Eight Cases of Conscience, Case 8
The CASE of a RASH VOVV Deliberately Iterated.
The Case.
A Gentleman of good Estate, hath Issue one only Daughter, who placing her affections upon a person much below her rank, intendeth Marriage with him: The Father hearing of it, in great displeasure Voweth, and confirmeth it with an Oath, that if she Marry him, he will never give her a farthing of his Estate. The Daughter notwithstanding Marryeth him: After which the Father sundry times iterateth and reneweth his said former Vow, and that in a serious and deliberate manner; adding further, That he would never give her or any of her… any part of his Estate.
QUAERE:
Whether the Fathers Vow so made, and so confirmed and iterated as abovesaid, be Obligatory or not?
The Resolution.
My opinion is, That the Vow was Rash, and is not at all Obligatory.
1. The Question here proposed is concerning the obligation only; yet I deem it expedient to declare my opinion concerning the Rashness also: and that for two reasons. First, Because there seemeth in the propo…al of the Case, to be some weight laid upon the after iterations, which were more deliberate, as if they added to the Obligation. And Secondly, Because I think it needful that the Vower should as well be convinced of the greatness of his sin in making such a Vow, for the time past, as satisfied concerning the present and future invalidity of it.
2. It is easie to believe, that the Gentleman, when he first made the Vow, was possessed with a very great indignation against his Daughter for her high and inexcusable disobedience to him in so very weighty a business. And truly it must be confessed, he had need to be a man of a very rare command over his own Spirit, and such as are scarce to be found one of a thousand, that could so contain himself within the bounds of reason, upon so just a provocation from an only child, (possibly some other aggravating circumstances concurring) as not to be transported with the violence of that passion, into some thoughts and resolutions, not exactly agreeable with the dictates of right reason. It can therefore be little doubted, but the Vow made whilst the Reason was held under the force of so strange a perturbation, was a rash and irrational Vow.
3. Nor will these after-acts in confirmation of the first Vow, though having more of deliberation in them, be sufficient to redeem either it or themselves from the imputation of Rashness: understanding rashness in that latitude as the Casuists do, when they treat de Voto temerario, under the notion whereof they comprehend all such Vows as happen per defectum plenae & discussae deliberationis, as they express it; For it is to be considered, that when an injury, disobedience, or other affront is strongly resented, it many times …aketh a very deep impression in the Soul, which though after the first impetus have a little spent it self, it begin somewhat to abate, yet it doth so by such slow and insensible degrees, that the same perturbation, which first discomposed the mind, may have a strong influence into all succeeding deliberations for a long time after. Even as after an acute Feaver, when the sharpest paroxysmes are over, and the malignity of the disease well spent, although the party begin to recover some degrees of strength; yet there may remain for a good while after such a debility in the parti…s, as that they cannot exercise their proper functions, but with some weakness more or less, till the party be perfectly recovered. Sith therefore the after-iterations on the first Vow in the present case, did proceed apparently from the rancor and malignity remaining in the mind, as the dregs and reliques of the same perturbation, from which the first Vow also proceeded: they must upon the same account (to wit, per defectum plenae deliberationis) undergo the same censure of Rashness with the first. The same I say for the kind; some difference I grant there is for the degree: but Magis & Minus non variant speciem, we know. And the consideration of that difference is only thus far useful in the present Case, that the more deliberate those after-acts were, the more culpable they are, and the le…s capable either of Excuse or Extenuation; and consequently do oblige the party to so much the more serious, solemn, and lasting Repentance.
4. But concerning rash Vowes (in as much as the knot of the Question lyeth not there) it shall suffice to note these few points. First, That every Rash Vow is a sin; and that upon its own score, and precisely as it is Rash, although it should not be any other way peccant. All acts of Religious worship (by the importance of the third Commandment) are to be performed with all due sobriety, attention, and advisedness: how much more than a Vow? which is one of the highest acts of worship, as being a sacred contract, where unto God himself is a party. See Eccl. 5.1. &c. Secondly, That Rash Vows are for the most part, (besides the Rashness) peccant in their matter also; For they are commonly made in passion, and all passions are evil Counsellors, and Anger as bad as the first. The wrath of Man seldom worketh the righteousness of God. Thirdly, That a Rash Vow, (though to be repented of for the Rashness) may yet in some cases bind. As for example, A man finding himself ill used by a Shop-keeper, of whom he had formerly been accustomed to buy, voweth in a Rage that he will never buy of him again: This is a Rash Vow, yet it bindeth, because if the party had never made any such Vow at all, it had neither been unjust or uncharitable, (nor so much as imprudent) in him for to have done the same thing, which by his Vow he hath now bound himself to do. So if a man impatient of his ill luck at Cards, should Vow in a heat never to Play at Cards any more; he were in this case also bound to keep his Vow: because there neither is any sin in keeping it, nor can be any great necessity why he should break it. That therefore Fourthly, if at any time a Rash Vow bind not; the invalidity thereof proceedeth not meerly (nor indeed at all) from the Rashness (which yet is a very common error amongst men) but from the faultiness of it otherwise, in respect of the matter, or thing vowed to be done; when that which is so Vowed, is either so evil in it self, or by reason of circumstances, becometh so evil, that it cannot be performed without sin.
5. That therefore concerning the Vow in the present case, I declared my Opinion that it is not at all obligatory; it is done upon this ground (which is a most certain truth, and consented to by all) that Rei illicitae nulla obligatio. If a man shall Vow any thing that is contrary to Piety; as if having taken offence at some indiscreet passage in a Sermon of his own Minister, he should vow that he would never come to the Church, or hear him Preach again,: Or that is contrary to Iustice, as to take away the life of an innocent person, as those 40 persons that had vowed they would neither eat nor drink till they had slain Paul: Or never to make restitution to one whom he knew he had wronged: Or contrary to Charity; as to be revenged of, or never to be friends with one that had done him wrong: Or that is contrary to Mercy; as if having lost some money by lending to his friend, or having smarted by suretiship, he should vow never to lend any man money, or become surety for any man again. Let such a Vow, I say, as any of these, or any of the like nature, be made either rashly, or deliberately, and strengthened with Oaths and Imprecations, in the most direful and solemn manner that can be devised to tie it on the faster; yet it is altogether null and invalid as to the eff…ct of Obligation. Whence those common sayings, In male promissis rescinde fidem; ne sit juramentum vinculum iniquitatis, &c. And we have a good president for it in David, after he had in a rage vowed the destruction of Nabal, and all that belonged to him; which vow, upon better consideration, he not only did not perform, but he blessed God also, for so providentially preventing the performance of it, by the discreet demeanor and intervention of Abigail.
6. Now the reason why such vows are not binding, is very cogent and clear; Even because the party at such time as he is supposed to have made such Vow as aforesaid, lay under another (a former, and therefore a stronger) obligation to the contrary. And it is agreeable to all the reason in the World, that he who either by his own voluntary act, hath bound himself (where lawfully he might so do) or by the command of his lawful Superior (that hath a right to his service, and may exact obedience from him) is already bound to do, or not to do this or that; should not have power to disoblige himself therefrom, at his own pleasure, or to superinduce upon himself a new Obligation contrary thereunto: Obligatio prior praejudicat posteriori. As in the case of Marriage, a precontract with one party, avoideth all after-contracts with any other: And if a man convey Lands to several persons, by deeds of several date, the first conv…yance standeth good, and all the rest are void; and so in all cases of like nature. The Obligatory power thereof that is in Vows, Oaths, Promises, &c. is rightly said by some, to be a constructive, not a destructive power. The meaning is, that such acts may create a new Obligation where was none before, or confirm an old one; but it cannot destroy an old one, or substitute another contrary thereunto, in the place… thereof.
7. And the reason of this reason also is yet farther evident; for that Quisquis obligatur, alteri obligatur. When a man is obliged by any act, it is also supposed, that the obligation is made to some other party; to whom also it is supposed some right to accrue, by vertue of the said act obligatory; and that that other party is by the said act sufficiently vested in that said right, of which right he cannot be again devested and deprived by the meer act of him who instated him therein, and is obliged to perform it to him (unless himself give consent thereunto) without the greatest injustice in the World. Now God having a perfect right to our obedience, by his own obliging Precept, both for the not doing hurt to any man, and for the doing good to every man upon all fit opportunities: and this right also confirmed, and ratified by our own obligatory act in a solemn manner, before many witnesses at our Baptism, when we vowed to keep all God's Commandments: it were unreasonable to think that it should be in our power, by any after-act of ours to disoblige our selves from both, or either of those obligations. For then we might by the same reason free our selves from the obligation, of that latter Act also (suppose an Oath, or Vow) by another subsequent Oath, or Vow; and from that again by another: and so play fast and loose, make Vows, and break them in infinitum. Evident it is therefore, that every vow requiring any thing to be done, which is repugnant to any office of Piety, Iustice, Charity, or Mercy, which we owe either to God or man, is void, and bindeth not, because it findeth us under the power of a former contrary obligation, and hath not it self power sufficient to free or discharge us from the same.
8. The general rule thus cleared, it remaineth to examine concerning the particular Vow now in question, whether it be void upon this account or no? It will befound hard I believe to free this Vow from being repugnant to the rules of Iustice, but impossible, I am sure, to reconcile it with the perfect Evangelical Law of Charity and Mercy. First, Civil and Political Iustice, requireth that every man should obey the wholsome Laws of his Countrey, and submit himself to be ordered thereby. Now, put the case (which is possible enough) that the Daughters Husband should for lack of support from his Father-in-law, or otherwise, live and die in great want, leaving his Wife, and many small Children behind him, destitute of all means for their necessary sustenance. The Law would (as I suppose) in that case, upon complaint of the Parish, and for their case, send the Daughter and her Children to the Father, and compel him to maintain them out of his Estate. Which order he ought to obey, nor can refuse so to do, without the high contempt of publick Authority, and manifest violation of the Civil Justice, notwithstanding his Vow to the contrary: The Law must be obeyed whatsoever becometh of the Vow; in that case therefore it is evident the Vow bindeth not.
9. But say that should not happen to be the case (which yet is more than any man can positively say before-hand) the Parent is nevertheless in Moral Iustice bound to provide due maintenance for his Children and Grand-Children if he be able. Saint Paul saith that Fathers ought to lay up for the Children. True it is, he speaketh it but upon the by, and by way of Illustration, in the handling of another argument, very distant from this business: but …hat doth not at all lessen the importance of it, such illustrations being ever taken à notiori, and from such common notions as are granted, and consented unto by all reasonable men. The same Apostle having amongst other sins of the Gentiles, mentioned disobedience to Parents in one verse, in the very next verse, mentioneth also want of natural affection in Parents. And the disobedience in the Child can no more discharge the Parent from the obligation of that duty he oweth to the Child, of affection, and maintenance, then the unnaturalness of the Parent, can the Child from the duty he oweth to the Parent, of Honour and Obedience. For the several duties, that by Gods ordinance, are to be performed by persons that stand in mutual relation either to other, are not pactional and conditional; as are the Leagues and Agreements made between Princes (where the breach in one part dissolveth the obligation on the other) but are absolute and independent; wherein each person is to look to himself, and the performance of the duty that lyeth upon him, though the other party should fail in the performance of his.
10. Something I foresee may be objected in this point, concerning the lawfulness of the Parents withdrawing maintenance from the Child (either in whole, or at least in part) in the case of disobedience. Which how far forth it may, or may not be done; as it would be too long to examine, so it would be of little avail to the present business. For it is one thing to with-hold maintenance from a disobedient Child for the present, and to resolve so to continue till he shall see cause to the contrary. And another thing to bind himself by Vow or Oath, never to allow him any for the future, whatsoever should happen. Let be granted whatsoever can be supposed pleadable on the Fathers behalf in the present case; yet there will still remain two particulars in this Vow, not easily to be cleared from being unjust. First, let the Daughters disobedience deserve all this uttermost of punishment f…om the offended Father; yet how can it be just, that for the Mothers fault, the pour in…ocent (perhaps yet unborn) Children, should be utterly, and irrecoverably excluded from all possibility of relief from their Grandfather? Secondly, It is (if not unjust, yet what differeth very little there-from) the extremity of rigid Justice; that any offender (much less a Son or Daughter) should for any offence, not deserving Death, be by a kind of fatal peremptory decree, put into an incapacity of receiving relief from such persons, as otherwise ought to have relieved the said offender, without any reservation either of the case of extreme necessity, or of the case of serious repentance.
11. However it be for the point of Iustice; yet so apparent is the repugnancy of the matter of this Vow, with the Precepts of Christian Charity and Mercy; that if all I have hitherto said were of no force, this repugnancy alone were enough (without other evidence) to prove the unlawfulness, and consequently the invalidity, or inobligability thereof. It is (not an Evangelical Counsel, but) the express peremptory precept of Christ, that we should be merciful, even as our heavenly Father is merciful. And inasmuch as, not in that passage only, but for the most part wheresoever else the duty of mercy is pressed upon us in the Gospel from the example of God: God is represented to us by the Name, and under the notion of a Father, although I may not lay much weight upon it, as a demonstrative proof; yet I conceive I may commend it as a rational Topick, for all that are Fathers to consider of, whether it do not import, that mercy is to be expected from a father as much as (if not rather much more then) from any other man; and that the want of mercy in a Father, is more unkindly, more unseemly, more unnatural then in another man: But …his by the way, from that Precept of Christ, we learn that as there is in God a two-fold mercy, (a giving mercy, in doing us good, though we deserve it not, & a forgiving mercy, in pardoning us when we have done amiss:) so there ought to be in every good Christian man a readiness (after the example of God) to shew forth the fruits of mercy to others, in both kinds, upon all proper and meet occasions. So that if any person, of what quality or condition soever, shall upon any provocat…on whatsoever Vow that he will never do any thing for such or such a man; or that he will never forgive such or such a man: every such Vow, being contra bonos mores, and contra officium hominis Christiani, is unlawful, and bindeth not.
12. The offices of mercy in the former of those two branches, viz. of doing good, and affording relief to those that are in necessity, are themselves of so great necessity (as the case may be) that common humanity would exact the performance of them from the hand, not of a stranger only, but even of an enemy. If a stranger or an enemies Beast lie weltering in a Ditch, a helping hand must be lent to draw it out. The Samaritans compassion to the wounded Traveller in the Parable, Luk. 10. (There being a feud, and that grounded upon Religion, which commonly of all others, is the most deadly feud between the two Nations) is commended to our example, to the great reproach of the Priest and Levite, for their want of Bowels to their poor Brother of the same Natio… and Religion with themselves; For the nearer the Relation is between the Parties, the stronger is the obligation of shewing mercy either to other. And there is scarce any relation nearer, and more obliging, then that of Parents and Children.
Our Saviour, who in Matth. 15. sharply reproved such vows, (though made with an intention to advance the Service of God, by inriching his Treasury (as hindred Children from relieving their parents, will not certainly approve of such vows (made without any other intention then to gratifie rage, and impatience) as hinder Parents from relieving their Children.
13. If to avoid the force of this argument, it shall be alledged, that the Daughters disobedience, in a business of so high concernment, might justly deserve to be thus severely punished, and that it were but equal that she, who had so little regard to her Father, when the time was, should be as little regarded by him afterwards. All this granted, cometh not yet up to the point of shewing Mercy according to the example of God. No Childs disobedience can be so great to an earthly Parent, as ours is to our heavenly Father: Yet doth he notwithstanding all our ill deservings continually do us good, communicating▪ to our necessities, and causing his Sun to shine, and his Rain to fall, and infinite benefits in all kinds to descend upon mankind, not excluding the most thankless, and disobedient, and rebellious, from having a share therein.
14. And as for that other branch of mercy in pardoning offences, God giveth a rich example to all men, of their duty in that kind, (and to Fathers particularly (by his great readiness to pardon the greatest offenders, if they sincerely seek to him for it. If the Father in the Parable, Luke 15. had proceeded with such severity against his riotous Son, as to have vowed never to have received him again; he had been a very improper …xemplar, whereby to shadow out the mercy of God to repentant sinners. Concernin… the great importance of this duty, which is so frequently inculcated by Christ and his Apostles, and so peremptorily enjoyned, as not any other duty more. See Matt. 6.4, 15. Matt. 18.21.—35. Eph. 4.32. Col. 3.13. Iames 2.13. See also Sirac. 28.1, &c.] I shall not need to say much; only as to the present Case, it would be considered, how perverse a course it is, and contradictory to it self, for a man to think himself obliged by one inconsiderate act, never to forgive his Daughter; when as yet he cannot beg pardon of his own sins, at the hands of God, (as he ought in his daily Prayer to do) without an express condition of forgiving every body, and an implicit imprecation upon himself, if he do not.
15. But shall the Daughter that hath thus grieved the spirit of her Father, thus escape unpunished, and be in as good a condition as if she had never offended? And will not others be incouraged by her impunity, to despise their Parents after her example? There is much reason in this objection; and therefore what I have hitherto written, ought not to be understood, as if thereby were intended such a plenary indulgence for the daughter, as should restore her in integrum, but only that she should be made capable of receiving such relief from her Father, from time to time, as in relation to her necessities, and after-carriage, from time to time, should seem reasonable; and that his Vow ought not to hinder him from affording her such relief. But by what degrees, and in what proportion, the Father should thus receive his daughter into his fatherly affection, and relieve her, must be left to discretion, and the exigence of circumstances. Only I should advise (in order to the objection, viz. for examples sake, and that the daughter might be made, even to her dying day, and kept, sensible of her great and sinful disobedience to her Fath…r) that the Father should cut off from his Daughter, and her Posterity, some meet portion of his Estate, (as perhaps a fifth part at the least; or if a fourth, or a whole third part, I should like it the better;) and by a solemn deliberate vow, dedicate the same to be yearly imployed in some pious and charitable uses. These times will afford him choice of objects, if God shall move his heart so to do; and by so doing, he may, First, in some sort redeem, and make a kind of satisfaction for his former Rashness, (not Popishly understood, and in regard of the Iustice of God, but) in a moral sense, and in regard of the World, and his own Conscience. Secondly, it may be a good means to keep the Daughter in a continual fresh remembrance of her fault, that she may not, after a short and slight repentance (as in such cases too often it happeneth) forget the same; whereof she ought to have some remorse all the daies of her life. Thirdly, he shall thereby after a sort, perform his first vow; I mean according to the general inte… tion thereof, and the rational part, (which was to make his Daug…ter repent her folly, and to smart for it:) the over-plus more tha… …his, being but the fruit of rancor and pertu…bation. Lastly, he shall in so doing, doubly imitate God, our heavenly Father. First, when a rash or sinful act is made an occasion of a pious or charitable work, it beareth some resemblance of, or rather is indeed it self a gracious effect of that goodness and wisdom in God, whereby he bringeth light out of darkness, and good out of evil. Secondly, God Himself when he graciously pardoneth an high presumptuous sin, as he did Davids great sin, in the matter of Vriah, commonly layeth some lasting affliction upon the offender, as he did upon David, who after the sealing his pardon for that sin by Nathan, scarce ever had a quiet day all his life long. The reason whereof seemeth to be double, partly for admonition to others, that none presume to provo…e God in like manner, lest they smart for it also in like manner; and partly for the good of the offender, that he may by the smart be brought to the deeper sense of his error, and be eftsoons reminded of it, lest he should too soon forget it.
Thus have I with very much ado, (in that weak condition I have been in, ever since the question came to my hands, and wherein I yet continue) declared my opinion fully concerning the whole business as far as I understand it. More largly I confess than I intended, or perhaps was needful; and with greater severity than (it may be) the parties will well like of. But truly I desired to do the part of a faithful Confessor, and the sores on both parts seemed to be such as were not to be touched with too gentle a hand: In the Daughter, an act of high disobedience, transported by the passion of inordinate love; and in the Father an act of great Rashnes…, transported by the passion of inordinate anger: both beyond the bounds of right Reason, a…d Religion; and both to be deeply repented of. Howsoever, I cannot be suspected to have written any thing, either out of favour for, or prejudice against either party; not having the least conjecture who the persons are that are concerned in the business; nor so much as in what part of the Nation they live. I shall pray that God would direct them both, to do that which may best serve to his glory, and bring the soundest comfort to their own souls. Amen.
FINIS.
End of the text · Robert Sanderson, Eight Cases of Conscience (1674)