A Weapon-Salve for the Churchs Wounds, Religious treatise 1 · Part 1 · Chapter 2

A Weapon-Salve for the Churchs Wounds · Religious treatise 1 · Part 1 · Chapter 2

p. 27CHAP. II.

Six Hypotheses laid down, as the basis of the following Discourse. 1. The irreversible obligation of the Law of Nature, either by humane, or Divine positive Laws, in things immediately flowing from it. 2. Things agreeable to the Law of Nature may be lawfully practised in the Church of God, where there is no prohibition by positive Laws; inlarged into 5 subservient Propositions. 3. Divine positive Laws, concerning the manner of the thing whose substance is determined by the Law of Nature, must be obeyed by vertue of the obligation of the natural Law. 4. Things undetermined, both by the naturall and positive Laws of God, may be lawfully determined by the supream authority in the Church of God. 5. What is th… determined by lawfull authority, doth bind the consciences of men▪ subject to that authority. to obedience to those determinations. 6. Things thus determined by lawfull authority, are not thereby made unalterable, but may be revoked, limited, and changed by the same authority.

HAving shewed what a Divine Right is, and whereon it is§ 1. founded; our next great inquiry will be, How far Church-Government is founded upon Divine Right, taken either of these two wayes. But for our more distinct, clear, and rationa… proceeding, I shall lay down some things, as so many Postulata or generall Principles and Hypotheses, which will be as the basis and foundation of the following Discourse; which all of them concern the obligation of Laws, wherein I shall proceed gradually, beginning with the Law of Nature, and so to Divine positive Laws; and lastly, to speak to humane positive Laws. The first Principle or Hypothesis which I lay down, is,Hypoth. 1.

That where the Law of Nature doth determine any thing by way of duty, as flowing from the principles of it, there no positive Law can be supposed to take off the obligation of it. Which I prove, both as to humane positive Laws and Divine: First as to humane. For first, the things commanded in the Law of Nature, being just and righteous in themselves, there can be no obligatory Law made against such things. Nemo tenetur p. 28ad impossibile, is true in the sense of the Civil Law, as well as in Philosophy; as impossibile is taken for turpe, and turpe for that which is contrary to the dictates of Nature. A man may be as well bound not to be a man, as not to act according to principles of reason▪ For the Law of Nature is nothing else but the dictate of right reason, discovering the good orGrot. de jure bell…, &c. lib 1. c…p. 1. s. 10. evil of particular actions, from their conformity or repugnancy to natural light. Whatever positive Law is then made directly infringing and violating natural principles, is thereby of no force at all. And that which hath no obligation in it self, cannot dissolve a former obligation. Secondly, the indispensablenesse of the obligation of the Law of Nature, appears from the end of all other Laws, which are agreed upon by mutual compact, which is, the better to preserve men in their rights and priviledges. Now the greatest rights of men, are such as flow from Nature its self, and therefore, as no Law binds against the reason of it, so neither can it against the common end of Laws. Therefore, if a humane positive Law should be made, that God should not be worshipped, it cannot bind, being against the main end of Laws, which is to make men live together as reasonable creature…, which they cannot do, without doing what Nature requires, which is, to serve God who made it. Again, it overturns the very foundation of all Government, and dissolves the tye to all humane Laws, if the Law of Nature doth not bind indispensably: for otherwise, upon what ground must men yield obedience to any Laws that are made? Is it not by vertue of this Law of Nature, that men must stand to all compacts and agreements made? If Laws take their force among men from hence, they can bind no further then those comp…cts did extend; which cannot be supposed to be, to violate and destroy their own natures. Positive Laws may restrain much of what is only of the permissive Law of Nature (for the intent of positive Laws, was to make men abate so much of their naturall freedom, as should be judged necessary for the preservation of humane Societies) but against the obligatory Law of Nature, as to its precepts, no after-Law can derogate from the obligation of it. And therefore it is otherwise between the Law of Nature and positive Laws, then between p. 29Laws meerly civil: for as to these the rule is, that posterior derogat priori, the latter Law cassats and nulls the obligation of the former; but as to natural Laws and positive, prior derogat posteriori, the Law o… Nature, which is first…, takes away the obligation of a positive Law, if it be contrary to it. As Iustellus observe it was in the primitive Church,—in reference to the obligation of the Canons of the Councils, that such asPr…sat. in Cod. Canon. Eccl. A…ric. p. 14. were inserted in the Codex Canonum, being of the more ancient Councils, did render the obligation of later Canons invalid, which were contrary to them, unlesse it were in m…tte…s of small moment. We see then, that supposing the Law of Nature doth not continue obligatory, the obligation of all humane positive Laws will fall with it, (as the superstructure needs must when the foundation is removed) for if any other Law of Nature may be dissolved, why not that whereby men are bound to stand to Covenants and contracts made? and if that be dissolved, How can the obligation to humane Laws remain, which is founded upon that basis? And so all civil Societies are thereby overturned. Thirdly, it appears from the nature of that obligation which follows the Law of Nature, so that thereby no humane Law can bind against this; for humane Laws bind only outward humane act…ons directly, and internall acts only by vertue of their necessary connexion with, and influence upon outward actions, and not otherwise; but the Law of N…ture immediately binds the soul and conscience of man: And therefore obligatio naturalis, and nexus conscientiae, are made to be the same by Lessius, Suar…z, and others. For Lessius d…sputing, WhetherLess. de just. & jure l. 2. c. 19. d…b. 3. n. 12. Suarez de leg. lib. 2: cap. 9. sect. 6. a Will made without solemnity of Law, doth bind in conscience or no? He proves it do…h by …his argument, from the opinion of the Lawyers, that without those solemnities there doth arise from it a natural obligation, and the hresae ab Intestato, who is the next of Kin, is bound to make it good; therefore it doth bind in conscience. So then there ariseth a necessary obllgation upon conscience, from the dict…tes of the Law of Nature, which cannot be removed by any positive Law. For although there lye no action in the civil Law against the breach of a meerly natural Law, as in the former case of succession to a Will not legally made; in covenants made without p. 30conditions expressed, in recovery of debt… from a person to whom money was lent in his Pupillage without consent of his Tutor; in these cases though no action lie against the persons, yet this proves not that these have no obligation upon a man, but only that he is not responsible for the breach of morall honesty in them before civil Courts. In which sense those Lawyers are to be understood, which deny the obligation of the Law of Nature. But however conscience binds the offender over to answer at a higher tribunal, before which all such offences shall be punished. Thus then we see no positive humane Law can dispence with, or dissolve the obligation of th… Law of nature. Much lesse; Secondly, can we suppose any positive Divine Law should. For although Gods power be immense and infinite to do what pleaseth him, yet we must always suppose this power to be conjoyned with goodnesse, else it is no divine power: and therefore posse malum, non est posse, it is no power, but weakness to do evil; and without this posse malum, there can be no alteration made in the nature of good and evil; which must be supposed, if the obligation of the natural Law be dispensed with. Therefore it was well said by Origen, when C…lsus objected it as the common speech of theOrig. lib. 3. C. Celsum. p. 154. ed. Co…. … Christians, That with God all things are possible, that he neither understood how it was spoken, nor what these all-things are, nor how God could do them: and concludes with this excellent speech, foreign, We say, saith he, that God can do all things, which are reconcilable with his Deity, Goodnesse, and Wisdom. And after adds, That as it is impossible for honey to make things bitter, and light to make things obscure, so it is for God to do any thing that is unjust. foreign. For the power of doing evil is directly contrary to the Divine Nature, and that Omnipotency which is consistent with it. To the same purpose he speaks elswhere, foreign,C. Celsum l. 5. p. 147. God wills nothing unbecoming himself: And again, foreign. We affirm that God cannot do evil actions: for if he could, he might as well be no God. For if God should do evil, he would be no God. So then p. 31though God be omnipotent, yet it follows not that he can therefore dissolve the obligation of the preceptive Law of nature, or change the natures of good and evil. God may indeed alter the properties of those things from whence the respects of good and evil do result, as in Abrahams offering Isaac, the Israelites taking away the Aegyptians Jewels; which God may justly do by vertue of his absolute dominion; but the change here, is not in the obligation of the Law, but in the things themselves. Murther would be an intrinsecal evil still; but that which was done by immediate and explicit command from God, would have been no murther. Theft had been a sin still, but taking things aliena…ed from their properties by God himself, was not Theft. We conclude then, what comes immediately from the Law of nature by way of command binds immutably and indispensably. Which is the first Hypothesis or Principle laid down.

The second Hypothesis is, That things which are either deducible § 2.from the Law of Nature, or by the light of Nature discovered to be very agreeable to it, may be lawfully practised in the Church of God, if they be not otherwise determined by the positive Laws of God, or of lawfull humane authority. We shall first inquire into the nature of these things, and then shew the lawfulnesse of doing them. For the nature of these things: we must consider what things may be said to be of the Law of nature. They may be reduced to two heads, which must be accurately distinguished. They are either such thing… which Nature dictates to be done, or not to be done necessarily and immutably; or else such things as are judged to be very agreeable to natural light, but are subject to positive determinations. The former are called by some jus naturae obligativum; by others jus naturae proprium, whereby things are made necessarily duties or sins; the latter jus naturae permissivum, and reductivum, for which it is sufficient if there be no repugnancy to natural light. From these two arise a different obligation uponCovarr. c. 10. de tesi…m…n. 11…. men; either strict, and is called by Covarr…vias, obligatio ex▪ justitiâ, an obligation of duty and justice; the other larger, obligatio ex communi aequitate, or ex honestate morali; an obligation from common equity, that is, according to the agreeablenesse of things to natural light, The former I have shewn already p. 32to bind indispensably, but these latter are subject to positive Laws. For our better understanding the obligation of these (which is more intricate then the former) we shall consider men under a double notion, either in a state of absolute liberty, which some call a state of Nature; or else in a state wherein they have restrained their own liberty by mutual compacts, or are determined by a higher Law. These things premised, I lay down these Propositions.

1. In a state of absolute liberty, before any positive Laws were superadded to the naturall, Whatsoever was not necessarily determined by the obligatory Law of Nature, was wholly left to mens power to do it or not, and belongs to the permissive Law of Nature. And thus all those things which are since determined by positive Laws, were in such a supposed state, left to the free choyce of a mans own will. Thus it was in mens power to joyn in civil Society with whom they pleased, to recover things, or vindicate injuries in what way they judged best, to submit to what constitutions alone they would themselves, to choose what form of Government among them they pleased, to determine how far they would be bound to any Authority chosen by themselves, to lodge the legislative and coercive Power in what persons they thought fit, to agree upon punishments answerable to the nature of offences. And so in all other things not repugnant to the common light of reason, and the dictates of the preceptive part of the Law of Nature.

2. A state of absolute liberty, not agreeing to the nature of man considered in relation to others; it was in mens power to restrain their own liberty upon compacts so far as should be judged necessary for the ends of their mutuall Society. A state of Nature I look upon only as an imaginary state, for better understanding the nature and obligation of Laws. For it is confessed by the greatest Assertors of it, that the relation of Parents and Children cannot be conceived in a state of natural liberty,Hobs de civ. cap. 1▪ s. 11. Ann. because Children assoon as born are actually under the power and authority of their Parents. But for our clearer apprehending the matter in hand, we shall proceed with it. Supposing then all those former rights were in their own power, it is most agreeable to natural reason, that every man p. 33may part with his right so far as he please for his own advantage. Here now, men finding a necessity to part with some of their Rights, to defend and secure their most considerable Ones, they begin to think of Compacts one with another (taking this as a Principle of the Natural Law, and the Foundation of Society, That all Covenants are to be performed:) When they are thus far agreed, they then consider the terms upon which they should enter into Society one with another. And here men devest themselves of their original liberty, and agree upon an Inclosure of Properties, and the Fences of those Properties; I mean, upon living together in a civil state, and of the Laws they must be ruled by. This is apparently agreeable to Natural Reason, the things being in their own power, which they agree to part with.

Men entring upon Societies by Mutual Compacts, things §. 3.thereby become good and evil, which were not so before. ThusProp. 3. he who was free before to do what and how he pleased, is now bound to obey what Laws he hath consented to; or else he breaks not only a Positive Law, but that Law of Nature, which commands Man to stand to Covenants once made, though he be free to make them. And therefore it is observable, that the doing of things that were lawful before Covenants made, and things thereby determined, may be so far from being lawful after, that the doing of them may contradict a Principle of the Obligatory Law of Nature. Thus in a state of liberty, every one had right to what he thought fit for his use; but Propriety and Dominion being introduced, which was a free voluntary act, by mens determining Rights, it now becomes an offence against the Law of Nature, to take awayPaulus l. 1. D. de …urtis. V… pian. lib. Post. D. de verb sig. that which is another mans. In which sense alone it is, that Theft is said to be forbidden by the Law of Nature. And by the same reason, he that resists and opposeth the lawful Authority, under which he is born, doth not only offend against the Municipal Laws of the place wherein he lives, but against that Original and Fundamental Law of Societies, viz standing to Covenants once made. For it is a gross mistake, as well as dangerous, for men to imagine, That every man is born in a state of Absolute Liberty, to chuse what Laws and Governours he please▪ but every one being now born a Subject to that Authority p. 34he lives under, he is bound to preserve it as much as in him lies: Thence Augustus had some reason to say, He was the best Citizen, qui praesentem reipublicae statum mutari … vult, That doth not disturb the present state of the Commonwealth; and who, as Alcibiades saith in Thucydides, foreign V. Grot. de jure belli. &c. lib. 2. cap. 4▪ sect. 8.endeavours to preserve that form of Government he was born under. And the reason of it is, that in Contracts and Covenants made for Government, men look not only at themselves, but at the benefit of Posterity; if then one Party be bound to maintain the Rights of the others Posterity, as well as of his person, the other party must be supposed to oblige his Posterity in his Covenant to perform Obedience; which every man hath power to do, because Children are at their Parents disposal; And Equity requires, that the Covenant entred should be of equal extent to both parties: And if a man doth expect Protection for his Posterity, he must engage for the Obedience of his Posterity too, to the Governor… who do legally protect them. But the further prosecution of these things belongs to another place to consider of; my purpose being to treat of Government in the Church, and not in the State. The sum of this is, that the Obligation to the performance of what things are determined (which are of the permissive Law of Nature) by Positive Laws, doth arise from the Obligatory Law of Nature. As the Demonstration of the particular Problemes in the Mathematicks, doth depend upon the Principles of the Theoremes themselves; and so whoever denies the truth of the Probleme, deduced by just Consequence from the Theoreme, must consequentially deny the truth of the Theoreme its self: So those who violate the particular Determinations of the Permissive Law of Nature, do violate the Obligation of the Preceptive part of that Law: Obedience to the other being grounded on the Principles of this.

4. God hath Power by his Positive Laws to take in and determine as much of the Permissive Law of Nature as he please, which being once so determined by an Universal Law, is so far from being lawful to be done, that the doing of them by those under an Obligation to his Positive Laws, is an offence against the Immutable Law of Nature. That God may restrain mans Natural Liberty, I suppose none who own Gods Legislative Power p. 35over the world can deny: especially considering that men have power to restrain themselves; much more then hath God, who is the Rector and Governor of the World. That a breach of his positive Laws is an offence against the common Law of Nature, appears hence; because man being Gods creature, is not only bound to do what is in general suitable to the principles of reason in flying evil, and choosing good; but to submit to the determinations of Gods will, as to the distinction of good from evil. For being bound universally to obey God, it is implyed that man should obey him in all things which he discovers to be his will: whose determination must make a thing not only good, but necessary to be done, by vertue of his supreme authority over men. This then needs no further proof, being so clear in its self.

5. Lastly, What things are left undetermined by divine positive Laws, are in the Churches power to use, and practise according as it judgeth them most agreeable to the rule of the Word. That things undetermin'd by the Word are still lawfull, evidently appears: because what was once lawfull, must have some positive Law to make it unlawfull, which if there be none, it remains lawfull still. And that the Church of God should be debarr'd of any priviledge of any other Societies, I understand not; especially if it belong to it as a Society considered in its self, and not as a particular Society constituted upon such accounts as the Church is. For I doubt not but to make it evident afterwards, that many parts of Government in the Church belong not to it as such in a restrained sense, but in the general notion of it, as a Society of men imbodyed together by some Laws proper to its self; Although it subsist upon a higher foundation, viz. of divine institution, and upon higher grounds, reasons, principles, ends; and be directed by other Laws immediately then any other Societies in the World are.§. 4.

The third Hypothesis is this; Where the Law of Nature determines the thing, and the Divine Law determines the manner and circumstances of the thing, there we are bound to obey the divine Law in its particular determinations, by vertue of the Law of Nature in its general obligation. As for instance, the Law of Nature bindeth man to worship God; but for the p. 36way, manner, and circumstances of Worship, we are to follow the positive Laws of God: because as we are bound by Nature to worship him, so we are bound by vertue of the same Law to worship him in the manner best pleasing to himself. For the light of Nature, though it determine the duty of worship, yet it doth not the way and manner, and though acts of pure obedience be in themselves acceptable unto God, yet as to the manner of those acts, and the positives of worship, they are no further acceptable unto God then commanded by him. Because in things not necessarily determined by the Law of Nature, the goodnesse or evill of them lying in reference to Gods acceptance, it must depend upon his Command, supposing positive Laws to be at all given by God to direct men in their worship of him. For supposing God had not at all revealed himself in order to his worship; doubtlesse it had been lawfull for men not only to pray to God, & express their sense of their dependance upon him; but to appoint waies, times and places for the doing it, as they should judge most convenient & agreeable to natural light. Which is evident from the Scripture its self as to places: for as far as we can find, sacrificing in high places,Judg. 6. 18 1 Sam. 7. 1, 4. 16. 9. 10. 3. 2 Sam. 15. 18, &c.Judg 6:181 Sam 7:11 Sam 7:41 Sam 7:161 Sam 7:91 Sam 7:101 Sam 7:32 Sam 15:18 (that is, such as were of mens own appointment) was lawful, till the Temple was built by Solomon; as appears by the several examples of Gedeon, Samuel, David, and others. Indeed after the place was setled by Gods own Law, it became wholly sinfull: but if so before, we should not have read of Gods accepting sacrifices in such places as he did Gedeons, nor of the Prophets doing it, as Samuel and David did. It is a disputable case about Sacrifices, Whether the offering of them came only from natural light, or from some express command: the latter seems far more probable to me, because I cannot see how naturall light should any wise dictate that God would accept of the blood of other creatures as a token of mans obedience to himself.Exerci… ▪ in Gen. 42.Gen 42 And Rivet gives this very good reason why the destruction of any thing in sacrifice cannot belong to the Law of Nature, because it is only acceptable as a sign, and token of obedience, and not simply as an act of obedience; and this sign signifying ex instituto (for mans destroying the life of a beast can never naturally signifie mans obedience to God) and therefore it must have some positive Law; for those which signifie p. 37only by institution, and not naturally, cannot be referred to a dictate of the Law of Nature. To which purpose it is further observable, that God doth so often in Scrip…ure slight the offering of Sacrifices, in respect of any inherent vertue or goodnesse in the action its self, or acceptablenesse to God upon the account of the thing done. In which sense God saith, He that killeth a bullock, is as if he slew a man; and he that Isa. 66. 3.Isa 66:3Sacrificeth a sheep, as if he cut off a dogs neck, &c. For what is there more in the one then in the other, but only Gods appointment, which makes one acceptable and not the other? So that it is no wayes probable that God would have accepted Abels sacrifice rather then Cains, had there been no command for their sacrificing. For as to meer natural light, Cains SacrificeGen. 4 3, 4.Gen 4:3Gen 4:4 seems more agreeable to that then Abels; Cains being an Eucharistical offering without hurt to other creatures, but Abels was cruentum Sacrificium a Sacrifice of blood. But the chief ground of Abels acceptance, was his offering in faith, as the Apostle to the Hebrews tells us: Now saith is aHeb. 1…. 4.Heb 1:4 higher principle then natural light, and must suppose divine Revelation, and so a divine Command as the Principle and ground of his action. Moses his silence in reference to a Command, is no argument there was none, it not being his design to write at large all the particular precepts of the Orall Law, but to deduce the Genealogy of the Patriarchs down from Adam and the Creation. But, supposing a Command given from God determining modes and circumstances of such …hings of which the substance depends on a natural Law, men are as well bound to the observation of them after their revelation, as the other before. The one being a Testimony of their obedience to God as clear and full as the other; yes, and so much the clearer evidence of obedience, in that there could be no argument for the performing of those things but a divine Command. And even in doing things intrinsecally good, the ground of purely religious obedience is, because God commands men to do those things more then that they are good in themselves: Doing a thing because most suitable to nature, speaking morality; but doing because God commands it, speaks true Religion and the obedience of Faith. For as the formal reason of the act of Faith is a divine Testimony discovered to our understandings, so the formal principle p. 38of an act of spiritual obedience is a divine Command inclining the will, and awing it to performance. So far then as divine Law determines things, we are bound to observe them from the dictates of the natural Law.

The fourth Hypothesis: In things which are determined both §. 5.by the Law of Nature, and divine positive Laws, as to the substance and morality of them, but not determined as to all circumstances belonging to them; it is in the power of Lawful authority in the Church of God to determine them, so far as they judge them tend to the promoting the performance of them in due manner. So that not only matters wholly left at liberty as to the substance of them are subject to humane Laws and Constitutions, but even things commanded in the divine Law, in reference to the manner of performance, if undetermined by the same Law, which enforce the duty. Thus the setting apart some time for Gods Worship, is a dictate of the natural Law: that the first day of the week be that time, is determin'd under the Gospel; but in what places, at what hours, in what order, decency and solemnity this Worship shall be then performed, are circumstances not determined in Scripture, but only by general Rules; as to these then so they be done in conformity to those Rules, they are subject to humane positive determinations. But this is not an hypothesis in the Age we live in to be taken for granted without proving it: some denying the Magistrate any power at all in matters of Religion; others granting a defensive, protective power of that Religion which is professed according to the Laws of Christ, but denying any determining power in the Magistrate concerning things left undetermin'd by the Scripture. This Hypothesis then hath landed me into a Field of Controversie, wherein I shall not so much strive to make my way through any opposite party, as endeavour to beget a right understanding between the adverse parties, in order to a mutual compliance; which I shall the rather do, because if any Controversie hath been an increaser and fomenter of heart-burnings and divisions among us, it hath been about the determination of indifferent things. And, which seems strange, the things men can least bear with one another in, are matters of liberty: and those things men have divided most upon, have been matters of uniformity, and wherein they have differed most, have been pretended p. 39things of Indifferency. In order then to laying a foundation for peace and union. I shall calmly debate what power the Magistrate hath in matters of Religion, and how far that power doth extend in determining things left undetermin'd by the Word. For the clear understanding the first of these, we shall make our passage open to it by the laying down several necess… ry distinctions about it, the want of considering which hath been the ground of the great confusion in the handling this Controversie. First then, we must distinguish between a power respecting Religion in its self, and a power concerning Religion as it is the publick owned and professed Religion of a Nation. For although the Magistrate hath no proper power over Religion in its self, either taking it abstractly for the Rule of Worship, or concretely for the internal acts of Worship; for he can neither add to that Rule nor dissolve the obligation of it; nor yet can he force the consciences of men, (the chief seat of Religion) it being both contrary to the nature of Religion its self, which is a matter of the greatest freedom and internal liberty, and it being quite out of the reach of the Magistrates Laws, which respect only external actions as their proper object; for the obligation of any Law can extend no further then the jurisdiction and authority of the Legislator, which among men is only to the outward actions. But then, if we consider Religion as it is publikely owned and professed by a Nation, the supreme Magistrate is bound by vertue of his office and authority, not only to defend and protect it, but to restrain men from acting any thing publikely tending to the subversion of it, So that the plea for liberty of conscience, as it tends to restrain the Magistrates power, i… both irrationall and impertinent; because liberty of conscience is the liberty of mens judgements, which the Magistrate cannot deprive them of. For men may hold what opinions they will in their minds, the Law takes no cognizance of them: but it is the liberty of practice and venting and broaching those opinions which the Magistrates power extends to the restraint of. And he that hath the care of the publike good, may give liberty to, and restrain liberty from men, as they act in order to the promoting of that good; And as a liberty of all opinions tends manifestly to the subverting a Nations peace, and to the embroyling it into continual confusions, a Magistrate cannot p. 40discharge his office unlesse he hath power to restrain such a liberty. Therefore we find plainly in Scripture that God imputes the increase and impunity of Idolatry as well as other vices to the want of a lawful Magistracy, Iudges 17. 5, 6. where the account given of Micahs Idolatry was, because there was no King in Israel; which implies it to be the care and duty of Magistrates to punish and restrain whatever tends to the opposing and subverting the true Religion. Besides, I cannot find any reason pleaded against the Magistrates power now, which would not have held under David, Solomon, Asa, Iehosophat, Hezekias, Iosias, or other Kings of the Jews, who asserted the publike profession, to the extirpation to what opposed it. For the plea of Conscience (taken for mens judgements going contrary to what is publikely owned as Religion) it is indifferently calculated for all Meridians, and will serve for a Religion of any elevation. Nay, stiff and contumacious Infidels or Idolaters may plead as highly (though not so truly) as any, that it goes against their judgements or their conscience to own that Religion which is established by authority. If it be lawfull then to restrain such notwithstanding this pretence, why not others, whose doctrine and principles the Magistrate judgeth to tend in their degree (though not so highly) to the dishonouring God, and subverting the profession entertained in a Nation? For, a mans own certainty and confidence that he is in the right, can have no influence upon the Magistrate judging otherwise; only if it be true, it wil afford him the greater comfort and patience under his restraint; which was the case of the primitive Christians under persecutions: The Magistrate then is bound to defend, protect, and maintain the Religion he owns as true, and that by vertue of his office, as he is Custos utriusque tabulae; The maintainer of the honour of Gods Laws, which cannot be if he suffer those of the first Table to be broken without any notice taken of them. Were it not for this power of Magistrates under the Gospel, how could that promise be ever made good, that Kings shall be nursing Fathers to the Church of God? unlesseIsa. 49. 23.Isa 49:23 they mean such Nursing Fathers as Astyages was to Cyrus, or Amulius to Romulus and Remus, who exposed their nurslings to the Fury of wild Beasts to be devoured by them. For so must a Magistrate do the Church, unlesse he secure it from p. 41the incursion of Hereticks, and the inundation of Seducers. But so much for that which is more largely asserted and proved by others. The Magistrate then hath power concerning Religion, as owned in a Nation.

Secondly, We must distinguish between an external and objective power, about matters of Religion; and an internal formal power, which some call an Imperative and Elicitive power, others a power of Order, and a power of Jurisdiction, others potestas Ecclesiastica, and potestas circa Ecclesiastica, or, in the old distinction of Constantine, foreign,Euseb. vit: Constant. l. 4. c. 24. a power of things within and without the Church; the sense of all is the same, though the terms differ. The internal, formal, Elicitive power of Order, concerning things in the Church, lies in authoritative exercise of the Ministerial Function, in preaching the Word, and administration of Sacraments; but the external, objective, Imperative power of Jurisdiction, concerning the matters of the Church, lies in a due care and provision, for the defence, protection, and propagation of Religion. The former is only proper to the Ministry, the latter to the Supreme Magistracy: For, though the Magistrate hath so much power about Religion, yet he is not to usurp the Ministerial Function, nor to do any proper acts belonging to it. To which the instance of Uzzias is pertinently applied. But then this takes nothing off from the Magistrates power; for it belongs not to the Magistrate imperata facere, but imperare facienda, as Grotius truly observes,De Imp. sum▪ Potest. cap. 2. l. 1. not to do the things commanded, but to command the things to be done. From this distinction we may easily understand, and resolve that so much vexed and intricate Question, concerning the mutual subordination of the Civil and EcclesiasticalIn Iud. c. 19.Judg 19 power: For, as Peter Martyr well observes, these two powers are some wayes foreign, are conversant several wayes about the same thing; but the Functions of both of them must be distinguished: For the Pastors of the Church are not to administer Justice, but it is their duty to declare how Justice should be rightly administred, without partiality, or oppression. So, on the other side, the Magistrate must not preach the Gospel, nor administer Sacraments; but however, must take care that these be duly done by …hose to whose p. 42Function it belongs: But for a clearer making it appear, these things are to be considered; both in a Magistrate, and Minister of the Gospel. In a Magistrate, the Power it self, and the Person bearing that Power: The power it self of the Magistrate is no ways subordinate to the Power of the Ministry: Indeed, if we consider both Powers, in reference to their objects, and ends, there may be an inferiority of Dignity, as Chamier callsPanstrat. Cath. Tom. 2. l 15. cap. 6. it, in the civil power to the other, considered abstractly; but considering it concretely, as lodged in the persons, there is an inferiority of Subjection in the Ecclesiastical to the Civil. But still the person of the Magistrate, though he is not subject to the power of the Ministers, yet both as a Christian, and as a Magistrate, he is subject to the Word of God, and is to be guided by that in the Administration of his Function. So on the other side, in a Minister of the Gospel, there are these things considerable; the Object of his Function, the Function its self, the Liberty of exercising it, and the Person who doth exercise it. As for the Object of this Function, the Word and Sacraments, these are not subject to the Civil Power, being setled by a Law of Christ; but then for the Function its self, that may be considered, either in the Derivation of it, or in the Administration of it. As for the derivation of the power and authority of the Function, that is from Christ, who hath setled and provided by Law, that there shall be such a standing Function to the end of the world, with such authority belonging to it: But for the Administration of the Function, two things belong to the Magistrate: First, to provide and take care for due administration of it; an… to see that the Ministers preach the true Doctrine, though he cannot lawfully forbid the true Doctrine to be taught; and that they duly administer the Sacraments, though he cannot command them to administer them otherwise then Christ hath delivered them down to us: This for due Administration. Secondly, in case of male-administration of his Function, or scandal rendring him unfit for it, it is in the Magistrates power, if not formally to depose, yet to deprive them of the liberty of ever exercising their Function within his Dominions; as Solom…n did Abiathar, and Iustinian Sylverius, as Constantius did Vigilius: For the liberty of exercise of the Function is in the Magistrates p. 43power, though a right to exercise it be derived from the same power from which the Authority belonging to the Function was conveyed. And then lastly, as to the persons exercising this Function, it is evident, As they are members of a Civil Society as well as others, so they are subject to the same Civil Laws as others are. Which as it is expresly affirmed by Chrysostom, on Rom. 13. 1. Let every Soul be subject to the Higher Powers; that is, saith he, foreign, Be he an Apostle, Evangelist, Prophet, In loc. To. 3. Ed. Ae…on. p. 189. Ed. 1607.Priest, Monk, be he who he will: So it is fully, largely, irrefragably proved by our Writers against the Papists; especially by the learned Is. Casaubon in his piece de libertate Ecclesiasticâ. So then we see what a fair, amicable, and mutual aspect these two powers have one upon another, when rightly understood, being far from clashing one with the other; either by a subjection of the Civil Power to the Ecclesiastical, or the Civil powers swallowing up and devouring the peculiarity of the Ministerial Function. And upon these grounds, I suppose, Beza and Erastus may, as to this, shake hands; So that the Magistrate do not usurp the Ministerial Function,De Episcop. Const. Magn. which Videlius calls Papatus politicus; nor the Ministers subject the Civil power to them, which is Papatus Ecclesiasticus.

Thirdly, we distinguish between an absolute Architectonical § 7.and Nomothetical Power, independent upon any other Law, and a Legislative Power, absolute as to persons, but regulated by a Higher Law. The former we attribute to none but God; the latter belongs to a Supreme Magistrate, in reference to things belonging to his power, either in Church or Commonwealth. By an Architectonical, Nomothetical Power, we mean that power which is distinguished from that which is properly call'd Political. The former lies in the making LawsAristot. Ethic. lib. 6. c. 6. for the good of the Commonwealth; the latter in a due execution and administration of those Laws for the Common Good. This we have asserted to the Magistrate already: We now come to assert the other; where we shall first set down the bounds of this power, and then see to whom it belongs. First, then we say not, that the Magistrate hath a power to revoke, rep…al, or alter any Divine positive Law; which we p. 44have already shewn. Secondly, we say not, that the Magistrate by his own will may constitute what new Laws he please for the Worship of God. This was the fault of Ieroboam who made Israel to sin, and therefore by the Rule of Reason must be supposed to sin more himself: So likewise Ahab, Ahaz, and others. Religion is a thing setled by a Divine Law; and as it is taken for the Doctrine and Worship of God, so it is contained in the Word of God, and must be fetched wholly from thence. But then thirdly, The Magistrate by his power, may make that which is a Divine Law already, become the Law of the Land. Thus Religion may be incorporated among our Laws, and the Bible become our Magna Charta. So the first Law in the Codex Theod. is about the believing the Trinity, and many others about Religion are inserted into it. Now as to these things clearly revealed in the Word of God, and withall commanded by the Civil Magistrate, although the primary obligation to the doing them, is from the former determination by a Divine Law; yet the Sanction of them by the Civil Magistrate, may cause a further obligation upon Conscience then was before, and may add punishments and rewards not expressed before. For although when two Laws are contrary the one to the other, the obligation to the Higher Law takes away the obligation to the other; yet when they are of the same Nature, or subordinate one to the other, there may a New Obligation arise from the same Law, enacted by a New Authority. As the Commands of the Decalogue brought a New Obligation upon the Consciences of the Jews, though the things contained in them, were commanded before in the Law of Nature: And as a Vow made by a man, adds a new …ye to his Conscience, when the matter of his Vow is the same with what the Word of God commands; and renewing our Covenant with God after Baptism, renews our Obligation: So when the Faith of the Gospel becomes the Law of a Nation, men are bound by a double Cord of duty to entertain and profess that Faith. Fourthly, in matters undetermined by the Word, concerning the External Polity of the Church of God, the Magistrate hath the power of determining things, so they be agreeable to the Word of God. This last Clause is that which binds the Magistrates power, that it is p. 45not absolutely Architectonicall, because all his Laws must be regulated by the generall rules of the Divine Law- But though it be not as to Laws, yet I say it is as to persons; that is, that no other persons have any power to make Laws, binding men to obedience, but only the civil Magistrate. This is another part of the Controversie between the Civil and Ecclesiastical Power, about the power of determining matters belonging to the Churches Government: But there is here no such breach between those two, but what may be made up with a distinction or two▪ We distinguish then between a power declarative, of the obligation of former Laws; and a power authoritative, determining a New Obligation; between the office of counselling and advising what is fit to be done, and a power determining what shall be done; between the Magistrates duty of consulting, in order to the doing it, and his deriving his authority for the doing it. These things premised, I say: First, that the power of declaring the obligation of former Laws, and of consulting and advising the Magistrate for setling of New Laws, for the Policy of the Church, belongs to the Pastors and Governours of the Church of God. This belongs to them, as they are commanded to teach what Christ hath commanded Matth. 28. 18.Matt 28:18them; but no authority thereby given to make new Laws to bind the Church; but rather a tying them up to the commands of Christ already laid down in his Word. For a power to bind mens consciences to their determinations; lodged in the Officers of the Church, must be derived either from a Law of God giving them this right, or else only from the consent of parties. For any Law of God, there is noneHeb. 13. 17.Heb 13:17 produced with any probability of reason, but that, Obey those that are over you in the Lord. But that implies no more then submitting to the Doctrine and Discipline of the Gospel, and to those whom Christ hath constituted as Pastors of his Church, wherein the Law of Christ doth require obedience to them, that is, in looking upon them, and owning them in their relation to them as Pastors. But that gives them no authority to make any new Laws or Constitutions, binding mens consciences any more then a Command from the Supreme authority that inferiour Magistrates should be obeyed, doth imply any power in them to make new Laws to bind them. But p. 46thus far I acknowledge a binding power in Ecclesiastical Constitutions, though they neither bind by virtue of the matter, nor of the authority commanding (there being no legislative power lodged in the Church) yet in respect of the circumstances and the end, they should be obey'd, unlesse I judge the thing unlawfull that is commanded, rather then manifest open contempt of the Pastors of the Church, or being a scandallV. Pe…, Ma…tyr. in 1 Sam. 14. Whitaker, … cont. 4. q. 7. Cameron. de Eccles. p. 386. To. 1. op.1 Sam 14 to others by it. But as to the other power, arising from mutual compact and consent of Parties, I acknowledge a power to bind all included under that compact, not by vertue of any Supream binding power in them, but from the free consent of the parties submitting; which is most agreeable to the Nature of Church-power, being not coactive but directive; and such was the confederate discipline of the primitive Church, before they had any Christian Magistrate: And thence the decrees of Councils were call'd Canons, and not Laws. Secondly, Though it be the Magistrates duty to consult with the Pastors of the Church, to know what is most agreeable to the Word of God, for the settlement of the Church; yet the Magistrate doth not derive his authority in commanding things from their sentence, decree, and judgement; but doth by vertue of his own power cause the obligation of men to what is so determin'd, by his own enacting what shall be done in the Church. The great use of Synods, and Assemblies of Pastors of Churches, is to be as the Council of the Church unto the King, in matters belonging to the Church, as the Parliament is for matters of civil concernment. And as the King, for the settling civil Laws, doth take advice of such persons who are most versed in matters of Law; so by proportion of reason, in matters concerning the Church, they are the fittest Council, who have been the most versed in matters immediately belonging to the Church: In the management of which affairs, as much, if not more prudence, experience, judgement, moderation, is requisite, as in the greatest affairs of State. For we have found by dolefull experience, that if a fire once catch the Church, and Aarons Bells ring backward, what a Combustion the whole State is suddenly put into, and how hardly the Churches Instruments for quenching such fires, lachrymae & preces Ecclesiae, do attain their end. The p. 47least peg serued up too high in the Church soon causeth a great deal of discord in the State, and quickly puts mens spirits out of Tune. Whereas many irregularities may happen in the State, and men live in quietnesse and peace. But if Pha…tons d…ive the Chariot of the Sun, the World wil be soon on fire. I mean such in the Church whose brains like the Unicorns run out into the length of the Horn▪ Such who have more fury then zeal, and yet more zeal then knowledge or Moderation. Persons therefore whose calling, …temper, office, and experience, hath best acquainted them with the State-actions▪ Policy of the primitive Church, and the incomparable Prudence and Moderation then Used, are fittest to debate, consult, deliberate, and determine about the safest expedients for repairing breaches in a divided, broken, distracted Church. But yet, I say, when such men thus assembled have gravely and maturely advised and deliberated what is best and fitted to te done▪ the force, strength, and obligation of the things so determin'd doth depend upon the power and authority of the Civil Magistrate: for taking the Church as incorporated into the civillLib. 2. c. Parmen. state, as Ecclesia est in republicâ, non respublica in Ecclesia, according to that known speech of Optatus Milivetanus, so, though the object of these constitutions, and the persons determining them, and the matter of them be Ecclesiasticall, yet the force and ground of the obligation of them is wholly civill. So Peter Martyr expresly; Nam, quod ad potestatem …a 1 Sam. 8. Loc. Com. Class. 4. c. 5… ▪ sect. 11.1 Sam 8Ecclesiasticam attinet, satis est civilis Magistratus: is enim …urare debet ut omnes officium faciant. (But for the judgement of the reformed Divines about this, see Vedelius de Episcopatis Constant. M— & Officium Magistratus Christiani, annexed to Grotius de Imper. &c.) I therefore proceed to lay down the reason of it. First, That whereby we are bound either to obedience, or penalty upon disobedience, is the ground of the obligation; but it is upon the account of the Magistrates power that we are either bound to obedience, or to submit to penalties upon disobedience. For it is upon the account of our general obligation to the Magistrate, that we are bound to obey any particular Laws or Constitutions: Because it is p. 48not the particular determinations made by the civil Magistrate, which do immediately bind Conscience, but the general Law of Scripture requires it as a duty from us, to obey the Magistrate in all things lawfull. Obedience to the Magistrate is due immediately from Conscience; but obedience to the Laws of the Magistrate comes not directly from Conscience but by vertue of the general obligation. And therefore disobedience to the Magistrates Laws is an immediate sin against Conscience, because it is against the general obligation; but obedience to particular Laws ariseth not immediately from the obligation of Conscience to them in particular, but to the Magistrate in general. So that in things left lawfull and undetermin'd by the Word, where there ariseth no obligation from the matter, it must arise from our subjection and relation to the Magistrate; and what is the ground of obedience, is the cause of the obligation. Secondly, He hath only the power of obligations who hath the power of making Sanctions to those Laws. By Sanctions, I mean here, in the sense of the civil Law, eas legum partes, quibus poenas constituimus adversus eos qui contra leges fecerint; those parts of the Law which determine the punishments of the violaters of it. Now it is evident that he only hath power to oblige who hath powerPapin. l. 41 D. de poenis Hot…oman. Com. v. juris v: sanct. Cicero ad Ar…ic. l. 3. ep. 23. to punish upon disobedience. And it is as evident, that none hath power to punish but the civill Magistrate; I speak of legall penalties which are annexed to such Laws as concern the Church. Now there being no coercive or coactive power belonging to the Church as such, all the force of such Laws as respect the outward Polity of the Church, must be derived from the civill Magistrate. Thirdly, He who can null and declare all other obligations void, done without his power, hath the only power to oblige. For whatsoever destroys a former obligation, must of necessity imply a power to oblige, because I am bound to obey him in the abstaining from that I was formerly obliged to: But this power belongs to the Magistrate. For suppose, in some indifferent Rites and Ceremonies, the Church representative, that is, the Governors of it pro tempore, do prescribe them to be observed by all, the Supreme power f…rbids the doing of those things, if this doth p. 49not null the former supposed obligation, I must inevitably run upon these absurdities. First, that there are two supreme powers in a Nation at the same time. Secondly, that a man may lie under two different Obligations as to the same thing; he is bound to do it by one power, and not to do it by the other. Thirdly, the same action may be a duty and a sin; a duty in obeying the one power, a sin in disobeying the other. Therefore there can be but one power to oblige, which is that of the Supreme Magistrate.

Having thus far asserted the Magistrates due power and§. 8. Authority, as to matters of Religion; we proceed to examine the extent of this power, in determining things left at liberty by the Word of God, in order to the Peace and Government of the Church. For our clear and distinct proceeding, I shall ascend by these three steps: First, to shew that there are some things left undetermined by the Word. Secondly, that these things are capable of positive Determinations and Restraint. Thirdly, that there are some bounds and limits to be observed in the stating and determining these things. First, That there are some things left undetermined by the Word: By Determining here, I do not mean determining whether things be lawful or no; for so there is no Rit… or Ceremony whatsoever, but is determined by the Scripture in that sense, or may be gathered from the application of particular actions, to the general Rules of Scripture: but by Determining, I mean, whether all things concerning the Churches Polity and Order be determined as Duties or no: viz. that this we are bound to observe, and the other not. As for instance, what time, manner, method, gesture, habit, be used in preaching the Word; whether Baptism must be by dipping or sprinkling; at what day, time, place, the Child shall be baptized, and other things of a like Nature with these. Those who assert any of these as duties, must produce necessarily the Command making them to be so: For Duty and Command have a necessary respect and relation to one another. If no Command be brought, it necessarily follows, that they are left at liberty. So as to the Lords Supper Calvin saith, whether the Communicants take the Bread themselves, p. 50or receive it being given them; whether they shouldInstitut. l. 4. cap. 17. s. 43. & cap. 15. s. 19. give the Cup into the hands of the Deacon, or to their next Neighbour; whether the Bread be leavened or not, the Wine red or white, nihil refert, it matters not; Haec indifferentia sunt & in Ecclesiae libertate posita; they are matters of indifferency, and are left to the Churches liberty. But this matter of Indifferency is not yet so clear as it is generally thought to be; we shall therefore bare the ground a little by some necessary distinctions to see where the root of indifferency lies: Which we shall the rather do, because it is strongly asserted by an Honourable person, that there is no Indifferency in the things themselves, which are still either unlawful or necessary, (if lawful at this time, in these circumstances) but all indifferency lies in the darkness and shortness of our understandings, which mayNature of Episc. chap. 5. make some things seem so to us. But that Honourable person clearly runs upon a double mistake. First, that Indifferency is a medium participationis of both extremes, and not only negationis, viz. that, as intermediate colours partake both of black and white, and yet are neither; so in morality, between good and bad, there is an intermediate entity, which is neither, but indifferent to either: Whereas the Nature of Indifferency lies not in any thing intermediate between good and bad, but in some thing undetermined by Divine Laws, as to the necessity of it; so that if we speak as to the extremes of it, it is something lying between a necessary duty, and an intrinsecal evil. The other mistake, is, that throughout that Discourse he takes Indifferency as Circumstantiated in Individual actions, and as the morality of the action is determined by its Circumstances; whereas the proper notion of Indifferency lies in the Nature of the action, considered in its self abstractly; and so these things are implyed in an indifferent action. First, absolute undetermination; as to the general nature of the act by a Divine Law, that God hath left it free for men to do it or no. Secondly, that one part hath not more propension to the Rule then the other; for if the doing of it comes nearer to the rule then the omission; or on the contrary, this action is not wholly indifferent. Thirdly, that neither part hath any repugnancy to the Rule; for that which hath so, is so p. 51far from being indifferent, that it becomes unlawful: So that an indifferent action is therein like the Iron accosted by two Loadstones on either side of equal virtue, and so hovers in medio, inclining to neither; but, supposing any degree of virtue added to the one above the other, it then inclines towards it: or as the Magnetical Needle about the Azores, keeps its self directly parallel to the Axis of the world without variation, because it is supposed then to be at an equal distance from the two Great Magnets, the Continents of Europe and America: But no sooner is it removed from thence, but it hath its variations. So indifferency, taken in specie, as to the Nature of the act, inclines neither way; but supposing it lye under Positive Determinations, either by Laws or Circumstances, it then necessarily inclines either to the Nature of Good or E…il.

Neither yet are we come to a full understanding of the Nature of indifferent actions; we must therefore distinguish between indifferency, as to goodness, necessitating an action to be done; and as to goodness, necessary to an action to make it good: For there is one kind of goodness propter quam fit actio, in order to which the action must necessarily be done; and there is another kind of goodness sine quâ non benè fit actio, necessary to make an action good when it is done. As following after peace hath such a goodness in it, as necessitates the action, and makes it a necessary duty: but handling a particular Controversie is such an action, as a man may let alone without sin in his course of studies; yet when he doth it, there is a goodness necessary to make his doing it a good action, viz. his referring his study of it to a right end, for the obtaining of truth and peace. This latter goodness is twofold, either bonitas directionis, as some call it, which is, referring the action to its true end; in reference to which, the great Controversie among the Schoolmen, is about the indifferency of particular actions, viz. Whether a particular direction of a mans intention to the ultimate end, be not so necessary to particular actions, as that, without that, the action is of necessity evil, and with it good; or whether without that anV. Forbes. Iren. lib. 1. cap. 13. action may be indifferent to good or evil, which is the state of the Question between Thomas and Scotus, Bonaventure and p. 52Durandus; but we assert the necessity of at least an habitual direction, to make the action in individuo good, and yet the act in its self may notwithstanding be indifferent, even in individuo, as there is no antecedent necessity lying upon mens Consciences for the doing of it; because men may omit it, and break no Law of God. Besides this, to make an action good, there is necessary a bonitas Originis, or rather Principii, … good Principle, out of which the action must flow; which must be that Faith, which whatsoever is not of, is sin; as the Apostle tells us. Which we must not so understand, as though inRom 14. 23.Rom 14:23 every action a man goes about, he must have a full perswasion that it is a necessary duty he goes about; but in many actions that Faith is sufficient, whereby he is perswaded upon good ground, that the thing he goes about is lawful; although he may as lawfully omit that action; and do either another, or the contrary to it. There may be then the necessity of some things in an action when it is done to make it good, and yet the action its self be no ways necessary, but indifferent, and a matter of Liberty. This may be easily understood by what is usually said of Gods particular Actions, that God is free in himself either to do or not to do that action (as suppose the Creation of the World) but when he doth it, he must necessarily do it with that goodness, holiness, and wisdom, which is suitable to his Nature: So may many actions of men be in themselves indifferent, and yet there must be a concomitant necessity of good intention and Principle to make the action good. But this concomitant necessity doth not destroy the Radical Indifferency of the action it self; it is only an antecedent necessity from the obligation of the Law, is that which destroys indifferency. So likewise it is as to evil; there is such an evil in an action, which not only spoils the action, but hinders the person from the liberty of doing it, that is, in all such actions as are intrinsecally evil; and there is such a kind of evil in actions, which though it spoils the goodness of the action, yet keeps not from performance; which is such as ariseth from the manner of performance, as praying in hypocrisie, &c. doing a thing lawful with a scrupulous or erring Conscience. We see then what good and evil is consistent with indifferency in actions, and what is not. And that the Nature p. 53of Actions, even in individuo, may be indifferent, when as to their Circumstances they may be necessarily determin'd to be either good or evil. As Marrying, or not Marrying, as to the Law of God, is left at liberty, not making it in its self a necessary duty, one way or other; but, supposing particular Circumstances make it necessary, pro hîc & nunc, yet the Nature of it remains indifferent st…ll; and supposing Marriage, it is necessary it should be in the Lord, and yet it is not necessary to make choice of this person rather then of that, so that not only the absolute indifferency of the action is consistent with this concomitant necessity, but the full liberty, both of contradiction, and contrariety. Again, we must distinguish between an Indifferency, as to its Nature, and Indifferency, as to its use and end; or between an indifferency as to a Law, and indifferency as to order and peace: Here I say, that in things wholly indifferent in both respects, that is, in a thing neither commanded nor forbidden by God, nor that hath any apparent respect to the Peace and Order of the Church of God, there can be no rational account given, why the Nature of such indifferencies should be alter'd by any Humane Laws and Constitutions. But matters that are only indifferent as to a Command, but are much conducing to the Peace and Order of a Church, such things as these, are the proper matter of Humane Constitutions concerning the Churches Polity: Or rather, to keep to the words of the Hypothesis it self, where any things are determin'd in general by the Word of God, but left at Liberty, as to manner and Circumstances, it is in the power of Lawful Authority in the Church of God to determine such things, as far as they tend to the promoting the good of the Church.

And so I rise to the second step, which is, That matters of§. 9. this Nature may be determin'd and restrained. Or, that there is no necessity, that all matters of Liberty should remain in their primary indifferency. This I know is asserted by some of great Note and Learning; that in things which God hath left to our Christian Liberty, man may not restrain us of it, by subjecting those things to Positive Laws; but I come to examine, with what strength of reason this is said, that so we may see, whether men may not yield in some lawful things p. 54to a restraint of their Christian Liberty, in order to the Peace of the Church of God: Which I now prove by these Arguments. First, What may be lawfully done when it is commanded, may be so far lawfully commanded, as it is a thing in it self lawful; but matters of Christian Liberty may be lawfully done when they are commanded to be done, though it were lawful not to do them before that Command. The truth of the Proposition appears, because Lawful Authority may command any thing that may be lawfully done. Because nothing can exempt from obedience to a lawful Magistrate, but the unlawfulness of the thing commanded; and therefore nothing can debar the Magistrate from commanding these things; for nothing can hinder him from Commanding, but what may hinder the Subject from Obedience. I grant in many cases it may be lawful to obey, when it is very inconvenient for the Magistrate to command: but inconveniency and unlawfulness are two things; nay, and in some cases a man may lawfully obey when he is unlawfully commanded; but then the matter of the Command it self is unlawful. As in executing an unjust Sentence, granting that a Princes Servants may lawfully do it, especially when they know it not; yet in that case, the ground of their lawful obedience, is the ground of the Magistrates lawful Command, which is the supposed Justice of the Execution. But that which makes the Magistrates Command unlawful, is the intrinsecal evil of the thing its self. So for unlawful Wars, though the Subjects may lawfully obey, yet the Prince sins in commanding, not but that he hath right to command so far as they are bound to obey, which is only in things lawful: but that which in this case alters the matter, is, the Princes knowing his cause to be unjust. So that however the Proposition holds in things not manifestly unjust. But however this be, it is hereby granted, that the things may be lawfully done, when they are restrained by the Magistrates Command: and by that it appears, that liberty may be restrained, else it could not be lawful to act under that restraint, not as it respects the things themselves, but under that formality, as they are the restraint of that which ought to be left free. The Restraint however then is lawful, as to the persons acting under Authority, who are the Subjects p. 55of this liberty, though it were granted unlawfull as to the authority doing it. Which former is sufficient for my purpose, viz. that Christian liberty, as to the subjects of it, may be lawfully restrained. Secondly, A lesser duty ceaseth to be a duty, when it hinders from the performance of greater; but the preserving Christian liberty is a lesser duty, which may hinder the peace of the Church, which is a greater; therefore in that case it may be restrained. The Major is granted by Divines and Casuists; when duties stand in competition, the lesser ceaseth to bind, as is evident, in that God will have mercy rather then sacrifice. Positives yield to morals and naturals. Thence the obligation of an Oath ceaseth, when it hinders from a natural duty; as the Corban among the JewsGrat. de jure belli & pacis. lib. 2. cap 13. sect. 7. from relief of Parents. And therefore Grotius saith, that an Oath taken concerning a thing lawfull, if it doth hinder majus bonum morale, the obligation of that Oath ceaseth. Now that preserving-liberty is a lesser duty then the looking after the peace of the Church, is evident, because the one is only a matter of liberty, and left undetermin'd by the Word; and the other a matter of necessity, and absolutely, and expresly required of all, as a duty as much as possibly lyes in them to endeavour after. Thirdly, If an occasional offence of weaker Brethren may be a ground for restraining Christian liberty; then much more may commands from lawfull authority do it; but the offence of weaker Brethren may restrain Christian liberty, as to the exercise of it, as appears by the Apostles discourse, Rom. 14. 21. The reason of the consequence lies here, that a case of meer offence, which is here pleaded towards weak Brethren, cannot have that obligation upon Conscience, which a known duty of obeying lawfull Authority, in things in themselves lawfull, hath▪ Nay further, insisting only on the Law of scandall, I would fain know, whether it be a greater offence and scandall to Christians consciences, to infringe the lawfull authority of the Magistrate, and to deny obedience to his commands, in things undetermin'd by the Law of God; or else to offend the Consciences, that is, go against the judgements of some well-meaning, but less-knowing Christians. Or thus, whether in the matter of scandall, it be a greater offence to go against the judgements of the p. 56weaker and more ignorant, or the more knowing and able; when the one have only their own weak apprehension to byasse them, the other are backed by and grounded upon an established Law. And whether it be not a greater scandall to Religion to disobey a Christian Magistrate, then it is to offend some private Christians. Let these things be examined, and then let us see whether the argument will not hold à majori; if the Law of scandall as to private Christians may restrain liberty, then may a command from the Magistrate do it. Fourthly, I argue thus, If the nature of Christian-liberty may be preserved under the restraint of the exercise of it, then it is not against the nature of Christian-liberty to have the exercise restrained; but the former is true; and therefore the latter. Now that the nature of Christian-liberty may be preserved under the restraint of its exercise, I prove by these arguments.

First, Because the nature of Christian-liberty is founded§. 10. upon the freedom of judgement, and not the freedom of practice. The case is the same in moral and natural liberty as in Christian. Now we say truly, that the radical liberty of the soul is preserved, though it be determined to a particular action. For the liberty of the Will lying in the power of determining its self either way (as it is generally thought) the actuall determination of the Will doth not take away the internal power in the soul; and in that respect there may be a potentia faciendi where there is not possibilit as effectûs, a power of doing when there is no possibility the thing should be done, when the event is otherwise determined by a divine decree, as in breaking the bones of Christ upon the Crosse. So it is in reference to Christian liberty; though the exercise of it be restrained, yet the liberty remains: because Christian-liberty lyes in the freedom of judgement; that is, in judging those things to be free which are so; so that if any thing that is in its self free, be done by a man with an opinion of the necessity of doing it antecedent to the Law commanding it, or without any Law prescribing it, thereby his Christian liberty is destroyed; but if it be done with an opinion of the freedom and indifferency of the thing it self, but only with a consequential necessity of p. 57doing it, supposing the Magistrates command, he retains the power of his Christian-liberty still, though under the restraint of the exercise of it. And therefore it would be well observed, that the opinion of the necessity of any one thing undetermined by Scripture, destroys Christian-liberty more then a Magistrates command doth. And by this reason, they that hold any one posture at receiving the Lords Supper necessary (as sitting, leaning, kneeling) do all equally destroy their own Christian-liberty as to these things which are undetermined by the Word. So a Magistrate when commanding matters of Christian-liberty, if in the preface to the Law he declares the thing necessary to be done in its self, and therefore he commands it, he takes away as much as in him lyes our Christianliberty. And in that case we ought to hold to that excellent Rule of the Apostle, Stand fast therefore in the liberty Gal. 5. 1.Gal 5:1wherewith Christ hath set you free, and be not intangled again with the yoke of bondage. But if the Magistrate declare the things to be in themselves indifferent, but only upon some prudent considerations for peace and order, he requires persons to observe them, though this brings a necessity of obedience to us, yet it takes not away our Christian-liberty. For an antecedentD. Sanderson. de oblig. cons. prael. 6. s. 5. necessity expressed in the Law (as a learned and excellent Casuist of our own observes) doth not necessarily require the assent of the practical judgement to it; which takes away our liberty of judgement, or our judgement of the liberty of the things; but a consequentiall necessity upon a command supposed, doth only imply an act of the Will, whereby the freedom of judgement and conscience remaining, it is inclined to obedience to the commands of a superior Law. Now that liberty doth lye in the freedom of Judgement, and not in the freedom of Practise, and so is consistent with the restraint of the exercise of it; appears both in the former case of scandall, and in the actions of the Apostles and primitive Christians complying with the Jews in matters of liberty; yea which is a great deal more, in such ceremonies of which the Apostle expresly saith, that if they observed them, ChristGal. 5. 2.Gal 5:2 would profit them Nothing; and yet we find Paul himself circumcising Timothy because of the Jews. Certainly thenActs 16. 3.Acts 16:3 however these ceremonies are supposed to be not only p. 58mortuae but mortiferae now the Gospel was preached, and the Law of Christian-liberty promulged; yet Paul did not look upon it, as the taking away his liberty, at any time when it would prevent scandall among the Jews, and tend to the furtherance of the Gospel, to use any of them. It was therefore the opinion of the necessity of them was it which destroyed Christian-liberty; and therefore it is observable, that where the opinion of the necessity of observing the Judaicall Rites and Ceremonies was entertained, the Apostle sets himself with his whole strength to oppose them, as he dothGal. 4. 9, 10, 11. Coloss. 2. 16, 18, 19.Gal 4:9Gal 4:10Gal 4:11Col 2:16Col 2:18Col 2:19 in his Epistles to the Galatians and Colossians. Whom yet we find in other places, and to other Churches, not leaven'd with this doctrine of the necessity of Judaicall Rites, very ready to comply with weak Brethren, as in his Epistles to the Romans and Corinthians. From which we plainly see, that it wasRom. 14. 3, 6, 21. 1 Cor. 10. 24.Rom 14:3Rom 14:6Rom 14:211 Cor 10:24 not the bare doing of the things, but the doing them with an opinion of the necessity of them, is that which infringeth Christian-liberty, and not the determination of one part above the other by the Supream Magistrate, when it is declared not to be for any opinion of the things themselves as necessary, but to be only in order to the Churches peace and unity. Secondly, It appears that Liberty is consistent with the restraint of the exercise of it; because the very power of restraining the exercise of it, doth suppose it to be a matter of liberty, and that both antecedently and consequentially to that restraint. Antecedently, so it is apparent to be a matter of liberty, else it was not capable of being restrained: Consequentially, in that the ground of observance of those things when restrained, is not any necessity of the matter, or the things themselves; but only the necessity of obeying the Magistrate in things lawfull and undertermin'd by the Word: which leads to another argument. Thirdly, Mens obligation to these things, as to the ground of it, being only in point of contempt and scandall, argues that the things are matter of liberty still. I grant the Magistrates authority is the ground of obedience, but the ground of the Magistrates command is only in point of contempt and scandall, and for preserving order in the Church: For I have already shewed it to be unlawfull, either to command or obey; in reference to these p. 59things, from any opinion of the necessity of them, and therefore the only ground of observing them, is to shew that we are not guilty of contempt of the power commanding them, nor of scandall to others that are offended at our not observing them. Tota igitur religio est in fugiendo scandalo & vitando Controv. 4. quaest. 7. cap. 2.contemptu, saith our learned Whitaker: All our ground of obedience is the avoiding scandall and contempt of authority. To the same purpose Pet. Martyr, speaking of the obligation of Ecclesiasticall Laws: Non obstringunt si removeatur In 1 Sam. 14.1 Sam 14contemptus & scandalum: So that non-observance of indifferent things commanded, when there there is no apparent contempt or scandall, do not involve a man in the guilt of sin: as suppose a Law made that all publike prayer be performed kneeling, if any thing lies in a mans way to hinder him from that posture, in this case the man offends not; because there is no contempt or scandall: So if a Law were made that all should receive the Lords Supper fasting, if a mans health calls for somwhat to refresh him before, he sins not in the breach of that Law. And therefore it is observable which Whitaker takes notice of in the Canons of the Councils of the primitive Church, that though they did determine many things belonging to the externall Polity of the Church, yet they observed this difference in their Censures or Anathema's; That in matte…s of meer order and decency they never pronounced an Anathema, but with the supposition of …pp…rent contempt; and inserted, Si quis contrà praesumpserit, si quis contumaciter contrà fecerit: but in matters of Doctrine or Life, fully determin'd by the Law of God, they pronounced a simple Anathema, without any such clause inserted. Now from this, we may take notice of a difference between Laws concerning indifferencies in civill and Ecclesiastical matters: That in civils the Laws bind to indifferencies without the case of contempt or scandall, because in these the publike good is aimed a…, of which every private person is not fit to judge, and therefore it is our duty either to obey or suffer; but in Ecclesiasticall constitution, only peace and order is that which is looked at, and therefore, Si nihil contra foreign feceris, non teneris illis, is the rule here. If nothing tending to apparent disorder be done, men break not those Laws: For the end and reason p. 60of a Law is the measure of its obligation. Fourthly, Mens being left free to do the things forbidden, either upon a repeal of the former Laws, or when a man is from under obligation to that authority which commands them, argues them still to be matters of liberty, and not matters of necessity. That Laws respecting indifferent things may be repealed, I cannot imagine that any have so little reason as to deny, upon a different state of affairs from what it was when they were first enacted; or when they cannot attain the ends they are designed for, the peace and order of the Church, but rather tend to imbroil it in trouble and confusion: And that when men are from under the authority imposing them, men are at their own liberty again, must necessarily be granted, because the ground of restraint of that liberty was the authority they were under; and therefore the cause being taken away, the effects follows. Therefore for men to do them when authority doth not impose them, must imply an opinion of the necessity of the things themselves, which destroyes Christianliberty.Aug. e…. 118. ad Ianuar. Whence▪ it was resolved by Augustine in the case of Rites, that every one should observe those of that Church which he was in: which he saith, he took from Ambrose. His words are these, Nec disciplina ulla ▪in his melior gravi prudentique Christiano, quàm ut eo modo agat, quo agere viderit Ecclesiam, ad quamcunque forte devenerit. Quod enim neque contra fidem, neque contra bonos mores injungitur, indifferenter est habendum, & pro corum inter quos vivitur societate servandum est. He tells us, He knew no better course for a serious prudent Christian to take in matters of Rites and Customes, then to follow the Churches example where he is: for whatsoever is observed neither against faith or manners, is a matter in its self indifferent, and to be observed according to the custome of those he lives among. And after, acquaints us that his Mother coming to Milan after him, and finding the Church there not observe the Saturday-fast as the Church of Rome did, was much perplexed and troubled in her mind at it (as tender, but weak consciences are apt to be troubled at any thing contrary to their own practice); she for her own satisfaction sends her Son to Ambrose, then Bishop of the Church there, who told him he would give him no other answer but what p. 61he did himself, and if he knew any thing better, he would do it. Augustine presently expects a command from him to leave off Saturday fasts: instead of that; Ambrose tells him; Cum Romam veni…, jejuno sabbato; cum hic sum, non jejuno. Sic etiam tu ad quam forte Ecclesiam veneris, ejus morem serva; si cuiquam non vis esse scandalo, n… quenquam▪ tibi. When I am at Rome I fast on the Sabbath, but at Milan I do not. So thou likewise, when thou comest to any Church, observe its custome, if thou wouldst neither be an offence to them, nor have them be so to thee. A rare and excellent example of the piety, prudence, and moderation of the primitive Church: far from rigid imposing indifferent customs on the one side; from contumacy in opposing meer indifferencies on the other. Which judgement of Ambrose, Augustine saith, he alwayes looked on as often as he thought of it, tanquam caeleste oraculum, as an Oracle come from Heaven; and concludes with this excellent Speech, which if ever God intend peace to his Church, he will make men understand: Sensi enim saepe dolens & gemens, mult as infirmorum perturbationes fieri per quorundam fr… trum contentiosam obstinationem, & superstitiosam timiditatem; qui in rebus hujusmodi, quae neque Scripturae sanctae autoritate, neque universal is Ecclesiae traditione, neque vitae corrigendae utilitate ad certum possunt terminum pervenire (perducere▪) tantum quia subest quàliscunque ratiocinatio cogitantis, aut quia in suâ patriâ sic ipse consuevit, aut quia ibi vidis ubi peregrinationem suam quò remotiorem à suis, eò doctiorem factam putat, tam litigiosas excitant qu estiones ut nisi quod ipsi faciunt, nihil rectum existiment. I have often, saith he, found it to my grief and sorrow, that the troubles of weaker Christian…, have been caused by the contentious obstinacy of some on the one hand, and the superstitious fearfulnesse of others on the other▪ in things which are neither determin'd by the authority of the holy Scriptures, nor by the custome of the universall Church, nor yet by any usefulnesse of the things themselves, in order to the making mens lives better; only for some petty reason in a mans own mind, or because it hath been the custome of their Countrey… or because they have found in those Churches, which they have thought to be the nearer to truth, the further they have been from home, they are continually raising such quarrels and contentions, p. 62that they think nothing is right and lawfull, but what they do themselves. Had that blessed Saint lived in our age, he could not have utter'd any thing more true, nor more pertinent to our present state: which methinks admirers of antiquity should embrace for its authority, and others for the great truth and reason of it. Did we but set up those three things as Judges between us in our matters of Ceremonies, The Authority of the Scriptures, the practise of the Primitive Universal Church, and the tendency of them to the reforming mens lives; how soon might we shake hands, and our controversies be at an end! But as long as contentious obstinacy remains on one side, and a superstitious fearfulnesse on the other (for superstition may as well lye in the imagined necessity of avoiding things indifferent, as in the necessary observing of things which are not) we may find our storms increase, but we are not like to see any Land of Peace. How happy might we be, did men but once understand that it was their duty to mind the things of peace! How little of that Dust might still and quiet our most contentious frayes!

Hi motus animorum, atque haec certamina tanta

Pulveris exigui jactu compressa quiescunt.

But in order to so happy and desireable an Union and accommodation, I shall not need to plead much from the nature of the things we differ about; the lownesse of them in comparison of the great things we are agreed in, the fewnesse of them in comparison of the multitude of those weighty things we ought most to look after, the benefits of union, the miseries of division, which if our lamentable experience doth not tell us of, yet our Consciences may; I shall crave leave humbly to present to serious consideration some proposalls for accommodation: which is an attempt which nothing but an earnest desire of peace can justifie, and I hope that will: which here falls in …s the third step of my designed Discourse, about the bounds to be set in the restraint of Christian-liberty,

The first is, that nothing be imposed as necessary, but§. 11. what is clearly revealed in the Word of God. This there is the highest reason and equity for, since none can have p. 63command immediately over Conscience, but God himself, and what ever is imposed as necessary, doth immediately bind Conscience. And whatever binds mens conscience… with an opinion of the necessity of it, doth immediately destroy that Christian-liberty which men are necessarily bound to stand fast in, and not be intangled with any yoke of bondage. Not only the yoke of Jewish Ceremonies, but whatever yoke pincheth,Gal. 5. 2.Gal 5:2 and galls as that did, with an opinion of the necessity of doing the thing commanded by any but the Word of God. Which the Apostle calls Dogmatizing, Coloss. 2. 20 and v. 16. Let no man judge you in meat and drink; nè Praepositi quidem vestri, saith Whitaker; these impositions he calls v. 22. the commandments and doctrines of men. And such he calls a Snare, 1 Corinth. 7. 23. which was the making an indifferent thing, as Coelibate, necessary. Laqueus est quicquid praecipitur ut necessarium, quod liberum esse debet. So that though obedience be necessary to ind…fferent things when commanded; yet it must alwayes be liber â conscientiâ, quoad res ipsas legum, no obligation to be laid upon Conscience to look upon the things as necessary.

Secondly, That nothing be required, nor determin'd, but what is sufficiently known to be indifferent in its own nature. The former proposall was in reference to the manner of imposing, this respects the nature of the things themselves. The only difficulty here is, How a thing may be sufficiently known to be indifferent; because one man looks upon that as indifferent, which another doth not. The most equal way to decide this Controversie, is to make choyce of such Judges as are not interested in the quarrel: And those are the sense of the Primitive Church in the first 4 Centuries, who were best able to judge whether they looked upon themselves as bound by any command of Scripture or no; and withall the Judgement of the Reformed Churches: So that what shall be made appear to be left indifferent, by both the sense of the Primitive Church, and the Churches of the Reformation, may be a matter determinable by Law, and which all may be required to conform in obedience to.

Thirdly, That whatever is thus determined be in order only to a due performance of what is in general required in the p. 64Word of God, and not to be looked on as any part of Divine Worship or Service. This is that which gives the greatest occasion of offence to mens Consciences, when any thing is either required; or if not, yet generally used and looked on as a necessary part or concomitant of Gods Worship, so that without it the Worship is deemed imperfect. And there is great difference to be made between things indifferent in their own nature, and indifferent as to their use and practise. And when the generality of those who use them do not use them as Indifferent, but as necessary things, it ought to be considered, whether in this case such a use be allowable till men be better informed of the nature of the things they do. As in the case of the Papists about Image-worship, their Divines say, that the Images are only as high teners of Devotion, but the worship is fixed on God; but we find, it is quite otherwise in the general pract…se of people who look at nothing beyond the Image. So it may be, bating the degrees of the offence, when matters of indifferency in themselves are by the generality of people not looked on as such, but used as a necessary part of divine Service. And it would be considered whether such an abuse of matters supposed indifferent being known, it be not scandalum datum to continue their use without an effectual remedy for the abuse of them.

Fourthly, That no Sanctions be made, nor mulcts or penalties be inflicted on such who only dissent from the use of some things whose lawfulnesse they at present scruple, till sufficient time and means be used for their information of the nature and indifferency of the things, that it may be seen whether it be out of wilfull contempt and obstinacy of spirit, or only weaknesse of Conscience and dissatisfaction concerning the things themselves that they disobey. And if it be made evident to be out of contempt, that only such penalties be inflicted as answers to the nature of the offence; I am sure it is contrary to the Primitive practise, and the Moderation then used, to suspend or deprive men of their ministerial function for not conforming in Habits, Gestures, or the like. Concerning Habits, Walafridus Strabo expresly tells us, There was noDe rebus Eccles. cap. 14.Sir 14 distinction of Habits used in the Church in the Primitive times. Vestes sacerdotales per incrementa ad eum▪ qui nunc habetur, p. 65aucta sunt ornatum. Nam primis temporibus communi vestimento induti, Missas agebant, sicut & hactenus quidam Orientalium facere perhibentur. And therefore the Concilium Gangrense condemned Eustathius Sebastenus for making a necessity of diversity of habits among Christians for their profession, foreign,Can. 14 in Cod. Can. in V…n. Eccles. can. 71. Salm. Not. in Tertul. de Pall o. 76. Ant. Cercocthius in Salmas. p. 11. Eus…b. lib. 6. cap. 20. it being acknowledged both by Salma sius and his great Adversary Petavius, that in the Primitive times the Presbyters did not necessarily wear any distinct habit from the people, although the former endeavours to prove, that commonly they did in Tertullians time; but yet that not all the Presbyters, nor they only did use a distinct habit, viz. the Pallium Philosophicum, but all the Christians who did foreign, as Socrates said of Sylvanus Rhet…r, all that were foreign among them, stricter Professors of Christianity; among which most of the Presbyters were. And Origen in Eusebius expresly speaks of Heraclas a Presbyter of Alexandria, that for a long time foreign, he used only the common Garment belonging to Christians, and put on the Pallium Philosophicum for the study of the Grecian Learning, after that Christianity began to lose in height what it got in breadth: instead of the former simplicity of their garments as well as manners, and their foreign came in the use of the byrri, Penulae Dalmaticae, and so daily increasing, as Strabo saith. I say not this in the least to condemn any distinction of habit for meer decency and order, but to shew it was not the custome of the Primitive times to impose any necessity of these things upon men, nor to censure them for bare disuse of them. He must be a great stranger in the Primitive Church that takes not notice of the great diversity of Rites and Customs used in particular Churches, without any censuring those who differed from them; or if any by inconsiderate zeal did proceed so far, how ill it was resented by other Christians. As Victor's excommunicating the Quarto-decimani, for which heEuseb. l. 5. So…rat. hist. Eccles. l. 5. c. 23.Sir 50:5 is so sharply reproved by Irenaeus, who tells him, that the Primitive Christians who differed in such things, did not use to abstain from one anothers communion for them; foreign; as Socrates tells us; Those that agree in the same Faith, may differ among themselves in their Rites and Customs, as he largely shews in a p. 66whole Chapter to that purpose; as, in the observation of Easter, some on the fourteenth day of April, others only upon the Lords Day, but some of the more Eastern Churches differed from both. In their Fasts, some observed Lent but for one day, some two, some three weeks, some six weeks, other seven: and in their Fasts some abstained from all kind of living creatures, others only from fresh, eating fish, and others …oul: others abstained from fruit and eggs: others eat only dry bread, others not that neither. And so for their publick Assemblies; Some communicating every Lords day, others not. The Church of Alexandria had its publick Meetings and Sermons every fourth day of the week, as he tells us. The same Church made the publick Readers and Interpreters, either of the Catechumeni, or of the baptized, differing therein from all other Churches. Several Customes were used about Digamy, and the Marriage of Ministers in several Churches. So about the time of Baptism, some having only one set time in the year for it, as at Easter in T…h…ssaly; others two, Easter, and Dominica in Albis, so call'd from the white garments of the baptized. Some Churches in Baptism used three dippings, others only one. Great differences about the time of their being Catechumeni, in some places longer, in others a shorter time. So about the Excommunicate, and degrees of penance (as they are call'd) their Flentes, audientes, succumbentes, consistentes, the Communio peregrinae, the several Chrismes in vertice, in pectore, in some places at Baptism, in some after. So for placing the Altar (as they Metaphorically called the Communion Table) it was not constantly towards the East; for Socrates affirms, thatCap. 23. l. 5. in the great Church at Antiochia, it stood to the West end of the Church; and therefore it had foreign, a differentEccles. hist. l. 10. cap. 4. positure from other Churches. And Eusebius saith out of the Panegyrist, that in the New Church built by Paulinus at Tyre, the Altar stood foreign in the middle. These things may suffice for a taste at present, of which more largely elsewhere (God willing) in due time. We see the Primitive Christians did not make so much of any Uniformity in Rites and Ceremonies; nay I scarce think any Churches in the Primitive times can be produced, that did exactly in all things observe the same customes: Which might especially be an p. 67argument of moderation in all, as to these things, but especially in pretended Admirers of the Primitive Church. I conclude with a known saying of Austin, Indignum est ut propter ea quae nos Deo neque digniores, neque indigniores possunt facere, alii alios vel condemnemus, vel judicemus. It is an unworthy thing for Christians to condemn and judge one another for those things which do not further us at all in our way to Heaven.

Lastly, That Religion be not clogg'd with Ceremonies. They when multiplied too much, if lawful, yet strangely eat out the heart, heat, life, vigour of Christianity. Christian Religion is a plain, simple, easie thing. Christ commends his Yoke to us by the easiness of it, and his burden by the lightness of it. It was an excellent testimony which Amm. Marcellinus a Heathen gave to Christianity, when speaking of Constantius, Religionem Christianam rem absolutam & simplicem a…li superstitione confudit, That he spoiled the beauty of Christianity, by musting it up in Superstitious observations. And it is as true which Erasmus said in answerEras. in declar. ad Cens. Paris. art. 14. to the Sorbonists, Quò magis in corporalibus ceremoniis haeremus, hoc magis vergimus ad Iudaismum. External Ceremonies teach us backward, and bring us back from Christ to Moses; which is fully proved as to the Papists, by our Learned Rainolds and Mr. De Croy: But we need no further EvidenceCons. with Hart. chap. 8. Div. 8. De Croy 3. Conformity, part. 2 then a bare perusal of Durandus Mimatensis his Rationale Divinorum officiorum. By Ceremonies, I mean not here matters of meer decency and order, for order sake; which doubtless are lawful (if the measure of that order be not the pomp and glory of the world, but the gravity, composure, sobriety, which becomes Christianity) for when the Jews were the most strictly tyed up by a Ceremonial Law, they did introduce many things upon the account of order and decency: ás the building Synagogues, their hours of Prayer, their Parashoth and Haphtaroth, the Sections of the Law and Prophets; the continuation of the Passover fourteen days by Hezekiah, when the Law required but seven: the Feast of Purim by Esther and Mordecai: the Fasts of the 4. 5. 10 monethmonth under the Captivity; the Feast of Dedication by the Maccabees. The use of Baptism in Proselyting, washing the feet before the Passeover, imitated and practised by our Saviour: So that p. 68matters of Order and Decency are allowable and fitting; but Ceremonies properly taken for actions significative, and therefore appointed because significative, their lawfulness may with better ground be scrupled. Or, taking Ceremony, in Bellarmines description of it, to be actio externa, quae De Sacram. lib. 2. c. 29.non aliunde est bona & laudabilis, nisi quia fit ad Deum colendum: And in this sense it will be hard to manifest any thing to be lawful, but what is founded upon a Divine Precept; if it be not a matter of Order, and so no Ceremony. And as for significative Ceremonies, concerning matter of Doctrine or Fact, a learned Dr. puts us in mind of the old Rule,Dr. Ham. of Superstition, sect. 39. that they be paucae & salubres, and the fewer, the more wholesome: for, as he observes from Aristotle in Insect…le Animals, the want of blood was the cause they run out into so many legs. I shall conclude this whole Discourse with another Speech of S. Austin, very pertinen… to our present purpose.Ep. 119. ad Ian. cap. 19. Omnia itaque talia quae neque sanctarum Scripturarum autoritatibus continentur, nec in Con…iliis Episcoporum statuta inveniuntur, nec consuetudine universae Ecclesiae roborata sunt, sed diversorum locorum diversis moribus innumerabiliter variantur, ita ut vix aut omnino nunquam inveniri possint causae, quas in eis instituendis secuti sunt homines, ubi facultas tribuitur, sine ulla dubitatione resecanda existimo. All such things which are neither founded on the authority of the Scriptures, nor determined by General Councils (for so he must be understood) nor practised by the Catholick Church, but vary according to the customes of places, of which no rational account can be given; …ssoon as men have power to do it, I judge them to be cut off without any scruple: For which definitive sentence of his, he gives this most sufficient Reason; Quamvis enim neque hoc inveniri possit, quomodo contra fidem sint; ipsam tamen religionem (quam paucissimis & manifestissimis celebrationem sacramentis misericordia. Dei liberam esse voluit) servilibus oneribus premunt, ut tolerabilior sit conditio. Iudaeorum, qui etiamsi tempus libertatis non agnoverint, legalibus tamen sarcinis, non humanis praesumptionibus subjiciuntur: For although we cannot positively say, how such things as these do manifestly i…pugn our Faith, yet in that they load our Religion with such servile burdens, (which the mercy of God hath left free for all other observations, but p. 69the celebration of some few and most clear Sacraments) that they make our condition worse then that of the Iews; for they, although strangers to Gospel Liberty, had no burdens charged upon them by the Constitutions of men, but only by the Law and Commands of God: Which Sentence and Reason of his, I leave to the most Impartial Judgement of every true sober▪ minded Christian. And thus I am at last come through this Field of Thorns and Thistles; I hope now to find my way more plain and easie. So much for the fourth Hypothesis. The two next will be discharged with lesser trouble.

Hypoth. 5. What is left undetermined both by Divine Positive §. 12.Laws, and by Principles deduced from the Natural Law, if it be determined by lawful Authority in the Church of God, doth bind the Conscience of those who are subject to that Authority, to Obedience to those Determinations. I here suppose, that the matter of the Law be something not predetermined▪ either by the Law of Nature, or Divine Positive Law…; for against either of these no Humane Law can bind the Conscience: For if there be any moral evil in the thing Commanded, we are bound to obey God rather than men; in which case, we do not formally and directly disobey the Magistrate, but we chuse to obey God before him. And, as we have already observed, a former Obligation from God or Nature destroys a latter; because God hath a greater Power and Authority over mens Consciences, then any Humane Authority can have: And my Obedience to the Magistrate being founded upon a Divine Law, it must be supposed my duty to obey him first, by virtue of whose Authority I obey another; then, the other whom I obey, because the former hath commanded me. If I am bound to obey an Inferiour Magistrate, because the Supreme requires it; if the Inferiour command me any thing contrary to the Will and Law of the Supreme, I am not bound to obey him in it, because both the derives his Power of Commanding, and I my Obligation to Obedience, from the Authority of the Supreme, which must be supposed to do nothing against it self. So it is between God and the Supreme Magistrate; By him Kings reign; God when he gives them a Legislative Power, doth it cumulativè non privativè, not so as to deprive himself of it, nor his own Laws of a binding force against his; So that no p. 70Law of a Magistrate can in reason bind against a Positive Law of God. But what is enacted by a Lawful Magistrate, in things left undetermined by Gods Laws, doth even by virtue of them bind men to Obedience, which require Subjection to theRom. 13. 5.Rom 13:5 Higher Powers for Conscience sake. So that whatsoever is left indifferent, Obedience to the Magistrate in things indifferent is not: And if we are not bound to obey in things undetermin'd by the Word, I would …ain know wherein we are bound to obey them? or what distinct Power of Obligation belongs to the Authority the Magistrate hath over men? For all other things we are bound to already by former Laws; therefore either there must be a distinct Authority without Power to oblige, or else we are effectually bound to whatsoever the Magistrate doth determine in lawful things. And if it be so in general, it must be so as to all particulars contained in that general, and so in reference to matters of the Church, unless we suppose all things concerning it to be already determined in Scripture: which is the thing in Question, and shall be largely discussed in its due place.

Sixthly. Hypoth. 6. Things undetermined by the Divine §. 13.Law, Natural and Positive, and actually determined by lawful Authority, are not thereby made unalterable, but may be revoked, limited, and changed, according to the different ages, tempers, inclinations of men, by the same Power which did determine them. All Humane Constitutions are reversible by the same Power which made them: For the Obligation of them, not arising from the matter of them, but from the Authority of the Person binding, are consequently alterable, as shall be judged by that Power most sutable to the ends of its first promulgation. Things may so much alter, and times change, that what was a likely way to keep men in Unity and Obedience at one time, may only inrage them at another: The same Physick which may at one time cure, may at another only inrage the distemper more. As therefore the Skill of a Physitian lies most in the application of Physick to the several tempers of his Patients: So a wise Magistrate, who is, as Nicias said in Thucydides, foreign, The Physitian to cure the Hist. lib. 6. Spartian. in Adriano.distempers of the body Politick; and considers (as Spartian tells us Adrian used to say in the Senate, Ita se Rempub. gesturum, p. 71ut sciret populirem esse, non propriam) that the Peoples Interest is the main care of the Prince, will see a necessity of altering, reforming, varying many Humane Constitutions, according as they shall tend most to the ends of Government, either in Church or State. Thence it is said of the several Laws of Nature, Divine, and Humane; that Lex naturae potest poni, sed non deponi, Lex divina nec poni nec deponi, Lex humana & poni & deponi. The Law of Nature may be laid down (as in case of Marriage with Sisters in the beginning of the world) but not laid aside; the Law of God can neither be laid down, nor laid aside; but Humane Laws, both may be laid down, and laid aside. Indeed, the Laws of the Medes and Persians, are said to be unalterable, but (if it be meant in the sense it is commonlyDan. 6. 8.Dan 6:8 understood in) yet that very Law which made them unalterable (for they were not so of their own Nature) was an alterable Law, and so was whatever did depend upon it. I conclude then, whatever is the subject of Humane Determination, may lawfully be alter'd and changed, according to the wisdome and prudence of those in whose hands the care of the Publick is. Thus then, as those things which are either of Natural or Christian Liberty, are subjected to Humane Laws and restraints, so those Laws are not irreversible; but if the Fences be thrown down by the same Authority which set them up, whatever was thereby inclosed, returns to the Community of Natural Right again. So much for these Hypotheses, which I have been the longer in explaining and establishing, because of the great influence they may have upon our present Peace, and the neer concernment they have to this whole Discourse, the whole Fabrick of which is erected upon these Foundations.