Eight Cases of Conscience, Case 7
The CASE of the ENGAGEMENT.
SIR,
I Have hitherto been very sparing in delivering my opinion concerning the point now most in agitation, viz. Of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of Subscribing the Engagement: considering the mischiefs that must needs have followed, if it should be once noised abroad, that I had given forth any determination in so tickle a point. I could not but foresee on the one side, if I should condemn it as utterly unlawful, how I should be looked upon by those that have all power in their hands, not as a refuser only, but a disswader also of what they have thought fit to require: And on the other side, if I should allow it in any case lawful, what ill use would certainly be made thereof by multitudes of people, apt to be so far scandalized thereby, as either to swallow it whole without chewing, (that is, resting themselves upon the general determination of the lawfulness to take it in hand over head, without due consideration, either of the true meaning of it, or of other requisite cautions and circumstances) or else to conceive themselves by so engaging, to be for ever discharged from the bond of their former Allegiance.
Yet since by your Letter, and by sending your servant therewith on purpose so many daies journey, through unknown waies, and at this season of the year (especially as the weather hath proved since his coming forth) scarce passable, you have shewn your earnest desire to understand what my opinion is in this point; so great, both for difficulty and concernment; I could not think it fit, nor consistent with that civility which is to be used, especially towards Strangers, to send back your messenger without the return of some kind of answer: Wherein, albeit I shall not come up to the full, of what your Letter declareth to be your desire, viz. In giving a particular Iudgment and estimate of the Eight several Arguments therein proposed, and the additional Quaere in the Postscript: yet you shall find something tending towards your satisfaction therein, by touching upon those points (so far as the straits of time would suffer) wherein the difficulty of the whole business seemeth chiefly to consist.
First then, it is to be considered, that Allegiance is a duty that every Subject, under what form of Government soever, by the Law of Nature, oweth to his Countrey, and consequently to the Sovereign Power thereof. For the very same Law (which we may call the Law of Nature, at least in a large acceptation) which inclineth particular men to grow into one civil body of a Common-wealth, must necessarily withal, imprint a sense, and tacite acknowledgment of such a duty of Allegiance in every inferior member of the body, unto the Caput Communitatis, or Sovereign Power, by which that Common-wealth is governed, as is necessary for the preservation of the whole body. So that the bond of Allegiance doth not arise originally from the Oath of Allegiance; as if those that had not taken the Oath, had a greater liberty to act contrary to the Allegiance specified in the Oath, than those that have taken it, have: or as if, in case the Oath should be quite laid aside, there should be no Allegiance due. But it is so intrinsecal, proper, and essential a duty, and (as it were) fundamental, to the relation of a Subject, quâ talis, as that the very name of a Subject doth, after a sort, import it; insomuch, that it hath thereupon gained, in common usage of speech, the stile of Natural Allegiance: Whence all these inferences will follow.
1. That the bond of Allegiance, (whether sworn or not sworn) is in the nature of it perpetual and indispensable.
2. That it is so inseparable, from the relation of a Subject, that although the exercise of it, may be suspended by reason of a prevailing force, whilest the Subject is under such force, (viz. where it cannot be imagined, how the endeavour of exercising it can be effectually serviceable to restore the Sovereign Power to the right owner, for the establishment of that Publick Justice and Peace wherein the happiness of Commonwealths consisteth) yet no outward force can so absolutely take it away, or remove it, but that still it remaineth vertually in the Subject, and obligeth to an endeavour (so soon as the force that hindered it is over) of actually exercising of it, for the advantage of the party, to whom of right it is due, and the advancement of the common good thereby, upon all fit occasions.
3. That no Subject of England, that either hath, by taking the Oaths of Supremacy, or Allegiance, acknowledged; or that not having taken either Oath, yet otherwise knoweth, or believeth, that the Sovereign Power in England, to whom his Natural Allegiance is due, is the King, his Heirs, and lawful Successors, can without sinning against his Conscience, enter into any Covenant, Promise, or Engagement, or do any other Act or Acts whatsoever, whereby either to transfer his Allegiance to any other party, to whom it is not of right due, or to put himself into an incapacity of performing the duties of his bounden Allegiance to his lawful Sovereign, when it may appear to be useful and serviceable to him.
4. That therefore the taking of the late Solemn League and Covenant, by any Subject of England (notwithstanding the Protestation in the Preface, that therein he had the Honour of the King before his eyes; and that express clause in one of the Articles of it, wherein he swore, The Preservation of the Kings Person and Honour) was an act as clear contrary to the Oath of Allegiance, and the Natural Duty of every Subject of England; as the Assisting of the King to the utmost of ones power (which is a branch of the Oaths) and the assisting against any person whatsoever, with his utmost power, those that were actually in Arms against the King (which was the very end for which that Covenant was set on foot) are contrary the one unto the other.
5. And that also for the same reason, no Subject of England, that hath taken the Oaths, and understandeth them, or is perswaded that the Sovereignty of this Realm doth of right belong to the King, his Heirs, and lawful Successors, can without sinning in like manner against his Conscience, take the Engagement now offered: if he so understand the words, wherein it is expressed, as if they did contain in them, and require of the Promiser, an acknowledgment that the Supream Power of this Realm, whereunto the Subjects owe their bounden Allegiance, is rightly vested in those persons that now exercise it; or as if they did import an utter abjuration, or renouncing of that Allegiance which was formerly held due to the King.
II. This being cleared, the next enquiry must be, Whether or no the words of the Engagement will reasonably bear such a construction, as to the understanding of a rational and conscientious man, may seem consistent with his bounden duty and Allegiance to his lawful Sovereign? Whereof (I think) there need be no great question made, if it be well considered.
1. That all expressions by words, are subject to such ambiguities, that scarce any thing can be said or exp…essed in any words, how cautelously soever chosen, which will not render the whole speech capable of more constructions than one.
2. That very many men, known to be well affected to the King and his Party, and reputed otherwaies both learned and conscientious (not to mention the Presbyterians, most of whom, truly for my own part, when we speak of learning and conscience, I hold to be very little considerable) have subscribed the Engagement; who in the judgment of Charity, we are to presume, would not so have done, if they had not been perswaded the words might be understood in some such qualified sense, as might stand with the duty of Allegiance to the King.
3. That (as you write) it is strong…y reported and believed, that the King hath given way to the tak…ng of the Engagement, rather than that his good Subjects should lose their Estates for re…using the same. Which, as it is a clear evidence, that the King, and they who are about him, to advise him, do not so conceive of the words of this Engagement, as if they did necessarily import an abandoning of the Allegiance due to him: so 'tis (if true) a matter of great consideration towards the satisfaction of so many, as out of that fear only, have scrupled the taking of it. For the doing of that cannot be reasonably thought to destroy the Subjects Allegiance; which the King, who expecteth Allegiance from all his Subjects, advisedly, and upon mature deliberation alloweth them to do.
III. But all this being granted, that the words of the Engagement are capable of such construction; yet is not the Conscience thereby sufficiently secured, from justly scrupling at the taking thereof, unless it may yet further appear, that the Subject hath the liberty to make use of such a construction; which is in effect the Qu…re contained in your Postscript, viz. Whether upon supposition, that the words of the Engagement will bear more constructions than one, the subscriber may take it in his own sense, or is bound to take it in the imposers sense? or, Whether it be necessary or expedient before he subscribe, to ask those that require his subscription, in what sense they require him to subscribe it? Upon the resolution of which Quaere, since (as I conceive) the last resolution of the Judgment, wherein the Conscience is to acquiesce, doth principally depend; I shall endeavour to give you my thoughts therein, (wherein I acknowledg to have received much light and satisfaction from a Discourse written by a Learned, Judicious, and Pious friend, whereof I lately had the perusal, but for some reasons, not thought fit to be published) as distinctly, and clearly, as the time I have to do it in, will suffer.
1. First then, for a man that is required of another to give Faith by some Oath, Promise, or other Engagement, to take it in a sense of his own, manifestly different (even in his own apprehension) from the others meaning, sufficiently expressed by words, according to the common custome of speech, and the nature of the business which it concerneth, is so gross a conceit, that had not the impudence of the J…suits, in maintaining the lawfulness of their Equivocations, and the sad experience of these late times, (wherein thousands have cheated themselves in perjury, by thinking to avoid it) evidenced the contrary, it might well have been thought a thing incredible, that any man of common understanding, should suffer his reason to be so infatuated by his affections, as to be deceived thereby. For if such latitude of construction should be admitted in Promises, and other Obligations of that nature, intended for the Preservation of Faith amongst mankind, there would not remain any possible means, whereby for men to have assurance of one anothers meanings. Wherefore I take that for a clear truth, That all Promises, and Assurances, wherein Faith is required to be given to another, ought to be understood, ad mentem imponentis, according to the mind and meaning of him to whom the Faith is to be given; so far forth as the meaning may reasonably appear, by the nature of the matter about which it is conversant, and such signification of the words, whereby it is expressed, as according to the ordinary use of speech amongst men, agreeth best thereunto. The reason whereof is, because the Faith so required to be given, is intended to the b…hoof, and for the interest of him that requireth it; namely, to the end he may have the better assurance from him that giveth the faith, that what is promised shall be accordingly performed: which assurance he cannot have, if after his meaning, sufficiently declared by the words, it should yet be at the liberty of the Promiser to reserve another secret meaning in his own breast, differing there-from.
2. But Secondly, what if the Intention of the Imposer be not so fully declared by the words and the nature of the business; but that the same words may in fair construction be still capable of a double meaning, so as taken in one sense, they shall bind to More, and in another to Less? I conceive in such case it is not necessary, nor always expedient (but rather for the most part otherwise) for the Promiser, before he give faith, to demand of the Imposer, whether of the two is his meaning. But he may by the rule of Prudence, and that (for ought I see) without the violation of any Law of Conscience, make his just advantage of that ambiguity, and take it in the same sense which shall bind to the Less. And this I ground upon the very same reason as before; For sith the Faith to be given, is intended to the behoof of him, to whom it is given, it concerneth him to take care that his meaning be expressed in …uch words as will sufficiently manifest the same to the understanding of a reasonable man. Which if he neglect to do, no Law of Equity or Prudence bindeth the Promiser by an over-scrupulous diligence to make it out, whereby to lay a greater obligation upon himself than he need to do.
3. But then Thirdly, if it shall happen (as often it cometh to pass, when we have to deal with cunning men, and may possibly be the Case now, and undoub…edly was so in the business of the P…otestation, when the time was) That he …hat requireth the faith to be given, do of purpose so contrive the words, that there may be l…ft an ambiguity and latitude of sense therein; yea, and that it be very probable, and in a manner apparent, (upon the consideration of the point of interest, or other strong presumptions arising from circumstances or otherwise) even to the apprehension of the Promiser himself, that he hath some farther reach in requiring that promise from him, some more remote and secret intention then he is willing to discover. In that case what is to be done? I answer, That the Promiser in such case is no ways obliged in giving his Faith, to take notice of any secret intention, but is at liberty to make use of that Latitude of sense, which the other did rather chuse to leave undetermined, than to restrain, and so to turn the others cunning dealing to his own best advantage, by taking it in the more favourable construction; and that which bindeth to less. For it is the declared intention only, (viz. That which the words, according to the common use of speech, do in relation to the nature of the subject, most naturally and properly represent to the understanding of reasonable men, when they hear them) and not … the remote, secret, and reserved intent, which the Promiser is obliged unto. The reason whereof is manifest; because he that requireth Faith to be given from another, by words of his own contriving, is ever presumed so to have determined the sense thereof, in the contrivance of the words, as may sufficiently declare what he intendeth the Promiser should assure him to perform. If therefore he have not so determined the words, as to signifie the More; it is in all reason to be presumed, that he intended to oblige him but to the Less. For being at liberty to make his own choice of words, whereby to express his own meaning; who can think otherwise, but that he would make the choice with respect to his own Interest? And therefore, though he might have a secret desire, which he is lo…h to discover, that the Promiser should be bound to the More, and would be marvellously well pleased, that he should so understand the words, as if they intended to bind him to the More: Yet since it had been so easie a matter for him, by adding or altering a few words, to have declared that intent, if he had thought it conducible to his own ends; it will be presumed also, that it was out of respect of self-interest, that he forbare so to do, and chose rather to leave his meaning, in such general words, as will not exclude the sense, which bindeth but to the Less; and consequently that his declared intent obligeth to no more but to the Less only.
IV. To bring the matter yet closer, and to put it up to the present Cases, there are yet two things more to be done.
First, To shew what the different constructions (the highest, I mean, and the lowest) the words of the Engagement are fairly capabl… of.
And Secondly, to find as well as we can, whether of the two is more probably the meaning intended by the Imposers, to be declared by the words.
The words are these: I do promise to be true and faithful to the Common-wealth of England, as it is now established without King or Lords.
Wherein there are sundry ambiguities.
1. First, In the words true and fai…hf…l; by which may be intended, either the promise of that Fidelity and Allegiance (which was formerly acknowledged to be due to the King, &c.) to be now performed to those that are presently possessed of the Supream Power, as their right and due. Or else that promise of such a kind of fidelity, as Captives taken in the War, promise to their Enemies, when they fall under their power; viz. to remain true Prisoners of War, and so long as they are in their power, not to attempt any thing to their destruction.
2. Secondly, In the word Common-wealth, by which may either be meant, those persons who are the prevalent party in this Kingdom, and now are possessed of, and do exercise the Supreme Power therein, as if the right of Soveraignty were vested in them: Or else, the whole entire Body of the English Nation, as it is a Civil Society or State within it self, distinguished from all other Foreign Estates. Taken in the former sense, the fidelity promised to the Common-wealth, relateth directly to the upholding of that party who are the present Governors de facto, and imports subjection to them as de jure: But taken in the latter, it relateth to the safety of the Nation, and importeth no more as to the present Governors, but to live peaceably under them de facto, and to yield obedience to them in things absolutely necessary for the upholding Civil Society within the Realm; such as are the defence of the Nation against Foraigners, the furtherance of Publick Justice, and the maintenance of Trade.
3. In the words as it is now established, &c. which may be understood either by way of approbation of what hath been done by way of abolishing Kingly Government, and the House of Peers, and placing all Authority and Power within the Realm, in the House of Commons. Or else foreign only, as a clause simply and barely reciting what manner of Government it is that this Nation de facto, is now under; viz. a Government by the Commons only, without either King or House of Lords.
Which Ambiguities considered, The highest construction that can be reasonably made of the words, is to this effect. I acknowledge the Sovereign Power of this Nation, where unto I owe Allegiance and Subjection to be rightly stated in the House of Commons, wherein neither King nor Lords (as such) have, or henceforth ought to have any share; And I promise that I will perform all Allegiance and Subjection thereunto, and maintain the same with my fortunes and life to the utmost of my power.
And the lowest construction that can be reasonably made of the same words, is to this effect: Whereas for the present, the Supreme Power in England, under which Power I now am, is actually possessed and exercised by the House of Commons, without either King or Lords; I promise that so long as I live under that power and protection, I will not contrive or attempt any act of hostility against them: but living quietly and peaceably under them, will endeavor my self faithfully in my place and calling, to do what every good member of a Common-wealth ought to do for the safety of my Country, and preservation of Civil Society therein.
V. Now cometh in to be considered in the last place the great Question, whether of the two constructions it is, (That which bindeth to the Most, or This which obligeth to the Least, the words can well bear) that the formers of the Engagement did rather intend to declare by these words. They that think the former, want not probability of reason to ground their perswasions upon. For they consider, that those who are presently possessed of the Supreme Power, are not minded to part with it if they can hold it. And that the likeliest way to hold it is, if they can possibly bring the whole people of England, or at least the far greatest part thereof, to acknowledge that they are rightly possessed of it, and to promise Subjection and Allegiance to them as such. And that therefore the Engagement, being purposely devised and set on foot, as the fittest engine to expedite that work, must in all reason intend to oblige so far. Which being so contrary to their Judgment and perswasion, concerning the duty and Oath of Allegiance, I cannot blame those that so understand the words of the Engagement, if they abominate the very thought of taking it.
But there wanteth not great probability of Reason on the other side, to induce us to believe that the latter and lower sense is rather to be deemed the immediate, and declared intent of the Imposers, whatsoever cause of suspition there may be, that the former meaning may be more agreeable to their secret, reserved, and ultimate intent; between which two, if there be any difference (as it is not impossible but there may be) the Engager is not concerned in it, or not yet: the Equivocation, if there be any in that, must be put upon the Imposers, not on the Promisers score. For thus believing, there are amongst others these Probabilities.
1. That many prudent and consciencious men of the Royal Party, as well Divines and Lawyers, as others, have thus understood it, who we presume would not for any outward resp…ct in the world have taken it, if they had conceived any more to have been intended in it.
2. That it hath often been affirmed, both publickly and privately in several parts of the Kingdom (if we may believe either common fame, or the reports of sundry credible particular persons) by those that have perswaded or pressed others to subscribe; that the same is the very true intent and meaning of it, and no other.
3. That if the Imposers had been minded to have declared an intent of binding to more, they might easily have framed the words so as not to be capable of a construction binding to Less.
4. That (as is also credibly reported) whilst the form of words was under debate, the opinion of those that would have had it set higher, was not followed, as held unseasonable; and the vote carried, for the more moderate expression wherein it now standeth.
5. That the Imposers, intending by the Engagement to secure themselves, especially against the designs and attempts of those men, who they knew (well enough) held them for no other than Usurpers, must be in reason supposed to require no more assurance of them by the Engagement, than such as may and is usually given to Usurpers; which is, not an acknowledgment of their title, and a promise of Allegiance, but meerly a promise of living quietly, so long as they are under their power, and enjoy their protection.
6. That it is a received Maxim of Political prudence, for all new Governors, (especially those that either introduce a new form of Government, or come in upon a questionable title) to abstain from all harsh proceedings, even against those whom they know to be evil affected to their Power, and not so much as to exasperate them (though it be in the power of their hands to destroy them) especially in the beginning of their Government; but rather to sweeten them into a better opinion of their persons, and to win upon them by Acts of Grace and Oblivion (for Remissiùs imperanti meliùs paretur. Senec. 1. De Clem. 24.) So as they may have but any tolerable kind of as…urance from them in the mean time, of living quietly and peaceably under them. We have no reason therefore to believe that the Imposers of this Engagement, who have acted the parts of the greatest Politicians, …o perfectly and succesfully hitherto, as to possess themselves so fully of the Supream Power of so great and flourishing a Kingdom, in so few years▪ would be so impolitick as not to proceed by the same …ules, that all wise and succesful persons have ever practised in the managing, and for the establishing of an acquired power.
VI. Out of all these premises together (weighing my Positive conclusion, either Affirmative or Negative, touching the Lawfulness or Unlawfulness of subscribing in universali) I shall declare my opinion only in these few following particulars.
1. That it is not lawful for any man to take the Engagement with a resolution to break it.
2. That therefore, whosoever thinketh the words of the Engagement do contain a promise of any thing which it is not law…ul for him to perform, cannot take it with a good conscience.
3. That whosoever so understandeth the words of the Engagement, as if they did oblige him to any thing contrary to his Allegiance, or render him unable to act according thereunto, upon any seasonable emerging occasion, cannot with a good conscience take it.
4. That if any man for any temporal benefit, or avoiding any temporal damage, shall take the Engagement with a doubting conscience (that is, before he be perswaded in his Judgment, upon some probable ground of reason, that it is lawful for him so to do) he sinneth therein.
5. That if any man after a serious desire of informing himself as rightly as he can, what are the duties of his Allegiance on the one side, and what is most probably the meaning intended by the words of the Engagement on the other side, shall find himself well satisfied in this perswasion, that the performance in the mean time of what is required by the Engagement so understood, is no way contrary (for any thing he can discern for the present) to his bounden Allegiance, so long as he is under such a force, as that he cannot exercise it; and likewise, that whensoever that force is so removed from him, or he from under it, as that he hath power to act according to his Allegiance, the Obligation of the Engagement of it self determineth and expireth: and out of these considerations, rather than suffer extreme prejudice in his person, estate, or necessary relations, shall subscribe the Engagement; since his own heart condemn…th him not, neither will I.
Sir, I have now two requests to you, which I doubt not but you will think reasonable. The one, that whatsoever use you shall please to make of these papers, or any thing therein contained, for your own, or any frien…s satisfaction; yet you would not deliver any Copies abroad, lest they should come to be printed, as some other papers of mine, written in this manner, have been without my knowledg. This I desire, both in respect of the danger I might incur from the displeasure of the Potent Party, if any such thing should come abroad; as also lest upon the consideration of some things here hinted, they might think the words of the Engagement too light, and might thence take occasion to lay some heavier Obligation upon us, in words that should oblige to More. The other request is, that since I have not any other perfect Copy of what I now send you, you would procure it to be transcribed for me; and either the copy so transcribed, or these very papers rather, when you have transcribed them, transmit enclosed in a Letter, or by some Friend that will be sure to deliver them safe, with his own hands, to my Son — in London, to whom I shall write shortly, that he may expect them,
Sir, I desire that my best respects may be presented, &c. — God endue us all with Grace and Wisdom fit for these evil times; to whose Mercy and Blessing commend us all, I rest,
Your Loving Friend and Servant. B.P. Dec. 20. 1650.