the bed when it thunder'd? What made Tiberius, that great Maſter of the crafts of government complain ſo much of the grievous ſtings and laſhes he felt in his Conſcience? What made Cardinal Woolſey (that great Miniſter of State in our own Nation) to pour forth his ſoul in thoſe ſad words, Had I been as diligent to pleaſe my God as I have been to pleaſe my King, he would not have forſaken me now in my gray hairs? What reaſon for ſuch actions and ſpeeches, if p. 55theſe great men had known that Religion was but a cheat? But if they knew nothing of this ſecret, I think we may ſafely conclude that the notion of a God did not come from the Court, that it was not the invention of Politicians and a juggle of State to cozen the people into obedience.

And now from all this that hath been ſaid it ſeems to be very evident, that the general conſent of mankind in this apprehenſion that there is a God muſt in all reaſon be aſcribed to ſome more certain and univerſal cauſe than fear or tradition or State-policy, viz. to this that God himſelf hath wrought this image of himſelf upon the mind of man, and ſo woven it into the very frame of his being that (like Phidias his Picture in Minerva's Shield) it can never totally be defaced without the ruine of humane nature.

I know but one Objection that this diſcourſe is liable to, which is this; That the univerſal conſent of mankind in the apprehenſion of a God is no more an Argument that He really is, than the general agreement of ſo many Nations for ſo many Ages in the worſhip of many Gods is an Argument that there are many.

To this I anſwer, i. That the generality of the Philoſophers and wiſe men of p. 56all Nations and Ages, did diſſent from the multitude in theſe things. They believed but one Supreme Deity, which with reſpect to the various benefits men received from him had ſeveral titles beſtowed upon him. And although they did ſervilely comply with the people in worſhipping God, by ſenſible images and repreſentations, yet it appears by their writings that they deſpiſed this way of worſhip as ſuperſtitious and unſuitable to the nature of God. So that Polytheiſm and Idolatry are far from being able to pretend to univerſal conſent from their having had the vote of the multitude in moſt Nations for ſeveral Ages together. Becauſe the opinion of the vulgar ſeparated from the conſent and approbation of the wiſe, ſignifies no more than a great many Cyphers would do without figures.

2. The groſs ignorance and miſtakes of the Heathen about God and his worſhip are a good argument that there is a God; becauſe they ſhew that men ſunk into the moſt degenerate condition, into the greateſt blindneſs and darkneſs imaginable, do yet retain ſome ſenſe and awe of a Deity; that Religion is a property of our natures and that the notion of a Deity is intimate to our underſtandings and ſticks cloſe to p. 57them, ſeeing men will rather have any God than none; and rather than want a Deity they will worſhip any thing.

3. That there have been ſo many falſe Gods devis'd, is rather an argument that there is a true one than that there is none. There would be no counterfeits but for the ſake of ſomething that is real. For though all pretenders ſeem to be what they really are not, yet they pretend to be ſomething that really is. For to counterfeit is to put on the likeneſs and appearance of ſome real excellency. There would be no Braſsmoney if there were not good and lawful money. Briſtol-Stones would not pretend to be Diamonds, if there never had been any Diamonds. Thoſe Idols in Henry the ſeventh's time (as Sir Francis Bacon calls them) Lambert Simnell and Perkin Warbeck, had never been ſet up if there had not once been a real Plantagenet and Duke of York. So the Idols of the Heathen though they be ſet up in affront to the true God, yet they rather prove that there is one than the contrary.

III. Speculative Atheiſme is abſurd, becauſe it requires more evidence for things than they are capable of. Ariſtotle hath long ſince well obſerved, how unreaſonable it is to expect the ſame kind of proof p. 58and evidence for every thing, which we have for ſome things. Mathematical things, being of an abſtracted nature are capable of the cleareſt and ſtricteſt Demonſtration: But Concluſions in Natural Philoſophy are capable of proof by an Induction of experiments; things of a moral nature by moral arguments; and matters of fact by credible teſtimony. And though none of theſe be capable of that ſtrict kind of demonſtration, which Mathematical matters are; yet have we an undoubted aſſurance of them, when they are proved by the beſt arguments that things of that kind will bear. No man can demonſtrate to me (unleſs we will call every argument that is fit to convince a wiſe man a demonſtration) that there is ſuch an Iſland in America as Jamaica. Yet upon the teſtimony of credible perſons who have ſeen it, and Authors who have written of it, I am as free from all doubt concerning it, as I am from doubting of the cleareſt Mathematical demonſtration. So that this is to be entertained as a firm Principle by all thoſe who pretend to be certain of any thing at all: That when any thing in any of theſe kinds, is proved by as good Arguments as a thing of that kind is capable of, and we have as great aſſurance that it is as we could poſſibly have p. 59ſuppoſing it were, we ought not in reaſon to make any doubt of the exiſtence of that thing.

Now to apply this to the preſent caſe. The being of a God is not Mathematically demonſtrable, nor can it be expected it ſhould, becauſe only Mathematical matters admit of this kind of evidence. Nor can it be proved immediately by ſenſe, becauſe God being ſuppoſed to be a pure ſpirit cannot be the object of any corporeal ſenſe. But yet we have as great aſſurance that there is a God as the nature of the thing to be proved is capable of; and as we could in reaſon expect to have ſuppoſing that he were. For let us ſuppoſe there were ſuch a Being as an Infinite Spirit, clothed with all poſſible perfection, that is, as good and wiſe and powerfull, &c. as can be imagined: what conceivable ways are there whereby we ſhould come to be aſſured that there is ſuch a Being? but either by an internal impreſſion of the notion of a God upon our minds; or elſe by ſuch external and viſible effects as our Reaſon tells us muſt be attributed to ſome cauſe, and which we cannot without great violence to our underſtandings attribute to any other cauſe but ſuch a Being as we conceive God to be, that is, one that is infinitely good, and wiſe, and powerfull? Now we p. 60have this double aſſurance that there is a God; and greater, or other than this the thing is not capable of: If God ſhould aſſume a body and preſent himſelf before our eyes, this might amaze us but could not give us any rational aſſurance that there is an Infinite Spirit. If he ſhould work a Miracle; this could not in reaſon convince an Atheiſt more than the arguments he already hath for it. If the Atheiſt then were to ask a ſign in the heaven above, or in the earth beneath, what could he deſire God to do for his conviction more than he hath already done? Could he deſire him to work a greater Miracle than to make a world? Why, if God ſhould carry this perverſe man out of the limits of this world, and ſhew him a new heaven and a new earth, ſpringing out of nothing, he might ſay that innumerable parts of matter chanc'd juſt then to rally together and to form themſelves into this new world, and that God did not make it. Thus you ſee that we have all the rational aſſurance of a God that the thing is capable of, and that atheiſm is abſurd and unreaſonable in requiring more.

IV. The Atheiſt is unreaſonable, becauſe he pretends to know that which no man can know, and to be certain of that which p. 61no body can be certain of; that is, that there is no God, and which is conſequent upon this (as I ſhall ſhew afterwards) that it is not poſſible there ſhould be one. And the Atheiſt muſt pretend to know this certainly. For it were the greateſt folly in the world for a man to deny and deſpiſe God, if he be not certain that He is not. Now whoever pretends to be certain that there is no God hath this great diſadvantage, he pretends to be certain of a pure Negative. But of negatives we have far the leaſt certainty, and they are uſually hardeſt, and many times impoſſible to be proved. Indeed ſuch negatives as onelyonly deny ſome particular mode or manner of a things exiſtence, a man may have a certainty of them; becauſe when we ſee things to be, we may ſee what they are, and in what manner they do or do not exiſt. For inſtance, we may be certain that man is not a creature that hath wings, becauſe this only concerns the manner of his exiſtence; and we ſeeing what he Is, may certainly know that he is not ſo, or ſo. But pure negatives, that is, ſuch as abſolutely deny the exiſtence of things, or the poſſibility of their exiſtence, can never be proved. For after all that can be ſaid againſt a thing this will ſtill be true, that p. 62many things poſſibly are which we know not of, and that many more things may be than are; and if ſo, after all our arguments againſt a thing it will be uncertain whether it be or not. And this is univerſally true, unleſs the thing denied to be do plainly imply a contradiction; from which I have already ſhewn the notion of a God to be free. Now the Atheiſt pretends to be certain of a pure negative, that there is no ſuch being as God, and that it is not poſſible there ſhould be: But no man can reaſonably pretend to know thus much, but he muſt pretend to know all things that are or can be; which if any man ſhould be ſo vain as to pretend to, yet it is to be hoped that no body would be ſo weak as to believe him.

V. Speculative atheiſm is unreaſonable, becauſe it contradicts it ſelf. There is this great contradiction in the denial of a God. He that denies a God, ſays that that is impoſſible which yet he muſt grant to be poſſible. He ſays it is impoſſible that there ſhould be ſuch a Being as God, in ſaying that de facto there is no ſuch being. For eternity being eſſential to the notion of a God, if there be not a God already it is impoſſible now that there ſhould be one; becauſe ſuch a being as is ſuppoſed to be eſſentially eternal p. 63and without beginning cannot now begin to be. And yet he muſt grant it poſſible that there ſhould be ſuch a being, becauſe it is poſſible there ſhould be ſuch a being as hath all poſſible perfection: and ſuch a being as this is that which we call God, and is that very thing which the Atheiſt denies and others affirm to be. For he that denies a God, muſt deny ſuch a being as all the world deſcribe God to be; and this is the general notion which all men have of God, that he is a being as perfect as is poſſible; that is, endued with all ſuch perfections as do not imply a contradiction, which none of thoſe perfections which we attribute to God do, as I have already prov'd.

II. Speculative atheiſm as it is unreaſonable, ſo is it a moſt imprudent and uncomfortable opinion: And that upon theſe two accounts. Firſt, becauſe it is againſt the preſent intereſt and happineſs of mankind. Secondly, becauſe it is infinitely hazardous and unſafe in the iſſue.

I. It is againſt the preſent intereſt and happineſs of mankind. If Atheiſm were the general Opinion of the World, it would be infinitely prejudicial to the peace and happineſs of humane Society, and would open a wide door to all manner of confuſion and diſorder. But this I ſhall not now inſiſt p. 64upon, becauſe I deſign a particular Diſcourſe of that by it ſelf.

I ſhall at preſent content my ſelf to ſhew, how uncomfortable an opinion this would be to particular perſons. For nothing can be more evident than that man is not ſufficient of himſelf to his own happineſs. He is liable to many evils and miſeries which he can neither prevent nor redreſs. He is full of wants which he cannot ſupply, and compaſs'd about with infirmities which he cannot remove, and obnoxious to dangers which he can never ſufficiently provide againſt. Conſider man without the protection and conduct of a ſuperior Being, and he is ſecure of nothing that he enjoys in this world, and uncertain of every thing that he hopes for. He is apt to grieve for what he cannot help, and eagerly to deſire what he is never likely to obtain. Man walketh in a vain ſhew, and diſquieteth himſelf in vain. He courts happineſs in a thouſand ſhapes, and the faſter he purſues it the faſter it flies from him. His hopes and expectations are bigger than his enjoyments, and his fears and jealouſies more troubleſome than the evils themſelves which he is ſo much afraid of. He is liable to a great many inconveniences every moment of his life, and is continually inſecure p. 65not onelyonly of the good things of this life, but even of life it ſelf. And beſides all this, after all his endeavours to the contrary, he finds himſelf naturally to dread a ſuperior Being that can defeat all his deſigns, and diſappoint all his hopes, and make him miſerable beyond all his fears. He has oftentimes ſecret miſgivings concerning another life after this, and fearful apprehenſions of an inviſible Judge; and thereupon he is full of anxiety concerning his condition in another world, and ſometimes plung'd into that anguiſh and deſpair that he grows weary of himſelf. So that the Atheiſt deprives himſelf of all the comfort that the apprehenſions of a God can give a man, and yet is liable to all the trouble and diſquiet of thoſe apprehenſions.

I do not ſay that theſe Inconveniences do happen to all; but every one is in danger of them. For man's nature is evidently ſo contriv'd as does plainly diſcover how unable he is to make himſelf happy. So that he muſt neceſſarily look abroad and ſeek for happineſs ſomewhere elſe. And if there be no ſuperiour Being, in whoſe care of him he may repoſe his conſidence and quiet his mind; If he have no comfortable expectations of another life to ſuſtain him under the evils and calamities he is liable p. 66to in this world, he is certainly of all creatures the moſt miſerable. There are none of us but may happen to fall into thoſe circumſtances of danger, or want, or pain, or ſome other ſort of calamity, that we can have no hopes of relief or comfort but from God alone: none in all the world to flee to, but Him. And what would men do in ſuch a caſe if it were not for God? Humane nature is moſt certainly liable to deſperate exigencies, and he is not happy that is not provided againſt the worſt that may happen. It is bad to be reduc'd to ſuch a condition as to be deſtitute of all comfort. And yet men are many times brought to that extremity that if it were not for God they would not know what to do with themſelves, or how to enjoy themſelves for one hour, or to entertain their thoughts with any comfortable conſiderations under their preſent anguiſh and ſufferings. All men naturally flye to God in extremity, and the moſt atheiſtical perſon in the world when he is forſaken of all hopes of any other relief is forc'd to acknowledge him and would be glad to have ſuch a friend.

Can it then be a wiſe and reaſonable deſign to endeavour to baniſh the belief of a God out of the world? Not to ſay how p. 67impious it is in reſpect of God, nothing can be more malicious to men, and more effectually undermine the onelyonly foundation of our happineſs. For if there were no God in the world man would be in a much more wretched and diſconſolate condition, than the creatures below him. For they are onelyonly ſenſible of preſent pain, and when it is upon them they bear it as they can. But they are not at all apprehenſive of evils at a diſtance, nor tormented with the fearfull proſpect of what may befall them hereafter: nor are they plung'd into deſpair upon the conſideration that the evils they lye under are like to continue, and are incapable of a remedy. And as they have no apprehenſion of theſe things, ſo they need no comfort againſt them. But Mankind is liable to all the ſame evils, and many others; which are ſo much the greater, becauſe they are aggravated and ſet on by the reſtleſs workings of our minds, and exaſperated by the ſmart reflexions and frettings of our own thoughts: And if there be no God we are wholly without comfort under all theſe, and without any other remedy than what time will give. For if the providence of God be taken away, what ſecurity have we againſt thoſe innumerable dangers and miſchiefs p. 68to which humane nature is continually expos'd? What conſolation under them, when we are reduc'd to that condition that no creature can give us any hopes of relief? But if we believe that there is a God that takes care of us, and we be carefull to pleaſe him, this cannot but be a mighty comfort to us, both under the preſent ſenſe of affliction, and the apprehenſion of evils at a diſtance. For in that caſe, we are ſecure of one of theſe three things. Either that God by his providence will prevent the evils we fear, if that be beſt for us: Or that he will ſupport us under them when they are preſent, and add to our ſtrength as he encreaſeth our burthen: Or that he will make them the occaſion of a greater good to us, by turning them either to our advantage in this world, or the increaſe of our happineſs in the next. Now every one of theſe conſiderations has a great deal of comfort in it, for which if there were no God there could be no ground. Nay, on the contrary the moſt real foundation of our unhappineſs would be laid in our Reaſon; and we ſhould be ſo much more miſerable than the beaſts, by how much we have a quicker apprehenſion and a deeper conſideration of things.

So that if a man had arguments ſufficient p. 69to perſwade him that there is no God (as there is infinite reaſon to the contrary) yet the belief of a God is ſo neceſſary to the comfort and happineſs of our lives, that a wiſe man could not but be heartily troubled to quit ſo pleaſant an error, and to part with a deluſion which is apt to yield ſuch unſpeakable ſatisfaction to the mind of man. Did but men conſider the true notion of God, he would appear to be ſo lovely a Being, and ſo full of goodneſs and of all deſirable perfections, that even thoſe very perſons who are of ſuch irregular underſtandings as not to believe that there is a God, yet could not (if they underſtood themſelves) refrain from wiſhing with all their hearts that there were one. For is it not really deſirable to every man, that there ſhould be ſuch a Being in the world as takes care of the frame of it, that it do not run into confuſion, and in that diſorder ruin mankind? That there ſhould be ſuch a Being, as takes particular care of every one of us, and loves us; and delights to do us good; as underſtands all our wants, and is able and willing to relieve us in our greateſt ſtraits, when nothing elſe can; to preſerve u… in our greateſt dangers, to aſſiſt us againſt our worſt enemies, and to comfort us under our ſharpeſt ſufferings, p. 70when all other things ſet themſelves againſt us? Is it not every man's intereſt, that there ſhould be ſuch a Governour of the world as really deſigns our happineſs, and hath omitted nothing that is neceſſary to it; as would govern us for our advantage, and will require nothing of us but what is for our good, and yet will infinitely reward us for the doing of that which is beſt for our ſelves? that will puniſh any man that ſhould go about to injure us, or to deal otherwiſe with us than himſelf in the like caſe would be dealt withal by us? In a word, ſuch a one as is ready to be reconcil'd to us when we have offended him, and is ſo far from taking little advantages againſt us for every failing that he is willing to pardon our moſt wilfull miſcarriages upon our Repentance and amendment? And we have reaſon to believe God to be ſuch a Being, if he be at all.

Why then ſhould any man be troubl'd that there is ſuch a Being as this, or think himſelf concern'd to ſhut him out of the world? How could ſuch a Governour as this be wanting in the world, that is ſo great a comfort and ſecurity to mankind and the confidence of all the ends of the earth? If God be ſuch a being as I have deſcrib'd, woe to the world if it were without p. 71out him. This would be a thouſand times greater loſs to mankind and of more diſmal conſequence, and if it were true, ought to affect us with more grief and horrour than the extinguiſhing of the Sun.

Let but all things be well conſider'd, and I am very confident that if a wiſe and conſiderate man were left to himſelf and his own choice, to wiſh the greateſt good to himſelf he could deviſe; after he had ſearch'd heaven and earth, the ſum of all his wiſhes would be this, that there were juſt ſuch a being as God is; Nor would he chuſe any other benefactor, or friend, or protector for himſelf, or governour for the whole world, than infinite power conducted and managed by infinite wiſedom and goodneſs and juſtice, which is the true notion of a God.

Nay, ſo neceſſary is God to the happineſs of mankind, that though there were no God, yet the Atheiſt himſelf upon ſecond thoughts would judge it convenient that the generality of men ſhould believe that there is one. For when the Atheiſt had attain'd his end, and (if it were a thing poſſible) had blotted the notion of a God out of the minds of men, mankind would in all probability grow ſo melancholly and ſo unruly a thing, that he himſelf would think it fit in policy to contribute p. 72his beſt endeavours to the reſtoring of men to their former belief. Thus hath God ſecur'd the belief of himſelf in the world, againſt all attempts to the contrary; not onelyonly by rivetting the notion of himſelf into our natures, but likewiſe by making the belief of his being neceſſary to the peace and tranquillity of our minds, and to the quiet and happineſs of Humane Society.

So that if we conſult our reaſon, we cannot but believe that there is; if our intereſt, we cannot but heartily wiſh that there were ſuch a Being as God in the world. Every thing within us and without us gives notice of him. His name is written upon our hearts; and in every creature there are ſome prints and footſteps of him. Every moment we feel our dependance upon Him, and do by daily experience and that we can neither be happy without Him, nor think our ſelves ſo.

I confeſs, it is not a wicked man's intereſt, if he reſolve to continue ſuch, that there ſhould be a God; but then it is not mens intereſt to be wicked. It is for the general good of humane Society, and conſequently of particular perſons, to be true and juſt; it is for mens health to be temperate; and ſo I could inſtance in all p. 73other vertues. But this is the myſtery of Atheiſme, men are wedded to their luſts and reſolv'd upon a wicked courſe; and ſo it becomes their intereſt to wiſh there were no God, and to believe ſo if they can. Whereas if men were minded to live righteouſly and ſoberly and vertuouſly in the world, to believe a God would be no hindrance or prejudice to any ſuch deſign; but very much for the advancement and furtherance of it. Men that are good and vertuous do eaſily believe a God; ſo that it is vehemently to be ſuſpected, that nothing but the ſtrength of mens luſts, and the power of vicious inclinations do ſway their minds and ſet a byaſs upon their underſtandings toward Atheiſm.

2. Atheiſm is imprudent, becauſe it is unſafe in the iſſue. The Atheiſt contends againſt the religious man that there is no God; but upon ſtrange inequality and odds, for he ventures his eternal intereſt; whereas the Religious man ventures onelyonly the loſs of his Luſts, (which it is much better for him to be without) or at the utmoſt of ſome temporal convenience; and all this while is inwardly more contented and happy, and uſually more healthfull, and perhaps meets with more reſpect and faithfuller friends, and lives in a more ſecure p. 74and flouriſhing condition, and more free from the evils and puniſhments of this world, than the Atheiſtical perſon does; however, it is not much that he ventures: And after this life, if there be no God, is as well as he; but if there be a God, is Infinitely better, even as much as unſpeakable and eternal happineſs is better than extream and endleſs miſery. So that if the arguments for and againſt a God were equal, and it were an even queſtion whether there were one or not; yet the hazard and danger is ſo infinitely unequal, that in point of prudence and intereſt every man were obliged to incline to the affirmative: and whatever doubts he might have about it, to chooſe the ſafeſt ſide of the queſtion, and to make that the principle to live by. For, he that acts wiſely and is a throughly prudent man, will be provided againſt all events, and will take care to ſecure the main chance whatever happens; but the Atheiſt, in caſe things ſhould fall out contrary to his belief and expectation, he hath made no proviſion for this caſe. If contrary to his confidence it ſhould prove in the iſſue that there is a God, the man is loſt and undone for ever. If the Atheiſt when he dies ſhould find that his ſoul remains p. 75after his body and has onelyonly quitted its lodging, how will this man be amazed and blank'd when contrary to his expectation, he ſhall find himſelf in a new and ſtrange place, amidſt a world of ſpirits, entred upon an everlaſting and unchangeable ſtate? How ſadly will the man be diſappointed when he finds all things otherwiſe than he had ſtated and determined them in this World? When he comes to appear before that God whom he hath denied and againſt whom he hath ſpoken as deſpightful things as he could, who can imagine the pale and guilty looks of this man and how he will ſhiver and tremble for the fear of the Lord, and for the glory of his Majeſty? How will he be ſurpriſed with terrors on every ſide, to find himſelf thus unexpectedly and irrecoverably plunged into a ſtate of ruin and deſperation? And thus things may happen for all this man's confidence now. For our belief or diſ-belief of a thing does not alter the nature of the thing. We cannot fanſie things into being or make them vaniſh into nothing by the ſtubborn conſidence of our imaginations. Things are as ſullen as we are, and will be what they are whatever we think of them. And if p. 76there be a God a man cannot by an obſtinate disbelief of him make him ceaſe to be, any more than a man can put out the Sun by winking.

And thus I have as briefly and clearly as I could endeavoured to ſhew the ignorance and folly of ſpeculative Atheiſme in denying the exiſtence of God. And now it will be leſs needful to ſpeak of the other two Principles of Religion, the immortality of the ſoul, and future rewards. For no man can have any reaſonable ſcruple about theſe, who believes that there is a God. Becauſe no man that owns the exiſtence of an infinite ſpirit can doubt of the poſſibility of a finite ſpirit, that is, ſuch a thing as is immaterial and does not contain any principle of corruption in it ſelf. And there is no man that believes the goodneſs of God, but muſt be inclin'd to think that he hath made ſome things for as long a duration as they are capable of. Nor can any man, that acknowledgeth the holy and juſt providence of God, and that he loves righteouſneſs and hates iniquity, and that he is a Magiſtrate and Governour of the World, and conſequently concerned to countenance the obedience, and to puniſh the violation of his Laws; and that does withall conſider the promiſcuous diſpenſations p. 77many times of God's Providence in this world? I ſay, no man that acknowledges all this, can think it unreaſonable to conclude, that after this life good men ſhall be rewarded, and ſinners puniſhed. I have done with the firſt ſort of irreligious perſons, the ſpeculative Atheiſt. I ſhall ſpeak but briefly of the other.

Secondly, The practical Atheiſt, who is wicked and irreligious, notwithſtanding he does in ſome ſort believe that there is a God, and a future ſtate; he is likewiſe guilty of prodigious folly. The principle of the ſpeculative Atheiſt argues more ignorance, but the practice of the other argues greater folly. Not to believe a God, and another life, for which there is ſo much evidence of reaſon is great ignorance and folly; but 'tis the higheſt madneſs when a man does believe theſe things to live as if he did not believe them: When a Man does not doubt but that there is a God, and that according as he demeans himſelf towards him he will make him happy or miſerable for ever, yet to live ſo as if he were certain of the contrary, and as no man in reaſon can live but he that is well aſſured that there is no God. It was a ſhrewd ſaying of the old Monk that two kind of Priſons would ſerve for all offenders in the p. 78world, an Inquiſition and a Bedlam: If any man ſhould deny the being of a God and the immortality of the ſoul, ſuch a one ſhould be put into the firſt of theſe the Inquiſition, as being a deſperate Heretick; but if any man ſhould profeſs to believe theſe things, and yet allow himſelf in any known wickedneſs, ſuch a one ſhould be put into Bedlam; becauſe there cannot be a greater folly and madneſs than for a man in matters of greateſt moment and concernment to act againſt his beſt reaſon and underſtanding, and by his life to contradict his belief. Such a man does periſh with his eyes open, and knowingly undoes himſelf; he runs upon the greateſt dangers which he clearly ſees to be before him, and precipitates himſelf into thoſe evils which he profeſſes to believe to be real and intolerable; and wilfully neglects the obtaining of that unſpeakable good and happineſs which he is perſwaded is certain and attainable. Thus much for the ſecond way of Confirmation.

III. The third way of confirmation ſhall be, by endeavouring to vindicate Religion from thoſe common imputations which ſeem to charge it with ignorance or imprudence. And they are chiefly theſe three:

1. Credulity.

p. 792. Singularity.

3. Making a Fooliſh Bargain.

Firſt, Credulity: Say they, the foundation of Religion is the belief of thoſe things for which we have no ſufficient reaſon, and conſequently of which we can have no good aſſurance; as the belief of a God, and of a future ſtate after this life; things which we never ſaw, nor did experience, nor ever ſpoke with any body that did. Now it ſeems to argue too great a forwardneſs and eaſineſs of belief to aſſent to any thing upon inſufficient grounds.

To this I anſwer,

1. That if there be ſuch a Being as a God, and ſuch a thing as a future ſtate after this life, it cannot (as I ſaid before) in reaſon be expected that we ſhould have the evidence of ſenſe for ſuch things: For he that believes a God, believes ſuch a Being as hath all perfections, among which this is one, that he is a ſpirit; and conſequently that he is inviſible, and cannot be ſeen. He likewiſe that believes another life after this, profeſſeth to believe a ſtate of which in this life we have no trial and experience. Beſides, if this were a good objection, that no man ever ſaw theſe things, it ſtrikes at the Atheiſt as well as us. For no man ever ſaw the World to be from eternity; p. 80nor Epicurus his Atoms, of which notwithſtanding he believes the World was made.

2. We have the beſt evidence for theſe things which they are capable of at preſent, ſuppoſing they were,

3. Thoſe who deny theſe principles, muſt be much more credulous, that is, believe things upon incomparably leſs evidence of reaſon. The Atheiſt looks upon all that are religious as a company of credulous fools. But he, for his part, pretends to be wiſer than to believe any thing for company; he cannot entertain things upon thoſe ſlight grounds which move other men; if you would win his aſſent to any thing, you muſt give him a clear demonſtration for it. Now there's no way to deal with this man of reaſon, this rigid exactor of ſtrict demonſtration for things which are not capable of it, but by ſhewing him that he is an hundred times more credulous, that he begs more principles, takes more things for granted without offering to prove them, and aſſents to more ſtrange concluſions upon weaker grounds▪ than thoſe whom he ſo much accuſeth of credulity.

And to evidence this, I ſhall briefly give you an account of the Atheiſt's Creed, and p. 81preſent you with a Catalogue of the fundamental Articles of his Faith. He believes that there is no God, nor poſſibly can be, and conſequently that the wiſe as well as unwiſe of all ages have been miſtaken, except himſelf and a few more. He believes that either all the world have been frighted with an apparition of their own fancy, or that they have moſt unnaturally conſpired together to cozen themſelves; or that this notion of a God is a trick of policy, though the greateſt Princes and Politicians do not at this day know ſo much, nor have done time out of a mind. He believes, either that the Heavens and the Earth and all things in them had no Original cauſe of their being, or elſe that they were made by chance and happened he knows not how to be as they are; and that in this laſt ſhuffling of matter all things have by great good fortune fallen out as happily and as regularly as if the greateſt wiſedom had contriv'd them, but yet he is reſolv'd to believe that there was no wiſedom in the contrivance of them. He believes, that matter of it ſel… is utterly void of all ſenſe, underſtanding and liberty; but for all that he is of opinion that the parts of matter may know and then happen to be ſo conveniently diſpos'd, as to have all theſe qualities, p. 82and moſt dextrouſly to performe all thoſe fine and free operations which the ignorant attribute to Spirits.

This is the ſum of his belief. And it is a wonder, that there ſhould be found any perſon pretending to reaſon or wit that can aſſent to ſuch a heap of abſurdities, which are ſo groſs and palpable that they may be felt. So that if every man had his due it will certainly fall to the Atheiſt's ſhare to be the moſt credulous perſon, that is, to believe things upon the ſlighteſt reaſons. For he does not pretend to prove any thing of all this, only he finds himſelf, he knows not why, inclin'd to believe ſo and to laugh at thoſe that do not.

II. The ſecond imputation is ſingularity; the affectation whereof is unbecoming a wiſe man. To this charge I anſwer,

I. If by Religion be meant the belief of the principles of Religion, that there is a God, and a providence, that our ſouls are immortal, and that there are rewa ds to be expected after this life; theſe are ſo far from being ſingular opinions, that they are and always have been the general opinion of mankind, even of the moſt barbarous Nations. Inſomuch, that the Hiſtories of ancient times do hardly furniſh us with the names of above five or ſix perſons who denied p. 83a God. And Lucretius acknowledgeth that Epicurus was the firſt who did oppoſe thoſe great foundations of Religion, the providence of God, and the immortality of the ſoul. Primum Grajus homo, &c. meaning Epicurus.

2. If by Religion be meant a living up to thoſe principles, that is, to act conformably to our beſt reaſon and underſtanding, and to live as it does become thoſe who do believe a God and a future ſtate; this is acknowledged, even by thoſe who live otherwiſe, to be the part of every wiſe man; and the contrary to be the very madneſs of folly, and height of diſtraction: Nothing being more ordinary than for men who live wickedly to acknowledge that they ought to do otherwiſe.

3. Though according to the common courſe and practice of the world it be ſomewhat ſingular for men truly and throughly to live up to the principles of their Religion, yet ſingularity in this matter is ſo far from being a reflexion upon any man's prudence that it is a ſingular commendation of it. In two caſes ſingularity is very commendable.

1. When there is a neceſſity of it in order to a man's greateſt intereſt and happineſs. I think it to be a reaſonable account p. 84for any man to give why he does not live as the greateſt part of the World do, that he has no mind to die as they do and to periſh with them; he is not diſpoſed to be a fool and to be miſerable for company, he has no inclination to have his laſt end like theirs who know not God, and obey not the Goſpel of his Son, and ſhall be puniſhed with everlaſting deſtruction from the preſence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power.

2. It is very commendable to be ſingular in any excellency, and I have ſhewn that Religion is the greateſt excellency: to be ſingular in any thing that is wiſe, and worthy, and excellent, is not a diſparagement, but a praiſe: every man would chuſe to be thus ſingular.

III. The third imputation is, that Religion is a fooliſh bargain; becauſe they who are religious hazard the parting with a preſent and certain happineſs for that which is future and uncertain. To this I anſwer.

1. Let it be granted, that the aſſurance which we have of future rewards falls ſhort of the evidence of ſenſe. For I doubt not, but that ſaying of our Saviour, bleſſed is he who hath believed, and not ſeen; and thoſe expreſſions of the Apoſtle, we walk by faith and not by ſight, and faith is the evidence of p. 85things not ſeen, are intended by way of abatement and diminution to the evidence of Faith, and do ſign fie that the report and teſtimony of others is not ſo great evidence as that of our own ſenſes: And though we have ſufficient aſſurance of another ſtate, yet not man can think we have ſo great evidence as if we our ſelves had been in the other world and ſeen how all things are there.

2. We have ſufficient aſſurance of theſe things, and ſuch as may beget in us a well grounded confidence and frees us from all doubts of the contrary and perſwade a reaſonable man to venture his greateſt intereſts in this world upon the ſecurity that he hath of another: For,

1. We have as much aſſurance of theſe things as things future and at a diſtance are capable of, and he is a very unreaſonable man that would deſire more: Future and inviſible things are not capable of the evidence of ſenſe; but we have the greateſt rational evidence for them, and in this every reaſonable man ought to reſt ſatisfi'd.

2. We have as much as is abundantly ſufficient to juſtifie every man's diſcretion, who for the great and eternal things of another world hazards or parts with the poor and tranſitory things of this life. And p. 86for the clearing of this it will be worth our conſidering, that the greateſt affairs of this world, and the moſt important concernments of this life are all conducted onelyonly by moral demonſtrations. Men every day venture their lives and eſtates onelyonly upon moral aſſurance. For inſtance, men who never were at the eaſt or Weſt-Indies, or in Turky or Spain, yet do venture their whole eſtate in traffick thither, though they have no Mathematical demonſtration but onelyonly moral aſſurance that there are ſuch places. Nay which is more, men every day eat and drink, though I think no man can demonſtrate out of Euclide or Apollonius, that his Baker or Brewer, or Cook have not conveyed poiſon into his meat or drink. And that man that would be ſo wiſe and cautious as not to eat or drink till he could demonſtrate this to himſelf, I know no other remedy for him but that in great gravity and wifedom he muſt die for fear of death. And for any man to urge that though men in temporal affairs proceed upon moral aſſurance, yet there is greater aſſurance required to make men ſeek Heaven and avoid Hell, ſeems to me to be highly unreaſonable. For ſuch an aſſurance of things as will make men circumſpect and carefull to avoid a leſſer dangér ought in p. 87all reaſon to awaken men much more to the avoiding of a greater, ſuch an aſſurance as will ſharpen mens deſires and quicken their endeavours for the obtaining of a leſſer good ought in all reaſon to animate men more powerfully and to inſpire them with a greater vigour and induſtry in the purſuit of that which is infinitely greater. For why the ſame aſſurance ſhould not operate as well in a great danger as in a leſs, in a great good as in a ſmall and inconſiderable one, I can ſee no reaſon; unleſs men will ſay, that the greatneſs of an evil danger is an incouragement to men to run upon it, and that the greatneſs of any good and happineſs ought in reaſon to diſhearten men from the purſuit of it.

And now I think I may with reaſon entreat ſuch as are atheiſtically inclined to conſider theſe things ſeriouſly and impartially; and if there be weight in theſe conſiderations which I have offered to them to ſway with reaſonable men, I would beg of ſuch that they would not ſuffer themſelves to be byaſſed by prejudice or paſſion, or the intereſt of any luſt or worldly advantage, to a contrary perſwaſion.

Firſt, I would entreat them ſeriouſly and diligently to conſider theſe things, becauſe they are of ſo great moment and concernment p. 88to every man. If any thing in the world deſerve our ſerious ſtudy and conſideration, theſe principles of Religion do. For what can import us more to be ſatisfied in than whether there be a God, or not? whether our Souls ſhall periſh with our bodies, or be immortal and ſhall continue for ever? And if ſo, whether in that eternal ſtate which remains for men after this life, they ſhall not be happy or miſerable for ever according as they have demeaned themſelves in this world? If theſe things be ſo, they are of infinite conſequence to us; and therefore it highly concerns us to enquire diligently about them, and to ſatisfie our minds concerning them one way or other. For theſe are not matters to be ſlightly and ſuperficially thought upon, much leſs (as the way of atheiſtical men is) to be played and jeſted withall. There is no greater argument of a light and inconſiderate perſon, than prophanely to ſcoff at Religion. It is a ſign that that man hath no regard to himſelf, and that he is not touched with a ſenſe of his own intereſt, who loves to be jeſting with edg'd tools and to play with life and death. This is the very mad-man that Solomon ſpeaks of,Prov. 26.18.Prov 26:18 who caſteth fire-brands, arrows and death, and ſaith, am I not in ſport? p. 89To examine ſeverely and debate ſeriouſly the principles of Religion, is a thing worthy of a wiſe man; but if any man ſhall turn Religion into raillery, and think to confute it by two or three bold jeſts, this man doth not render Religion, but himſelf ridiculous, in the opinion of all conſiderate men; becauſe he ſports with his own life. If the principles of Religion were doubtfull and uncertain, yet they concern us ſo nearly that we ought to be ſerious in the examination of them. And though they were never ſo clear and evident, yet they may be made ridiculous by vain and frothy men; as the graveſt and wiſeſt perſon in the world may be abuſed by being put into a fools coat, and the moſt noble and excellent Poem may be debaſed and made vile by being turned into burleſque. But of this I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more largely in my next diſcourſe.

So that it concerns every man, that would not trifle away his ſoul and fool himſelf into irrecoverable miſery, with the greateſt ſeriouſneſs to enquire into theſe matters whether they be ſo or not, and patiently to conſider the arguments which are brought for them. For many have miſcarried about theſe things, not becauſe there is not reaſon and evidence enough for p. 90them, but becauſe they have not had patience enough to conſider them.

Secondly, Conſider theſe things impartially. All wicked men are of a party againſt Religion. Some luſt or intereſt ingageth them againſt it. Hence it comes to paſs that they are apt to ſlight the ſtrongeſt arguments that can be brought for it, and to cry up very weak ones againſt it. Men do generally and without difficulty aſſent to Mathematical truths, becauſe it is no bodies intereſt to deny them; but men are ſlow to believe moral and divine Truths, becauſe by their luſts and intereſt they are prejudiced againſt them. And therefore you may obſerve that the more vertuouſly any man lives, and the leſs he is enſlaved to any luſt, the more ready he is to entertain the principles of Religion.

Therefore when you are examining theſe matters, do not take into conſideration any ſenſual or worldly intereſt, but deal clearly and impartially with your ſelves. Let not temporal and little advantages ſway you againſt a greater and more durable intereſt. Think thus with your ſelves, that you have not the making of things true or falſe, but that the truth and exiſtence of things is already fix'd and ſetled, and that the principles of Religion p. 91are already either determinately true or falſe before you think of them, either there is a God, or there is not; either your Souls are Immortal, or they are not; one of theſe is certain and neceſſary, and is not now to be altered; the truth of things will not comply with our conceits, and bend it ſelf to our intereſts. Therefore do not think what you would have to be, but conſider impartially what is, and (if it be) will be whether you will or no. Do not reaſon thus; I would fain be wicked and therefore it is my intereſt that there ſhould be no God, nor no life after this; and therefore I will endeavour to prove that there is no ſuch thing, and will ſhew all the favour I can to that ſide of the queſtion; I will bend my underſtanding and wit to ſtrengthen the negative, and will ſtudy to make it as true as I can. This is fond, becauſe it is the way to cheat thy ſelf; and that we may do as often as we pleaſe, but the nature of things will not be impoſed upon. If then thou be as wiſe as thou oughteſt to be, thou wilt reaſon thus with thy ſelf; my higheſt intereſt is not to be deceived about theſe matters, therefore ſetting aſide all other conſiderations I will endeavour to know the truth and yield to that.

And now it is time to draw towards a p. 92concluſion of this long diſcourſe. And that which I have all this while been endeavouring to convince men of and to perſwade them to, is no other but what God himſelf doth particularly recommend to us as proper for humane conſideration, unto Man he ſaid, behold the fear of the Lord that is wiſedom, and to depart from evil is underſtanding. Whoever pretends to reaſon, and calls himſelf a man, is oblig'd to acknowledge God and to demean himſelf religiouſly towards him. For God is to the underſtanding of man as the light of the Sun is to our eyes, the firſt and the plaineſt and the moſt glorious object of it. He fills Heaven and earth, and every thing in them does repreſent him to us. Which way ſoever we turn our ſelves, we are encountred with clear evidences and ſenſible demonſtrations of a Deity. For (as the Apoſtle reaſons) The inviſible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly ſeen, Rom. 1.Rom 1being underſtood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead: foreign, ſo that they are without excuſe; that is, thoſe men that know not God have no apology to make for themſelves. Or if men do know and believe that there is ſuch a being as God, not to conſider the proper conſequences of p. 93ſuch a Principle, not to demean our ſelves towards him as becomes our relation to him and dependance upon him and the duty which we naturally owe him, this is great ſtupidity and inconſiderateneſs.

And yet he that conſiders the lives and actions of the greateſt part of men would verily think that they underſtood nothing of all this. Therefore the Scripture repreſents wicked men as without underſtanding. It is a Nation void of counſel, Deut. 32.28. Pſal. 14.4Deut 32:28Ps 14:4neither is there any underſtanding in them: and elſewhere, have all the workers of iniquity no knowledge; Not that they are deſtitute of the natural faculty of underſtanding, but they do not uſe it as they ought; they are not blind but they wink, they detain the truth of God in unrighteouſneſs, and though they know God, yet they do not glorifie him as God, nor ſuffer the apprehenſions of him to have a due influence upon their hearts and lives.

Men generally ſtand very much upon the credit and reputation of their underſtandings, and of all things in the world hate to be accounted fools, becauſe it is ſo great a reproach. The beſt way to avoid this imputation and to bring off the credit of our underſtandings is to be truly religious, to fear the Lord, and to depart p. 94from evil. For certainly there is no ſuch imprudent perſon as he that neglects God and his ſoul, and is careleſs and ſlothful about his everlaſting concernments; becauſe this man acts contrary to his trueſt reaſon and beſt intereſt; he neglects his own ſafety, and is active to procure his own ruine; he flies from happineſs and runs away from it as faſt as he can, but purſues miſery, and makes haſte to be undone. Hence it is that Solomon does all along in the Proverbs give the title of fool to a wicked man, as if it were his proper name and the fitteſt character of him, becauſe he is ſo eminently ſuch: There is no fool to the ſinner, who every moment ventures his Soul, and lays his everlaſting intereſt at the ſtake. Every time a man provokes God he does the greateſt miſchief to himſelf that can be imagined. A mad man that cuts himſelf and tears his own fleſh and daſhes his head againſt the ſtones does not act ſo unreaſonably as he, becauſe he is not ſo ſenſible of what he does. Wickedneſs is a kind of voluntary frenzy and a choſen diſtraction, and every ſinner does wilder and more extravagant things than any man can do that is craz'd and out of his wits, onelyonly with this ſad difference that he knows better what he does. For p. 95to them who believe another life after this, an eternal ſtate of happineſs or miſery in another world, (which is but a reaſonable poſtulatum or demand among Chriſtians) there is nothing in Mathematicks more demonſtrable than the folly of wicked men; for it is not a clearer and more evident principle that the whole is greater than a part, than that eternity and the concernments of it are to be preferred before time.

I will therefore put the matter into a temporal Caſe, that wicked men who underſtand any thing of the rules and principles of worldly wiſedom may ſee the imprudence of an irreligious and ſinfull courſe, and be convinced that this their way is their folly, even themſelves being judges.

Is that man wiſe, as to his body and his health, who onelyonly cloaths his hands but leaves his whole body naked? who provides onelyonly againſt the tooth-ach, and neglects whole troops of mortal diſeaſes that are ready to ruſh in upon him? Juſt thus does he who takes care only for this vile body, but neglects his precious and immortal ſoul; who is very ſolicitous to prevent ſmall and temporal inconveniences, but takes no care to eſcape the damnation of hell.

p. 96Is he a prudent man, as to his temporal eſtate, that lays deſigns only for a day, without any proſpect to, or proviſion for the Remaining part of his life? even ſo does he that provides for the ſhort time of this life, but takes no care for all Eternity, which is to be wiſe for a moment, but a fool for ever, and to act as untowardly and as croſly to the reaſon of things as can be imagined, to regard time as if it were eternity, and to neglect eternity as if it were but a ſhort time.

Do we count him a wiſe man, who is wiſe in any thing but in his own proper profeſſion and employment, wiſe for every body but himſelf; who is ingenious to contrive his own miſery and to do himſelf a miſchief, but is dull and ſtupid as to the deſigning of any real benefit and advantage to himſelf? Such a one is he, who is ingenious in his Calling but a bad Chriſtian; for Chriſtianity is more our proper calling and profeſſion than the very trades we live upon: and ſuch is every ſinner, who is wiſe to do evil, but to do good hath no underſtanding.

Is it wiſedom in any man to neglect and diſoblige him who is his beſt friend, and can be his ſoreſt enemy? or with one weak troop to go out to meet him that comes againſt him with thouſands of thouſands, to flie a ſmall danger and run upon a greater? Thus p. 97does every wicked man that neglects and contemns God, who can ſave or deſtroy him; who ſtrives with his Maker and provoketh the Lord to jealouſie, and with the ſmall and inconſiderable forces of a man takes the field againſt the mighty God, the Lord of Hoſts; who fears them that can kill the body, but after that have no more that they can do; but fears not him, who after he hath kill'd, can deſtroy both body and ſoul in hell; and thus does he who for fear of any thing in this world ventures to diſpleaſe God, for in ſo doing he runs away from men, and falls into the hands of the living God, he flies from a temporal danger and leaps into Hell.

Is not he an imprudent man, who in matters of greateſt moment and concernment neglects opportunities never to be retriev'd, who ſtanding upon the ſhore, and ſeeing the tide making haſte towards him apace, and that he hath but a few minutes to ſave himſelf, yet will lay himſelf to ſleep there till the cruel ſea ruſh in upon him and overwhelm him? And is he any better who trifles away this day of God's grace and patience, and fooliſhly adjourns the neceſſary work of repentance and the weighty buſineſs of Religion to a dying hour.

And to put an end to theſe queſtions, p. 96duplicate page p. 97duplicate page p. 98Is he wiſe who hopes to attain the End without the means, nay, by means that are quite contrary to it? ſuch is every wicked man who hopes to be bleſſed hereafter without being holy here, and to be happy, that is, to find a pleaſure in the enjoyment of God and in the company of holy ſpirits by rendring himſelf as unſuitable and unlike to them as he can.

Wouldſt thou then be truly wiſe? Be wiſe for thy ſelf, wiſe for thy ſoul, wiſe for eternity. Reſolve upon a religious courſe of life. Fear God and depart from evil. Look beyond things preſent and ſenſible unto things which are not ſeen and are eternal, labour to ſecure the great intereſts of another world, and refer all the actions of this ſhort and dying life to that ſtate which will ſhortly begin but never have an end: and this will approve it ſelf to be wiſedom at the laſt, whatever the world judge of it now. For not that which is approved of men now, but what ſhall finally be approved by God is true wiſedom; that which is eſteemed ſo by him who is the fountain and original of all wiſedom, the firſt rule and meaſure, the beſt and moſt competent judge of it.

p. 99I deny not but that thoſe that are wicked and neglect Religion may think themſelves wiſe, and may enjoy this their deluſion for a while: But there is a time a coming when the moſt prophane and atheiſtical, who now account it a peice of Gallantry and an argument of a great ſpirit and of a more than common wit and underſtanding to ſlight God and to baffle Religion and to level all the diſcourſes of another world with the Poetical deſcriptions of the Fairy-land; I ſay, there is a day a coming when all theſe witty fools ſhall be unhappily undeceived, and not being able to enjoy their deluſion any longer ſhall call themſelves fools for ever.

But why ſhould I uſe ſo much importunity to perſwade men to that which is ſo excellent, ſo uſefull, and ſo neceſſary? The thing it ſelf hath allurements in it beyond all arguments: For if Religion be the beſt knowledge and wiſdom I cannot offer any thing beyond this to your underſtandings to raiſe your eſteem of it, I can preſent nothing beyond this to your affections to excite your love and deſire. All that can be done is to ſet the thing before men, and to offer it to their choice; and if mens natural deſire of wiſdom and knowledge and happineſs will not perſwade p. 100them to be religious, 'tis in vain to uſe arguments if the ſight of theſe beauties will not charm mens affections, 'tis to no purpoſe to go about to compell a liking, and to urge and puſh forward a match to the making whereof conſent is neceſſary. Religion is matter of our freeſt choice, and if men will obſtinately and wilfully ſet themſelves againſt it there is no remedy. Pertinacioe nullum remedium poſuit Deus, God has provided no remedy for the obſtinacy of men; but if they will chuſe to be fools and to be miſerable, he will leave them to inherit their own choice and to enjoy the portion of ſinners.